The Essence of Aritotle's Zoology

The Essence of Aritotle's ZoologyAuthor(s): Vernon PrattSource: Phronesis, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1984), pp. 267-278Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182206 .

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The Essence ofAritotle's Zoology

VERNON PRATT

After a long period in which Aristotle's contribution to the study of living things was treated with reverential incomprehension,' there have been steps recently2 to recover its sense.

It is certainly not profitable, of course, to look for Aristotelian 'anti- cipations' of modern discoveries and to base a claim for his modern interest on those sort of grounds. But it is possible to show that Aristotle had an approach to the living thing (though he concentrated rather exclusively on animals) that is strikingly contemporary, and that, because he thought so powerfully, he was able to explore the implications of this conception with a clarity that is indeed still arresting today.

In various passages throughout the 'biological' works, and indeed throughout the corpus, Aristotle makes it clear that the key to understanding an animal is, in his view, the identification of its 'end'. 'Nature' he says famously at one point, 'does everythingfor the sake of something' (De Partibus Animalium I 641b 11, 12), and he makes it clear throughout De Partibus A nimalium that the animal and its structure are not exceptions.3

Moreover, it is the animal's for-the-sake-of-which that must be grasped first if anything else about it is to understood, because it is of course its 'purpose' which will explain its having whatever features it has.4 Here is Aristotle making the general point:

In quotations from De Partibus Animalium and Metaphysics the translations are by Balme and Ross respectively, except where otherwise stated. Translations of other passages are from the editions mentioned in the list of references. I A modern example of this approach is offered by Slaughter, Ch. I. 2 Notably Grene, Balme (1) and (2), Barnes and Pellegrin. 3 E.g. 'Now, as each of the parts of the body, like every other instrument, is for the sake of some purpose, viz. some action, it is evident that the body as a whole must exist for the sake of some complex action' (PA I 645b 16-18 trans. Peck). See also PA I 640b 17-23; 641b 11; and 645b 20. 4 E.g. 'Hence we should if possible say that because this is what it is to be a man, therefore he has these things: for he cannot be without these parts' (PA I 640a 33f trans. Balme).'. . .

Phronesis 1984. Vol. XXIX/3 (Accepted March 1984) 267



. .. since we see more than one cause in connection with coming-to-be in nature, for example the causefor-the-sake-of-which as weH as the causefrom which comes the beginning of the movement, we must be clear about these too, as to which sort of cause is naturally first and which second. First is evidently the one we callfor the sake ofsomething. For this is the definition, and the definition is the beginning alike in things composed according to an art, and in things composed naturally (De Partibus A nimalium I 639b 1 1-16).

As far as an animal is concerned, its 'end' is identified with some kind of 'action' or 'activity':

Now, as each of the parts of the body, like every other instrument, is for the sake of some purpose, viz. some action, it is evident that the body as a whole must exist for the sake of some complex action (De Partibus Animalium I 645b 15f, translated by Peck)

- or, as Balme prefers to translate it, 'for the sake of a full activity'.5 Commentators have often taken this to mean that an animal's 'end', for

Aristotle, is something wholly to do with behaviour. For example, Stephen Clark, who interprets Aristotle as maintaining that an animal's end is its 'ergon'(often translated asfunction), concludes that 'the ergon of a variety of living creature .. . is the particular form of life, of activity which 'makes sense' of its structure'.6

An animal's 'end' cannot be defined solely in terms of its activities, however, if we are to do justice to the consistent importance Aristotle attaches to the physical make-up of animals - for example, when he says at Historia Animalium 491a 12ff that in discovering the causes of the differences between animals, the first thing to do is to consider their parts. If we accept that for Aristotle the 'end' of an animal gives its definition7 attributing to him the view that an animal's 'end' is to be behaviourally defined would be to commit him to regarding physical constitution as entirely incidental to what made an animal the animal that it was.8

the body ... is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts are for the sake of the functions in relation to which each has naturally grown. Therefore we must first state the activities, both those common to all and those that are generic and those that are specific' (PA I 645b 18-22 trans. Balme). See also PA 641a 15-17; 640a 33, 34. 5 Balme (1), p. 19. see also Met 1050a 22 ('For the action is the end'). 6 Clark, p. 16. And if the equation ofform with end (in the case of an animal) is accepted - see below - the claim of Nicholas White is a further illustration: 'Aristotle is often ready to think of the form of a thing, especially a living thing, as its characteristic way of behaving . . .' (White, p. 194). 7 'First <in priority> is the one <i.e. the cause> we call for-the-sake-of-something. For this is the definition. . .' (PA I 639b 14, 15 trans. Balme). 8 Which he clearly does not - see e.g. PA I 640a 33.

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It is, indeed, possible to put a finer point on this difficulty, for Aristotle explicitly recognises the occurrence of analogies in animal structures - where a part in one animal is not similar to but carries out the same function as a part in another.9 This commits him to the conceptual possibility of two animals engaging in the same pattem of activities but with parts that differ analogously. But if animals were defined in terms of their pattern of activities, such a possibility would not be there.'0

If it is wrong to understand an animal's 'end' simply at its pattern of life, how is it to be understood?

The 'complex action' or 'full activity' for the sake of which, Aristotle tells us at De Partibus Animalium I 645b 17, the body of an animal exists, has often been construed by commentators as function." Aristotle himself avers in Nicomachean Ethics that as far as man is concerned, at any rate, the good - that is, the end - would seem to reside in his 'function (ergon) or activity (praxis)': just as the good of a flautist, for example, clearly resides in his function or activity (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b 25-33).12

Two things, however, stand in the way of this interpretation. The first is the fact that the human being could only be said to have a function if it were part of some larger working whole, or if it were an artifact built for a purpose: and it is not at all obvious that Aristotle thinks of the human being as either.

Second, there is the awkwardness of Aristotle's reference here to two notions, to function or activity, ergon or praxis: as though neither term caught exactly the concept he was striving after.

Hardie is one of many commentators who have ignored the second point and taken the first to mean that Aristotle was simple mounting an invalid argument at this point:

... it is not natural to speak as if the fact that the eye can be thought of as having a function, or the fact that a cobbler has one, creates a presumption that the whole man is not functionless ... It is only the fact that the eye and hand are parts of the body that makes it possible to think of them as tools. My whole body is not like a tool ... I may misuse my hands in playing a golf shot; but I do not use, or misuse, my body to play golf with. That is not what it is for. It is not for anything.13

9 PA I 644b 10- 15; 645b 9-1 1. 10 Cf. Met Z 1036b 24-31; but see also 1036b 4-6. I Grene apparently accepts this construal at one point (p. 133), but her overall position is close to the view I myself would advocate. However, she sees a more intimate connection between teleological analysis and holism than I do, and places this in the centre of the stage. See Grene, pp. 133-7. 12 Clark translates Met 1050a 2: 'For the ergon is the end' - Clark, p. 16; and see EE 1219a 8: 'Each thing's ergon is its telos' 13 Hardie, p. 24.

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This businesslike riposte neglects, I think, a way of looking at living things that has been fostered in recent times within biology but which Aristotle in his time may well have been seeking to articulate. It is a conception that Hardie himself invokes, in a somewhat grudging fashion, when he grants that it is indeed 'intelligible that the eye or the hand, or even the brain, should be regarded as analogous to instruments'.14 In other words, it is intelligible to speak of these organs as havingfunctions. But what sanctions the ascription of a function to a part is the ascription of a goal to the whole. Hardie thus acknowledges that the organism is properly spoken of as having a goal or goals, in spite of his asseveration that 'it is not for anything'.

This asseveration is, in any case, something that biology as we know it would reject. Organisms are teleological systems: they have goals, and they are made up of components whose organisation and interaction can only be understood by grasping the goals and sub-goals which they help to secure.15 Modem biology has the benefit of the theory of evolution by natural selection as well as the science of control systems to help it understand how things can have goals without being given them by intelligent purposing agents. Aristotle had not'6: but he saw even with this disadvan- tage that the only way in which animals and their behaviour were to be understood was to regard them as teleological systems endowed with goals and susceptible therefore of functional analysis.

The interpretation I would advocate therefore is that when Aristotle speaks of the 'complex action' or 'full activity' (De Partibus A nimalium I 645b 17) for which the body of an animal exists he is to be understood as invoking not so much its 'function' as its functioning. His invitation, I suggest, is for us to see the animal as a working system.

Such an understanding recognises a sophisticated relationship between structure and behaviour. A system's 'working' cannot be understood without a grasp of the causal relations that obtain between its various component parts: but a knowledge of those relations is not itself sufficient. We have to know also what the system's 'working' consists in - i.e. what

14 Hardie, p. 23. 15 For a perceptive discussion of the place of teleological conceptions in modern biology, see Beckner, ch. 6. 16 Sorabji explores the differences between the modem theory of natural selection and the ancient, with which Aristotle was familiar, and discusses their relevance for his teleology in Ch. 1 of Necessity Cause and Blame; Wieland's paper "The Problem of Teleology" is illuminating on the role of teleology in Aristotle's approach to explanation in general.

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counts as its working successfully: and for this we need to know what the goals of the system are.'7 For an animal, the contemporary perspective would be that these are the goals that the workings of natural selection have endowed it with. The highest are the goals which generate, when pursued, the animal's characteristic form of life: for it is behaviour directed towards these that natural selection has selected. Subordinate are goals to do with physical integrity and metabolic stability. My suggestion is thus that the animal's end is its functioning: functioning which consists in its parts interacting in such a way as to generate behaviour which achieves the goals represented by its distinctive way of life.

Such a conception of the animal attributes to the study of animals a double thrust. It is seen as directed on the one hand at grasping what it is that an animal's form of life demands of it, and on the other at understanding how the animal's physical organisation brings it about that these goals are achieved.18

Aristotle's approach to the animal, if this construal is right, is thus that of a design engineer. He thinks of is as having a certain mode of life, and of that mode of life setting up, as it were, the design objectives. Its parts and structure he then conceives of as being designed with the achievement of these objectives in mind. As D. J. Allen remarks of the more theoretical works: 'The general object of his Aristotle's > inquiry in the de Partibus and de Generatione is to show that the arrangement of < the parts of the animals > is such as a mind, working with a purpose in view, would produce.'"9

The full richness of this conception was not returned to until 'modern' biology was born with Cuvier, but today it belongs to the common ground. Aristotle's articulation of it is therefore perhaps of historical interest only. When he pursues the implications of his engineering approach for the way in which animals should be classified, however, he has things to say on matters that are under active contention, and they are things that perhaps are not fully taken account of by all the parties.

Aristotle's approach to classification as it applies particularly to animals has been repeatedly and extensively referred to, but seldom in a way that carries conviction. It has been very widely seen as providing the orientation of his whole interest in living things:

17 See Woodfield, ch. 7. 18 E.g. '. . . the Aristotelian concept of'for'. . . in a living thing at any rate is supposed somehow to comprise both efficient and final causes of the substance's natural behavioure (Waterlow, p. 65). 19 Allan, p. 88.

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. . . one of the main problems, if not the main problem, < Aristotle> was concerned with in his biological researches, is that of the classification of animals,

declares G. E. R. Lloyd.20 Yet for this view there is remarkably little support in Aristotle himself. Classification was once the overriding concern of those who studied animals and plants, it is true - in what Foucault calls the Classical age, when the object of the study of nature was (I would suggest) to reconstruct the great plan of Creation, and its task therefore the ordering of animals and plants into logically well-constructed classificatory schemes.2' But unless one is under the spell of that enterprise it is difficult to read Aristotle as labouring under the same enchantment.

Balme22 gives some account, in particular, of the sustained attempt throughout the 19th century to read Historia Animalium as the presentation of a taxonomy, in spite of the fact that the author's own account of the book's object is quite at variance: 'first, to grasp the differentiae and attributes that belong to all animals; then to discover their causes' (Historia Animalium I, 49 la 9).23

Aristotle's driving concern is thus not with classifying, but with understanding why animals have the characteristics they do have. But the explanations he arrived at, and the type of explanations he thought it appropriate to seek, certainly have implications for how it is sensible to classify. They have to be understood, however, in the context of his general conception of the relationship between being something of a particular sort and being something at all.

It is easy to think that grouping things into sorts is secondary, in logic, to identifying the individual things for sorting: first one assembles the individual things, and second one devises categories and assigns the individuals to them. The species of a thing can then be seen as a grouping to which that thing has been assigned.

This, however, was not Aristotle's assumption. The point that seems to inform his approach can be put by saying that an individual animal or plant, or indeed an individual object of any kind, cannot be picked out

20 Lloyd, p. 86, Lloyd's own position now is better stated in his Science, Folklore and Ideology. 21 On the concerns of Natural History see Lovejoy, ch. 8 and Foucault, ch. 5. The 18th Century notion of a 'sortal term' cannot be used in any proper account of Aristotle's view, since it imports exactly the Lockean assumption I began by distinguishing as alien to Aristotle, the assumption thatflrs:, in logic, there are individuals which subsequently have to be ascribed to sorts. 22 Balme (1). 23 Balme (I), p. 192.

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from its surroundings and 'fixed' as something that endures through time, except by identifying it as a thing of a particular sort.24

It might be thought that it would be possible to identify and reidentify a particular thing simply as a certain lump of matter, without invoking any sortal category. But Aristotle rejects this idea, as neglecting the 'separability and "thisness"' which must characterise particular things (Metaphysics Z 1029a 28, 29).25

There are two difficulties in the way of picking individuals out without recourse to sortal categories which Aristotle may have been getting at. First, without sortal categories, how could we make it plain (even to ourselves) which bits of matter were included in the entity we were attempting to refer to, and which bits were excluded? If I say I will call 'this lump of matter' X, when there is in front of me an animal in a cage, how do I make it plain what delimits, e.g. from bits of the cage itself, the stuff I am trying to call X - unless I have recourse to a sortal concept? Second, the envisaged classification will not only take time to be carried through, but will also be conceived of as applying once established. It implies therefore the making ofjudgements of the form 'this individual is the same as the one I was considering earlier'. But, it is argued, except by the invocation of prior sortal categories it will not be possible to attach clear sense to judgements of that form. As Anscombe puts it, the envisaged classification of individuals identified only by proper names 'presupposes that, having grasped the assignment of the proper name 'A', you can know when to use it again, without its being already determined whether 'A' is the proper name of, say, a man, or a cassowary: as if there were such a thing as being the same without being the same such-and-such'. But, she concludes, this presupposition is 'clearly false'.26

Aristotle uses the terms 'essence' and 'form' to refer to whatever it is that gives a thing its identity as a thing of a particular sort:

Since we must have the existence of the thing as something given, clearly the question is why the matter is some definite thing; e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing, or this body having this form, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite thing ... (Metaphysics Z 104 lb 3-7).

Today, we find it tempting to try to express the point in terms of the

24 Anscombe in Anscombe and Geach, pp. 8f; Wiggins, ch. 1. 25 See also Met 1017b 20-5; 1024a 29. 26 Anscombe and Geach, p. 8. A sustained interpretation of Aristotle along these lines is also offered by Hartman - see esp. pp. 31-3.

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conditions governing the use of 'concepts'. We might say that it is the sortal concept under which we identify an individual which supplies the necessary criteria of individuation and reidentification. But this temptation27 has to be resisted, for it would import into Aristotelian thought too sharp a distinction between language and the world. Un- happily, Aristotle's own reference to the 'definition' of a thing as giving its 'essence' (e.g. De Partibus Animalium 1, 639b 14, 15) and thus its individuality, can mislead the modern and careless reader into assuming that he is thinking of linguistic items as performing this crucial role. But he is not. When he puts his position in terms of a thing'sform it is quite clear that an animal's form is something that is transmitted in nature from parent to offspring and so is certainly not a resource provided solely by language:

... the begetter is adequate to the making of the product and to the causing of the form in the matter. (Metaphysics Z 1034a 1 5).28

The parents, the agency through which fresh matter is made into the new individual, confer upon the matter the form which makes both parents and offspring alike the kind of thing that they are.

What then is the 'essence' or 'form' of an animal? Aristotle's engineering approach returns the answer that what confers individuality is an animal's identity as a functioning system. He makes this clear, for example in De Partibus Animalium I where he contrasts his view with that allegedly defended by Democritus, that an animal is defined by its shape and colour. If a hand were so defined, Aristotle argues, it would be possible for a sculptor to make one. But a stone hand is not a proper hand, nor a stone flute a proper flute, because neither of these 'can perform the functions appropriate to the things that bear those names' (De Partibus A nimalium I, 641a 1-4, translated by Peck.29 In Metaphysics Z the point is again made in terms of the hand analogy, this time explicitly in connection with defining an animal:

. . . it is not possible to define it - an animal > without reference to movement - nor, therefore, without reference to the parts' being in a certain state. For it is not a

27 The temptation springs from a further attempt to read Aristotle through 18th Century eyes. 28 Thus the discussion presented in Metaphysics Z juxtaposes the view that the form of a thing makes it the sort of thing that it is (esp. ch. 17) and the idea that animals and plants reproduce to yield individuals of their kind (chs. 7-9). See Hartman, p. 33. Aristotle is arguing in the passage quoted against Platonic forms, not against any thesis that forms might be provided by language, but in so doing makes it clear that he would have to reject the latter. 29 See the discussion in which this quotation is embedded - PA I 640b 30-64 la 34.

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hand in any and every state that is a part of man, but only when it can fulfill its work ... (Metaphysics Z, 1036b 26f).

If we are attempting to pick out an animal's definitive or essential characteristics therefore, on this view, our task will be to work out which are importantfunctionally.

There is of course a familiar distinction, as far as any working machine is concerned, between features upon which its continued functioning depend and those which are, as it were, incidental: the colour of my car doesn't affect its working, but the presence of a fuel pipe does. Balme's comment, that 'Aristotle's zoological ground for distinguishing definitive from accidental attributes is function' apparently invokes this distinction.30 But it is not quite enough: for Aristotle clearly holds many more features to be functional than he holds to be essential.31

But there is another distinction available to one who takes the engineer's perspective between 'design decisions', as it were, that are fundamental, and those that are less so. For example, the screw-thread of the spark plugs of a car engine can be redesigned without any 'knock-on' effects: but if it is decided to have the engine fuelled by diesel oil instead of petrol there will have to be redesign of the piston block, fuel supply, lubrication system and so on.

Perhaps it would be less indulgent to find a way of avoiding reference to 'decisions' in formulating this distinction. Let us say then that in any complex functioning system, such as Aristotle takes an animal to be, there is a difference between the goal of the system, or the goal of any of its component sub-systems, and the way in which that goal is achieved. Fea- tures having to do with one of a number of alternative ways of achieving a goal might well be said to be less fundamental than features to do with the goal itself. This is the sense in which it will be functionally more fundamental a feature of an animal that it eats than that it eats plants or other animals; and likewise functionally more fundamental that an animal has to cool itself (if this is the fact) than that it does so using water or air as the coolant;32 and functionally more fundamental that an animal has to move about than that it does so by flying, or by swimming, or by walking, or by creeping (De Partibus Animalium I 639b 1). For Aristotle therefore the essential features of an animal are the ones that are fundamental from the point of view of its 'design' as a functioning system. These are the features

30 Balme (2), p. 1 15. 31 Cf. Sorabji's discussion in ch. 10 of Necessity Cause and Blame (p. 158ff). 32 GA II 732b 15ff; PA III 669b 10-14.

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that define it, that make the animal the animal that it is. And when Aristotle suggests that the study of animals is concerned

primarily with getting at the 'definition' of the objects of its study, as I observed before he has in mind not a taxonomic exercise but establishing which features of particular animals are fundamental in this sense. Nevertheless, what he says has clear implications for classification. Most obviously, it cannot make sense to impose a taxonomy which places any two individual animals having the same essence in different groups: no sense, because no such animals could ever be identified.

The functional perspective also gives Aristotle a way of construing the groupings of animals he finds in common use - groupings such as birds and fishes - by providing him with the notion of analogy: parts belonging to different animals may differ structurally and yet perform the same role. His interpretation is that in animals belonging to one and the same such grouping ('genus') you find parts that are morphologically similar; while in animals belonging to different 'genera' parts which may perform the same functions nevertheless differ morphologically (De Partibus A nimalium I 644a 16-24).

Another inference Aristotle draws is that it would make sense to have a single name covering all animals sharing an essential design feature. For example, all those animals which, living on the land, need to utilize air as a coolant rely on lungs of one kind or another to bring coolant and body to be cooled into sustained contact. Animals with lungs therefore comprise a coherent category and a name for it would be appropriate:

There is no common name which is applied to all animals that have lungs. But there ought to be: because the possession of a lung is one of their essential characteristics, just as there are certain characteristics which are included in the essence of a 'bird', the name which is applied to another such class. (De Parlibus Animalium III 669b 10-14, translated by Peck)

Aristotle has other things to say about the classification of animals - for example, he devotes Ch. 3 of De Partibus Animalium I to demonstrating that if you are to arrive at the definition of a particular animal's infima species by starting with the definition of its genus you must offer further specification of several of the generic characters rather than just one (as the 'dichotomists' maintained); and he offers thoughts about the formalities of classification systems in general in Analytica Posteriora. But concentration on these passages, which has been overwhelmingly common, focusses on a few secondary remarks and neglects the real substance of his approach to taxonomy, an approach which springs from his conception of an animal as a working system, defined by its goals and its means of achieving them.

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This conception, he clearly thought, entailed a functional basis for classification: species of animal were to be grouped according to the functional resemblances and differences they bear to one another (e.g. because air-cooling is a major design feature of an animal, animals with lungs should be grouped together).

It is in making this kind of connection, I believe - between on the one hand a particular theoretical concern and, on the other, one's fundamental conception of the animal and animal study - that Aristotle may be inter- esting to the contemporary biologist and not simply to the historian of biology. There is, for example, a contemporary school of ('numerical') taxononomy which holds that all the observable characteristics of an organism are of equal importance taxonomically, ruling out the idea for instance that the functional significance of a particular character may confer taxonomic importance upon it. Classification for them is essentially a matter of setting up groups which reflect statistical correlations between equally weighted characters. As I have argued elsewhere,33 this is a position which is fraught with difficulties: and they are difficulties of a kind that are brought to the fore by Aristotle's clear-sighted and sensitive exploration of the nature of what we now call the organism and of what might interest us about it. However that may be, my real concern in the foregoing has not been principally to defend the brave idea that Aristotle still has a contribution to make to modern biology; but rather with establishing a reading of Aristotle's work about animals and animal study which does them some justice. It is horribly wrong in my view to see Aristotle as contriving to impose on nature the rigid categories of an arcane and irretrievable metaphysic; wrong to see him as an 18th Century natural historian, studying the natural world in order to reconstruct the great Plan of Cre- ation. Instead Aristotle saw animals much as we do, as teleological systems whose working is to be understood. And his perception was so clear, his thought so powerful, that even if not of much use to biology today his writings remain a delight and an inspiration.34.

University of Lancaster

33See Pratt. 34 Jonathan Barnes helped me to put some things right, and other things better, and I'm grateful.

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REFERENCES

Anscombe, G. E. M. and Geach, P. T., Three Philosophers, Oxford 1963. Allen, D. J., The Philosophy ofA ristotle, London, 1963. Barnes, J., Aristotle, Oxford, 1982. Balme, D. M. (ed), (1) Aristolle's De PartibusA nimalium I and De Generatione A nimalium

I, Oxford, 1972. Balme, D. M., (2) 'Aristotle's Use of Differentiae in Zoology' in Barnes et al. (eds.),

A rticles on A ristotle I, London, 1975. Beckner, M., The Biological Way of Thought, Berkeley, 1959. Clark, S. R. L., Aristotle's Man, Oxford, 1975. Foucault, M., The Order of Things, London, 1970. Geach, P. T., Reference and Generality, Ithaca, 1962. Grene, M., A Portrait ofAristotle, London, 1963. Hardie, W. F. R., Aristotle's Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1968. Hartman, E., Substance, Body and Soul, Princeton, 1977. Lloyd, G. E. R., Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought, Cambridge, 1968. Lloyd, G. E. R., Science, Folklore and Ideology, Cambridge, 1983. Lovejoy, A. O., The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge, Mass., 1957. Pellegrin, P., La Classification des animaux chez Aristote, Paris, 1982. Pratt, V., 'Numerical Taxonomy: a critique', J. Theor. Biol. 36 (1972) 581-92. Slaughter, M. M., Universal Languages and Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth

Century, Cambridge, 1982. Sorabji, R., Necessity Cause and Blame, London, 1980. Waterlow, S., Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle's Physics, Oxford, 1982. Wieland, W., 'The Problem of Teleology' in Bames et al. (eds.) Articles on Aristotle I. White, N., 'Aristotle on Sameness and Oneness', Philosophical Review 80 (1971) 177-97. Wiggins, D., Sameness and Substance, Oxford, 1980. Woodfield, A., Teleology, Cambridge, 1976.

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The Essence of Aritotle's Zoology