The Evolving Modern Egyptian Republic

8/7/2019 The Evolving Modern Egyptian Republic

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-evolving-modern-egyptian-republic 1/11

The Evolving Modern Egyptian Republic: A Special Report

March 1, 2011 | 1312 GMT

The Egyptian establishment faced internal strife over the transition of power from President

Hosni Mubarak even before massive public unrest demanding regime change erupted in mid-January. With Mubarak now out of office, some hope for democracy while others fear the rise

of radical Islamist forces. Though neither outcome appears likely, the Egyptian state plainly isunder a great deal of stress and is being forced to make changes to ensure its survival.

The modern Egyptian state is a new polity, founded a mere 60 years ago in the wake of amilitary coup organized by midranking officers under the leadership of Col. Gamal Abdel

Nasser. Nasser overthrew a 150-year-old Albanian dynasty to establish a military-dominatedregime. Mubarak was only the third leader of the order established in 1952. Under his rule and

that of his predecessor, President Anwar Sadat, Egypt evolved into a complex civil-militaryLeviathan.

Since the late 1960s, the military has not directly governed the country, allowing for the

consolidation of single-party governments led by former military officers assisted by anincreasingly civilian-dominated ruling elite. In recent years, however, the military had begun to

reassert itself given the succession question, a process accelerated by the outbreak of popular demonstrations. The military has thus assumed a more direct role in security, governance and

managing the transition. The National Democratic Party (NDP) regime depends upon themilitary to ensure its survival, and opposition forces, including the country¶s main Islamist

movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), are reliant upon the Egyptian armed forces torealize their objectives.

The provisional military authority, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, led by the

country¶s top general, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, will play the pivotal role inthe post-Mubarak era. To understand what Egypt¶s future holds, one must examine the

evolution of the incumbent political arrangement, the central role played by the military in theformation of the state, previous transitions, and the reasons behind the regime¶s need to oust

one of its own.

Founding and the Nasser Days

On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers Movement, a group of largely junior military officers from

lower middle class backgrounds, overthrew the monarchy and established a new politicalsystem based on their left-wing Arab nationalist ideology. Within days, King Farouk was

exiled after having been forced to abdicate. Within a matter of months, parliament wasdissolved and political parties outlawed. A Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)



comprising the leadership committee of the Free Officers Movement ² a group that includedLt. Col. Nasser, Maj. Abdel Hakim Amer, Lt. Col. Anwar Sadat, Maj. Salah Salem, Maj.

Kamal el-Din Hussein, Wing Cmdr. Gamal Salem, Squadron Leader Hassan Ibrahim, Maj.Khaled Mohieddin, Wing Cmdr. Abdel Latif Baghdadi, Maj. Hussein el-Shafei and Lt. Col.

Zakaria Mohieddin ² was formed and began forging the country¶s new political and economic

structure.

Among the RCC¶s most important changes were radical agrarian reform and the confiscation of

private property. By limiting land ownership to 80 hectares (200 acres) per person ² reducedto 20 hectares in 1969 ² and redistributing some of the confiscated land to peasants, the

military established its populist roots. The nationalization of the industry and service sector andthe creation of a mammoth public sector were other key factors sustaining the military regime.

As it steered the country away from its monarchical past, early on the new military order

encountered internal problems. Within two months of the coup, the civilian figurehead premier,Ali Mahir Pasha, was dismissed due to his differences with the RCC over land reform policy.

Maj. Gen. Muhammad Naguib succeeded him. Four months later, in January 1953, the RCChad Naguib disband all political parties, abolish the 1923 constitution and declare a three-year

period of transitional military rule.

Issues also emerged with the Regency Council. The council had replaced the ousted monarch

and was tasked with exercising the prerogatives of the infant King Fuad II, Farouk¶s son. Thethree-member body included Prince Muhammad Abdel Moneim, a cousin of King Farouk; Col.

Rashad Mehanna, a free officer with close connections with the MB; and Bahieddin Barakat, aformer president of the Senate. Problems arose when Mehanna also turned against the RCC

over the land reform policies. The clash resulted in Mehanna¶s being imprisoned over chargesof plotting a counter-coup. With Mehanna¶s departure, the Regency Council was reduced to a

ceremonial status.

Though the Wafd, the MB and the Communists had been neutralized with the move to outlawpolitical parties, the old order was not officially abolished until June 18, 1953. Egypt now was

officially a republic, with Naguib holding both the portfolios of the president and primeminister. While the military would run the show for several years, Nasser laid the foundations

of a civilian single-party state in 1953 with the creation of an entity called the Liberation Rally.

Nasser became deputy prime minister, Abdel Hakim Amer succeeded Naguib as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Abdel Latif Baghdadi took over as minister of war and Salah

Salem became the minister of national guidance and Sudan affairs. Just who was the ultimate

leader of the new regime remained unclear, however, leading to strains between Naguib andNasser.

The two disagreed on a variety of issues, including the British withdrawal from Egypt; the MB,

which Nasser was hostile toward; and the issue of resuming parliamentary life, which Nasser and his supporters opposed. (Their vilification of the politicians led to factionalization within

the RCC.) These differences made Nasser distrust Naguib and his mild attitude toward the



conservative Wafd and the Islamist MB.

Nasser ultimately began to view Naguib as an obstacle to the revolution. Nasser and hiscolleagues in the RCC were in a rush to institute their envisioned political order. Naguib in turn

regarded Nasser and his supporters as impatient young men who lacked his experience.

Naguib proved the loser in this contest. He tendered a first resignation Feb. 23, 1954, but wasrestored to office due to pressure from a public that still supported him and out of fears that

Khaled Mohieddin was engineering a revolt in the cavalry corps. His second and finalresignation came April 19, 1954, as a result of Nasser¶s behind-the-scenes efforts to portray

Naguib as supporting a return of the Wafd and of the old order in general.

Nasser assumed the positions of prime minister and chairman of the RCC. All the members of

the RCC were inducted into the new Cabinet except Mohieddin, the most left-leaning member of the RCC, who was sent away to Europe. Nasser and officers in the RCC loyal to him thus

took full control of Egypt.

In January 1955, the RCC appointed Nasser president of Egypt. It took another year to draft thenew constitution. That same year, the National Union replaced the Liberation Rally as the

state¶s sole political party. The new party selected Nasser as its presidential candidate, and inJune 1956, Nasser was overwhelmingly elected president in a national referendum.

Nasser¶s election as president brought the three-year transitional period from the monarchy to

an end. The RCC was dissolved and its members resigned from the military to assume civilianpositions. The new constitution established an institutional framework for the new regime,

which concentrated power in a strong executive branch.

Now firmly in control, Nasser began paying more attention to foreign policy, in particular, tohis Pan-Arab goals. As a first step, he nationalized the Suez Canal, which led to the 1956 war and in the process made Nasser a national hero and enhanced his stature in the wider Arab

world. His involvement in regional and international affairs ² which saw alignment with theSoviets and hostile relations with the West and Israel; involvement in Syrian, Yemeni, Iraqi,

Algerian and Lebanese domestic politics; and tensions with Saudi Arabia and Jordan ² had animpact on his efforts to consolidate power at home.

Nasser¶s most unusual foreign policy move was the brief merger of Egypt and Syria into the

so-called United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. North Yemen sought to join the merged statethe same year to create a loose confederation known as the United Arab States. While the

Yemeni component retained its autonomy, the Egyptian-Syrian merger required adjustments tothe still nascent political structure of Egypt. A new constitution in 1958 for the UAR created a

legislature and two vice presidents, one for Egypt and Syria, which had become provinces of the UAR.

Merging with Syria proved challenging, however. The Syrians resented that Egyptiansdominated the UAR. Using Syria as a base to engineer a coup against Iraqi leader Abdel-



Kareem Qasim also exacted a toll on the union between Cairo and Damascus. The UAR ultimately collapsed when Syrian army units declared the country independent in 1961 and

forced the Egyptians out of Syria.

Fearing that the collapse of the UAR would undermine his position at home, Nasser embarked

on a more aggressive drive toward socialist political economy. A new National Charter wasdevised in 1962, and a new ruling party called the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) replaced theNational Union. More than half of the country¶s businesses underwent nationalization, and

Nasser¶s opponents in the military were purged from the ranks.

While Nasser was working on a new constitution in the post-UAR period, the rise to power of pro-Nasser military officers in a coup that overthrew the monarchy in North Yemen once again

pulled the Egyptian leader out of domestic politics and into regional geopolitics. A proxy war ensued between the Egyptians, who supported the new Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and the

Saudis, who threw their weight behind the forces of ousted Imam Muhammad al-Badr. Unableto impose a military solution, Egyptian forces backing YAR troops became locked in a

stalemate with Yemeni monarchist forces. Many of Nasser¶s top comrades came to oppose themilitary adventure in Yemen.

Further afield, the 1963 coup in Iraq brought pro-Nasser forces to power, and there was onceagain a move toward a new Arab union. The idea never gained traction because Nasser insisted

on his own vision, and by this time Nasser faced serious domestic challenges from individualswho had been with him since the Free Officer and RCC days, including Amer, Sadat and

Baghdadi.

A provisional constitution was enacted in 1964 that created a 350-member parliament.Elections were held and the new legislature completed one four-year term and another half term

from the 1969 legislative elections before yet another constitution was enacted in 1971. Nasser secured a second six-year term in a fresh presidential election, taking his oath of office in

March 1965.

While Nasser and many of his close allies had become civilian leaders, the military remainedvery much part of the government. It was not until Egypt¶s crushing defeat at the hands of

Israel in the June 1967 war that the military truly began moving away from actual governance.The defeat was a major setback for the military establishment¶s reputation. In the period of

introspection that followed the defeat, the regime decided that the military¶s direct involvementin governance had degraded its professionalism. The 1967 war was seen as the culmination of a

series of miscalculations, including the lack of preparation for the British-French-Israeli assault

in the wake of the 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal; the 1961 military coup by Syrianmilitary officers, which led to the collapse of the union between Egypt and Syria; and the lossesincurred in Yemen.

In an attempt to recover from the 1967 war, Nasser was forced to make changes to the militaryorder he had established a mere 15 years earlier, removing senior military officers including

military chief Field Marshal Amer, air force chief Gen. Muhammad Sidqi Mahmud and nineother generals. (Replaced as commander of the armed forces by Gen. Muhammad Fawzi, Amer



eventually committed suicide.) The changes saw a second generation of military commanderscome to the fore, a group that, with the exception of the army chief, had no direct ties to the

Free Officers Movement. Under pressure from anti-government demonstrations triggered bythe 1967 defeat, Nasser embarked on the March 30 Program, an initiative aimed at overhauling

the military and the political system. In 1968, Nasser promulgated a law designed to separate

the military from the formal government structures, but because the Israelis controlled the SinaiPeninsula, the army retained a privileged position within the state.

Despite these problems on the home front, which remained volatile, Nasser continued to dabblein foreign policy but by now had backed off from his desire to control the Arab world. Instead,

he sought an Arab alignment against Israel. Nasser gave himself the additional roles of primeminister and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In December 1969, he appointed Sadat

and Hussein el-Shafei as his vice presidents. He had fallen out with a number of his associatesfrom the RCC days, such as Khaled and Zakaria Mohieddin and former Vice President Ali

Sabri. Having reconciled with Baghdadi, Nasser considered him as a replacement to Sadat.

Metamorphosis During the Sadat Era

Nasser¶s death due to a heart attack in September 1970 cut short his plans and brought Sadat topower. It was under Sadat¶s rule that the major moves to separate the government from the

military took place. Initially, Sadat ran into a number of challenges, including the fact that helacked Nasser¶s stature and was opposed by those loyal to his predecessor both within the

military and the ruling ASU.

As a result, within the first three years Sadat had to get rid of two sets of senior regime leaders

² first, the Nasser loyalists, and then those he himself had brought to replace the pro-Nasser elements. For example, he replaced his vice president, Sabri, with el-Shafei, whom he

eventually replaced with Mubarak in 1975. Sadat skillfully used the 1971 constitution and his³Corrective Revolution´ to forge a new establishment. Like his predecessor, Sadat relied on the

military for his support and legitimacy. Unlike his predecessor, he went one step further byplaying the officer corps off each other. To this end, Sadat made full use of his presidential

powers and the weakening of the military during the end of the Nasser era.

While Sadat picked up on Nasser¶s move to separate the military from governance, he was alsomaking good use of Soviet assistance to rebuild the armed forces in preparation for another war

with Israel to reverse the 1967 outcome. Egypt¶s ³victory´ in the 1973 war with Israel greatlycontributed to Sadat¶s ability to establish his leadership credentials and bring the military under

his control.

The following year, he initiated the open-door economic policy, known in Arabic as ³infitah,´which steered the country away from the Nasserite vision of a socialist economy and led to the

creation of a new economic elite loyal to Sadat. To further weaken the Nasserites and the leftwing, he also worked to eliminate the idea of a single-party system by calling for the creation

of separate platforms within the ASU for leftist, centrist and rightist forces.



As a result, the ASU weakened and was dissolved in 1978 and its members formed the NDP. Inaddition to a new ruling party, Sadat allowed multiparty politics in 1976. Sadat also relaxed

curbs on the country¶s largest Islamist movement, the MB, allowing it to publish material andcarve out a limited space in civil society as part of his efforts to counter left-wing forces.

In sharp contrast with the Nasser era, when the government was heavy with serving militaryofficers, the Sadat era saw the creation of a new civilian elite consisting largely of ex-militaryofficers. The elimination of Nasser¶s allies, the rise of a new generation of military officers, and

the building of a relationship of trust between the serving and former military officers were keyfactors in shaping a new order in which the military did not feel the need to rule the country

directly.

The 1967 defeat had weakened the military¶s position in the state, and there were concerns thatNasser¶s death and Sadat¶s rise would force it to resort to extra-constitutional means to regain

power. A mix of purges and the relatively positive outcome of the 1973 war helped rehabilitatethe institution, which went a long way toward strengthening the relationship between the

presidency and the military.

By this time, Egypt had also switched sides in the Cold War, with Sadat establishing close

relations with the United States. The move led to the creation of a new generation of U.S.-trained military officers. Even more important, U.S. President Jimmy Carter¶s administration

mediated a 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and its historic foe, Israel. That he faced noopposition from within the military in recognizing the state of Israel ² still a controversial

move among wider Egyptian society ² underscores the extent to which Sadat had consolidatedhis hold on power, and how much Egypt had drifted away from its Nasserist roots.

The 1978 peace treaty made the military more comfortable with its exclusion from government.

It did raise concerns about a reduction in the military budget, however, especially when Sadat¶seconomic policies were leading to the creation of a new civilian economic elite.

Sadat salved the military¶s concerns by giving it the freedom to engage in business enterprises.

While on one hand he promoted economic liberalization, allowing for the return of the privatesector, he also promulgated Law 32 in 1979, which gave the armed forces financial and

economic independence from the state. The military became heavily involved in the industrialand service sectors, including weapons, electronics, consumer products, infrastructure

development, agribusinesses, aviation, tourism and security. According to the reasoning behindthe move, this would keep the military from draining state coffers. In fact, it did drain the

state¶s coffers via subsidies for the military¶s businesses.

In the 1980s, during the days of Defense Minister Mohamed Abu Ghazala, the military created

two key commercial entities: the National Services Projects Organization and the EgyptianOrganization for Industrial Development. It also created a variety of joint ventures with both

domestic and international manufacturing firms.

In addition to the enrichment of the military as an institution, senior officers have long



benefited in individual capacities through commissions on contracts involving hardwareprocurement. Even in the political realm, the military was able to have its say. This especially

was true regarding succession, where Sadat appointed former air force chief Mubarak as hisvice president.

The strong links via institutional mechanisms and informal norms were key to stability: Retiredofficers were able to run the show without having to worry about a coup. The politicalleadership felt it needed to prevent the emergence of a new civilian elite, which it feared could

upset the relationship between the presidency and the military and thus increase the chances of a coup.

From the military establishment¶s point of view, the new arrangement under Sadat was actually

better than the arrangement under Nasser. Under Sadat, the military did not have to shoulder the responsibility of governance, but its interests in the government still were being looked

after by people from military backgrounds. This allowed the military to avoid the hassles of governance and accountability for mistakes in governance and to maintain a democratic facade

for domestic and foreign consumption.

The military still could briefly intervene should the need arise, as during the 1977 bread riots,

when domestic law enforcement was unable to cope with unrest. The military was able to exacta price for helping Sadat then, forcing him to do away with the austerity measures. Overall,

common origins, shared socialization, and academy and institutional experiences shaped acollective worldview. This created tight links between the presidency and the military, paving

the way for the military to go into the background.

Institutionalization and Decline Under Mubarak

The changes that Sadat brought did not alter the reality that the military was embeddedthroughout the fabric of state and society. Senior serving officers in the presidential staff and at

the Defense Ministry, governors in most provinces, and a parallel military judicial systemprovided a structural mechanism through which the security establishment maintained a say in

policymaking. Even so, the move toward greater civilian political and economic space initiatedby Sadat went into effect under Mubarak.

As Sadat did when he first came to power, Mubarak engaged in limited reforms and expanded

on the process of developing institutions in an effort to consolidate the regime. The newpresident freed political prisoners and allowed for a slightly freer press. During the 1980s,

Egypt also began having multiparty parliamentary elections in accordance with Law 40 enacted

by the Sadat government in 1977 allowing for the establishment of political parties.

While carefully developing political institutions, the regime under Mubarak began addressingthe presence of radical Islamist sympathizers in light of Sadat¶s assassination. Emergency laws

helped immensely to this end; they also helped the military preserve its clout at a time of increasing civilianization of the regime.



While Mubarak sought to broaden his base of support, his government fought the two mainIslamist militant movements at the time, Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah. To do

this, the Mubarak government reached out to the country¶s main and moderate Islamistmovement, the MB. The need to work with the MB to combat jihadists, who, in assassinating

Sadat, had threatened the state, allowed the Islamist movement to expand.

The MB remained proscribed, preventing it from operating as a political entity. But theMubarak government allowed it to spread itself in civil society through academic and

professional syndicates as well nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in socialservices. Elections also allowed the MB to enhance its public presence.

In the 1984 elections, the MB won 58 seats out of a total of 454 in a coalition with the Wafd

party, and in the 1987 polls, an MB alliance with the Labor and Liberal parties bagged 60 seatswith the MB getting 30, Labor securing 27 and Liberals three. The rise of opposition forces,

especially the MB, in the 1980s saw the regime institute new electoral laws in 1990. TheSupreme Constitutional Court ruled that the mixed voting system was unconstitutional,

however, given that it did not allow for people to run as independents.

On its face, the judgment looked like it would help the opposition, freeing it from being bound

by lists and thresholds to securing its candidates¶ election. The way in which the NDPimplemented the new system, however, gave the ruling party an advantage through

redistricting. The outcome was a reduced presence of opposition parties in the legislature.

By 1992, the Algerian experiment with democracy had further scared the Mubarak governmentabout the risks of allowing multiparty polls. The Algerian elections almost saw a relatively new

Islamist movement, Front Islamique du Salut, secure a two-thirds majority in parliament. Anarmy intervention annulling the polls denied victory to the Algerian Islamists but sparked a

decade-long insurgency by more militant Islamist forces. From the point of view of theMubarak government, the MB was far more organized than Front Islamique du Salut, and

Egypt¶s jihadist movements were just as well established. This viewpoint received validationfrom Gamaa al-Islamiyah attacks against the government.

Having political opponents operating within constitutional bounds served the military by

stabilizing the regime and giving it a democratic veneer. But the move to allow these forces tocreate space had unintended consequences, namely the rise of the MB. The NDP could only go

so far in rigging the system in favor of the government, which meant the ruling party needed totake steps to enhance its domestic standing.

While the Mubarak regime was toiling with how to have a democratic political system whilemaintaining the ruling party¶s grip, it was also experimenting with economic liberalization.

There were efforts toward the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the mid-1990s. Butthe army made it very clear that its holdings were off-limits to any such moves.

The economic liberalization and the need to bolster the ruling party allowed for the rise of a

younger generation of businessmen and politicians. Toward the end of the 1990s, Mubarak¶s



son Gamal was heading the Future Foundation, an NGO supported by pro-privatizationbusinessmen. Gamal floated the idea of founding a Future Party, but his father brought him into

the ruling party and Gamal still presided over the NGO.

The Gamal group included prominent businessmen Mohammed Abul-Einen and steel magnate

Ahmed Ezz. This new guard led by Gamal quickly rose through the ranks of the NDP, and byFebruary 2000, Gamal, Ezz and another key businessman, Ibrahim Kamel, became members of the NDP¶s General Secretariat. Their entry immediately created a struggle between the

military-backed old guard and the business-supported rising elements within the NDP, giventhat new voices had begun contributing to the policymaking process.

The 2000 parliamentary polls were a defining moment in the history of the NDP because of the

need to balance parliamentarian candidacies between the business community and the oldguard. Further complicating matters was a Supreme Constitutional Court ruling that members

of the judiciary must oversee polling, which meant the usual electoral engineering wouldbecome difficult to pull off. Gamal wanted younger candidates who could revitalize the party

and improve its public image, something rejected by old guard figures such as NDP Secretary-General Youssef Wali and organizational secretaries Kalam al-Shazli and Safwat Sharif, who

later became secretary-general.

Eventually a compromise was reached in which some 42 percent of the NDP candidates were

from the rising elements, with as many as a hundred of them in the 30-40 years age bracket.The party also benefited by the move of some 1,400 NDP members to run as independents, an

average of six per constituency. In the end, the opposition parties bagged only 38 seats, 17 for the MB and the remaining 21 divided among the legal opposition parties.

While the struggle within the NDP actually benefited the ruling party on election day, it

reshaped the landscape of the party. Only 172 of the official NDP candidates (39 percent) won,while another 181 NDP independents won, later joining the NDP. Another 35 genuine

independent members of parliament also joined the ruling party, giving the party a total of 388seats.

Thus, for a time, the NDP was forced to rely on its members who had run as independents to

sustain its hold on the legislature. The outcome triggered an internal debate in which Gamalwas able to make the case that the party needed internal reforms and pressed for a meritocratic

method of candidate selection. Consequently, for the first Consultative Council polls and thenlocal council elections, the NDP formed caucuses that allowed party members to vote for

candidates.

This new system further enhanced Gamal¶s stature within the party to the extent that he and

two of his allies, lawmaker Zakariya Azmi and Minister of Youth and Sports Ali Eddin Hilal,were given membership in the NDP Steering Committee in 2002. This move brought parity

between the old guard and the rising elements in the six-member body. In the 2002 partyconference, Gamal was also appointed head of the party¶s new Policies Secretariat.



Additional business class parliamentarians such as Hossam Awad and Hossam Badrawi gainedentry into the NDP General Secretariat. In an election, 6,000 delegates voted in favor of

Gamal¶s agenda calling for technocratic reforms and economic liberalization, giving his factionmajority control of the NDP¶s central board. While the old guard under Sharif¶s leadership held

onto the post of secretary-general, the No. 2 position after Mubarak, Gamal¶s influence rivaled

that of Sharif.

Essentially, the need to revitalize the ruling party enabled a new generation of businessmen to

enter the political realm via the parliamentary vote. The rise of these elites was likely seen asdisturbing to the military-backed old guard, as it threatened their political and economic

interests. But it served the military¶s need to see the NDP sustain its hold on power in order toensure regime stability.

The Roots and Future of the Current Crisis

It did not take long for the situation to change, however. Sept. 11, the 2003 U.S. invasion of

Iraq, and the George W. Bush administration¶s push for democracy in the region complicatedmatters for the regime. They forced Mubarak to focus on the home front, as opposition forces

became emboldened and sought to expand their presence.

Of all the opposition groups, the MB benefited most from this development, winning 88 seats

in the 2005 elections. For their part, secular opposition forces began organizing protests under the banner of the Kifayah movement. The combined pressure forced Mubarak to permit a

multi-candidate presidential election, though arranged in such a fashion as to make it extremelydifficult for an opposition candidate to win.

Most significantly, these changes took place as the aging Mubarak¶s health rapidly failed.

Regime continuity post-Mubarak became the critical issue for the military and the old guard.These elements did not accept Gamal, as he was seen as leading a group that might bring in a

new ruling elite. The old guard disagreed over who from within the regime would be best tosucceed Mubarak, in great part because Mubarak failed to appoint a vice president as his

predecessors had.

The internal struggle to succeed Mubarak intensified in recent years, especially in the past 18months. The outbreak of popular protests in Egypt in the wake of the Tunisian unrest vastly

complicated this process. The military sought to channel these protests to its advantage to better manage the transition from Mubarak. In the process, it had to engage in domestic security,

governance and managing a crisis for the first time since the early 1970s.

Now that Mubarak is out, a military-led provisional authority controlled by the Supreme

Council of the Armed Forces is in power for a six-month interim period. The military council iscomposed of 18 generals and is chaired by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who is

also the commander-in-chief of the military. It has moved to suspend the constitution but hasthus far not issued an interim legal framework order. Instead, it has appointed an eight-member

committee, headed by a renowned legal personality and including a representative of the MB,



to work on amendments to the constitution. The amendments will enable the holding of competitive parliamentary and presidential elections, at which time the military council intends

to cancel the emergency law.

In addition to stabilizing the situation, a core intent behind the democratization of the political

system is the military¶s imperative to avoid regime change. The military will need a partyaligned with the establishment, especially since it still dominates the caretaker Cabinet, and thisis where the fate of the NDP is a significant factor. Besides, the military needs a political force

strong enough to counter the MB; however, strength is not just a function of party machinerybut also public support, which is where the NDP is seriously lacking.

The history of the modern Egyptian republic and its evolution in the past six decades provides

for a great deal of experience. The current crop of generals can use its experience to manage thetransition in a way that placates popular demands for a democratic political system while

maintaining the military¶s grip on power. There are numerous options for revamping the order established in 1952, but none of them will be easy, as the current transition leaders¶

predecessors never faced such a robust popular demand for democracy. Regardless, Egypt hasessentially returned to the 1952-type situation in which there are only two organized forces in

the country, the MB and the military, and the country is in the hands of a provisional militaryauthority.

Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us© Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.

Documents

The Evolving Modern Egyptian Republic