The effect of relationship orientation on negotiators' cognitions and tactics

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2:16%186 (1993) �9 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers

The Effect of Relationship Orientation on Negotiators' Cognitions and Tactics

LEONARD GREENHALGtt Amos Tuck School qf Buslness Administration, Dartmouth College, Hanover, Ni t 03755

RODERICK W. GILKEY School of Business Administration, Emo~y University, Atlanta, GA 30322

Abstract

Multimethod research was conducted to investigate how relationship orientation affects cognitions and tactics of dealing with conflicts. In-depth interviews by a clinical psycho|ogist revealed differences in perspective on the relationship, and content analysis of a videotaped laboratory simulatiort revealed differences ir~ tactics attributable to differential concern for relationship preservation. A second laboratory simulation manipulated the duration of the negotiators' relationship to investigate the effects of relationship orientation when situational factors are taken into account. The results generally show that relationship-oriented negotiators tend to view relationships with the other party as continuous rather than episodic, adopt flexible postures, and avoid relationship.- impairing tactics; they also show that situation can have a strong effect.

Key words: interpersonal relationships, negotiation, gender differences, personality, episodie~ continuous time perspective, empathy, deception, negotiating tactics

The study of negotiation has gone through several phases, all of which have pro- duced useful information, but none of which has proven fully satisfactory in ex- plaining and predicting the course of everyday conflicts. The first major thrust was undertaken by economists (see, e.g., Nash 1950), relying heavily on game- theoretic formulations. Their work was embellished by social psychologists, who studied similar negotiation scenarios in the laboratory and sought primarily to identify the determinants of outcomes (Rubin and Brown 1975). A more recent thrust has been in the cognitive area, ~4th negotiations being viewed as a more or tess rational process of interdependent decision making (Neale and Bazerman 1991). What all of these approaches have in common is a tendency to tbcus on outcomes rather than process, and a view of disputes as isolated transactions rather than as strains in ongoing relationships between the parties.

The yield from years of research in these traditions has been a substantial sci- entific contribution, but its practical applicability is limited. (In fact, researchers working in these paradigms often have difficulty identifying the usefillness of their most recent study to the dispute in which they themselves were most recently involved.) The reason for the limitations to applicability seems to be that theory

168 LEONARD GREENHALGH/RODERICK W. GILKEY

and research in this area have been constrained by a masculine bias, as in other areas of organizational behavior (see~ e.g., Gray 1992; Smircich 1985). That is, negotiation research and theory have focused almost exclusively on masculine preoccupations: transactions rather than the relationships in which they arise, power and status differentials rather than rapport, coalition activity rather than connectedness, outcomes construed as payoffs rather than the future relationship, scorable games rather than disagreements, and decision making aimed at utility optimization rather than accommodation aimed at generating goodwill. Because of this apparent bias, caution must be exercised when generalizing the findings of this stream of research beyond disputes involving masculine negotiators who are strangers and envision no future interaction.

Positing that the existing body of knowledge is masculine in character leads to the question of how an unbiased theory of negotiation would be different. The most salient feature of such a theory would be its inclusion of relationships as a strong determinant of the course of negotiations. Outside the negotiation para- digm, a body of knowledge is emerging concerning relationships (see, e.g., Duck 1988), differential awareness of relationships (see, e.g., Acitelli 1992), and the link between relational competence and empathy (Long and Andrews 1990).

As a step toward counterbalancing the masculine bias in negotiation research, this article explores differences in the ways that relationship-oriented and trans~ action-oriented negotiators experience conflict and the resulting contrasts in the way they conceptualize and respond to situations requiring negotiation. We begin with a summary of the literature concerning the developmental roots of relationship versus transaction orientation, and how these differences in orientation can affect the way strains in ongoing relationships are addressed; then we explain the use of a clinical psychologist to determine subjects' orientations toward relationships; next we describe two laboratory simulations in which content analysis of the process was used to test hypothesized differences in relationship-oriented versus transaction-oriented styles; finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for research, practice, and the development of an integrated theory of negotiation.

1. The developmental roots of relationship versus transaction orientation

A number of developmental psychologists have discussed the evolution of difference in orientation toward interpersonal relationships, and found the difference strongly linked to patterns of gender socialization (e.g., Chodorow 1974; Gilligan 1982). Their general conclusion has been that women grow to be concerned with interdependence, cooperativeness, and mutuality, while men tend to be concerned with independence, competitiveness, and individualism. Chodorow (1974) attrib- uted these contrasting orientations to differences in early developmental experiences: females develop their sex-rote identity in an interdependent interplay between mother and child, whereas males establish their sex-role identity through

RELATIONSHIP ORIENTATION ON NEGOTIATORS' COGNITIONS AND TACTICS 169

separation and individuation from their mother. These differing experiences lead women to define themselves in relation to others, and men to define themselves in contrast to others.

Chodorow's work laid the groundwork for the research of Carol Gilligan (1982) who observed a greater emphasis on interdependence and mutuality in women's development. Chodorow provided an explanation for the difference between the sexes in their perspective on morality--that women emphasize their long-term responsibilities and men their immediate rights in considering moral dilemmas. Gilligan cites as an example the case of two 11-year-old children, a boy and a girl, who respond to questions about one of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas: the boy, Jake, uses deductive logic to deal with what he sees as a conflict over rights and prin- ciples among three people, and he describes the solution that would quickly resolve the issues; Amy's response is seemingly less clear and more equivocal. It is tempting to view Amy's response as being inferior to and less morally mature than Jake's, until it becomes clear that Amy is viewing the conflict in very different terms. For her, the dilemma is one of trying to resolve a problem within a relationship through ongoing personal communication. Jake, by contrast, views it as a conflict over rights that can be resolved through a morally informed legal sys- tem. The essential difference, as Gilligan describes it, is that Amy sees " . . . in the dilemma not a math problem with humans but a narrative of relationships that extend over time" (1982, p. 28). Amy's response is based on a sophisticated analysis of interpersonal dynamics and calls for an ongoing series of interactions concerned more with preserving the relationships between the conflicting parties than with the parties' rights.

Gilligan viewed the difference between masculine and feminine modes of ex- periencing the same situation as so stark that it warranted using the phrase "a different voice." Her observations and insights provide the theoretical basis for expecting a range of conceptions of relationships, and lead us to review the literature on male-female differences relevant to negotiation as a proxy for transaction-relationship orientation.

The majority of studies concerning male-female differences conclude that females are more cooperative (Amidjaja and Vinacke 1965; Conrath 1972; Lindskold and Tedeschi 1971 ; Miller and Pyke 1973; Tedeschi, Bonoma, and Lindskold 1970) and males more competitive (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). However, the findings are by no means consistent: a number of studies found no difference (e.g., Neu, Graham, and Gilly 1988), while some others found that males negotiate in a more cooperative manner (Bedell and Sistrunk 1973; Gahagan and Tedeschi 1969; McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman, and Campos 1973; Oskamp and Kteinke 1970; Pruitt 1967; Rapoport and Chammah 1965). It is important to note that the great majority of the studies that diverge from the pattern use games such as prisoner's dilemma in which competitive responses are often maladaptive.

Rubin and Brown (1975), who undertook the most exhaustive analysis of the literature on negotiation to date, explain patterns in the literature in terms of the aspects of conflict situations to which males and females attend, which is consis-

170 LEONARD GREENHALGH/RODERICK W, GILKEY

tent with what one would expect on the basis of the developmental psychology literature. In Rubin and Brown's view, the literature becomes understandable if one considers

. . . not that males and females are different in their inherent propensity to bargain cooperatively with one another, but rather that they are sensitive to different cues. Women are highly sensitive and reactive to the interpersonal aspects of their relationship with the other. Males orient themselves not to the other, but to the impersonal task of maximizing their o~n earnings [p. 173].

In work that supports this thesis of differential sensitivity to interpersonal dynamics, Hall (t 984) reviewed nine studies of interruption behavior and found that in eight of them, women were less likely to interrupt the dialog than men. In the ninth study, which found that women interrupt more, Hall suggests that the women's interrupting might not have represented aggressive acts, but might include supportive questions designed to draw out the point of view of the other party. The study falls short of drawing the link to differential concern for preserving the relationship arising from gender socialization, but Hall's results are consistent with our own proposition that relationship-oriented individuals will be hesitant to interrupt and likely' to ask empathic questions during a dispute.

A number of studies suggest that women tend to be more accommodating than men in their dealings with others (Hall 1984). They tend to be more polite (Jay 1980), agreeable (Strodtbeck and Mann 1956), and complimentary (Lott, Lott, Reed, and Crow t970; Warr 197I). They also are slightly better at detecting deception (Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal 1981), but are more likely to over- look such deception (DePaulo, Jordan, Irvine, and Laser 1982). These findings, too, reinl'orce the view that there is a general tendency for women to be more attuned to relationships than men and more concerned with behaving in a way that fosters relationships.

In summary, the literature on masculine/feminine differences relevant to negotiation serves as a useful proxy for differences in transaction-relationship orientation. Although there are inconsistencies in that literature, there is substantial evidence of some masculine-feminine differences in approach to disputes that is consistent with the developmental literature's predictions of differences in transaction versus relationship orientation. Furthermore, we should note that developmental experiences are far from uniform for either biological sex but these experiences shape the evolution of their orientation toward disputes. The result is that, irrespective of biological sex, individuals can differ on a continuum from strongly transaction-oriented to strongly relationship-oriented. We predict that where individuals fall on this continuum influences the process by which they deal with the conflicts that strain interpersonal relationships.

Specifically, in contrast to a strong transaction orientation, we would expect a strong relationship orientation to be associated with the following tendencies: to conceptualize interpersonal relationships in continuous terms, to be empathic,


and to engage in negotiating behaviors that foster rather than risk the continuity of the relationship with the other party. This article reports an empirical investi- gation of the effects of these differences in orientation; the specific hypotheses tested are presented below.

2. Hypotheses

Seven hypotheses are posited that summarize differences between transaction- oriented and relationship-oriented types in response to dispute situations. Specif- ically, individuals who are predominantly relationship-oriented will tend to:

Hypothesis 1:

Hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis 4:

Hypothesis 5:

Hypothesis 6: Hypothesis 7:

conceptualize interactions involving interpersonal strains in terms of the long-term relationship rather than the immediate transaction. redefine situations that objectively are episodic (single, isolated transactions) as more continuous (having long-term conse- quences that need to be considered). have greater capacity for empathy. exhibit empathic behavior in negotiations by seeking to learn the other person's point of view. be more open-minded about making concessions in order to set- tle a dispute. refrain from interrupting the other person during negotiations. refrain from attempts to deceive the other party to gain a short- term tactical advantage.

3. Method

3.1 Subjects

The 64 subjects were second-year Master's of Business Administration (MBA) students enrolled in a course on negotiation. Each was trained in negotiation and had significant organizational experience (the average age of subjects was 28; they had from two to ten years of corporate experience). Subjects were randomly assigned to different dyads in the two simulations, and randomly assigned to the episodic or continuous condition in the second simulation.

3.2 Measurement of relationship~transaction orientation

The instrument used to identify subjects as predominantly transaction-oriented or relationship-oriented was the Bern Sex-Role Inventory (Bem 1974). The BSRI generates separate scores for dimensions that Bern labels masculinity and femi-


ninity; these categorizations are made largely on the basis of whether the individual is transaction- or relationship-oriented, respectively; therefore, the instrument is appropriate for operationalizing our construct. A debate has appeared in the literature over this measure, primarily focusing on its use as an androgyny measure (see, e.g., Wong, McCreary, and Duffy 1990). Our use of the scale is limited to calculating whether relationship orientation or transaction orientation is the stronger tendency; therefore, that controversy does not affect the appropriateness of our use of the instrument.

Subjects who scored higher on relationship orientation than transaction orientation were classified as predominantly relationship-oriented, and vice versa. These classifications correlated only moderately (r = .29, p < .01) with biological sex. Thirty of the 64 subjects were transaction-oriented males, 11 were relationship-oriented males; 13 were relationship-oriented females, and 10 were transaction-oriented females.

3.3 Assessment of time horizon and empathy

In order to operationalize the dependent variable of Hypothesis 1, subjects were assessed on their characteristic tendency, across situations, to visualize episodic or continuous time horizons. This individual-difference dimension was assessed prior to subjects' participating in the simulations by a clinical psychologist who was unfamiliar with subjects' BSRI scores. The clinician's primary basis for making judgments was information obtained in a clinical interview; assessments were bolstered by themes arising in responses to projective tests (Rorschach and The- matic Apperception) and the subject's account of his or her psychological history. The clinician assigned a rating (on a seven-point scale) for each individual's characteristic tendency to focus on the continuity of interpersonal relationships. The anchor points of this scale were "sees all interactions as isolated transactions" and "sees all interactions as events in an ongoing relationship."

The clinician provided ratings of a second dimension that was of interest in this study, capacity for empathy. Perspective-taking ability has been shown to influence performance in negotiations (see Neale and Bazerman 1983), and there is some evidence that it is related to relationship orientation (Long and Andrews 1990). The in-depth interviews, in conjunction with the projective tests, yielded a rich understanding of the subject's capacity to understand situations from the other person's point of view. The clinician recorded a rating of each subject on a seven-point scale representing this dimension. The anchor points of this scale were "incapable of empathic understanding" and "highly empathic."

3.4 Laboratory simulations of negotiations

Two simulations were developed for this research that were highly realistic and understandable to subjects. The first simulation involved a simple dyadic sales


transaction, Subjects were provided information about their own needs, but no information concerning the needs of the other party. The simulation was designed to create symmetrical utility structures and equal power for the two negotiators.

The second simulation involved a complex dyadic transaction based on an ac- tual case study of a multiattribute contract negotiation. The contract concerned the purchase of network television advertising time by a representative of a major consumer-goods company (see Neslin and Greenhalgh I983). Manipulation of the continuity of the relationship between the negotiators was accomplished in the second study by means of special role instructions. In the episodic condition, the negotiators were advised that they were about to be transferred to other func- tions in the organization such that there could be no future working relationship with the other party. In the continuous condition, the negotiator was advised that the current transaction was only one event within a stream of interactions extend- ing into the future with the other party.

A questionnaire, designed to learn how they conceptualized the upcoming interaction and what were their behavioral intentions regarding tactics, was filled out by each subject at the beginning of the laboratory experiment. Buried within the set of questions was an item that addressed perceived continuity of interaction. Subjects were asked to respond by means of a five-point Likert-type response category: at one pole, the situation was construed as continuous (an event within a long-term relationship); at the other pole, the situation was construed as episodic (all isolated transaction).

A second question buried in the set addressed flexibility of stance in the negotiation. We had hypothesized, on the basis of the literature review, that relationship-oriented negotiators would be open-minded about making concessions in order to achieve a settlement, whereas their transaction-oriented counterparts would be more intransigent. The item asked subjects to rate their stance (i,e,, behavioral intention) toward compromise in the upcoming multiattribute contract negotiation, Subjects were asked to respond by means of a five-point Likert-type response category: at one pole, they stated their intention to be unyielding; at the other pole, they stated their intention to make compromises if necessary to achieve an agreement.

3.5 Content analysis of videotaped process data

Each of the 64 dyadic negotiations (one set of 32 dyads for each laboratory study) was videotaped. The videotapes were later analyzed by a research assistant who was trained in content analysis but unaware of the hypotheses of this study or the subjects' BSRI scores. The data were analyzed for the extent to which three behaviors were exhibited: interruption, empathic inquiries (attempts to elicit the other party's point of view), and attempted deception. (This last variable was operationalized as depicting one's situation as different from what the role instructions specified, such as by falsely claiming that a particular alternative deal was available. The research assistant was familiar with the role instructions and could

t74 LEONARD GREENHALGH/RODERICK W. GILKEY

easily tell when a subject was manipulating perceptions in order to gain an advantage.) The research assistant counted the frequency of each behavior, then rated the frequencies on five-point scales using pre-established categories appropriate for each dimension. For example, interruption frequency ratings were anchored at zero if there were no interruptions and 4 if there were more than seven interruptions per unit of time.

4. Results

4.1 Differences in cognitions related to relationship orientation

Subjects were classified as predominantly relationship-oriented (n = 24) and predominantly transaction-oriented (n = 40) on the basis of their higher BSRI sub- scale score. The two groups displayed significant differences in mean scores on the two clinically rated individual-difference variables, and these data lend support to Hypotheses 1 and 3. Table 1 shows that relationship-oriented subjects were more likely to see interactions with the other person as events within a long- term relationship rather than to focus on the exigencies of the immediate transaction. The table also shows that relationship-oriented subjects were more adept at conceptualizing interpersonal disputes from the other person's point of view, thus attesting to their hypothesized greater capacity for empathy.

4.2 Results o f first laboratory simulation

Table 2 reports the results of the content analysis of the videotaped negotiations and compares the negotiating tactics used by the two groups. It shows that predominantly relationship-oriented negotiators were slightly more likely to make empathic inquiries (Hypothesis 4), but the difference was not significant and

Table 1. Differences between relationship-oriented and transaction-oriented subjects on traits involving time perspective and capacity for empathy as rated by a clinical psychologist.

Predominantly Predominantly relationship- transaction- oriented oriented subjects subjects Level of

Clinician-rated significance personality dimensions m s.d. m s.d. of difference

Continuous time 5.97 1.02 5.08 1.3 t p < .05 perspective

Capacity for empathy 5.21 1.18 4.52 1.41 p < .05


Table 2. Differences between relationship-oriented and transaction-oriented subjects on use of negotiation tactics in the laboratory study of a single-issue transaction.

Tactics used in negotiation (Data from content analysis of videotapes)

Predominantly Predominantly relationship- transaction- oriented oriented subjects subjects

m s.d. m s.d.

Level of significance of difference

Empathic inquires 1.52 1.20 1.38 1.23 (ns) Interruptions 1.78 t.48 2.56 1.48 p < .001 Attempted deception t. 13 0.76 2.03 1.25 p < .05

therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, Hypotheses 6 and 7 were supported: predominantly relationship-oriented negotiators were significantly more likely to refrain from interruptions (p < .05) and from attempts to deceive the other party in order to gain an advantage (p < .00t).

4.3 Results o f the second laboratory simulation

The second laboratory study, a true experiment, manipulated the episodic-continuous nature of the simulated situation. The purpose was to substantiate our earlier observation that relationship-oriented negotiators' greater concern with protect- ing the long-term relationship has effects on cognitions and behaviors beyond those resulting from the demands of the objective situation.

Table 3 summarizes the results of five multiple-regression analyses conducted to test such effects, The first independent variable entered was situation, a cate- gorical variable scored so that positive regression coefficients indicate a positive effect of an episodic (isolated transaction) scenario. The second independent variable entered was predominant relationship orientation (that is, relationship orientation score minus transaction orientation score on the BSRI; note that for the t-tests summarized in tables 1 and 2, predominant orientation is treated as a cat- egorical rather than a continuous variable). The dependent variables were: episodic time horizon (measured by means of the subject's score on the prenegotiation questionnaire); wilfingness to compromise as necessary (the behavioral intention item reported on the pre-negotiation questionnaire); then the three frequency counts (determined by content analysis of the videotapes)---empathic inquiries, interruptions, and attempted deception.

Table 3 shows that all of the regression coefficients were in the hypothesized directions, but the regression equations only reached significance in the case of episodic orientation, willingness to compromise, and attempted deception. A substantial amount of variance was explained by the two independent variables when the dependent variable was episodic orientation (r 2 = .41) and willingness to corn-

176 L E O N A R D G R E E N H A L G H / R O D E R I C K W. G 1 L K E Y

Table 3. Results of multiple-regression analyses with situation and relationship/transaction orientation as independent variables, and predispositions and tactics as dependent variables.

Standardized partial regression coefficients

Nature of Predominant dependent Dependent Episodic relationship variable variable situation orientation r 2

Prenegotiation self- Tendency to .62*** .15 .41 ***

reports view situation as an episodic transaction

Willingness to - ,59*** .24** . 41"**

compromise

Content analysis of Empathic - . 13 .09 .02

videotaped process inquiries data

Interruption .17 .19 .07

Attempted .19 - , 21" .08*

deception

*p < .10

**p < .05

***p < .01

promise (r z = .41), relatively little when the dependent variable was attempted deception (r 2 = .08). Overall, these results do not adequately support our general hypothesis that relationship-oriented predispositions would have a strong effect beyond situational manipulations.

Hypothesis 5 received the strongest support: subjects' willingness to compromise was significantly influenced by relationship versus transaction orientation beyond a strong effect from situational cues. Two interpretations of these data are possible. First, relationship-oriented negotiators are open-minded about making compromises as necessary to reach a settlement even when future reciprocation of such concessions is precluded by situational factors. Second, the tendency of transaction-oriented negotiators to experience negotiations as a competitive struggle is manifest even in ongoing relationships where intransigence might be counterproductive (the other party might seek revenge or avoid the aggressive negotiator in the future, thus reducing the present value of the total payoff from the intransigent stance). These explanations are not mutually exclusive; future research is warranted to investigate the two possibilities.

Hypothesis 2 was not supported at an acceptable level of significance. The sign of the standardized partial regression coefficient suggests that predominantly relationship-oriented negotiators may have some tendency to conceptualize inter-


personal relationships in continuous terms beyond the much stronger, opposing effect of the situational manipulation. We are disappointed with this result and believe that this warrants further research because our debriefing of subjects in- dicates a stronger effect than shown by the data. In fact, an earlier experiment involving the episodic-continuous time horizon failed because subjects would not respond in accordance with the manipulation if it ran counter to their basic tendency. In debriefing, the typical transaction-oriented negotiator in the continuous condition reported feeling a need to achieve the maximum advantage in the present negotiation because the next interaction was "a new ball game." By contrast, the typical relationship-oriented negotiator told us "it doesn't matter very much that you're never going to do business with this person again: you still have a working relationship." Thus, while we make no assertions on the basis of our empirical findings, we have not abandoned the hypothesis because it is supported by qualitative data.

In the case of Hypothesis 7, although the overall regression equation explains only a small proportion of the variance in attempted deception, relationship orientation emerged as a significant predictor, thus providing additional support for the hypothesis. (Table 2 shows support for this hypothesis in the first laboratory simulation.)

Hypothesis 4 received no more support in the second laboratory study than it did in the first: predominantly relationship-oriented negotiators may be slightly more prone to make empathic inquiries, but the effect is not significant. The effect of the situational manipulation was not significant either.

Finally, whereas Hypothesis 6 was supported in the first laboratory study, the effect was too weak to achieve significance in the second. Predominantly relationship-oriented subjects had only a slightly lower tendency to interrupt the other party. As in the case of attempted deception, the situational manipulation had only a weak effect.

5. Discussion

This research contributes to the emerging body of knowledge concerning relationships between negotiators by empirically investigating relationship orientation as a key negotiator predisposition. It drew on the literature of developmental psychology to arrive at a global proposition: that relationship-oriented negotiators will conceptualize disputes (and their stance toward the other party in those disputes) differently from their transaction-oriented counterparts. These cognitions were expected to lead to an avoidance of tactics that risk harming the ongoing relationship.

Before we discuss the implications of our findings, it is appropriate to draw attention to shortcomings of the study. First, the sample size (64) was small. This prevented our using the dyad as the unit of analysis for the two laboratory simulations. As a result, we can make statements about how individuals behave, but


we cannot address the important issue of whether such behavior is modified by the predispositions and behavior of the other party. It is quite likely that relationship-oriented negotiators with considerable negotiating experience respond differently depending on whether the other party is also relationship-oriented or is transaction-oriented (see Dindia and Allen 1992, p. 114).

Second, the sample is underrepresented in relationship-oriented subjects in comparison to the total population. This bias is attributable to self-selection and admissions selection processes that shape business school populations, and there may be a further selection bias operating on course enrollment choice. That is, relationship-oriented people may be less likely to choose business over other professions, to enroll in business school, and to enroll in negotiation courses if they do go to business school. While such a selection bias would pose problems in generalizing the results of this study to the population at large, it is less of a shortcoming in this particular study: we are interested in comparing relationship- oriented negotiators with their transaction-oriented counterparts in business negotiations, not in making generalizations about the population at large. The bias does affect the research, however, by reducing the proportion of predominantly relationship-oriented subjects in the sample (only 24 out of the 64 subjects were predominantly relationship-oriented).

A third shortcoming is the failure to assess inter-rater reliability. We largely avoided common method variance problems by using a self-reported orientation measure for the independent variable, then a clinical psychologist's ratings to assess the cognitive dependent variables, and independent ratings of the negotiation process by a trained research assistant to assess the behavioral (i.e., process) variables. However, we only used one clinician and one research assistant, respectively. The videotapes could have been content analyzed by multiple judges so as to enable assessment of inter-rater reliability but this step was not taken due to cost-benefit considerations (the videotape content analysis was extremely labor-intensive). Establishing inter-rater reliability of the clinical assessments was less feasible. Clinical data arise from a relationship between a clinical psychologist and a subject. It is an intrusive process that cannot casually be replicated without producing a complex respondent burden (see Gilkey and Greenhalgh 1992). Thus, tradeoffs were made in the way the study was conducted, and the quality of the findings is dependent on the competency of the clinical psychologist and the training and diligence of the research assistant, neither of which can be substantiated empirically. The reader is urged to exercise appropriate caution in judging the results.

Despite these caveats, this study makes a significant contribution and has important implications. The first phase of the research confirmed the usefulness of the BSRI as a predictor of differences in how interpersonal relationships are conceptualized: the in-depth interviews conducted by a clinical psychologist confirmed that relationship-oriented subjects do, as Gilligan (1982) suggested, show more concern for the long-term relationship. Such concern was specifically re-


flected in our finding that relationship-oriented subjects' conception of the time horizon of the interaction tends to be continuous rather than episodic.

One implication of this finding is that the time-horizon variable may not have been adequately explored by researchers despite the number of studies that have addressed it (see, e.g., Caplow 1968; Pruitt and Rubin 1986; Thompson 1990). Many studies have had an essentially episodic operationalization of the continuous condition; that is, the continuous scenario is seen simply as involving more than one transaction, A pair of transactions (or a set of them in a repeated-trials scenario) cannot be assumed to represent to all subjects the same psychological experience as a truly continuous situation (such as when the parties are siblings, business partners, significant others, etc.). Thus, for example, while it is possible that transaction-oriented marriage partners may envision their life together as a series of transactions, relationship-oriented marriage partners are likely to define their interdependence differently, so that the paradigmatic multitrial operationalization of a continuous relationship will not adequately simulate their experience. More generally, this transaction-based operationalization of continuous time horizon can be viewed as another instance of masculine bias in negotiation research and further illustrates how the generalizability of the results of that stream of research may be limited.

During this first phase of research, we also found capacity for empathy to be higher for relationship-oriented subjects. Surprisingly, however, the difference did not become manifest in empathic inquiries in the two laboratory simulations, and this may have implications for the training of negotiators. It is possible that our subjects did not differ strongly on this dependent variable as a result of uniform training. The laboratory studies were conducted in the context of a negotiation course in which a key learning objective was to induce students to gather information in order to craft persuasive appeals that responded to the other party's interests. The training of transaction-oriented subjects to make empathic inquiries may have masked the difference in predispositions. From a research perspective, follow-up studies need to be conducted on a naive subject pool in order to investigate this possibility. From a practitioner perspective, the results indicate that it may be possible to develop this competency in individuals who are not predis- posed to use this negotiation tactic.

Although the results of the third phase of this study, the laboratory" experiment, do not adequately support all the hypotheses it was designed to test, the pattern of results should stimulate further research using naive subjects. All of the regression coefficients had signs that were in the hypothesized directions, and as we noted earlier, the data proved to be much weaker than we expected from inter- viewing and observing previous cohorts. Part of the reason may be that the laboratory experiment was conducted in the context of a negotiation course, so that relationship-oriented subjects had learned to compensate for their natural tendencies to be accommodating in episodic situations, and transaction-oriented subjects had learned to curb their aggressiveness in continuous relationships.


The final implication of this study returns our attention to the larger issue we raised at the outset of this article, that we need to assess the full extent to which the dominant paradigms for studying negotiations have been gender-biased. To counteract the negative effects of masculine bias, scholars should be working toward a gender-neutral theory of negotiations. This means going beyond the as- sumption that seems implicit in much of the current theory, namely, that the masculine transaction-oriented approach to negotiation is the norm, and any de- partures from this norm, such as those displayed by relationship-oriented negotiators, can be construed as lack of ability. The goal of the new theory would be to incorporate a relationship-oriented perspective on negotiations that has char- acteristics that contrast with the masculine preoccupations with transactions, power and status differentials, coalition activity, economic payoffs, and competitive decision making.

A synthesis with the existing masculine-oriented body of knowledge would ap- pear to be difficult, given that feminine types speak "in a different voice" (Gilligan 1982) and masculine types tend to be poorly attuned to their relationships (Acitelli 1992). However, we believe that such integration is possible because much of the incompatibility is at the level of conscious awareness rather than basic nature: that is, transaction-oriented individuals are, in fact, also concerned with relationships, but have been socialized to suppress this concern because its expression is discouraged by masculine norms. In other words, underneath their manifest preoccupation with winning, dominance, and the transaction, these individuals actually possess an underlying motive for connectedness. Scholars who are dom- inated by masculine norms will tend to study scorable games almost exclusively, and at an extreme wilt show intolerance for theory and research that focuses on other aspects of negotiation, dismissing it as "unscientific" (but really meaning "un-masculine"). Both practicing negotiators and the scholars who study them have much to learn from addressing the unexplored facets of the phenomenon, facets that can be designed out of laboratory simulations but are an integral part of real-life situations.

An integrated theory would have as a central construct the relationship between the parties. It would not take for granted that the relationship was primarily a means of exchange, or even basically adversarial with each party dedicated to maximizing his or her own utility (through joint problem solving if necessary); instead, it would investigate how each party construed his/her relationship. It would never assume there was "no relationship" because even total strangers involved in a negotiation have a relationshily--of one stranger to another. It would also take seriously the possibility that relationship quality can be the primary outcome (cf. Simons in press), and also would investigate negotiation process as a possible key determinant of postnegotiation relationship quality. Thus, because a relationship is inescapable, it behooves scholars to investigate this variable, as well as people's predispositions to take the relationship into account as well as the transaction. Thus, an integrated theory would obviously lead us in new directions in the study of disputes.


To explore the relationship-oriented side to the theory of negotiation, we must develop constructs, instruments, research designs, and data concerning relationships, and develop a rich understanding of how conflict affects them. Although a body of knowledge has been evolving on the subject of interpersonal relationships (e.g., Clark and Reis 1988; Hinde 1979; Kelley et al. 1983; Wish, Deutsch, and Kaplan 1976), very little research has concerned relationships in organizations or the effects of conflict and how it is addressed (Greenhalgh 1987). As this special issue of Group Decision and Negotiation illustrates, significant research on relationships is now evolving (see also Greenhalgh and Chapman 1992; Greenhalgh and Kramer 1990; Halpern 1992; Lowenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 1991; Northcraft and Neale 1991; Thompson and DeHarpport 1991; Mannix 1991; Val- ley 1991; Valley and Neale 1991).

Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the help of Deborah Chapman, Lucy Axtell, Susan Pu- fahl, and Sonia Stryker, along with numerous colleagues and reviewers, in the development of this article.

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Documents

The effect of relationship orientation on negotiators' cognitions and tactics