1

The End of Anti-Suffrage Movement in Britain:

the Failure of the National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage

in 1910-1913

Introduction

The first anti-suffrage organisation in Great Britain, the Women’s National

Anti-Suffrage League (WNASL), was founded in 1908. It was led by Lady Margaret

Jersey, Mary Ward and Violet Markham. The Men’s League for Opposing Women’s

Suffrage was founded later that year. It was presided over by Lord Cromer, Lord

Curzon and John Massie. In response to the growing suffrage movement, in June

1910, the two organisations decided to amalgamate. The National League for

Opposing Woman Suffrage (NLOWS) became the largest anti-suffrage organisation.

Lord Cromer and Lady Jersey were the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the

NLOWS respectively. Lord Curzon, Ward and Markham were important members.

The major pro-suffrage organisation was the National Union of Women’s Suffrage

Societies (NU) founded in 1897. This organisation was led by Millicent Fawcett.

Members of the NU were called moderate suffragists. The Women’s Social and

Political Union (WSPU), founded in 1903, was a smaller but more radical group of

suffragists. It was led by Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughters, Christabel and

Sylvia. Members of the WSPU were called militant suffragists or suffragettes. Their

campaigns consisted of hunger strikes, vandalism, arsons and other militant stunts.

Historians generally considered the WSPU as a hindrance to suffrage movement.1

An overview of suffrage movement in 1910-1913 helps to contextualise the failure of

the NLOWS. Prior to the establishment of the NLOWS in June 1910, the Conciliation

Bill was introduced. The Bill was drafted by the Conciliation Committee which

consisted of 36 MPs from different political parties. To secure the success of this Bill,

the WSPU agreed to call a halt to militant stunts.2 In July, the Bill won a majority of

109 votes.3 Because of the lack of follow-up actions by the government, the

Conciliation Bill was again introduced in 1911. It won an overwhelming majority of

1 See for example Mitzi Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists: the Women’s Vote and the Tory Party

(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007); William O’Neill, The Woman Movement: Feminism in the United States and England (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969); Jo Vellacott, From Liberal to Labour with Women’s Suffrage: the Story of Catherine Marshall (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993). 2 Constance Rover, Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain, 1866-1914 (London: Routledge &

Kegan Paul, 1967), 129. 3 Brian Harrison, Separate Spheres: the Opposition to Women’s Suffrage in Britain (London: Croom

Helm, 1978), 28-29.

2

257 to 91.4

The year 1912 was however turbulent for suffragists. Despite the resumption of the

WSPU militancy, the suffrage movement enjoyed greater support from the

Conservative Party and the Labour Party.5 Yet, many pro-suffrage Irish Nationalists

voted against the 1912 Conciliation Bill because it might jeopardise the success of

the Irish Home Rule Bill. A group of Labour MPs was also absent from voting due to

miner unrest.6 The Bill was defeated by 14 votes.7

Female enfranchisement returned to the parliament in January 1913 in the form an

amendment bill. Despite the radicalisation of the WSPU, intensive parliamentary

lobbying organised by the NU was successful. Nonetheless, the Speaker unexpectedly

ruled the Reform Bill out of order. In May, ‘Dickinson’s Bill’ was introduced. It was

defeated by 48 votes due to the breadth of enfranchisement.8

British women were eventually enfranchised in 1918. Historians such as Brian

Harrison and Julia Bush take 1918 as the end of the anti-suffrage movement.9

Martin Pugh, however, suggests that the movement had been defeated before the

First World War. Building upon Pugh’s view, this paper argues that 1913, when the

NLOWS had lost its momentum, marked the effective end of the anti-suffrage

movement.10 This paper explores factors contributing to the failure of the NLOWS in

1913. It argues that the incompatibility of the leaders and the failure to reach a

compromise on a constructive policy served as in-built limitations of the league and

restricted its development. The inability to stir up public opinion and financial

insolvency weakened this already vulnerable organisation. However, the failure to

mobilise parliamentary support by 1913 was the decisive factor contributing to the

downfall of the league. Without public, financial and parliamentary support, the

league had lost much of its influence on the suffrage debate by 1913. Drawing upon

obscure primary manuscripts from archival collections, this paper argues that the

anti-suffrage movement had been defeated in 1913, not in 1918 as historians have

argued.

4 Ibid.

5 Rover, Women’s Suffrage, 150.

6 Sophia A. van Wingerden, The Women's Suffrage Movement in Britain, 1866-1928 (London:

MacMillan Press, 1999), 132. 7 Harrison, Separate Spheres, 28-29.

8 Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists, 87.

9 Harrison, Separate Spheres; Julia Bush, Women against the Vote: Female Anti-Suffragism in Britain

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 10

Martin Pugh, The March of the Women: A Revisionist Analysis of the Campaign for Women's Suffrage 1866-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

3

Incompatibility of the Leaders: Hostility within the Leadership

The first cause of the failure of the NLOWS was the incompatibility of the

anti-suffrage leaders. The NLOWS was founded upon the principle of ‘separate

spheres’ – the notion that ‘the spheres of men and women, owing to natural causes,

are essentially different.’11 Although male and female leaders shared this belief,

certain aspects of their views were in conflict.

To Cromer and Curzon, ‘separate spheres’ entailed female subservience. Since issues

within the domestic sphere were subjected to decisions made in the public sphere,

male leaders assumed that both spheres should submit to male dominance.12 Lady

Jersey, Mary Ward and Violet Markham, however, were far from their subservient

ideal. Whilst Cromer wished to ensure male dominance in the league, Lady Jersey

refused to concede on the principle of equal representations of the two sexes on the

Executive Committee. 13 The power struggle was so acrimonious that Cromer

lamented the decision to dissolve the Men’s League, which could have been a big

bargaining chip.14 Since female antis were anxious to secure the amalgamation, male

leaders could have pressurised them by threatening to dissolve the merger. As

explained in the introduction, the success of the 1910 Conciliation Bill injected

momentum into the suffrage movement. Yet, leaders were preoccupied by the

power struggle between the two sexes. For six months, no work had been done to

counter the initiative of the suffrage movement.15 This exemplifies how poor

relations between male and female leaders undermined the operation of the league.

In addition to the clash on female subservience, male and female leaders had

contrasting views on female citizenship. Cromer and Curzon considered women to be

second-class citizens. Curzon pointed out that women were relieved of national

duties such as enlisting, maintaining social order and paying taxes. They were

‘incapacitated from discharging the ultimate obligations of citizenships.’16 Due to

their exclusion from the public sphere, women’s national duty lay in the domestic

sphere only. Cromer wrote that men relied on women to be homemakers to

11

NLOWS, “No.52: Manifesto,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 12

NLOWS, “Nine Convincing Reasons against the Enfranchisement of Women,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 13

Cromer to Curzon, 18/7/1910, Curzon papers, British Library, MSS Eur F112/33A. 14

Cromer to Curzon, 28/9/1910, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33B. 15

Bush, Women against the Vote, 204. 16

NLOWS, “No.5: Lord Curzon’s Fifteen Good Reasons against the Grant of Female Suffrage,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32.

4

contribute to the prosperity of the state.17 These views reflect that male leaders

considered female citizenship to be inferior and incomplete. To them, the public role

of women was almost non-existent. Contrarily, Lady Jersey, Ward and Markham

believed that female citizenship was different from but parallel to male citizenship.

Markham wrote that ‘a woman’s citizenship is as great and as real as that of any

man’.18 Ward also believed in the ‘equal powers’ of the two sexes.19 She suggested

that women might fulfil the political aspect of their civic duties through local

government. The above indicates that female leaders believed that there was no

hierarchy between male and female citizenship.

These conflicting views over female citizenship exacerbated the hostility caused by

the clash over female subservience. They also resulted in significant debates in the

NLOWS (which will be explored in the next section). The incompatibility of the

leaders limited the growth of the NLOWS and served as a background cause to the

failure of the league.

The Inability to Compromise on a Constructive Policy: A Missed Opportunity

Because of conflicting beliefs over female citizenship, the league failed to reach an

agreement on any constructive policy which might have drawn the support of

moderate suffragists. To many moderate suffragists, female enfranchisement seemed

to be the only lawful way of achieving female political participation.20 In response to

this, female antis believed that moderate suffragists’ eagerness for political

participation could be diverted from enfranchisement to local government, thus

deterring them from suffragism.21 Although such a constructive policy seemed

feasible and useful, the league eventually abandoned this policy.

The first round of negotiations on a constructive policy was the debate over clause b

at the beginning of the merger. Clause b aimed ‘to maintain the principle of the

representation of women on Municipal and other bodies concerned with the

domestic and social affairs of the community’.22 As explained in the previous section,

17

Markham to Cromer, 24/10/1910, Cromer papers, National Archives, FO633/19. 18

Ibid; NLOWS, “Miss Violet Markham’s Great Speech in the Royal Albert Hall on February 28th

1912,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 19

“Against the Vote: Mrs Humphry Ward’s Address” in Eastern Morning News, No. 19330, Hull, 10/10/1913, Women’s Library, 2LSW/E/02/39. 20

Pugh, The March of the Women, 10. 21

Andrea Geddes Poole, Philanthropy and the Construction of Victorian Women's Citizenship: Lady Frederick Cavendish and Miss Emma Cons (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 53. 22

NLOWS, “Constitution of The National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage,” Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33A.

5

male leaders were convinced that women belonged to homes and families only. In

their eyes, the expansion of women’s participation in local government violated the

principle of ‘separate spheres’.23 However, female antis insisted on the inclusion of

clause b. Cromer was concerned that the division caused by this clause would

terminate the amalgamation.24 The debate over clause b could not be resolved by

negotiations between male and female leaders. It was submitted to the meeting of

the General Council. Eventually, male leaders gave into the pressure from female

antis and other committee members. Clause b was included in the Constitution after

six months of negotiation.25 Despite their acknowledgement of the constructive

policy, male leaders remained against it. When Ward tried to implement clause b,

they were outraged.

The second round of negotiations was the controversy over the Local Government

Advancement Committee (LGAC) in 1912. The LGAC was established to execute

clause b. Ward decided that the LGAC would assist non-suffragist female candidates

to counter suffragist candidates supported by the NU. The controversy over the LGAC

began when the Committee publicly supported Dr Sophia Jevons, a West Marylebone

county council candidate.26 In January 1912, male leaders condemned the adoption

of a constructive strategy. Ward assured Curzon that ‘nothing alarms the suffragists

so much’ as a sophisticated local government committee.27 Markham also wrote

that the work of the LGAC might be able to cater for ‘a large body of centre opinion

which I feel it should be our object to conciliate and detach from the Suffragist

side’.28 However, male leaders were not persuaded. After rounds of antagonistic

negotiations, the LGAC broke away from the NLOWS in March, the same month as

voting on the 1912 Conciliation Bill began. The split greatly weakened the

anti-suffrage camp. First, the independence of the Committee revealed to the public

the internal divisions of the league. Founded upon the principle of mixed-sex

collaboration, this split discredited the NLOWS. Second, supporters of the NLOWS

were shared by the LGAC. Lucy Terry Lewis, for instance, joined the LGAC as a

member of the General Committee after she was sacked from the NLOWS.29 Lady

Jersey, Lady Wantage, Gertrude Bell and Gladys Pott were also members of the

23

Markham to Cromer, 11/8/1910, Cromer papers, FO633/19. 24

Cromer to Curzon, 3/11/1910, Cromer papers, FO633/19. 25

Bush, Women against the Vote, 204. 26

Julia Bush, “British Women’s Anti-Suffragism and the Forward Policy, 1908-14,” in Women’s History Review, 11/3 (2002), 443. 27

Ward to Curzon, 11/1/1911, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/34. 28

Markham to Cromer, 10/2/1912, Cromer papers, FO633/21. 29

Bush, “British Women’s Anti-Suffragism,” 444.

6

LGAC. 30 The anti-suffrage camp returned to the state of separateness it had

occupied before the amalgamation.

The constructive policy had been intended to draw the support of moderate

suffragists. Yet, male leaders deemed it a violation of the ‘separate spheres’ ideology

and refused to adopt it. In the end, the league not only missed an opportunity to

attack moderate suffragists, but also injured itself through internal divisions.

The Inability to Stir Up Public Opinion: Weakening the Appeal of the League

One of the significant impacts of the absence of a constructive policy was that the

NLOWS lacked momentum. The NLOWS aimed to promote and facilitate the

expression of mass opinion.31 However, ineffective publicity methods prevented the

league from rallying supporters.32 By 1913, the NLOWS were unable to counter the

efforts of the suffragists.

The failure to rally the public owed much to problematic arguments. “Suffrage

Fallacies” was perhaps the most outrageous publicity material reprinted by the

NLOWS. Sir Almroth Wright was a notable physician. He explained that women could

not be trusted with political power because ‘the mind of woman is always

threatened with danger from the reverberations of her physiological emergencies’.33

Such a poorly justified argument immediately sparked public condemnation.

Representing the indignant female antis, Mary Ward wrote a public letter

denouncing the offensive remarks. Many female antis also wrote to Cromer

personally to express their fury.34 Not only did the NLOWS fail to mobilise men to

voice their view, the female antis were also dissatisfied with the league.

Apart from distributing flyers which contained counterproductive arguments, other

publicity methods deployed by the NLOWS were ‘unenterprising’.35 Public meetings

were perhaps the league’s most prized publicity method. The meetings in 1911, 1912

and 1913 brought new subscriptions and donations.36 However, because of high

costs (the meeting in Royal Albert Hall in 1912, for instance, cost GBP1000) and the

30

Bush, Women against the Vote, 246. 31

NLOWS, “Anti-Woman Suffrage Appeal,” Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33A. 32

Pugh, The March of the Women, 145. 33

Almroth Wright, “Suffrage Fallacies,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 34

Pugh, The March of the Women, 157; Bush, Women against the Vote, 228. 35

Harrison, Separate Spheres, 152. 36

Gladys Pott, “Memorandum by Gladys Pott,” Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/36.

7

shortage of speakers, the league held few public meetings.37 In contrast, the

suffragists frequently held large meetings to demonstrate public support and boost

their morale. The Coronation Procession in 1911, for instance, gathered 40000

suffragists from different parts of the British Empire. 38 The NLOWS was less

successful than the suffragists in publishing literature too. The NLOWS ran a

periodical called the Anti-Suffrage Review. Its circulation was unsatisfactory. Even

Curzon commented that the Review was ‘an unpardonable waste of money’.39 The

suffragists performed much better in this aspect. The Common Cause, for instance,

had a circulation of 10000 by 1912.40 As a result, the literature published was as

much of a failure as organising public meetings.

Despite these unsuccessful publicity efforts, the league was able to maintain some

degree of public support until 1913 mainly because of militant suffragists. Their

militant stunts in 1912 and 1913 offended the public and were favourable to the

anti-suffrage cause. However, militancy led to a decline of the WSPU. Thus, the

impact of militancy on public opinion should not be overestimated.

The headquarters of the WSPU were raided by the police in 1912 and 1913. Their

funds were seized. The publishing of The Suffragette was hindered.41 In addition, the

WSPU was plagued by internal divisions from mid 1912 as the Pankhursts proposed

an escalation of militant acts. Many members did not agree with the escalation and

quit the organisation. Internal conflict occurred again in 1913. Sylvia Pankhurst

distanced herself from the WSPU and dedicated her efforts to the East London

Federation of Suffragettes (ELFS). The ELFS absorbed many working class members of

the WSPU and was officially expelled in early 1914.42 All these incidents led to a

drop in WSPU membership and funds in 1913. Although the militant suffragists’

actions provided favourable stimulus to the anti-suffragists, the influence of militancy

on public opinion should not be exaggerated.43

The above demonstrates that publicity methods used by the NLOWS were ineffective.

37

Curzon, “Note by Lord Curzon,” 27/11/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/37. 38

Maroula Joannou and June Purvis, “Introduction: The Writing of the Women’s Suffrage Movement,” in The Women’s Suffrage Movement: New Feminist Perspectives, edited by Maroula Joannou and June Purvis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 5-6. 39

Quoted in Harrison, Separate Spheres, 151. 40

Harold Smith, The British Women's Suffrage Campaign, 1866-1928 (New York: Longman, 2010), 26. 41

June Purvis, “Emmeline Pankhurst (1858-1928) and Votes for Women,” in Votes for Women, edited by June Purvis and Sandra Stanley Holton (London: Routledge, 2000), 128. 42

Wingerden, The Women's Suffrage Movement, 149. 43

Ray Strachey, The Cause: A Short History of the Women's Movement in Great Britain (London: Virago, 1978), 329.

8

Since the league was unable to reach out to the public, mass mobilisation was

impossible. The NLOWS was left in the shade by suffragists in terms of public

support.

Financial Insolvency: Paralysing the League

Apart from rallying public support, another aspect in which the league could not

compete with the suffrage organisations was financial stability. The short-sighted

financial policy of the NLOWS led it into a financial crisis in summer 1912, which

would render the league immobile by 1913. This greatly hindered the league’s ability

to counter the Reform Bill and Dickinson’s Bill in 1913.

Cromer and Curzon relied heavily on one-off donations from the wealthy. Cromer

wrote that ‘it all depends upon what the big men give’.44 This statement concluded

their financial strategy – targeting the wealthy and neglecting the majority of the

middle-class NLOWS members. Many ‘big men’ donated under the persuasion of

Cromer and Curzon. Even though some of the donation amounts disappointed the

male leaders, they were relatively successful at the beginning.45 By the end of 1910,

the league had raised over GBP20000.46 However, amongst the ten pages of the

subscriptions, only seven donations were promised for two to five years.47 Cromer

and Curzon were apparently unaware that without renewed fundraising efforts, the

league would face a financial crisis in a few years.

By the time male leaders were aware of this impending financial crisis, funds were

already alarmingly few. In February 1912, Cromer suggested that they might need to

organise ‘a small meeting’ to determine whether to set up a committee to raise

funds.48 At the end of March, Curzon was informed that only GBP10000 was

available and half of it would be spent on wages.49 In April, Colonel Lewis reiterated

the necessity of immediate large-scale fundraising.50 Given the success in 1910,

Cromer and Curzon once again attempted to raise funds from the rich. However,

Curzon realised that ‘this time [they were met] with hardly the same success as

before’.51 By June 1912, the financial difficulty greatly undermined the operation of

44

Cromer to Curzon, 6/7/1910, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33A. 45

Cromer to Curzon, 11/7/1910, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/33A. 46

NLOWS, “Subscriptions to the Anti Woman-Suffrage League,” Women’s Library, PC/06/396-11/32. 47

Ibid. 48

Cromer to Curzon, 8/2/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/35. 49

Unknown sender (possibly Colonel Lewis) to Curzon, 25/3/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/35. 50

Colonel Lewis to Curzon, 18/3/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/35. 51

Curzon, “Note by Lord Curzon,” 27/11/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/37.

9

the league. The league could not support the establishment of new branches,

organise meetings or publish propaganda materials. This paralysis was furthered by a

decision made in July. To bring down its expenses by GBP4500 per annum, the league

would greatly limit the scale of the Anti-Suffrage Review, hold fewer meetings and

invite only voluntary speakers.52 Since these were the major publicity events, public

support for the league was jeopardised.

By the end of 1912, the league survived mostly on the emergency fund of

GBP8300. 53 Fearful of the passing of the 1913 Reform Bill, many executive

committee members hoped that Curzon would release the emergency fund to

campaign against it. Curzon rejected the appeal. He explained that the emergency

fund should be retained for the two-year interval before the official legislation of

female enfranchisement.54 The strain on resources was exacerbated by Curzon’s and

Cromer’s refusal to engage in fundraising. Although members repeatedly appealed to

Curzon, his stance remained unchanged in 1913.55 The scale of activities could not

expand in response to the approaching Bill. Unless more funds were collected, the

league was paralysed.

On the other hand, the NU, who relied on continuous small-scale fundraising,

possessed GPD40000 (twice as much as in 1911).56 The financial status of the

NLOWS could not rival that of the NU. The inability to recognise the financial needs

or to respond to the insolvency immobilised the NLOWS since summer 1912.

The Failure to Rally Parliamentary Support: the Fatal Blow

The circumstances were unfavourable to the anti-suffrage movement, as

demonstrated in previous sections. Given the British political structure, parliament

was the ultimate decision-maker, and therefore a key player in the anti-suffrage

movement. This is especially important given that the NLOWS was not backed up by

active public opinion. The failure to garner loyal parliamentary support was the fatal

blow to the NLOWS. Cromer and Curzon encountered the indifference of the MPs.

The strategy of relying on Asquith also proved to be a fatal blunder.

52

NLOWS, “Notes of the Meeting,” 9/7/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/35. 53

Curzon, “Note by Lord Curzon,” 27/11/1912, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/37. 54

Ibid. 55

Pugh, The March of the Women, 167. 56

Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906-18 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 22.

10

The MPs were indifferent to anti-suffrage debates owing to different political

concerns. Austen Chamberlain and Walter Long were contenders for Conservative

leadership. Although both of them were confirmed anti-suffragists, they refused to

associate with the league publicly because they feared a division within the

Conservative party.57 The conditions were also unfavourable to the NLOWS in the

Liberal Party. Leading anti-suffrage Liberals included Asquith, Lord Harcourt, Charles

Hobhouse and Lord Crewe.58 As members of the government, it would wound their

impartiality to openly commit to the anti-suffrage cause. Moreover, they did not wish

to aggravate the existing internal conflict.59 Again, leading anti-suffrage Liberals had

reservations in supporting the NLOWS. Anti-suffragists were preoccupied with

political concerns which were prioritised over anti-suffragism. The NLOWS was thus

compelled to rely heavily on Asquith.

Cromer and Curzon recognised both the importance and unreliability of Asquith’s

support. It was not until the end of 1911, when the mobilisation of other MPs failed,

that Asquith became the last and only resort of the male leaders. This was

demonstrated by Cromer’s distressed appeal to Asquith:

I have been hampered at every turn by the fact that almost all the

leading Anti-Suffragists politicians on both sides of the House, though

full of sympathy, have been unable, from one reason or another, to give

us any effective help. … I would therefore most earnestly beg of you to

give us your personal assistance [my italics].60

In his reply, Asquith assured Cromer that he was a convinced anti-suffragist. Yet, he

was still reluctant to commit to the NLOWS personally.61 Curiously, however, Cromer

was not at all deterred by Asquith’s unreliability. In January 1912, Cromer assured

Curzon that he ‘may depend upon it that Asquith and his friends will somehow or

other find a method for not passing the Conciliation Bill into law’.62 With all their

hopes riding on Asquith, and weak support in parliament, the NLOWS was in a

precarious position, especially after 1912.

The parliamentary support of suffragists grew and reached a climax in 1913. This

57

Ibid, 26. 58

Pugh, The March of the Women, 159; Harrison, Separate Spheres, 165. 59

Phillip Williamson, “The Conservative Party, 1900-1939: From Crisis to Ascendency,” in A Companion to Early Twentieth-century Britain, edited by Chris Wrigley (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 11. 60

Cromer to Asquith, 15/12/1911, Cromer papers, FO633/21. 61

Asquith to Cromer, ?/12/1911, Cromer papers, FO633/21. 62

Cromer to Curzon, 20/1/1912, Cromer papers, FO633/21.

11

trend was perhaps obscured by the defeat of Dickinson’s Bill in May 1913. Whereas

the Conciliation Bill aimed to enfranchise one million women, Dickinson’s Bill aimed

at approximately six million. Mitzi Auchterlonie suggests that the MPs, especially the

Conservatives, voted against this Bill primarily because of the large number but not

the gender of the new voters.63 In fact, in 1910-1913, over half of the Liberals voted

for each female enfranchisement measure. 64 Whilst the Liberals remained

predominantly pro-suffrage, the suffragists gained increasing support from Labour

and the Conservatives.

The relationship between suffragists and the Labour Party reached new heights in

1913. In June 1912, the NU reached an agreement with Labour. The endorsement of

female enfranchisement would become an integral part of the Labour policy. In

return, the NU would support Labour candidates in elections. The alliance benefited

the suffrage movement. By removing Liberals from their seats, the electoral alliance

successfully pressurised the Liberals.65 The Labour Party also consolidated their

stance for women’s suffrage in 1913.66 By 1913, suffragists had gained strong

support from the Labour Party.

The suffragists posed a threat to the anti-suffrage majority of the Conservatives in

1912-1913. Andrew Bonar Law, who was in favour of a limited female

enfranchisement, became the Conservative leader in November 1911. In addition,

the NU intensified the lobbying effort among the Conservatives.67 By 1913, the

NLOWS found it hard to counter the shifting opinion amongst the Conservatives.68

By 1913, suffragists had important allies in most of the political parties. The

Conservatives, Liberals and Labour members all proposed different versions of

female enfranchisement bill. The House of Commons was also overwhelmingly

pro-suffrage.69 The NLOWS could not counter the pro-suffrage tide in the parliament.

The fatal blow came when Asquith’s stance shifted in 1913. Indeed, up till 1913,

Asquith’s hostility was a major obstacle to the female enfranchisement.70 However,

in 1912, when the political climate shifted towards the suffragists, he was ready to

63

Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists, 187. 64

Harrison, Separate Spheres, 28-29. 65

Les Garner, Stepping Stones to Women’s Liberty: Feminist Ideas in the Women’s Suffrage Movement 1900-1918 (London: Heinemann, 1984), 99-100. 66

Sandra Stanley Holton, Feminism and Democracy: Female Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain, 1900-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 90; Rover, Women’s Suffrage, 150. 67

Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists, 185. 68

Arnold Ward to Curzon, 5/2/1913, Curzon papers, MSS Eur F112/36. 69

Pugh, The March of the Women, 166. 70

Sandra Stanley Holton, “The Making of Suffrage History,” in Votes for Women, 25.

12

‘retreat into the democratised woman suffrage’.71

After the ‘Summer Pilgrimage’, a large procession organised by suffragists in July

1913, the NU immediately arranged a meeting with Asquith. In August, when Asquith

met with the NU deputation, he reiterated his support for a democratised form of

female enfranchisement. He also repeatedly expressed his admiration for the mass

support shown in the Pilgrimage.72 This compliment was especially important since

Asquith demanded more concrete evidence of the prevalence of pro-suffrage

opinion. Millicent Fawcett wrote that ‘we felt that his education in the principles of

representative government was progressing’.73 Historian Jo Vellacott remarks on the

symbolic value of this deputation. She considers this event as the first instance of

Asquith’s changing stance.74 Asquith’s change of heart in 1913 was confirmed by the

ELFS deputation in June 1914. The deputation was followed by negotiations between

the ELFS and David Lloyd George which aimed to curb the militancy. Historian

William O’Neill believes that the elimination of militancy was Asquith’s first step to

make way for female enfranchisement.75 These friendly gestures indicate that

Asquith prepared to embrace female enfranchisement. The NLOWS was betrayed by

their most significant ally.

With the drive of the pro-suffrage MPs, and the lack of opposition from Asquith, the

prospect of female enfranchisement was hopeful. The conditions were ripe for

legislation but the progress was hindered by the outbreak of the First World War.76

With the turn of tide in the parliament by 1913, the NLOWS was already doomed.

The NLOWS lost much of its influence on both public opinion and parliamentary

debate. It was no longer an effective opposition. The anti-suffrage movement had

been defeated by 1913.

Conclusion

The failure of the NLOWS is an important aspect of the history of women’s suffrage.

This paper aims to challenge past perceptions of the failure of the NLOWS. Contrary

to historians Brian Harrison and Julia Bush, it argues that the anti-suffrage movement

had, to all intents, already been defeated in 1913. Martin Pugh shares the view that

71

Harrison, Separate Spheres, 50. 72

Vellacott, From Liberal to Labour, 241. 73

Quoted in ibid. 74

Ibid. 75

O’Neill, The Woman Movement, 86-87. 76

Ibid, 88; Garner, Stepping Stones.

13

the anti-suffrage movement had lost before the First World War. This paper

supplements his argument by specifying the time of its pre-war defeat. The failure of

the NLOWS in 1913 resulted from various factors.

The incompatibility of the leaders created hostility within the league and resulted in

fragmentation. Because of the failure to compromise on a constructive policy, the

league missed an opportunity to draw upon the support of moderate suffragists. The

failure of mass mobilisation further weakened the league. In addition, the NLOWS

was paralysed by financial insolvency from 1912. By 1913, the immobile league was

hardly a threat to the suffragists. The fatal blow, however, was the failure to mobilise

the parliamentary opinion. The NLOWS failed to convert the predominantly

pro-suffrage parliament or to organise the anti-suffrage MPs into a powerful

opposition. The betrayal of Asquith in 1913 devastated the anti-suffrage movement.

The NLOWS lost the parliament to the suffragists. They had no more strength or

bargaining chips to turn back the tide by 1913.

Although conditions were already ripe for female enfranchisement, the First World

War disrupted progress. In May 1917, the Representation of the People Bill, the first

female enfranchisement bill proposed after the outbreak of the war, won a majority

of 331. In February 1918, propertied women aged thirty or above were enfranchised.

In April 1918, the NLOWS was disbanded. This marked the official finale of the

anti-suffrage movement which had been effectively defeated by 1913.

14

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