The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013

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IntroductionSince the 1993 Oslo Accords through to the

present, the role of the Palestinian Authoritys(PA) security forces has transformed accordingto the evolution of political developments,conflict dynamics, as well as changes in thecomposition of Palestinian leadership, itsstrategies, and security doctrines. Those trans-formations remained within the framework

of the Oslo Accords and its security arrange-ments, which intended to protect Israeli secu-

rity (Khan 2010), and to maintain law, order,and stability in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory (OPT).

This article provides a contextual analy-sis of the evolution and reform processesof Palestinian security forces over the lasttwo decades. It argues that the Oslo Accordsand Arafatism (Yasser Arafats style of gov-ernance) saw an increase in security forcepersonnel but the proliferation was associ-

ated with higher levels of insecurity andcoupled with high levels of corruption,patronage-based politics and personalised

Tartir, A 2015 The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian SecurityForces 19932013. Stability: International Journal of Security &Development,4(1): 46, pp. 120, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gi

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Evolution and Reform of PalestinianSecurity Forces 19932013

Alaa Tartir*

This article provides a contextual analysis of the evolution and reform processesof Palestinian security forces over the last two decades. It categorises the evolu-

tion of security reform processes into three phases: the Oslo Accords phase; theSecond Intifada phase; and the Fayyadism phase. The article argues that despitethe attempt to reverse the conditions of insecurity through security reform underFayyadism (the Palestinian Authoritys state-building project between 20072013in the occupied West Bank), fundamental tensions between the Palestinian Author-itys security forces and the Palestinian resistance movement have emerged. Thistension manifested in authoritarian transformations and trends and therefore theentire security reform project constituted yet another form of institutionalisedinsecurity, but framed in a state-building and good governance framework. Thisarticle concludes that the enhanced functionality of the Palestinian Authoritys

security forces and the reformed style of governance, resulted in the criminalisa-tion of resistance against the Israeli occupation. In this way, the state-buildingproject during the Fayyadism era directly and indirectly sustained the occupa-tion. Conceptually, the Palestinian case demonstrates the fundamental aws ofconducting a security sector reform in the absence of sovereign authority andlocal ownership of the reform processes, and while living under a foreign militaryoccupation.

* Department of International Development, LondonSchool of Economics and Political Science (LSE),and the Program Director of Al-Shabaka: ThePalestinian Policy Network, [email protected]

stability
http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gimailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gi


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Tartir: The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 19932013Art. 46, page 2

rule. Furthermore, this article highlightsthat while the state-building project in theoccupied West Bank under the premiershipof Prime Minister Salam Fayyad between2007 and 2013 (Fayyadism paradigm) meant

to reverse the negative outcomes of the OsloAccords and Arafatism, it resulted in risingtensions between the PAs security forces andthe armed resistance groups. This article willshow that this tension under the Fayyadismparadigm created better stability for Israelbut not better security for the Palestinianpeople. It is also illustrates that despite thesecurity reform processes under Fayyadism,the transformations, reforms, and paradigm

shifts led to a deepening of authoritarianismin the OPT.

The evolution of the Palestinian securityforces underwent three major phases: TheOslo Accords Phase-Arafatism (19931999);The Second Intifada Phase (20002006); andThe Fayyadism Phase (20072013). Figure 1below provides a thematic and chronologicalevolution of Palestinian security forces, andthe main characteristics of each phase. This

article is structured in chronological order:it starts by addressing the tensions betweenstate-building and national liberation pro-jects, and their impact on the evolution ofPalestinian security forces, focusing in par-ticular on the proliferation of the securityforces, the complex dynamics of corruption,and Arafats personalised style of govern-ance. The second section discusses the roadto reform, the dominance of armed groups inthe security realm, and the clashes between

the different security paradigms. Lastly, itreflects on the security model of Fayyadism,discusses its essence, technical successes,and national failures.

Building Security Forces: State-Buildingvs. National Liberation (19931999)During this phase, the process of building-upthe PAs security forces was neither inclusivenor transparent, but rather fraught with cor-

ruption and nepotism, and exposed to inside-outside leadership clashes (Lia 2006; Khatib2010). This resulted in the proliferation of

security forces, increased internal conflictsand competition, the absence of a unifiedsecurity strategy or chain of command,and a failure to protect the Palestinianpeople. This failure to protect Palestinians

was partly due to the lack of expertise andprofessionalism of the security forces, butmore importantly it was the consequenceof the Oslo Accords design (Khan 2005) andthe failure to resolve the dilemma of state-building versus national liberation. Meyers(2000: 91) argued that, it is an anomaly inthe Palestinian case, created by the agree-ments, that the functions of the Palestiniansecurity forces are very specifically limited,

but for the interests of an outside state, notto protect Palestinian citizens. Therefore, aswas argued by Agha and Khalidi (2005: 88),the PA was torn between reining in armedelements and thus providing security to itsadversary Israel, and indulging those ele-ments and thus participating in the strugglefor national liberation. At the same time,the PA has been totally incapable of defend-ing its people in the sense of actively con-

fronting Israeli armed actions or incursionsonto Palestinian soil, or raising the cost ofthe occupation (Agha and Khalidi 2005).The legacy of corruption, absence of profes-sionalism, and Arafats personalised style ofgovernance allowed the Palestinian peopleto perceive the PAs security forces as inef-fective and unreliable (Lia 2007).

The Origins

The 1994 Cairo Agreement stipulated the

establishment of a strong police forcewith a maximum of 9,000 recruits (7,000from abroad and 2,000 from the occupiedterritories) to guarantee public order andinternal security within the jurisdiction ofthe Palestinian Authority (Lia 2006: 96),and it lead to the establishment of variousPalestinian-Israeli joint security bodies. Tendays after signing the Cairo Agreement, thePalestine Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and

the returnees (Al-aedin) started to returnback to Gaza and Jericho to set up the PAssecurity forces and institutions. The 1995


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Tartir: The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 19932013 Art. 46, page 3

Figure

1:Themat

icandChronologicalEvolution

ofPalestinianSecurityForces19932013.


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Oslo II increased the number of policemen to30,000 (12,000 for the West Bank and 18,000for Gaza); however, by then the Palestinianpolice force had already reached 22,000in Gaza and Jericho alone. In 1995, Arafat

arrived in the West Bank and Palestinianforces were deployed in Areas (A),1touringin the Palestinian cities in their PLA militaryuniform in an act of revolutionary victory(Frisch 2008: 8688).

In 1998, the number of security personnelreached between 30,000 and 40,000, increas-ing to 50,000 by 2000, and 53,000 by 2003(Le More 2008). By 2004, there were morethan 15 different security bodies operating

in the occupied territories. This proliferationof security forces urged Ramadan Shallah,the leader of Islamic Jihad, to argue in 1996:Arafat has so many intelligence services inthe self-rule areas that if you open your win-dow, Preventive Security peeps in; if you openyour door, the Presidential Security Servicecomes in; if you go out to your garden, youbump into Military Intelligence; and if yougo out to the street, you come across General

Intelligence (Cited in Lia 2006: 307). WhileEdward Said stated that Arafat establishedseveral security forces, five of them wereintelligence services all spying on each other(Said 1995: xxxi).

Proliferation, Patronage and Corruption

The proliferation of the security forces didnot occur incidentally. It was a tool that Arafatused to maintain control over the securityestablishment and to enforce his approach

of divide-to-rule. He created a system inwhich the heads of security forces reportedto him exclusively. In turn, they themselveswere in rivalry in their operations, often lead-ing to bloody clashes. This mode of person-alised governance and patronage led to theestablishment of self-interested groups thatresisted reform. Arafat, up until 2003, refusedto use the word reform preferring, at the bestof times, the word development. Arafat once

stated: no one can intervene between meand my children in reference to the securityforces leadership (Al-Shuaibi 2012: 5). This

personalised style of governance was inter-related with corruption and nepotism, andas such generated negative consequenceson the security forces operations. Not onlydid it damage the forces reputation, but it

also impeded the security and safety of thePalestinian people. This de-institutionalizedmode of governance was coupled with anintra-Palestinian conflict between the insideand outside leaderships. Additionally, therewere problematic recruitment policies, aswell as managerial and administrative weak-nesses, which ultimately impeded the effec-tiveness of these forces and the services theyprovided.

One of the most striking manifestationsof corruption was the distribution of cashsalaries. The head of the security force (Jihaz)would visit Arafats office, receive a bag fullof cash; soldiers were supposed to queue upto receive their cash in hand (Le More 2008).This phase also featured the emergence of agun culture in the Palestinian society (Lia2006; Najib and Friedrich 2007), wherebyit was common to see men in plain clothes

walking the streets with a gun on their side,ready to be used for the resolution of anysmall problem. The matter in which the PAforces dealt with such chaos and violencewas also corrupted. The corruption dynam-ics expanded to reach both procurement andinventory systems, as well as the benefitssystems with the misuse of resources, pow-ers, and public facilities. All of these dynam-ics were felt and seen by the public, whichintensified the legitimacy gap between the

PA forces and people.Additionally, there had been an absence of

effective mechanisms to ensure inter-agencycooperation, which resulted in a waste ofresources and inefficient performance. Therewas no space for developing effective civil-democratic oversight or accountability mech-anisms, particularly since the PalestinianLegislative Council had been neglected andbypassed due to Arafats mode of govern-

ance. The executive branch of the Authoritywas dominating the realm in the absence ofeffective judiciary or legislative branches.


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The corruption thread was also reflectedat the political level, which witnessed adivide between the Palestinian inside andoutside leaderships. This divide proved tobe problematic when the returnees arrived

to the West Bank and Gaza and establishedthe security forces. These forces and theirleadership were returning from exile, animposition that made the local Palestiniansuncomfortable. Many felt that these securityforces were theirs not ours, and the lastthing local Palestinians wished for was toreplace the foreign occupation with a localone (Lia 2007). Palestinians were not expect-ing practices such as the Black Friday in Gaza

in November 1994, when Palestinian policefired live ammunition at civilian demonstra-tors killing 13 and wounding another 200,or the arresting and torturing of the opposi-tion (Frisch 2008). Hence, inclusiveness wasa challenge from the beginning.

This lack of inclusiveness was reinforced byrecruitment policies, since the vast majorityof the recruited security personnel belongedto one political party, Fatah. Such policies

served to de-legitimize the whole institutionand [were] not viewed as neutral nationalinstitutions by the public (Al-Shuaibi 2012: 2).The recruitment process lacked transpar-ency and accountability. This meant thatwasta (nepotism) was the marker of meritrather than actual training or skill set. Aspointed out in 1997 by Mohammed Dahlan,then the PA Preventive Security Chief inGaza: We have 36,000 people of whom weonly need 10,000. This huge number is a bur-

den on the PA and a burden on the securityorgan. We view it as a social issue because Icannot tell a prisoner who spent 15 years injail that I have no job for him (Cited in LeMore 2008: 78). Thirteen years later in sum-mer 2010, I asked Dahlan about the progressof the PA security forces, he told me: themajor problem for our misery now and thedefeat in Gaza in 2007 is attributed to prior-itizing quantity over quality.2

On the other hand, technically, the PAssecurity forces fulfilled many of their obliga-tions dictated by the Oslo Accords, as they

engaged in a process of dismantling thePalestinian infrastructure of terror as wellas protecting Israeli security. The PA forces,along with their duties to enforce law andorder, targeted, arrested, and harassed many

Palestinian members of the opposition. Theyalso conducted a controlling campaign toregulate, license, and organise the possessionof arms. The PA forces managed to impressthe Israelis, despite their lack of expertise(Friedrich and Luethold 2007). This partiallyexplains why Israel and the internationalcommunity were silent about, and complicitin, sustaining the network of corruptionand perpetuating the absence of reform in

Palestinian security institutions. By 1999 andfrom the perspective of the PAs supporters,the mere existence of the PAs security forces,despite all the challenges, was their biggestsuccess.

This phase was characterised by a clashbetween two parallel projects: state-buildingversus national liberation. While the formerimplied building the institutional underpin-nings and capacities for the interim author-

ity to transform into the statehood phaseon the 1967 borders by 1999, the latterassumed that that the PA security forces willbe an extension to the PLOs PLA and there-fore engage in a national liberation endeav-our of historical Palestine based on 1948borders. These are two parallel ventures: oneimplemented by state-like institutions andthe other by a national liberation movement.These two contradictory approaches meantthat the tensions that emerged between the

two approaches were also reflected in thestyle of governance and the security doctrineof the Palestinian leadership. These tensions,in addition to the deep distortions in the evo-lution of the PA forces caused by the asym-metry of power relations, resulted in a mixedrecord concerning the PAs security forceseffectiveness.

However, Arafats personalised style of ruleand the complex network of corruption were

not the only reasons to blame and such anexplanation would be overtly simplistic, if notdisingenuous as argued by Le More (2008: 82).


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Any contextualised analysis of the effec-tiveness of the PAs security forces shouldinclude a review of the complexity of theinternal and external dimensions of thegrowth of authoritarianism and patronage-

based system in the West Bank and Gaza.Robinson argued that the PA became anauthoritarian polity because the exiled lead-ership of the PLO had to recapture and cen-tralise power, thereby marginalising localpolitical leaders (1997). Brynen argued thatthe Oslo Accords managed to create newPalestinian elite that sustained their opera-tion with a framework of neo-patrimonialstyle of governance (Brynen 2000). Khan

et al. (2004) argued that Israels intentionwas to create a client state upon which itcould continue to exert considerable controland leverage through the rents it distributedto the PA, which was coupled with territo-rial fragmentation and a strategy of asym-metric containment. Therefore, the tenetsof the Oslo Accords and Israeli policies weremajor factors in the breakdown of the PAsecuritys effectiveness, as the next section

demonstrates.

Destroying and ReformingPalestinian Security Infrastructure(20002006)A new round of violence began after the fail-ures of Camp David and Taba Peace Summitsin 2000. This was in addition to the infa-mous visit of Ariel Sharon, the leader ofthe Israeli Likud political party at the time,to Al-Haram Al-Sharif (Temple Mount) in

September 2000 accompanied by 1,000 secu-rity guards. In the five days that followed hisvisit, 47 Palestinians were killed, 1,855 wereinjured, and five Israelis were killed. The sec-ond intifada erupted, and the PA securityforces actively engaged. This intifada took ona militarised character from the Palestinianside as well, and all armed resistance groupsintensified their operations. The newly estab-lished Fatahs Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were

influential and controversial, having acquiredsubstantive resources from Arafat and the PAleadership.

Security Vacuum

On the 12th of October 2000, a major inci-dent in Ramallah signalled the PAs securityforces engagement in the intifada. The PApolice stopped two Israeli soldiers in plain

clothes and dragged them to the main policestation where they were beaten, stabbed,and killed. This incident deepened theIsraeli security establishments mistrust ofthe PA forces, resulting in the reconsidera-tion of their relationship. On the same day,Israel launched airstrikes against PA securitytargets, completely destroying the securitypremises. In March 2002 Israel launchedOperation Defensive Shield, and this mili-

tary operation caused massive destructionand losses in both human and economicmeasures. Palestinian security personnelwere detained and disarmed en masse, theirfacilities destroyed, and PA civil institutionsransacked. The destruction of physical infra-structure is estimated to have cost the econ-omy $3.5 billion, equivalent to 30 per cent ofpre-2000 capital stock (UNCTAD 2005). Thedestruction of the PAs security apparatus

and facilities exceeded $38.5 million in theWest Bank and $34.5 million in Gaza Strip upto early 2002 (World Bank 2004).

With their diminished capacity, the activi-ties of the security forces became more hap-hazard. Traffic police in civilian attire, thedetainment of thieves by the city governorin his own home in the absence of prisonfacilities, became common occurrences. Thedestruction of the PA forces capabilities,capacities, and resources created a gap that

was soon filled by armed groups, includingHamas. This security vacuum filled by non-PA security actors imposed new challengesto security provision and governance, asPalestinian people perceived these actors asmore trustworthy and legitimate than thePA-actors (PASSIA and DCAF 2006).

A national survey conducted in 2005 by theGeneva Centre for the Democratic Controlof Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Graduate

Institute of International and DevelopmentStudies (IUED) revealed that 34 per centof the interviewees had great trust in the


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Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas), and 29 percent had great trust in the Saraya Al-Quds(Islamic Jihad), as opposed to 21 per centin the Civil Police and 18 per cent in thePreventive Security (DCAF and IUED 2005).

In another national survey (a sample of 1,800Palestinians) conducted by DCAF in 2006,more than 70 per cent of the respondentstrusted non-PA forces very much or to someextent, while the trust in the PA securityforces remained shaky. The most trustwor-thy groups were the military wings of Hamas(79 per cent) and Islamic Jihad (78 per cent),confirmed when surveyed on their views ofhow the PA should deal with armed groups.

A majority of 86 per cent favoured dialogueand consensus over the use of force. Seventy-six per cent of the respondents rejected theuse of force against the militias (DCAF 2006).Figure 2 introduces the statutory (PA) andnon-statutory (non-PA) security forces. Itdivides the PAs statutory security forces intointernal security forces and national securityforces (PAs Proto-army), and combined theyare comprised of some fifteen active bod-

ies. By contrast, the non-statutory securityforces and groups are mainly associated withpolitical factions, social movements, familiesand clans, popular protection committees,and other informal bodies that are embed-ded in Palestinian traditions, and combinedthey are comprised of some thirteen activegroups. The chart also introduces the majorinternational security actors.

The Road to Reform

The rising influence of non-PA actors was athreat to Israeli security; therefore, underIsraeli and international pressure, the PA wasforced to start a reform project for its secu-rity sector and forces (Sayigh and Shikaki1999). On the 23rd of June 2002, one daybefore President Bush delivered a speech onhis vision for peace in the Middle East, thePA announced its 100-Day Reform Plan.3The100-Day Plan called for a comprehensive

reform throughout the government, renewalof the legitimacy of elected officials throughdemocratic elections, rearranged ministerial

structures, and reinforced separation of pow-ers (UNDP 2003: 3). It aimed to reduce thepower of the president, increase the power ofthe parliament, institute the rule of law, andincrease the scrutiny of Palestinian finances

(Turner 2009) as a prerequisite for peace andstate recognition (ICG 2002, 2004). In thedomain of public security, the 100-Day Planaimed to restructure the Ministry of Interior(MoI) and modernise its apparatus; attachthe Preventive Security Services, the Policeand the Civil Defence to the MoI; and acti-vate the role of the MoI and its apparatusesin the enforcement of court rulings. It alsoaimed to reinforce loyalty to the Authority;

end the role of the security services in civil-ian affairs; and give utmost attention to theneeds of the population, whose support andcooperation would be acquired by inducinglaw and order (PA 2002).

By 2002, the role of the CIA was expanded,and the Quartet and its International TaskForce on Palestinian Reform were estab-lished as international bodies to supervisethe Palestinian security sector reform. With

the proliferation of international control-ling bodies, scholars argued that Palestinebecame under (financial) international trus-teeship and lost any kind of ownership onthe reform processes (Khalidi 2005; Brown2010). As argued by Turner (2009: 568), thePA, still reeling from the shock and aweof Operation Defensive Shield and lack-ing the resources to rebuild what had beendestroyed, had little choice but to take theshock doctors medicine, This was further

entrenched by the launch of the Road Mapin 2003 by the Quartet.4Phase I of the RoadMap demanded the PA to undertake visibleefforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, andrestrain individuals and groups conductingand planning violent attacks on Israelis any-where (Road Map 2003: 2).

The plan demanded that rebuilt and refo-cused Palestinian Authority security appa-ratus had to confront all those engaged

in terror and dismantle the terroristcapabilities and infrastructure (Road Map2003). The text stipulated that this included


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Figure

2:Mapping

theStatutoryandNon-Statuto

rySecurityForcesandGroups.


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confiscating illegal weapons, and consoli-dating security authority, free of associa-tion with terror and corruption (Road Map2003). In other words, the PAs security sec-tor was forced to: combat terrorism; appre-

hend suspects; outlaw incitement; collect allillegal weapons; provide Israel with a list ofPalestinian police recruits; and report pro-gress to the United States (Agha and Khalidi2005). This, according to Friedrich andLuethold (2007) meant that the Palestiniansecurity reform had,

remained, in essence, an externally-controlled process, driven by the

national security interests of Israeland the United States, and charac-terised by very limited ownership onthe part of Palestinian society . . . theprimary Israeli and American inter-est is to transform the Palestiniansecurity sector into an instrument intheir fight against terror . . . [and] thePalestinian security interests play atbest a subordinate role in the design

and implementation of this trans-formation process (Friedrich andLuethold 2007: 192).

These reform plans forced Arafat to appointMahmoud Abbas as the PAs first PrimeMinister, and a loyalist as the first Ministerof Interior in 2003. Salam Fayyad wasappointed as finance minister as per theWorld Banks conditionality, and as far assecurity forces were concerned, he created

a single treasury account and enhancedfinancial transparency. This meant that aftera decade of its establishment, the PAs secu-rity personnel were able to receive their sal-aries through bank transfers; however, thesereforms were superficial. Abbas remainedPrime Minister for less than six monthsbecause he was marginalised, and withinfive months, four Ministers of Interiors wereappointed. Thus, internal power dynamics

dominated the reform scene (Friedrich andLuethold 2007).

Clashing Paradigms

The inconsistencies between the securityreform efforts and the challenges posed bythe dominance of non-PA groups continuedto accelerate until the death of Arafat in

November 2004. With Arafats death, a newsecurity doctrine started to emerge. In hispresidential victory speech in 2005, Abbasdeclared his determination to establish thePAs monopoly of violence as the main pri-ority, and to implement the electoral slo-gan one law, one gun, one authority.5 Inan immediate reaction to this renewal ofthe security sector reform approach, Abbasforced the Palestinian factions, including

Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to agree in Cairoon a period of calm (Tahdia). This entaileda temporary ceasefire based on reciproc-ity. The international community reacted tothis through organizing the London Meetingon Supporting the Palestinian Authority. Inthat international conference, the PA prom-ised to create the conditions conduciveto the peace process with the immediateobjective of restoring internal law and order

and preventing violence (London Meeting2005: 4), while the international commu-nity promised to provide advice and assis-tance on legal, structural, and organisationalaspects to strengthen the security sector,through establishing the European UnionCoordinating Office for Palestinian PoliceSupport (EUPOL COPPS) and the UnitedStates Security Coordinator (USSC).

As a consequence for this speedy entryinto security sector reform processes, modest

progress was made that can be categorisedat five levels: (i) structural reorganisationthrough merging numerous security forces,sending long-standing security command-ers into early retirement, disbanding theSpecial Forces and the Special Security, andreactivating the National Security Council;(ii) commence working on a White Paperto establish a normative-legal frameworkfor the security sector; (iii) initiation of the

Civil Police reform programme with theestablishment of the EUPOL COPPS to assist


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the PA in improving its law-enforcementcapacity; (iv) the PA embarked on tenta-tive Disarmament, Demobilization andReintegration (DDR) processes, such as dis-mantling Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; and, (v)

improving the capabilities of the PA securityforces through better human resource man-agement, increase in salaries and benefits,and local and regional training. Additionally,the MoI banned the PAs security bodies fromreceiving foreign aid directly and called forit to be channelled through the Ministry ofFinance. The logistical and procurementsprocedures were reviewed, and an inventorycheck was developed (Friedrich and Luethold

2008; Hussein 2007).However, despite these transformations,

the overall evaluation of the security reformprocess by the end of 2005 was bleak. TheDfID (2006: 19) concluded that:

The PA security forces lack a monopolyover the means of violence. Israel con-tinues to control significant portionsof the West Bank. Communications

between West Bank and Gaza are dif-ficult. Command and control of thePalestinian Authority Security Forces(PASF) is factionalised and personal-ised. There are overlapping responsi-bilities among the different servicesand no unifying doctrine. The securityservices have limited political sup-port, and there is an inadequate leg-islative framework to guide them. Thejudiciary is weak. Parliamentary and

other forms of oversight are virtuallynon-existent.

The victory of Hamas in the 2006 parliamen-tary elections halted this one year of reform(Le More 2006). The attempt to impose a newsecurity doctrine led by Abbas and donorswas put on hold until the new dynamicswere figured out. The victory of Hamas rear-ranged all the cards, confused all the actors,

and challenged the PA security doctrine. Thiswas mainly due to Hamas legacy as a non-PA actor that provided informal but effective

public services, including security, throughits committees, military groups, charities,and institutions. However, the existingFatah-PAs security forces leadership refusedto deal with Hamas-government, and there-

fore the chain of command, responsibilities,interests, ideologies, and approaches beganto clash. The refusal of Fatah to accept theelectoral defeat made the year 2006 unsta-ble and ambiguous, and thus a new roundof archery and negligence of citizens basicsecurity needs emerged.

The international communitys boycottof the Hamas-led Palestinian governmentresulted in the inability to pay salaries to

150,000 public employees, including thesecurity forces. This led to deterioratingeffects that further eroded the legitimacyand functionality of the PA institutions.Israel, in turn, withheld the transfer of taxrevenues that it collects on behalf of thePA (UNCTAD 2005, 2006). The interna-tional community created parallel routes(DeVoir and Tartir 2009) to bypass Hamasand continue its support for the PA and its

security apparatus; a selective process thatsupported the moderate and pragmaticFatah leadership, and excluded the rest.6This represented a rejection of Palestiniandemocracy and a move that went against theprinciples of good governance that fuelledthe Palestinian divide, and created new elitethat were viewed as credible partners forpeace (Turner 2011).

As a consequence for this Palestinianschism, the PAs President initiated meas-

ures to keep control over security forces.Abbas separated the National SecurityForces from the MoI; nominated a Chief-of-Staff to report directly to him; appointed aloyal Fatah leader as the head of three inter-nal security bodies; and, created new bod-ies and expanded others, particularly thePresidential Guard (Friedrich and Luethold2007). In June 2006, the PLC became dys-functional. Hamas in turn took its measures,

first by establishing a unity government andsubsequently by violently taking over Gaza.Meanwhile, Hamas was building-up its back


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up plans, particularly the Back-Up forcesin Gaza, which later became the ExecutiveForces. Hamas managed to establish a strongmilitary base in Gaza that combined both astate-like security apparatus and an armed

resistance wing. However, in June 2007,violent clashes between Fatah and Hamaserupted and resulted in 118 casualties and555 injuries, which brought a new phaseof fragmentation and instability into thePalestinian polity (Brown 2009). This intra-Palestinian divide led to multi-level conse-quences on the security sector, its structures,and the further steps for its reform. TheFayyadist paradigm, discussed in the fol-

lowing section, emerged as the way forwardto reform the security sector and build aPalestinian state.

The Fayyadism Phase: Re-InventingPalestinian Security Forces (20072013)In the aftermath of the 2007 intra-Palestiniandivide, Hamas controlled Gaza and Fatahcontrolled the West Bank. Both parties took

parallel measures to sustain the fragmenta-tion (Tartir 2012a). The PA President declareda state of emergency (Brown 2007; PCHR2007),7 and after dismissing the Hamas-ledcabinet, appointed Fayyad to head an emer-gency government. With the appointmentof Fayyad, a new era in the Palestinian pol-ity and style of governance had emerged.Fayyad, through his West Bank Firstapproach,8declared a commitment to botha strict reform agenda based on establishing

a monopoly of violence by the PA securityapparatus and the adoption of a neoliberalpost-Washington economic agenda aimed atcreating the institutional underpinning for afuture Palestinian state (PA 2008, 2010a, b).

The Essence of Fayyadism

Fayyads major plans (PRDP, 13thGovernmentPlan, and NDP)9 spelled out a commitmentto modernizing and professionalizing the

Palestinian security services under the bannerof One Homeland, One Flag, and One Law. Itaimed to reinvent the security forces through:

Rebuilding, restructuring and reform-ing the security services and developingdemocratic oversight mechanisms . . .creating an appropriate legal andinstitutional framework; enhanc-

ing the professional and operationaleffectiveness of security forces; ensur-ing the fiscal sustainability of thesecurity forces; re-inforcing demo-cratic governance and accountability;and addressing the legacies of conflict(e.g. unlawful ownership and use ofweapons) (PA 2008: 38).

The Security First approach under Fayyadism

posited that security reform will prove thatPalestinians are credible partners for peaceand able to govern themselves despite theexistence of the occupation. However, not-withstanding the glowing rhetoric, themajor problem that remains unsolved isrelated to the meaning of security andpolitical reform in the first place. Securityreform under Fayyad meant the creation ofa monopoly of violence through a weapons

cleansing process, which was conducted todisarm or render dysfunctional the militarygroups committed to armed resistance ofIsraeli occupation. Hence, the PA securityplan under Fayyad has several overlappingelements:

Checking Hamas and its armedwing, the Qassam Brigades; contain-ing Fatah-allied militants throughco-optation and amnesty; restoring

public order by cracking down oncriminals; conduct security campaignin Nablus and Jenin; and strengthen-ing security forces through training,weapons procurement and securityreform (ICG 2008: 4).

Technical Success, National Failures

Although the Oslo Accords framework hadnot been altered in this phase, the Palestinian

security forces became better defined. Theinternational actors were able to dominatethe reform process with their funds and


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policy advice, stripping Palestinians of anylevel of ownership. Disarmament and secu-rity campaigns were conducted to enforcelaw and order and collect illegal arms, thedestroyed security sectors physical infra-

structure was rebuilt, strategic plans forthe sector were drafted, and the USSC andEUPOL COPPS, as well as the PalestinianSecurity Academy, became the major illus-tration of the new PA security doctrine. Thesecurity forces were reorganised into sixmain operational branches and two smallerones, besides auxiliary services, with for-mal control divided between the PA presi-dency and the MoI (Friedrich and Luethold

2007). Corruption declined in the securityspheres, and the security personnel werebetter equipped, trained, educated, dressed,and compensated. Many of the old securityguards appointed by Arafat were dischargedand replaced by a new security lite. Thisphase witnessed a proliferation in the num-ber of local and foreign NGOs working in thesecurity realm (Tartir 2012b). These transfor-mations were completely dependent upon

donors funds, with more than 30 per cent oftotal aid to Palestinians devoted to the secu-rity sector (Taghdisi-Rad 2010; UNCTAD 2010).

In technical terms, the PAs securityforces became professionalised, well-trained, and engaged in daily coordina-tion with the Israeli counterpart despitethe existence of the asymmetry of power.Their technical achievements reached thehighest levels since the establishment ofthe PA, and even won international and

regional excellency prizes. The Palestiniansecurity sector was reinvented underFayyadism and an overhaul to its func-tionality was conducted,10which led manyscholars to celebrate its success (Sellwood2009; Brning 2011).

However, this reform process was notwithout costs, and the implications of theenhanced functionality of PA security forceson the national struggle and resistance

against the occupation were detrimental(Khan 2009). The reformed security forceswere accused of human rights violations,

suppression of freedom of speech, andpolitical affiliation (Amrov 2013). The PA hastwice ranked lower in the Reporters WithoutBorders Press Freedom Index than any Arabgovernment, and it retains a note free rat-

ing on the Freedom House political rightsand civil liberties index (Thrall 2010; Danin2011). They were accused of creating a policestate and an authoritarian regime (Sayigh2011). Moreover, they were blamed for add-ing another layer of repression, for failingto protect the foundation of a Palestiniandemocratic system, and for sustaining theoccupation through their sub-contractorrole that protected Israeli security through

coordination mechanisms and disarmamentprocess (Leech 2012). The excessive use ofviolence, torture, arbitrary detention, andintimidation by the PAs security forces hasbeen documented by numerous local andinternational human rights organisations(HRW 2008, 2010; ICG 2008, 2010; ICHR2010; MEM 2010; Al-Haq 2011). Furtherexamples include political imprisonment,humiliation, torture, dismissal of public

servants due to their political affiliation, theclosing of Hamas-affiliated NGOs and civilsociety organisations, and money launderingregulation.

A 2010 International Crisis Groups (ICG)report warned that Palestinian securityforces had violated human rights and cir-cumvented the Basic Law through extra-judicial arrest campaigns and detentionwithout a court order, as well as throughtorture and ill-treatment at PA detention

centres. Following the brutal crackdownon protestors in Ramallah between Juneand July of 2012, an Amnesty Internationalreport argued that, The brutality that fol-lowed was shocking even by the standardsof the PA security forces, whose use of exces-sive force on previous occasions and abusesagainst detainees had already earned theman unenviable reputation at home and inter-nationally (Amnesty International 2013: 1).

The practices of the security forces wereobserved by scholars as a reform unfoldingin an authoritarian context. Nathan Brown


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argued that Fayyadism had no domesticfoundation, and that the maintenance ofthe existing institutions was done in anauthoritarian context that robs the results ofdomestic legitimacy (Brown 2011). Hence,

the entire program was based not simply onde-emphasizing or postponing democracyand human rights, but on actively denyingthem for the present (Brown 2010: 2). Thismade Palestinian authoritarianism differentfrom the one under Arafat, insofar as it wasregularised and softened and less venal andprobably less capricious. But it is also morestultifying (Brown 2010: 10). Hence, themain problem with Fayyadism is not the way

it undermines democracy in the short termbut in the way it masks the absence of anylong-term strategy (Brown 2009: 5).

Likewise, Yezid Sayigh (2011) argued thatalthough the security forces in the WestBank received $450 million, their capacitieswere hindered. This was due to the lack ofownership in the Security Sector Reformprocess, lack of democratic governance andconstitutional order, and an exclusive focus

on technical issues. Sayigh concluded thatthe authoritarian and securitisation trans-formation in the West Bank will threatennot only long-term security, but also the abil-ity to achieve Palestinian statehood (Sayigh2011). Meanwhile, Leech (2012) argued thatwhile the process of reforming the securitysector may manifest a genuine, even exis-tential, improvement in the lives of people,the regime treated this as a starting point forincreasing authoritarianism, not the reason

for its conclusion.Finally, the evolution of security forces

during the Fayyadism phase was influencedby the contested role of the internationalcommunity and their security missions,particularly the United States SecurityCoordinator (USSC) and the European UnionCoordinating Office for Palestinian PoliceSupport (EUPOL COPPS). An aid official com-mented on this by arguing:

On one hand, we demand demo-cratic processes, transparency and

accountability and constantly stressthe importance of human rights.But on the other hand, we have forthe most part been silent about thePAs extra-judicial campaign against

Hamas. There is a huge contradictionin our message (Cited in ICG 2010: 33).

The USSC and the EUPOL COPPS missionswere part and parcel to the transforma-tions that took place in the security sphereunder Fayyadism. As such, they bear a shareof responsibility in the consequences ofthese security transformations on the livesof Palestinian people in the occupied West

Bank. They are not only new actors, but alsoinfluential ones that shape discourse andstrategies, and affect the dimensions of thePalestinian struggle. This constituted a majortransformation in the role of external actorsfrom being sponsors of the reform processto become real implementers of it throughreal presence on the ground. This shift frombeing observers to implementers had its ownrepercussions on the ownership of the secu-

rity reform processes and opened-up a wholenew section in the international aid industryas a further amplification of securitisationand the securitised development process.

However, both the USSC and the EUPOLCOPPS failed to support democratic gov-ernance and improve civil oversight andaccountability due to the technical natureof their intervention and their lack of localsensitivity. Both bodies focused on a conven-tional train-and-equip approach which cre-

ated a more skilful security forces, but failedto generate a genuine institutional capacityto design, plan, and conduct training indig-enously. Their support paved the way formoving toward authoritarianism and theestablishment of a police state (Rose 2008;Sayigh 2011; Kristoff 2012).

Despite technical successes, such as thetraining of more than 3,000 Palestinianpolice officers and supporting the justice

system, the EUPOL COPPS were criticisedfor their limited and technical scope, fortheir attempts to promote the rule of law


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in an authoritarian rather than democraticmanner, and for their role in sustaining theoccupation through failing to challenge theIsraeli measures (Bulut 2009; Persson 2011;Youngs and Michou 2011; Bouris 2014).

The USSC was criticised for brainwashingthe young Palestinians that were recruited,entrenching the security collaboration withIsrael at the expense of Palestinian security,criminalising resistance, and also for pro-tecting Israeli security through the creationof new Palestinian men (as argued by KeithDayton who headed the mission from 2005until 2010). The people referred to forcesthat were trained by the USSC as the Dayton

forces, and not only were they engaged in abrutal crackdown on Palestinians, they werealso accused of an unprecedented level ofhuman rights violations (Byrne 2009; Dayton2009; Zanotti 2009, 2010; Thrall 2010).

In sum, the reinvention of Palestiniansecurity forces during the Fayyadism era(PAs post-2007 state-building project) con-stituted a major pillar that demonstrated theability of the PA to govern the Palestinian

people and build public institutions thatare able to deliver effectively. However, thesecurity reform agenda had detrimentalconsequences for the Palestinian nationalstruggle, the everyday security of the people,the role of resistance movements, as well asintra-Palestinian politics (Amrov and Tartir2014a, b).11

ConclusionThis article provided a contextual analysis

of the evolution and reform processes ofPalestinian security forces since the estab-lishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993until the era of Fayyadism. It focused on threedistinct phases: (i) 19931999 and the estab-lishment and building-up of the PAs securityforces in the West Bank and Gaza accordingto Oslo Accords; (ii) 20002006 when theexisting security forces were destroyed inthe aftermath of the intifada and when the

non-PA forces filled the security gap; (iii) andfinally, from 2007 until the departure ofFayyad in mid-2013, the phase during which

the reinvention of the Palestinian secu-rity forces went through a major securityreform project. The article concludes thatthe proliferation of the security forces underArafatism resulted in further insecurities for

the Palestinian people despite the attemptto reverse this condition under Fayyadismthrough security reform. This raised new ten-sions between the PAs security forces andthe armed resistance groups and eventuallymanifested in authoritarian transformations.Therefore the intended reforms constitutedanother form of institutionalised insecurity,but disguised in a state-building and goodgovernance project.

The complex relationship between the PAand non-PA security forces and groups inthe Palestinian context posed an additionalchallenge to the security governance reforminitiatives. Despite the shifts in the securitydoctrines, what remained constant was theproblematic reality and fundamental flaw ofconducting a security sector reform and pur-suing a disarmament strategy in the absenceof sovereign authority, and while living under

a foreign military occupation.At best, the security reform underFayyadisms state-building project andthe leadership of PAs president MahmoudAbbas resulted in better stability and moresecurity to Israel and its occupation, but it didnot result in better security conditions for thePalestinian people in the occupied West Bank.At worst, the enhanced functionality of thePAs security forces and the reformed style ofgovernance that was defined through security

collaboration with Israel, resulted in creatingauthoritarian transformations and criminalis-ing resistance against the Israeli occupation,and as such directly and indirectly sustained it.

Competing InterestsThe author declares that they have no com-peting interests.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank the anony-mous peer reviewers, PhD thesis supervisorsat LSE (Mary Kaldor and Denisa Kostovicova),
http://al-shabaka.org/people/member/sabrien-amrovhttp://al-shabaka.org/people/policy-advisor/alaa-tartirhttp://al-shabaka.org/people/policy-advisor/alaa-tartirhttp://al-shabaka.org/people/member/sabrien-amrov


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and Sabrien Amrov for useful commentsmade on an earlier draft. However, anyerrors are the authors own. This article ispart of a wider PhD research conducted atthe LSE between 2010 and 2015, and the

author acknowledges the financial supportfrom the LSEs Department of InternationalDevelopment.

Notes 1 According to the Oslo Peace Accords, the

West Bank was divided into three areas:Area (A) under the civilian and securitycontrol of the Palestinian Authority (17%);Area (B) under Palestinian Authoritys

civilian control only (24%); and Area (C)under full Israeli control (59%).

2 Interview with Mohammad Dahlan in hisoffice in Ramallah, Occupied West Bank,June 2010.

3 Following the 100-Day Plan, the PAworked towards implementing a 60-DayAction Plan in 2003 and a Six-MonthReform Plan in early-mid 2004, and putforward a One-Year Reform Action Plan in

September 2004. 4 The full title of the roadmap is: APerformance-based Roadmap to aPermanent Two-State Solution to theIsraeli-Palestinian Conict. The Quartetwas headed until mid-2015 by Tony Blairand consists of the United Nations, UnitedStates, European Union, and Russia.

5 See the 2005 electoral program of Abbashttp://president.ps/electoral.aspx; andinterview with Al-Jazeera in April 2004

http://bit.ly/1eCnQgi 6 TIM and PEGASE were the major EU

mechanisms used to bypass Hamas. Theyaimed to channel aid directly throughthe EU to the beneficiaries accounts(public servants and security personnelsalaries) or through the Office of the PAsPresident.

7 A state of emergency can last up tothirty days. After that, it may be renewed

only with the consent of two-thirds thePalestinian Legislative Council. Up tonow Palestinians live under a state of

emergency, in violation of the PalestinianBasic Law.

8 West Bank First strategy was largely bornout of the American and Israeli desirewith the tacit approval of the PA to either

isolate Hamas, weaken it, force it to mod-erate, or defeat it altogether. The aim ofthe strategy is to create two drasticallydifferent realities in the two Palestinianterritories, whereby the West Bank pros-pers and Gaza despairs (for further dis-cussion see (Samhouri 2007)).

9 PRDP refers to the Palestinian Reform andDevelopment Plan; the 13thGovernmentPlan refers to Ending the Occupation:

Establishing the State plan 20092010(PA 2009); the NDP refers to the NationalDevelopment Plan 201113.

10 On the achieved successes please referto: UN (2011); World Bank (2011a, b); PA(2010a, b, 2011a, b).

11 For further analysis on the consequencesof the PA security campaigns between2007 and 2013 on the lives of thePalestinian people in the occupied West

Bank, please refer to the authors forth-coming article entitled Securitized devel-opment and Palestinian authoritarianismunder Fayyadism(Tartir 2015).

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Tartir: The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian S

Documents

The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993-2013