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EN United in diversity EN

European Parliament2014 - 2019

Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions and maladministration in theapplication of Union law in relation to money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion

05/09/2017

AMENDMENTS: 140

Petr Ježek, Jeppe KofodReport on the inquiry into Money Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion

Motion for a resolution PE604.514 - 2017/2013(INI)

Amendments created with

Go to http://www.at4am.ep.parl.union.eu

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Amendments per language:

EN: 140

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Amendment 1Molly Scott Cato, Eva Joly, Sven Giegold, Pascal Durand, Ernest Urtasun, Heidi Hautala,Michel Reimon, Jordi Soléon behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Motion for a resolutionCitation 1 a (new)

Motion for a resolution Amendment

- having regard to Article 116 of theTreaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union (TFEU),

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Motion for a resolutionCitation 15 a (new)


- having regard to the EU FIUPlatform mapping exercise and gapanalysis on EU FIUs’ powers andobstacles for obtaining and exchanginginformation (15 December 2016),

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Motion for a resolutionCitation 15 b (new)

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- having regard to the EuropeanParliament reports of the SpecialCommittees TAXE1 and TAXE2 on “Taxrulings and other measures similar innature or effect”

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Motion for a resolutionCitation 15 c (new)


- having regard to the EuropeanParliament report on“Bringingtransparency, coordination andconvergence to corporate tax policiesinthe Union”

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Motion for a resolutionCitation 15 d (new)


- Having regard to the Council ofEurope Warsaw Convention (16 May2005);

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Motion for a resolutionRecital C


C. whereas maladministration meanspoor or failed administration that occurs,for instance, if an institution fails to respectthe principles of good administration, andwhereas examples of maladministrationinclude administrative irregularities andomissions, abuse of power, unfairness,malfunction or incompetence,discrimination, avoidable delays, refusal ofinformation, negligence, and othershortcomings that reflect a malfunctioningin the application of Union law in any areacovered by this law;

C. whereas maladministration meanspoor or failed administration that occurs,for instance, if an institution fails to respectthe principles of good administration, andwhereas examples of maladministrationinclude administrative irregularities andomissions, abuse of power, unfairness,unlawful procedures, malfunction orincompetence, discrimination, avoidabledelays, lack or refusal of information,negligence, and other shortcomings thatreflect a malfunctioning in the applicationof Union law in any area covered by thislaw;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital D


D. whereas money laundering involvesconcealing illicit money to disguise theidentity of illegally obtained proceeds sothat they appear to have originated fromlegitimate sources; whereas such offencesare known as predicate offences, and,under the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) 2012 Recommendations and the4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive(AMLD), applicable as of 26 June 2017,

D. whereas money laundering involvesconcealing illicit money to disguise theidentity of illegally obtained proceeds sothat they appear to have originated fromlegitimate sources; whereas such offencesare known as predicate offences, and,under the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) 2012 Recommendations and the4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive(AMLD), applicable as of 26 June 2017,

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include tax crime; include tax crimes;

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Motion for a resolutionRecital K


K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the legal butimproper utilisation of the tax regime toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax planning consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability;

K. whereas tax fraud and tax evasionconstitute illegal activities involvingevading tax liabilities, while, on the otherhand, tax avoidance is the legal butimproper utilisation of the tax regime toreduce or avoid tax liabilities, andaggressive tax avoidance consists in takingadvantage of the technicalities of a taxsystem, or of mismatches between two ormore tax systems, for the purpose ofreducing tax liability; whereas the Panamapapers demonstrated that the scope ofoffshore companies registered by MossackFonseca exceeded privacy concerns andtax fraud attempts to also include cases ofVAT carousel fraud, drug trafficking,illegal immigration, cybercrimes orterrorism financing;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital L


L. whereas as a result of data leaks inrecent years the awareness of money

L. whereas as a result of data leaks inrecent years the awareness of money

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laundering, tax evasion, tax fraud schemesand corruption has increased considerablyand these issues have become a majorfocus of international political concern;

laundering, tax evasion, tax fraud schemesand corruption has increased considerablyand these issues have become a majorfocus of international political concern aswell as raised concern of EU citizens;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital M


M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16 ; whereas moneylaundering, tax avoidance and tax evasionundermine the fair distribution of taxcontributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and socialcohesion;

M. whereas unreported and untaxedincome is reducing national tax revenuesand is a threat to the stability of thefinancial system16 ; whereas tax evasionand tax avoidance creates unfaircompetition, especially towards small andmedium enterprises and large companiesnot using complex structures to go againstthe spirit or letter of the law; whereasmoney laundering, tax avoidance and taxevasion undermine the fair distribution oftax contributions in the EU Member States;whereas massive tax avoidance by high networth individuals and enterprises not onlypenalises ordinary taxpayers, publicfinances and social spending, but alsothreatens good governance,macroeconomic stability and security,social cohesion and public trust in theinstitutions;

__________________ __________________16 ECB hearing. 16 See for example Anna Meyendorff -

Designing financial systems in transitioneconomies : strategies for reform inCentral and Eastern Europe, S. 102"giving an example for Russia; or "Taxevasion, the underground economy andfinancial development":

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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811200128X

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Motion for a resolutionRecital P


P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions have specialised in creatingextremely preferential tax regimes to thebenefit of multinational companies andhigh net worth individuals, who do not infact have a real presence within thesejurisdictions but are merely represented byshell companies;

P. whereas some governments andjurisdictions have specialised in creatingextremely preferential tax regimes to thebenefit of multinational companies andrich individuals, who do not in fact haveeconomic substance within thesejurisdictions but are merely represented byshell companies;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital Q


Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion and tax fraud amount to at leastEUR 1 trillion within the European Unionalone;

Q. whereas the European Commissionhas cited previous estimates according towhich the annual revenue losses owing totax evasion and tax fraud amount to at leastEUR 1 trillion within the European Unionalone 1a;

__________________1a

https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fight-against-tax-fraud-tax-evasion/a-huge-

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problem_enOr. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital R


R. whereas as of 2014, at least 7.6trillion of the world’s total financial privatewealth of USD 95.5 trillion wasunaccounted for; whereas worldwide, 8 %of financial private wealth is held offshore,leading to global tax revenue losses ofUSD 190 billion; whereas an estimatedUSD 2.6 trillion of financial private wealthin Europe is held offshore, leading to taxrevenue losses of USD 78 billionannually17 ;

R. whereas as of 2014, at least USD7.6 trillion of the world’s total financialprivate wealth of USD 95.5 trillion wasunaccounted for; whereas worldwide, 8 %of financial private wealth is held offshore,leading to global tax revenue losses ofUSD 190 billion; whereas an estimatedUSD 2.6 trillion of financial private wealthin Europe is held offshore, leading to taxrevenue losses of USD 78 billionannually17 ;

__________________ __________________17 Gabriel Zucman, ‘The Hidden Wealth ofNations – The Scourge of Tax Havens’,University of California, 2015.

17 Gabriel Zucman, ‘The Hidden Wealth ofNations – The Scourge of Tax Havens’,University of California, 2015.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital S


S. whereas in 2011 an estimated USD3.1 trillion globally were lost each year viatax evasion and tax avoidance of large

S. whereas in 2011 an estimated USD3.1 trillion globally were lost each year viatax evasion and tax avoidance of large

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companies owing to secrecy18 ; companies 18 ;

__________________ __________________18 Tax Justice Network, November 2011. 18 Tax Justice Network, November 2011.

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Motion for a resolutionRecital T


T. whereas money launderingamounts to an estimated 2 %-5 % of GDPworldwide;

T. whereas the United Nationsestimated the total amount of criminalproceeds in 2009 at approximately USD2.1 trillion, equivalent to 3.6% of globalGDP 1a;whereas money laundering casesare increasing according to Eurojuststatistics 1b and necessitates a coordinatedresponse across multiple jurisdictions tofight such transnational offenses;

__________________1a http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4452_en.htm1b 148money laundering cases in 2012,202 cases in 2013, 221 cases in 2014, and285cases in 2015

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionRecital W

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W. whereas 79 countries so far, or one-third of all nations, have announced a totalof 150 inquiries, audits or investigations bypolice, customs, financial crime and mafiaprosecutors, judges and courts, taxauthorities and parliaments, and by meansof corporate reviews, according to globalmedia reports and official statements;whereas thousands of taxpayers andcompanies are under investigation;whereas over the past eight months this hasled to national authorities having alreadyrecovered tens of millions of dollars intaxes on previously undeclared funds20 ;

W. whereas 79 countries so far, or one-third of all nations, have announced a totalof 150 inquiries, audits or investigations bypolice, customs, financial crime and mafiaprosecutors, judges and courts, taxauthorities and parliaments, and by meansof corporate reviews, according to globalmedia reports and official statements;whereas Member States identified morethan 3000 EU-based taxpayers andcompanies linked to the Panama papers;whereas Member States have collectivelylaunched at least 1300 inquiries, auditsand investigations into Panama Papersrevelations; whereas over the past eightmonths this has led to national authoritieshaving already recovered tens of millionsof dollars in taxes on previouslyundeclared funds20 ;

__________________ __________________20 ICIJ 2017, ‘Where Are They Now? AYear Later, Mixed Fortunes For PanamaPapers Line-Up’.

20 ICIJ 2017, ‘Where Are They Now? AYear Later, Mixed Fortunes For PanamaPapers Line-Up’.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 2


2. Recognises that offshore financialcentres generally present the followingfeatures: 1) a primary orientation ofbusiness toward non-residents; 2) afavourable regulatory environment (lowsupervisory requirements and minimalinformation disclosure); 3) the existence of

2. Recognises that offshore financialcentres generally present the followingfeatures: 1) a primary orientation ofbusiness toward non-residents; 2) low ormoderate supervisory and financialrequirements and/or minimal informationdisclosure; 3) the existence of low

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low (unspecified) or zero taxationschemes21 ;

(unspecified) or zero taxation schemes21 ;4) Financial systems with external assetsand liabilities out of proportion todomestic financial intermediation; 5) theexistence of very specific and restrictedtax advantages or certain administrativepractices that provide selective advantagesfor tax planners;

__________________ __________________21 ‘Offshore activities and moneylaundering: recent findings andchallenges’, Prof. Dr. Brigitte Unger,Utrecht University School of Economics,The Netherlands, February 2017.

21 ‘Offshore activities and moneylaundering: recent findings andchallenges’, Prof. Dr. Brigitte Unger,Utrecht University School of Economics,The Netherlands, February 2017.

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 2 a (new)


2 a. Notes that academic literaturedistinguishes between sink-OFCs - whichattract and retain foreign capital - andconduit-OFCs- which are attractiveintermediate destinations in the routing ofinternational investments and enable thetransfer of capital without taxation;Underlines that five countries – theNetherlands, the United Kingdom,Ireland, Singapore and Switzerland –canalize the majority of corporateoffshore investment as conduit-OFCs,specialising either by geographical areaor industrial sector 1a

__________________1a University of Amsterdam, “UncoveringOffshore Financial Centers: Conduitsand Sinksin the Global Corporate

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Ownership Network” 24 July2017http://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-06322-9

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4 a. Notes that projects managed by theEuropean Investment Bank involvedMossack Fonseca and that the EuropeanCommission blocked 18 projects in 2016,preventing €1billion to end up in taxhavens;

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 4 b (new)


4 b. Notes the jurisprudence of theCourt of Justice of the European Unionregarding the principle of abuse of law inrelation to taxation, ruling that nationalsof a Member States cannot attemptimproperly or fraudulently to takeadvantage of provisions of EU law; Addsthat several Member States apply theconcept of abuse of law to taxation issues1a;__________________

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1a For example: France, Italy, Poland andthe Netherlands

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5. Welcomes the fact that the Councilis aiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim ofaddressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards;

5. Welcomes the fact that the Councilis aiming to establish by the end of 2017 a‘Common EU List of Non-CooperativeTax Jurisdictions’, with the aim ofaddressing external risks to MemberStates’ tax bases posed by third countriesthat refuse to adhere to international taxgood governance standards; deplores,however, that only third countries outsidethe EU will be scrutinized and that theEuropean Parliament is not involved inthe screening process, which is carriedout by the Council Code of ConductGroup on Business Taxation sufferingfrom opaque proceedings and inefficientdecision rules; Stresses that the above-mentioned list should be realistic andobjective in order to be credible and torestore confidence in EU actions to fighttax havens;

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7. Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list tobe ready in 2017;

7. Welcomes the fact that in May2016, the Council endorsed the proposedlisting process and called for an EU list tobe ready in 2017; Regrets however thatdespite support from the EuropeanParliament and the EuropeanCommission, Member States did not agreethat low or no taxation rates should beconsidered as a specific criterion to assessunfair tax competition when screeningthird country jurisdictions 1a

__________________1a See Written answers by CommissionerJourova, November 2016

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8. Recalls that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that this has been implementedrecently only by a small number ofjurisdictions; recalls that on 15 February2011 the Economic and Financial AffairsCouncil (ECOFIN) adopted CouncilDirective 2011/16/EU on administrativecooperation in the field of taxation andrepealing Directive 77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that this Directive makes itmandatory for national tax administrations

8. Welcomes that the OECD CommonReporting Standard (CRS) requiresjurisdictions to obtain information fromtheir financial institutions andautomatically exchange that informationwith other jurisdictions on an annual basis;regrets that the United States are notcommitted to this new internationalstandard; points out that also the CRS hasweaknesses and welcomes that the OECDis working on refining the standard tomake it more effective; recalls that on 15February 2011 the Economic and FinancialAffairs Council (ECOFIN) adoptedCouncil Directive 2011/16/EU onadministrative cooperation in the field of

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to supply information concerning ataxpayer of another Member State onrequest, even if this information is heldonly by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information forcertain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;

taxation and repealing Directive77/799/EEC (DAC 1);recalls that thisDirective makes it mandatory for nationaltax administrations to supply informationconcerning a taxpayer of another MemberState on request, even if this information isheld only by a bank or other financialinstitution; notes that on 1 January 2013the national laws, regulations andadministrative provisions implementingthis directive entered into force, with theexception of the provisions relating toautomatic exchange of information forcertain categories23 , which entered intoforce on 1 January 2015;

__________________ __________________23 Income from employment, directors’fees, dividends, capital gains, royalties,certain life insurance products, pensions,and ownership of and income fromimmovable property.

23 Income from employment, directors’fees, dividends, capital gains, royalties,certain life insurance products, pensions,and ownership of and income fromimmovable property.

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13. Welcomes the Commissionproposal on DAC 6 for mandatoryautomatic exchange of information in thefield of taxation in relation to reportablecross-border arrangements;

13. Welcomes the Commissionproposal of 21 June 2017 on DAC 6 formandatory automatic exchange ofinformation by intermediaries and taxadvisors in the field of taxation in relationto reportable cross-border arrangements;

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Amendment 25Molly Scott Cato, Eva Joly, Sven Giegold, Pascal Durand, Ernest Urtasun, Heidi Hautala,Michel Reimon, Jordi Solé

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on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group



14. Observes that offshore entities areoften set up as shell companies24 , withoutunderlying economic rationale orsubstance within the country ofestablishment;

14. Notes that companies, foundationsand trusts are the main tools used bymoney launderers and tax evaders,according to Panama papers data andthat these structures are often used incombination to obfuscate ownership ofassets; Stresses the risks of increased useof trusts for money laundering purposes,as these instruments do not have legalpersonality and arenot subject toreporting and disclosure requirements;Observes that offshore entities are often setup as shell companies24 , which do nothave to have real economic substancewithin the country of establishment;Deplores that there is no European orinternational minimum standardsregarding the definition of corporatesubstance or aggressive tax planning;notes that in July 2017, a French courtruled that Google had no permanentestablishment in France despiteemploying more than 700 persons in a10000 square meters office located on“Rue de Londres” leading to no taxablepresence in France while there is noEuropean binding definition of apermanent establishment;

__________________ __________________24 As the OECD defines it, a shell companyis a company that is formally registered,incorporated or otherwise legally organisedin an economy but which does not conductany operations in that economy other thanin pass-through capacity.

24 As the OECD defines it, a shell companyis a company that is formally registered,incorporated or otherwise legally organisedin an economy but which does not conductany operations in that economy other thanin pass-through capacity.

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15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or savings tax in the countrieswhere the UBOs are residents26 , shieldingassets from creditors or heirs, the evasionof sanctions, masking criminal activity andmoney laundering, or transferring assetsfrom an individual or company to a newcompany without incurring the liabilities ofthe former;

15. Underlines that motivations for theestablishment of offshore entities mostoften include obscuring the origins ofmoney and assets and concealing theidentity of the ultimate beneficial owner(UBO)25 , the avoidance or evasion ofinheritance or income or capital gains taxin the countries where the UBOs areresidents26 , shielding assets from creditorsor heirs, the evasion of sanctions, maskingcriminal activity and money laundering, ortransferring assets from an individual orcompany to a new company withoutincurring the liabilities of the former;Notes that several documents from thePanama papers demonstrated theknowledge by intermediaries and MossackMonseca of these motivations;

__________________ __________________25 The ultimate beneficial owner is thenatural person who is ultimatelyresponsible for the entity.

25 The ultimate beneficial owner is thenatural person who is ultimatelyresponsible for the entity.

26 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Operational Risk andMannheimer Swartling Advokatbyra.

26 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Operational Risk andMannheimer Swartling Advokatbyra.

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16. Adds that in the case ofmultinational corporations, shell andletterbox companies are also used as part ofcorporate tax optimising strategies, tofacilitate transfer pricing;

16. Adds that in the case ofmultinational corporations, shell andletterbox companies are also used as part ofcorporate tax optimising strategies, tofacilitate transfer pricing; Notes thataggressive tax planning is not compatiblewith Corporate Social Responsibilityprinciples and recalls its request toCommission to include this element in anupdated Corporate Social ResponsibilityEU strategy;

Or. en




17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had the largestnumber of offshore entities revealed in thePanama Papers (17 973 entities), followedby Luxembourg (10 877 entities) andCyprus (6 374 entities), as well as Latvia,Ireland, Spain, Estonia and Malta27 ;

17. States that among the EU MemberStates, the United Kingdom had the largestnumber of offshore entities revealed in thePanama Papers (17 973 entities), followedby Luxembourg (10 877 entities) andCyprus (6 374 entities), as well as Latvia,Ireland, Spain, Estonia and Malta27 ;Stresses that out of the 21 countries usedmost by Mossack Fonseca to set up shellcompanies or other complex structures,12 countries, in addition to the UK areBritish Overseas Territories, BritishCrown Dependencies or members of theCommonwealth;

__________________ __________________27 ‘Role of advisors and intermediaries in 27 ‘Role of advisors and intermediaries in

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the schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

the schemes revealed in the PanamaPapers’, Willem Pieter de Groen, Centrefor European Policy Studies, April 2017.

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17 a. Notes with concern that theFootball Leaks revelations and the severalindividual cases of tax evasion in theworld of football recently discovered haveshown that many loopholes andmismatches still exist in nationallegislation regarding the taxation ofimage rights and the taxation offootballers’ international transfers;

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17 b. Recommends that while exercisingtheir tax sovereignty, countries shouldtake into account the impact of theiractions more globally, especially in so faras they restrict the exercise of taxsovereignty of other countries; Notes thatsuch ‘spillover’ analyses are not oftendone by European Member States for

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19. Underlines that at the time the datawere leaked, 55 728 entities were stillactive and approximately 90 % were basedin the British Virgin Islands (BVI),Panama and the Seychelles;

19. Underlines that the British VirginIslands (BVI), Panama and the Seychellesconstituted the top three countries were90% of entities were created;

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20. Notes that in offshore jurisdictionscompany registers and authorities often donot require the information necessary toidentify beneficial owners, or do not shareit; notes that the identification of UBOs insome countries relies only on self-declaration of beneficial ownershipinformation, without any furtherverification29 ;

20. Notes that in offshore jurisdictionsand in some EU Member States companyregisters and authorities often do notrequire or do not share the informationnecessary to identify beneficial owners,qualified shareholders, supervisory boardmembers, management board membersand general managers nor information onbalance sheet as well as profit and lossstatement; notes that the identification ofUBOs in some countries relies only onself-declaration of beneficial ownershipinformation, without anyfurtherverification29 ;

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__________________ __________________29 Intervention by Daniel Thelesklaf,Chairman of the Committee of Experts onthe Evaluation of Anti-Money LaunderingMeasures and the Financing of Terrorism(MONEYVAL) in PANA Committeehearing on 13 October 2016.

29 Intervention by Daniel Thelesklaf,Chairman of the Committee of Experts onthe Evaluation of Anti-Money LaunderingMeasures and the Financing of Terrorism(MONEYVAL) in PANA Committeehearing on 13 October 2016.

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21. Notes that in most offshoredestinations tax and reporting obligationsare non-existent;

21. Notes that in most offshoredestinations tax and reporting obligationsare non-existent 1a; Is concerned thatseveral of these jurisdictions include intheir national legislation or administrativepractice obstacles to exchangeinformation with foreign competentauthorities;

__________________1a OECD SECRETARY-GENERALREPORT TO G20 FINANCEMINISTERS, Baden-Baden, Germany,March 2017:http://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-secretary-general-tax-report-g20-finance-ministers-march-2017.pdf

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22. Notes that none of the three above-mentioned jurisdictions, namely the BVI,Panama and the Seychelles, are currentlylisted as ‘uncooperative tax havens’ by theOECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs;recalls that the BVI, the Seychelles andPanama were taken off the list between2000 and 2002 after having made formalcommitments to implement the OECD’sglobal standards of transparency andexchange of information;

22. Notes that none of the three above-mentioned jurisdictions, namely the BVI,Panama and the Seychelles, are currentlylisted as ‘uncooperative tax havens’ by theOECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs;recalls that the BVI, the Seychelles andPanama were taken off the list between2000 and 2002 after having made formalcommitments to implement the OECD’sglobal standards of transparency andexchange of information; Deplores that theOECD list of tax havens contains onlyone country since July 2017;

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25. Notes that most of the offshoreconstructions revealed in the PanamaPapers were set up from Luxembourg, theUnited Kingdom and Cyprus and that thesecountries could have suspected that thisimplied a loss of the tax base of otherMember States where the UBOs wereresident – in Luxembourg, for example,many offshore companies were set uppurely to circumvent the withholding tax31

(which only applied to natural persons,not to offshore companies), and some ofthose were still active after the entry intoforce of DAC 1;

25. Notes that most of the offshoreconstructions revealed in the PanamaPapers were set up from the UnitedKingdom, Luxembourg and Cyprus andthat these countries could have suspectedthat this implied a loss of the tax base ofother Member States where the UBOs wereresident; Notes that due to the ‘ne bis inidem’ principle, legal action cannotalways be started in a Member Statebecause of the dual system ofadministrative and criminal sanctionsexisting in many countries;

__________________ __________________

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31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

31 See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of Nordea PrivateBanking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee of Inquiryin a meeting with a PANA delegation.

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25 a. Notes that in Luxembourg, forexample, many offshore companies wereset up purely to circumvent thewithholding tax 1a (which only applied tonatural persons, not to offshorecompanies), and some of those were stillactive after the entry into force of DAC 1;recalls that Luxembourg, thanks tointensive blocking and lobbying in theCouncil of Member States, obtained aconcession in the EU Savings TaxDirective (EUSTD) to not automaticallyexchange information allowing taxevaders to hide their money from the taxauthorities of their residence; deploresthat Luxembourg tolerated the creation ofa tax avoidance business on its territoryhelping wealthy individuals to formallymove the ownership of their funds intooffshore companies located in tax havensand thus escaping the scope of theEUSTD; is concerned that until todayLuxembourg does not cooperateeffectively in order to help its partnercountries to bring their tax evaders to

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justice; Notes that the Commissionreviews of the Savings Directive, carriedout in 2008 and 2011, identified the use oflegal entities and arrangements and theexposure of European financialinstitutions towards such structures inoffshore centres as an issue; Recalls thatthe Commission made an updatedproposal in 2009 which did not receivepolitical support by Member States;__________________1a See, for example, Nordea (2016),‘Report on Investigation of NordeaPrivate Banking in Relation to OffshoreStructures’, joint report by Nordea GroupCompliance, Nordea Group OperationalRisk and Mannheimer SwartlingAdvokatbyra. This was also confirmed bythe Belgian National Committee ofInquiry in a meeting with a PANAdelegation.

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25 b. Notes that in the UK, more than75% of corruption cases involvingproperty investigated by the authoritiesinvolved anonymous companies registeredin secrecy jurisdictions; Adds that ofthese,78% of the companies involved wereregistered in either the UK’s overseasterritories or crown dependencies; Notesthat the United Kingdom government caninvoke special prerogatives that wouldforce British overseas territories andcrown dependencies to introduce central

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public registers of company ownershipand end their tax secrecy;

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 25 c (new)


25 c. Points out that within theEuropean Union, special economic zoneslike Madeira are abused by largecompanies and wealthy individuals tostash profits without paying taxes; Sees,therefore, a need for the EuropeanCommission to review the status of theseschemes if the initial objectives haven’tbeen met and also to review the guidelinesfor EU regional aid with stricter taxconditions;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 25 d (new)


25 d. Notes that little progress has beenachieved on the revision of the mandateand transparency of the Code of ConductGroup on Business Taxation since theParliament’s reports on the Luxleaksrevelations; Recalls its requests to makemandatory to the Code of Conduct Groupthe approval of new tax measure adopted

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by the Member States; Points out that dueto a lack of political will, Member Stateshave been unable to agree on abolishing anumber of harmful tax measures whichare under discussion in the Code ofConduct Group on Business Taxation forseveral years; notes that French andItalian patent box regimes are still notcompliant with the Code of ConductGroup criteria and no action has beentaken by the Council nor the Commission;notes that the Code of Conduct Group’sAnti-abuse Subgroup started its work oninbound profit transfers in 2009 buthasn’t agreed yet on a switchover clausefor foreign untaxed income entering theEU; notes that the Code of ConductSubgroup on outbound profit transfersstarted to work at least since 2010 on theproblem of untaxed profit distributionsfrom the EU to a third country but noagreement has yet been reached; notesthat, as regards taxation applicable tointerest and royalty payments madebetween associated companies of differentMember States, despite a Commissionproposal presented in November 2011 torecast Council Directive 2003/49/EC of3June 2003, Member States haven’t beenable to agree on solving shortcomingsresulting from the limited scope of theDirective by including a MinimumEffective Taxation (MET) clause in theDirective; notes that, as regardsinvestment funds, Member States deniedin September 2011 to continue thediscussion about these schemes’ allegedand potential harmfulness;

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26. Notes the lack of adequate humanand financial resources available toregulators, supervisors and applicable taxlaw enforcement bodies;

26. Notes the lack of adequate humanand financial resources available toregulators, supervisors and applicable taxlaw enforcement bodies; Notes forexample that only the EBA is allocatingresources to ensure ALM coordinationwith other EU financial authorities butonly have0.8 person in charge of thisissue; Regrets the lack of commonEuropean definitions for tax evasion andtax avoidance, which would easecooperation between Member States;Points out that administrative cooperationand legal assistance in criminal mattersbetween two or more Member States withregard to tax evasion, tax fraud andmoney laundering are hampered bymismatched national legislation; regretsthat in some Member States, like inLuxembourg for example, simple taxevasion was or still is not treated as anaggravated crime and therefore preventscross-border administrative cooperationand legal assistance in criminal matters;regrets that in some Member States, likein Luxembourg for example, the time ofthe commitment of the crime was or still isconsidered as the starting point forcalculating the limitation periodpotentially preventing cross-borderadministrative cooperation and legalassistance in criminal matters; welcomesthat some Member States, for exampleLuxembourg, already have or plan tomodify their national law in order toremove obstacles to cross-borderadministrative cooperation and legalassistance in criminal matters;

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26 a. Notes that 18 infringement caseswere open by the Commission againstMember States regarding the lack oftransposition of DAC1 1a, 13 casesregarding the implementation ofDAC2 1b

and 8 cases regarding the implementationof DAC3; Recalls that the Directive onadministrative cooperation 4 on country-by-country reporting between taxadministration had to be implemented innational law by Member States by 4 June2017; Notes that actions with regard to 11Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus,Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary,Malta, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic,Slovakia) are still pending 1c;__________________1a 14 actions were initiated for non-communication of domestic provisions byMember States (not meeting the 01January 2013 deadline fortransposition).Another infringement casewas initiated for non-transposition(including the spontaneous exchange ofinformation) and six actions wereinitiated for possible incorrecttransposition of DAC1. Out of these sixactions, three cases are still ongoing.1b Deadline for transposition was 01January 20161c Cases for Greece and Portugal shouldbe closed soon

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27. Stresses that this lack of resourcesin tax administrations impedes the capacityto effectively comply with the spontaneousexchange of information under DAC, andthat this is a systemic problem in the EU;

27. Stresses that this lack of resourcesin tax administrations impedes the capacityto effectively comply with the spontaneousexchange of information under DAC, andthat this is a systemic problem in the EU;Notes that the distinction betweenadministrative tax offences and criminaltax offences is often blurred at memberStates level, creating sometimes obstaclesto good cooperation between memberStates; Recalls its proposal to amend DACin order to improve Member States’coordination on tax audits;

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28. Concludes that the DAC provisions,especially Articles 1, 2 and 8(1) – onspontaneous information exchange – werenot implemented effectively; highlights thatMember States had grounds for supposingthat there had been a loss of tax in otherMember States owing to offshoreconstructions, but did not report this taxinformation to those other Member States;

28. Concludes that the DAC provisions,especially Articles 1, 2 and 8(1) – onspontaneous information exchange – werenot implemented constituting cases ofmaladministration by negligence oromission; highlights that Member Stateshad grounds for supposing that there hadbeen a loss of tax in other Member Statesowing to offshore constructions, but didnot report this tax information to thoseother Member States; points out that

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already in 2012, the Council Code ofConduct Group on Business Taxationacknowledged the lack of exchange ofinformation on rulings on a spontaneousbasis 1a; Concludes that the Commissionfailed to enforce DAC provisionseffectively;__________________1a Council Code of Conduct on BusinessTaxation, Background document from10September 2012: “The monitoringexercise discussed at the 17 April 2012Code meeting showed that in practice noinformation on rulings was exchanged ona spontaneous basis”

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29. Recalls that the FATF set the globalstandards for Anti-Money Laundering andCountering Financing of Terrorism(AML/CFT), and that all its members,including the main offshore financialcentres cited in the Panama Papers (BVI,Panama and the Seychelles), committed toimplementing these standards;

29. Recalls that the FATF set the globalstandards for Anti-Money Laundering andCountering Financing of Terrorism(AML/CFT), and that all its members,including the main offshore financialcentres cited in the Panama Papers (BVI,Panama and the Seychelles),committed toimplementing these standards; recalls thatFATF recommendations were latestamended in 2012 and should be revised assoon as possible according to new risks ofmoney laundering or money launderingpractices highlighted in the PanamaPapers;

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29 a. Notes that the Council of EuropeWarsaw Convention constitutes the mostcomprehensive international conventionon money laundering, asking parties toadopt legislative measures to facilitate theprevention, investigation and prosecutionof money laundering as well as theeffective freezing and confiscation ofproceeds and instrumentalities of crime;Regrets that the Warsaw Convention hasbeen ratified by only 18 Member States sofar; 1a

__________________1a Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,Malta, The Netherlands, Poland,Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,Spain, and the United Kingdom.

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30. Acknowledges that the EUframework for AML is the Anti-MoneyLaundering Directive (AMLD), whichidentifies the money laundering risks atthree levels, namely supranational level,

30. Acknowledges that the EUframework for AML is the Anti-MoneyLaundering Directive (AMLD),whichidentifies the money laundering risks atthree levels, namely supranational level,

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Member State level and the level of thereporting entities as part of their customerdue diligence (CDD);

Member State level and the level of theobliged entities as part of their customerdue diligence (CDD); Regrets however thelack of greater harmonisation in MemberStates’ approaches to fighting financialcrimes;

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32. Notes that AMLD IV improves thescope of enhanced CDD for undertakingbusiness with high-risk countries and thedefinitions and obligations concerningpolitically exposed persons and UBOs,lowers the cash payment threshold fromEUR 15 000 to EUR 10 000 and extendsthe scope of reporting entities to includethe entire gambling sector, and not justcasinos; recalls that the threshold foridentifying beneficial owners of corporateentities is a shareholding of 25 % plus oneshare or an ownership interest of more than25 %; recalls that AMLD IV entered intoforce on 26 June 2017;

32. Notes that AMLD IV improves thescope of enhanced CDD for undertakingbusiness with high-risk countries and thedefinitions and obligations concerningpolitically exposed persons and UBOs,lowers the cash payment threshold fromEUR 15 000 to EUR 10 000 and extendsthe scope of obliged entities to include theentire gambling sector, and not justcasinos; recalls that one criterion foridentifying beneficial owners of corporateentities is a shareholding of 25 % plus oneshare or an ownership interest of more than25 %; recalls that AMLD IV entered intoforce on 26June 2017 but only sixMember States have notified fullimplementation into national legislationin due time to the European Commission1a;

__________________1a The six countries are: Czech Republic,Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Sweden and theUK. Austria, France, Hungary, Ireland,Latvia, Slovakia and Spain have notifiedpartial implementation only.

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32 a. Welcomes the EuropeanCommission proposal on controls on cashentering or leaving the Union and callsfor greater harmonisation of cashrestrictions at the European level;

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34. Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATF;

34. Points to the fact that this is aduplicate of the list produced by the FATF;Questions why Panama was taken out ofthe FATF list of non-cooperationjurisdictions in 2016 before GALIFAThas conducted its peer-review evaluationon Panama and analysed the properenforcement of FATF standards; Notesthat Panama was rated as ‘non-compliant’ by the Global Forum at theend of 2016;

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35. Recalls that the Commissionproposed to amend the list by removingGuyana and adding Ethiopia; reiteratesParliament’s objections to these delegatedacts, of 19 January and 17 May 2017;

35. Recalls that the Commissionproposed to amend the list by removingGuyana and adding Ethiopia; reiteratesParliament’s objections to these delegatedacts, of 19 January and 17 May 2017, dueto dissatisfaction with the list notcontaining any single important offshorefinancial centre and with the aim to urgethe Commission to allocate more staff tocombat money laundering and terroristfinancing allowing for an own andindependent EU assessment of thirdcountries;

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36. Notes that the FATF has reviewedmore than 80 countries since 2007 in termsof their compliance and deficiencies andthat 59 countries have been put on thepublic list; reiterates the FATF’s claimsthat since then, 49 countries have madesignificant progress in terms of putting inplace legal and regulatory frameworks andreforms, committing themselves toupholding international tax standards suchas the OECD’s common reportingstandards, so as to be taken off the list;

36. Notes that the FATF has reviewedmore than 80 countries since 2007 in termsof their compliance and deficiencies andthat 61 countries have been put on thepublic list identifying countries withstrategic AML/CFT deficiencies ;reiterates the FATF’s claims that sincethen, 51countries have since made thenecessary reforms to address them, suchas putting in place legal and regulatoryframeworks and reforms, committingthemselves to upholding international taxstandards such as the OECD’s commonreporting standards, and to be taken off the

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list; highlights that being delisted from thepublic list should not take place only aftercommitments to reforms but after athorough FATF evaluation ensuringchanges in practice;

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37. Recalls that under AMLD III eachMember State is obliged to establish anFIU in order to combat money launderingand terrorist financing, that each nationalFIU must be given adequate resources tofulfil its tasks, and that the FIUs have to beequipped to ensure timely access to thefinancial, administrative and lawenforcement information they require toproperly carry out their tasks;

37. Recalls that under AMLD III eachMember State is obliged to establish anFIU in order to combat money launderingand terrorist financing, that each nationalFIU must be given adequate resources tofulfil its tasks, taking into account factorssuch as the exposure to money launderingrisks, the number of corporateheadquarters located in the country, thepossession of offshore territories, thevolume of tax collection of the jurisdictionas well as the number of offshore entitiesidentified in the Panama papers or otherleaked information and that the FIUs haveto be equipped to ensure timely access tothe financial, administrative and lawenforcement information they require toproperly carry out their tasks;

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40. Notes and welcomes theestablishment of the FIU.net cooperation inthe framework of Europol; recalls that theEgmont Group, an international body forthe cooperation of FIUs, is composed of154 FIUs worldwide;

40. Notes and welcomes theestablishment of the FIU.net cooperation inthe framework of Europol but is concernedby still existing legal and technicalbarriers preventing or/and significantlydelaying cooperation between EU FIUs;Regrets that several FIUs in Europe arestill not allowed according to theirnational legal framework to exchangedata directly with foreign lawenforcement; regrets that Europol islacking investigation powers to prosecutetax evasion and money laundering; recallsthat the Egmont Group, an internationalbody for the cooperation of FIUs, iscomposed of 154 FIUs worldwide;

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41. Observes that a number ofintermediaries did not adequately carry outthe mandatory enhanced CDD measures,whether upon the establishment of thebusiness relationship with their clients orduring that business relationship, evenwhen there was a suspicion of moneylaundering; highlights, therefore, the lackof reporting by obliged entities ofsuspicions of money laundering to thecompetent FIUs33 ;

41. Observes that a number ofintermediaries , such as the Berenbergbank in Germany or the Pilatus bank inMalta, did not adequately carry out themandatory enhanced CDD measures,whether upon the establishment of thebusiness relationship with their clients orduring that business relationship, evenwhen there was a suspicion of moneylaundering; highlights, therefore, the lackof reporting by obliged entities ofsuspicions of money laundering to thecompetentFIUs33 ;

__________________ __________________

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33 The investigation into the privatebanking activities of Nordea showed thatthe bank did not comply with internalguidelines or regulatory requirements inLuxembourg. More specifically, it did notclassify customers in the appropriate high-risk category, and the subsequent enhanceddue diligence (EDD) reporting wasincomplete. The EDD requirementsinclude, for instance, collectinginformation on the source of the funds andthe purpose of the accounts. Moreover, duediligence needs to be repeated regularlyand reassessed. This so-called ‘ongoingdue diligence’ (ODD) was, however, notsystematically conducted. The informationwas in many cases not up to date accordingto the internal investigation of the bank(Nordea, 2016). Similar implementationand enforcement problems were indicatedby a former compliance officer of theGerman Berenberg Bank that testified forthe PANA Committee.

33 The investigation into the privatebanking activities of Nordea showed thatthe bank did not comply with internalguidelines or regulatory requirements inLuxembourg. More specifically, it did notclassify customers in the appropriate high-risk category, and the subsequent enhanceddue diligence (EDD) reporting wasincomplete. The EDD requirementsinclude, for instance, collectinginformation on the source of the funds andthe purpose of the accounts. Moreover, duediligence needs to be repeated regularlyand reassessed. This so-called ‘ongoingdue diligence’ (ODD) was, however, notsystematically conducted. The informationwas in many cases not up to date accordingto the internal investigation of the bank(Nordea, 2016). Similar implementationand enforcement problems were indicatedby a former compliance officer of theGerman Berenberg Bank that testified forthe PANA Committee.

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42. Finds that in many cases no, orinsufficient, inquiries were carried out toidentify the UBOs of offshore entities;highlights the consequential failure todefine the ownership and control structureof the entity and/or to obtain informationon the purpose and intended nature of thebusiness relationship34 ;

42. Finds that in many cases no, orinsufficient, inquiries were carried out toidentify the UBOs of offshore entities;highlights the consequential failure todefine the ownership and control structureof the entity and/or to obtain informationon the purpose and intended nature of thebusiness relationship34 ; Stresses thatpublic documents from the PanamaPapers show that Mossack Fonseca wasaware that customer due diligence was

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not always properly done by some of itsclients or subsidiaries 1a;Highlights thatMossack Fonseca admitted that in somecases, they did not know who thebeneficial owners of the registered entitieswere; 1b

__________________ __________________1a In an email from 24 September 2010,Jürgen Mossack wrote ‘it would appearthat Mossfon UK are not doing their duediligence thoroughly (or maybe none atall) and maybe from now on we ourselveswill have to do the DD on all clients thatMossfon UK have with us, present andfuture!”1b In an email relating an exchangebetween Mossack Fonseca and UBS, therepresentative from Mossack Fonsecasaid: “He explained that UBS had neverbeen a contracting partner of ours. Idisagreed at this issue and added that insome cases we even don’t know who theBO is. (...) I answered that in the past, wespecifically, on demand of UBS and otherbanks, were not supplied with the identityof the BO”.

34 For 25 % of the MosFon entities thatwere still active in 2015, the UBO wasunknown or anonymous.

34 For 25 % of the MosFon entities thatwere still active in 2015, the UBO wasunknown or anonymous.

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42 a. Condemns the fact that in order toaccommodate the special uses of theirclients, Mossack Fonseca charged more

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expensive services with no proper duediligence checks while deliberatelyknowing these services entailed a higherrisk of money laundering; 1a

__________________1a In an email from 05 May 2009, arepresentative from Mossack Fonsecaexplained that the price for creating twofoundations “is higher basically for thespecial use the client will make with theFoundation and the special flexibleservice that we are providing (withoutmuch due diligence) as definitively entaila higher risk.”

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43. Underlines that as a result,insufficient documentation is available tonational FIUs or other competentauthorities to conduct the appropriateinvestigations and analysis in accordancewith national law;

43. Underlines that insufficientdocumentation is available to national FIUsor other competent authorities to conductthe appropriate investigations and analysisin accordance with national law, especiallyregarding the identification of theultimate beneficial owners; Regrets thatcertain European FIUs did not receiveSuspicious Transaction Reports related tothe Panama Papers before the scandalwas made public by ICIJ journalists,showing the under-reporting of moneylaundering risks by certain obligedentities; Regrets that the requirement ofdual criminality provisions (both in thecountry requesting information and in thecountry receiving the request forcooperation) has preventing goodcooperation among Member States to

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fight tax evasion and money laundering;

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44. Notes that the lack ofdocumentation and inquiry also applies tocertain life insurance policies granted byinsurance companies and offered to clientsvia insurance intermediaries or any otherentity identified as a financial institutionunder AMLD III;

44. Notes that the lack ofdocumentation and inquiry also applies tocertain life insurance policies granted byinsurance companies and offeredsystematically to clients via insuranceintermediaries or any other entity identifiedas a financial institution under AMLD III;

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45 a. Recalls the request expressed bysome FIUs to have greater access toinformationthrough increasedcooperation with their counterparts andaccess to moresources of information likecentralised bank accounts data orregistries for real estate or life insuranceproducts;

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46. Notes that EU FIUs have differentstructures, powers and often a lack ofresources across the Member States, andthat these differences affect the ways inwhich EU FIUs collect and analyseinformation, and ultimately impact theexchange of information between them;underlines that this leads to fragmented,asymmetric and incomparable responsesfrom the EU FIUs36 ;

46. Notes that EU FIUs have differentstructures, sizes, powers and often a lack ofresources across the Member States, andthat these differences affect the ways inwhich EU FIUs collect, analyse anddisseminate information, and ultimatelyimpact the exchange of informationbetween them; underlines that this leads tofragmented, asymmetric and incomparableresponses from the EU FIUs36 ; Recalls theimportance of having independent andautonomous FIUs receiving STRs directlyand exclusively, which is not the case inall Member states;

__________________ __________________36 EU FIU Platform mapping exercise andgap analysis on EU FIUs’ powers andobstacles for obtaining and exchanginginformation, 15 December 2012.

36 EU FIU Platform mapping exercise andgap analysis on EU FIUs’ powers andobstacles for obtaining and exchanginginformation, 15 December 2016.

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47. Regrets that the Commission is notable to conduct its own proper assessmentof money laundering high-risk thirdcountries as it does not have sufficient

47. Regrets that the Commission is notable to conduct its own proper andindependent assessment of moneylaundering high-risk third countries as it

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qualified staff to fulfil this obligation underthe AMLD;

does not have sufficient qualified staff tofulfil this obligation under the AMLD;

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48. Points in particular to the increasingnumber of STRs driven by new legislationand to the fact that the lack of resourcesimplies that the FIUs can deal with only afraction of the problem37 ;

48. Points in particular to the increasingnumber of STRs driven by stricterlegislation and to the fact that FIUsurgently need to step up their resources inorder to deal not only with a fraction of theproblem37 ; Notes that according toEuropol statistics, two countries alone(UK and the Netherlands 1a) account for67% of all STRs filed in the EU and thatthe level of STRs in certain countries 1b

does not appear to be commensurate withthe activities of the regulated sectors,including offshore financial services oronline gambling; Notes that certainEuropean FIUs receive threshold-basedreports which are a useful tool to enrichthe FIUs’ information basis;

__________________ __________________1a UK FIU may be the recipient of some ofthe highest reporting volumes in the EUas it is one of the largest financialmarkets in Europe and operates aSuspicious Activity Regime. Reportingvolumes in The Netherlands areanomalously high and can be explainedby way of the fact that they do not receiveSTRs, but rather Unusual TransactionReports (UTRs), the vast majority ofwhich stem from exchange/remittanceinstitutions who are obliged to report all

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transactions in excess of 2000 Euros1b Notably Cyprus, Malta andLuxembourg, which receive very fewSTRs compared to the size of theregulated sectors in their jurisdictions.

37 PANA FIU hearing of 21 June 2017. 37 PANA FIU hearing of 21 June 2017.

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49. Regrets that the current FIU.netplatform under Europol is not efficientenough owing to the varying levels of useby the Member States and the lack ofresources and competences at EU level;

49. Regrets that the current FIU.netplatform under Europol is not efficientenough owing to the varying levels of useby the Member States and the lack ofresources and competences at EU level;Notes that FIUs in the Union often havescarce human and financial resourcesand face increasing workload to properlycarry out their mission of receiving,analyzing and disseminating suspiciousreports;

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50. Notes that time delays in responsesto requests affect FIUs’ cooperation andthat the replies to these requests are often

50. Notes that time delays in responsesto requests affect FIUs’ cooperation andthat the replies to these requests are often

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of poor quality and lacking in detail, thusconstituting an obstacle to internationalcooperation by FIUs themselves;

of poor quality and lacking in detail, thusconstituting an obstacle to internationalcooperation by FIUs themselves; Regretsthat certain FIUs limit the usage oftransmitted information, includingprohibiting their use for judicialprosecution or fiscal investigations; Notesthat some European FIUs have seen theirrequest for cooperation with non-European counterparts hindered becauseof legal or administrative obstacles inthird-country jurisdictions;

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51. Notes that not all EU FIUs areempowered to approach obliged entitieswith requests for information, and that inmany cases these requests are conditionalupon the prior receipt of STRs; notes,therefore, that some FIUs cannot requestinformation from reporting entities onbehalf of foreign FIUs if they do not haverelated suspicious transactions recorded intheir database;

51. Regrets that not all EU FIUs areempowered to approach obliged entitieswith requests for information, and that inmany cases these requests are conditionalupon the prior receipt of STRs; notes,therefore, that some FIUs cannot requestinformation from reporting entities onbehalf of foreign FIUs if they do not haverelated suspicious transactions recorded intheir database;

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52. Notes that in some Member Statesthere are no clear guidelines on mutualcooperation between national FIUs andnational tax authorities in order to ensuretax compliance;

52. Notes that in some Member Statesthere are no clear guidelines on mutualcooperation between national FIUs andnational tax authorities in order to ensuretax compliance; Regrets that there are stillfrequent cases of refusal to providecooperation by some FIUs (in full or inpart) in response to requests by theircounterparts and considers that thecapacity to exchange for FIUs should bebroadened and made unconditional bynarrowing down the possibility ofexemptions to exceptional circumstancesonly; Suggests that European FIUs’cooperation would benefit from a morehomogeneous categorisation of theirresponsibilities and tasks;

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53. Notes that tax crimes have onlyrecently been recognised as a predicateoffence of money laundering under AMLDIV, the deadline for transposition of whichexpired on 26 June 2017; points out thatthe directive explicitly indicates thatdifferences between national lawdefinitions of tax crimes will not impedethe ability of FIUs to exchangeinformation; notes, however, thatinternational cooperation between FIUscan still be refused on the grounds of thesignificant differences across MemberStates as to how predicate offences to

53. Notes that tax crimes have onlyrecently been recognised as a predicateoffence of money laundering under AMLDIV, the deadline for transposition of whichexpired on 26 June 2017; points out thatthe directive explicitly indicates thatdifferences between national lawdefinitions of tax crimes will not impedethe ability of FIUs to exchangeinformation; regrets the lack of a commonEuropean definition of tax crimes 1a

which so far has hampered investigationand prosecution of tax crime related casesin the Union and the fact that several

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money laundering are defined andcriminalised;

European countries consider only veryserious tax offences as tax crimes; notesthat international cooperation betweenFIUs can still be refused on the grounds ofthe significant differences across MemberStates as to how predicate offences tomoney laundering are defined andcriminalised;

__________________1a whether tax crime is criminalized whencommitted as a positive act, by omissionor both and whether tax crime is dealtwith by administrative bodies or byjudicial authorities

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53 a. Notes that judicial cooperationbetween Member Statescan be improved,especially regarding the execution ofmutual legal assistance requests, whichoften involves multiple sub-requests forwhich different national authorities mightbe competent to execute; Notes thatobstacles to effective judicial cooperationcan arise when national legislationrequires that the predicate offence formoney laundering is precisely establishedand because there is no uniformdefinition on predicate offences across theUnion;

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Amendment 69Molly Scott Cato, Eva Joly, Sven Giegold, Pascal Durand, Ernest Urtasun, Heidi Hautala,

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Michel Reimon, Jordi Soléon behalf of the Verts/ALE Group



54. Notes that the obligation toestablish central UBO registers is includedin AMLD IV; regrets that to date thisobligation has not been fulfilled by allMember States and that not all FIUs haveaccess to this information on UBOs;

54. Notes that the obligation toestablish central UBO registers is includedin AMLD IV; regrets that to date thisobligation has not been fulfilled by allMember States and that not all FIUs haveaccess to this information on UBOs; sees astrong need for interconnecting centralUBO registers and for establishing fullpublic access to effectively scrutinise illicitbehaviour;

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55. Notes that the EU’s FIU platformidentified several shortcomings in itsmapping exercise and gap analysis onFIUs; points out that this is owing to thenon-implementation of AMLD IIIprovisions, notably access to bankaccount information, and to significantdiscrepancies between nationalapproaches;

55. Stresses that the EU’s FIU platformidentified several shortcomings andinadequate implementation of Europeanlegislation in its mapping exercise and gapanalysis on FIUs, concluding to breachesof implementation of AMLD IIIprovisions; notes that it especiallyhighlights insufficient capacity of foreigncounterparts to provide information eitherbecause of lack of domestic access torelevant sources or due to constraints inthe capacity to share availableinformation; Notes also that the reporthighlighted the lack of capacity for FIUsto carry out joint analysis of cross bordercases to identify money laundering and

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terrorist financing threats, risks andtrends; deplores that by May 2016, only16 Member States had or were in theprocess of putting in place automatedmechanisms that enable them to identifyholders of bank and payment accounts; 1a

__________________1a Italy, Spain, Belgium, Bulgaria,Croatia, Greece, France, Czech Republic,Poland, Germany, Lithuania, Portugal,Romania, Slovenia, The Netherlands, andAustria.

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55 a. Highlights that the mappingexercise by the EU’s FIU platform alsoconcludes to a lack of sufficiently detailedand harmonised European rules when itcomes to fighting money laundering;

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56. Highlights that some Member Stateinstitutions in charge of implementing andenforcing rules as regards tax fraud and

56. Highlights that some Member Stateinstitutions in charge of implementing andenforcing rules as regards tax fraud and

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money laundering appear to be not entirelyindependent from political influence38 ;

money laundering appear to be not entirelyindependent from political influence38 ;points out that the discretionary power ofthe police in some Member States whetheror not to investigate information receivedfrom and confirmed by the FIU canqualify as maladministration in case ofinaction; Notes that the Maltese FIUproduced report on suspicions of moneylaundering involving Maltese PoliticallyExposed Persons, which has not led topolice investigation so far; is concernedabout allegations regarding possible non-compliance of competent authorities withanti-money laundering provisionsenshrined in the Capital RequirementsDirective IV, in particular requirementsfor qualifying shareholders and the fit &proper requirements for the managementbodies when granting a banking licence;1a

__________________ __________________1a Leaked Reports of the FinancialIntelligence and Analysis Unit (FIAU) inMalta.

38 PANA mission report to Malta – 20February 2017.

38 PANA mission report to Malta – 20February 2017.

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56 a. Notes that at least one MemberState - Malta - had a Minister ingovernment, as part of the PoliticallyExposed Persons mentioned in thePanama Papers; Notes that for most

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Member States the Committee visited witha fact-finding mission 1a,inquiries werestarted after the Panama Papersrevelations; Regrets however, that in somecountries, like in Malta, there has been nopolice investigation despite evidence fromthe FIU of serious risks of moneylaundering; Regrets that this lack ofinvestigation prevented the possibility toidentify and if necessary sanctionintermediaries in Malta, which may havenot be compliant with their obligations,including customer due diligence; Drawsattention on the online gambling sectorand its licencing procedures in Malta,which may not be compliant with the lawas online gambling is a high-risk sectordue to the huge volumes oftransactions/financial flows and non-faceto face elements, as identified in its supra-national risks assessment 1b;Condemnsthat the Commission didn't investigatefurther on possible non-compliance byMalta to the AMLD, despite havingbrought this to its attention;__________________1a the United Kingdom, Luxembourg,Malta, Portugal, Cyprus1b COM(2017) 340 final page 5

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57. Highlights that infringement letterswere sent to several Member States forfailing to implement AMLD III and that six

57. Expresses concerns at the low levelof compliance by some EU Member Stateswith international AML/CFT standards,

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Member States (Belgium, France, Spain,Ireland, Poland and Sweden) were broughtto court; notes that the Polish case waswithdrawn but that the other five MemberStates were sanctioned for failing toimplement the directive on time; stresses,however, that this raises questions as towhether infringement procedures aresufficient to verify the quality ofimplementation by Member States;

as showed in FATF or Moneyval peer-reviews; Highlights that infringementletters were sent to 22 Member States forfailing to implement AMLD III and that sixMember States (Belgium, France, Spain,Ireland, Poland and Sweden) were broughtto court; notes that the Polish case waswithdrawn but that the other five MemberStates were sanctioned for failing toimplement the directive on time; stresses,however, that this raises questions as towhether infringement procedures aresufficient to verify the quality ofimplementation by Member States andsuggests to further explore the possibilityof economic sanctions for non-compliance with European Directives;

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58. Concludes that by not respondingadequately to these shortcomings, MemberStates have allegedly failed to enforceAMLD III effectively; points also to thefact that the Commission has potentiallyfailed to enforce these provisions by notinitiating infringement procedures;

58. Concludes that by not respondingadequately to these shortcomings, MemberStates have allegedly failed to enforceAMLD III effectively; Concludes that bynot empowering FIUs to cooperate asforeseen in AMLD III, Member Stateshave breach article 4 of the Lisbon Treatyon sincere cooperation; points also to thefact that the Commission has potentiallyfailed to enforce these provisions by notinitiating infringement procedures;

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Amendment 76Molly Scott Cato, Eva Joly, Sven Giegold, Pascal Durand, Ernest Urtasun, Heidi Hautala,

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Michel Reimon, Jordi Soléon behalf of the Verts/ALE Group



60. Recalls that according to AMLDIV, the current definition of obligedreporting entities includes financial andcredit institutions, auditors, accountantsand tax advisors, notaries, trust andcompany service providers, real estateagents, providers of gambling services andother independent legal professionals;

60. Recalls that according to AMLDIV, the current definition of obliged entitiesincludes financial and credit institutions,auditors, accountants and tax advisors,notaries, trust and company serviceproviders, real estate agents, providers ofgambling services and other independentlegal professionals; Recalls that accordingto AMLD IV, Member States are requiredto ensure that their competent authoritiesresponsible for supervision have theadequate financial, human and technicalresources to perform their functions(Article 37 3AMLD and Article484AMLD) and notes that deficienciesrelating to resources have been detectedthrough FATF's and Moneyval's MutualEvaluation Reports;

Or. en




62. Recalls that enhanced CDD isrequired notably for clients who arepolitically exposed persons (PEPs), inorder to establish the source of wealth andsource of funds; recalls that credit andfinancial institutions are required to havesystems in place that enable them torespond fully and rapidly to enquiries from

62. Recalls that enhanced CDD isrequired notably for clients who arepolitically exposed persons (PEPs) andother high-risk customers, in order toestablish the source of wealth and source offunds; recalls that credit and financialinstitutions are required to have systems inplace that enable them to respond fully and

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FIUs, in accordance with their nationallaw;

rapidly to enquiries from FIUs, inaccordance with their national law;

Or. en




64. Underlines that in many MemberStates tax evasion, facilitated by thoseenablers, is not a predicate crime formoney laundering, since it does not fallunder serious crime in their penal code,and that in some Member States taxevasion is a misdemeanour and thereforewould only be considered an administrativeoffence; notes that AMLD IV, thetransposition deadline for which expired on26 June 2017, aims to harmonise thispoint;

64. Underlines that in many MemberStates tax evasion, facilitated by thoseenablers, is not a predicate crime formoney laundering, since it does not fallunder serious crime in their penal code,and that in some Member States taxevasion is a misdemeanour and thereforewould only be considered an administrativeoffence; welcomes that AMLD IV, thetransposition deadline for which expired on26 June 2017,aims to harmonise predicatecrimes for money laundering; notes thatthe European Parliament’s mandate forthe trialogue negotiations on AMLD Vincludes the decoupling of tax crimesfrom the requirement of being punishableby deprivation of liberty or a detentionorder; points out the need to harmonisetax crimes at EU level by a distinctcriminal law instrument to be adoptedunder Article 83(2) TFEU or ultimatelyunder Article 116 TFEU if Member Statesare unable to agree on eliminatingdistortion of the conditions of competitionin the internal market;

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66. Welcomes the Commission’sproposal on the automatic exchange of taxschemes proposed by intermediaries,published on 21 June 2017;

66. Welcomes the Commission’sproposal on the automatic exchange ofcross-border aggressive tax avoidanceschemes proposed by intermediaries,published on 21 June 2017; encouragesMember States to extend the scope of theDirective to purely domestic cases;

Or. en




67. Recalls that Directive 2013/36/EUon access to the activity of creditinstitutions and the prudential supervisionof credit institutions and investment firms(CRD IV) requires Member States toensure that administrative penalties forfinancial institutions found liable for aserious breach of the national provisionsadopted pursuant to AMLD III are applied;

67. Recalls that Directive 2013/36/EUon access to the activity of creditinstitutions and the prudential supervisionof credit institutions and investment firms(CRD IV) requires Member States toensure that administrative penalties forfinancial institutions found liable for aserious breach of the national provisionsadopted pursuant to AMLD III are applied;recalls that CRD IV requires competentauthorities to refuse authorisation tocommence the activity of a creditinstitution if, taking into account the needto ensure the sound and prudentmanagement of a credit institution, theyare not satisfied as to the suitability of theshareholders or members, i.e. inter alia ifthere are reasonable grounds to suspectthat money laundering or terroristfinancing is being or has been committed

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or attempted, or that the proposedacquisition could increase the riskthereof;

Or. en




71 a. Stresses the multiplication of taxand money laundering revelations sincethe setting-up of this committee, includingthe latest to date involving Scottish limitedpartnerships which acted as shellcompanies to channel several billionsfrom Azerbaijan into the UK between2012and 2014; Is concerned that the UKdecided in June 2017 only to require suchlimited partnerships to disclose theirownership information to the UK registerfor companies; Calls on the Commissionto assess the money laundering risks atUnion level of limited partnershipstructures in member States as more thanhalf of such structures in the UK declaredto have no information on their beneficialowners;

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72. Notes that law firms, accountants,trust and fiduciary companies and banksare the most prevalent types ofintermediaries but that many other self-regulated and non-regulated professionalscan also provide these services;

72. Notes that law firms, accountants,trust and fiduciary companies and banksare the most prevalent types ofintermediaries but that many other self-regulated and non-regulated professionalscan also provide tax and financialservices, such as offshore incorporationand tax planning;

Or. en




73. Notes that wealth managers inparticular remain insufficiently regulated inEU law, and in Member States’ and thirdcountries’ national laws; finds that themultinational nature of their servicesprovides a particular challenge for correctand proper monitoring and sanctioning oftheir activities;

73. Notes that wealth managers inparticular remain insufficiently definedand regulated in EU law, and in MemberStates’ and third countries’ national laws;finds that the multinational nature of theirservices provides a particular challenge forcorrect and proper monitoring andsanctioning of their activities;

Or. en




75. Observes that trusts and fiduciarycompanies as well as company service

75. Observes that trusts and fiduciarycompanies as well as company service

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providers form the most important groupdemanding the creation of offshore entitiesfrom Mossack Fonseca, followed byaccountants, tax advisors, lawyers andconsultants, who are responsible for aboutone third of the established offshoreentities42 ;

providers form the most important groupdemanding the creation of offshore entitiesfrom Mossack Fonseca, followed byaccountants, tax advisors, lawyers andconsultants, who are responsible for aboutone third of the established offshoreentities42 ; Recalls that Mossack Fonsecamostly gained clients under therecommendation of intermediaries andthat these new clients were only lightlychecked under costumer due diligence; 1a

__________________ __________________1a In an email from Mossack Fonseca on03 February 2012, a representative of thecompany explains that there has been anagreement with HSBC private Bank Luxto work directly with Mossack Fonsecaand that the new clients will only receive a« DDlight » based on informationprovided by the bank

42 Based on a mapping exercise ofintermediaries responsible for about 86 %of the entities in the ICIJ database.

42 Based on a mapping exercise ofintermediaries responsible for about 86 %of the entities in the ICIJ database.

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76. Highlights that intermediaries helpestablish shell companies and openaccounts, often providing a nomineedirector to manage the assets working onbehalf of the real beneficiary, resulting inanonymity for the UBO;

76. Highlights that intermediaries helpestablish shell companies and openaccounts, often providing a nomineedirector to manage the assets working onbehalf of the real beneficiary, resulting inanonymity for the UBO; Recalls evidenceprovided by the French FIU that banks,law firms, accountants and otherintermediaries are the main architects

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designing offshore structures andnetworks for their clients, MossackFonseca being mostly a service providerto implement them;

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77. Highlights that the real estatemarket provides a significant avenue forindividuals to launder or invest illicitlygained funds, as property is purchasedthrough anonymous shell companies ortrusts without being subject to proper duediligence;

77. Highlights that the real estatemarket provides a significant avenue forindividuals to launder or invest illicitlygained funds, as property is purchasedthrough anonymous shell companies ortrusts without being subject to proper duediligence, as evidenced for example forthe London property market;

Or. en




77 a. Highlights that insuranceproducts, particularly life insurance,provide a very attractive and simplemeans of laundering money and thatmoney launderers and terroristorganisations take extreme measures tohide their financial activities and makethem indistinguishable from legitimate

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transactions;Or. en




78. Highlights that obliged entitiesoutsourced their CDD obligations to thirdparties in some cases, which often resultedin little or no CDD being carried out;

78. Highlights that obliged entitiesoutsourced their CDD obligations to thirdparties in some cases, which often resultedin little or no CDD being carried out;highlights that anti-money launderingobligations apply only to obliged entitieswithin the scope of AMLD IV and not tothird parties; points out that the EuropeanParliament’s mandate for the trialoguenegotiations on AMLD V suggestsMember States to require competentauthorities to monitor effectively activitiesof persons whom AML/CFT related tasksare delegated by obliged entities and self-regulatory bodies;

Or. en




80. Notes that in some countries taxevasion is not a criminal offence and thattax advisors are expected to identify thecheapest tax constructions for theirclients, as they otherwise make themselves

80. Notes that in some countries taxevasion is not a criminal offence, whichrisks amplifying the phenomenon;Regrets that tax advisors have a duty toadvise their clients with all possibilities to

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liable to pay damages to their clients; minimize taxation, including with riskyschemes that could be considered illegal,as they otherwise make themselves liableto pay damages to their clients; Worryinglynotes that according to legislation incertain member states, someintermediaries are not liable toprosecution for being complicit in a taxevasion offence if such offence is takingplace in another country;

Or. en




82. Stresses that the EU legislation inplace is not sufficiently enforced and thatthis allows intermediaries to formally fulfiltheir duties, such as CDD and otherreporting obligations, while circumventingthe spirit of the rules;

82. Stresses that the EU legislation inplace is not sufficiently enforced and thatthis allows intermediaries to formally fulfiltheir duties, such as CDD and otherreporting obligations, while circumventingthe spirit of the rules; Deplores thatintermediaries, especially financialentities adopt a decentralized approachwhere anti-money laundering standardsvaried too much from branch to branch;Believe that the headquarter of anintermediary should always be responsiblefor ensuring the proper implementation ofAML standards in all business areas andbranches;

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83. Notes that banks, other financialinstitutions and wealth managers set upapproximately one sixth of the entitiesrevealed in the Panama Papers; highlightsthat banks intermediated in about 9 % ofthe offshore entities that were incorporatedby Mossack Fonseca;

83. Notes that banks, other financialinstitutions and wealth managers set upapproximately one sixth of the entitiesrevealed in the Panama Papers; highlightsthat banks intermediated in about 9 % ofthe offshore entities that were incorporatedby Mossack Fonseca; Notes that severalbanks appearing in the Panama Papershave been bailed out with public moneybetween 2008 and 2012;

Or. en




84. Recognises that banks wereinvolved in four broad activities, namelyproviding and managing offshorestructures, delivering bank accounts tooffshore entities, providing other financialproducts and correspondence banking43 ;

84. Recognises that banks wereinvolved in four broad activities, namelyproviding and managing offshorestructures, delivering bank accounts tooffshore entities, providing other financialproducts and correspondence banking43 ;Stresses the importance to makelegislation on correspondence bankingclearer and stricter regarding remittanceof funds to offshore and non-cooperativejurisdictions, with the obligation to ceaseactivities if beneficial information is notprovided;

__________________ __________________43 Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016. 43 Obermayer & Obermaier, 2016.

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85. Stresses that banks are key actors indetecting suspicious transactions andreporting these to national FIUs;

85. Stresses that banks are key actors indetecting suspicious transactions andreporting these to national FIUs; Notesevidence presented to the Committee thatcertain banks had opened accounts fortheir clients before finalising CDDrequirements and identifying thebeneficial owners; Notes that severalbanks mentioned in the Panama papershave been fined by supervisors for notcomplying with AML/CFT standards butsanctions imposed remain lower thanthose enacted in the United States forsimilar breaches; Regrets that fines givento financial obliged entities by supervisorsare tax-deductible;

Or. en




86. Acknowledges that theintermediation by banks in the setting up ofoffshore constructions has significantlydecreased since 2007, when it was revealedthat banks were promoting the evasion ofthe European Savings Directive (2005) ona large scale; notes that reputational andregulatory risks in the aftermath of the

86. Acknowledges that for the PanamaPapers, revelations the intermediation bybanks in the setting up of offshoreconstructions has significantly decreasedsince 2007,when it was revealed that bankswere promoting the evasion of theEuropean Savings Directive (2005) on alarge scale; notes that reputational and

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financial crisis have also added to thedecline in the offshore entitiesintermediated by banks since 200844 ;

regulatory risks in the aftermath of thefinancial crisis have also added to thedecline in the offshore entitiesintermediated by banks since200844 ;Acknowledges however, that at the globallevel, statistical data show that there is nogeneral decline in the funds channellingthrough tax havens at least until 2014 1a

but more a reorganization of jurisdictionsand instruments used; notes that inparallel to the progressive rise inwithholding tax levied by Luxembourg,Austria and Belgium (until 2009) from15% in 2005, 20% in 2008 to 35% in2011, offshore money was increasinglyallocated to letterbox companies injurisdictions like Bahamas, Singaporeand Hong Kong; Notes however, that theintermediation business has been takenover by other professions, namely lawyers,as demonstrated in the Panama papers;

__________________ __________________1a According to data from the IMF, theBank of International Settlements, theEuropean Commission and EconomistGabriel Zucman

44 Report on Investigation of NordeaPrivate Banking in Relation to OffshoreStructures, 20 June 2016, and mission tothe Belgian Parliamentary InquiryCommittee, 26 April 2017.

44 Report on Investigation of NordeaPrivate Banking in Relation to OffshoreStructures, 20 June 2016, and mission tothe Belgian Parliamentary InquiryCommittee, 26 April 2017.

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88. Highlights that private banking 88. Highlights that private banking

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institutions did not always comply withtheir own internal guidelines or regulatoryrequirements (CDD), and that bankssometimes failed to classify customers inthe appropriate high-risk category, and thesubsequent enhanced due diligence (EDD)reporting was incomplete45 ;

institutions did not always comply withtheir own internal guidelines or regulatoryrequirements (CDD), and that bankssometimes failed to classify customers inthe appropriate high-risk category, and thesubsequent enhanced due diligence (EDD)reporting was incomplete45 ; Notes withconcern cases of financial institutions -including in European Member States -being owned or managed by PEPs orPEPs’ acquaintances, influencing howthey conduct their due diligence checks;

__________________ __________________45 PANA Committee hearing, 9 February2017.

45 PANA Committee hearing, 9 February2017.

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89 a. Notes that some answers providedby intermediaries to the Committee seemto be in contradiction with informationretrieved from the Panama Papers 1a ;condemns any possible false statementsmade to the Committee;__________________1a For example, Société Générale said tothe committee that they were not thebeneficial owners of two foundationsRousseau and Valvert they requestedMossack Fonseca to create but this wascontradicted by Panama Papersdocuments published by journalists fromthe ICIJ consortium; similarly Malteseintermediary Nexia BT answered towritten questions from our committee

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stating that one of their founders had norelations with Mr Keith Schembri, chief ofstaff of Maltese Prime Minister while hesigned a reference letter to MossackFonseca explaining he has a business andpersonal relationship with Mr Schembrifor many years;

Or. en




90. Notes that supervisory actioncarried out by competent authorities afterthe Panama Papers varied from a full cross-check of all supervised banks, to randomchecks, to no action at all;

90. Notes that supervisory actioncarried out by competent authorities inMember States after the Panama Papersvaried from a full cross-check of allsupervised banks, to random checks, to noaction at all;

Or. en




91. Points out that in some MemberStates, competent authority powers arelimited to supervising the existence of anti-money laundering controls;

91. Points out that in some MemberStates, competent authority powers arelimited to supervising the existence of anti-money laundering controls; Notes thatdivergence in powers granted to financialsupervisors in different Member Stateshinders full implementation of AML/CFTstandards and good cooperation; notes

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that the ECB, the biggest prudentialsupervisor within the EU, is notcompetent under the SSM for AML/CFTsupervision which is preventingcompetent authorities from exchangingconfidential information with the ECB;

Or. en




95. Observes that Member Stateauthorities failed to effectively supervisefinancial institutions even before thePanama Papers revelations, and that theydid not adequately sanction the financialinstitutions subject to CRD IV that werefound liable for serious breach of thenational provisions adopted pursuant toAMLD III;

95. Observes that Member Stateauthorities failed to effectively supervisefinancial institutions even before thePanama Papers revelations, and that theydid not adequately sanction the financialinstitutions subject to CRD IV that werefound liable for serious breach of thenational provisions adopted pursuant toAMLD III; Notes that the AzerbaijanLaundromat revelations demonstrates thefailure of some financial supervisors toensure financial institutions respect theirAMLD obligations, even after theadoption of new FATF recommendationsin 2012;

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96. Notes that over 20 competent EUbank supervisory authorities tooksupervisory action directly as a result of thepublication of the Panama Papers47 ;

96. Notes that over 20 competent EUbank supervisory authorities tooksupervisory action directly as a result of thepublication of the Panama Papers47 ;Regrets however that the EuropeanBanking Authority only has limitedpowers and resources to ensure properimplementation of enforcement of itsstandards and cannot start aninvestigation without obtaininginformation from a third party, with nogrounds to take the initiative with suchinvestigations beyond peer-reviewing therules; Notes that while EBA standards oninternal governance and AML/CFT exist,they require updating to provide moretargeted provisions, including on doingbusiness with jurisdictions with low levelof AML/CFT compliance;

__________________ __________________47 PANA Committee written answercontributions by EBA, PANA hearing, 13October 2016.

47 PANA Committee written answercontributions by EBA, PANA hearing, 13October 2016.

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97. Points to the difficulties ofregulating lawyers and law firms involvedin setting up and maintaining offshorestructures, as they often operate cross-border and in some cases are not subject tospecific legislative requirements;

97. Points to the difficulties ofregulating lawyers and law firms involvedin setting up and maintaining offshorestructures, as they often operate cross-border and in some cases are not subject tospecific legislative requirements orcustomer due diligence checks; 1a

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__________________1a As in Switzerland, when lawyers act asnominee directors, they are not obliged tocarry CDD according to Swiss law.

Or. en




101. Notes that members of the legalprofession are subject to strict sanctions(civil and sometimes criminal) for anyfailure to adhere to AMLD obligations;notes also, however, that these strictdisciplinary procedures rarely lead to beingstruck off the bar49 ;

101. Notes that members of the legalprofession are subject to strict sanctions(civil and sometimes criminal) for anyfailure to adhere to AMLD obligations;notes also, however, that these strictdisciplinary procedures rarely lead to beingstruck off the bar49 ; Deplores that thesanctions against lawyers who act againstthe letter or the spirit of laws to preventtax evasion and money laundering areweak and do not include significant threatto livelihood;

__________________ __________________49 Rules on independence andresponsibility regarding auditing, taxadvice, accountancy, account certificationservices and legal services, Ian Roxan andSaipriya Kamath (London School ofEconomics) and Willem Pieter De Groen(Centre for European Policy Studies), April2017.

49 Rules on independence andresponsibility regarding auditing, taxadvice, accountancy, account certificationservices and legal services, Ian Roxan andSaipriya Kamath (London School ofEconomics) and Willem Pieter De Groen(Centre for European Policy Studies), April2017.

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106. Notes that the role of accountingfirms in the schemes revealed in thePanama Papers consisted primarily ofadvice and maintenance of offshoreconstructions and that auditors were notactively involved since the offshore entitiesoften do not have an audit requirement;

106. Notes that the role of accountingfirms in the schemes revealed in thePanama Papers consisted primarily ofadvice and maintenance of offshoreconstructions and that auditors were notactively involved since the offshore entitiesoften do not have an audit requirement;Notes however that the Big 4 accountingfirms, dominating the market, have playeda role in other tax scandals such asLuxleaks and that their activities of bothfiscal advise and auditing presents thepossibility of serious conflicts of interest;

Or. en




108. Notes that the number of STRs byaccountants is low50 ;

108. Deplores that the number of STRsto FIUs by accountants is low and doesnot reflect the sector’s exposure to moneylaundering risks50 ;

__________________ __________________50 See, for example, FATF MutualEvaluation Reports or ‘Fighting tax crimes– cooperation between FinancialIntelligence Units’, Dr Amandine Scherrerand Dr Anthony Amicelle, EuropeanParliamentary Research Service (EPRS),March 2017.

50 See, for example, FATF MutualEvaluation Reports or ‘Fighting tax crimes– cooperation between FinancialIntelligence Units’, Dr Amandine Scherrerand Dr Anthony Amicelle, EuropeanParliamentary Research Service (EPRS),March 2017.

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109. Recalls that trust and fiduciarycompanies play an important role in thecreation and maintenance of offshoreentities;

109. Recalls that trust and fiduciarycompanies play an important role in thecreation and maintenance of offshoreentities; Considers that the legal form ofthe trust was established in Anglo-Saxonlegal systems precisely to facilitate theconcealment of wealth and the avoidanceof tax;

Or. en




113. Stresses that trusts could become aneven bigger instrument for misuse in thefuture as they are not legal entities andtherefore, unlike companies, not subject toany form of accounting or legal disclosurerequirements, for example of their annualaccounts;

113. Stresses the imminent risk thattrusts could become an even biggerinstrument for misuse in the future as theyare not legal entities and therefore, unlikecompanies, not subject to any form ofaccounting or legal disclosurerequirements, for example of their annualaccounts;

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114. Recalls that the collection of UBOinformation for legal entities does notcurrently constitute an obligation accordingto legislation in some third countries51 ;

114. Recalls that the centralizedcollection of UBO information for legalentities does not currently constitute anobligation according to legislation in somethird countries, like in the United Statesfrom example51 ; Notes evidence thatcertain countries, including Panama, arenot always cooperating with Europeancountries especially to provide relevantinformation concerning tax-relatedmatters, which may hamper the fightagainst money laundering related to taxcrimes; Stresses that some non-Europeanjurisdictions share information on UBOwith European FIUs for intelligencepurposes only, but do not respond tointernational requests for cooperation,thus preventing the use of the informationbefore courts;

__________________ __________________51 PANA mission report to USA – 21 to 24March 2017.

51 PANA mission report to USA – 21 to 24March 2017.

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115 a. Notes that several countries,including some Member States ,haverecently developed citizenshipprogrammes for non-EU residents,providing citizenship in exchange offinancial investments in their country;

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Considers that the contravenes the spiritof EU citizenship law, which is not atransactional arrangement; Stresses thatsuch programmes must be compliant withAML standards, especially as to verifyingthe source of wealth and source of fundsof individuals benefitting from theseprogrammes; Stresses that dual-citizenship resulting from theseprogrammes may also undermine theobjectives of automatic exchange of taxinformation;

Or. en




115 b. Stresses that the Brexitnegotiations are likely to have an impacton the corporate tax strategy of the UKafter it leaves the Union; Stresses theimportance to the Union of defending thehighest standards of tax governance andrequires the UK to be required to meetthese standards before any FTA or otherclose trading relationship can be agreed;

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116. Observes that although USlegislation on AML and UBO transparencyis less ambitious than in the EU, the USenforcement is more effective;

116. Observes that US has a lessambitious AML legislation than in theEU, especially on UBO transparencywhere no centralised UBO register exists,but has a better track record of effectivelyimplementing it; notes that in contrast tothe40+9 FATF recommendations and dueto the common internal market rules, EUMember States do not treat each other asthird countries, potentially leading toAML loopholes; observes that due to alack of human resources by theCommission, Member States’ compliancewith AML legislation is not properlymonitored;

Or. en




117 a. Points to the AML legislation inSwitzerland, which does not considerlawyers acting as or using nomineedirectors as obliged entities having tocarry costumer due diligence, whichseems contrary to FATFrecommendations; Regrets thatSwitzerland has not changed itslegislation since the publication of thePanama Papers; Highlights the lownumber of STRs in Switzerland reportedto the FIU and the lack of power by theSwiss FIU to investigate a request from acounterpart, if no prior STR has beenfiled, hindering international

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cooperation;Or. en




117 b. Highlights that real estate, taxplanning structures and transactions aswell as securities are three areas of highrisk of money laundering for several thirdcountries, as highlighted for example inthe Gibraltar national risks assessment;

Or. en


Motion for a resolutionParagraph 117 c (new)


117 c. Notes that the EuropeanCommission provides comments for eachevaluation by FATF or Moneyval ofMember States and suggests thesecomments are made public in the future;

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Motion for a resolutionParagraph 117 d (new)


117 d. Recalls its request to enhance theEU’s role on the international stage byspeaking with one voice and to work onthe development of a common EUframework for bilateral treaties in taxmatters as a way to tackle treaty shopping;Considers that the setting up of free tradeagreements needs to be accompanied byenhanced tax cooperation, provisionspreventing tax avoidance and shouldinclude principles of good taxgovernance;

Or. en




118 a. Deplores the hypocrisy of some EUpoliticians criticising corruption indeveloping countries while their leadingcorporations are complicit in the dealsthat allow the draining of wealth throughtax avoidance;

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120. Emphasises the controversy thatsome companies, often supported byfraudulent officials, use tax evasion andavoidance, transfer pricing and anonymouscompany ownership to maximise profits,while millions lack adequate nutrition,health and education55 ;

120. Emphasises the controversy thatsome companies, often supported byfraudulent officials, use tax evasion andavoidance, transfer pricing and anonymouscompany ownership to maximise profits,while millions lack adequate nutrition,health and education55 ; Furtheremphasizes the importance of goodcorporate governance and the principlesof transparency and accountability instate owned enterprises;

__________________ __________________55 Marc Tran, ‘Tax Evasion Still CripplingAfrica as Rich Countries Fail to DeliverSupport’, The Guardian, 10 May 2013.

55 Marc Tran, ‘Tax Evasion Still CripplingAfrica as Rich Countries Fail to DeliverSupport’, The Guardian, 10 May 2013.

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121. Takes the view that developingcountries are excluded from the OECDsystem for automatic informationexchange, owing to lack of technical,human and institutional capacity; notes thatregarding global cooperation, a commonapproach to simple principles is yet to beestablished so as to have an effectiveoutcome;

121. Is concerned that no developingcountries will implement the OECD systemfor automatic information exchange as of2017 or 2018, because of a lack oftechnical, human and institutional capacity;notes that regarding global cooperation, acommon approach to simple principles isyet to be established so as to have aneffective outcome; Warns against the riskof having a two-speed internationalsystem of automatic exchange ofinformation with developing countriesbeing left out because of lacking capacityto commit to reciprocal exchanges;

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121 a. Notes that the work of the UN TaxCommittee is seriously under-resources;Considers that a just global tax regimerequires a democratic and adequatelyresourced policy-making and enforcementbody under the auspices of the UN;

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123. Points to the fact that LuxLeaks, thePanama Papers, Swiss Leaks, BahamasLeaks, Football Leaks and numerous otherleaks have shown how crucial a rolewhistle-blowers can play when it comes tofighting money laundering, fraud,aggressive tax planning or corruption orotherwise shedding light on hiddenbehaviours; underlines, therefore, that theprotection of whistle-blowers cancontribute to safeguarding the publicinterest, promoting good governance andstrengthening the rule of law;

123. Points to the fact that LuxLeaks, thePanama Papers, Swiss Leaks, BahamasLeaks, Football Leaks and numerous otherleaks have shown how crucial a rolewhistle-blowers can play when it comes tofighting money laundering, fraud,aggressive tax planning or corruption orotherwise shedding light on hiddenbehaviours; underlines, therefore, that theprotection of whistle-blowers cancontribute to safeguarding the publicinterest, promoting good governance andstrengthening the rule of law; notes that aslong as obliged entities only risk low finesfor not reporting or misreportingsuspicions of money laundering to the

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authorities, the prevention of moneylaundering and terrorist financing isseverely hindered;

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124. Regrets that some countries use theprosecution of whistle-blowers as a meansto safeguard secrecy57 ; finds it highlyregrettable that in the case of LuxLeaks, sofar only the whistle-blowers have beenprosecuted while the companies andintermediaries involved in the tax rulingsexposed by the LuxLeaks documentsremain unchanged;

124. Regrets that some countries use theprosecution of whistle-blowers as a meansto safeguard secrecy57 ; finds it highlyregrettable that in the case of LuxLeaks, sofar only the whistle-blowers have beenprosecuted while the practices ofcompanies and intermediaries involved inthe tax rulings exposed by the LuxLeaksdocuments remain untackled; recalls thatthe European Parliament has repeatedlycalled for improving protection of whistle-blowers;

__________________ __________________57 ‘Overcoming the shadow economy’,Joseph E. Stiglitz and Mark Pieth,November 2016.

57 ‘Overcoming the shadow economy’,Joseph E. Stiglitz and Mark Pieth,November 2016.

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125. Welcomes the fact that the 125. Welcomes the fact that the

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Commission is currently assessing thescope for horizontal or further sectorialaction at EU level to strengthen whistle-blower protection; notes that Parliament isin the process of drafting a non-legislativeresolution to provide its recommendationson the issue;

Commission is currently assessing thescope for action at EU level to strengthenwhistle-blower protection; notes thatParliament is in the process of drafting anon-legislative resolution to provide itsrecommendations on the issue; Requeststhat Commissions' urgent attention to thisresolution and speedy legislative actionfollowing its publication;

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130. Points to the fact that it took sixmonths to reach an agreement with theCommission on the access to non-classifiedconfidential documents and that this delayconstituted a major obstacle for theCommittee’s work; highlights that thedocuments received are not all updated andoften heavily redacted, creating furthermajor obstacles to the work of theCommittee;

130. Points to the fact that it took sixmonths to reach an agreement with theCommission on the access to non-classifiedconfidential documents and that this delayconstituted a major obstacle for theCommittee’s work; highlights that thedocuments received are not all updated andoften heavily redacted, creating furthermajor obstacles to the work of theCommittee; Finds it extremely regrettablethat no findings from these non-classifieddocuments (either on the intranet or inthe reading room) are incorporated in thisreport, as information provided wereconsidered confidential and theCommittee was forbidden to include themin its final report;

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131. Notes that the Committee hasinvited the current and incomingPresidencies on several occasions toparticipate in hearings to discusscooperation and the way forward in thearea of anti-money laundering, tax evasionand tax avoidance, but that these requestshave been declined on all occasions;

131. Notes that the Committee hasinvited the current and incomingPresidencies on several occasions toparticipate in hearings to discusscooperation and the way forward in thearea of anti-money laundering, tax evasionand tax avoidance, but regrets that theserequests have been declined on alloccasions;

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132. Notes that despite requests to theCouncil, no documents have been madeavailable to the Committee; calls intoquestion, therefore, the political will of theCouncil to enhance transparency andcooperation in the fight against tax evasion,tax avoidance and money laundering;stresses that Parliament feels that citizensshould be able to see their respectivegovernments’ positions on such importantissues;

132. Notes that despite requests to theCouncil, no documents have been madeavailable to the Committee; calls intoquestion, therefore, the political will of theCouncil to enhance transparency andcooperation in the fight against tax evasion,tax avoidance and money laundering andthe political will to comply with the Treatyand the principle of sincere cooperation;stresses that Parliament feels that citizensshould be able to see their respectivegovernments’ positions on such importantissues;

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133. Notes that the Chair of theCouncil’s Code of Conduct Group onBusiness Taxation declined the invitationto participate in a committee hearing;

133. Deplores that the Chair of theCouncil’s Code of Conduct Group onBusiness Taxation declined the invitationto participate in a committee hearing;

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135. Concludes, therefore, that there hasbeen a breach of the sincere cooperationprinciple for the above-mentioned reasons;

135. Concludes, therefore, that there hasbeen a breach of the sincere cooperationprinciple by the Member States for theabove-mentioned reasons;

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136. Concludes that the underlyingproblem embedded in the Panama Papers isthe moving of money between differentjurisdictions, both offshore and onshore,and that as long as these practices aretolerated all other efforts will have only

136. Concludes that the underlyingproblem embedded in the Panama Papers isthe moving of money between differentjurisdictions, both offshore and onshore,against the spirit and letter of laws andthat as long as these practices are tolerated

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limited impact; all other efforts will have only limitedimpact; Acknowledges that theliberalisation of financial flows hasfacilitated the practices of tax evasion andmoney laundering and that greater legalcontrol, monitoring and enforcement isurgently required to match the level oftransactions that have mushroomed inrecent years;

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137. Finds that through the use of trusts,shell companies, tax havens and complexinternational financial structures, somemultinational companies and high networth individuals have successfullyshielded their fortunes from, for example,the tax authorities and others withlegitimate financial claims against them,thereby rendering themselves immune bypositioning their wealth in a legislativevacuum;

137. Finds that through the use of trusts,shell companies, tax havens and complexinternational financial structures, taxevasion, corruption, organised crime,drug and people trafficking, terrorfinancing and other money launderingactivities have been made possible andthat some multinational companies andindividuals have broken national andEuropean rules to commit these crimes;

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140. Recalls that transparency and 140. Recalls that transparency and

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exchange of information are keyinstruments in fighting tax evasion, taxavoidance and money laundering;

exchange of information are keyinstruments in fighting tax evasion, taxavoidance and money laundering;concludes that public country-by-countryreporting of tax information of all largecompanies is warranted;

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141. Concludes that the EU legislation inforce was not sufficient before the PanamaPapers revelations and was not alwaysenforced effectively, thus allowingintermediaries to formally fulfil theirduties, such as CDD and other reportingobligations, while circumventing the spiritof the rules; notes that since then a numberof reviews have been carried out, forexample on the DAC and the AMLD, andthat new legislative proposals have beenpresented, such as country-by-countryreporting and the regulation ofintermediaries;

141. Concludes that the EU legislation inforce was not sufficient before the PanamaPapers revelations and was not alwaysenforced effectively, thus allowingintermediaries to formally fulfil theirduties, such as CDD and other reportingobligations, while circumventing the spiritof the rules; notes that since then a numberof reviews have been carried out, forexample on the DAC and the AMLD, andthat new legislative proposals have beenpresented, such as country-by-countryreporting and the regulation ofintermediaries; notes that the President ofthe European Commission has committedto put forward proposals to enhancegreater tax cooperation betweenEuropean Member States through anobligation to answer group requests in taxmatters so that one European country canprovide all information necessary toothers to prosecute cross-border taxevaders and also to make tax reformproposals under Article 116 TFEU,leading to co-decision between theCouncil and the European Parliament toeliminate distortion of the conditions of

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competition in the internal market;Or. en




142. Concludes in particular that therehas been a significant gradual improvementin terms of having a register of UBOs withaccessibility based on legitimate interest;underlines that the ongoing AMLDrevision aims to enhance the powers of theEU FIUs and to facilitate their cooperation,but that the scope is still too limited andthat there is a need to share financialinformation to tackle all economic crime,but also to trace the proceeds from fraud-linked activities;

142. Concludes in particular that therehas been a significant gradual improvementin terms of having a register of UBOs withaccessibility based on legitimate interest;underlines that the ongoing AMLDrevision aims to enhance the powers of theEU FIUs and to facilitate their cooperation,but that the scope is still too limited andthat there is a need to share financialinformation to tackle all economic crimes,but also to trace the proceeds from fraud-linked activities;

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143. Concludes that proper identificationof UBOs remains a key obstacle tostopping illegal tax avoidance schemes andthat the international nature of financialflows and company structures uncoveredby the PANA Committee exacerbates thisproblem;

143. Concludes that proper identificationof UBOs remains a key obstacle tostopping illegal tax avoidance schemes andthat the international nature of financialflows and company structures uncoveredby the PANA Committee exacerbates thisproblem; sees a strong benefit in settingup full public registers for beneficial

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owners of companies and trusts tosignificantly improve scrutiny of unlawfulactivities;

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146. Notes that taxes should be levied atthe point and place of profit creation;concludes that the actions and financialconstructions revealed in the PanamaPapers successfully circumvent this basicprinciple and that a dedicated EU approachis therefore needed to combat shellcompanies in third countries;

146. Notes that taxes should be levied atthe point and place of profit creation;concludes that the actions and financialconstructions revealed in the PanamaPapers successfully circumvent this basicprinciple and that a dedicated EU approachis therefore needed to combat shellcompanies in third countries; welcomes,therefore, the Commission proposal for aCommon Consolidated Corporate TaxBase and urges the Member States toswiftly come to an agreement;

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147. Concludes that this was madepossible by insufficient implementation oflegislation by the Member States andinsufficient enforcement by theCommission;

147. Concludes that this was madepossible by insufficient implementation oflegislation by the Member States andinsufficient enforcement by theCommission; notes that the Commissionhas potentially failed to enforce Union

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law by not initiating infringementprocedures despite clear evidence ofbreaches;

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148. Notes that the Commission is notsufficiently equipped in terms of resourcesto ensure full enforcement of EUlegislation against money laundering, taxevasion and tax avoidance;

148. Notes that the Commission is notsufficiently equipped in terms of resourcesto ensure full enforcement of EUlegislation against money laundering, taxevasion and tax avoidance; notes that thePresident of the European Commissionhas committed to allocate more resourcesto the European Commission Task Forceto prevent financial crimes; welcomes theCommission roadmap “Towards a newmethodology for the EU assessment ofHigh Risk Third Countries underDirective (UE) 2015/849 on theprevention of the use of the financialsystem for the purposes of moneylaundering or terrorist financing” of 29June2017 as an important step forward tocome to a credible EU list of high-riskthird countries;

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149. Concludes that FIUs are keyinstruments to fight money laundering;observes, however, the differing structuresacross the EU and the fact that they are notsufficiently equipped with personnel tocope with their tasks, including examiningthe increasing number of STRs driven bynew legislation, and that they can deal onlywith a fraction of the problem;

149. Concludes that FIUs are keyinstruments to fight money laundering;observes, however, the differing structuresacross the EU and the fact that they are notsufficiently equipped with personnel tocope with their tasks, including examiningthe increasing number of STRs driven bynew legislation, and that they can deal onlywith a fraction of the problem; concludesthat Member State institutions in chargeof implementing and enforcing rules asregards tax fraud and money launderingneed to be entirely independent frompolitical influence; concludes thenecessity to ensure that investigationscarried out by FIUs are followed-upthrough criminal investigations by thepolice if the situation so warrants,otherwise inaction of the police has to bequalified as maladministration;

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151. Concludes that on the basis of thePANA Committee findings, several casesof maladministration of EU legislation canbe identified, namely regarding the DAC,the AMLD and the list of third countrieswith strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering regimes;

151. Concludes that on the basis of thePANA Committee findings, several casesof maladministration of EU legislation canbe identified, namely regarding:

· failure of Member States authorities tocommunicate spontaneously taxinformation to another Member State in

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case of grounds for supposing that theremay be a loss of tax in the other MemberStates (Article 9(1) of DAC) and failure ofthe European Commission to ensureeffective implementation of DAC· failure of Member States authorities toact upon the evidence of serious andpersistent failure to identify beneficialowners in the context of customer duediligence and to require that theverification of the identity of the customerand the beneficial owner takes placebefore the establishment of a businessrelationship or the carrying-out of thetransaction (Article 8(1)(b) , Article9(1) ofAMLD III) and failure of the EuropeanCommission to ensure effectiveimplementation of AMLD III;· failure of Member States authorities toensure that AML obliged entities can beheld liable for infringements of thenational provisions, including reportingof beneficial ownership information tocompetent authorities (Article 39(1) ofAMLDIII) and failure of the EuropeanCommission to ensure effectiveimplementation of AMLD III;· failure of the Commission to provide alist of third countries with strategicdeficiencies in their anti-money launderingregimes;

· failure of Member States authorities toapply administrative penalties and otheradministrative measures to institutionsfound liable of serious breach of thenational provisions adopted pursuant toAMLD III, as required by Article67(1)(o)and Article 67(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU(CRD IV) and failure of the EuropeanCommission to ensure effectiveimplementation of CRD IV;· failure of Member States to cooperatesincerely in the framework of the Code ofConduct Group on Business taxation andfailure to abide by the principle of sincere

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cooperation, as required by Article IV ofthe TFEU; failure of the EuropeanCommission to act as Guardian of theTreaty;

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152. Regrets the lack of cooperation ofcertain EU institutions with the PANACommittee; believes that this constitutes abreach of the principle of sincerecooperation;

152. Regrets the lack of cooperation ofcertain EU institutions with the PANACommittee; States that this constitutes abreach of the principle of sincerecooperation;

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153. Concludes that the closed andsecretive nature of the Council’s Code ofConduct Group on Business Taxation isdetrimental to the effective and expeditiousformulation, adoption and implementationof vital anti-tax evasion legislation withinthe EU; underlines, therefore, the need forimproved accountability and transparencyregarding the actions, statements andpositions of the Member States engaged inthe group;

153. Concludes that the closed andsecretive nature as well as the inefficientdecision rules based on broad consensusof the Council’s Code of Conduct Groupon Business Taxation is detrimental to theeffective and expeditious formulation,adoption and implementation of vital anti-tax evasion legislation within the EU;underlines, therefore, the need forimproved accountability and transparencyregarding the actions, statements andpositions of the Member States engaged in

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the group and for revising the inefficientdecision rules of the Code of ConductGroup;

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155. Concludes, therefore, that a numberof questions remain unanswered in order tofully ascertain the scale of this issue andthe methods employed in these schemes.

155. Concludes, therefore, that a numberof questions remain unanswered in order tofully ascertain the scale of this issue andthe methods employed in these schemesand suggests the continuation of theinquiry tasks within a permanentcommittee or high level working groupwithin the European Parliament;

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Documents

The document was created from a file 'G:Sebastian ... · \000000EN.doc 3/91 EN Amendment 1 Molly Scott Cato, Eva Joly, Sven Giegold, Pascal Durand, Ernest Urtasun, Heidi Hautala,