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Bachelor Thesis
The European Union’s Performance in International Climate Change Negotiations – an Analysis of the Bonn Climate Change
Conference in March 2014
- Bachelor Thesis, submitted to the Department of Political Science at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, May 2014 -
WORK IN PROGRESS – PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT AUTHORS PERMISSION
Lukas Prinz, B.A. Mail: [email protected] _________________________________________________________________________ Abstract Climate change is a major challenge of the 21st century. Therefore, the European Union’s role in the global response to this challenge remains important, even after the failure of the Kyoto Protocol. Since 2011, the international community works towards a new climate treaty, evolving under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This thesis analyses the Performance of the EU during the session of the ADP in March 2014, using the concept of EU Performance proposed by Groen and Oberthür in 2013. In addition to the analysis of these small-scale negotiations, it provides a reflection of the participant observation method. After a review of the EU’s global role on climate change, an overview of the conceptual literature to grasp this phenomena integrates the different strands of literature. It argues, that the approach taken builds an innovative reconceptualisation of previous accounts, further set out in chapter three. The empirical analysis is structured according to the three variables of the concept: the quality of the EU’s policy objectives, the fit of EU activities with the international constellation of the talks and the EU’s goal attainment. Overall, EU Performance during ADP 2-4 was low-intermediate. In order to increase this score, the findings point towards a need for a more coherent EU policy portfolio between different negotiation topics. Acknowledgements I am grateful to Lisanne Groen and Sebastian Oberthür for the possibility to use their very recent concept of EU performance for this thesis and their helpful replies to my questions. I also thank my supervisors, Arne Niemann and Julian Bergmann, for their stimulating advise during the process. Last but not least, my gratitude is to WWF and Germanwatch for accrediation and valuable insights into the negotiations.
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Overview of Terms ..........................................................................................13
Figure 2: Elements and Variables of EU Performance ...................................................15
Table 1: Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2010…………………………………………….. 28
Table 2: Summary of the EU's Performance during ADP …………………................. 36
List of Abbreviations ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India and China CAT Climate Action Tracker CBDR Common, but differentiated responsibilities COP Conference of the Parties EU European Union GHG Greenhouse Gases G77/China Group of 77 and China i.e. “that is” INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (developed the UNFCCC) IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change KP Kyoto Protocoll LMDC Like Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change MoI Means of Implementation MS Member States NDC intended nationally determined contributions (to the 2015 agreement) OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development REIO Regional Economic Integration Organisation SEA Single European Act Umbrella Negotiating Group within the UNFCCC, comprising the US, Australia, Group Canada, Japan, Russia, Norway, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Ukraine UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change US United States (of America) WCCB World Conference Center Bonn
Contents
List of Tables and Figures
List of Abbreviations
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................1
2. The European Union’s role in international climate change negotiations ....................3
2.1 The Evolution of EU Climate Policy ......................................................................3
2.2 Literature Review: Research on the EU’s global role...........................................10
3. Goal attainment, ambition and the international context – Concept and Methods to
assess EU performance....................................................................................................14
3.1 EU Performance – the approach by Groen and Oberthür in context ....................14
3.2 Operationalisation .................................................................................................16
3.3 Case selection........................................................................................................18
3.4 Methods.................................................................................................................19
4. The EU’s performance at the Bonn Climate Change Conference in March 2014......21
4.1 Negotiation setting and political context...............................................................21
4.2 Quality of the EU’s policy objectives ...................................................................23
4.2.1 Absolute quality .............................................................................................24
4.2.2 Relative quality ..............................................................................................25
4.3 Fit of EU activities with the international constellation........................................25
4.3.1 EU activities during the negotiations .............................................................25
4.3.2 Position in the international constellation of power and interests..................27
4.3.3 Fit of activities with the EU’s role .................................................................32
4.4 Goal attainment .....................................................................................................33
4.5 Summary ...............................................................................................................35
4.6 Method reflections.................................................................................................36
5. Conclusion...................................................................................................................37
References .......................................................................................................................41
Annex ..............................................................................................................................44
1
1. Introduction “We are at the highest level of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere for the last 800,000 years and we have not yet started to bend that curve back down again - this is the urgency of the challenge. […] Just as climate change impacts are accelerating, 2014 needs to be a year of accelerated action and ambition to check the advance of climate change.” (Christiana Figueres, UNFCCC 2014).
This statement made by the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the occasion of the first session of
international climate change negotiations in 2014 points out the origins of this thesis.
Twenty years after the entry into force of the Convention to combat climate change, the
process is in deep need for progress. Most recent scientific findings leave little doubts
about global warming being the defining challenge of the 21st century. The European
Union (EU) has played a crucial role in the international response to this challenge,
most notably in the establishment of the Kyoto Protocoll (KP). The progressiveness of
both the EU and the UN processes came to a halt in 2009, however. The failure of the
Copenhagen Summit to deliver a successor treaty to the KP temporarily broke hopes for
the UNFCCC to demonstrate effective multilateral governance. It also showed the limits
of EU influence on the global stage, making a renewed assessment of the EU’s role
necessary. Scholarly accounts, so far, furthermore focussed on the EU’s role in summits
of greater scale, like the one in Copenhagen, whereas its part in smaller preparatory
sessions remains underexplored. However, the last twenty years of talks indicate the
importance of these in-between meetings for the success of the annual climate summits.
As a new climate agreement is expected to be signed at the end of 2015, the upcoming
gatherings need to specify most of the details for a deal to emerge by then. For these
reasons this thesis examines the EU’s activities during the first negotiation session in
2014, technically referred to as the fourth part of the second session of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-4).
The main research question therefore is: How did the EU perform during ADP 2-4?
The performance concept applied was developed only recently by Lisanne Groen and
Sebastian Oberthür (2013), which is why the main added value of the case study is to
probe this concept by applying it to the assessment of the EU at the Bonn Climate
Change Conference in March 2014. Therefore, the author took part in this session of the
UNFCCC in order to collect the data through observation. This method selection
originated from the author’s curiousity about the seldom use of this method in the
literature on international negotiations, as his previous experience indicated the
2
importance of informal negotiations. Also, most actors in the field rely on negotiating
tracking and observation for insights into the talks. Hence, an additional research
interest was to discover reasons why the method of observation is rarely used in
political science.
Besides these academic contributions, the high social relevance of research on climate
change negotiations is invaluable. Assuming that a legally-binding international
agreement on climate change would effectively reduce climate impacts, the knowledge
about a well-performing, progressive EU in the talks cannot be underestimated, as
global warming potentially affects every individual on our planet. The analysis could
merit EU delegates to better assess possible options for negotiation actions and the body
of research on EU performance could hence be used to enhance the overall performance
of the climate regime.
The thesis proceeds as follows. It starts with a review of the history of EU climate
policy from the beginnings of European integration until today, followed by a literature
review of the scholarly attempts to grasp the EU’s global role. It argues for an
integrated perspective on the literature, which builds the foundation for the performance
concept by Groen and Oberthür (2013) set out in chapter three. Then, the three
categories of the concept, goal attainment, quality of policy objectives and fit with the
international constellation of power and interests are briefly situated in the universe of
terms, before the detailed operationalisation is explained. It is noteworthy here, that due
to the limited scope of the thesis, the EU was compared only with two of the main
protagonists in the international context, namely the United States (US) and China.
These two countries were selected as a point of comparison due to the importance of
their participation in any meaningful climate treaty because of their significant share of
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Chapter three concludes with an illustration of
the case selection and explanation of the methods applied. After a short summary of the
negotiating setting, chapter four analyses the EU’s performance according to the
conceptual dimensions supplemented by some reflections on the method of observation.
Finally, the findings are summarised and evaluated in the Conclusion.
3
2. The European Union’s role in international climate change
negotiations
The literature review in this chapter sets the stage for the analysis later on in the thesis.
It starts with an overview of the development of the EU’s environmental and climate
policy from the beginnings of European integration until today, followed by a review of
terms and concepts applied to assess the EU’s role in the international arena.
2.1 The Evolution of EU Climate Policy
Today’s EU climate policy developed as a sub-branch of the environmental policy field.
Thus this paragraph begins with a review of the EU’s competences in this area, before
focussing on its role in the UNFCCC process leading up to the ADP 2-4 session
researched in this thesis.
Knill and Liefferink (2013: 28f.) identify three phases of EU environmental policy.1
The first one characterises the emergence of this policy field from the founding treaties
until the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. Environmental policy was not mentioned
in the Treaty of Rome and hence lacked a legal basis for Community action. It
developed as an interpretation of the treaties in order to achieve the common market by
harmonisation of environmental standards. Raising public awareness of cross-border
phenomena like forest dieback in Germany contributed as well and led to the adoption
of the first European Environmental Action Program in 1972.
The de facto practice of environmental policy found its de jure formalisation only with
the SEA fifteen years later. The SEA also marked the beginning of the second phase,
which was “characterized by the legal and institutional consolidation and further
development” (ibid: 29) of the policy field until 1992. It introduced a new treaty title for
environmental policy including key principles and thus made it an official task of the
community. This ‘coming of age’ phase found its climax with the Treaty of Maastricht
in 1992, which created not only the EU but also established the European
Environmental Agency and the principle of sustainability as a prerequisite for all policy
areas. Since then, the policy dynamic of EU environmental policy stagnated compared
to earlier phases and limited itself to updates of the existing framework. This can be
interpreted as a sign for the maturity of the policy field (Knill/Lieffering 2013). Even
the latest reform with the Treaty of Lisbon introduced rather minor changes internally
1 For brevity and enhanced readability, the term “EU” will be continuously applied, at times also for the historic predecessors of the Union, namely the European Communities.
4
by broadening the sustainability principles, the applicability of the co-decision
procedure involving the European Parliament and a de jure formalisation of already
practiced EU competences on Energy policy.
However, regarding the external competences of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon obliged
the EU “to promote ‘measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change’” (Benson/Adelle
2013: 38), accompanied by the introduction of an EU diplomatic service represented by
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs. The interconnection of the internal and
external dimensions of EU environmental policy, in which the former builds the basis
for the latter, was pointed out by the European Court of Justice ruling 22-70 in 1971
which stated the ability of the Community to act externally on all policy areas if it
possessed the internal competences for them. These powers are therefore implied by
treaty expressions like the task established with the SEA. External competences are
furthermore shared between the EU and its member states (MS), requiring concerted
action on the international stage (Delreux 2013: 290f.). The EU developed as a relevant
and recognised player on global environmental issues such as climate change,
biodiversity loss or the depletion of the ozone layer and played a crucial role in the
development of multilateral environmental agreements to mitigate their impacts (Vogler
2011: 358, Delreux 2013: 289).
Apparently, these actions, in particular on climate change, are predominantly influenced
by normative principles, like the precautionary principle stated in the SEA and the
political perception of scientific findings. The EU’s action on the international level was
also enhanced by its commitment to “’effective multilateralism’ as a guiding principle
of international policy- and law-making” (Van Schaik/Schunz 2012: 173).
Consequently, this desire for strong global governance led the EU to an active
involvement in the process towards and in the UNFCCC. The following outline of the
EU’s role therein proceeds chronologically in five phases, according to important steps
in the development of the Convention.2
Emergence of the Convention (1990-1992)
In advance to the adoption of the UNFCCC, the EU’s dynamic in the environmental
policy field expressed itself also in its involvement in the international process from the
2 The phases build on the ones proposed in Schunz 2012, VanSchaik/Schunz 2012 and Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013. For a detailed timeline of the UNFCCC and related processes see http://unfccc.int/timeline.
5
late 1980s onwards. Not yet recognised as a distinct entity, the EU participated
indirectly through its MS in the preparation of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee (INC). The INC was set up by the UN General Assembly in late 1990 to
develop a regime framework on climate change, strongly influenced by the first
scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which
was established in 1988 in order to research the causes and effects of an increased
global greenhouse effect. Within the INC, two negotiating groups emerged: the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for industrialised
countries and the Group of 77 and China (G77/China) comprising nearly 140 countries
of the developing world. Besides procedural matters, two topics were at the core of the
debate. Firstly, the question of “who should do what?” (Schunz 2012a: 194), regarding
emission reductions proved difficult. Developing countries insisted on a differentiation
taking into account historical emissions by industrialised countries. The EU MS
together with other OECD countries opposed this at first, but later compromised on the
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (UNFCCC 1992: 9) (CBDR),
which effectively excluded developing countries from any reduction obligations.
Secondly, the EU’s approach of “targets and timetables” (Schunz 2012: 194; Vogler
2011: 364) for emission reductions was opposed by the US, hence the final text of the
Convention only refers to a “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system” (UNFCCC 1992: 9) without specific reduction mitigation goals.
Finally, the work of the INC culminated in the 1992 Rio de Janeiro summit which
established the UNFCCC to come into force in 1994. Henceforth, the EU was
recognised as a Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO) and Party to the
Convention. This provided full participation rights for the Union and the opportunity to
cast the votes of MS altogether, without an additional vote for its own however (Vogler
2011, Schunz 2012 a, b; Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).
Negotiations towards the Kyoto Protocol (1992-1997)
One year after the UNFCCC’s entry into force, the first Conference of the Parties (COP)
in Berlin set out a mandate for a legally-binding protocol to be adopted in Kyoto in
1997. In doing so, the EU, participating as the only REIO, succeeded with its approach
of binding obligations, also by defending the “firewall” (Bäckstrand / Elgström 2013:
1376) between country blocks along the CBDR principle and the annexes of the
6
Convention. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocoll (KP) was finally adopted, setting GHG
reduction obligations of up to eight percent (-8%) compared to 1990 levels and
obtainable for all developed country Parties in Annex I until 2012. The relatively
ambitious target of -8% was weakened by the introduction of flexible mechanisms for
tradable emissions certificates however. These were conditions by a group of countries
around the US for them to accept binding targets (Vogler 2011, Schunz 2012b,
Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).
Ratifying the KP (1998-2005)
Despite the latter compromise on flexible mechanisms, the US withdrew from the KP in
2001. This posed a major challenge for the KP, as from now on all other Annex-I
countries needed to ratify it in order to meet the required share of 55% of global
emissions in 1990. At the same time, the US retreat provided the opportunity for the EU
to show leadership in the process by securing the KP ratification and operationalisation.
The EU, for instance, successfully made its support for the Russian membership in the
World Trade Organisation conditional on the ratification of the KP and engaged in a
‘capitals tour’, i.e. active climate diplomacy on all levels. It furthermore ensured the
functionality of the KP with concrete proposals at the Marrakesh COP in 2001, but due
to the tedious ratification process3 the KP only entered into force in 2005. (Vogler 2011,
Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).
Post-2012 Negotiations until Copenhagen (2006-2009):
As already foreseen by the KP and under the impressions of the new IPCC report,
which deemed the KP reduction targets insufficient to achieve the goal of the
Convention, negotiations on a second commitment period started in 2005. Due to the
CBDR-‘firewall’, the KP neither included developing countries nor the US, which is
why the 2007 COP set out the two negotiating tracks of the ‘Bali roadmap’. One on the
second commitment period for the KP from 2012 onwards, the second for a new
agreement encompassing all major emitters. The latter approach was advanced by the
EU in order to ensure involvement of the US, China and India under one stream of talks
while maintaining the CBDR distinction under the KP track, i.e. talks without the US.
However, the questions arising from this approach, in particular about the legal nature
of the new treaty, remained unresolved until the unfortunate climax in Copenhagen in
3 Russia ratified the KP only in late 2004.
7
2009 (COP15). Expectations for COP15 were sky-high and the conference not only
sparked in the number of participants, media attention and involvement of Heads of
State and Government, but also in subsequent research (see inter alia Dimitrov 2010,
Groen/Niemann/Oberthür 2012, Groen/Niemann 2013, Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).
In light of the high expectations to deliver a new climate treaty, COP15 truly collapsed.
The outcome document, the Copenhagen Accord, was not adopted but only ‘taken note
of’, as the many unresolved questions and its intransparent emergence prevented
consensus. Besides the aforementioned legal nature of the new treaty, another main
point of contention constituted the different approaches for an agreement. While the US,
Australia and China advocated a “bottom-up” (Dimitrov 2013: 348) approach to set
mitigation targets for countries - meaning every country determines their own
reductions - the EU and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) insisted on a “top-
down” (ibid.) way of targets noted in the international treaty in order to ensure
meaningful mitigation. Conditioned by repeated public disputes between EU MS and a
strategic mistake to temporarily let go of the KP as the only legally binding treaty,
which alienated AOSIS and other developing countries, the EU was sidelined in the
negotiations. The BASIC countries4 and the US deliberated a least common
denominator document behind closed doors, setting the stage for all upcoming talks:
“The Copenhagen Accord signified a new global climate order, where a system of
voluntary carbon reduction pledges submitted by countries replaced science-based
binding targets and timetables negotiated under the UN” (Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013:
1378). As a minimum requirement, it mentioned the two degree Celcius (2°C) ‘safe
limit’ and financial and technological support as political goals. In sum, the failure of
COP15 to adopt a new climate treaty was a major setback both for the UN process and
the prominent role of the EU therein (Vogler 2011, Schunz 2012 b,
Backstränd/Elgström 2013, Groen/Niemann 2013).
Getting back on track: talks from Copenhagen towards a new climate treaty in 2015
The Cancun COP, one year later, mainly served to “get the UN process back on track
after the Copenhagen failure and to make sure that multilateralism was still alive”
(Herbel 2012: 91), which was also the EU’s principle goal for the 2010 negotiating
round. That year, Cancun officially adopted the core points of the Copenhagen Accord,
thereby restoring the process in an atmosphere of low expectations. The EU regained
4 Brasil, South Africa, India and China
8
the confidence of other Parties by a clear commitment to maintain the KP, while it
adapted its negotiation conduct to the changed “geopolitics of climate change”
(Groen/Niemann/Oberthür 2012: 186) and bridged gaps between major Parties as a
preparation for Durban in 2011 (Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).
The atmosphere of low ambition surrounding COP17 in Durban reflected the different
global policy preferences at the time, in particular the fear for a repeated economic
downturn and the crisis in the Eurozone. However, the conference was the only
possibility left to ensure a continuation of the commitments under the KP, which were
about to run out by 2012. The assessment of the Durban Outcomes was twofold. On the
one hand, the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action (ADP) postponed international action on climate change under a new
treaty until 2020 while the scope of the prolonged KP melted down to less than quarter
of global GHG emissions.5 Particularly developing countries’ and observer voices
lamented a failure to address the urgency of the issue (Banerjee 2012, Dimitrov 2013).
On the other hand, many accounts praised the regained leadership of the EU during the
summit as a success. Its “leader-cum-mediator” (Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013: 1381)
strategy to combine an extension of the KP with the prerequisite for a clear pathway
towards a new legally-binding agreement and underscoring these demands through
support of renewed coalitions with AOSIS and the African group proved successful for
the Union. Besides the shrunk KP, Durban set out a remarkable step towards a new
agreement by 2015, stating the task for the new ADP as “to develop a protocol, another
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable
to all Parties” (UNFCCC 2011: 2, emphasis added). This constituted a clear discharge
of CBDR and the distinctive responsibilities of countries, opening the possibility for all
countries to take commitments under the 2015 agreement. The somewhat blurred
formula at the beginning resulted out of an informal ‘huddle’ in the plenary after
extended negotiating sessions, in order to find compromise between the US’s need for
legal range, the EU’s insistence on a legally-binding agreement and India’s (for the
BASIC countries’) concerns about possibly ‘top-down’ imposed mitigation targets for
them. Although focussed on emission reductions and committed to raise ambition
before 2020, the outcome mentions other elements6 to be considered under the ADP as
5 Canada withdrew from the KP while still in Durban, Russia and Japan declared their non-participation later on. 6 “Inter alia, on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action and support, and capacity-building“ (paragraph 5, UNFCCC 2011).
9
well (Banerjee 2012, Dimitrov 2013, Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013). Despite the
ambiguous wording, legal accounts of the ADP mandate suggest a legally-binding
protocol to become the core of the new agreement in 2015. As this remains disputed, a
package solution encompassing political decisions on the remaining elements seems
most likely (Voigt 2012).
Between Durban and the most recent COP19 in Warsaw in November 2013, talks in
Doha and at intersessional meetings in Bonn saw the conclusion of the negotiations
under the Bali roadmap and further decisions to operationalise the second commitment
period under the KP until 2020.
In Warsaw, the ADP fleshed out its workplan until 2015. The ADP negotiations towards
the new agreement take place under the so-called ‘Workstream 1’, while workshops to
enhance the mitigation ambition until 2020 are conducted in ‘Workstream 2’. The latter
is characterised mainly through technical exchange and knowledge transfer between
countries, which is why the analysis in chapter four focusses on the former. Concerning
this workstream, Warsaw specified the timetable for the ADP negotiations to “elaborate
the elements of the new climate agreement as of their first meeting in March 2014, table
an initial draft text by December 2014, and submit the formal draft text by May 2015
[...] to successfully conclude in December 2015” (UNFCCC 2013).
COP19 furthermore introduced “intended nationally determined contributions” (ibid.)
(NDC) as a term capturing the input from Parties for the 2015 agreement.
‘Contributions’ therein emerged again during a ‘huddle’ as a compromise between
developing countries, in particular the Like Minded Developing Countries on Climate
Change (LMDC)7, and developed countries, including the EU. Similar to the Durban
compromise this term was introduced last-minute and left the question of the pledges’
legal status open, in contrast to the term ‘commitments’ argued for by the EU.
Moreover, ‘nationally determined’ depicts the bottom-up character of the agreement
sought for by 2015 as introduced by the Copenhagen Accord, while dealing with the
question of differentiation was strategically avoided. Instead, LMDC argued for a
continued differentiation along the Annexes of the Convention and its CBDR principle
(ENB 2013: 29f.). This concludes the chronological review. In sum, today’s talks are
characterised by a different geopolitical context than twenty years ago, although the
issue of differentiation for binding commitments and hence CBDR remains contentious 7 The group consists of 18 countries: Bolivia, China, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Mali, Nicaragua, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Venezuela.
10
between Parties.8 The short-term circumstances of ADP 2-4 are further elaborated in
chapter 4.1.
2.2 Literature Review: Research on the EU’s global role
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework and a brief overview of the State of the
Art of research on the EU’s global role. It strives for an integrated perspective on the
literature, building the foundation for the approach taken which will be further
elaborated on in chapter three.
Research on the EU as an international actor developed in two strands of literature, one
originated from scholarly interest in the EU and its external relations, the second from a
broader interest in the performance of international organisations.
The first strand evolved out of the European Foreign Policy literature, trying to
understand the EU’s ability to act on a global scale. As traditional International
Relations theories failed to adequately grasp this phenomena due to their state-centered
view on world affairs, the sui generis special nature of the EU as neither simply an
intergovernmental organisation nor yet a federal state led to scholarly debates about the
conceptualisation of this new actor. The question of how to describe the EU’s external
impacts was reformulated as ‘what kind of international power?’ the EU would
constitute. Several answers to these questions were suggested, the most known ones
being the concepts of “Civilian” or “Normative Power Europe” (Niemann/Bretherton
2013: 263f., Herbel 2012: 6). They conceive of the EU as a rather non-military power,
aiming at effective international legal governance by transferring the EU norms of
democracy and human rights to the international arena. Although criticised by scholars
for lack of empirical evidence and subject to ongoing reformulations, they retain
relevance for the EU’s self-perception as an actor, in particular in the case of climate
change (VanSchaik/Schunz 2012, Herbel 2012, Niemann/Bretherton 2013).
Another understanding of the EU’s role derives from the literature on international
negotiations. Here, the EU is understood as a “bargaining power” (Meunier 2000) able
to get as much as possible out of an agreement for both Parties (Herbel 2012: 8).9
8 Further review of the climate-specific policy research is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a recent Special Issue of ‘Climate Policy’ (Eds. Streck/Terhalle, vol. 13(5), 2013) summarises the current debate from a scholarly perspective, with a focus on policy advice. 9 Bargaining theory has implicit relevance for the concept of negotiating effectiveness/performance, set out in Chapter three.
11
Whereas the studies mentioned so far shed light on the EU’s role in world affairs, they
all take EU actorness as given without further scrutinizing this assumption. “Yet, [...]
studies contesting the legitimacy and impact of EU foreign policy suggest that perhaps
the second step was taken before the first” (Niemann/Bretherton 2013: 264).
Understanding the EU as an international actor today, requires to further research its
very basis, namely the EU actorness, or, to put it differently, answer the question ‘Is the
EU an international actor?’ Therefore, recent literature revisited the concept of actorness
(cf. Niemann/Bretherton 2013), also devoting attention to the EU’s role in international
climate politics (Herbel 2012, Groen/Niemann 2013, Bretherton/Vogler 2013).
The idea of actorness was first introduced as “actor capability” by Sjösted (1977: 16).
His notion comprised a distinctive, active and conscious engagement vis-à-vis other
actors in the international arena. Furthermore, Sjösted assumed some characteristics
traditionally devoted to states, like a certain degree of autonomy. Hence, for the EU to
be able to interact with its state counterparts on the international level, stronger
integration in a supranational system was supposed to enhance EU actorness. But as a
classic work introducing the term of actor capability in general, Sjösted’s concept is not
easily operationalisable.
Therefore, the conceptualisation of Jupille and Caporaso (1998) contributed
substantially to the applicability of actorness. Aiming at global environmental politics
during the 1990s, with a focus on the 1992 Rio de Janeiro-summit, they developed four
relative, interdependent criteria to measure EU actorness: “Recognition”, defined as
“acceptance and interaction by and with an organisation and other Parties” (ibid: 214);
“Authority”, meaning the legal competence to act on an issue but also comprising
informal power through an advantage in knowledge for the European Commission;
“Autonomy” of the EU as an independent institution distinctive from member states and
able to act differently and “Cohesion”, as an internal dimension with four different
subcategories10 enabling the EU to act together towards a common goal (ibid: 214ff..).
The clear structure of Jupille and Caporaso’s approach lends itself to adaptation to
specific cases (see Groen/Niemann 2013, Herbel 2012), but was critisized for neglecting
the international context in which actions take place.
10 1) “value cohesion”: basic goals. 2) “tactical cohesion”: ability to create coherence of goals. 3) procedural cohesion: clear “rules of procedure” how to deal with disputes. 4) Output cohesion: ability to formulate a common position. (Jupille/Caporaso 1998: 214ff. and Niemann/Bretherthon 2013:265)
12
This international context in turn constitutes the core for more constructivist approaches
like the one put forward by Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 2013). They suggested an
interlinked approach of three concepts, namely Opportunity, Presence and Capability.
The aforementioned international context constitutes the “Opportunity structure” (2006:
24), framing all possibilities for EU external action, for instance through the perceptions
of the EU by other actors in the international arena. “Presence” means the passive
“ability of an actor [...] to exert influence beyond its borders” (Bretherton/Vogler 2006:
24, 2013: 376). The concept of capability builds on Sjösted’s work, taking into account
the internal factors enabling action, but also the external framework of Opportunity and
Presence. Recent refinements point out the significance of coherence between different
institutions and EU MS, as well as a consistent policy framework and ‘toolkit’ to take
action (ibid: 2013).
So far, the literature tried to grasp the EU’s role in the world. But after establishing the
EU as an actor in international politics,11 the next question logically arises: Do the EU’s
actions matter?
The conceptual answer to this question was the term ‘effectiveness’, also responding to
the emergence of the EU’s goal to achieve ‘effective multilateralism’ in the early
2000’s. Whereas actorness looked at the capability to act or the “input side”
(Groen/Niemann 2013: 311), effectiveness is concerned with the “output side” (ibid.) of
international processes and most commonly understood in terms of “goal attainment”
(Jørgensen/Oberthür/Shahin 2011, Niemann/Bretherton 2013, Groen/Oberthür 2013,
Oberthür/Rabitz 2014). This understanding stems from the literature on international
regimes, which deemed a regime effective if it solved the problem that led to its
creation, as well as scholarship on organisational performance concerned with the
achievement of an organisation’s objectives.
The latter contributions build the second strand of literature, out of which ‘performance’
emerged as a concept. It was initially developed to analyse (international) organisations
and actors therein more generally and later applied to the EU. Despite the common
origin from research on regime effectiveness, the term ‘performance’ derived from
organisational theory and public management research. Attempts to conceptualise
performance in this field like the ones by Lusthaus et al. (2002) or Gutner and
Thompson (2010) included not only ‘effectiveness’ but also elements such as 11 See the EU’s legal recognition in the climate change regime in chapter 2.1 and the studies on EU actorness.
13
“relevance” (of the EU for its main stakeholders), “efficiency” (outputs vs. costs) or
“resource viability” (ability to raise funds necessary) (Jørgensen/Oberthür/Shahin 2011:
603; Groen/Shahin 2013: 3)
Together with the broader International Relations research interest it somehow
distinguished this strand of literature from the one evolved out of EU Foreign Policy
research. With elements as the ones mentioned above, performance approaches tried to
overcome the interconnectedness and lacking comparability of previous concepts
(Jørgensen/Oberthür/Shahin 2011). This led to a temporary parallel development of
concepts and terms, although the object of investigation, the EU’s global role, remained
the same for both tracks of scholarship.
However, the comparison of terms used in the literature (Figure 1) as well as integrating
proposals such as “Effectiveness 2.0” (Groen/Shahin 2013) demonstrate that
understandings converged and nowadays both strands share key concepts.12 Most
notably, the notions of opportunity structure and international context as well as the
concept of effectiveness in terms of goal attainment depict essentially the same,
independent of the broader overarching concepts.
Figure 1: Overview of Terms
12 Elaboration of all terms in the figure would exceed the scope of this thesis, why it restrains itself to the references given therein. It is also noteworthy that there is no ‘ideal’ set of criteria for EU performance but different approaches to unpack and grasp its existence.
14
Building upon the conclusion of the two strands of literature being mutually
complementary rather than exclusive, the following chapter will set out the concept and
methods used to assess the EU’s performance at the Bonn Climate Change Conference
(ADP 2-4) in March 2014.
3. Goal attainment, ambition and the international context –
Concept and Methods to assess EU performance
This chapter describes the relationships of the concept by Groen and Oberthür (2013)
with the terms in the literature reviewed above, before developing the detailed
operationalisation and research questions. As the final step of this theoretical part the
methods used and their respective challenges are characterised.
3.1 EU Performance – the approach by Groen and Oberthür in context
To begin with, the concept of EU performance consists of three major elements
(Groen/Oberthür 2013: 1-11, see Figure 2 and Research Matrix in Annex 1). First, EU
goal attainment depicts the ‘classic’ notion of effectiveness, which originated from the
literature on international regimes, organisational performance and was further applied
to the EU in the research field on actorness.
Second, the “quality of the EU’s policy objectives” (ibid: 6) measures the ambition
towards the core purpose of the institution, here the UNFCCC. This new element of
performance developed most recently (see Groen/Shahin 2013, Oberthür/Rabitz 2014),
building on ideas developed in both strands of literature noted above, most notably the
notion of ‘problem solving’ from research on regime effectiveness and the relevance of
objectives for their achievement from bargaining theory. This element assesses, whether
the EU’s policy aims at the negotiations would contribute to the main objective of the
international institution concerned.
Third, the “fit of the EU’s activities within the international constellation of power and
interests” (ibid: 8) consists of two analytical subcategories: As a precondition, the EU
must actually be active at the negotiation table, to assess, in a second step, its position in
the international context of the talks. The first subcategory therefore builds upon the
notions of recognition and authority by Jupille and Caporaso. Recent literature also
points out that a minimum degree of actorness is required to allow for any degree of
effectiveness and hence performance (Herbel 2012, Groen/Niemann 2013,
Niemann/Bretherton 2013).
15
Figure 2: Elements and Variables of EU Performance, based on Groen/Oberthür (2013)
In addition, this subcategory assesses by what means the EU is active at the talks, which
is necessary for the overall assessment of fit as the third element of EU performance.
The second subcategory adds the EU’s location in international context of power and
interests. This notion, in turn, is very close to the concept of “opportunity structure” by
Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 2013) and could be considered another way to
operationalise this concept, as done on a case by case basis before (see Herbel 2012,
Groen/Niemann 2013). The dimension of “Issue-specific power” in the constellation
builds upon both strands of literature. Groen and Oberthür (2013: 9) attribute the term to
both regime research and actorness (Sjöstedt). It also resembles the structural
component of Bretherton and Vogler’s ‘presence’ (2006, 2013) and ‘relevance’ from
organisational performance (cf. Lusthaus et al. 2002) literature (Jørgensen/Oberthür/
Shahin 2011). Complementing chapter two, these relationships situate this recent
approach as an innovative (re-)conceptualisation within the research on the EU’s role in
international institutions, taking into account both “process- and outcome related
variables” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 3).
Regarding the relationships between the three elements, one has to bear in mind the
overall aim of the approach to describe and explain the EU’s role in international
institutions. Therefore, all three equally form part of the EU’s overall performance
score.
As this conference contribution constitutes work in progress, the relationship between
EU performance and the three elements in terms of dependent or independent variable is
not set out specifically, which is why a final causal assessment of EU performance is
16
not within the scope of the current framework. But, considering its research context, one
can certainly state that the authors suppose a dependent relationship of EU performance
on goal attainment. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the approach already provides
clear relationships between the three elements assessed (see Figure 2). The elements of
ambition and fit with the international constellation both condition the degree to which
the EU can achieve its objectives, by setting the framework to which the EU’s
negotiation partners respond with their actions.
Therefore, the concept provides a parsimonious framework and operationalisation to
measure the EU’s activities in international negotiations, which is further specified in
the following part.
3.2 Operationalisation
The three elements of EU performance depicted in Figure 2 and outlined above will
now be operationalised for the concrete case at hand, based on Groen and Oberthür
(2013: 1-11), also pointing out the research questions behind them. Therefore, sources
of information available for ADP 2-4 and methods were allocated to the suggested
variables (see the Research Matrix in Annex 1).
The first element is goal achievement, or attainment: both terms will be used
interchangeably. It will be assessed by answering “to what extent the EU achieved its
declared policy objectives at the end of the negotiations” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 6)
through a comparison between the official EU statements before or at the beginning of
the negotiations and the outcome documents of the session. This leads to a final result
for this variable, categorised as low, intermediate or high goal achievement.
The second element is the quality of the EU’s policy objectives regarding the purpose of
the international institution, which is subdivided into two variables. Higher efforts result
in a high score, while less ambitious targets accordingly result in a lower value. Both
categories will be rated as either low, intermediate or high, and result in a combined
score for this variable, ranging from low-low to high-high, with intermediate values
respectively in between.
Absolute goal quality answers the question, whether “the EU’s objectives aim at
achieving the objectives of the institution?” (ibid: 7). It is measured in reference to the
UNFCCC’s initial objective “to stabilise atmospheric [...][GHG] at a ‘safe level’”
(Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013: 1375, cf. UNFCCC 1992: 9). The ‘safe’ level of GHG is
determined by the IPCC’s regular reports, which also include scenarios assessing the
17
amount of emissions still ‘allowed’ to avoid any global temperature increase exceeding
2°C, as adopted in Cancun in 2010. The EU’s emission targets, therefore, will be
evaluated against this backdrop.
Under the umbrella of the institutional purpose, relative goal quality compares the EU’s
objectives with those of other Parties to evaluate whether the EU’s goals are more or
less ambitious as the contributions of other Parties. Instead of measuring absolute goals,
this variable values whether the EU’s objectives are striving more to achieve the two-
degree-goal than those of other Parties, using the overall objective of the Convention as
a point of comparison. Both elements of the ambition variable will be measured through
their score on the Climate Action Tracker13, accompanied by an analysis of relevant
policy documents.
The third element constitutes the “fit of the EU’s activities [in the negotiations] with the
international constellation of power and interests” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 8). As a first
variable of this element and as a prerequisite for the whole analysis, the question needs
to be answered whether the EU was actively taking part in the talks. This question could
be answered with a simple yes or no, but the overall question of ‘fitting actions’ vis-à-
vis the international context requires further elaboration by what means the EU took
action, e.g. through proposals, submissions and statements during the proceedings.
Other conceivable strategies are: “coalition [...][or] bridge building, issue
linkage/making package deals [or] compromises” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 9-10), as well
as levering public opinion, or demonstrating power as a block.
The second part of the element answers the question, where the EU is situated in the
international context of actors by measuring two variables. At first, its position is
determined through “Issue-specific power” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 9) denoting the
Union’s relevance for the solution to the problem at hand and measured by its share in
global GHG emissions. This power can either be strong or weak.
Subsequently, the variable “Interests” (ibid: 9) answers the question where the EU is
situated in the constellation of interests vis-à-vis other Parties. The position of interests
can be determined for each agenda item and against the background of the current status
quo. In order to do so, the spectrum of interests encompassing all major players needs to
be explored to define the EU’s location. Positions can either aim at changing the status
quo of negotiations, and can therefore be progressive, or trying to keep the current state
and be conservative accordingly. Bargaining theory sets out that a progressive position 13 An interdisciplinary project evaluating current emission pledges and their impact on the GHG concentration in the atmosphere. See CAT (2014).
18
is harder to achieve under consensus decision-making rules, hence it requires more
engagement in negotiation activities than a conservative stance (Meunier 2000,
Groen/Oberthür 2013, Oberthür/Rabitz 2014).
The values of both variables lead to an aggregate score depicting the EU’s role, i.e. its
position in the international context, with four possible values: weak-progressive, weak-
conservative, strong-progressive or strong-conservative.
In order to influence goal attainment positively, the EU’s role in the international
constellation needs to fit with the activities undertaken and measured as the first
variable in this element. The degree of fit of these two dimensions can vary over low,
intermediate to high.
3.3 Case selection
This paragraph sets out the case selection before describing the methods used for the
EU’s performance assessment in the following paragraph.
As a general starting point, the thesis assumes middle-ground in the ontological-
epistemological sphere, based on a Weberian notion of the social sciences. On ontology,
or the question how we conceive of “the nature of the social world” (Jackson/Sørensen
2010: 294), the thesis follows the constructivist view of a rather socially constructed
world formed by the subjective perceptions of individuals. This, in turn, is close to the
ontological foundation of the qualitative methods applied, which postulates “an
understanding of causality that acts on the assumption of combinatory, non-linear and
heterogeneous impacts of factors” (Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 35). However, this
does not preclude the possibility of finding recurrent patterns researching (phenomena
within) this world and ‘explain’ it to a certain degree in an epistemological sense, i.e. to
gain knowledge about our living environment. Therefore, the discovery of “Causal
Mechanisms” (Seawright/Collier 2010: 317) is considered possible, based on a thorough
grasp of the socially constructed world as already expressed by Max Weber
(Jackson/Sørensen 2010: 294f.).
Concerning the selection of the case assessed, it was chosen mainly due to its ‘real
world’ characteristics. As “context-dependent knowledge” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 222) is key
to human perception of the world, the following characteristics were the origin and
main argument for the focus of this case study. Besides the occasion of the twentieth
anniversary of the UNFCCC’s entry into force in 2014, the ADP 2-4 case differed from
cases studied before in important aspects: Being a rather technical, low-level meeting of
19
delegates, political salience and public interest in this specific session were low. Most
importantly though, according to many seasoned participants of the process,
intersessional meetings between COPs such as ADP 2-4 or the biannual meeting of the
subsidiary bodies in Bonn, constitute the main arena where negotiations on most issues
make substantive progress before getting finalised and signed at the summits. Also, at
first sight, the smaller scale of ADP 2-4 (see Ch. 4.1) allowed for enhanced formal
access to the process. It was also conveniently situated in the period scheduled for the
thesis.
Practical, ‘real world’ reasons aside the case selection also accounted for theoretical
added-value of the study. Bearing in mind the ‘work in progress’ state of the conceptual
framework, commonly used types of case studies like “deviant” (Odell 2001: 166) or
“crucial” (Eckstein 1975: 113) case studies were not directly applicable, as they build
upon an established theoretical framework able to be affirmed or dismissed. Therefore,
the primary theoretical purpose of this case study is one of “plausibility prob[ing]”
(ibid: 108). Such a probe is not yet a fully-fledged test for the concept but rather a
“racehorse trial” (ibid.). Despite being inconclusive for the theory as a whole, it
strengthens it by either confirming or dismissing some of the conceptual aspects. It is
rather economic in the use of resources as well, hence suitable for a thesis of limited
scope (ibid.).
In light of the overall research framework to explain the EU’s performance in
international negotiations (see above), the case study, furthermore, forms part of an
incremental “building blocks” (George/Bennett 2005: 76) approach to theory building,
contributing to the current conceptual debate through its findings. All in all, the thesis
constitutes a single descriptive-analytical case study, in order to probe the concept
suggested by Groen and Oberthür (2013) under different contextual conditions than
studies so far.
3.4 Methods
The thesis builds on two complementary methods, participant observation and
document analysis.
Concerning the former, observation is one of, if not the, oldest method in science but
rather uncommon in political science to date. Still, the method advanced considerably
20
since the late 1970s14 and assets and drawbacks have been identified (see below).
Nevertheless, studies reflecting the methodology remain scarce, despite the growing
amount of literature applying this way of data collection.15 It, therefore, still constitutes
a rather innovative method, in particular for research on global environmental
governance (O’Neill et al. 2013: 450, Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 67-74, Schöne
2003, Dargie 1998).
Despite its shortcomings regarding the conventional quality criteria for (quantitative)
research (reliability, validity) inherent to all qualitative methods the main benefit of
observation is the consideration and inquiry of contextual data. Observing informal
interactions, getting an impression of the situation and the atmosphere as the “affective
component” (Schöne 2003) enables insights into processes like negotiations which other
methods do not provide. Combined with other data sources, such as document analysis,
observation is also capable of producing valid and reliable findings (Dargie 1998).
However, significant challenges in the implementation of the method remain and are
most likely the main reasons for its limited use. The most obvious constrains are the
limited timeframe available for observation and the high costs affiliated with it. The
researcher is unable to conduct observation at all times and, therefore, needs to identify
certain points in time for it. Nonetheless, as soon as the scholar decides for the method,
preparation and the actual observation phase become a ‘full-time job’, also bearing
additional expenditures like accommodation, transport and alike. Most important for the
substantial quality of the study is the question of access though. Administrative efforts
aside, the role of trust to gain valuable insights cannot be overestimated (Dargie 1998,
Schöne 2003, Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 68). Helpful tools to achieve a
meaningful data record are chronological notes, which, besides substantial information
on statements, should also encompass impressions and facts about the location, room
arrangements and access modalities of the observation. To ensure an adequate focussed
assessment of the variables derived from theory, a research matrix gives valuable
guidance during the implementation phase (Dargie 1998, Schöne 2003, see Annex).
Now what type of observation is applied for this thesis? There are five defining pairs of
dimensions commonly mentioned in the literature: “covert vs. open; systematic vs. non-
systematic; natural vs. artificial; self vs. external and non-participant vs. participant
14 The first ground-breaking study by Richard Fenno “Home style: House Members in their districts” researched US-congressmen and their relationships with their constituency, extensively using participant observation for the first time in 1978. 15 On observation of the climate change regime, see inter alia Dimitrov 2010; Bannerjee 2012; Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013; Groen/Oberthür 2014 and Dimitrov 2013: 347 for additional contributions.
21
observation” (Schöne 2003). At first sight, the study, therefore, classified as an open,
systematic, external participant observation in the ‘natural’ circumstances of real
negotiations. However, considering the ‘subdimension’ of an active vs. a passive
participation (Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 70), it was characterised through a
passive role during the talks with the observer ‘covert in the crowd’. “[T]he boundary
between participant and nonparticipant observation is thus not a clear one” (Lewis-
Beck/Bryman/Liao 2004: 798). For the sake of a distinct understanding, this study
therefore applies ‘observation’ and ‘participant observation’ exchangeable, in the sense
of “a method of data collection in which the investigator uses participation in an area of
ongoing social life to observe it.” (ibid: 797). The practical implications of the method
are reflected in chapter 4.6.
Regarding the complementary method of document analysis, this is foremost used in
order to verify the notes taken during the observation through secondary documents. It
roughly follows the idea of “process tracing” (George/Bennet 2005: 205-232; Herbel
2012: 27-30). Thus, documents were located in the observation context to cross-
reference and thereby ensure validity of notes and interpretations, yet generally taken
“at face value” (Groen/Oberthür 2014: 2) without considering the intentions or strategic
implications behind them, as this would have gone beyond the scope of this thesis.
4. The EU’s performance at the Bonn Climate Change
Conference in March 2014
Before assessing the EU’s performance at the fourth part of the second session of the
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-4) in
March 2014 through the concept outlined above, the next paragraph will briefly
describe the context of these negotiations.
4.1 Negotiation setting and political context
Since 2012, as described in chapter 2, the ADP constitutes the key arena of current
UNFCCC talks, with the task to achieve a broad, inclusive and accepted outcome at the
Paris summit in 2015. In order to achieve this, the ADP is chaired by two co-chairs,
proposed by Parties and elected for every session. Since the start of the ADP’s second
session in May 2013, it is co-chaired by Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) and
22
Artur Runge-Metzger (EU).16 The fourth part of the second session (2-4) took place in
the World Conference Center Bonn (WCCB) from Monday, 10 March to Friday, 14
March 2014. Being an intersessional meeting of only one Subsidiary Body to the
Convention, ADP 2-4 was of a rather small size, counting a total amount of 879
participants (ADP 2014a). The daily schedule started with a three hour session at 10.00
a.m., succeeded by a two hour lunch break. Both in the morning and noon meetings of
groups of Parties took place. Besides the formal opening and closing plenaries, each
session was attributed to a specific topic related to the elements of the ADP’s mandate
from Durban (see Annex 2).
Despite this small absolute number, the former German Federal Parliament buildings
proved to be insufficient for the usual procedures of the meeting. The big plenary hall,
in which both opening and closing plenary took place, was the only room capable of
hosting all Parties and observers. The Group of 77 and China, being the group including
most Parties, used this room for their coordination meetings during the lunch break, as
there was no separate room available. Their extensive discussions about procedural
matters (see 4.3.2) resulted in daily delays to the formal negotiating schedule of up to
sixty minutes and hence even longer negotiating days with formal consultations running
until 7.00 PM. On a more positive note, this ‘waiting time’ allowed for informal talks
with delegates in front of the plenary hall, through which relevant background
information on the proceedings was gathered (e.g. internal coordination of EU MS, see
below). However, in addition to the inconvenient delays, the second plenary room,
(Wasserwerk) used for consultations on the first two days was heavily criticised by
Parties for its size as not even all Parties could have a seat at the table due to lack of
space. Although this was intended by the co-chairs to some extent in order to accelerate
debate by means of a more intense atmosphere, this room-arrangement was rejected by
Parties as non-inclusive. To avoid further complaints distracting from substance, the
rooms were switched from Wednesday onwards, to allow for all Parties to have a seat in
the big plenary of the WCCB for talks on Workstream One.
The talks were conducted in the negotiating mode of “open-ended consultations”,
described by co-chair Runge-Metzger during the Opening Plenary as a formal
16 The EU’s potential influence through Artur Runge-Metzger (the former EU lead negotiator) is not further examined in this thesis, although some research points to a non-negligible “power of the chair” (see inter alia Tallberg, Jonas (2010): The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation. ISQ vol. 54). However, this might be counter-balanced by the fact that Runge-Metzger was conceived as an ‘EU-chair’ by developing countries, rather than an impartial ADP co-chair, as some participants noted.
23
negotiating mode, open to observers and not ‘endless’ but clearly directed towards
progress on the ADP’s mandate from Durban. Restating the positive spirit of
compromise after COP19 in Warsaw, he, furthermore, referred to the glass-walls of the
venue as a symbol of transparency and trust, which could motivate delegates to engage
with each other in good faith. Stressing this point seemed appropriate to start, bearing in
mind the overall political environment of the talks. Shortly before ADP 2-4, leaked
documents revealed the US spied on other Parties during the pivotal Copenhagen
Climate Summit in 2009 and the Crimean crisis sparked concerns over a new Cold War
(The Guardian 2014a, b). This external political landscape, that plagued the world in the
lead up to and over the duration of the talks also contributed to a lack of trust between
Parties, apart from the substantial disputes outlined below (RTCC 2014a). However, on
a more positive note, the European Commission’s (2014a) Proposal for a 2030
emissions reduction target showed some movement in the EU’s climate politics. Yet,
the simple announcement with Heads of State and Government to debate the proposal
only one week after ADP 2-4 concluded, did not build enough momentum to overcome
the ‘firewall’ divide about differentiation between countries during the talks in Bonn.
The following paragraphs will assess the variables outlined in chapter 3.2 by answering
the research questions stated therein. These are based upon information gathered during
the participant observation in Bonn (see Annex for notes and research matrix) as well as
the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB 2014) and the summaries of the talks by the Third
World Network (TWN 2014). As explained in chapter 2.1, the analysis will focus on the
talks under Workstream One, as Workstream Two explicitly aimed at technical
exchange and hence no negotiation performance would be assessable.
The order in which the variables are assessed is generally interchangeable, as they all
contribute to EU Performance. However, both the quality of the EU’s policy objectives
and the fit of the EU’s activities with the international context condition the EU’s goal
achievement. Therefore, they are determined in advance to goal attainment as the last
paragraph.
4.2 Quality of the EU’s policy objectives
This category assesses, how ambitious the EU is in achieving the objectives set out by
the Convention, that is to limit global warming to a maximum of two degree Celcius
(2°C) compared to pre-industrial levels. The assessment of ambition, or quality of
24
policy objectives is based on the assumption that more ambitious goals are more
difficult to achieve in a consensus based decision-making process than less ambitious
ones, as outlined in chapter three. The urgency of climate change furthermore requires
timely action. Hence, ambition constitutes a relevant aspect of credibility because it
matters if a party is really willing to act upon the issue.
It is also noteworthy that the current global emissions pathway does generally not meet
the landmarks towards a stable climate as identified by the IPCC. On the contrary, to
date climate policies are bound for global warming to exceed 3°C compared to 1900, so
worldwide ambition is quite low and does not react to climate change to the extent
deemed necessary by science (CAT 2013, Groen/Oberthür 2014 IES Policy Paper).
4.2.1 Absolute quality
The category of absolute quality asks if the EU’s current policy objectives are in line
with the acknowledged 2°C goal. It, therefore, depicts the EU’s ambition to the
overarching objective of the Convention. The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) rates the
current internally legally binding EU objective of GHG emission reductions of 20%
until 2020 compared to 1990 levels as “inadequate” regarding the 2°C goal. However,
the adopted option for a 30% reduction for 2020, which is conditional on international
action, i.e. an agreement enshrining efforts from other Parties, would place the EU close
to “sufficient” reductions (CAT 2013). With already 17% of reductions achieved until
2011, the EU is also about to overachieve its -20% target. The European Commissions’
impact assessment for the proposed 2030 target of -40% GHG emissions, therefore
states that the EU’s efforts would be coherent with the global 2°C goal (European
Commission 2014b: 15, 48). This assessment is based on the 80% reductions target for
2050 agreed in 2011 and modelling assumptions such as converging national and
sectoral carbon prices. Opposing the European Commissions’ assessment other
accounts consider at least -95% emissions for 2050 necessary in order to achieve the
2°C goal, which would require the EU to achieve a minimum reduction of 55% by 2030
(CAN Europe 2014). Last but not least, the -40% by 2030 target to date is only a
Commission proposal and the decision upon this has just been postponed until October
2014 (RTCC 2014b). Therefore, the only valid climate policy for the EU to date
remains the 2020 package. Although the -20% target is insufficient to achieve the 2°C
goal, the favourable implementation record and ‘overachievement’ results in an
intermediate level of absolute ambition or policy quality.
25
4.2.2 Relative quality
The level of relative quality of policy objectives answers the question, whether the EU’s
policies are more ambitious than those by other Parties in light of the 2°C goal.
The CAT (2013) analysis rates the US and China as “inadequate” regarding the 2°C
ceiling, with the US voluntary pledge representing a mere 3% cut in GHG emissions
compared to 1990 levels. Even this minimal pledge is deemed difficult to achieve for
the US. For China, however, the rating is mainly based on the uncertainty evolving out
of the data-insecurity of China’s current pledge to almost halve its emissions intensity,
i.e. the amount of GHG per unit in GDP growth. As the EU’s absolute ranking was
intermediate and both the US and China have to be considered low in this respect, the
EU’s relative ambition, therefore, assumes a high score.
In order to have a common reference framework for the analysis, the EU-US-China
‘triangle’ is continuously assessed, although the picture of the EU as a relative
frontrunner does not live up to global realities. Already within the countries assessed by
the CAT, all BASIC countries except for China outrun the EU with a ‘medium’ score
for their pledges compared to the 2°C objective. China, therefore, constitutes somewhat
of an ‘outlier’ on this variable in the analytical sample, as also meta-assessments of
different studies further confirm the wider picture that the level of ambition on
mitigation is clearly higher in developing than in developed countries (Kartha/Erickson
2011). This should be kept in mind when considering the EU’s position within the
sphere of actors. In sum, the quality of the EU’s policy objectives is rated intermediate-
high, setting the baseline for the EU’s engagement in the process.
4.3 Fit of EU activities with the international constellation.
The following part, firstly, elaborates the ways the EU undertook actions in Bonn
before, secondly, locating the EU in the international constellation of power and
interests in order to, thirdly, summarise and assess the extent to which the former fits
the latter as a main factor of the EU’s performance.
4.3.1 EU activities during the negotiations
The EU was clearly present and active in Bonn. It had already submitted its views on
how to proceed during ADP 2-4 and its work throughout 2014 in a submission one
week in advance to the session, pointing out the priorities of up front information
requirements for ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (NDC) and progress on
26
the rules base for the 2015 agreement (see 4.4). Submissions were encouraged by the
co-chairs to have clear positions before the start of the talks. Besides the EU inter alia
the US, China, the LMDC, Switzerland and even Ukraine handed in submissions before
the opening-plenary, yet, for example the position of G77/China was not submitted.17
The EU also regularly delivered statements in plenary while also engaging in informal
debates during the welcome reception and through meetings in groups of Parties such as
those of the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action.18 Regarding the strategies
applied by the EU, the picture emerging during the observation was a mixed one. On the
one hand, it appeared as if the EU engaged more in efforts to ‘issue-division’ rather than
issue linkage, advocating a clear distinction between mitigation-focussed NDCs and
other elements of the 2015 package, such as adaptation and Means of Implementation
(MoI), in particular finance.19 No solution for these diverging views appeared until the
end of the negotiating week and at least in official statements, there were no offers for
compromise or concessions either, impairing the EU’s chances to succeed with its
progressive proposals.
On the other hand, the EU consistently spoke with one voice, only represented by the
Greek Presidency during the official plenaries (opening and closing), while all other
interventions where delivered by lead negotiators from the European Commission or the
MS on behalf of the EU and its MS. Delegates from MS informally even phrased the
EU’s policy at ADP 2-4 as ‘prohibiting MS to take the floor’. Despite some disputes
between MS, these were reconciled behind closed doors in the morning coordination
meetings and did not affect the EU’s outside image as a unified actor. This ‘secret’
internal process for compromise is vital for the EU’s perception as a Union. The
absence of internal compromise and open divergence impaired the EU’s performance in
previous talks, most notably in Copenhagen (cf. Groen/Niemann 2013, Groen/Oberthür
2013).20 While there was no direct reference to strong public support for climate action
in the EU during the talks, the European Commission released a special Eurobarometer
report only one week before the start of the session in Bonn (European Commission
2014c).
17 All submissions are available online: http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg/items/7398.php 18 This dialogue is an informal platform of 31 countries and the EU, which developed at and during the aftermath of Copenhagen. It provides a space outside the negotiations to openly discuss positions and facilitate compromise as its small to medium sized members cover the whole development spectrum. For an insider perspective of 2011 see http://intercambioclimatico.com/en/2011/02/02/the-cartagena-dialogue-a-sui-generis-alliance-in-the-climate-negotiations/ (6 May 2014). 19 MoI include the negotiating topics of Finance, Technology and Capacity-Building. 20 Other negotiating groups face the same challenge, naturally growing with the size of the group. For an account of AOSIS see Betzold et. al (2012, In: Climate Policy, 12(5)).
27
This could be interpreted as a strategic publication in order to underscore the EU’s
commitment on climate change and set the stage for the first ADP round in 2014.
Although the EU delegates were actively engaged in outreach to other Parties by all
means, the positions in plenary statements remained unchanged (see below). If coalition
or bridge building by the EU took place in the background, this did not flesh out any
progress in the official multilateral negotiations throughout the week and was thus not
observable to non-party-delegates (see method reflection, 4.5). However, the procedural
disagreement over the establishment of a Contact Group as requested by most
developing countries could be resolved timely through compromise in the so called
“bureau” of the COP.21 Within the bureau, the EU ensured not another agenda fight
would emerge if a Contact Group would be established and, therefore, brokered a
compromise to overcome this procedural impediment (Informal NGO-meeting with
German Head of Delegation and Member of the Bureau for the EU on 13 March 2014).
This background-compromise was announced through party statements to the ADP
stocktaking plenary on Wednesday and enabled all Parties to refocus on substantial
talks for the last two days.
4.3.2 Position in the international constellation of power and interests
The EU’s position in the international context is determined through two dimensions,
“issue-specific power” (weak vs. strong) and “Interests” (progressive vs. conservative).
Both dimensions, therefore, result in a combined score describing the EU’s role in the
constellation of actors. First, “Issue-specific power” assesses the relevance of the EU
for the solution to the problem at hand, i.e. avoiding dangerous global climate change.
As the most relevant factor contributing to this issue are GHG emissions, the EU’s
power is determined through its share in global GHG emissions.
Table 1 depicts the EU, US and Chinese share of GHG emissions worldwide adding up
to almost half of all GHG released into the atmosphere in 2010. The EU, today, is only
responsible for a mere tenth of climate active emissions, whereas the other two ‘fossil
superpowers’ sum up to more than one third of the world’s GHG emissions.
Additionally, Table 1 compares the respective share of emissions for all major
negotiating blocks. This further illustrates the EU’s decline in issue-specific power, with 21 This advisory body to the secretariat consists of elected representatives of all regional groupings under the UNFCCC and, thus, possesses legitimacy to reconcile divergence on procedural issues. Cf. https://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6430.php
28
the BASIC and LMDC countries representing three times the EU’s emissions share.
Therefore, the EU’s issue-specific power has to be categorised as weak, because there is
no need for the ‘G2 superpowers’ to take the EU into account specifically when talking
about a solution to climate change.
Total GHG Emissions
in 2010
Share of Global
GHG E
GHGE Per
Capita
Number of
Countries
EU27 4848,47 MtCO₂e 10,41% 9.57 tCO₂e 28
US 6775,45 MtCO₂e 14,54% 21.90 tCO₂e 1
China 10081,53 MtCO₂e 21,64% 7.54 tCO₂e 1
G77/China 26756,36 MtCO₂e 57,43% 5.07 tCO₂e 130
BASIC 15081,78 MtCO₂e 32,37% 4
LMDC 15656,19 MtCO₂e 33,60% 19
Umbrella Group 12609,51 MtCO₂e 27,07% 9
AOSIS 497,25 MtCO₂e 1,07% 44
LDC 2344,63 MtCO₂e 5,03% 48
Global (sum of all
countries)
46589,02 MtCO₂e
Sum EU,US, China 21705,45 MtCO₂e 46,59% 30
Sum EU, G77,
Umbrella
44214,34 MtCO₂e 94,90% 167
Sum EU,US, BASIC 26705,7 MtCO₂e 57,32% 33
Table 1: GHG Emissions 2010, CAIT 2.0 (2014)22
Second, the dimension of “Interests” locates the EU vis-à-vis the position of other
actors and their position compared to the status-quo in advance to ADP 2-4 as
described in paragraphs 2.1 and 4.1. It is composed of the ADP mandate from Durban
and the subsequent COP decisions, the most recent one in Warsaw setting the timetable
until the 2015 agreement.
More specifically on the ADP, its two co-chairs presented their views on the status-quo
after Warsaw and how to proceed from here onwards. Following the Warsaw decision
they pointed out the need to discuss elements of the 2015 agreement as of the first ADP
session in 2014 and make concrete progress on the preparations for NDC, while
stressing the new “agreement will be applicable to all Parties, [...] under the Convention
and [...] [hence] guided by its objectives and principles” (ADP 2014b: 1). Furthermore,
22 Percentages calculated by the author. GHG Emissions include Emissions from Land Use and Forestry. The total percentages exceed 100% due to substantial overlap between negotiating groups, i.e. multiple memberships of Countries, mostly between the G77/China and other developing country groups.
29
pre-2020 ambition under Workstream Two should be advanced through technical expert
meetings.
Put differently, expectations framed in Warsaw for the ADP 2-4 session were to
progress on the content of the draft agreement and the information necessary for
submission of the NDC through negotiations, while enhanced emission reductions until
2020 should be achieved through exchange of knowledge and experience between
Parties. Therefore, in advance to ADP 2-4, the status-quo and workplan for Bonn
appeared to be clearly set out.
Before comparing the EU, US and Chinese positions on the most prominent agenda
items of NDCs and MoI some general remarks seem appropriate. Opening statements
already showed the first line of divergence.23 While most Parties stressed the need to
move into substantial discussions, the proposal by the LMDC group to establish a
Contact Group once more triggered discussions on procedural matters, occupying
especially the G77/China group during its coordination meetings (ENB 2014: 17).
Informal debates on this matter drew off time from negotiations, although plenary
sessions stayed relatively focussed on their assigned topics and the matter could be
resolved until the stocktaking plenary on Wednesday (see also 4.3.1). It might well be
that the matter was raised tactically by the LMDCs to generate more frankly discussions
on substantial matters like the provision of financial and technological support as
further described below. This thought is based upon an impression and is difficult to
prove, but it seems a plausible negotiating tactic. The concern by the EU and the
Umbrella group that such intersections between process and substance could lead to a
division of debates in several sub-groups and hence loss of sight of the overall picture
underscore the rationale for this tactical move.
Also, the overall tense atmosphere of the talks (see 4.1) might have furthered the re-
appearance of procedural disputes as some Parties hoped for more concrete debates in a
Contact Group-format. The Contact Group was formally established during the closing
plenary and will start its work at the beginning of the next ADP session in June 2014. In
the end, the dispute was not conducive to a progressive outcome at ADP 2-4, although
most observers viewed it as positive step to move into the June session in a slightly
more formal mode of work. Besides the procedural questions, the insufficient room
arrangements mentioned at the beginning of the chapter and the respective concerns
evolving around them additionally put a strain on the already tight schedule. 23 See Annex 2. All statements during official sessions are also available on http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg/items/7544.php
30
Another cross-cutting, yet substantial issue constituted the question of differentiation
between countries, also known as the ‘firewall’ between developed and developing
countries and on the question whether developing countries should become subject to
commitments under the new agreement. This ‘old’ dispute already emerged in Warsaw
and came back overarching most of the discussions, with developing countries (China
and the Phillipines of the LMDC in front) requesting developed countries, based on the
Conventions principles of CBDR and equity, to take the lead in emissions reductions
and, furthermore, provide financial and technological support for developing countries
to enable mitigation. To sum it up, most of the topics discussed under the ADP
(“mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of
action and support, and capacity-building”, UNFCCC 2011: 2) interact in various
aspects, hence this analysis focusses on the most frequent and pressing substantial
intersections.
It analyses, what were the EU, US and Chinese positions on the different topics
discussed and to which extent do they amend the status-quo or, more accurately,
progress on the way towards the new agreement in 2015. Accordingly, such a stance
would be ‘progressive’ in conceptual terms in contrast to ‘conservative’ interests
retaining the status-quo.
The most obvious dispute emerged on the question whether to include adaptation as
contributions of developing countries, and, therefore, equally to mitigation
commitments, or to focus NDCs on mitigation only. The latter approach by developed
country Parties ran counter to the position of most developing countries striving for an
inclusion of all elements of the Durban mandate under the umbrella of NDCs. This
dispute reflected the overall situation of party blocks repeatedly clashing on the same
issues as in Warsaw before.
The co-chairs encouraged delegates several times to not only state ‘what’ they want to
include, but ‘dig deeper’ into substance and answer ‘how’ they wish to include them
recalling the urgency of progress on a draft text by COP20. Ignoring these calls for most
of the negotiating time, the majority of countries stayed in rather parallel talks, often
simply rephrasing their well-known positions without responding to statements of other
Parties. Accordingly, the lines of divergence mainly ran along the ‘firewall’ and
positions for all three actors, the EU, US and China, on the elements of adaptation, MoI
31
and transparency of action and support need to be classified as conservative. However,
on the last element of transparency the EU made some progressive points due to the
interconnected nature of this topic with the EU’s priority of progress on up-front
information for NDCs, the other major arena of the talks in Bonn due to its need for a
timely compromise until the end of 2014.
Thus, the EU tried to point out that the agreement on up front information requirements
would be a “technical issue, rather than a political one” (Statement 12 March 2014, see
Annex 2) and framed it as a necessity to proceed towards “transparent, quantifiable,
comparable, verifiable and ambitious” (EU Submission 2014: 4) NDCs. Accompanying
these criteria, the EU provided a concrete basis for the debate on up-front information
requirements on NDCs in its submission by proposing a detailed list of information such
as target year, sector and gas coverage and methodologies used to calculate the GHG
equivalence as a basis for discussions.
This proposal, together with parsimonious and constructive statements during the
workshop and sessions on NDC were conducive to an enhanced understanding of the
scope and parts of this important element for the 2015 agreement.
The EU’s submission included key points of the US position while providing more
flexibility to include developing countries interests. Neither the US nor China voiced
their opinion on the EU’s proposal nor made concrete suggestions themselves on up-
front information requirements during ADP 2-4 (ENB 2014: 7).
In terms of the conceptual classification, the EU, therefore, assumed a rather
progressive stance on this topic, being the only major party providing specific input to
the process.
As an example of generally hard-line positions, China requested developed countries at
several occasions to deliver commitments on financial and technical support as part of
their NDCs, also mentioning concrete amounts of finance. This, in turn, proved
unacceptable for the US which due to domestic circumstances24 was unable to grant any
further commitments on support as long as capable developing countries were not
subject to mitigation commitments as well. As outlined above, developing countries
insisted on differentiating legal obligations according to the annexes of the Convention
24 Mostly fiscal constraints, but also the still valid Byrd-Hagel-Resolution. Since 1997 this bill prohibits the US to sign any agreement not including emerging economies. Majorities in the Congress leave the Obama administration little range for climate action, which is thus constrained to executive agreements. The scope of such presidential acts won’t be acceptable to other (developing) Parties (Bang et al. 2012).
32
though. Those conservative positions of both the US and China resulted in an overall
stalemate on the issue of NDCs (CAN 2014), as the US “would rather have no progress
on information requirements than commitments on finance in NDCs” according to an
informal statement by a high ranking Secretariat official. Some observers even noted the
threat of an emerging ‘G2-outcome’ for 2015, determined by the least common
denominator of the US and China’s positions.
In sum, the EU assumed a somewhat progressive position on the identification of up-
front information requirements in the international constellation compared to the US
and China. However, the overall task to identify elements for a draft text on the 2015
agreement stalled as only well-known positions were stated again resulting in a
generally conservative international context.
Combining the two dimensions of power and interests assessed in this paragraph in
order to classify the EU’s role in the international constellation of the talks, the EU
resumed its relative position of a weak-progressive actor, bearing in mind the general
atmosphere of a “low profile event [with] muted expectations” (ENB 2014: 16).
4.3.3 Fit of activities with the EU’s role
Looking at the fit of EU activities with its role in the international constellation of the
‘G2’ US and China as major actors, the picture is twofold.
The literature on EU performance in multilateral talks so far found that for the EU to
perform well in a weak-progressive position, it needs to make full use of its ‘toolkit’ of
negotiation means. On the one hand, in terms of unity the EU had no shortcomings
during ADP 2-4, as it was fully perceived as a Union, speaking with one voice.
Likewise, the attempt to demonstrate public support as a sign of the EU’s continued
commitment to climate action and the presentation of its new 2030 climate and energy
proposal would have been conducive to achieve its progressive objectives, but was not
directly leveraged during the talks.
On the other hand, their potentially positive impacts were marginalised by the overall
lacking spirit of agreement. Although the EU engagement for a compromise on the
Contact Group calmed down the tense atmosphere, it was unable to overcome the
substantial divides between developing and developed countries. Both the strategy of
‘issue-division’ and the absence of offers for compromise in plenary, therefore, failed to
capture the EU’s challenging role in the negotiating context. The rather small progress
achieved by exchanging views on draft elements and up-front information requirements
was also conditioned across issues by the EU’s conservative position on some elements
33
(e.g. finance and adaptation in NDCs) which impaired the possibility for concessions by
other Parties (in particular China/LMDCs). In the absence of strong coalition building to
put pressure on the “G2”, for example with AOSIS and the African Group as seen in
Durban, the fit of EU’s activities with its position in the international constellation of
power and interests has to be categorised as low.
4.4 Goal attainment
Having established the surrounding conditions of the EU’s actions at ADP 2-4, the last
indicator of EU performance is goal attainment, defined as the extent to which the EU
achieved its objectives during the talks. Since the ADP talks are still characterised by
the mode of ‘open-ended consultations’, there was no negotiating on concrete text
proposals but rather an exchange of views on the different elements for the 2015
agreement, summarised in a reflection note by the co-chairs published after the session
(cf. ADP 2014c). This reflection note comprises the points mentioned in statements by
all Parties and hence does not constitute a conventional outcome document suitable for
comparison with the EU’s initial goals. Therefore, EU goal attainment will be assessed
by comparing the respective submissions and statements of the EU with the closing
statements of its negotiating partners. This results in a supplement to the initial research
question for better adaptation to the empirical circumstances. In other words: To what
extent were EU objectives reflected in the closing statements by other Parties?
First of all, in order to enable an evaluation of the EU’s goal attainment the question
needs to be answered: What were the EU’s objectives at ADP 2-4?
Its submission in advance to the session in Bonn (ADP 2014b) identified one main
priority for ADP 2-4: the topic of up front information requirements. Those
requirements need to be agreed by COP 20 in Lima at the end of 2014 to ensure timely
submission of NDCs (see chapter 2.1) based on a common information framework, for
which the EU made a comprehensive, concrete proposal in its submission. .
Furthermore, the elaboration of a rules based 2015 agreement and finding common
ground on the elements to be included therein were noted as ADP priorities for 2014.
Having established what the EU aimed at during the week in Bonn, the assessment of its
extent of goal attainment will be twofold, following its two main objectives.
34
First, on up front information requirements for NDCs: The topic was treated
subsequently in time slots on three out of five negotiating days due to constant overflow
on the speakers list and also featured a workshop right at the beginning of the talks on
Tuesday, where inter alia the EU, China and the US presented their preparations for
NDCs (see Annex 2 for timed notes and schedules). This shows the stated interest of
Parties on the issue. However, the substantial quality of party statements during the
following consultations lacked concrete proposals and exchange. Although the majority
of Parties agreed on the necessity for progress on this topic, no concrete requirements
have been established in neither Umbrella’s closing statement nor in those of
G77/China nor the LMDC. They also did not state if they agreed with the EU’s proposal
or not. In absence of other Parties’ opinions on this topic, the information requirements
listed in the Chair’s reflection note (ADP 2014c) are nearly identical with the criteria
mentioned in the EU’s submission (2014) prior to ADP 2-4. Whether this constitutes
agreement on the EU’s proposal is difficult to assess at this time. The reflection note is
simply a summary of all statements made during ADP 2-4. As no divergent positions on
NDC requirements were voiced and hence do not appear in the note, this could be a
signal for consensus. However, a final assessment if this is really the case requires
further analysis of the next session of the ADP (2-5) in June 2014. If Parties would
agree on the EU’s suggestions, this would be a major success for the EU. In the
meantime, it appears like the topic of up front information requirements on NDC was
partially overshadowed by other issues, such as the procedural debate and discussions
about differentiation and support (see above). Therefore, the degree of EU goal
attainment on this element has to be categorised as low for now.
Second, talks on the rules-base and elements of the 2015 agreement were characterised
by a broader agreement of Parties (EU, China, AOSIS) concerning the inclusion of a
compliance mechanism, to achieve accountability and transparency which was deemed
key to build trust between countries. This compliance mechanism should be built upon
existing frameworks and not duplicate efforts for transparency. Despite the Parties’
agreement on these points, countries differed on who should take on specific, legally
binding commitments and therefore take the lead. China pointed towards different
means for measurable, reportable and verifiable pledges and support for developed
countries and argued that developing countries need to take national circumstances into
account “in a manner that is non-punitive and respectful of national sovereignty” (ENB
2014: 11).
35
The general agreement by Parties on transparency measures as a crucial element to
build trust between Parties was evident in statements throughout the session. Despite
this general view of the significance of transparency this as well did not flesh out in
concrete proposals and only the EU referred to it in its closing statement, pointing out
the necessity to further operationalise it during the June session. Hence, the degree of
goal achievement on this issue can be categorised as intermediate.
All in all, countries exchanged their views on both topics prioritised by the EU and
mapped the territory for upcoming negotiations, without achieving greater compromise
or substantial progress towards the new agreement. Even the small steps on
transparency measures seem rather insignificant and, in absence of concrete proposals,
purely political. This results in an overall low score for the EU’s goal attainment.
4.5 Summary
The EU’s performance at the ADP 2-4 talks in Bonn was assessed by means of three
overall categories (see Table 2). First, EU goal attainment was low, conditioned by the
scores on the other two categories. Second, quality of policy objectives or ambition
towards the 2°C goal of the Convention was intermediate-high compared with the US
and China, while some other major players’ mitigation actions (e.g. Brazil, South
Africa, India) outperform the EU’s. This, in turn, impaired the EU’s credibility towards
developing countries which called for declared leadership through actions by developed
countries and thus weakened the EU’s position in the international constellation.
Third, the fit of EU negotiating activities with the EU’s role in the international
constellation of power and interests was low. Strong EU engagement in the process
would have been necessary for the EU to achieve its objectives out of a weak-
progressive role in the international context of actors, as the carbon superpowers US
and China don’t require the EU’s small share of today’s GHG emissions for a solution
to the problem. Accordingly, their conservative interests on NDCs clashed with the
EU’s more progressive position on its prioritised topic. Yet, the EU’s conservative
interests on other topics than mitigation such as finance and adaptation ‘spilled over’
and hampered concessions by developing countries on the EU’s priority.
Hence, the misfit resulted out of a lack of coalition building efforts by the EU in the
multilateral forum, i.e. the plenary, where Parties address the entirety of other countries
and, therefore, could convince a majority. Instead of talking ‘with’ each other, Parties
talked ‘at’ each other during sessions and seldom picked up arguments from their
36
counterparts. Lacking this crucial part of actual negotiations, also factors like public
support and unified EU statements did not cut the deal. They built a sound basis but
substantial outcomes need to develop in the plenary as part of a party-driven process
and multilateral compromises. Due to the deeply rooted mistrust, also in face of the
current global political landscape and the bottom-up focus of the process since the
Copenhagen failure, such ‘package deals’ are looked at with suspicion. In conclusion
the EU needs to re-establish confidence of Parties both in the process and in itself, by
making its own policy portfolio more coherent. Closing not only the emissions gap but
also the gap in EU ambition between different elements for the 2015 agreement will be
the key to achieve an effective multilateral process, as wished for by the EU.
In sum, the three scores add up to an overall low-intermediate EU performance in Bonn.
Table 2: Summary of the EU's Performance during ADP 2-4
4.6 Method reflections This paragraph reflects the implementation of the ADP 2-4 observation in the light of
the question outlined in the introduction, why observation is rarely used in research on
international negotiations. The reflection follows the challenges reflected in the
literature as summarised in chapter 3.4. First of all, the issue of a limited timeframe and
specific location, i.e. the selection of the observation period, didn’t bear any particular
difficulties. Most UNFCCC talks are divided into sessions of one to two weeks, which
pre-selects potentially observable negotiations and determines the point in time for the
research to take place. Most logistical expenditures are inevitable though and can only
be minimised to a certain degree, for instance by using private contacts for
accommodation. Given these prerequisites, the major challenge constitutes access to the
negotiations and more specifically insights into the EU’s appearance therein. Provided
that the researcher has some contacts in the field, for instance in accredited observer
organisations, the administrative effort to register with the UNFCCC secretariat is rather
low and straightforward. One simply submits its personal identification data and
receives confirmation some time later, depending on the contingent allocated to the
Conceptual Categories Score at ADP 2-4 EU Performance
Goal attainment Low
Quality of the EU’s policy objectives Intermediate-high
Fit of EU activities with the international
constellation of power and interests
Low
Low-intermediate
37
registering organisation.25 Having arrived, all observers receive their badge at the
entrance and are henceforth free to roam the premises of the talks, except for areas
restricted to party delegates. This is were the major factor of trust comes to play.
Despite continued approaches of delegates, also via contact persons well known in the
process, EU delegates refrained from answering substantial questions. The interaction
repeatedly followed the same pattern: Personal introduction and question, friendly
response by the delegate, glance at the badge (stating non-governmental observer) and
an immediate ‘drop of temperature’ within the conversation, which henceforth stayed
on a general level of knowledge and only partially offered bits of information. Thus,
this access to backdoor intelligence was blocked and even participants registered as
party delegates were not admitted to attend the EU morning meetings, due to the
prevailing distrust between Parties.26 On a more positive note, the observation allowed
for interesting views on informal talks and a grasp of the atmosphere which was not
transmitted like this in secondary documentation. Furthermore, informal talks and
‘corridor rumours’ were even more important to comprehend the situation of the talks,
as the official negotiation sessions did not present much progress. However, reflecting
the overall efforts for the method regarding the research objective, most substantial
documents and summaries were freely available and potential interview candidates
might be even more open to enquiry when not in session. This leads to the conclusion
that observation is a useful supplement for e.g. interviews and process tracing, but the
cost-benefit analysis makes clear why it remains seldom applied in research. The
outcomes do not counterbalance the efforts, provided that most information is
accessible without participating on site.
5. Conclusion
This thesis set out to analyse the EU’s performance in the international climate change
negotiations in March 2014. In order to do so, it first illustrated the recent history of
these negotiations, before situating the recent (re-)conceptualisation of EU performance
by Groen and Oberthür (2013) in the scholarly universe of terms. Here, it was argued
that the three overarching concepts of Actorness, Effectiveness and Performance which
25 Due to the growing interest of many stakeholders and financial constraints for adequately sized venues, the UNFCCC process has seen a harsh drop in numbers for observer spots after COP15 (see also ADP 2014a). 26 One might overcome this shortcoming when accredited as a party delegate (see the examples of Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013, Oberthür/Rabitz 2014 and Groen/Oberthür 2014). However, this requires a lot more effort in advance to prepare the observation.
38
emerged out of different research fields, converged on two major aspects relevant for
performance: the importance of goal attainment and the relevance of the international
context within which the EU acts. By adding the notion of policy ambition, the new
attempt provides a parsimonious operationalisation of previous contributions to assess
the EU’s role in climate change talks. This operationalisation together with the method
of observation was outlined before adressing the main research question: How did the
EU perform during ADP 2-4?
The EU’s performance was assessed by means of the three dimensions above, which
added up to an overall low-intermediate score. Despite the intermediate-high quality of
the EU’s policy objectives compared to the climate policy goals of the US and China,
the fit of the EU’s negotiating activities with the international constellation of power
and interests was low. Similar to the Copenhagen summit, the EU again incorporated a
weak-progressive role. The former in terms of its share in global GHG emissions, the
latter compared to the status quo of the talks at the end of 2013. The EU aimed, in
particular, at progress on the question of common requirements for NDCs as an
important part of the draft for an agreement in 2015. As neither the US nor China,
representing many of the industrialised, respectively developing countries, deviated
from their commonly known positions, the EU was unable to achieve its priority for the
ADP 2-4. This results in a low score on the variable of goal attainment and
demonstrates the high degree to which this element of performance is conditioned by
the other two dimensions. However, the analysis of the EU’s negotiating activities also
revealed shortcomings in the EU’s behaviour during the talks, mostly a lack of coalition
building efforts in the plenary. Due to the lack of trust and the ‘bottom-up’ or ‘party-
driven’ nature of the process since Copenhagen, the plenary of all Parties to the
Convention becomes a main arena to exchange views and actually negotiate. Instead of
doing so, all Parties rather talked ‘at’ each other, not ‘with’ each other, rarely
referencing points made by their fellow delegates. This deficiency of the EU to mediate
as in previous years was furthered by its conservative positions on elements other than
NDCs, like finance or adaptation, as these prevented developing countries from
concessions on the EU’s priority.
In conclusion, the EU needs to re-establish confidence of Parties both in the process and
in itself, by making its own policy portfolio more coherent. Closing not only the
emissions gap but also the gap in EU ambition between different elements for the 2015
agreement will be crucial to achieve both EU goals and an effective multilateral
39
process, as wished for by the EU. For instance, the Union could send a positive signal to
developing countries with a strengthened commitment on climate finance or a more
open position on technology transfers.
Reflecting on the implementation of the study, two aspects emerged. First, the
implementation of participant observation to study the negotiations proved difficult, as
the mistrust between Parties pertained also to observers. Judging from that experience,
it appears the method is rarely used in research on multilateralism and political science
more broadly because the outcomes in data collection don’t counterbalance the
(financial) efforts. Many well-informed sources for process-tracing are publicly
available and interviews might provide even more insights outside the ‘hot phase’
during sessions.
Second, the thesis probed the concept of EU performance recently suggested by Groen
and Oberthür (2013). As mentioned above, it provides an almost ‘ready to operate’
operationalisation, which is relatively easy implementable. By using tools like a
research matrix for observation, data sources can be allocated to the variables and
adapted to the case at hand. This provides a clear distinction between the variables for
the assessment. Reflecting on the concept in light of the findings of the analysis, the
picture is twofold. On the one hand, it becomes apparent, that the concept needs to
refine the distinction between EU performance and EU goal attainment. The current
framework does not allow conclusions how these two elements interact. Furthermore,
although previous case studies found the values of the two elements to be different, the
case of ADP 2-4 finds the score on goal attainment close to the overall EU performance
score, albeit not identical. Hence, the newly introduced element of ambition does
influence the EU’s performance, but goal attainment seems to remain a major factor,
why this relationship merits further scrutiny. On the other hand, the conceptual
assumption for the ‘fit with the international constellation’ strongly influencing EU
performance is reconfirmed. Here, the main value of the concept are the case-
independent operationalised elements, integrating previous thoughts, thereby further
progressing towards more direct comparability of scholarly research on EU
performance.
In sum, the thesis restructured the scholarly debate on EU performance, applying the
latest approach in the field to a recent case with the hope to gain valuable insights on
how the EU could further its role in the global negotiations on climate change and scale
40
up its performance in the short term. As addressed in the introduction, time for action on
climate change is scarce and global action deeply needed. Being the most advanced
project of supranational integration, the EU has a crucial role to play in the
establishment of a new multilateral framework that delivers a sustainable future for
young and future generations. Let’s hope it will live up to the challenge.
41
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Annex
1. Research Matrix
2. Statements Synopsis
3. UNFCCC accreditation confirmation letter
Annex 1: Research Matrix based on Schöne (2003)
1
Conceptual category / indicator
Variable Research Question (Groen/Oberthür 2013)
Method Information Source Operationalisation Possible Scores
Goal attainment/ Effectiveness
Goal attainment
“To what extent did the EU achieve its declared policy objectives?”
Document analysis
Submission, Opening Statement vs. Closing statements and Reflection Note by Co-Chairs (ADP 2014c)
What are the EU’s objectives at ADP 2-4? Do they appear in outcome? To what degree were they fullfilled/appear?
Low, Intermediate, High
Absolute quality
“To what extent do EU goals achieve the objectives of the institution?”
Document analysis
UNFCCC-documents and Climate Action Tracker (CAT 2013)
Do the EU’s set objectives achieve the 2°C goal?
Quality of EU’s policy objectives
regarding UNFCCC goals/
Ambition
Relative quality
To what extent are EU goals more ambitious than other parties’ objectives regarding the UNFCCC goals?
Document analysis
CAT and policy studies
Does the EU strive “more” towards achievement of 2°C goal than other Countries, in particular China and USA?
Each variable assessed as Low, Intermediate or High. Results in a combined score for Quality, encompassing all nine possible combinations of both single scores, e.g. from Low-Low over Intermediate-Low or Intermediate-High to High-High
Activities at negotia-tions
Is the EU active at negotiations?
Participant observation
Observation notes of talks (Annex 2): EU statements, reactions from other parties
Is the EU active? (submissions, proposals) What means of negotiation does the EU apply/use? e.g. Does the EU deliver speeches/hold meetings with groups? What strategies did the EU adopt/implement?
“Issue-Specific Power”
What relevance does the EU have for solving the problem?
Data analysis WRI GHG emissions database CAIT 2.0 (2014)
What’s the share of the EU’s share in global GHG emissions? Hence, what’s the EU’s position of power? Strong or weak F
it of
EU
act
iviti
es w
ith
inte
rnat
iona
l con
stel
latio
n
(see reverse)
Power: weak or strong. Position in Interests: Progressive vs. Conservative Results in combined score of “roles the EU can play: A) weak-reformist; B) weak-conservative; C) strong-
Annex 1: Research Matrix based on Schöne (2003)
2
Position in global constellation of “Interests”
Where’s the EU’s position situated vis-à-vis other relevant actors positions?
Document analysis
EU, US, China submissions and statements (Annex 2)
What is the status quo? What’s the EU’s position on agenda items? Where do US and China stand? Do positions change the status quo? To which extent?
reformist or D) strong-conservative” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 9)
Fit of activities with role in inter- national constellation
Do the activities undertaken fit with the EU’s role in the context?
Comparison of observed EU negotiations with position’ variables
Variables above, observation context
How did the EU activities match the position in constellation?
Low, Intermediate or High
Annex 2. EU,US,China Statements during ADP 2-4
Date/Session EU US China
time ran out, proceeded on Thursday on spill-over speakers list for Thursday
10 March, Adaptation
Adaptation is distinct from mitigation. Mitigation as
precaution against more adaptation. Enhance regime on individual actions, planning processes, subnational actors.Collective risk assessment and regional cooperation, EU as example for this. L&D mechanism from COP19 needs time. Methodological concerns regarding global adaptation goal.
Adaptation concerns all parties. COP19-Timetable requires to find common ground ASAP. Global goal: share questions with EU (other countries see ENB). US committed to adaptation/support, but support for whom and by whom? Adaptation can't be an alternative for mitigation in NDC.
Agrees with AOISIS, LDC on adaptation considered for Agreement as well. Treated equally. Adaptation deficit due to lack of funding. Concerned not all 6 elements of ADP mandate discussed equally. Criticises Chair. Refers to submission for substance.
11 March, Workshop on NDC preparations
not only climate + Renewable Energies, but also economic consolidation and growth. Stakeholder consultation, presents 2030 -40% proposal. Also for EU Council 21 March. Will publish NDC until 1st quarter 2015. Asks China, whether there are any developing countries willing to have a fixed target?
All parties need to contribute to emission reductions. US enhances pre-2020 ambition, power plant efficiency, HFC gases. Aims at up-front transparency rules, every country already gathers this information, should put it forward. Points towards plurilateral initiatives. Very important to overcome Annex-divide for US in order to „sell deal at home“
Lengthy (one hour) presentation, starting from principles of convention, espec. Annex-differentiation, all pillars. (Comment CJN: Much Bali, so 2007). Response to EU question: Economic development of developing difficullt to assess, therefore BAU/intensity targets easier to implement. China „does its best“. Strong wording in response (tense atmosphere)
11 March, Consultations on NDC
Contributions = diplomatic compromise to avoid blockade in Warsaw, must not forget about commitments. Basis for elements of 2015 agreement are transparency and finance. MoI are core for dev.ing countries. Convention as political and legal basis for NDC.
Annex 2. EU,US,China Statements during ADP 2-4
continued on Thursday continued on Thursday
11 March, Consultations on finance, technology and capacity-building (MoI)
Climate finance is means to an end: low carbon transformation. Member States ready to contribute to GCF as soon as ready. Also private sources for funding, to achieve greater scale for finance.
2015 agreement should entail specific amounts for climate finance by developed countries in an Annex, administered by GCF.
12 March, continued consultations on MOI from Tuesday
US takes climate finance seriously, increased funding despite domestic fiscal problems. Encourages other parties and public as well as private funds (diversity). Mitigation commitments should not be conditional on finance.Build upon existing institutions.
12 March, continued cons. On NDC
Both adaptation and mitigation part of 2015 package. Highlights stepwise approach + rules-basis for agreement. (MRV, transparency). Presents ideas for up-front information requirements (see submission), which need to be agreed pre-Lima. Technical issue, not a political one.
NDCs should focus on mitigation, componants crucial as concrete timetable for this element of 2015 agreement. Needed to build trust within talks. Adaptation no substitute for mitigation. NDC need to be quantifiable, to achieve transparency. Legal form of NDC: applicable to all, three options (see submission). Countries need to submit their best efforts right from the start.
12 March, consultations on Mitigation
Developed countries must take the lead in mitigations (Conv. = basis. CBDR, equity). GHG cuts in all sectors, accompanied by MoI.
Annex 2. EU,US,China Statements during ADP 2-4
12 March, Stock-Taking plenary
accellerate work on both WS by broad participation
of parties. WS1: consultations very helpful to come forward, clarify understandings. Transparency not enough, more rules-based discussion. We need the requirements for up-front information. WS2: key role in ADP, enhanced ambition through tech-meetings. Outcome furthers political will, crucial for June. Consultations mode worked well, but does not object to other formats. Need to focus on substance rather than process! Concerned about risk of 300-page „COP15 style“ text.
„We’re interested to have something concrete in writing to talk about” Need for broad acceptance by parties ensures
accordance with conv. Principles. US afraid of hundreds of pages of text as draft, therefore Co-Chairs need to ensure coherence. US prefer to talk about elements of text instead of concrete proposals. Look forward to careful guidance by the chairs.
13 March, continued cons. On Mitigation
(partially in NGO-meeting with German Head of Delegation and Member of the Bureau for the EU).Content of this session: ENB 2014)
New agreement should maximise broad scope of participation and contributions from all parties. Public consultative period for NDCs needs clear up-front information requirements, in order to achieve transparency and ensure equity.
(partially in NGO-meeting with German Head of Delegation and Member of the Bureau for the EU).Content of this session: ENB 2014)
Annex 2. EU,US,China Statements during ADP 2-4
Note
13 March, cons. On Transparency and Support
Rules based regime (COP19 dec.) is key element for 2015. Comprising MRV, accounting for mitigation, compliance to hold countries accountable for what they do. Ensure no double counting. IPCC serve as guidance Different types of commitments, have different types of information submitted with them. Work on transparency both inside and outside convention should be recognised, avoid duplication of work. Agreement needs to have a robust rule basis.
continued on Friday: Distinction necessary between NDC (submitted before March 2015) and elements of whole agreement. Package will include adaptation. NDC = mitigation, in order to assess aggreggate effect of contributions. Therefore schedules (see submission). Peer review system like IPCC would ensure flexibility, US commited to their level of transparency. Current MRV system already provides a lot.
Purpose is to confirm every party fullfills their commitments under the convention. based on existing frameworks (e.g. biannual reviews)enhance MRV.Not wait for others to actDeveloping countries will enhance their transparency only in amount regarding national circumstances.Without a clear roadmap developing can’t contributeResponse measures are also part of NDC
Blank cells signify the party did not make a statement during the session. All Daily Programs of ADP 2-4, including scheduled times of the sessions, are available here: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_mar_2014/meeting/7979/php/view/dailyprogramme.php