The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century

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The Evolution of PeaceOperations from theNineteenth CenturyErwin A. Schmidl aa Head of Research at the Austrian Institute forMilitary StudiesPublished online: 26 Nov 2007.

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The Evolution of Peace Operations from theNineteenth Century

ERWIN A. SCHMIDL

Peace operations - or peace support operations (PSO) as they are nowsometimes called1 - have been an instrument of foreign policy since theearly nineteenth century, but have gained new importance with the end ofthe Cold War in 1989. They are perhaps the most evident activity of theUnited Nations Organization created in 1945 although numerous operationswere (and still are) organised outside the UN framework. In the UN context,they became known as 'blue helmets' or 'blue berets' because of theirdistinctive headgear, and over the years were alternatively praised as theUN's key 'recipe of success' for handling crises, or denounced as a symbolof the world organisation's 'total failure' when faced with tragedies likeSomalia or Bosnia in the 1990s. As an introduction to this volume dealingwith several different aspects of peace operations, the following articleattempts to establish a systematic framework for defining peace operations,and present an overview of their development through the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries.

What are Peace Operations? Possible Definitions

When comparing different peace operations, it soon becomes clear that theycan differ wildly in the field, ranging from unarmed civilian and policeobservers through lightly armed inter-position forces to heavily armedcombat troops. Their common elements lie in their aims, composition andmandate, not in their execution. Peace operations also lack any activitieswhich could be seen as typical or peculiar to this type of mission - allactivities find their equivalents in 'normal' military, police or civilian tasks(albeit under different circumstances). However, in peace operationsdifferent actors might fulfil different roles - for example, militarypeacekeepers might man roadblocks which would be a police task in normallife.2 In general, the following six principle criteria apply to all peaceoperations, and therefore might be used as a definition:

1. an international mandate or authorisation for the mission (ideally, fromthe UN Security Council);

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EVOLUTION FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 5

2. the execution of the mission either by an international organisation (suchas the UN), a regional arrangement (such as NATO or the EU) or byseveral states co-operating in an ad hoc coalition (as was the case in1994 during the US-led intervention in Haiti);

3. a multinational composition of the force and/or the personnel of themission;

4. the aim of restoring or preserving the status quo, or to enable thepeaceful transition from the status quo to a different, agreed-on status(such as the transfer of a colony into independence);

5. the aim not to conquer territory, but rather to act for the benefit of thelocal population;3

6. keeping 'collateral damage' (admittedly, yet another 'diplomatic'euphemism) as limited as possible, by operating - like police - under theprinciples of 'minimum damage' and 'measured force' (which might, bythe way, not always imply 'minimum force').

These criteria apply to all peace missions, from unarmed election observersto military enforcement missions. I propose, however, for the purpose ofthis study to draw the line at negotiation assistance ('good offices') withoutthe deployment of any mission to the field on the one end of the spectrum,and at outright war on the other. Thus, operations like the war in the Gulf1991 ('Desert Storm') or the NATO air campaign against Serbia in 1999should not be regarded as peace operations.4

Although the discussions about possible definitions continue, oneusually talks about three broad categories of peace operations which aremost commonly referred to as 'peacekeeping', 'wider peacekeeping' and'(peace) enforcement':

• Peacekeeping or truce-keeping: The deployment of military observersand/or lightly armed troops to monitor truce and armistice agreements orthe withdrawal of troops. Often referred to as 'classical peacekeeping'(or, better: 'truce-keeping'), these missions were mounted since 1948 bythe United Nations, mainly dealing with stabilising the armistice linesbetween states (such as Israel and her neighbours) after armed conflicts,in order to prevent a renewal of violence. These are the typical 'bluehelmets' missions, characterised by no use of force (except in self-defence), and the support of the host countries. Sometimes thesemissions are referred to as 'first generation' - a misleading term becausethe 'generation' terminology implies a gradual evolution whereas inreality all three types of missions evolved in a parallel fashion.

• Wider or strategic peacekeeping: The deployment of military, police and

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6 PEACE OPERATIONS BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE

civilian contingents making it possible to hold elections, re-establish afunctioning administration, resettle refugees, recreate a working policeforce etc. Usually, these activities take place following internal (ofteninter-ethnic) conflicts - terms most commonly used include 'widerpeacekeeping' or 'peace-building', or 'strategic peacekeeping' asoutlined by Professor Dandeker in the following contribution (whichincludes enforcement functions), also 'second generation peacekeeping'(see above). To re-build a stable society after internal conflict (evenassuming there had been one in the first place!) is a difficult and long-term mission, calling for reliable support from the internationalcommunity over a long time.

• Enforcement: If it is necessary to apply military force to enforce asolution to a conflict (whether internal or between states), one speaks of'enforcement', 'peace-enforcement', 'assertive' or 'robust peace-keeping', also referred to as 'third generation peacekeeping'. Often,these missions involve combat and in many respects resemble traditionalcounter-guerrilla or counter-insurgency operations, especially regardingthe physical and - most of all - psychological stress for the soldiers andpersonnel.5 Sometimes, missions might be at the same time 'wider' and'assertive' - for example when military force is necessary to push ahumanitarian aid convoy through to its objective.

Often, the divisions between these three categories are blurred - even theBritish 'Wider Peacekeeping' manual, while establishing host-country'consent' as the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement,concedes that in peacekeeping consent might be lacking at a local level(when the local warlord is less than hospitable to the peacekeepers despitethe 'consent' of the government).6

Although peace operations gradually evolved in the nineteenth century,they are often identified with UN operations. While the UN Charterincludes among the central aims of the organisation to 'maintaininternational peace and security',7 it lacks any reference to 'peacekeeping'as such. Therefore, peacekeeping operations are sometimes called 'ChapterVI Vi missions, falling between Chapters VI ('pacific settlement ofdisputes') and VII ('action with respects to threats to the peace...',including forceful measures such as sanctions or military force).'Enforcement' operations were duly referred to as 'Chapter VI %'.

In this context, it should be noted that the French term for peacekeeping is'maintenir la paix' - which is included in the French version of the Charter.8

To keep to the text of the Charter, Jarat Chopra has recently proposed to use'peace maintenance' as an overall English term for UN peace operations - aninteresting concept which he outlines elsewhere in this volume.9

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The Historical Development of Peace Operations until 1945

Peace operations developed in the nineteenth century because of theincreasing international co-operation between states, an evolution assisted(and partly caused) by technological progress. The first examples ofinternational co-operation were the Rhine and Danube Commissionsinstitutionalised after the Napoleonic Wars. Significant elements of the 'UNsystem' - the Union Internationale des Telecommunications (UIT) goingback to 1865, the Union Postale Universelle (UPU) of 1874, and the WorldMeteorological Organization (WMO) of 1873 - date back to the laternineteenth century, as do the attempts to at least reduce the damages and thehuman suffering caused by war in the conventions of Geneva (1864; 'RedCross') and The Hague (1899, 1907).10

Although minor wars still occurred between the European powers, theAlliance created by the Vienna Congress in 1814-15 managed to sustain acertain stability in Europe. Lacking an organisation of its own, co-ordination between the powers of the 'Concert of Europe' was achieved by'congress diplomacy' - the concerto image is misleading, by the way, as themusicians were usually left without a designated conductor.

To maintain this stability, expeditionary operations took place on thefringes of Europe - usually organised by one power alone, but acting withsome sort of international consent. Examples include Austria's Naplesexpedition in 1821, the Swedish peace force for Schleswig-Holstein in1848-49, or the mandate of the 1878 Berlin Congress for Austria-Hungaryto occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for Great Britain to occupy Cyprus(both remaining on paper under the suzerainity of the Ottoman Empire until1908 and 1914, respectively).

Joint expeditions or at least military co-operation between the powerswere directed against the Barbary pirates of North Africa up to 1830, theTurco-Egyptian forces in the Greek War of Independence (Battle ofNavarino 1827 and its land sequel when a French army was landed to ensurea Turkish withdrawal from the Peloponnese) and against the trans-Atlanticslave trade. Along similar lines, Austrian, British and French naval forcesintervened in Lebanon in 1840 and 1860. Then, as now, the distinctionsbetween peace operations for the sake of international stability, and purelyimperialist behaviour, were often blurred. Austria's expedition to quell therevolution in Naples in 1820-23 is a case in point, when 50,000 troops weresent to stabilise King Feredinand Fs rule in the south Italian kingdom.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the international mission inCrete was the first mission undertaken by all the European powers (GreatBritain, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy and Russia) together, andmet all six criteria for peace operations outlined above. To quickly describe

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the background: Crete, like Cyprus some decades later, had a mixedpopulation of about two thirds Greek and one third Turks. It was part of theOttoman Empire, but the object of Greek aspirations of national unity.Following previous phases of unrest, an insurrection supported by armedtroops from Greece threatened the status quo in the Eastern Mediterraneanin 1896.

The European powers, however, were interested in preventing thecollapse of the Ottoman Empire, and first ordered a naval blockade of theisland, followed by the dispatch of land forces (numbering up to 20,000men) to pacify Crete. Acting in part through their consuls and militaryattaches, and in part by employing officers from the contingents, the powersreorganized the police, administration and judiciary. Police fromMontenegro was employed as the nucleus of a new police force." Thismission lasted for several years and achieved a compromise solution: Creteremained part of the Ottoman Empire, but with a wide autonomy, governedby a member of the Greek royal family. It was only in the Balkan Wars of1912-13 that Crete finally became part of Greece.

In these Balkan Wars, the European powers embarked on a new peaceoperation: in Albania. This country was created by the powers in 1913,neutralized and under international control, as a compromise betweenAustria-Hungary and Italy, and to deny Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea.(Without this decision of the Ambassadors' Conference in London,Albanians would now share the fate of the Kurds, to be left without a stateof their own. As part of the compromise, however, the Kosovo regionbecame part of Serbia, despite its mainly ethnic-Albanian population.) Aninternational naval operation forced Montenegro and Serbia to retreat fromAlbania, and in April 1913, an international force of nearly 2,000 soldiersand marines was dispatched to Scutari (Shkodra) to guard northern Albania.This force remained there until the outbreak of the Great War.12

To some extent, the international forces sent to China in 1900 against theBoxer Rebellion could be interpreted as a predecessor of later 'enforcement'missions, although the eight Great Powers taking part did not really lackcolonial aspirations of their own.

Both the missions in Crete and Albania - and, to a lesser extent, theChina venture - included police, judiciary and administration elements:tasks which are often seen as an important element of 'wider peacekeeping'or 'peace-building' (or, indeed, the 'second generation') operations whichgained importance after 1989.

The Concert of Europe did not survive the fateful shots in Sarajevo on28 June 1914, and the international peace force left Shkodra in August 1914(although remnants of the international administration continued until1920). Following the First World War, however, international co-operation

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advanced to a new dimension: it was no longer limited to ad hoc diplomaticconferences, but was supported by a proper organisation, as the League ofNations was established as part of the Paris Peace agreements of 1919-20.

Most peace operations after 1918 were undertaken in connection withthe peace agreement, usually to preserve law and order in those areas whosefuture was decided by plebiscite. Several of these took place in 1920: inCarinthia in southern Austria, the vote (whether the part of this provincewith mixed German and Slovene population was be become Austrian orYugoslav) was controlled by an Inter-Allied commission without forces.

By contrast, the international commission to organise the plebiscite inSchleswig (to determine which parts should be [re-] transferred fromGermany to Denmark) was supported by a British and a French battalion aswell as four British warships and a French warship. Along similar lines, aBritish-French-Italian force was deployed to Allenstein and Marienwerderin East Prussia in the same year.

In 1921, 16 battalions from Britain, France and Italy were sent to UpperSilesia, while another mission of 1,800 soldiers was planned (but notexecuted) for the Wilna/Vilnius region (Lithuania/Poland) in the same year.Intended troop contributors were Belgium, Britain, France and Spain, withsmaller contingents from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.13

Perhaps the best-known of the interwar peace operations was organizedin 1934-35: 3,300 men, with troop contingents from Britain, Italy, theNetherlands and Sweden, and police from Czechoslovakia, were deployedto the German Saarland which had been under League administration since1919, and was to decide by plebiscite about its return to the Reich. Theinternational force, known as 'Knox Army' after the British administrator,Geoffrey Knox, was to prevent Nazi putsch attempts.14

Post-1945 Developments

With the establishment of the United Nations Organization in 1945, peaceoperations entered a new era. However, the development of peace operationsunder UN auspices saw several phases. At first, it was expected that themembers of the Security Council, above all the Permanent Members, wouldplay the leading role in maintaining international peace and security. In April1947, the Military Staff Committee recommended 'the establishment ofmilitary forces, consisting of units from the Five Big Powers, to be at thedisposal of the Security Council. The strength of these forces had beenplanned in such a way that they would be able to stop any threat to the peacefrom all Member States except the Big Five. If the military forces of theUnited Nations cannot be established, the United Nations ... cannot becomewhat it was planned to be."5 This prediction proved only too true, and these

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plans were eventually made unrealistic by the evolving Cold War. (TheMilitary Staff Committee still exists, and meets regularly, but could neverfulfil the tasks foreseen by the UN's founding fathers.)

Although unable to become the leading player in the field of peace andsecurity, in these early years of the Cold War the UN organised militaryobserver missions to monitor truce agreements, border troubles, or thetransition from colonial to newly-independent rule: in Greece (1947-51),the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia (1947-51), Palestine (from 1948) and inKashmir (from 1949) - the latter missions exist to this day.16

The war fought by UN forces to Korea in 1950-53 was only possiblebecause of the temporary absence of the Soviet delegate from the SecurityCouncil, and was executed by a 'coalition of the willing' under UNmandate, with the US command doubling as a UN command. It wastherefore similar to the (Second) Gulf War of 1991, authorised but not reallyled by the UN.17 Following the Korean War, however, the ambitious andactive second UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold developed newmodels for UN peace operations in the 1950s.

The 'Invention' of the Blue Helmets

Following the Suez Crisis of 1956 (the British-French intervention to securethe Suez Canal, and the Israeli advance into the Sinai), Hammarskjoldtogether with Canadian foreign minister Lester B. Pearson 'invented' UNpeacekeeping: a 6,000-strong 'United Nations Emergency Force' (UNEF[I]) was assembled and rapidly deployed to enable the intervention forces towithdraw, and then patrol the armistice line between Egypt and Israel.18 Theestablishment of this force was facilitated by experience gained in theobserver missions. The soldiers wore their national uniforms, but with blueheadgear (blue-painted helmet liners, later also blue berets and field caps)and UN badges as distinctive insignia - which in turn gave way to thefamiliar term 'blue helmets' (or 'blue berets').

As Sir Brian Urquhart (a close aide of Hammarskjold and later UnderSecretary-General for political affairs) stressed, the main aim of theseendeavours (and the strong motivation of the UN staff involved) was tokeep the regions out of the Cold War which were not yet directly involvedin the East-West confrontation, in order to limit the risks of a new WorldWar.19 This was the main background for the UN missions of the 1950s and1960s:

• the observer missions sent to Lebanon in 1958, and to Yemen in1963-64;

• the UN force sent to the Congo to relieve Belgian intervention forces

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after the internal troubles following independence, and preserve theunity of the country (1960-64);

• the interim administration for West New Guinea (Irian Jaya) during thetransfer from Dutch to Indonesian control (1962-63); and

• the peacekeeping force for Cyprus, established in 1964 to prevent a civilwar between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

The wide spectrum of these missions is remarkable, ranging frommonitoring and force separation through transitional administration,internal stability, and police functions, to combat operations. Both theoperations in West New Guinea and Cyprus were 'wider peacekeeping' inthe truest sense - it was only after the Turkish invasion of 1974, and the defacto separation of the island, that the Cyprus mission changed to a'traditional' interposition force. The Congo operation (1960-64) saw up to20,000 'blue helmets' - the largest UN operation until 1992 - involved inoccasionally heavy fighting, including the use of fighter-bombers againstthe forces of the secessionist Katanga (now Shaba) province in the south-east.

The Congo operation also clearly demonstrated the weaknesses of theUN in larger, more robust missions. The structures of the UN are well suitedfor smaller observation and peacekeeping missions, but proved hopelesslyinadequate for larger, more robust operations requiring clear lines ofcommand and quick decisions. The Congo operation became a debaclewhich cost the life of the UN secretary-general (in 1961, DagHammarskjb'ld was killed in an air crash while mediating betweenCongolese and Katanga authorities) and threw the organisation into a severepolitical and financial crisis.20 This mission clearly demonstrated problemslike lack of communications between diplomats and political UN staff andthe military, police, and civilian staff in the field, the slow and inadequateUN administration, and the difficulties encountered in matching the diversenational interests of contributing countries. Many of these problemscontinue to plague UN operations to this day.

The Sixties and Seventies: Crises and Scaling Down to the Feasible

The crisis of the UN after the Congo operation resembled the situation ofthe UN three decades later, following setbacks in Somalia and formerYugoslavia. After euphoric optimism in the beginning, hailing the UN'snewly-found field of action, public opinion quickly changed to disillusionand attacks on the organisation itself. The truth lies - then as now - inbetween. Measured against exaggerated expectations, missions like the

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Congo or Somalia were disasters - but in both cases it would be unfair todismiss the UN's role, and overlook the successes which were achieved.

For the development of peace operations in general, the Congo debacleas well as the withdrawal of the UN force from the Sinai in 1967 (Egyptwithdrew its consent to the mission, and Secretary-General U Thant orderedthe 'blue helmets' to leave, which in turn made the Six Day War possible21)led to a reduction of UN peacekeeping to smaller, more feasible operations:the following missions, from 1973-74 on the armistice lines between Israeland Egypt and Syria, and the renewed Cyprus operation from 1974, all were'classical' peacekeeping, between countries supporting these missionsbecause it was in their own interest to stabilise the situation. Also, theMiddle East missions took place in sparsely populated or desert areas whichare easier to control than mountains or jungles.22

The missions in the Middle East after 1973-74 are generally consideredas rather successful - the Golan Heights operation still exists today.However, the Middle East also demonstrated the impossibility ofduplicating a successful mission under different circumstances. The UNoperation established in 1978 for southern Lebanon proved unable to fulfilthe expectations despite its contribution to humanitarian activities - the areastill is a crisis zone, and Israel as well as Syria lack genuine interest in alasting solution.23 This example also illustrates that 'gaps' sometimes existbetween the expectations and the mandate for a mission - and that it wouldbe unfair to blame the lack of success on the 'blue helmets' when the realfaults lie in an unrealistic assessment of the situation beforehand, and thelack of political will of the parties to the conflict or their peers among thePermanent Members of the Security Council.24

Another legend should be mentioned here: that 'traditional' UNoperations never included the Permanent Members of the Security Council(P-5).25 Some missions indeed took place without active participation ofP-5 forces on the ground, but the operations taking place in traditionalregions of interest always were formed around a nucleus of the interestedpower: thus, Britain contributed half of the Cyprus force, and France wasthe lead nation for the 1978 mission in Lebanon. In observer missions, theUS and others had been involved from the very beginning, and with fewexceptions, most missions depended on US airlift capabilities at least in thefirst phase.

The Eighties: Success and Disaster Outside the UN System

The 1980s saw new (or renewed older) developments. Following the end ofdetente in the late 1970s - with events like the Soviet intervention inAfghanistan and the positioning of SS-20 medium range missiles in Eastern

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Europe, followed by NATO's 'Dual-track' decision to deploy Cruise andPershing II missiles in Western Europe, and the crisis in Poland - the co-operation of the powers in the UN deteriorated again, and several new peaceoperations were created outside the UN system: the 'Multinational Forceand Observers' (MFO) for the Sinai was established under US leadership in1980 and is still in existence, perhaps one of the least known and best-functioning peace operations.

By contrast, the American-British-French-Italian 'Multinational Forces'(MNF) in Lebanon (1982-84), lacked both in concept and organisation, andended in disaster.26 Another, smaller mission outside the UN was the'Commonwealth Monitoring Force' (CMF) to supervise the transition ofZimbabwe-Rhodesia to independence in 1979-80.27

In 1983, the US-led intervention in Grenada was traditional policing ina big power's zone of influence rather than true peacekeeping, but againshowed how blurred the distinctions can be. That peace operations werecreated outside the UN system was not at all new, of course - already in1965, an Inter-American peace force (organized mainly by the US, withOAS support) had been sent to the Dominican Republic (Operation 'PowerPack').28

In 1988, the 'blue helmets' were honoured with the Nobel Peace Prize -in retrospect, nearly prophetic, because UN peacekeeping was to expanddramatically following the end of the Cold War in 1989. Two of the threenew UN observer missions of the 1980s (these were 1984-91 in the FirstGulf War between Iran and Iraq, then 1988-94 on the Afghanistan-Pakistanborder, and 1989-91 to monitor Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola)were already linked to the new geopolitical climate, and the withdrawal ofthe Soviets and their proxies from over-expanded zones of influence likeAfghanistan and Angola. The Cuban withdrawal from Angola was aprerequisite for agreement on a solution for Namibia - in 1989-90, SouthAfrica withdrew from former German South West Africa (administereduntil then under a mandate dating from the League of Nations), which inturn led to the first major UN mission after the end of the Cold War.

'Desert Storm', 'Agenda for Peace', New Missions, and NewDisappointments

The successful UN operation in Namibia in 1989-90 - 4,500 troops, 1,500police and 2,000 civilians ensured the peaceful transition from SouthAfrican administration to independence - led to exaggerated expectationsthat after the Cold War, the UN might be better capable to undertake largerand more complicated missions, and even to act on its own. Theseexpectations were in part based on the Security Council's strong action

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during the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis of 1990-91, leading to the UN-mandated,US-led coalition operation to free Kuwait ('Desert Storm').

Also, with East-West rivalry gone, several conflicts around the world,from Cambodia to Western Sahara, suddenly appeared much closer to asolution than before. And many omisiens (UN officials, so called after theorganisation's French accronym 'ONU') became over-optimistic about thepossible new activities of the world organisation, talking • about a new'second generation' of UN peacekeeping (although the UN's tasks inNamibia closely followed earlier missions of the 1960s, like West NewGuinea or Cyprus). 'Diversification' of UN peace operations became thenew catchword although less optimistic contemporaries preferred'mushrooming' to characterise the numerous new missions.

The fundamental mistake at this point was to overlook that the UN is not(and, indeed, should not be) an actor per se, but provides a 'stage' for themember states to act on. The following years only confirmed thisassessment.

An often quoted document which illustrates ambitious UN attitudes inthe early 1990s is the Agenda for Peace of 1992, originally written by UNSecretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as a report to the SecurityCouncil about the UN's option for contributing to solutions to impending orexisting conflicts. The Agenda is an important document, although it wasoften misunderstood as a definition of the different types of interventions(the terms used in the Agenda still feature in the discussions on the topic).But Boutros-Ghali presented a chronology of phases rather than a definitionof missions. Thus, the international community could act (through the UN):

1. already before a crisis became armed conflict ('Preventive Diplomacy'),

2. after conflict broke out, to end it ('Peacemaking'),

3. to secure the following armistice ('Peacekeeping'), and finally

4. to turn a truce into a lasting peace settlement ('Peace-building').

In all phases, the possible means range from diplomatic mediation and goodoffices right through forceful military intervention, depending on thecircumstances.29 Therefore, Boutros-Ghali included the 'preventivedeployment' of troops in the first phase ('preventive diplomacy'), andarmed intervention ('peace enforcement') in the second ('peacemaking').This was often criticized, because 'peacemaking' is usually understood todenote only diplomatic negotiations, not the use of force.30 (In his 1995version of the Agenda, Boutros-Ghali eventually contradicted himself byintroducing 'peace enforcement' and 'sanctions' as separate groups inaddition to the four phases outlined here.) So far, we still lack a consistentdefinition of the different terms used in different countries and by different

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FIGURE 1

THE FOUR PHASES OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, ACCORDING TO THE 'AGENDA FOR PEACE1 OFUN SECRETARY-GENERAL BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, 1992

INTENSITYOF THE CONFLICT

CONFLICT ; ^ »

TIME"

PreventionPreventive DiplomacyPreventive Deployment

'Peacemaking'Good Offices,

negotiations, peaceenforcement, sanctions

'Peacekeeping'observers, troops

'Peace-building'elections, police, democracy

refugees resettlement...Dow

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organisations, despite attempts by the UN and NATO to find definitions, soit is still recommended to describe the task in question clearly rather thanrisk misunderstanding.31

A graphic interpretation of the 'Agenda' could look like Figure 1.Although Boutros-Ghali was heavily criticised for some of the ideas

presented in the Agenda, it remains an important contribution to our thinkingon peace operations. He rightfully drew attention to the - hitherto oftenneglected - phase of 'peace building' once the hostilities have subsided(sometimes also referred to as 'nation building'). Especially in 'intra-state' orinternal conflicts, inter-ethnic or otherwise, of which the world has seen somany after the Cold War, peace building is crucial for a long-term settlement,and might include many different tasks, ranging from reconciliation ofdifferent population groups or re-integration of refugees to holding elections,setting up an organised administration including a reliable police, judiciaryand prisons system, and in general generating the trust of the wholepopulation. All these are long-term tasks: for example, based on experiencesin Latin America, US experts estimate that it takes at least five years, andmaybe longer, to build a new and reliable police force. Like in tending agarden, 'peace' is a delicate flower which takes much care - and time - togrow.

This is a most important point: in our TV-society, where the most difficultcrimes have to be solved within the length of a movie (one and half hours atthe utmost), the public opinion's patience in contributing countries is limited.The 'Vietnam syndrome' has often been quoted in this context, and manycountries find it hard to tolerate casualties - the rapid change of mind in theUS following the October 1993 'Ranger incident' in Mogadishu (where 18US soldiers were killed, and TV images of mutilated American bodies led tothe demise of the Somalia operation) is a good example.32 Especially inwestern democracies, public opinion is an important element of political will.

To prevent negative repercussions in public opinion, the mid-1990s sawthe demand for a set 'exit date' before committing troops on the ground.However, as a writer in the New York Times commented in 1998 inconnection with the debates about an extension of the mandate for theBosnia missions, there is a difference between a cup of yoghurt in thesupermarket, and a peace operation: only the former has an expiration date.In the meantime, it has become clear that the formulation of an 'exit state'- a clear definition of the conditions for a withdrawal - is more useful thansetting an 'exit date'. This 'exit state' should be clear in the beginning, andform part of the international community's motivation for intervening in thefirst place. However, the 'end state' should be occasionally evaluated andmodified, as time progresses, in order not to become alienated from therealities of the theatre.33

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At the Brink of the Twenty-First Century

To come back to the role of the UN in peace operations at the turn of thecentury, there are parallels to the 1960s: then as now, the UN was unable tofulfil expectations of managing more complex operations - and wiselylimited itself to organising smaller, more limited missions, where it stillfulfils a crucial and positive role. For more complex missions, a division oflabour has emerged which allows governments to make use of capabilitiesand strengths of various actors, the UN's role being often limited toproviding a mandate and some components of missions.

The rapid expansion of UN peace operations (from about 10,000 in 1991to nearly 80,000 in 1993-94) could not be sustained, and missions likeSomalia or Bosnia called for military, not diplomatic command structures.In the following years, the number of operations was reduced, and in1995-96, the military component of the renewed Bosnia mission was takenover by a US-led force organised by NATO as part of the Dayton and Parispeace agreement. By January 1996, the total number of 'blue helmets' hadbeen reduced to 29,140, and has by now dropped to 12,132 (May 1999).These are more manageable dimensions.

Especially with the end of the Cold War, new actors appeared:Organisations like the European Union, OSCE, NATO, or WEU in Europe,but also regional arrangements elsewhere (such as the EconomicAssociation of West African States, ECOWAS) or "ad hoc coalitions of thewilling', usually under the patronage of a 'lead nation', became involved inpeace operations and conflict management.

Although it is difficult to predict future developments, peace operationswill probably continue to develop along these lines, with more and different'actors' and organisations involved. The Haiti operation in 1994-95demonstrated a positive division of labour: in the first phase, a US-ledmilitary intervention force stabilised the situation, and then graduallyhanded over to a more traditional UN peacekeeping operation. In duecourse, authority was handed back to Haitian leaders, with continuingassistance rendered through the UN as well as on bilateral terms.

According to the UN Charter, military intervention requires a clearmandate from the Security Council, but recent events during the 1999Kosovo Crisis (the NATO-orchestrated air campaign against Serbia) showsthat international law is flexible, and often allows contradictoryinterpretations. In any case, for more traditional peacekeeping missions, butalso for tasks like civilian police components, the UN appears still to be theprime choice, despite its weaknesses and deficiencies.

The Haiti operation demonstrated a well-organized, step-by-steptransition from one phase to another, from the US-led military to the less

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robust UN mission. But this is not always possible. The internationalactivities in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995 were hampered by lack of co-operation between the different components: NATO was responsible for themilitary part, whereas the police was organised by the UN, and the OSCEtook over human rights monitoring and elections (the EU continued to berepresented by its monitor mission, besides humanitarian tasks). It tookseveral months to establish a working relationship between thesecomponents, which often depends on the personalities of the peopleinvolved, at all levels.

The various missions in South East Europe also demonstrate theimportance of the necessary political will to be mustered by all contributingcountries. In many cases, success is not only a question of the appropriatemandate, but - perhaps even more - of its adequate and flexibleinterpretation. Public opinion in the contributing countries, as well asacceptance by the local population (who are on the 'receiving end' of apeace operation, and have to live there, after all) are crucial, calling forextensive information and media activities.

Conclusions

At the end of this tour d'horizon, with all the difficulties noted, somereaders might have gained a pessimistic impression of the state of peaceoperations. But this would be wrong. On the contrary, and despite all theirdeficiencies, peace operations have become a most important tool forinternational crisis management. And they will remain so for a long time,with occasional ups and downs, and will continue to develop further.

NOTES

1. UN as well as US parlance at this moment still favours 'peace operations' as an 'umbrella term'for international missions of the peacekeeping, peace enforcing, or humanitarian variety (see,e.g., the US Army Field Manual FM 100-223 'Peace Operations' of Dec. 1994). Despite allattempts so far, we still lack a clear set of definitions and a clear terminology. Since 1995, theUS term '(Military) Operations other than War' (MOOTW, OOTW) has been 'de-emphasized'as too unprecise (referring to unilateral as well as to international actions, and such diverse tasksas peacekeeping, counter-drug operations, or purely humanitarian relief missions) although it isstill occasionally used, especially among US Marines. Because the term 'peace operations' israther vague, too, the British (Interim) Manual 5/2 ('Operations other than War/WiderPeacekeeping') of 1994 introduced the term 'Peace Support Operations' (PSO) to better describethe aim of such missions: to support the preservation or restoration of peace in an internationalcontext, usually under a mandate from the UN or another international body. Since then, the term'peace support operations' is increasingly used in NATO documents; however, PSO aresometimes misinterpreted to refer only to more robust ('enforcement') missions, not totraditional 'blue helmet' peacekeeping (such as separation of forces, or monitoring of anarmistice agreement). See also John Mackinlay (ed.) A Guide to Peace Support Operations(Providence, RI: Brown Univ./Thomas J. Watson Jr Inst. for Int. Studies 1996).

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2. As I am presently working on a larger, comprehensive study on the development of peaceoperations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I have limited my citations of referenceshere — for an overview of the subject, the reader is referred to the volume of the Henry L.Stimson Center edited by William J. Durch: The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: CaseStudies and Comparative Analysis (NY: St Martins 1992); as well as the (now 3rd,unfortunately rather unhandy edition of the) official UN book: The Blue Helmets: A Reviewof United Nations Peace-keeping (NY: UN 1996).

3. International law experts often define this as 'host-country consent'. I find this insufficient,however, because this would enable the Warsaw Pact's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia toqualify as a peace operation, for example. Also, what would one do with Somalia, wherethere was no government at all to consent to the operation?

4. I admit that this might seem illogical at first, as these operations conform with some of thecriteria listed above. However, these cases clearly were wars (even if not declared), and I findit difficult to accept the 'minimum damage' principle in either of them.

5. This became particularly obvious in Somalia. See Donna Winslow, The Canadian AirborneRegiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry (A study prepared for the Commission ofInquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia; Ottawa: GovernmentPublishing 1997); and her chapter (with Christ Klep) in this volume.

6. On this typology, see Taylor Wentges, 'Force, Function and Phase: Three Dimensions ofUnited Nations Peacekeeping', Peacekeeping & International Relations 27/2 (March/April1998) pp.5-7; a longer version followed in International Peacekeeping 5/3 (Autumn 1998)pp.58-77. Wentges distinguished between 'classical', 'wider', and 'assertive peacekeeping'- useful terms, even though one might not follow all of his ideas, especially concerning theattribution of different missions to these categories.

7. Already emphasized both in the Preamble and Article I of the Charter.8. Daniel Colard, La Société Internationale après la Guerre froide (Paris: Armand Colin 1996),

esp. pp.31-4.9. Jarat Chopra (ed.) The Politics of Peace-Maintenance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998);

and see Jarat Chopra's contribution in this volume.10. A good summary is André Lewin, La France et l'ONU depuis 1945, Panoramiques (Condé-

sur-Noireau: Corlet 1995); L'ONU: Pour quoi faire? (Découvertes Gallimard 1995); see alsoGünther Unser, Die UNO: Aufgaben und Strukturen der Vereinten Nationen, 6th rev. ed.(Munich: Beck/dtv 1997).

11. About the police functions, see my study: Police in Peace Operations, Informationen zurSicherheitspolitik 10 (Vienna: BMLV/MWB Sept. 1998); also the introduction to Robert B.Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), Policing the New World Disorder:Peace Operations and Public Security (Washington DC: National Defense Univ. 1998); JostDülffer, 'Die Kreta-Krise und der griechisch-türkische Krieg 1890-1898', Jost Dülffer, Hans-Otto Mühleisen and Vera Torunsky, Inseln als Brennpunkte internationaler Politik:Konfliktbewältigung im Wandel des internationalen Systems 1890-1984: Kreta, Korfu, Zypern,Bibliothek Wissenschaft und Politik 35 (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik 1986) pp.13-59.

12. An article and map on the international mission to Albania can be found in InternationalPeacekeeping, 6/3 (Autumn 1999) pp.1-10.

13. These interwar missions were examined at UN headquarters in 1947 as possible models forUN missions (UN-Archives New York: DAG-1/2.3, Box 42, file 399, Working Papers No.69and 71 of Oct. 1947, SCA/GPD/314 & 319). In several points (like refunding of additionalexpenses incurred by the troop contributing countries), the UN later referred to the Leagueexperiences. See Larry E. Fabian, Soldiers without Enemies: Preparing the United Nationsfor Peacekeeping (Washington DC: Brookings 1971) pp.44-53.

14. Sarah Wambaugh, The Saar Plebiscite (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 1940).15. 'United Nations Armed Forces' (UN-Archives New York: DAG-1/2.3. Box 42, file 399).16. See note 3 above. For a complete list of international peace operations after 1945, see my

Annex to Erich Reiter (ed.) Jahrbuch fur Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 1999 (Hamburg:Mittler 1999) pp.795-824.

17. For contemporaries, the UN authorization for the Korean War was more obvious than mightappear now: the various contingents were ceremoniously handed UN flags, including the UN

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flag which had been flown at Count Bernadotte's headquarters in Palestine.18. 'A Brief History of UNEF' (Ms, c. 1958, UN Archives New York: DAG-1/2.2.5.5.1, Box 9);

Mona Ghali, 'United Nations Emergency Force I: 1956-1967', Durch, Evolution of UNPeacekeeping (note 2) pp.106-30; Joshua Sinai (ed.) United Nations Peace Operations CaseStudies (Washington DC: Library of Congress 1995) pp. 102-11. For the background, seeNathan A. Pelcovits, The Long Armistice: UN Peacekeeping and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,1948-1960 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), esp. pp. 123-7, 167.

19. I am indebted to Sir Brian Urquhart for his information.20. Erwin A. Schmidl, Blaue Helme, Rotes Kreuz: Das österr. UN-Sanitätskontingent im Kongo,

1960 bis 1963, Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte 13 (Innsbruck - Vienna:Studien Verlag 1995) Ch.2.

21. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Forceleading to the Six Day War, June 1967 (New Delhi: Oxford & IBH for International PeaceAcademy 1978). About the issue of host country consent: Antonietta Di Blase, 'The Role ofthe Host State's Consent with Regard to non-coercive Actions by the United Nations', inAntonio Cassese (ed.) United Nations Peacekeeping: Legal Essays (Alphen/Rijn: Sijthoff &Noordhoff 1978) pp.55-94, esp. pp.65-72.

22. In this context, I am grateful to Dr William J. Durch (Stimson Center) for his suggestions.Population, size of the country, climate, terrain, and vegetation all are important factors.

23. John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of peacekeeping operations at the Arab-Israeli interface (London-Boston: Unwin Hyman 1989).

24. This was clearly demonstrated during the UN operation in former Yugoslavia(UNPROFOR): based on German experiences in World War II, the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations estimated 50,000 troops or more necessary. Diplomats scaled thisdown to 35,000 when they presented this estimate to the Security Council - which eventuallyauthorized 7,000 (a number never reached). When most of the enclaves were taken by Serbforces in 1995, the UN were accused of incapability, although the responsibility rested withthe members of the Security Council, notably the 'Big Five'. About Srebrenica, see the studyby Christ Klep and Donna Winslow in this issue.

25. This is sometimes listed as a principle of UN peacekeeping in traditional literature.26. Apart from Mackinlay, see: Alessandro Migliazza (ed.) Le forze multinazionali nel Libano e

nel Sinai, Studi di diritto internazionale e comparato 8 (Milano: Giuffre 1988).27. Anthony Verrier, 'Peacekeeping or Peacemaking? The Commonwealth Monitoring Force,

Southern Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, 1979-1980', International Peacekeeping 1/4 (Winter 1994)pp.440-61.

28. Remarkably, the official UN Blue Helmets book does not include the Inter-Americanmission, but lists the UN good offices mission (with a military adviser and two observers) asa UN peacekeeping operation of its own ('DOMREP').

29. Agenda for Peace, June 1992. See Cornard, Société internationale (note ?) pp.31-40.30. In different countries, different interpretations exist. Therefore, the rather robust Somalia

mission of 1992-93 was called 'peace enforcement' in the US, but 'peacemaking' in Canada.31. Among the 'peace terms' used are 'Peacekeeping', '(Peace) enforcement' and 'Peace-

making', but also add-ons to 'peacekeeping' ('assertive', 'robust', 'enhanced', 'with teethand muscle', 'aggressive', 'wider', 'encompassing peacekeeping') and terms like 'Peaceenhancement', 'Peace support(ing)', 'Peace creating', 'Peace pushing' - the list is nearlyendless.

32 A remarkable study of this incident has been published recently: Mark Bowden, BlackhawkDown: A Story of Modern War (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press 1999).

33 See Gideon Rose, 'The Exit Strategy Delusion', Foreign Affairs lll\ (Jan./Feb. 1998)pp.56-67.

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Documents

The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century