The DYnamics of ConflicT in the MulTieThnic Union of mYanmar

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The Dynamics of Conflict in theMultiethnic Union of Myanmar

PCIA - Country Conflict-Analysis Study

Timo KivimKi & Paul Pasch

October 2009

n Crucial developments are taking place in Burma / Myanmars political landscape.

Generation change, the change of the nominal political system, and the recovery

from a major natural disaster can lead to many directions. Some of these changes

can possibly pave the way for violent societal disruptions.

n As an external actor the international community may further add to political

tensions through their intervening policies. For this reason it is very important that

the international community assesses its impact on the agents and structure of

conflict in Burma / Myanmar.

n This study aims at mapping the opportunities and risks that various types ofinternational aid interventions may have in the country.

n The study utilizes and further develops the peace and conflict impact assessment

methodology of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.


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The DYnamics of conflic T in The mulTieThnic union of

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Table of Contents

fore Wor D 5ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................. 11

PART I: conflic Tsan D Their ma PPinG................................. 13

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 13

Background and Objectives............................................................................................. 13

Elements of Conflict in FE S PC IA Methodology................................................................ 14

Method for Assessing Conflict Sensitivity of Aid and Suggestions for Improvement ......... 16

Summary: Conducting the PCIA forBurma/Myanma r...................................................... 18

PART II:The conflic T maP of Burma /mYanmar .............. 21

Conflict in Burma/Myanmar ............................................................................................ 21

Mental Maps ofDivisionsand Agents ............................................................................. 23

Mental Maps: Conflict .................................................................................................... 37

Grievances and Incentives forViolence............................................................................ 40

ExistingOpportunities forViolence.................................................................................. 43

Paths to Conflict and Non-Violent Outcomes .................................................................. 44

PART III:aiD an D conflic T...................................................... 59

Conflict Prevention and Its Relationship to Other Motives ofAid ..................................... 59

Conflict Prevention and Its Linkages to Aid Assets and Instruments ................................. 61

Transforming Burma/Myanmars Antagonistic Agent Structure ........................................ 62

Dealing with Conflict-Prone Cleavages ............................................................................ 65

Transforming Conflict Attitudes that Make Conflict Resolution Difficul t........................... 69

Addressing Conflict Motives and Opportunities ............................................................... 71

PART IV: conclusions ............................................................. 75

Context of Conflict-sensitive Aid..................................................................................... 75

Main Recommendations ................................................................................................. 75


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fr i e D r i ch e B e rT foun D aT

ANNE X1: lis Tof inTerie Wees................................................ 78

Interviews and discussions with Union of Myanmar Government officials........................ 78

Interviews with armed conflicting party organisations ..................................................... 79

People from ceasefire groups who have given information

for the conflict mapping in interviews with the project team ........................................... 79

Interviews with anonymous informants ........................................................................... 79

Interviews with experts, activists, donors and development workers ................................ 80

ANNE X2: inTervie W Ques Tionnaire ................................... 82

Instructions ..................................................................................................................... 82

Questions for ethnic informants ...................................................................................... 82

Questions to people involved in post-Nargis rescue ......................................................... 83

Questions for people who are part of the economic elite,

but who did not participate in the post-Nargis rescue ..................................................... 84

Questions to Government officials .................................................................................. 84

ANNE X3: Kios 19 Poin TsPro Posal forcons TiTuTional Provisions an D clause s....................... 85

ANNE X4: reccommen DaTions for enhance Dcoo PeraTion BeTWeen eu an D mYanmar ....................... 88

enDno Tes ................................................................................. 92


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5


fore Wor D

In the past 10 to 15 years, civil peace

building, conflict management and crisisprevention have become important aspectsof international relations arounddevelopment cooperation and have takenroot as goals for political action. Althoughthe basic idea that developmentcooperation always seeks to be a policy forpeace is by no means new, what is new isits attempt to contribute directly topeaceful development in conflict situa-tions. This concern is no longer just anoverriding, ab-stract goal: it should bereflected in specific strategies and

measures, and the conflict impact of aid isnow open to assessment in much the sameway as the environmental impacts. Theissue of civil peace building acquired a newdimension with the terrorist attacks in theUnited States on11 September 2001; the debate on crisisprevention and conflict management mayprovide substantive input in this context.

Civil peace building comprises all non-military measures adopted before, during orafter a violent conflict. Its purpose ispeaceful conflict transformation and/orthe promotion and establishment ofstructures and mechanisms for non-violentconflict management. Peace cannot becreated at the highest political level alone;rather, the whole of society industry andbusiness, academia and education, faith-based communities, the media and localNGOs (multi-track diplomacy) must beinvolved in the peace process. Moreover,peace building is always an intra-societalprocess which external actors can at best

support but cannot im- ple-ment. Promotinglocal peace actors and peace constituenciesis therefore especially important infacilitating the peace building process.

From the 30 to 50 violent conflicts a yearbetween, but mostly within, countries it isclear how nec- essary it is to findconstructive ways of resolving conflicts.Many countries also find themselves in agrey area between war and peace, in whichthe Government is undergoing a process ofinsidious or overt disintegration. Violentdisputes are often the core problem.Besides causing enormous human suffering,violent conflicts reverse past progress including that achieved through develop-

ment cooperation and block opportunities

for future development. They are also amajor burden


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fr i e D r i ch e B e rT foun D aT

on the international community (cost ofmilitary operations, reconstruction aid, etc.).

International development cooperationplays a key role in civil peace building, as itis a challenge which requires a coherent,holistic and interdisci- plinary approach. Theaim is to address the causes of conflict,

support structural stability, promote stateand non-state peace actors throughsocial and political programmes, and con-tribute to a sustainable peace in post-conflict societies, e.g. through reconciliationwork.

The commitment to conflict sensitivity in allof- ficial development activities, forexample by the German Ministry ofEconomic Development and Cooperation(BMZ) and the British Department forInternational Development (DFID), shows

that peace building has now become apriority cross- cutting theme indevelopment cooperation. Non- governmentactors are equally committed to pro- activedevelopment-oriented peace work and areengaging in partnership with officialdevelopment agencies in order tocontribute to peaceful conflicttransformation at various levels of society.

Since the mid-1990s a number of bi- andmultilat- eral donors (Germany, UnitedKingdom, Norway, the World Bank among

others) and the OECDs DevelopmentAssistance Committee (DAC) have carriedout country and project studies to deter-mine what influence developmentcooperation has on conflict situations. Pastexperience can be summarised as follows:

Relative influence of developmentcooperation: Expectations of whatdevelopment cooperation can achieveshould not be pitched too high. Theresponsibility for preventing or endingcon- flicts rests mainly with the parties

concerned. In most cases, developmentcooperation will be unable to prevent orend violent conflicts on its own. It may,on the other hand, tip the balancebetween civil and violent forms of conflict.

Development cooperation is not neutralin conflicts: Development cooperationexerts an intended and unintendedinfluence on conflict in partnercountries. These effects are identifi- ableboth at the level of individual measuresor


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project regions (micro level) and at thelevel of a countrys overall policy (macrolevel). At micro level the question inmany partner countries is whether and, ifso, how account has been taken of the

ethnic affiliation of the target groups.There is considerable evidence to showthat even purely technical measureshave a positive or negative impact onsocial tensions and conflict situations.

Development cooperation and the fightagainst terrorism: It is not yet possible tosay what effect the terrorist attacks willhave on German and inter-nationaldevelopment cooperation. Some of thepossible implications for developmentcooperation were, however, already beingdiscussed immediately after 11September 2001. The discussion showsthat development cooperation as awhole may become more important as aresult of the new challenges.

To meet these challenges the Friedrich-Ebert-Stif- tung has developed guidelines tooffer practical tools for a systematic Peaceand Conflict Impact Assessment in countryconflict-analysis studies. These guidelinesare intended to help international

development agencies involved ininternational development cooperation to:

carry out a conflict analysis to ensuretheir work is conflict-sensitive,

systematically incorporaterecommendations stemming from thecountry-related analysis and theconflict mapping into their projectplanning,

monitor changes in the constellationand dy-

namics of theconflict,

consider the possible impacts of theproject on the conflict and

draw conclusions about adapting theproject planning.

After the EU had formulated its newCommon Position in October 2004, FESlaunched its first engagement projects inBurma/Myanmar. After years of work withdifferent groups in Myanmar society, during

which the volume of projects grad- uallyincreased, the need for a detailed assess-ment of the status quo concerning conflictand aid arose. With the prospect of

elections in 2010, this seems a goodmoment to look back and formulate


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some recommendations for futureengagement in the form of a PCIA study.

The Union of Myanmar is a complexmulti-ethnic structure made up of sevenBamar divisions and seven Ethnic States.Myanmar (also known as Burma) gainedindependence from Britain in

1948 and has been ruled by militaryGovernment in one form or another since1962. The current military Government wasestablished in Septem- ber 1988. Knowninitially as the State Law and OrderRestoration Council (SLORC), it was sub-sequently renamed the State Peace andDevelop- ment Council (SPDC). InAugust/September 1988 anti-Governmentprotests were met with a violent militarycrackdown, which resulted in the killing ofthousands of demonstrators, the arrest ofhu- man rights activists, the declaration ofmartial law and the imprisonment of theNational League for Democracy (NLD)leader (and daughter of My- anmarsindependence hero) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Since 1948, over 30 ethnic armedgroups have been involved in insurgenciesagainst the central Government. But theSPDC has concluded ceasefire agreementswith most of them since the early1990s, co-opting their leaders with offers ofpeace benefits through economic

concessions. The larg- est ethnic resistancegroup not to sign a ceasefire is the KarenNational Union, with whom clashescontinue.

In 1990 free and fair elections werepromised. The election was indeed fairenough to demonstrate the popular lack ofsupport for the Government. After-wards,the opposition felt that the elections hadbeen for a Peoples Assembly, i.e. a parlia-ment, while the Government claimed theyhad been for a Constitutional Assembly. This

led to continued antagonistic positioning byboth the ruling military and the winningparty, National League for Democracy(NLD).

In any case, the election results were nothon- oured: neither was a ConstitutionalAssembly swiftly convened to draft a newConstitution, nor was a parliament called todetermine a new Gov- ernment. The SLORCremained in power. Aung San Suu Kyi wasawarded the Nobel Peace Prize. A military-picked National Convention was set up to

write a new constitution in 1993. Aung SanSuu Kyi was released from house arrest in1995


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but her movement was restricted; she wasde- tained again in 2000 and 2003. Over thepast 20 years, ASSK has spent more than 14years under house arrest.

US sanctions were first imposed in 1989,and the EU followed with an arms embargoand a ban on defence cooperation in 1990and 1991. In 1996 the EU adopted aCommon Position imposing restrictions onaid, diplomatic relations and financial re-lations with Myanmar. However, China andother neighbouring countries havemaintained unre- stricted relations.Sanctions and the relative inter- nationalisolation of Myanmar failed to achieve theobjective of restoring democracy. Myanmarwas admitted into ASEAN in 1997 ongrounds of constructive engagement.China is Myanmars most important tradingpartner and investor, and has tended toshield the regime from internationalpressure.

Poor governance and widespread conflicthas allowed Myanmar to become a centreof the drugs trade. Despite generally goodrelations with Thai- land, tensions haverisen over drug trafficking, border disputesand illegal migration. India has accused

Myanmars western Sagaing division ofbeing a safe haven for insurgents in Indiasnorth- east. Furthermore, Bangladeshand Myanmar have experienced tensionover off-shore gas ex- ploration.

August and September 2007 saw the largestpro- tests since 1988 when thousands ofmonks walked the streets in protest againstsocio-economic conditions. In lateSeptember, the Government re- acted witha brutal crackdown, leaving at least31 people dead and 2,100 in detention.

ASEAN expressed revulsion at theregimes actions. The US and the EUresponded by tightening sanctions. UNefforts to en-courage political dialogue andgain the release of political prisoners havehad little success. An unhurried dialoguebetween a Re- lations Minister and AungSan Suu Kyi began in October 2007.

A new constitution manifesting the militaryGov- ernments roadmap to democracywas adopted in a referendum in May2008, reserving 25 per cent of

parliamentary seats for the military andcalling for parliamentary elections in 2010.

In early May 2008 Cyclone Nargis stuck

the Ay-eyarwady Delta and Yangon. Thecyclone left


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at least 138,000 dead or missing and800,000 displaced. After some initialdifficulties, Nargis brought unprecedentedcooperation between the militaryGovernment and the international com-munity.

The overall humanitarian situation remains

des- perate. Authoritarian governance andeconomic mismanagement mean that 90per cent of the population live on lessthan 65 cents a day, and over a third ofchildren under five are malnourished. Be-cause of Western sanctions, Myanmarreceives twenty times less aid than otherleast developed countries. Malaria,tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS remain a seriousproblem in Myanmar, with prevalencerapidly growing. The conflict ridden borderareas of the ethnic states are being hit themost severely by these three diseases.

Myanmar is one of the most ethnicallydiverse countries in the world andthroughout its existence as anindependent state has experienced acomplex set of conflicts between thecentral Government and ethnic nationalitiesseeking autonomy. While the worldsattention has, for the past decade, focusedon the struggle between the militaryGovernment and the political oppositionover national power, these underlying

conflicts perhaps represent a morefundamental and in- tractable obstacle topeace, development and democracy.

The military capacity and influence ofethnic na- tionalists has declinedsignificantly over the past decade. Severalgroups have entered into ceasefireagreements with the Government and beengrant- ed de facto administrative authorityover areas under their control. Theycomplement a number of political partiesformed in areas under Govern- ment

control to represent local, ethnicinterests in the 1990 election (see Map 1).There are also a growing number ofreligious or community-based organisationsthat work to further the interests of theircommunities and have significant localinflu- ence.

Many of these organisations are officiallybanned, and all face severe restrictions bythe military Government on their activities.Yet they are important voices for ethnicgroups, particular the large percentage who

live in their traditional home-lands in thehills and mountains surround- ing thecentral plain.


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The most fundamental grievance of ethnicminori- ties in Myanmar today is their lackof influence on the political process andthus on decisions af- fecting their lives. Likesociety at large, they have been

disenfranchised by a strongly centralisedmilitary state that regards them withintense suspicion. They have felt the lossof political and economic power even moreacutely than the majority population, asboth the Government and the officer corpsare overwhelmingly Bamar in make-up andwidely perceived as a foreign force.

Ethnic nationalities consider themselvesdiscrimi- nated against and have openlyaccused successive Governments of adeliberate policy of Burmani- sation. Theyfeel not only marginalised economi- cally,but also that their social, cultural, and reli-gious rights are being suppressed.

While many ethnic groups originally foughtfor independence, today almost all haveaccepted the Union of Myanmar as a factand merely seek increased local authorityand equality within a new federal statestructure. The military Government,however, still suspects them of scheming tosplit the country and sees this as

justification for its repressive, often brutalpolicies in minority areas.

Since 1988, most ethnic minorityorganisations have expressed support fordemocracy, seeing this as their best chanceto gain a voice in national politics and pressfor a redress of their long-stand- inggrievances. But few leaders of the dominantethnic militant groups are democrats bypersua- sion or regard democracy as an endin itself. Their main concern is to securelocal political and administrative authority

and further development of their regions,and to enjoy the right to maintain andpractice their language, culture and religionwithout constraints.

The strength of organisations representingethnic nationalities has traditionally beenmeasured in military terms. The shift innational politics since1988 and sub-sequent ceasefires, however,have transferred the main struggle from thebattle-field to the political andadministrative arena. The primary

challenge for ethnic organisations today is,therefore, to build political andorganisational capacity individually andcollectively to ensure that they are not left

out of future negotiations about the futureof Myanmar and can continue to representthe interests of their communities. They


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also need to help rebuild their war-torncommuni- ties and economies and re-establish a sense of nor- malcy andconfidence in the future.

Politically, ethnic minorities are divided overgoals, strategy and other issues, and havebeen unable to form any truly effective

nationwide or even broadly inclusive fronts.There is also a great discrepancy betweenavailable human and financial resourcesand needs.

To negotiate and eventually overcomethese obstacles requires vision, carefulbalancing of objectives and strategies, andsignificant implementation capacity. Firstand foremost perhaps, it requires agenuine commitment to move beyondnarrow agendas and build a better life forlocal communities and the country at

large. Most groups, however, lack theseskills. In fact, the weaknesses andapproaches of the ethnic organisationsoften mir- ror those of the centralGovernment and other local authorities.

Many organisations are still dominated bysol- diers who have little knowledge ofpolitical and social affairs or experience withthe relevant tools for organisation andnegotiation. They may have significantlegitimacy rooted in the struggle for self-determination or, in some cases, the 1990

election but strong hierarchies and top-down approaches mean that their links tolocal communities are often weak. There isalso a general short- age of people in thesecommunities who have ap- propriateeducation and experience in civiliangovernance.

Over the past few years, the EthnicNationalities Council (in exile) and theEthnic Nationalities Me- diators Fellowshiphave begun to face up to these problemsand started on the difficult task of build- ingnetworks in long-divided communities andtraining capable leaders and administrators.Nev- ertheless, the ethnic nationalities donot yet seem prepared to respond to theactions of the SPDC with sound strategicthinking or by developing an overall andinclusive political blueprint that will bring asatisfactory conclusion to the ethnic prob-lems of the country.

Recent clashes in the Shan State betweenthe army of the military Government and

the Myanmar National Democracy AllianceArmy (MNDAA of Kokang) havehighlighted differences between


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the ruling SPDC and the ethnic ceasefiregroups as the 2010 election approaches.Attempts by the SPDC to persuade theceasefire groups to transform themselvesinto Border Guard Forces or surrender

their arms and contest the forthcomingelections as a political party seem to havefailed. Ostensibly, the SPDC is trying topressure the groups to conform to its 2008Constitution, which states in Chapter VII,Article 338, Defence Serv- ices, that allarmed forces in the union shall be under thecommand of the defence services.

Faced with a forthcoming constitutionaldilemma, the regime had little option but toseek an alternative in dealing with theceasefire groups. Mindful of Chinasinfluence and support for these groups, andalso the need to justify its actions, the SPDCmanufactured a number of pretexts. Thereis little doubt that the military Governmentcould have simply turned on those groupsthat opposed it. Instead, the militaryGovernment exploited fis- sures in theceasefire groups leadership to createdivision and to excuse its actions.

Past history has shown, especially in thecase of the various splits within the Karen

national movement, that the Burmesemilitary is more than capable of using suchinternal division to further its own interests.

However, the ultimatum for the ceasefiregroups to become Border Guard Forces byOctober 2009, which was delivered byLieutenant-General Ye Myint, Chief ofMilitary Affairs Security, in April2009, contradicted all previous SPDCinstructions and assurances to the ceasefiregroups.

In the past 20 years, the SPDC has alwaysem- phasised that it is only a transitionGovernment and does not have a mandateto negotiate political terms with theethnic ceasefire groups. The latter weretold they could retain their arms and thatthey were to negotiate the surrender ofthese with the new Government thatwould have to be elected. After the 2008referendum, the ceasefire groups wereonce again reassured when the SPDCannounced that the new constitution wouldonly come into effect after the new

Government is sworn in.

This assurance was repeated as late asJanuary

2009. Furthermore, the writtenagreement with the Kachin IndependenceOrganization (KIO),


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another ceasefire group, stipulates that theKIO would retain its arms until it obtainedthe constitutional guarantees that itdesires. The KIO has consistently statedthat, despite its participation in theNational Convention, it is not satisfied withthe SPDCs 2008 State Constitution, sincenone of its own constitutional proposals

were accepted by the SPDC-controlledassembly.

Meanwhile, the New Mon State Party andthe Zomi National Congress seem to begearing up to oppose the elections.Whether the SPDC will move militarilyagainst the NMSP a ceasefire group remains to be seen. The proximity of NMSP-controlled territory to Thailand and theKaren National Union (a non-ceasefiregroup) may give the SPDC second thoughts.

However, by the end of October 2009 theMyan- mar National Democracy AllianceArmy decided to comply in principle withthe military Govern- ments One Country,One Military proposal and agreed to placea 4,500-strong armed force under theSPDCs control on a step-by-step basis.

So far the Pa-O National Organisation (PNO)and the Kayinni National Peoples LiberationFront (KNPLF) have accepted theGovernments de- mands. They willtransform their armed units into Border

Guard Forces and form political parties. TheDemocratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA)and the New Democratic Army Kachin(NDAK) have accepted, but with someconditions that still have to be worked out.For now they insist on not forming politicalparties but supporting the 2010 nationalelections.

In addition, negotiations between the UnitedWa State Army (USWA) and the North-Eastern Re- gional Command and theKachin Independent Army (KIA) and theNorthern Regional Com- mand on aproposed Border Guard Force are un- derway.

These developments seem to haveaverted a re-turn to armed struggle for the time being.As the31 October 2009 deadline to transform theceasefire groups into SPDC-controlledBorder Forces looms, negotiations betweenthe military Gov- ernment and the ceasefire

groups seem to be pro- gressing.At a time when the EU and USGovernments are in the process ofreopening channels of direct


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communication with the militaryGovernment, it seems to be high time forthe ethnic nationalities to overcome thedisunity which persistently dogs the innercircles of each and every ethnic national- ity

and ceasefire group. Until such time, themilitary Government will continue tosucceed with its divide-and-rule policyand will apply pres- sure tactics to forcethe ethnic ceasefire groups to accept itsRoad Map and support the 2010 elections.Furthermore, the international communitywill fail to recognise the relevance of thepolitical claims raised by the ethnicnationalities.

In these difficult circumstances, it seemsto be quite timely for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung to

publish this Peace and Conflict ImpactAssess- ment Country conflict-analysisstudies: The Dynamics of Conflict in theMultiethnic Union of Myanmar in the hope offormulating some recommendations forconflict-sensitive development co-operation.

Berlin, 31 October2009

Prof. Dr. TimoKivimkiNordic Institute for AsianStudies

Dr. PaulPaschFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung


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dd

acKno WleDGemen Ts

The present publication Peace andConflict Im- pact Assessment Country

conflict-analysis studies: The Dynamics ofConflict in the Multiethnic Union of Myanmaris the result of extended field workconducted by the authors between Septem-ber 2006 and September 2009 in Yangon,Naypyi- taw and the border area (includingfield trips to more than 10 ceasefire groups)as well as the Thai- Myanmar border. Thestudy profited from the extensive networkof contacts established by the Frie-drich-Ebert-Stiftung and the ASEM Educa- tionHub for Peace and Conflict Studies in Myan-mar as well as among the Burmese exilecommu- nity. Without the assistance ofnumerous people this study could not havebeen completed.

However, given its sensitive nature and thecir- cumstances under which it wasconducted, it is not possible toacknowledge all the people, insti- tutionsand organisations that granted their unre-served support and assistance.

Essential for this PCIA were the ShalomFounda- tion in Yangon, which is working for

peace and development for the people ofMyanmar by supporting the process ofbuilding a stable and just society based onmutual understanding and re- spect fordiverse cultures, customs and traditionsthrough its Ethnic Nationalities MediatorsFellow- ship and the Ethnic NationalitiesCouncil based in Chiang Mai, which isentrusted with the task of fostering unityand cooperation between all ethnicnationalities in preparation for a TripartiteDia- logue and a transition to democracy.

We would

like to thank explicitly the Reverend Dr.Saboi Jum and Ja Nan as well as Sao Harn

Yawnghwe and Dr. Liang H. Sakhong.Without their encour- agement, advice andsupport we would not have been able tofollow the path of constructive en-gagement.

The track two workshop series conducted bythe Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and theMyanmar Insti- tute for Strategic andInternational Studies pro- vided manyopportunities for access and contacts forthis PCIA. We express our gratitudecollective- ly to all the participants for their

precious contri- butions.

This PCIA also benefited from Burma:Map- ping the Challenges and Opportunitiesfor Dia- logue and Reconciliation,conducted by the Cri- sis ManagementInitiative Martti Ahtisaari Rapid ResponseFacility for the European Commission. Ourappreciation is due to Dr. Morten Pederson,Sami Lahdensuo (CMI) and Andreas Listfrom the Directorate General for ExternalRelations at the European Commission.

Many thanks are also due to DavidTengenfeldt, Sylwia Gil, Dr. Rurik Marsden,Khin Zar Naing, Dr. Khin Zaw Win, Gregg,the UNDP country of- fice and other teammembers for their tireless efforts,enthusiasm and intellectual contribution tothis endeavour.

Finally we are grateful to Marina Kramer,who served as a Junior Expert on the FESMyanmar Project in 2007/2008 for theexcellent job she has done in editing themanuscript.


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Map 1: Approximate distribution of armed groups on Myanmar territory

KIO Kachin Independence Organization

NDA(K) New Democratic Army (Kachin)

SSA Shan State ArmySSPP Shan State Progressive Party

KDA Kachin Defense Army

PNO Pa-O National Organization

PSLO Palaung State Liberation Organization

SNPLO Shan State Nationalities Peoples LiberationOrganization

MTA Mong Tai Army

UWSA United Wa State Army

SURA Shan United Revolutionary Army

SPRC Shan People Representative Committee

SSNA Shan State National Army

KNG Kayan National Guard

KNPLF Kayinni National Peoples Liberation Front

KNLP Kayan New Land Party

KNPP Kayinni National Progressive Party

KNPDP Kayinni National Peace and Development Party

KNDP Kayinni National Democratic Party

KNU Karen National Union

DKBA Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army

KPC Karen Peace Council

NMSP New Mon State Party

BCP Burma Communist Party (Rakhine State)

CNF Chin National Front

Source: Shalom Foundation, Yangon, September 2009

Map 2: Approximate distribution of armed groups on Myanmar territory

Source: Tom Kramer, Ceasefires at Risk, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, 2009


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PART I: conflic Tsan D Their ma PPinG

Introduction

The first part of this study explicates,develops and further improves theFriedrich-Ebert-Sif- tungs (FES) Peace andConflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)methodology. In the following parts, theimproved methodology is then used forconflict mapping Burma/Myanmar.2 In thisrespect, the report differs from the usualPeace and Conflict Impact Assessments, asthe objective is not only to assess aparticular case, but also to analyse anddevelop the methodology by looking at it in

the light of the most recent scholarlyunderstanding of conflicts.

The material used for this study is thefollowing:a) comparative research on therelationship be-

tween conflict and aid;b) methodological guidelines and studiesfrom

PCIA, FES and other donors;c) documentary material from conflict

parties and the EU;

d) expert analyses on the Burma/Myanmarcon-

flict, ande) interviews among stakeholders inBurma/My-

anmar.

Background and Objectives

Optimising the effect of aid on conflict.Aid programming, even humanitarian aid,

influences causes of conflict andconsequently needs to be sensitive to itsimpacts on conflict potential. In So- malia inthe early 1990s, the relationship betweenhumanitarian aid and conflict was feltclearly as, in the absence of a structure ofgovernance, every shipment of food aidincreased the level of violence: food wasloot to fight over3. Aid and conflict werestrongly correlated and peaks of aid werereflected in casualty statistics as peaksof battle deaths. Around the same time, aid

for inte- grating combatants into civilian lifein Northern Mali contributed to thetransformation of conflict structures and thedecline in political violence in the country.4

Clearly, aid can fuel conflict, but it can

also help build peace and settleconflicts. The starting point for the idea ofPeace and Con- flict Impact Assessment isthe need to map the


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conflict and its relationship to the socialrealities that aid affects, the aim being tooptimise the effect of aid on conflictmanagement, dispute resolution andconflict transformation; in other words, tomake aid have the effect it had inNorthern Mali, rather than the effect it hadin Somalia in the

1990s. The FES guidelines on PCIAmethodology state that the objective ofPCIA is to help make aid more conflict-sensitive, so that negative impacts [onpeace] can be reduced to a minimum andthat positive impacts of the projectactivities are max- imised. Like anenvironmental impact assessment, PCIAtackles a specific factor in the quality of aid:rather than environmental quality, here weare talking about the conflict resolution andtrans- formation quality of aid.

The objective of this report is to assessthe impact of existing FES, German

and international aid in

Burma/Myanmar and suggest ways to

improve its

conflictmanagement,resolution,transfor

mation and peace building qualities.

Doing good vs. doing no harm. Thestarting point of this assessment isoptimisation, and not strict absoluteprinciples of best practice. Even though, for

example, the principles of do no harmare a standard reference in peace andconflict impact assessments, thisassessment does not distinguish betweenobjectives designed to do good (in conflictprevention) and those aimed at doing noharm. If one wants to optimise the peaceand conflict impact of aid, one cannot startby ensur- ing that aid is harmless andthen go on to identify ways of doingsomething constructive. This is especiallyclear in difficult development partner- ships

like the ones with civil society organisationsin Myanmar. Activities to support civilsociety inside the country do also minimallysupport the repressive capacity of theregime. In turn, activities to support theexiled Burmese community in their effortsto fight repressive violence will al- waysalso, at least minimally, encourage theover- confidence5 of violent oppositionforces and make them less likely to strikerational compromises in their efforts toavoid violence.

In some cases, humanitarian needs requirea toler-ance of operations that only have negativeconflict


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impacts. For example, humanitarian aidafter Cy- clone Nargis was obliged tomake compromises between hasty actionand perfect planning: in the wake of hastyaction, distribution was not always perfectly

able to avoid inequality, and so it mighthave given rise to some conflict motives.Due to the limited safety of implementingagencies, some had to favour thecommunities they knew best and couldtrust. As a consequence, Buddhist aidagencies might have favoured Buddhistrecipi- ents, and Christian agenciesChristian recipients. This might have causedenvy among other communities. Yet theabsolute humanitarian needs requiredEuropean organisations to get involved

quickly. Also, in more long-term Europeanaid programming, the risks of conflictsensitivity are recognised and tolerated. Forexample, the Com- missions Multi-AnnualIndicative Programme (20072010)recognises the risk that aid may un-intentionally improve the image of themilitary regime: SPDC manages to securebenefits and/ or reap legitimacy as a resultof the implementation and impact of ECassistance programmes inBurma/Myanmar. This risk is clearly

linked to a risk of increased or moredurable authoritarian violence by themilitary Government.

Thus the question in the above cases is notwheth- er harm can be totally avoided, butwhether it is possible to producedisproportionately more good thaninadvertent harm.

The analysis sets out to achieve two setsof recommendations, one specificallyfor FES, and the other more generally forGerman and international donors. This isdone by following the methodological PCIAguidelines from FES and mapping theconflict situation along with its causal linksto and from the socio-economic changesthat aid activities affect.

As mentioned earlier, this report also setsout tofurther develop the FES PCIAmethodology,

1. by comparing it to the PCIAmethodologies of

other donors,2. by drawing on comparative evidence in

existing conflict research about therelationship between aid and conflict,

and3. by drawing more general conclusions

from experience specific toBurma/Myanmar in order to refine themethodological tools of FES PCIA.


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Elements of Conflict in FE SPCIA

methodology

What is conflict? The FES PCIAMethodological Guidelines define conflictimplicitly as something that happensbetween actors across dividing lines overissues where the agents have an

incompat- ibility of interests or values.The idea of focusing on dividing linesfollows the latest conflict theoryrecommendations: mapping conflict shouldnot focus so much on organisations thatplay an instru- mental role in conflict, butshould examine, rather, the cleavagesthat divide the conflicting parties and makethem create organisations that act as in-stitutional vehicles for policies that addressthe issues dividing groups of people.Furthermore, for aid agencies, who do not

directly negotiate peace, the things thatdivide people are more significant than anyformal divisions between organisationalactors. Yet to some extent both the agentsand the divisions are relevant in their ownway. Efforts by aid to bridge the dividinglines and to address the issues thatmotivate conflicts would be directlybeneficial to conflict prevention, whileefforts to avoid emphasising divisions in theorganisation of aid and to prevent aid frombecoming fought-over loot would all be

important to conflict-sensitive aidprogramming.

Conflict is dynamic, as it varies inintensity and scale by escalating and de-escalating, both hori- zontally (by involvingmore people) and verti- cally (by increasingin vigour). In part at least, the intensity ofconflict depends on the capacity of theactors to wage war, but also to resolveconflicts. Again, aid should be careful not tobuild up the resources for violent action.

Furthermore, the Guidelines link conflictswith specific structural settings thatmake a society more exposed to violentconflicts. Unavailabil- ity of non-violentchannels of protest and dispute resolution6,ethnic divisions7, lack of economic growth8,economic fluctuations9, inefficiency of lawenforcement10 and economic concentrationon primary, natural-resource-basedproduction11 are among the many structuralsettings that conflict studies have identifiedas factors exposing a country or society topolitical violence and conflict. All these

structures could be addressed by long-termdevelopment cooperation.


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The Guidelines discuss the causes ofconflicts and attribute them in many casesto the structural settings that makesocieties vulnerable to conflict, to theviolent capacity of actors in the conflict and

to the issues that motivate conflict.

What is the difference betweendisputes and conflicts? The relationshipbetween disputes and conflicts is explicitlydealt with in the Guidelines (p. 8), whichwarn against any confusion between violentconflicts and conflicts in general. Theformer are what FES and PCIA set out tolimit, while the latter are a natural partof social life and progress.12 The samedistinction is frequently made in current

conflict analysis, but the word conflict isoften reserved exclusively for violentdisputes. The Uppsala Conflict DataProgramme, for example, classifies anincident as a conflict only if it causes atleast 25 casualties and as a war if itcauses more than 1,000 casualties peryear.13 Conflicts that are not violent arereferred to as disputes. This will also be theconceptual practice in this report.

The importance of distinguishing betweencon- flicts and disputes is crucial since,

even though dispute is a necessarycondition for conflict, empirical evidencesuggests that discouraging disputes willnot contribute to progress and not evento conflict prevention.14 On the contrary, itseems that societies with many openlyaddressed disputes are actually lessconflict-prone than so- called harmonysocieties, which try to suppressexpressions of dispute. In fact, democracyas a political system could bedescribed as an institu- tionalised

dispute mechanism, and it seems thatthis system is superior in the prevention ofconflicts compared to non-democraticpolitical sys- tems.15

Grievances or greed as motives forconflict? In facilitating the definition ofquestions for an assessment, theMethodological Guidelines reveal a biastowards seeing grievances, rather thangreed and gainful opportunities, as the mainmotive for conflicts.16 Grievance-basedconflict motives are, undoubtedly, an

important source of conflict, and thesemotives17, together with a states inability toprevent rebellious mobilisation18, were longre- garded as the main source of conflict.

However, modern conflict analysis hasidentified greed as another importantsource of conflict motivation19.


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Hence modern conflict analysis hasflagged up further opportunities for conflictprevention: besides addressinggrievances, conflict prevention can alsohelp prevent the criminalisation of eco-nomic and political life so as to minimisegainful opportunities for violence. In orderto map all the opportunities aid has in

tackling the conflict problem, one mustalso carefully assess the possibili- ties forbuilding obstacles to violence. In most con-flicts, there are peace spoilers20 who benefitfrom the political economy of conflict forexample, armies that need conflict to masktheir illegal economic activities in conflictareas will try to thwart any efforts toresolve conflicts and, instead, stage conflictepisodes to emphasise their own impor-tance in the conflict area.21

What are the opportunities for conflict?Although the Guidelines address thecapacity aspect of conflicts, they focus onobjective capacities (such as availability ofweapons, availability of economic resourcesetc.) and on opportunities for conflictbehaviour (and peace). However, otherimportant factors behind many conflictsinclude the normative and constitutiveopportunities and capacities available toconflicting parties.22 The discourse aroundindigenousness legitimises and thusmakes it possible for local communities to

claim a certain priority over migrantcommunities. Without the concept ofindigenousness and the discourse towhich it has given rise, these people wouldnot be able to mobilise violent resistanceagainst migrants. Migrants, in turn, areempow- ered by their claims within equalrights discourses. Indeed, their capacity tomobilise counterac- tion often depends onthe existence of equal rights norms. Aidcould tackle the clash that occurs in its own

activities between these facilitating norma-tive discourses by encouraging forums fordia- logue where the entitlement of variousgroups to certain forms of aid can bediscussed.

Traditional myths about trance-like conflictritu- als, ancestors possessing the body andthe per- formance of religious dutiesthrough conflict all offer the conflictingparties a way to bypass the normativecodes that normally proscribe violence: oneis not responsible for deeds done in a

trance or acts committed by an intrusiveancestor. These normative and constitutiveconditions help create opportunities forviolence, and these opportunities can be

blocked by means of cooperation in the


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field of education or by providing aid forcapac- ity building. In this way, mappingnormative and constitutive obstacles toconflict also helps to develop the tools forconflict prevention.

The significance of aid in conflict

agency. The basic concept of conflict inthe FES PCIA Guide- lines tackles the issue

of conflict actors and dividing lines.However, it would be helpful if theGuidelines also pointed out that conflict

agency is not something objective orgiven: ethnicity is not necessarily

meaningful in conflicts, and neither arereligion, territory, gender and other divi-sions. It is important to realise that the

meanings attributed to differences asconflict divisions are created by theconflicting parties. This process of creating

conflict divisions out of the differencesbetween people also offers opportunities

for aid to intervene. Here, the question isnot about moti- vating violent behaviour,but selecting the targets of violence. The

polarisation of relations between

groups has recently been identified as afactor that predicts conflict better than

most other indicators

flict prevention is an asset, as it stops itfrom being depoliticised andbureaucratised. If a conflict preventionactivity is open to the idea of promot- ingpositive peace, transforming violentstructures and advancing dialogue andcooperation links between potentialconflicting parties, this activity cannot startfrom an apolitical platform. It has torecognise that deeper engagement withconflict prevention requires choices that arebound to affect the balance of politicalpower and, indeed, political culture.Burma/Myanmar is probably the best placeto make this point: simply tackling theproblem of direct violence by preventingactu- al fighting would not transform the

exclusion and violence in the politicalsystem, and nor would it reduce the long-term potential for fighting. By admittingthat aid always influences conflict situ-ations, and that conflict prevention alwaysinflu- ences social, economic and politicalsettings, the FES methodology escapes acriticism commonly levelled at PCIA. Thismethodology does not bu- reaucratise theexercise, it does not establish a

25

and contributes most fundamentallytowards it.23

uniform neutral project managementframe

for

These targets can change, and a targetgroup can emerge or disappear without anychanges in the objective setting. For

example, with its projects to generateemployment for both Catholics and

Protestants, the International Fund forIreland al-

proceeding regardless of the wishes of localsocie-ties, and it does not reduce conflictprevention to a top-down effort to makesociety secure. Rather, it concedes that, bybeing conflict-sensitive, aid will follow localpreferences instead of imposing a ra-

26

leviated the grievances that motivatedviolence, but also proved to the conflictingparties that the lack of jobs was a commonpersonal concern and not a collective issue(caused by outsiders who are getting allthe jobs). Aid should try to affect theemergence of conflicting parties, and thePCIA should map opportunities for suchinfluence.

Method for Assessing Conflict Sensitivity ofAid and Suggestions for Improvement

Aid is always political. The starting-point

for FES PCIA methodology is the fact thataid, like any other socio-politicalcooperation, is never perfectly neutral: anyeffort to prevent conflicts is always politicaland it always affects the social setting of theaid partner country in a way that eitherfuels or helps to inhibit conflict. This is not atypical assumption in the PCIA guidelinesof most donor organisations.24 In the PCIAmethodology, however, acknowledgingthe political nature of con-


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tional neutral logic of conflictprevention.

Realistic assumptions about conflictsare based on empirical data. Incommissioning a review that relates theempirical assumptions in the FES approachto the latest findings in conflict research,this PCIA methodology is seeking to avoid

the second most common criticism to whichits coun- terparts are exposed. This showsthat FES does not ignore the importance ofempirically tested assumptions andconclusions about causal re- lationsbetween conditions and conflict. This islaudable in the FES approach, andunfortunately rare among organisationsinvolved in the attempt to improve theconflict sensitivity of aid.

To map conflicts, the FES methodologyidentifies sectors of conflict, from politics

and the judiciary to security, the economyand society. Secondly, it identifies levels ofconflict, including national and internationallevels reflecting the traditional distinctionbetween intra-state and inter-state conflict.Furthermore, the scenario and strategymapping recommended to donororganisations


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is founded on an analysis of issues, conflictlines, agency structures, and the roles ofthe international community. In addition,the methods for inter- viewing informantsand experts illustrate that the mapping

exercise is designed to uncover the rootcauses of conflicts and consider whether aidmight tackle these root causes.

Drawing mental maps of the conflictingparties is the key to understandinghow to influence their strategicbehaviour. The methodology suggestsdrawing mental maps of the conflictingparties to see how they perceive thestructure and elements of the conflict. Thisis useful and should be regarded as anintegral part of any conflict mapping. Onecannot influence the strategic behaviour ofconflict- ing parties without penetratingtheir mindset and observing how theyperceive the conflict game. The difficulty weoften have in understanding conflicts isprecisely the assumption that all conflictingparties are playing the same game,whereas in fact each party constructs thegame for themselves and plays it accordingto the rules they perceive.

The case of Burma/Myanmar suggests that

mental mapping should also be applied tothe Euro- pean and German view of conflictelements (for example, various types ofpolitical violence and their relationship toaid) in order to understand the limits andsettings in which aid that needs to be mademore conflict-sensitive operates. Onecannot hope to make aid more conflict-sensitive without understanding the generalframework in which aid operates. It would,for example, be of limited value to presentrecommendations on aid work inBurma/Myanmar which conflict with thebasic principles of European policies onsanctions. If we do not understand that aidis used as lever- age in the European effortto reduce authoritarian violence andauthoritarianism, we cannot fullyunderstand what can and cannot bedone to aid to increase its conflictsensitivity.

While the methodology clearly follows thelatest findings in strategic conflict research,it has elements that could be improved to

make the methodology consistent withthe logic of optimising the conflictprevention quality of aid.

Conflict-sensitive aid should prioritise

conflict conditions/junctures that can

be positively manipulated. In muchcurrent peace research and conflictanalysis, the idea of there being a root


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cause for a conflict has been challenged.The idea of multi-causality has won groundin conflict studies, meaning that attentionhas shifted from what is seen as the firstcause to all the other nec- essaryconditions that are needed for conflicts tostart or continue. Once these have beenidentified, then practical conflict prevention

has to prioritise those that can bemanipulated, rather than those that areseen as more fundamental, or lodgedmore deeply within the roots of conflict.The at- tention that the FES guidelines, andmost of the existing FES conflict analyses,have given to the foundations of conflicts isthus inconsistent with the strategicapproach adopted by the FES meth- odologyto optimise the conflict sensitivity of aid.

The alternative approach of seeing conflict

development as a complex path, withjunctures that might be manipulated(blocked or rerouted), could well be moreconsistent with the internal logic of the FESmethodology. Once there are frustrationsand conflict motives, developments proceedtowards a conflict only if the frustratedgroups are faced with other groups whomthey see as opposed to themselves (andoften as causes for their frustration).However, this development does notproceed, even if such groups can beidentified, unless there are objective andnor- mative opportunities for conflictbehaviour: arms and ways around thenormative constraints on violence. Whenidentifying opportunities for conflictprevention by means of developmentcooperation, it would be much more usefulto frame the activity as something wherethe analyst follows the path to conflict andtries to identify opportunities to reroute orblock that path, rather than seeking somekind of a fundamental, singular, rootcause for the conflict. The methodology

might be more consistent within itsstrategic logic if it identified scenarios andstrategies as junctures in the path towardsconflict. At present the methodologyidentifies scenarios without trying to definetheir probabilities or their desirability.However, when trying to develop strategicprescriptions or analyse the impacts of aid,reference is made to positive andnegative impacts. It is not possible toclaim that an intervention is positive unlessone attaches normative values to scenarios.

Interven- tion is positive in a givenjuncture if it increases the possibility of thesituation developing towards


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a desired scenario and reduces theprobability of developments in undesireddirections.

Instead of scenarios and positive impacts,

conflict mapping could identify: paths with junctures that can lead to

alternative paths regardless of what theaid community does, and

junctures where the aid community canhave an impact.

It is not realistic to model the situationassuming first that there are neutralscenarios and then that only theinternational community can exert aninfluence. Instead, conflict prevention is a

game where some of the steps (junctures)cannot and some can be influenced bythe donor community. To optimise theconflict impact of aid, mapping has toidentify the approximate likelihood ofalternative paths in those junctures that aidcannot affect, orienting and preparingthe donors for the challenges ahead.Equally, the mapping has to identify waysto exert a positive effect on the juncturesthat aid can influence: the mapping has toreveal how to manipulate the developmentof conflict agency or the development ofconflict motives in order to producepositive, rather than negative impacts.

The reason why the FES methodology doesnot look for probabilities is likely to lie in theconfu- sion between manipulable andnon-manipulable junctures. It is naturallynot useful to predict outcomes injunctures that one wants to change: aprediction often becomes a self-fulfillingproph- esy. But in those junctures that aidcannot change, predictions are in order.

Confusion about the neutrality of scenarios,again, could be caused by the fact thatin every conflict situation the path topeace is based on compromises on oneside or another. While trying to avoidbecoming partisan, the PCIA should not,naturally, try to take sides between peaceon one or another partys terms. However,the PCIA has to consider positive movementtowards a situation where mutual interestis no longer compro- mised by violence.PCIA cannot be neutral between peace

and war, but it has to be neutral in thequestion of contested alternative terms ofpeace.27

Finally, to streamline the strategic approachin conflict mapping, the methodology willneed to be adjusted to the projectcycle. In addition to levels and sectors ofconflict, opportunities will have to beidentified for country consultations, de-velopment interventions, projectformulation, ap- praisal, financing decisions,implementation and monitoring, projectcompletion, and evaluation.

Summary:

Conducting the PCIA forBurma/Myanmar

Having adjusted the FES PCIA methodology,this report will now move on to the PCIA for

Burma/ Myanmar. The intention is, on theone hand, to show how the refinedmethodology works and, on the other,simply to define optimal conflict sen- sitivitystrategies for aid and NGO cooperation inthe specific conditions of Burma/Myanmar.In order to do that, this conflict mappingwill follow the Guidelines and structure thepresentation as suggested in the FESdocument. In addition to that, it will try to:

1. systematically work out strategies for

different phases of the aidprogramming cycle, the purpose beingto identify options for posi- tiveconflict influence in each of them.

2. For the interviews and questionnairesamong conflict stakeholders, thismapping will add questions about theopportunity side of violence: Whydid the police not do anything? How didthey justify their actions? Why did theynot fear retaliation?28 How do their localcustoms and norms tolerate thisviolence?

3. Furthermore, this mapping will have toidentify mental conflict maps. Thisincludes track- ing the emergence ofantagonistic agency: the processwhereby groups start identifying eachothers as enemies. How did certaingroups start seeing each other asenemies? What kind of situations did theantagonism induce and express? Howdid the relationship escalate into

hostilities?4. Mapping must also include the mental

map of the donors, which in turnwill condition the options for aid to


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display conflict sensitivity.


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5. Mapping will highlight differentrelation- ships of conflict violence.Violence by the Government againstunarmed civilians, violence betweenthe Government and its armed

challengers and conflict betweenethnic groups and sub-ethnicities allinfluence each other. Taking this intoaccount makes it easier to identify aidstrategies that will not do harm tosituations in another type of conflict.For example, preventing spontaneousviolence in civil society by supporting anau- thoritarian machinery of law andorder might help contain violence of thatkind, but it could simultaneouslyaggravate repressive conflict.

6. Building up strategies for conflict-sensitive aid programming will bebased on the conflict path

analogy. Here the path to conflict willbe reconstructed with all thealternative

routes to conflict and non-violentsolutions. The study will then identify thejunctures that cannot be influenced byaid. These junctures will have to betaken as given, and yet one needs to beprepared for them, in accordance withtheir probability. Aid cannot, for exam-ple, influence internal power strugglesinside the authoritarian leadership. Yetit will have to recognise the probabilityof sudden splits, and consider variousprobabilities in order to map the realitiesaround aid activities. PCIA will thereforehave to attribute elementaryprobabilities to the alternative pathsfrom these junctures and indicate themost likely causes of events. Then it will

identify the junctures that aid caninfluence and try to define strategiesthat could optimise the conflict im- pactof aid at these junctures.


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o


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21

PART II:The conflic T maP of Burma /mYanmar 29

Burma/Myanmar is a multi-ethnic countrywith an ethnic Bamar majority. The countryreceived its independence from the UnitedKingdom in 1948, but has been sufferingfrom political violence during the entireperiod of its independence. Since 1962state security has been the mainconsideration in the political system.Solving state security issues has beencharacterised by a military approach: in-stead of dealing with grievances, conflictsare set- tled by imposing military controlover opportunities for revolt and thedeterrence of discontent. The military

takeover in 1962, provoked by a disputeover how many concessions to make torebelling ethnic groups, was the watershedwhen the armed forces decided against theconciliatory approach of civilian leaders.Obsessions with security and the militaryresponse to security issues have resulted inan approach to governance that neglectsdevel- opment. The eagerness to focus ondevelopment, typical of almost all otherEast and Southeast Asian Governments, hasnot been echoed by the Govern- ment of

Burma/Myanmar, and as a result there hasbeen a drastic decline in almost all aspectsof it. Given this neglect of transformingeconomic grievances and the lack of focuson common development interests,Myanmar has not experienced the declinein conflict casualties associated with politi-cal violence that has characterised East andSouth- east Asia since the Vietnam War.

Until the end of the 1980s, Burmaseconomic ori-entation was socialist. But in the 1990s this

orien-

tation gradually shifted towards a more

market- friendly perspective. However, acleptocratic state obsessed with securityhas limited the freedom of market actorsin the country. This has created obstacles topromoting market instruments aspopulations become more interdependentpoliti- cally. Liberal peace the pacifyingdevelopment of positive interdependencebetween potential enemies has notemerged in Burma/Myanmar as it hasalmost everywhere else in East and South-east Asia. Instead, underdevelopment hasfuelled interests in conflict, further

highlighting security and encouragingdisregard for developmental priorities. This,in turn, has provoked underdevelopment,conflict motives, security problems, a focuson military solutions, a disregard for devel-opment, etc.

Conflict in Burma/Myanmar

To begin with an analytical view, we can

draw a graph based on information from theUppsala Conflict Data Programme onconflict casualties in Burma/Myanmar. Thisdata, however, does not include casualtiesof repression or non-state conflicts (suchas those between ethnic minorities andsub-ethnicities). The definition of directbattle deaths in conflict means that thisdata is best used to indicate trends ratherthan for absolute num- bers. This is why noabsolute figures are given in Graph 1

Graph 1: Battle deaths, 19462005


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Prime divisions of conflict:

Democracy vs. authoritarianism andrights

of ethnic groups

If one looks at the groups that pose amilitary challenge to the Government, onecan easily see that violence inBurma/Myanmar is primarily about:

democracy vs. authoritarianism,and rights of ethnicgroups.

Battle deaths seem to peak inBurma/Myanmar whenever the Governmentbacktracks on its con- ciliatory policies.Whenever hopes of ethnic and democratic

movements are frustrated and theGovernment restores its strict centralistand/or military order, casualties rise. Forexample, after independence, thishappened when the Govern- mentbacktracked on its commitments to ensurerelative ethnic autonomy. The casualty peakin the early 1960s might be attributed tothe strengthen- ing position of the armedforces and the eventual military takeover in1962. In the second half of the1980s, growing expectations of an end to

military rule and hopes fordemocratisation, combined with heavysuppression of the opposition, possi- blycontributed to the spread of conflictactivities in 1988. After the 1990 electionsthe Government backtracked on itspromises of democratisation and refused tohand over power to the electedrepresentatives, causing frustration andpoten- tially explaining the peaks in armedconflict after199

0.In general, the pattern in Burma/Myanmarcon- forms to the general pattern ofviolence in authoritarian countries:instability and violence are most probablewhen the Government backtracks on itsown commitments and starts restoring itsstricter centralist authoritarian rule.30 Thissuggests that the international community,rather than just demanding newcompromises, should focus on building (andexpanding) the Governments own

commitments to progress and preventing itfrom reneging on its promises.

Battle deaths: Communists vs. Government

According to the cited Uppsala data, as wellas the majority of experts on Burmeseconflicts, most battle deaths were

produced in the 1960s and


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1970s in the battles between communistsand the Government. However, thecommunists in Burma have not traditionallybeen simply a political organisation.Rather, many of the groups belonging to thecommunist movement were in fact ethnic,territorial movements, which were not onlyfight- ing for a change in governance, but

also for a territory and ethnic rights. Sothis battle was not, as it sounds, purelyideological, but was very much in- fluencedby ethnic lines of division. Chinas sup- portfor the communists contributed to the sym-metry of the battle, as well as to themagnitude of violence. It is difficult to sayhow many of the casualties are fromclashes between various commu- nistgroups and the Government and howmany of them were actually caused byclashes between different ethnic variants of

communists, or simply between variousethnic groups. The ideologi- cal factorplayed a role until the last two decades,after which the dividing lines were drawneither ethnically or politically betweendemocrats and the Government. While thefight of the main ethnic militias hasmainly targeted the Government or somesub-ethnicities that interfere with the uni- tyof struggle in the seven ethnic States, theethnic element has occasionally sneakedinto the mental maps of combatants. In the

minds of some ethnic fighters, theGovernment is associated with Bamarethnicity and Buddhism, making localBamars or local Buddhists (such as BuddhistKarens) a target for aggression.

Battle deaths: Democide

There are no reliable estimates of thecasualties from democide31 inBurma/Myanmar. The coun- ter-insurgencypolicies of the Burmese military in the

1960s were based on cutting off rebelliousvil- lages from food, money, intelligence andrecruits. This suggests that democidalpractices against ethnic groups are nothingnew for the military. Globally, the number ofcasualties of democide is about 6 times thenumber of casualties of war.32

During the Cold War, the ratio in the worldrose to about 1:10.33 Regionally, the ratio ishighest in East Asia, where 6 of the worlds10 most geno- cidal regimes are located.Democide per population ratios are also

higher in East Asia than else- where.34 It ishighly likely, therefore, that repression anddemocide also represent the gravest ele-


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ment of violence in Burma/Myanmar rightnow, especially as the country experiencesinstability after the Government managedto suppress most of the open conflictsituations and demonstra- tions.

Indirect casualties: A genderperspective

An important element of one-sided violenceis also relevant from the genderperspective. According to Donald Horowitz,95 per cent of conflict casualties are men,while 90 per cent of fighters are men.35

Sociologists of conflict tend to produce sim-ilar estimates, even though Timo Kivimkisfield observations in conflicts in Somalia,

Mali, South Africa, Finland, Aceh and Papuasuggest an even higher percentage. Yetthe victims of one-sided violence,occupation and military repression, have adrastically different gender balance. As partof the political economy of occupation indeveloping countries, leaders who areunable to pay decent salaries to theirsoldiers will not interfere with rape andabuse of women (or corruption and ex-tortion), which is then seen as a supplementto the low wages. Violence against women

is especially typical in countries likeBurma/Myanmar which suffer fromseparatist challenges. Because of sepa-ratist pressures, the Government istempted to ro- tate its army members inorder to avoid the rise of local loyaltiesamong the troops. Often this means thatsoldiers live apart from their families andthis affects relations between troops andlocal women. As a result, confidentialinterviews for this project were able toreveal the extent of violence againstwomen in Burma/Myanmar, especially in

areas where the rights of the locals cannotbe protected by existing institutionalmechanisms.

In Buddhist areas, such as the Bamardivisions, in- fluential monks weresometimes able to negotiate ways out ofmilitary impunity, while in non-Bud- dhistareas, such as the Karen State or the ChinState, for example, people were simply tooscared to even report cases of rape by themilitary. In areas with an extensive

international presence, such as the post-Nargis Delta area, some of the INGOs havemanaged to create mechanisms to resistmil- itary impunity, while some local NGOs

and NGO networks were working on suchmechanisms in areas with a lesserinternational presence.


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Indirect casualties: Humanitarian disaster

Finally, the number of indirect casualtieshas been swollen by the inability andunwillingness to tackle humanitariandisaster and allow international help withthis task, especially in rebellious areas andareas which are considered opposed to the

Government. The denial of access tointerna- tional humanitarian organisations inthe immedi- ate aftermath of the recentcyclone is an extreme example of a practicethat has been going on in peripheral areasof the country for decades.

In his analysis of the Crisis ManagementInitiative (CMI)36 Morten Petersen hasestimated the magni- tude of various typesof violence since the coun- trysindependence as follows:

1,000s of political activists have beenmurdered, tortured or jailed; 10,000s of combatants and non-

combatants have been killed in war; 100,000s of mainly ethnic minority

villagers have been displaced from theirhomes in conflict zones; and

1,000,000s of people from allnationalities have been suffering povertyor illness as a consequence of conflictand resultant emergency governance.

Different types of violence and conflict are

inter- linked. Academic generalisationssuggest that authoritarianism more thandoubles the probability of rebelliousviolence37. The lack of legitimategovernance is also linked to the risk ofcommuni- ties arming themselves fordefence (and offence), in the absence of amonopoly of legitimate law enforcement.38

However, the perception of thisrelationship among the key conflictingparties is at least as important as therelationship between conditions of various

types of conflict. This will be tackled in themental mapping below.

Mental Maps ofDivisionsand Agents

The starting point for all mental mapping ofconflicts is the realisation that theconflicting parties are not playing thesame game. Rather, they all perceive theconflicting parties, rules and strategies ofthe conflict differently.

In order to understand the moves in thismulti- game, one has to be able to see theconflict game


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from these different perspectives. Theplayers are perceived differently by theconflicting parties, and the setting, rules,strategy options and con- sequences are allseen in a very different light in each camp.

We identify the self-perception of thevarious conflict agents and look at howothers perceive the identity of each.Through this mapping, we then summarisethe relevant conflict agents as well as thosedividing lines that are prone to conflict andthat aid should be sensitive about. In thesummary of agents we also examinecleavages from the point of view of conflictprevention, ask- ing which cross-cuttingcleavages might serve as bridges acrossmore serious conflict-prone cleavages.

After that we present the mindset of theconflict setting and look at the options formanipulating the constructs so as to helpprevent violence in the chaotic multi-game.

Identification of the agent structure isbased on the interviews with stakeholdersand the mapping is done on the basis of theinformants visions. To assess the conflictpotential of each cleavage, we also drewsystematically on previous mappings in theBurma/Myanmar literature and on compara-

tive conflict analysis.

The Government

Myanmars military order has remained inplace since the early 1960s. There are moreor less two main periods: the first wasdominated by General Ne Win (19621988)and the other has been dominated bySenior General Than Shwe (1992today).While political authoritarianism has been ahall- mark of both periods, the economic

rhetoric of the State has been moremarket-oriented during the latter. Since1997 the ruling organisation of the countryhas been misleadingly renamed the StatePeace and Development Council (SPDC).Before that, from 1988 to 1992, it wascalled the State Law and Order RestorationCouncil (SLORC), which better describedthe state security-centred identity of theGovernment.39

The Government is not, however, just thecentral Government. Its political structurehas always combined elements of regionaldecentralisation and a degree of recognitionof the need to accom- modate the ethnicdifferences of the outer regions


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of the country. While the centre with itsseven divisions is dominated by the ethnicBamar core, seven other recognisednational races: Kachin, Shan, Mon,Karenni (Kayah), Karen (Kayin)40, Chin, andthe Rakhine people have their own eth- nicstates. Yet the governance system lackssome central elements of federal

decentralisation. Even more importantly,though, even the existing elements offederal governance are regional in nature,rather than ethnic, failing to give ethnic mi-nority groups a substantive say ingovernance at the national level ofGovernment.

Radical mentalmap:

The inexistentGovernment

In the most radical mental maps of theconflict, the Government of Myanmar doesnot exist, since this Government wasdefeated in the elections of1990. This is why Myanmar, the newname of the country chosen by theillegitimate Govern- ment, is non-existent.However, the effectively close to half amillion troops the Myanmar leader- shipcommands, and the economic resources

and bureaucratic power it possesses haveto be taken as real in any conflict mapping.

Official mentalmap:

One Government, onemilitary

In the mental map of Government officialsand especially military officers, theGovernment is united: there are no sub-

groups in the Government, no loy- alty tomilitary classes (like inThailand), no region-al loyalties, no political difference;just oneGovern- ment and military. When remindedof the split in the military after Ne Winsrule in the late 1980s, they often refer tothis experience as something that justifiesand causes the current unity. The mili- tarycannot be fragmented; otherwise there is arisk of bloodshed. Furthermore, whenreminded of the split between the militaryintelligence of Khin Ny- unt, Prime Ministerfrom 20032004, and the rest of theleadership, military officials often state thatfiring General Khin Nyunt was an example ofGov- ernment and military unity: KhinNyunt tried to develop his own groups

within the military and in the name of unitythat had to be stopped (inter- view with asenior military officer).


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It seems clear that, when looking at the self-perception of the Government, we canidentify one actor with a relatively coherentset of ideas on the conflict situation.However, ordinary people and aid workers

seem to have a more diversified view of theGovernment.

Regional vs. centralGovernment

The relationship between regional troopsand the central administration is veryinteresting. Region- al commanders are verywell integrated into the centraladministration, making them an integral

part of central Government. At the sametime, the centre has a strong grip on itsregions through the structure of the rulingbody in Burma/Myan- mar, the SPDC, whichreaches all the way down to townshiplevel. However, crucial political de- cisionsare implemented in vastly differing man-ners in different areas of the country,testifying to relative autonomy for regionaladministration. According to MortenPedersen, Since 1988 there has been a defacto devolution of power to regional armycommanders, who have almost unlimitedauthority... in their areas.41 This was alsoevident in the implementation of theconstitutional referendum in different partsof the country. For example, despiteuniform statutory provisions, the ways inwhich the constitutional referendum wasconducted show that regionaladministrations do have autonomouspowers in transposing even the mostimportant Government policies. While insome areas village heads were allowed tovote on behalf of villagers, in others, ethnic

groups (for example, most of the Rohingyapopulation in Sittwe) who normally lackcitizens rights were registered and regionalauthorities voted on their behalf. Someareas stuck to the Government-mandateddates, while in others people voted at theirwork places in the presence of their localGovernmen- tal or semi-Governmental(GONGO) authorities. What was common toall areas was that the ad- ministratorsresponsible for the area reported the resultsto central Government and were expected

to deliver positive results demonstratingpopular support for theGovernment/National Conven- tionConstitution.


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Civilian vs. militaryGovernment

Ordinary people have distinctly different,often more positive, views on civilianGovernment from the Governments militarypersonnel. Village heads often representvillagers to the military township

administration in cases where the villagersneed to bargain with the townshipauthorities.

Ethnic vs. Bamar Governmentalofficials

In the seven ethnic States in the country,people also often distinguish betweenofficials of the same ethnic origin andethnic Bamar officials, feeling thatcommunicating with non-Bamar officials is

easier and safer. Here the Government iscaught up in the same dilemma as so manyother Governments that rule over peopledivided between an ethnic majority andseveral minorities. While the Governmentitself recognises the dilemma of ethnicdiversity as the foundation of the countrysvulnerability, comparative conflict anal- ysisseems to suggest that the Burma/Myanmarethnic dilemma lies not in the countrysdiversity, but in the fact that Bamars are amajority race. As in Indonesia (with a

Javanese majority), Pakistan (Punjabis), Fiji(Fijians), Bosnia and Herzegovina(Bosniaks), Brazil (whites), East Timor(Tetum speakers), Afghanistan (Pashtuns)and Rwanda before the genocide (Hutus),minorities in Bur- ma/Myanmar easily seethe state/Government as serving theinterests of the majority group only. In theminds of minorities, therefore, there is adivision between local ethnic administratorsand Bamar administrators. To some extent,this division extends to popularperceptions of the armed force As in manyother countries with majority ethnicities,local troops in minority areas are seen asless threatening (even if they are actuallyoften composed of Bamars) than mobiletroops.

Generational divisions in theGovernment

Generations also create divisions in theGovern- ment administration. While at thetop the position of Senior General ThanShwe has remained un- challenged since hetook over as Head of State and Chairman ofthe SPDC in 1992, his age and physi- cal

condition is making him less active in day-today Government and militaryadministration.


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This enhances the profile of Joint Chief ofStaff General Thura Shwe Mann and hisgeneration. As witnessed in Indonesia,where the generational change fromSuharto to Jusuf Habibie brought a major

shift in orientations, such generationchanges can help to reduce one-sidedconflict. Regardless of his commitment orlack of commitment to democracy,General Shwe Mann must feel the tempta-tion to make compromises with the people,simply in order to make his owngovernance smoother. However, while thetop-level generational change offersconsiderable opportunities for the reductionof authoritarian violence, one cannotgeneralise the generational dynamics too

much. While the possibility of a power shiftto General Shwe Mann could open a windowof opportunity, one should not ex- pect thatyounger generations in Burma/Myanmarwould necessarily have a strongercommitment to democracy or goodgovernance.

Technocratic vs. security-orientedofficials

Finally, there seems to be a division in theGov- ernment between the moretechnocratic-oriented and the moresecurity-oriented individuals. Many activistsand development workers claim that it ispossible to get things done withtechnocratic ministers and their ministries.Different development workers namedifferent people they feel they can workwith, but many mention:

the Minister for Agriculture and Irrigation(Ma-

jor-General Htay Oo); the Minister for Culture (Major-GeneralKhin

Aung Myint); the Minister for Immigration, Population,

So- cial Welfare, Relief and Resettlement(Major- General Maung Maung Swe);

the Minister for Livestock and Fisheries(Briga-

dier-General Maung Maung Thein); the Minister for Telecommunications,Post and

Telegraphs (Brigadier-General Thein

Zaw); the Minister for Hotels and Tourism

(Major- General Soe Naing); the Minister for Electricity (Major-General

KhinMaung Myint);

the Deputy Minister for Defence (Major-Gener-

al Aye Myint)

the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs(Kyaw

Thu [until February 2009]).


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Many other ministers and ministries areperceived to have a security mentality,which effectively cre- ates an atmosphereof suspicion and makes cooperation fordevelopment and humanitarian objec- tivesimpossible. The division betweentechnocratic and security-orientedbureaucrats cuts across ministries and

offers very limited opportunities for aid workto navigate between individuals with differ-ent mindsets. Even under a rationalminister, some departments of the ministrycan be difficult to work with due to thesecurity mindset of the administrators.Similarly, under security-obsessedministers, some progressive work for thereduction of political violence can be doneby aid actors if they manage to operatewithin the administrative authority areas oftechnocratically orientedbureaucrats.

GovernmentalNGOs

Important instruments of the Governmentare the few Governm

Documents

The DYnamics of ConflicT in the MulTieThnic Union of mYanmar