THE EFFECTS OF ANTIDUMPING USE ON TURKEY’S

FOREIGN TRADE

Aslı Özgür Aktay

Yıldız Technical University

Istanbul Turkey

August 2014

Preliminary draft

Abstract

More than 20 years, both developed and developing countries have increasingly used

antidumping measures in order to protect their import-competing industries with the help of this

most influential and prevalent trade protection measure. This contingent protection measure has

in fact strong effects on countries’ strategies of foreign trade.

Turkey is mentioned as one of the leading developing countries among the users of antidumping

cases. This paper tries to explain the main effects of antidumping measure on Turkey’s exports

and imports over the past 20 years. A focus of the paper is to find some specific results after the

implications of dumping and antidumping measures related with Turkey.

After a short introduction, Section 1 provides a brief overview of the trends and facts of

antidumping usage of Turkey during the last 20 years. Then Section 2 presents some

characteristics of Turkey’s antidumping data and tries to find empirical evidence on exports and

imports after the cases. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in the last section.

Keywords: Antidumping, international trade, Turkish economy, empirical studies of trade

JEL Codes: F13, F1, O52, F14

1

1.Introduction

While liberalization wind was blowing over most of the world countries during 1980s, Turkey

was as well one of the countries which abandoned most of her trade tariffs and protective

regulations especially from 1984 and on. Foreign trade as well as other financial movements was

liberalized during that period. However this didn’t stop the authorities to adopt the antidumping

(AD) legislation in order to protect import-competitive domestic producers through AD

measures if needed. These measures have already been used by the so-called “traditional users”

(Moore & Zanardi, 2008): EU, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. With the liberalization

period, the AD measures have increasingly been used mostly by the developing countries

including Turkey which is called as one of the frequent users in Moore & Zanardi’s study

(2008). Bown (2006) refers to these “new users” of AD as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India,

Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela.

The basic definition of dumping takes place in WTO Antidumping Agreement, Article 2 as

follows1:

“… a product is considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of

another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product

exported from one country to another is less tha the comparable price, in the ordinary

course of trade, fort he like product when destined for consumption in the exporting

company”

Dumping takes place when a foreign exporter sells a certain good under its “normal” price in the

importer country’s market. “Normal” in this definition stands for either “price in the exporter’s

country” or –according to some literature, “the good’s production cost in the country where it is

produced”. Either way, when the import-competitive firm suspects a dumping, it has the right to

request an AD investigation for this exporter because “Under competition law, predatory pricing

is understood as a deliberate strategy to drive competitors out of the market by setting very low

prices (e.g.,”cut-throat pricing”), including at below average variable costs.” (Bienen, Ciuriak

and Picarello, 2014) Investigation then is held to find out if the dumping accusation is worth an

enforcement which is mostly an AD duty meant to be paid by the accused exporter. This duty has

1 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm

2

an increasing effect on prices which has a positive influence on the domestic firms’ import

competitiveness.

According to literature, evidence seeking and calculation of dumping margin processes are stated

below:

“Before a government can impose a definitive antidumping import restriction, the Agreement

also requires that its administrating authority solicit and collect substantial economic evidence to

confirm that market conditions and behavior of foreign exporters satisfy technical, WTO-

mandated legal criteria.” Bown (2006) That is, a national government must undertake and

investigation and come up with the appropriate evidence before imposing an AD measure2.

Evidences:

a) The price of the good in exporter’s home market

b) The price of the good in a third market

c) Exporter’s average cost

d) That the domestic industry is materially injured (injury determination)

Turkey handle dumping and injury determination at the same time.

Blonigen and Prusa (2001) state two versions of dumping margin calculation: 1. The difference

between the exporting firm’s home price and its export price. 2. The difference between a firm’s

cost of production and its export price (cost-based).

There are various understandings of AD mechanism such as Derk, Ciuriak and Picarello (2014).

They consider trade remedies as international trade analogue of market competition policies to

domestic competition policy for domestic commerce while Blonigen and Prusa (2001)’s

approach is rather suspicious: “… AD has nothing to do with keeping trade “fair””. They define

AD as “a tool to improve the competitive position of the complainant against other companies”.

Due to wide AD measure usage among the developing countries, there also exits many studies

which searches for correlation between liberalization and AD or the overall import amount of the

2 AD measures: duties, minimum price arrangements, price undertakings; which all result in import restrictions

(Moore and Zanardi, 2008)

3

country and AD or the price change and AD duties (Moore & Zanardi (2008), Bown (2013),

Finger and Nogués (2008), Blonigen and Prusa (2001)). Among them, Moore & Zanardi (2008)

suggest that “past use of antidumping may have led to less rather than more trade liberalization.”

In fact, they find no evidence for a positive correlation between past AD actions and later tariff

reductions in their sample of developing countries, although historically a positive correlation is

expected. For example, Finger and Nogués (2008) points out that Latin American countries

managed AD mechanisms as part of their trade liberalism. However, developing countries do not

seem to provide favorable conditions for such policy changes: “The administrative content of the

rules supported liberalization, the economic content did not.” (Finger and Nogués, 2008).

WTO/GATT doesn’t seem to take into consideration the challenging policy management (both

political and economical) in developing countries. As for Turkey, as a developing country: Bown

(2013) shakes the liberalization phenomenon to the core by indicating this one information that

formation of free trade agreement did not increase Turkey’s export as much as crisis in 2008

decreased it due to downfall in EU demand for imports.

What Moore and Zanardi (2008) have eventually come up with is anyway the evidence “that

higher incomes, lower inflation, weaker economic growth, and better institutions are all

correlated with greater reductions in tariffs” which essentially means that only developed

countries can have a positive correlation and a hope in further tariff liberalization. As a matter of

fact, according to their data, the correlation between AD use and liberalization is found to be

negative among developing countries. They also find that for 60% of the cases developing

countries target other developing countries and that the developing country AD use rises

dramatically around 1993. One can’t help to think that this vicious circle among

developing countries might exacerbate their liberalization process let alone improve it.

Hoping fort he best –in terms of further liberalization, Turkey enacted her first AD case in 1989

and has become a frequent user especially after 2000, where most of the cases were against

China (Avşar, 2014). The aim of this study is to overview the last 20 years of Turkey’s AD

journey in order to determine if there is a significant effect of the measures on the foreign trade,

mostly on imports. The AD data gathered from World Bank, Global Antidumping Database3

3http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:22574930~pagePK:642148

25~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html

4

starts from 1989 until 2014, and the data gathered from WTO Antidumping data4 is between

1995 and 2013. The data mining reveals that the country which has been mostly subject to the

AD cases run by Turkey is China while the good types from which Turkey has pursued import

protection are woven fanrics of synthetic filament yarn (HS 4-digit code 5407), bicycle ad

motorcycle tires (HS 4-digit code 4011), certain fabrics (HS 4-digit code 5603) and steel billets

(HS 4-digit code 7207). According to import data extracted from UN Comtrade5 the decreases in

imports are significant provided that the investigation is made country by country. From one year

to another with an AD measure implementation, the import fall can be spotted in some cases, but

if the total sector imports are taken into consideration, it is impossible to end up with a decrease

except from steel billets.

The paper is constructed as follows: In the following section, the cases run by Turkey and

against Turkey are being examined after a short background of Turkey’s AD history. In Section

3, the effects of the measures imposed on certain sectors and countries are examined and

discussed. In the final section, last remarks are presented along with a short commentary on the

AD procedures.

4 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm

5 http://comtrade.un.org/

5

2. Turkey’s Antidumping History

2.1. Short background

History of AD begins with 1947 GATT agreement.

World Bank Global Antidumping Data for Turkey’s AD cases start in 1989 for products like

thermometers, polyster fibers, electrodes and paper. Some of the exporting countries were, East

Germany, Taiwan, China and Yugoslavia, respectively.

After adopting rather a liberalized economy in order to fit in the world conjucture at the time,

1980’s were the years when Turkey’s overall economy started to take more active role in world

trade. Trade liberalization, on the other hand, came with a concern: How to protect the domestic

producers now that importing has become much easier. Moreover, as of 1996, when Turkey has

become a member of Customs Union with the European Union (but without being a member in

EU), the domestic economy has raised such concerns along with enjoying mostly duty free and

less regulated trade. After phasing in of a customs union and implementations of Uruguay Round

WTO commitments, Turkey’s ability to alter its import tariffs were restricted and this has lead

Turkey to consider of applications of new TTBs (temporary trade barriers) along with AD

initiations. (Bown, 2010)

According to Bown (2013) Turkey has become one of the frequent users of TTBs, especially

against PTA non-members. It seems like liberalization itself still needed a solid ground where

countries are eager to acknowledge some benefit-seeking boundaries.

Blonigen and Prusa (2001) as well claim that although AD is likely the most costly form of

protection, its actions have flourished since other instruments of trade protection such as tariffs,

quotas etc. have been brought under greater GATT/WTO discipline.

Then, there seems to be a two-way interaction between trade liberalization and AD disputes.

More liberalized trade comes with tariff liberalization. The only so-called protection which is left

for the countries to use rather more freely is AD measures because of the restriction to use other

policies. Bown (2006) on the other hand claims that use of AD can also increase a country’s “…

willingness to take on more extensive liberalization commitments than it would take on without

such an option.”

6

2.2. Turkey as an exporting country

According to WTO AD data, Turkey has been subject to 64 antidumping initiations between the

years 1995-2013 and 33 antidumping measures. That is, Turkey is enforced to antidumping

measures of approximately 45% of the initiations that were held up against her exporting. The

year when Turkey was imposed to investigations most is 2000, with a number of 7 initiations and

4 of them resulted in duties.

Turkey has mostly gone through such investigations by a petition of European Union and the

United States between 1995 and 2013 according to WTO data.

Nevertheless, Bown (2013) states that:

“The data for Turkey indicate clearly that foreign trade barriers such as antidumping and

other TTBs are not major current causes of concern for Turkey’s exporters and are thus

not a likely major influence on Turkey’s own use of such flexibilities toward its own

imports.”

Either due to small number of cases Turkey was imposed or due to mild AD measures, Turkey

does not seem to have been affected much by AD measures she has been obliged to.

2.3. Turkey as a reporter country

According to WTO AD data, from 1995 to 2013 Turkey has had 168 antidumping initiations. By

2013, the number of measures she has is 154 which leads to the conclusion that approximately

91% of the initiations has resulted in duties, as mostly a kind of import-duty. 2004 is the year

when Turkey pursued protection from import most (25 initiations) and in 2003 Turkey had

measures for 28 cases which implies a possible lag between intitiations and final and affirmative

dumping decision.

According to Global Antidumping Data (GAD) by the World Bank, Turkey has demanded

antidumping investigation mostly on 4 good types which can be easily spotted in Figure 1.

Between 1989 and 2013, these goods have been mostly under investigation:

7

1. HS code 5407: Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn (421 cases)

For this type of good, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand were

investigated. The date of initiation of the investigation was 2000 with date of imposition

of final antidumping measure being 2002.

2. HS code 5603: Nonwovens, whether or not impregnated, coated, covered or laminated

(42 cases)

For nonwovens, China was investigated in 2008 and imposed a measure in 2009 while

investigations were begun for other countries like Iran, Israel, Italy and Saudi Arabia for

certain fabrics in 2008 but they did not end up with a measure; final dumping decision

being terminated prior to ruling by government. That is, the exporter countries act first

and increase their prices before the government even takes an action against dumping, by

reporting to WTO.

3. HS code 4011: New pneumatic tyres, of rubber (35 cases)

Among this code, the exact goods that were mostly imported and taken to investigation

are bicycle tires and motorcycle tires. The countries who were claimed to have done

dumping and were imposed measures were China, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, Sri

Lanka, Indonesia and Malaysia. The initiations were taken into consideration in 2002,

2004 and 2008. And the final decisions were made 1 year after the first initiation date.

4. HS code 7207: Semi-finished products of iron and non-alloy steel (18 cases)

For steel billets, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova were investigated in 1994 and imposed a

measure. However, it is removed in 2008 (Bown, 2008).

8

Figure 1

Source: World Bank, Global Antidumping Database

Looking at the sections of these goods considering their 2-digit codes, we come up with three

sections:

Section VII: Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof (40: Rubber and articles

thereof)

Section XI: Textiles and textile articles (54: Man-made filaments; 56: Wadding, felt and

nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof.

Section XV: Base metals and articles of base metal (72: Iron and steel)

Comparing the sections Turkey has pursued antidumping investigations with the sections which

have been mostly subject to such investigations all around the world between 1995 and 2013,

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

3904 4011 4013 4412 4802 5208 5209 5402 5407 5503 5603 6005 7207 7307 7312

Nu

mb

er

of

the

inve

stig

atio

ns

pu

rsu

ed

4-digit HS codes of the goods that has been subject to AD investigation pursued by Turkey more than 10 times between 1989 and 2013

9

WTO data can be examined to figure out whether Turkey has been unique for the sectors that are

important only for her in terms of import competitive domestic firms or not:

With 1287 cases, Section XV, base metals and articles has been the sector which has been

subject to antidumping panels most, in the world. According to this data, Turkey has been

investigated as an exporter country most for the Section XV as well. And 15 measures out of 32

initiations, with almost 50% of the cases, Section XV was also the sector where Turkey has been

enforced measures most. However it is the forth mostly investigated sector by Turkey’s petition

in order to protect its import-competitive producers of similar product. Below, Figure 2 shows

the mostly investigated sector for dumping, all around the world.

Figure 2

Source: WTO Antidumping Database

VI Products of the chemical and allied

industries

VII Resins, plastics and articles; rubber

and articles

X Paper, paperboard and articlesXI Textiles

and articles

XIII Articles of stone, plaster; ceramic

prod.; glass

XV Base metals and articles

XVI Machinery and electrical equipment

The sections that have been subject to antidumping investigations most

10

As for the measures that Turkey gained right to run against exporting countries of the goods that

belong Section VII, Section XI and Section XV, which she ran initiations most, WTO data shows

that almost all the initiations ended up with a measure.

In the whole world, China and South Korea have been the mostly investigated countries for

dumping while India and United States are the countries that have done the reporting most,

according to WTO data. According to Global Antidumping Data (GAD), WTO antidumping data

and data from the website of Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy, the country which

Turkey has petitioned for dumping investigation is China. The other countries that were also

investigated most by Turkey’s request are India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Figure 3 and

Figure 4 show the countries which Turkey targeted for dumping, according to different data sets.

Figure 3

Source: WTO Antidumping Database

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

China India Indonesia Korea, Republic

of

Malaysia Taipei, Chinese

Thailand Viet Nam

Nu

mb

er

of

case

s

The countries that were investigated due to Turkey's petititon according to WTO AD data, between 1995 and 2013

11

Figure 4

Source: World Bank, Global Antidumping Database

Given the general data of AD investigations run against Turkey above, the aim of this paper is to

focus on rather Turkey’s imports and effects of antidumping measures on Turkey’s imports.

Therefore, in the next section, in order to comment on imports, Turkey is taken as a reporter

country only and her being taken as an exporter country can be a future study’s subject.

3. General overview to Turkey’s foreign trade after AD cases

In order to examine the possible effects of antidumping measures to Turkey’s imports of the four

HS 4-digit coded goods, i.e 5407, 4011, 5603 and 7207, from the countries to which Turkey has

pursued AD duties.6

6 The data has been extracted from UN Comtrade. It is informed that data for Taiwan is absent because of political

reasons. Therefore, Taiwan is excluded from the import data

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

China India Indonesia Malaysia Thailand South Korea Vietnam

Nu

mb

er

of

case

s

The countries that were investigated due to Turkey's petition according to GAD, WB, between 1989 and 2013

12

Due to application lags, the data has been examined few years backwards from the first AD

measure imposition and the same number of years forward it.

1. HS code: 5407

The data is sought 5 years before Turkey pursued an AD investigation and 5 years after that,

that is 2000 for all the exporter countries of this good. The reason why the investigation year

is taken into consideration, and not the year that duties start to take place is that during

investigation, the imports are mostly held slow and sometimes they are stopped. When the

imports from all the four countries (China, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) that have

been imposed AD measure in 2002, are aggregrated in two time periods, i.e 1995-1999 and

2000-2004, the total value of imports substantially increase, let alone decrease because of the

measures. However, if we look at the import values country by country, we can spot an

import decrease from 2000 to 2002 in case of China and Thailand.

Table 1: 792 is the code of Turkey and trade flow code 1 refers to imports.

Table 1.a

China

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value

1995 792 1 156 5407 883,307 2,590,498

1996 792 1 156 5407 1,878,296 7,158,728

1997 792 1 156 5407 3,526,470 15,872,207

1998 792 1 156 5407 4,681,032 21,514,404

1999 792 1 156 5407 6,531,895 22,964,700

2000 792 1 156 5407 11,118,406 39,826,294

2001 792 1 156 5407 11,232,351 34,392,090

2002 792 1 156 5407 4,583,016 15,786,383

2003 792 1 156 5407 5,573,903 19,748,226

2004 792 1 156 5407 8,506,302 40,965,454

2005 792 1 156 5407 6,810,182 41,384,815

2006 792 1 156 5407 8,425,809 52,720,399

2007 792 1 156 5407 13,140,191 77,342,206

2008 792 1 156 5407 14,794,244 77,214,225

2009 792 1 156 5407 10,092,283 53,547,989

2010 792 1 156 5407 7,401,168 41,867,281

2011 792 1 156 5407 6,879,780 47,133,419

2012 792 1 156 5407 7,757,668 50,455,674

2013 792 1 156 5407 5,762,005 37,493,773

13

Table 1.b

South Korea

Table 1.c

Malaysia

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value

1995 792 1 410 5407 12,023,099 49,180,608

1996 792 1 410 5407 8,435,902 56,218,632

1997 792 1 410 5407 12,744,139 100,343,440

1998 792 1 410 5407 13,626,257 105,823,856

1999 792 1 410 5407 13,959,985 80,682,432

2000 792 1 410 5407 14,838,070 86,652,285

2001 792 1 410 5407 13,773,254 70,558,032

2002 792 1 410 5407 16,499,244 78,651,915

2003 792 1 410 5407 18,702,162 102,368,929

2004 792 1 410 5407 17,329,371 114,882,822

2005 792 1 410 5407 14,004,769 102,006,569

2006 792 1 410 5407 9,060,151 70,176,256

2007 792 1 410 5407 5,434,879 48,601,524

2008 792 1 410 5407 4,388,039 43,823,700

2009 792 1 410 5407 3,265,201 32,577,986

2010 792 1 410 5407 3,669,932 41,741,143

2011 792 1 410 5407 3,253,375 40,294,773

2012 792 1 410 5407 1,937,165 24,701,547

2013 792 1 410 5407 1,662,779 20,694,372

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

1995 792 1 458 5407 174,432 823,324

1996 792 1 458 5407 1,776,069 8,514,683

1997 792 1 458 5407 1,931,946 8,165,407

1998 792 1 458 5407 4,600,970 16,611,086

1999 792 1 458 5407 4,759,076 12,612,623

2000 792 1 458 5407 4,539,652 12,701,559

2001 792 1 458 5407 2,547,675 6,853,053

2002 792 1 458 5407 6,777,114 17,066,065

2003 792 1 458 5407 11,488,572 28,405,728

2004 792 1 458 5407 13,953,877 46,754,306

2005 792 1 458 5407 18,186,028 60,181,680

2006 792 1 458 5407 20,226,544 59,583,697

2007 792 1 458 5407 22,332,851 69,612,169

2008 792 1 458 5407 19,403,039 59,560,971

2009 792 1 458 5407 9,180,423 37,560,017

2010 792 1 458 5407 9,969,132 52,639,868

2011 792 1 458 5407 9,841,958 52,885,312

2012 792 1 458 5407 11,259,575 38,747,355

2013 792 1 458 5407 9,445,047 29,613,073

14

Table 1.d

Thailand

2. HS code: 5603

Since the other exporters of this good have acted before they were imposed any kind of AD

measure, China is left the only country that Turkey has pursued import protection. However,

looking at the UN comtrade data, one can see that the affirmative dumping decision and AD

measures did not seem to effect China’s exports negatively. Only in 2012, when the measures

are still valid, they are valid for 5 years unless they are removed for any reason like exporter

country’s deliberate price altering, there exists a substantial fall in imports from China. It

might be because of either China’s own economic situation or Turkey’s altering of the TTBs

to more severe measures as Bown (2013) points out to be happening more than seldom. If we

look at the total import figures, they increase in the years following the AD measure.

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

1995 792 1 764 5407 168,263 627,295

1996 792 1 764 5407 414,331 1,466,175

1997 792 1 764 5407 717,094 3,501,329

1998 792 1 764 5407 972,873 3,994,067

1999 792 1 764 5407 2,072,787 8,625,829

2000 792 1 764 5407 1,979,654 7,643,490

2001 792 1 764 5407 1,296,398 4,951,283

2002 792 1 764 5407 342,147 1,868,864

2003 792 1 764 5407 416,361 1,551,444

2004 792 1 764 5407 243,333 1,664,710

2005 792 1 764 5407 137,579 873,215

2006 792 1 764 5407 70,405 493,410

2007 792 1 764 5407 41,282 300,891

2008 792 1 764 5407 89,854 632,872

2009 792 1 764 5407 70,192 474,421

2010 792 1 764 5407 39,117 282,077

2011 792 1 764 5407 20,538 276,038

2012 792 1 764 5407 7,228 107,979

2013 792 1 764 5407 2,060 51,170

15

Table 2 China

3. HS code: 4011

Again, the total import amounts have increased significantly as if there were no measures at

all. For this good, China has been imposed measures both in 2003 and 2005 while other

countries get it once: India and Thailand in 2003; Sri Lanka and Vietnam in 2005; Indonesia

and Malaysia in 2009. Therefore, we compare the imports before and after those years7:

Table 3

Table 3.a

Sri Lanka

7 The data begins from 2000 for convenience.

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value

2002 792 1 156 5603 2,500,895 5,428,772

2003 792 1 156 5603 3,718,575 7,509,510

2004 792 1 156 5603 5,083,870 11,531,758

2005 792 1 156 5603 3,768,196 10,126,733

2006 792 1 156 5603 4,310,732 13,104,392

2007 792 1 156 5603 5,617,841 17,406,757

2008 792 1 156 5603 5,839,272 20,210,367

2009 792 1 156 5603 6,312,624 18,303,349

2010 792 1 156 5603 10,014,354 32,468,182

2011 792 1 156 5603 13,337,275 45,621,523

2012 792 1 156 5603 2,773,750 11,442,262

2013 792 1 156 5603 3,084,007 13,140,250

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

2000 792 1 144 4011 278,647 572,880

2001 792 1 144 4011 332,085 589,428

2002 792 1 144 4011 444,284 915,471

2003 792 1 144 4011 1,098,140 2,038,867

2004 792 1 144 4011 725,096 1,312,767

2005 792 1 144 4011 776,020 1,885,794

2006 792 1 144 4011 829,220 2,245,668

2007 792 1 144 4011 1,168,385 3,179,036

2008 792 1 144 4011 1,263,375 3,891,639

2009 792 1 144 4011 834,320 2,970,751

2010 792 1 144 4011 1,204,934 4,763,780

2011 792 1 144 4011 1,194,766 5,377,287

2012 792 1 144 4011 1,080,286 5,019,884

2013 792 1 144 4011 1,204,032 5,406,296

16

Table 3.b China

Table 3.c

Indonesia

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

2000 792 1 156 4011 12,922,683 17,358,546

2001 792 1 156 4011 4,099,791 5,881,693

2002 792 1 156 4011 12,206,083 15,997,874

2003 792 1 156 4011 29,732,709 43,081,549

2004 792 1 156 4011 26,577,311 44,696,272

2005 792 1 156 4011 6,359,125 12,037,389

2006 792 1 156 4011 1,421,003 3,022,781

2007 792 1 156 4011 1,575,206 3,905,510

2008 792 1 156 4011 3,277,619 10,144,368

2009 792 1 156 4011 1,450,880 4,067,962

2010 792 1 156 4011 2,888,949 7,324,122

2011 792 1 156 4011 9,824,633 35,270,794

2012 792 1 156 4011 10,506,190 40,595,060

2013 792 1 156 4011 13,315,630 49,235,204

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

2000 792 1 360 4011 747,749 1,753,526

2001 792 1 360 4011 158,885 346,375

2002 792 1 360 4011 794,835 1,487,390

2003 792 1 360 4011 1,376,675 2,647,540

2004 792 1 360 4011 2,276,617 4,434,481

2005 792 1 360 4011 2,140,956 4,232,305

2006 792 1 360 4011 1,712,020 4,233,329

2007 792 1 360 4011 2,468,423 6,901,160

2008 792 1 360 4011 2,714,394 8,355,479

2009 792 1 360 4011 2,728,879 8,853,936

2010 792 1 360 4011 4,090,090 14,269,482

2011 792 1 360 4011 3,127,821 13,297,033

2012 792 1 360 4011 2,409,264 12,116,952

2013 792 1 360 4011 3,882,358 17,241,934

17

Table 3.d Malaysia

Table 3.e India

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

2000 792 1 458 4011 139,064 384,688

2001 792 1 458 4011 34,161 78,548

2003 792 1 458 4011 42,182 124,650

2004 792 1 458 4011 303,874 660,705

2005 792 1 458 4011 1,008,156 2,439,135

2006 792 1 458 4011 926,944 2,272,161

2007 792 1 458 4011 833,293 2,081,305

2008 792 1 458 4011 758,697 2,090,849

2009 792 1 458 4011 151,740 558,983

2010 792 1 458 4011 388,361 1,753,587

2011 792 1 458 4011 241,833 1,323,540

2012 792 1 458 4011 397,170 2,117,963

2013 792 1 458 4011 142,204 823,907

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

2000 792 1 699 4011 269,771 343,825

2001 792 1 699 4011 667,091 853,363

2002 792 1 699 4011 636,215 853,346

2003 792 1 699 4011 428,499 764,923

2004 792 1 699 4011 1,050,107 2,147,225

2005 792 1 699 4011 2,463,976 5,965,979

2006 792 1 699 4011 3,018,836 7,503,130

2007 792 1 699 4011 4,080,425 10,490,999

2008 792 1 699 4011 2,092,742 6,702,729

2009 792 1 699 4011 1,295,245 4,089,350

2010 792 1 699 4011 1,559,519 5,436,072

2011 792 1 699 4011 3,085,729 14,098,954

2012 792 1 699 4011 3,797,750 17,198,564

2013 792 1 699 4011 4,902,144 20,820,943

18

Table 3.f Vietnam

Table 3.g Thailand

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

2000 792 1 704 4011 226,293 409,158

2001 792 1 704 4011 126,115 209,675

2002 792 1 704 4011 185,470 274,598

2003 792 1 704 4011 1,379,115 2,043,167

2004 792 1 704 4011 1,040,461 1,570,362

2005 792 1 704 4011 786,446 1,152,394

2006 792 1 704 4011 123,836 234,497

2007 792 1 704 4011 91,648 205,804

2008 792 1 704 4011 400,289 1,443,515

2009 792 1 704 4011 635,243 2,049,777

2010 792 1 704 4011 1,012,377 3,551,328

2011 792 1 704 4011 1,094,089 4,656,973

2012 792 1 704 4011 928,825 4,049,588

2013 792 1 704 4011 872,519 3,390,955

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

2000 792 1 764 4011 619,673 1,133,103

2001 792 1 764 4011 428,618 509,374

2002 792 1 764 4011 379,443 401,968

2003 792 1 764 4011 354,416 807,105

2004 792 1 764 4011 706,281 2,351,535

2005 792 1 764 4011 2,868,836 7,649,619

2006 792 1 764 4011 3,531,046 10,059,430

2007 792 1 764 4011 5,655,477 17,353,889

2008 792 1 764 4011 4,788,068 15,834,586

2009 792 1 764 4011 3,083,169 10,568,509

2010 792 1 764 4011 5,600,251 19,531,066

2011 792 1 764 4011 3,457,914 15,899,961

2012 792 1 764 4011 3,810,830 18,109,934

2013 792 1 764 4011 7,734,106 33,434,108

19

4. HS code: 7207

This sector is the only sector that shows a decrease in imports of the good in total import

figures as well as country based imports. The dramatic fall in imports as soon as measures

have been forced in 1995 is obvious. In 2008, the measures have been removed.

Table 4:

Table 4.a

Moldova

Table 4.b

Russia

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code

Netweight (kg) Value

1992 792 1 498 7207 8,525,570 1,647,095

1993 792 1 498 7207 128,877,500 25,539,293

1994 792 1 498 7207 68,884,312 13,673,639

1995 792 1 498 7207 3,972,875 816,678

1996 792 1 498 7207 11,891,511 2,613,677

1997 792 1 498 7207 2,027,062 446,403

1998 792 1 498 7207 4,214,367 844,763

1999 792 1 498 7207 2,000,000 306,099

2004 792 1 498 7207 14,881,200 5,889,500

2008 792 1 498 7207 6,052,050 5,976,023

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value

1992 792 1 643 7207 391,824,885 72,437,633

1993 792 1 643 7207 763,467,781 155,262,170

1994 792 1 643 7207 434,920,839 80,822,098

1995 792 1 643 7207 261,306,608 54,015,112

1996 792 1 643 7207 302,328,352 64,454,436

1997 792 1 643 7207 558,599,744 124,618,968

1998 792 1 643 7207 604,405,824 133,138,952

1999 792 1 643 7207 814,448,042 121,325,709

2000 792 1 643 7207 1,040,709,584 200,963,735

2001 792 1 643 7207 435,166,149 71,847,200

2002 792 1 643 7207 347,798,161 66,257,985

2003 792 1 643 7207 772,545,002 183,696,757

2004 792 1 643 7207 980,426,022 407,966,257

2005 792 1 643 7207 964,805,228 389,473,487

2006 792 1 643 7207 1,647,939,271 741,275,720

2007 792 1 643 7207 1,594,759,998 841,761,640

2008 792 1 643 7207 2,047,144,381 1,707,095,905

20

Table 4.c

Ukraine

Some of the data above do not have a hint of a decrease in imports even after the AD measures

have been imposed. Some of them decrease, while some of them implies a lag between the first

time AD measure is applied and the import has decreased. Also, these ordinary decreases could

have been caused by various economic conditions. For example, in case of conjunctional shocks,

imports tend to fall. Bown (2013) finds that Turkey’s TTB (temporary trade barriers) import

restrictions coincide with economic shocks; the increasing numbers of measures in 1994 and

2000 also are a proof of that. According to Blonigen and Prusa (2001) other possible

explanations for such a down movement of imports can be stated as:

- Effects of exchange rates on dumping measures and injury determination.

- AD activity being greater in periods of low foreign demand due to global downturn.

- Characteristics of AD duties -they are not static over time.

Year Reporter Code

Trade Flow Code

Partner Code

Commodity Code Netweight (kg) Value

1992 792 1 804 7207 37,720,230 7,257,605

1993 792 1 804 7207 817,211,714 170,468,526

1994 792 1 804 7207 616,451,186 116,216,170

1995 792 1 804 7207 328,286,272 72,603,408

1996 792 1 804 7207 253,115,584 53,470,080

1997 792 1 804 7207 443,147,840 96,588,904

1998 792 1 804 7207 493,509,728 90,048,736

1999 792 1 804 7207 543,310,226 83,995,339

2000 792 1 804 7207 547,620,836 90,731,697

2001 792 1 804 7207 245,757,253 39,263,719

2002 792 1 804 7207 360,885,031 60,751,737

2003 792 1 804 7207 503,345,160 114,331,855

2004 792 1 804 7207 376,931,930 138,072,867

2005 792 1 804 7207 826,688,796 314,007,993

2006 792 1 804 7207 1,103,882,874 424,154,155

2007 792 1 804 7207 1,566,546,215 778,801,909

2008 792 1 804 7207 1,250,456,466 955,411,434

21

4. Concluding remarks

In this study, the effects of AD use on Turkey’s foreign trade is examined, focusing mostly on

Turkey’s imports of the good that she has pursued protection most. Turkey is one of the most

frequent users of AD since she has adopted AD legislation at the end of 1980s which makes one

wonder why this frequency. With wider use of AD measures, it is now of great importance to

acknowledge the determinants of industrial use of AD measures in developing countries. For

example Avşar (2014) comes up with one of the determinants to be labour force; he runs an

econometric model and finds a positive relation between the number of antidumping

investigations pursued in a sector and the employment in that certain sector. More labour implies

more possibility of existence of a labour union. And according to him the reason why in the

sectors like base metals and its articles, there are more AD investigations than other sectors also

lies in high employment and number of unions. Many economists, on the other hand, are

convinced that the larger the sector takes place in a country’s domestic economy, the more AD

measures are sought and received: “… the larger volume of imports and the larger the profit

(output) loss, the greater chance of an affirmative decision” states Blonigen and Prusa (2001)

while Bown (2006) claims that larger and more concentrated industries which also have greater

capital expenditure and face rapidly falling import prices receive greater AD protection from

imports.

Many economists also allege that stimulus for AD use lies under liberalization itself: After all the

global limitations against protectionism in order to make international trade more fair, AD

measures and some other TTBs as such are the only tools left for having somewhat an incentive

over a country’s trade which has strong connection to public welfare. That is why some

economists are concerned that not all AD attemps are meant to be: Avşar (2014) is not convinced

that the genuine reason for an antidumping initiation is always the dumping which put the

domestic industries in disadvantage. He spots cases where the recession and the poor economy of

the country lead domestic industries search for a way out. Also, Blonigen and Prusa (2001) point

out AD’s “combination of political and economic manipulability, incentives and intrigues”. That

is, they consider it very important that the agencies conducting the investigations keep

themselves transparent and independent of domestic industry or political pressure. The authors,

furthermore, find the expansion of AD protection law unnecessary. They also suspect the overall

22

gain claiming that domestic producers gain at the expense of consumers’ welfare because “an

immediate effect of an AD duty is to raise the price paid by consumers in the protected market”

while Bown (2013) suspects about the producers’ gain as well pointing out the fact that applying

TTBs to both end-consumer products and key industrial products may exacerbate domestic

companies which use these imported goods as inputs thus face an increase in production costs.

Adding that, in WTO system, use of measures causing significant trade policy uncertainty for

exporter countries is something to think about, Bown (2010) indicates.

As explicitly for Turkey, suspicious minds still work because of the “sluggishness” about

removal of the AD measure when they expired (Bown, 2013); that is 5 years after the measures

come into effect, according to WTO Antidumping Agreement, Article 11. One can imagine,

being late for removing an import protection, does not serve the existence of AD investigations

in the first place. When it comes to vulnerability of this mechanism to political pressure, Turkey

again fails to seem as a trustful user of AD. With a widening current account deficit because of

Turkey’s export not having kept up with increasing imports, particularly severe trade imbalances

sometimes result in policymakers taking drastic action to cut imports through exercise of trade

policy flexibilities, suspects Bown (2013).

However, looking at the data that has been taken into consideration in this study implies there is

nothing to worry about. It seems there is almost no significant fall in imports of the goods that

have been subject to AD measure by Turkey’s requests from import-competing firms for

protection. The total import figures continue to increase even after the measures are imposed for

woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn, bicycle and motorcycle tires and certain fabrics. Only

the total imports of steel billets have decreased apparently due to the AD measures, according to

data. If one examines the imports country by country, he can spot some decreases in imports

from one year to another with imposed duty. Those countries are China and Thailand for woven

fabrics of synthetic filament yarn, Sri Lanka, China, Malaysia, India and Vietnam for bicycle and

motorcycle tires and finally Moldova, Russia and Ukraine for steel billets which by the way

present the most noteworthy import fall. These data coincides with Bown (2013)’s study where

he finds that increases in applied tariffs in the textiles and steel industry affect Turkey’s

manufacturing only up to 9%.

23

Considering the insignificant fall in most of the sectors’ import, its dependence on the current

political and economic structure of the country and the lack of inspection on the period that the

measures are supposed to be held, one can’t help to wonder if antidumping mechanism seems to

remain having some loop holes. What it comes to is that managing AD procedures is a matter of

how much and how long. One can’t help to agree with Prusa (2005) who considers AD as more

of a problem for international trade than economically meaningful dumping, like in medication

being more dangerous than the disease, due to misuse or overuse of it. Rational use of medicine

then is at least as important as possession of the medicine, for stable condition…by all means.

24

References

Avşar,Veysel (2014) “Türkiye’nin Antidamping Soruşturmalarını Etkileyen Faktörler: Sanayi

Verileri ile Ekonometrik bir Analiz” Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi, İİBF Dergisi, Nisan

2014, 9(1), pp. 41- 54

Bienen, Derk; Ciuriak, Dan & Picarello, Timothée (2014) “Does Antidumping Address “Unfair”

Trade?”, The International Trade Journal, 28:3, pp. 195-228, DOI:

10.1080/08853908.2013.878233

Blonigen, Bruce A. & Prusa, Thomas J. (2001) “Antidumping” Working paper 8398,

http://www.nber.org/papers/w8398, National Bureau of Economic Research

Bown, Chad P. (2006) “The World Trade Organisation ans Antidumping in Developing

Countries” http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4014 The World Bank,

Development Research Group, Trade and Integration Team, Policy Research Working Papers.

Bown, Chad P. (2010) “Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties,

1990-2009” http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-5436 The World Bank,

Development Research Group, Trade and Integration Team, Policy Research Working Papers.

Bown, Chad P. (2013) “Trade Policy Flexibilities and Turkey, Tariffs, Antidumping, Safeguards,

and WTO Dispute Settlement” http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6322

The World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade and Integration Team, Policy Research

Working Papers.

Finger, J. Michael & Nogués, Julio J. (2008) “Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American

Trade Liberalization” http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 The

World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade Team, Policy Research Working Papers.

Moore, Michael O. & Zanardi, Maurizio (2008) “Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade

Liberalization in Developing Countries?” IIEP-WP#1 Institute for International Economic Policy

Working Papers Series, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Prusa, Thomas J. (2005) “Anti-Dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade”

http://manoa.hawaii.edu/ctahr/aheed/ALex/Prusa%20AnitDumping.pdf

25

comtrade.un.org

WTO Antidumping Agreement: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm

WTO Antidumping Database: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm

Data from Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy:

http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=71F44472-9290-D77E-3BAB6F7C07B1E205

World Bank, Global Antidumping Database:

http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:2

2574930~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html)

- Working paper describing data and sources: Bown, Chad P. (2007) “Global Antidumping

Database Version 3.0”

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/544824-

1272916036631/bown-global-ad-v3.0.pdf