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The divergent impact of Islamic religiosity on ethno-religion social tolerance

in countries from the Middle East and North Africa (2001-2014)

Niels Spierings

Radboud University

Paper prepared for the ECPR joint session 2017 – v 20170328

Please do not cite without permission of the author

Introduction

Recent work shows that the Arab Uprisings and their aftermath dealt a heavy blow to ethno-religious

social tolerance across the region (Spierings, 2017). This is worrisome not just because of the decline

in tolerance itself, but also because a many have theorized and shown the importance of tolerance

for sustainable democracies (Lipset, 1959, Mill, 2007; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1994; Rawls,

2003; Sullivan & Transue, 1999), also for the MENA particularly (see Ciftci, 2010; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif &

Meyer, 2007; Sarkissian, 2012; Tessler, 2002 - IJCS).

As a cause for democratic support, Islam and Islamic religiosity has gotten much scholarly

attention (Fish, 2002; 2011; Hoffman, 2004; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Moaddel, 2002; Posusney, 2004;

Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007; Spierings, Smits & Verloo, 2009; Spierings, 2014; Stepan &

Robertson, 2003; Tessler, 2002); however, in explaining ethno-religious tolerance in the MENA, the

impact of Islamic religiosity is largely absent from the literature. Consequently we do not know

whether insights from the Western-based literature on the religiosity-tolerance linkage (e.g. Allport

& Ross, 1967; Bloom & Arikan, 2012; Cigler & Joslyn, 2002; Scheepers, Gijsberts & Hello, 2002) is

generalizable to the MENA context as well, let alone that we understand how the impact of

religiosity differs across the MENA, given the substantial differences in non-democratic regime types,

state-religion relations, and degrees of religious conflict and fractionalization. In the words of

Ceobanu & Escandell in their annual review of sociology overview study: we need to enlarge the

analytical focus of the field and “research has yet to provide a clear picture of the institutional and

sociopolitical macro-level factor that affect [these attitudes]” (2010: 310).

Nevertheless religion can be expected be important in the MENA. Based on in-depth

interviews in Oman Al Sadi & Basit conclude that youngster “use religion to define their relations

with, and determine their tolerance of, those who hold different religious beliefs.” (2013:447)

Moreover, the only comparative public opinion study so far finds that religious identification has

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different effects in five countries (2001-2007), but finds few effects of doctrinal orthodoxy (after

control for a measure that taps political tolerance) (Spierings, 2014).1 Neither of these studies clearly

distinguished between the different behavioural and attitudinal dimension of religions that are at the

core of the existing studies of religion in political sociology (e.g. Stark & Glock, 1968; Kellstedt, Green,

Guth & Smidt, 1996; Scheepers, Gijsberts & Hello, 2002) and theorize how these might impact social

ethno-religious tolerance differently. Moreover, these studies provide no explanations for why and

how the impact of religiosity might differ between MENA countries and years.

In this study, I will therefore follow the 3B approach in studying the impact of religiosity on

social tolerance, by distinguishing religious belonging, beliefs and behaviour, and I will theorize the

impact of these three dimension in the MENA context, acknowledging not only the differences in

context between the MENA and the West, but also the differences among MENA countries, in order

to avoid the Orientalist trap of simplifying and essentializing the MENA region (Owen, 2004; Said,

1978; Spierings, 2015). As such this study (a) provides unique empirical analyses of the applicability

of existing theories linking religiosity to social tolerance to the MENA region, (b) helps to further

translate and refine our theoretical understanding of this linking to different a different socio-

political context and religion, and (c) gives insight into the degree to which these mechanisms are at

work in the same way across the MENA region and explores theoretical explanations for possible

differences among MENA countries.

These contributions to the existing literature are based on the analyses of 32 synchronized

Arab Barometer and World Value surveys for 13 countries, with the years ranging from 2001 to 2014.

These data will first be analysed using pooled multilevel regression models to estimate the general

relationships between religiosity dimensions and social tolerance, which help to assess the unique

impact of each dimension of religiosity across the MENA. Next country-disaggregated OLS regression

models and multilevel models with cross-level interactions are estimated to assess the internal

generalizability of religiosity’s impact among MENA countries and explain the differences in this

impact.

Theoretical background and expectations

Ethno-religious social tolerance

1 In her online master’s thesis Siegel (2015) does focus on explaining social ethno-religious tolerance, but does not including religiosity. Also Sarkissian’s unpublished APSA paper (2011) focusses on explaining tolerance in the Arab MENA, but it has political, not social tolerance as explanandum; moreover the two religion indicators as explanation do not align with existing conceptualization of religiosity and no controls for the other dimensions are included.

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The literature on the relationship between people’s religion and ethno-religious tolerance is

positioned at the crossroads of two subfields: the more sociological literature on ethnocentrism and

prejudice against ethnic minorities (e.g. Allport & Ross, 1967; Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Scheepers,

Gijsberts & Hello, 2002; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008) and the more political science oriented literature

on political and social tolerance (e.g. Gibson, 1992; Bloom & Arikan, 2012; Bloom & Bagno-

Moldavsky, 2015). The first generally focusses on people’s attitudes regarding ethno-religious

outgroups, whereas in the latter social tolerance is defined as “the preparedness to co-exist in the

private realm … [which] involves the willingness to maintain personal contact with the member of

the disliked group, such as by having him or her as a neighbor or a dating partner” (Bloom & Bagno-

Moldavsky, 2015: 626; see also Gibson 1992; Sullivan et.al 1985)). So where the first explicitly

focusses on ethnic minorities and ethno-religious otherness, the second talks more generally about

disliked groups. It is exactly at this crossroad where ethno-religious social tolerance is found: the

preparedness to co-exist in the private realm with people that have a different ethno-religious

background or worldview then oneself.

While ethno-religious social tolerance – as of here social tolerance - has been shown to be an

important influence of people’s support for democracy in the MENA region (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif &

Meyer 2007; Ciftci 2010), hardly any study has focus on explaining individual level social tolerance in

the MENA (cf. Al Sadi & Basit, 2013) let alone studying the impact of (the multiple dimensions of)

religiosity on social tolerance in the MENA.2 This is the more surprising given the large literature on

linking religion to social tolerance in the US and western democratic countries more generally.

Particularly the 3B multidimensional concept of religion – belonging, beliefs, behavior (Bloom &

Arikan, 2012, 2013; Kellstedt etl.al, 1996)3 – combined with social identity theory (see Brown, 2000;

Al Sadi & Basit, 2013; Tajfel, 1981) and socialization theory (see Camilleri & Malewska-Peyre, 1997)

have proven useful to explain the complex impact religion has on tolerance in the Western

democratic context. Below, I will discuss in more detail how belonging, beliefs, and behaviour are

expected to influence social tolerance and the first contribution of this study is therefore largely

empirical: to test whether the results derived from the western literature hold up in the context of

the MENA and help to explain how religion impacts social tolerance there.

In this paper, I thus follow, for instance, Glock and Stark (1966) and Kellstedt et.al (1996) as

well as Islamic religiosity scholar Hassan (2007) in initially understanding the underlying dimension of

religion to be rather universal. At the same time, as Hassan also stresses (2007: 439), the specific

2 Even though social tolerance has been included an explanatory factor in the public opinion MEN literature, the only study known by the author studying the impact of religion on social tolerance in the MENA is Spierings (2014), which excludes contextual factors, the behavior dimension and only covers 5 MENA countries. 3 Evidently the 3B approach is not the only one. Other contributions largely distinguish similar (sub)dimensions but use different labels. Stark & Glock (1968) distinguish more, but the additional one are less relevant with respect to the linkage to tolerance; in that sense Kellstedt et.al’s conceptualization is more developed towards this relationship with tolerance.

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expressions of the different dimension do differ between religions, and, I would add, the context in

which the dimensions manifest themselves can also shape their relevance and influence, which aligns

with more recent studies on western countries that the context conditions the impact of religion on

tolerance (Verkuyten, Maliepaard, Martinovic & Khoudja, 2014; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2015;

Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). More concretely, in the MENA, for instance, attendance is much more

linked to custom and social pressure (Hassan 2007: 442) and the setting is one of various degrees of

lacking religious freedoms and religious tensions or conflicts are much more part of daily live in

several countries. Consequently, the impact of the belonging, beliefs and behaviour need not only be

tested, but also translated and conditioned to the MENA context, with its rather diverse positions of

religion across countries (Moghadam, 2013; Owen, 2004; Spierings, 2015). This theoretical

translation and adaption is the second, and theoretical, contribution of this study, which might

provide important insights into the role religion plays in influencing social tolerance in MENA as well

as the more general mechanisms relevant for our overall understanding of the religion-tolerance

connection.

Belonging, Beliefs and Behaviour

As others have shown, religiosity is a container concept harbouring a multitude of interrelated but

distinguishable dimension (Stark & Glock, 1968; Hassan, 2007; Guveli, 2015) and these dimension

have different relationship with tolerance (e.g. Bloom & Arikan, 2012, 2013; Eisenstein, 2006;

Kellstedt et.al 1996; Spierings, 2014). Particular the distinction, between belonging, beliefs and

behaviour has proven useful in theorizing these differential influences (Smidt, Kellsttedt & Gudt,

2009; Wald & Smidt, 1993; Wald & Wilcox, 2006), and I would go as far as arguing that most

deviations found in the Western literature on religion and tolerance are actually due to collapsing

dimension.4 In other words, the relationships discussed below are formulated under the condition

that the other dimensions are taken into account.

Belonging refers to whether people consider themselves religious, with a particular focus on

religion being part of one’s social identity (Bloom, Arikan & Courtemanche, 2015; Gibson, 2006;

Kellstedt et.al, 1996). This identification leads to intergroup tensions as a positive view of the in-

group is brought about by contrasting the in-group to outgroup. Consequently, a stronger or

activated in-group identification relates to feeling threated by other groups and intolerant views

becoming more likely (Bloom, Arikan & Courtemanche, 2015; Djupe & Calfano, 2013 (PRQ);

Scheepers , Gijsberts & Hello, 2002; Wilcox & Jelen, 1990; cf. Gibson, 2006). This negative

4 For instance Eistenstein (2006) finds no impact of religious commitment on political tolerance, but her operationalization of commitment collapses communal behaviour (attendance), individual behaviour (prayer), and religious salience, thus collapsing differen elements of belonging, socializing behaviour and ritualistic behaviour, which as is discussed here can be expected to have opposing effects.

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relationship has thus been widely been confirmed in the literature. Studies that seem to show

otherwise either collapse this dimension in their operationalization with other dimensions for which

generally positive relationship are found (e.g. Eisenstein) or do not control for important other

dimensions (e.g. Verkuyten et.al. 2014).

H1: Religious identification is negatively related to ethno-religious social tolerance.

Beliefs refer not so much to the degree of identification, but to the fundamental values and

understanding of one’s religion. Generally, this is linked to religious compassion with the argument

that all major religious worldview have benevolence, care for the needy at their core. So, it is argued

that the more doctrinally orthodox one is, the more likely that that person think in terms of their

group and helping each other and the less individualistic the believer is expected to be. The main

empirically shown caveat, however, is that this benevolence is generally only directed towards the

ingroup (Bloom, Arikan & Courtemanche, 2015; Djupe & Calfano, 2013; Norenzayan, 2014;

Scheepers, Gijsberts & Hello, 2002). Eisenstein (2006), however, finds a negative impact of doctrinal

orthodoxy as it also increased perceived threat. An explanation for this might be that the

conceptualization of doctrinal orthodoxy as beliefs in the 3B approach might actually harbours two

causal mechanisms (see Scheepers, Gijsberts & Hello, 2002). On the one hand there is the

compassion argument; on the other there is one of extremism or particularism (Glock & Stark, 1966;

Scheepers, Gijsberts & Hello, 2002): the more doctrinal orthodox, the more people are at a religious

extreme and see their religion as the only one true religion, which leads to increased negative

orientations towards outgroups. Translating this back to a singular concept of beliefs as doctrinal

orthodoxy, it would mean that the more inwards oriented a person is the more likely that doctrinal

orthodoxy relates negatively to tolerance, whereas among less inwards-oriented people, the

doctrinally orthodox might actually more tolerant. A recent study by Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky

(2015) seems to lend some support for this formulation, as they find that network diversity feeds

tolerance if people are open-minded but not otherwise.

H2: Doctrinal orthodoxy is negatively related to ethno-religious social tolerance among ingroup

oriented people and positively related to ethno-religious social tolerance among less ingroup

oriented people.

Last, behaviour is arguable given least attention of the 3B in the tolerance literature, partly

because it is generally seen as an antecedent of belonging or beliefs (e.g. Bloom, Arikan &

Courtemanche, 2015), but it actually has shown to be an independent influence too generally

decreasing tolerance (Scheepers, Gijsberts & Hello, 2002; Bloom & Arikan 2012; cf. Eisenstein, 2006).

This additional negative effect can be explained in terms of socialization and social norms.

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Attendance not just leads to stronger feelings of belonging or instils orthodox views, but also feeds

unconscious negative attitudes towards other (religious) groups. The assumption in this argument

here is that at least in some sermons or gathering this message is conveyed explicitly or implicitly.

H3: Communal attendance is negatively related to ethno-religious social tolerance.

Religion and tolerance in the MENA context

As said, I follow Glock & Stark (1966), Hassan (2007), and others in expecting the dimension of

religion being rather universal, while at the same time acknowledging that their expression might

differ between religions (Hassan, 2007) and their impact might be contextually shaped. Below I will

therefore reflect on the expectations formulated above by explicitly paying attention to Islam as the

dominant religion in the MENA region and to how the different and diverse societal and institutional

context in terms of religion-state relations and religious conflict matters for the impact belonging,

belief and behaviour might have.

The mechanism of social identity often links belonging in terms of identifying as a group

member to tolerance. In the MENA, not being Muslim or not being religious is often not even an

option. For instance, in several surveys people do not even have the option to say they are atheist.

Contrasting membership of different groups is hardly a solution in this respect as the social identity

mechanism does not distinguish between different types of groups. Moreover, contrasting for

instance Muslim citizens to Christian citizens collapses doctrinal categories (which could be linked to

beliefs) with majority and minority status, which are highly relevant in the context of religious

tensions or discrimination in some MENA countries. Therefore, in terms of belonging it is crucial to

which degree people consider themselves religious. Thus the expression of Hypothesis 1 as

formulated above should be that the more people identify as religious the lower their tolerance is

expected to be.

As already alluded to above, in several MENA countries threat is more real than it is in

Western countries in general or some particular stable, safe and religiously homogenous MENA

countries. First of all, while all countries are affected by region-wide politics such as the Arab-Israeli

conflict and the Arab Uprisings (see Dalacoura, 2012; Netterstrøm, 2015; Spierings, 2017), in some

countries are more religiously diverse with salient religious cleavages (e.g. Bahrain and Lebanon) or

event ethno-religious violent conflict within their borders at least in some years (e.g. Syria and

Yemen). Under these circumstances the threat perception linking religious social identity to tolerance

can be expected to be activated more strongly. Moreover, the perceived threat linking religious

belonging and tolerance can also be expected to be stronger among non-Muslim citizens in the

MENA context. First of all, Islam is the dominant religion in all Arab MENA countries and, although

this is theologically contested (Al Sadi & Basit 2013; Abou El Fadl 2002; Baderin, 2003), the distinction

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between Muslim believers, Christians and Jews (also referred to as People of the Book, Ahl al-Kitab,

or Dhimmi), and non-believers (also kafir or kufr) is regularly interpreted as a hierarchical distinction,

distinguishing perceived better from lesser people who should have respectively more and fewer

rights and status (e.g. Geaves, 2006). Citizens that have a stronger belonging to one of the non-

Muslim groups can than logically be expected to perceive more threat in case of equal belonging and

thus less tolerance.

H1a: The stronger the religious fractionalization and conflict in a country, the stronger the negative

relation between religious identification and ethno-religious social tolerance.

H1b: Among non-Muslims the negative relation between religious identification and ethno-religious

social tolerance is stronger than among Muslims

While Zakat (almsgiving) is one of five pillars in (almost all) Islam and prescribes all believers

to show compassion (Geaves, 2006: 121), much societal and academic discussion exists on what the

Qu’ran and hadith say about the compassion towards non-Muslims, as already referred to above

already. This seems to provide further theoretical support for the differential hypothesis on the

impact of doctrinal orthodoxy as formulated in the previous section.

At the same time we can expect the variation in state-religion relations to influence the

relationship between doctrinal orthodoxy and social tolerance as in several but certainly not all

MENA countries it is particularly the orthodox interpretations of Islam that have been suppressed.

For instance in Ben Ali’s Tunisia and Mubarak’s Egypt social and political expressions of religion were

banned and in Iraq Hussein interfered negatively with the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina) (El-

Ghobashy, 2005; Owen 2004; Spierings, 2014). From a Social Identity Theory perspective this threat

to more orthodox people particularly can be expected to active their orthodox identity and lead to

intolerance. At the same time others have argued from a more beliefs-centred perspective that this

might actually increase tolerance, bit little evidence have been found for this (cf. Djupe & Calfano

2013; Meyer, Rizzo & Ali 2007; Spierings, 2014). At the core of this argument is the religious notion

“Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you” which is not literally found in

Islamic scripture, but analogous Shura include 24:22 and 83:1-6. Particularly orthodox believers

experiencing discrimination are expected to fall back on this commandment, leading to a heightened

realization that the tolerance is an important virtue. In sum two additional, contradictory hypothesis

on doctrinal orthodoxy are formulated:

H2a1: If orthodox Islam is suppressed in a country, doctrinal orthodoxy in negatively related to

ethno-religious social tolerance.

H2a2: If orthodox Islam is suppressed in a country, doctrinal orthodoxy in positively related to ethno-

religious social tolerance.

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Regarding the dimension of Behaviour, it is crucial to understand that attendance of prayer in

the MENA is considered a social activity strongly subject to social norms and custom of one’s direct

environment (e.g. Hassan, 2007: 442). In other words, one can easily attend mosque or prayer while

at the individual level distance oneself from what is preached and consciously disagree. Through

attendance one could therefore be socialized into an unconscious belonging and ideas that other

religions should be regarded as less, lending further supports for the idea of an additional impact of

attendance on tolerance as hypothesized in the previous section. At the same time, it should be

acknowledged that the messages preached by the cleric (e.g. imam) can differ strongly in the degree

to which it denounces other religions and other religious groups in society. Accordingly, a study on

educational programs on tolerance in Oman has shown that the actual message communicated by

figures of authority does matter in shaping children’s ethno-religious social tolerance (Al Sadi & Basit,

2013). Consequently, we can expect differences between people attending different mosques, which

can unfortunately not be tested at the mosque-level given existing MENA wide survey data, as well

as differences between countries depending on the state-religion relations. In several MENA

countries religious matters are strictly regulated by governments and in some of these cases they

prescribed a rather exclusionary or Islamist form of Islam (e.g. Testas 2005). For instance, in Saudi

Arabia the government enforces Salafi or Wahhabi Islam and central government councils of clerics

issue the fatwas that are communicated by imams to the people during attending services (see

Boucek 2010). Particularly when this state controls the sermons and backs a particularist or Islamist

version of Islam, mosque attendance will imply communicating intolerance and (unconsciously)

socializing people accordingly. In line with this the last additional hypothesis is:

H3a: If a country is more Islamist and regulates sermon, attendance has a stronger negative

relationship with ethno-religious social tolerance.

Data & Method

Data sources

To test both the generalizability and the context-dependency of religion’s impact in the MENA, I

combine all 32 World Value Surveys (WVS, 1981-2014) and Arab Barometer surveys (AB, 2006-2014)

that have at least one valid item for each of the core theoretical concepts. This leads me to include

32 nationally representative surveys from 13 Arab MENA countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen. The first

included surveys were held in 2001 and the last in 2014, with some countries being represented only

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once (Libya) and others four times (Algeria, Iraq, and Jordan). A list of surveys included and more

detailed information per surveys is found in Appendix A.

By combining pooled models based on standardized values with country- and survey-

disaggregated analyses it will be prevented that differences in the exact items present for each

theoretical concept per survey bias the substantive conclusions, as it is assessed whether the results

systematically differ according to this slight differences in phrasing of the questions. At the same

time, combining as many MENA surveys as possible allows transcending both dominant approaches

in MENA survey studies: (a) single-country studies, in which the external generalizability of the

results cannot be assessed, and (b) pooled ‘civilizationist’ studies that generalize results across the

MENA by comparing the region as a whole to the Western democracy while ignoring that the

dynamics might differ considerable within the MENA as well. The approach followed here, including

many MENA countries and years is best, despite data limitations, to grasp to what extent results are

generalizable within the MENA and what shapes the different relationship across the region.

To estimate a pooled model, the standardized values of all items are calculated per survey.

This creates similar within country-year metrics across items. Setting the country-level averages to

zero is a consequence of this, but as this study does not focus on explaining differences in the

country-year level of ethno-religious tolerance, these 0-averages are not problematic here. Still,

random-intercept multilevel models with survey and country as higher levels allows for testing the

general impact of the different religiosity items taking into account that errors are not uncorrelated

(i.e. cases are nested) and allows testing Hypotheses 1a, 2a1, 2a2, and 3a on the context-dependent

impact of the different religiosity variables without deflating the standard errors. The interaction

models are estimated with random slopes of the religiosity variables.

Additionally, country-disaggregated analyses will be modelled too, which is always advisable

when estimating models on pooled data. First of all, this shows to what extent the pooled models on

this issue actually represent the relationship per country well. Second, while these disaggregated

models do not allow for formal tests of differences in effects, they are important to see in which

countries and years certain dimensions of religiosity have a positive, negative or insignificant effect –

the core difference in effects focussed on here5. This allows for assessing whether these patterns are

related to differences in the operationalization of the dimensions, the contextual-differences

hypothesized or other substantive differences between countries (see Spierings 2016).

Ethno-religious social tolerance

5 More subtle differences between the size of, for instance, a negative effect of belonging cannot be reliably be assessed with these data.

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Following the literature I defined ethno-religious social tolerance as the preparedness to co-exist in

the private realm with people that have a different ethno-religious background or worldview than

oneself. A common operationalization in non-Western countries focuses on accepting people of a

different race, colour or ethnicity or with a migration background as neighbour (Ciftci, 2010; Dixon,

2008; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer, 2007; Spierings, 2014). As the referred to studies show, items on

these different groups load on the same factor, implying one underlying concept. All datasets used

here include one or more of these items asking which groups a respondent objects to having as

neighbours. Of these, all items are selected that refer to religious, ethnic, national or racial groups

and thus refer to ethno-religious social tolerance. A full overview of the groups and which was

available per survey is given in Appendix B1. Reliability test and factor analysis of different sets of

items all show that combining these items leads to a valid and reliable indicator.6 While the items

thus tap one concept, we do know that particular groups can be less or more popular in the different

countries. As the groups included differs somewhat per survey, I therefor standardized all scores by

calculating z-scores per item per survey. A higher score indicates more tolerant attitudes. In all

surveys at least two items are available. Per respondent the average of all available scores is used as

the dependent variable in this study.7

To test the robustness of the results a second dependent variable was calculated on the two

items presents in most surveys and most directly linked to the ethno-religious social tolerance: not

objecting to neighbours of a different religion and of a different race. Using the summative score of

these two items as alternative did not lead to markedly different results for the available data, but

did lead to the loss of 6 datasets and 10,000 respondents. In the results section the more

comprehensive analyses are presented.

Dimensions of religiosity

As discussed in the theory section, for the MENA it is crucial to focus on the degree of religious

identification as belonging. All used surveys include at least one item of the following three: To what

extent do you consider you self as religious (not, somewhat, religious); Are you a religious person?

(no, including atheists; yes); How important is religion in your life? (0 to 3). In multiple WVS surveys

the latter two are included and factor analysis on them shows they load on one singular dimension. A

third item - How important is god in your life? (0 to 9) – that was initially selected showed a factor

6 The Cronbach’s alpha on the different (most presents) sets of items all are well above 0.6: (1) other race, migrant background, other religion, other language 0.718; (2) other race, migrant background, other religion, refugees 0.771; (3) other race, migrant background, other religion 0.650. Factor analyses for each of these sets of neighbor indicators show they load on one dimension, with all loadings above 0.7, with one exception which is still 0.69. 7 The Arab Barometer round 3 surveys and three WVS 5th round surveys did not include neighbor items but did included items on citizens’ rights. Additional analyses showed that these items do tap a form of tolerance, particularly at the macro-level (see also Spierings 2017) but that they related differently to individual-level religiosity and therefore these surveys could not be included in this study on ethno-religious social tolerance.

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loading well below 0.4, actually reproducing Stark & Glock’s (1968) conceptualization, and was not

included. The average survey-specific z-score over the available items per respondent was calculated

(higher score indicating a stronger religious identification). Appendix B2 presents the items included

per survey.

In addition, for H1b denomination is included as a dichotomous variable indicating whether a

respondent is Muslim or not. In five AB and WVS surveys8 no specific question on denomination was

included. In three of these Islam is makes up 98 to almost 100% of the population so I assumed the

respondents to be Muslim, not to lose these surveys.9 Surveys of these countries in other years

support this assumption: only 15 of over 10,000 respondents indicate not to be Muslim. The two

other surveys could not be included as this assumption does not hold there.10 As discussed in the

theory section the main effect of this denominational dummy in the interaction model testing H1b

should be interpreted with care as religious denomination and majority-minority status fully overlap.

The hypotheses on the beliefs focus on doctrinal orthodoxy and links this to in-group

orientation. Doctrinal orthodoxy is included in each survey in the form of people’s views on a set of

haram acts. The more a respondent thinks they should be forbidden or are not justified; the more

they are orthodox in sticking to the doctrine regarding the scriptures. The surveys issues include

suicide, alcohol, euthanasia, charging interest, divorce, and participation in a lottery. Appendix B2

indicates which items were available in which survey. While different, each act is forbidden. Again z-

scores are used to standardized the scores. Religious in-group orientation is expected to moderate

the effect of doctrinal orthodoxy. Empirically it could only be operationalized somewhat more

indirectly, by using six items on the extent to which religion is important in selection one’s closest

network: the nearest and dearest, the first-degree relative (see Appendix B2). Of these items the

within-survey z-scores are calculated and the average per respondent is used for the interaction

term.

Regarding the dimension of behaviour, attendance of communal services is at the core of the

expectations. Again each survey includes slightly different items, but all ask directly about religious

attendance: how regularly a respondent attends Friday prayer (or Sunday service) or whether the

respondent prays in church or mosque, and how often (Appendix B2). The higher the within survey z-

score per respondent the more a respondent attends communal services compared to the other

respondent in that country and year.

8 Algeria 2006, Bahrain 2014, Egypt 2012, Morocco 2006, Yemen 2011 9 Algeria 2006, Morocco 2006, Yemen 2011 10 Bahrain 2014, Egypt 2012

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Micro-level control variables

Core socio-economic and demographic variables are included to control for confounding effect.

Available across surveys are employment status (employed; retired; housewife; student; not

employed other), education (no education, completed primary education, completed secondary

education, at least some tertiary education), sex (female, male), age in 7 categories11 and age

squared (to account for curvilinear effects), and marital status (married, single, and other). After

selecting all respondents with valid score on the main dependent variable, all religion dimensions,

and these control variables 37,413 remain. A last additional control variable is the respondents’

household income. This control variable is only added in additional analyses, as it has a relatively

large number of missing values across survey (4,563 of the remaining 37,413 cases). It is included as

standardized z-scores of 10-point variables (which use somewhat different metrics across the

surveys). Descriptive information on all micro-level variables is given in Appendix C1.

Contextual variables

To test the context-dependency hypothesis, macro-level scores on the relevant concepts are

obtained from existing data sets and studies or coded specifically for this study. An overview of

scores can be found in Appendix C2.

To test Hypothesis H1a the degree of religious fractionalization and violence was measured,

by two variables. The first is the standard measure of religious fractionalization as operationalization

in the seminal article by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg (2003). As religious

fractionalization is fairly stable over time (certainly over a period of at most 14 year) and

(consequently) data are not available for every year, I use the scores presented by Alesina et.al. as

time-invariant data at the country level. Second, I created an indicator to measure a broad religious-

based threat of violence in society. The Global Restrictions on Religion Data (GRRD [ARDA, 2017])12

offers, to my knowledge, the broadest range of acts of religious-based (threats of) violence. Per

country-year the average score on 17 items13 (all running from 0 to 1) was calculated for the year of

11 For one Moroccan survey only the categories are available. Rerunning the models with age as an interval variables excluding this survey does not lead to substantively different results. 12 The data were downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives, www.TheARDA.com, and were collected by the Pew Research Center. 13 (i) mob violence related to religion; (ii) acts of sectarian or communal violence between religious groups; (iii) activity of religion-related terrorist groups; (iv) extensiveness of a religion-related war or armed conflict; (v) violence resulting from tensions between religious groups; (vi) organized groups using force or coercion in an attempt to dominate public life with their perspective on religion; (vii) religious groups attempting to prevent other groups to operate; (viii) use or threat of violence to try to enforce religious norms; (ix) assaults and displacements from homes in retaliation for religious activities; (x) incidents of hostility over proselytizing; (xi) hostility over conversations from one religion to another; (xii) harassment or intimidation of religious groups by social groups motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xiii) destruction of personal or religious property motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xiv) detentions or abductions motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xv) any displacement of individuals from their homes motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xvi) physical assaults motivated by religious hatred or bias; (xvii) deaths motivated by religious hatred or bias.

13

the survey and the year before the survey (if only one of two was available that single score is use).

This data captures a broad range of recent violent events that might influence how people translate

their religious belonging to tolerance. Because the main differences in scores are found between

countries and not between the years included in the analyses here and the GRRD data is only

available from 2007 through 2013, I subsequently calculated country averages and also this variable

is included at the country-level.14

For the impact of doctrinal orthodoxy, a possible moderation by suppressing orthodox Islam

was derived from the literature (Hypotheses H2a1 and H2a2). As a measurement of this I combined

two dimensions: (A) whether Islamist are forbidden to organize politically, in power politically15, or

neither; and (B) whether main orthodox religious groups where deprived or suppressed in society,

economy and politics, as was for instance the case with the Muslim Brotherhood being cracked down

upon in the Egypt of el-Sisi or Mubarak around 2007 (e.g. Owen, 2004).16 Subsequently, I grouped

countries in three: all cases with orthodox Islam being in political power (-1); countries in which

orthodox groups are suppressed on at least one front (1); and countries in which neither was the

case (0).

Lastly, to test Hypothesis H3a I combined two data sources in order to come to an indication

in which countries and years a fundamentalist government controls sermons, which falls apart in two

elements: whether Islamists rule and whether government has control over what is preached in

mosques. Regarding the latter, the GRRD (see above) also include an indicator of the extent to which

the government regulates or manages religious affairs. For years missing (2014 and the earliest

surveys), I consulted the literature to determine whether major changes could have been expected

compared to years for which data was available. The focus for this study is on the highest of four

scores with indicates strict and enforced regulation. Next I combined this with the Political Islamism

indicator as introduced in Spierings, Smits & Verloo (2010) and updated in Spierings (2015), which

indicates to what extent government is institutionally Islamist based on countries’ constitutions. For

the missing years the coding scheme provided in these sources was used to supplement the data

with new scores. Scores of 5 and 6 indicate countries without religious freedom, an Islamic state, and

14 Rerunning the analyses on the country-years for which country-year data was available and including this at that level does not lead to different conclusions. 15 With Hamas ruling in Gaza, the Palestinian territories are included 2006 onwards; the others are Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia in 2011, Egypt in 2012, and Yemen. 16 The other country-years considered here are: Bahrain with the Shi’a majority being discriminated against (Gengler, 2013), the Lebanese Sunni’s in 2012/2013 being politically intimidated (BBC), and to some extent (coded 0.5) the Islamist Sudanese by not having control over oil-rich Abyei. Other examples could be Tunisia under the rule of Ben Ali, but only surveys of Tunisia from later years are included.

14

sharia based law. So if in a country and year government regulated religions strictly according to the

GRRD and was Islamist (5 or 6) it was coded 1 for the purpose of this study, otherwise 0.17

Results

Religiosity and social tolerance across the MENA region

As a first step, Table 1 (Models 1 through 4) provides the results of the analyses that represent the

overall average impact of belonging, doctrinal orthodoxy and attendance. Finding an effect in these

models indicates that across all 13 MENA countries a patterns if found that is highly unlikely to be

coincidence, but it does not mean that the effect is per se present in all 13 countries (or all years);

this will be focussed on explicitly in the next section. Model 1 presents the main effects of the three

variables at the core of the hypotheses, controlled for differences in tolerance between socio-

economic and demographic societal groups as well as for survey-level differences in tolerance. Model

2 and 3 present the two micro-level interaction terms respectively (cf. H1b, H2). Model 4 includes the

results of the ‘most extreme’ robustness check: the model with the more restrictive dependent

variable, income as additional control variable, and only Muslim respondents as units of analysis. As

each of the models contributes pieces of the puzzle for each effect, I will discuss these results per

dimension of religiosity across models.

In all models people who more strongly identify as religious (belonging) are on average

somewhat less tolerant towards other ethno-religious groups, but this difference is clearly not always

statistically significant at conventional levels. There is thus considerable probability that this

relationship is not found in the population at large. This indicates that there is either no clear

relationship or under some circumstances a negative and under other positive one, which cancel

each other out. However, no indications were found that the effect is considerable stronger among

non-Muslim citizens (H1a) or weaker for that matter (see Model 2). The disaggregated analyses

might shed more light on whether and how the impact of belonging is dependent on other factors.

Regarding the denomination – the other half of the interaction terms (see Model 2) it is

important to note that, as discussed, we should be careful interpreting the results. That non-Muslims

are on average less tolerant (Model 2), might go against the expectation in some of the literature

that Muslim are generally less ethno-religiously tolerant, but we cannot disentangle denomination

17 Algeria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia in 2011, and Yemen as of 2011 are coded 1; 5 of 32 country years. Algeria’s score was corrected from the original source from 3 to 5 [it does not have explicit freedom of religion, head of state must be Muslim, practices contrary to Islamic ethics are forbidden (implying the importance of Shari’a); and the state’s religion is Islam] which means it scores 5 to 6, both are coded 1 here.

15

from majority/minority status here. It might well be that is particularly because of belonging to a

religious minority that non-Muslim are more hesitant to have neighbours belonging to the religious

majority, have lower social tolerance.

Doctrinal orthodoxy, linked to the dimension of beliefs, shows a rather stable positive

relationship with social tolerance across the models: the more orthodox the more tolerant. It was

hypothesized that this effect might differ in direction depending on the in-group or out-group

orientation of the respondent, but no strong evidence for this was found. The interaction was only

marginally significant and substantially only indicates a variation in the degree of the positive

relationship, which refutes H2. It seems that people who attach stronger value to living by the book,

are on average more tolerant towards others, also if they do not share their religion, suggesting the

benevolence mechanisms is dominant in understanding the impact of doctrinal orthodoxy

(controlled for the other dimensions or religiosity).

Model 3 also shows a strong negative relationship of in-group focus, which mediates the

impact of belonging it seems (cf. Models 1 and 3). Again care is needed in interpreting this direct

effect of in-group orientation as the specific operationalization focuses on a preference of people

with similar religious background in one’s closest social network, with the dependent variable in the

models being a similar, but negatively formulated variable for the larger social network. As such this

direct negative effect is not surprising, but contributes little new insights in itself. Interestingly

though is that is particularly mediates the effect or religious identification, which is (marginally

significant) in Models 1, 2 and 4, but not in 3. This lends some additional support for H1.

Lastly, communal attendance has a clear negative relationship with ethno-religious social

tolerance in all pooled models. The more people attend religious services the less likely they are on

average not to object to living next to people with ethno-religious backgrounds. This preliminarily

confirmed H3.

Table 1. Multilevel regression models estimating the impact of religion on ethno-religious tolerance

Model 1: Direct effects

Model 2: Interaction H1b

Model 3: Interaction H2

Model 4: Robustness – different DV, incl. income and only Muslim respondents

FIXED RELIGION Belonging -0.0084# -0.0077# -0.0047 -0.0193*** Non-Muslims (ref=Muslim) -0.0493** Interaction Belonging* non-Muslim -0.0130 Doctrinal orthodoxy 0.0150** 0.0143** 0.0164*** 0.0216*** Religious in-group orientation -0.0265*** Interaction Orthodoxy*in-group 0.0077# Attendance -0.0232*** -0.0226*** -0.0219*** -0.0181** CONTROLS

16

Employment (ref = employed) Retired -0.0316 -0.0334 -0.0310 -0.0141 Housewife -0.0268* -0.0274* -0.0247* -0.0300# Student 0.0199 0.0196 0.0193 0.0464* Not employed other -0.0037 -0.0047 -0.0036 0.0070 Education (ref = no) Primary completed 0.0786*** 0.0797*** 0.0767*** 0.0552*** Secondary completed 0.1158*** 0.1173*** 0.1136*** 0.1142*** At least some tertiary 0.1832*** 0.1847*** 0.1817*** 0.1964*** Sex (Ref = male) -.0091 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0111 Age (0-7) 0.0195* 0.0202* 0.0192* 0.0417*** Age sqaured 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 -0.0041#

Marital status (ref = married) Single 0.0274* 0.0283** 0.0267* 0.0307* Other (incl. divorced, widowed) 0.0140 0.0134 0.0139 0.0568* Income 0.0175*** Intercept -0.1335*** -0.1334*** -0.1316*** 1.2808*** RANDOM Survey level Intercept 0.000123 0.000128 0.000098 0.036442* Belonging Doctrinal Orthodoxy Attendance RANDOM Country level Intercept 0.000322 0.000286 0.000317 0.024714 MODEL STATISTICS BIC 84285.259 84289.814 84260.780 52044.771 Nind 37,413 37,413 37,413 23,533 Nsrvy 32 32 32 28 Nctry 13 13 13 13 *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 # p<0.10 Data source: AB and WVS surveys

How the impact of religiosity differs across contexts

Based on the pooled analyses represented in Table 1, the impact of religiosity seems rather

straightforward, confirming some of the expectations derived from the Western-based literature

while refuting others, particularly the restriction of orthodoxy’s benevolence towards people from

other religions. However, there is some more nuance to reality, as illustrated by Table 2 which shows

the coefficients of the country-disaggregated models. For doctrinal orthodoxy and attendance the

results from the pooled model are largely reproduced for all countries but some exceptions are laid

bare. In respectively 10 and 11 of 13 countries a positive coefficient for doctrinal orthodoxy and a

negative one for attendance is found. For both, the coefficients in five countries are large enough to

reach statistical significance (p<0.10). At the same time, we find a few exceptions: in Bahrain and

Sudan the relationship between doctrinal orthodoxy and social tolerance is negative and statistically

17

significant, and in Libya a positive and significant effect is found for attendance. However,

orthodoxy’s positive impact and attendance’s negative one by and large represent a relatively

general pattern that helps to understand the impact of religiosity on social tolerance in the MENA.

For the impact of identifying less or more strongly as religious, a whole different conclusion should

be drawn based on Table 2: there does not seem to be a rather general effect. The pool of 13

countries is split across the middle, with half showing a negative relationship and half a positive one

– regardless of whether we focus on all coefficients or the statistically significant ones only. In other

words: under some circumstances a stronger religious identity leads to less social tolerance, while

under other circumstances it is associated with more tolerance. Additional models with random

slopes for the three core religiosity variables confirm this picture: the variance of the coefficient

differs significantly at the contextual levels. Moreover, although the effect of orthodoxy and

attendance are mainly in the same direction also those effects are significantly different across

context statistically speaking. The pooled regression models thus suggest a universality or internal

generalizability of effect across the MENA that might turn out an unwarranted simplification after

more detailed analysis.

Table 2. Impact of Religious belonging, orthodoxy and attendance on ethno-religious social tolerance in 13 MENA countries

Belonging Doctrinal Orthodoxy Attendance

Algeria (3811) 0.082*** 0.002 -0.080*** Bahrain (340) -0.038 -0.176** 0.037 Egypt (4032) -0.003 0.031# -0.018 Iraq (6422) 0.004 0.010 -0.012 Jordan (4330) -0.002 0.017 -0.010 Lebanon (3085) 0.031* -0.013 -0.039** Libya (1712) 0.009 0.010 0.035* Morocco (3290) 0.038* 0.020 -0.007 Palestine (1934) -0.104*** 0.048* 0.019 Saudi Arabia (2236) -0.079*** 0.061** -0.048** Sudan (1270) -0.060** -0.044* -0.045* Tunisia (2253) -0.044* 0.035# -0.002 Yemen (4546) 0.016 0.055** -0.062**

*** p<0.001 ** p<0.001 * p<0.05 # p<0.10 All models are controlled for employment status, education, marital status, sex, and age. Positive coefficient, statistically significant Positive coefficient, statistically insignificant Negative coefficient, statistically significant Negative coefficient, statistically insignificant

The context-dependency as discussed and shown above thus asks for more attention. In

Table 3 the results are given of the models testing the hypotheses formulated above. Each of these

models is estimated with random slopes which means the threshold to reach statistical significance

as very high as the degrees of freedom for these cross-level interaction coefficients are close to the

number of countries or surveys included. In addition, for the relationships that are considered

statistically significant, I plotted the coefficients of identification, orthodoxy, or attendance per

18

country or survey (see e.g. Table 2) against the values of the contextual interaction variable in order

to provide an additional, visual assessment of the relationships. This will lay bare the impact of

outliers as well as provide more nuance to what actually makes the difference in terms of cut of

points or non-linear relationships.

Table 3. Multilevel models estimating the impact of contextual factors on the relationship between religion and tolerance.

Interaction with

Belonging Doctrinal orthodoxy

Attendance

FIXED RELIGION Belonging 0.0052 -0.0075# -0.0078# Interaction with Religious Fractionalization 0.0082 Interaction with Religious-based Violence -0.0444 Doctrinal orthodoxy 0.0151** 0.0090** 0.0152** Interaction with Orthodox Islam being suppressed

-0.0474*

Attendance -0.0236*** -0.0219*** -0.0156 Interaction with Islamist regulated sermons -0.0706* CONTROLS Employment (ref = employed) Retired -0.0298 -0.0299 -0.0317 Housewife -0.0272* -0.0292* -0.0303* Student 0.0200 0.0207 0.0241 Not employed other -0.0051 -0.0055 -0.0024 Education (ref = no) Primary completed 0.0813*** 0.0800*** 0.0834*** Secondary completed 0.1186*** 0.1215*** 0.1237*** At least some tertiary 0.1860*** 0.1888*** 0.1945*** Sex (Ref = male) -0.0083 -0.0080 -0.0135 Age (0-7) 0.0209* 0.0217* 0.0214* Age squared 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 Marital status (ref = married) Single 0.0277* 0.0292** 0.0286* Other (incl. divorced, widowed) 0.0150 0.0129 0.0131 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS Religious Fractionalization (country) -0.0328 Religious-based violence (country) -0.0181 Orthodox Islam being suppressed (country year) -0.0017 Islamist regulated sermons (country year) 0.0133 Intercept -0.1409*** -0.1412*** -0.1440*** RANDOM Survey level Intercept 0.000095 0.000734 0.001556 Belonging 0.002059* Doctrinal Orthodoxy 0.004411* Attendance 0.005334 RANDOM Country level Intercept 0.000402 0.000889 0.001906

19

Belonging 0.001480 Doctrinal Orthodoxy 0.000267 Attendance 0.000052 MODEL STATISTICS BIC 84260.746 84252.023 84215.342 Nind 37,413 37,413 37,413 Nsrvy 32 32 32 Nctry 13 13 13 *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 # p<0.10 Data source: AB and WVS surveys; GRRD data; Alesina et.al (2003); Spierings, Smits & Verloo (2009); Spierings, 2015; own codings

Model 1 (Table 3) shows that there does not seem to be a systematic relationship between

the religious fractionalization in a country or the degree of violence and the impact one’s religious

identification has on their ethno-religious tolerance. A further inspection of the relationships,

including models with alternative operationalizations, supports the conclusion that the expected

relationships are unlikely. At the same time it is noteworthy that Table 2 not only illustrates the

context-dependent impact of religious identification, but also suggests a pattern: all statistically

negative relationship are found in countries in which Islamist have ruled. Moreover, if we plot against

the survey level coefficient are rather strong pattern appears (see Figure 1) that is also statistically

significant if we model it as a cross-level interaction. In the conclusion I will reflect on this more.

While the impact of doctrinal orthodoxy on tolerance was relative robustly positive across

the board, the interaction term with societal position of orthodox Islam in society is statistically

significant (Model 2, Table 3). Figure 2 adds to this that this differential effect is mainly caused by the

impact of doctrinal orthodoxy on social tolerance being actually much more likely to be (strongly)

negative in countries in which orthodox Muslim have reason to feel suppressed. As the figure shows

this effect is driven by three of thirty-two country-years. While the pattern warrants more research,

the data and models here clearly suggest that under normal circumstances more doctrinal orthodox

people are on average more tolerant, but if they are suppressed as collective this turns to a rather

strong negative impact, whereby particularly the most orthodox citizens do not want to be in social

contact with people of other groups.

Lastly, I looked at whether mosque attendance had a stronger (more likely) negative effect in

countries and years in which sermons were more controlled by Islamist governments compared to

countries and years in which this was not the case. The difference in effect of attendance between

these two groups is statistically significant in Table 3. Actually the general negative effect seems to be

driven rather strongly by the countries in which such control was present, as they include the

country-years in which the strongest negative effect was found (see Figure 3), such as Saudi Arabia

(2011) and Yemen (2014).

20

-0,3

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Islamists ruling

Figure 1. Context-dependent impact of religious identifcation

-0,2

-0,15

-0,1

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0

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-1 0 1

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Suppression orthodox islam

Figure 2. Context-dependent impact of doctrinal orthodoxy

-0,3

-0,2

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0

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0 1

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relg

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Islamist control over mosque sermons

Figure 3. Context-dependent effect of religious attendance

21

Conclusion

This study set out to provide a systematic and nuanced understanding how MENA people’s religious

belonging, beliefs and behaviour shape their ethno-religious social tolerance. While social tolerance

is a fundamental attitude for sustainable democracies to come about and religion being an important

part of many people’s live across the region (Ciftci, 2010; Harik, 1994: 56; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer,

2007: 1155; Spierings, 2014), the relationship between individual level religiosity and tolerance has

hardly gotten any attention in the public opinion literature on the MENA region (cf. Spierings, 2014).

Not only does this mean that little is known about the role religion plays in shaping the MENA

peoples’ tolerance, but this also implies that we should be very careful in generalizing results from

the broader and Western-dominated literature to the MENA region.

While also in the Western-based literature the debate on the impact of different dimension

of religiosity is ongoing, the 3B – belonging, beliefs, behaviour (Kellstedt et.al 1996; Leege & Kellstedt

1993; Wilson, Smidt, Kellstedt & Guth 2009) – has proven to provide a very fruitful framework for

theorizing and analysing the relationship between religion and tolerance and is applied and refined

to the MENA context in which Islam is the predominant religion and religious conflict, suppression

and rule form the context in which the individual-level relationships should be understood.

Moreover, these contextual elements not only characterize the region, but also vary considerably

among different MENA countries. This study thus contributes theoretically and empirically to our

understanding of how the religiosity-tolerance linkage is context-dependent. First, it theorizes and

empirically tests whether relationships found in Western countries are generalizable to the MENA

region. Second, acknowledging ‘“the internal dynamics and plurality” of Muslim nations’ in the

Middle East (Davis & Robinson, 2006: 167), I test and theoretically explore how the different political

and social position religion has across the region shapes the impact religious belonging, belief and

behaviour has on ethno-religious social tolerance. In sum, this study has put forward a context-

sensitive 3B approach, which turned out rather helpful in understanding the multifaceted empirical

relationship between religion and tolerance in the MENA.

For each of the three core dimensions of religion – Belonging (degree of identification), Belief

(doctrinal orthodoxy), Behaviour (communal attendance) – I found that they relate to the degree of

social ethno-religious tolerance, but that this relationship differs in strength or even direct across

countries and years. At the same time, particularly doctrinal orthodoxy and communal attendance

showed predominantly similar effects in direction across countries. Moreover, the differences in

relationships could partly be linked to differences in the socio-political and institutional position

religion has at the contextual level. As such, this study’s result not just contribute to more insight in

the MENA region, but also offers a understanding of why scholar from a multitude of disciplinary

22

background have found different results for the impact religion has on attitudes towards other ethnic

and religious groups, including immigrants (see also Bloom, Arikan, Courtemanche, 2015: 203).

First, the impact of the degree of belonging on social tolerance varied considerably in

presence, strength and direction across the MENA and was not particularly negative among Muslims

or in societies characterized by religious fractionalization and violence, thereby refuting Hypothesis 1,

1a and 1b. The underlying idea that a stronger identification leads to a higher perceived threat and

less tolerance of outgroups members, particularly under pressure of war or violence (e.g. Bloom,

Arikan & Courtemanche, 2015; Djupe & Calfano, 2013; Hutchison & Gibler, 2006; Scheepers ,

Gijsberts & Hello, 2002; Simmel, 1955; Wilcox & Jelen, 1990) finds little general support in the MENA

context of religious societies. This does however not mean we should discard the belonging

hypothesis and threat perception mechanism for the MENA altogether. On the contrary, one

conditioning clause seems to help to fit the results here with the Western-based literature: the group

deviating from the societal religious norms is most subject to the threat mechanism. In this paper

this was shown by a negative relationship between being more religious and social tolerance among

non-Muslims minority members, which echoes Rizzo, Abdel-Latif & Meyer’s (2007: 1156) that the

perception of being part of a stigmatized group affects peoples’ democratic attitudes. In Western

countries it can than actually be the more religious groups who tend to feel threatened, leading to

seemingly contradictory results.

Also, while refuting the context-dependency hypothesis for Belonging, a pattern across

country years was found: if Islamist rule, it is more likely that a stronger belonging leads to less

tolerance. This suggests that when the regime is on the side of the most religious the latter

experience more freedom to not want to mix with people from other religious groups. Future

research might shed more light on how these two mechanisms discussed here interrelate, and

whether their simultaneous presence in some contexts but not in others explains the absence of an

overall effect in some cases but not in others.

Second, the impact of doctrinal orthodoxy was positive overall and rather consistently

positive across countries, and did not seem to depend on in-group and out-group orientation, partly

confirming Hypothesis 2. Most noteworthy is that Muslims who attach more value to living by the

rules of the Qur’an and Hadith seems to be more tolerance towards people with other ethno-

religious background and not just more benevolent to people of their own group. In other words, in

empirical terms the Islamic scriptures seem to teach not to exclude others and leave the judgement

to Allah. So while all major religions share a focus on compassion (Bloom, Arikan & Courtemanche,

2015: 205; Schwarts & Huismans 1995), the people whom it encompasses might actually be more

inclusive in contemporary Islam than in other religions. The context-dependency analysis, however,

did show a pattern of major exceptions: in places and time where orthodox Islam was supressed this

23

positive relationship turns strongly negative (confirming H2a1 and refuting H2a2). This mechanism

which seems to tap the threat mechanism again, might also help to identify groups in Western

democracies for which a similar impact can be expected, such the more doctrinal orthodox Jewish

people or Muslim immigrants – which also explain possible different effects among Muslims in

European countries and Muslims in MENA countries (cf. Dixon, 2009; Fish, 2011; Verkuyten et.al,

2014).

Third, I focussed on the impact of communal attendance from a socialization background and

the overall and country specific results largely confirm Hypothesis 3 by showing a negative

relationship between attendance and tolerance (see also Bloom & Arikan 2012; Scheepers, Gijsberts

& Hello, 2002); however further inspection of the relationship does indicate it duly matters what is

preached at the mosque and in line with H3a I find that in the more Islamist countries that also

control the Mosque sermons the socialization effect is particularly strong, and seem to drive the

overall relationship.

All in all, the results of this study show that it is a combination of identity-based threat,

socialization, and following scriptural rules that link people’s multifaceted religion to their social

tolerance of people belonging to other ethno-religious groups. By taking into account, which groups

are under pressure in society and which groups control government and what is preached, the

complex impact of religiosity can be understood rather well. As such, this study not only sheds more

light on how religiosity is working in varying ways in influencing tolerance across the divers group of

MENA countries. The results here also provides important insight into the conditions under which

results derived from analysis of western democracies can be generalized to other regions. In other

words, this study suggests which additional conditioning clauses help to lift the 3B theoretical

framework to a more universal framework, and which societal-level differences in religion’s position

are at the core of such conditioning clauses. Such an approach pushes our understanding of context-

dependent influences of religion on tolerance from claiming context-dependency to understanding it

in a systematic comparative way.

24

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28

Appendix A1. Survey information Country Year Survey

organisation Wav

e1

N N in analyses

Survey weight

Algeria 2002 WVS 4 1,282 1,164 N 2006 AB 1 1,300 667 N 2011 AB 2 1,216 911 Y 2013 WVS 6 1,200 1,066 N Bahrain 2009 AB 1 435 340 N Egypt 2001 WVS 4 3,000 2,864 N 2011 AB 2 1,219 1,172 Y Iraq 2004 WVS 4 2,325 2,176 N 2006 WVS 5 2,701 2,078 N 2011 AB 2 1,234 1,064 Y 2013 WVS 6 1,215 1,123 N Jordan 2001 WVS 4 1,223 1,189 N 2006 AB 1 1,143 911 N 2010 AB 2 1,188 1,026 Y 2014 WVS 6 1,200 1,199 N Lebanon 2007 AB 1 1,195 954 N 2011 AB 2 1,387 1,308 Y 2013 WVS 6 1,200 1,002 N Libya 2014 WVS 6 2,131 1,751 Y Morocco 2001 WVS 4 1,251 1,190 Y 2006 AB 1 1,277 942 N 2007 WVS 5 1,200 1,157 N Palestine 2010 AB 2 1,200 1,053 Y 2013 WVS 6 1,000 889 N Saudi Arabia 2003 WVS 4 1,502 1,337 N 2011 AB 2 1,404 1,068 Y Sudan 2011 AB 2 1,538 1,245 Y Tunisia 2011 AB 2 1,196 1,102 Y 2013 WVS 6 1,205 1,156 N Yemen 2007 AB 1 717 514 N 2011 AB 2 1,200 886 Y 2014 WVS 6 1,000 929 N 43,484 37,413

(86%)

29

Appendix B1. Items included in operationalization of Tolerance

Does (not) object to mentioned type of neighbour

Country year Oth

er r

ace

or

colo

r

Mig

ran

t o

r

qu

est/

exp

atri

ate

wo

rker

Jew

Oth

er r

elig

ion

Oth

er c

ou

ntr

y

Ch

rist

ian

s

Ku

rds

Oth

er la

ngu

age

Sun

nis

Shiit

es

Ref

uge

s

Imm

igra

nts

Oth

er r

elig

iou

s se

ct

Algeria 2002 X X X Algeria 2006 X X X Algeria 2011 X X X X Algeria 2013 X X X X Bahrain 2009 X X X Egypt 2001 X X X Egypt 2011 X X X X Iraq 2004 X X X X X X Iraq 2006 X X X X X X Iraq 2011 X X X X X X Iraq 2013 X X X X Jordan 2001 X X X X Jordan 2006 X X X Jordan 2010 X X X X Jordan 2014 X X X X Lebanon 2007 X X X Lebanon 2011 X X X X Lebanon 2013 X X X X Libya 2014 X X X X Morocco 2001 X X Morocco 2006 X X X Morocco 2007 X X X X Palestine 2010 X X X Palestine 2013 X X X X Saudi Arabia 2003 X X X Saudi Arabia 2011 X X X X Sudan 2011 X X X X Tunisia 2011 X X X X Tunisia 2013 X X X X Yemen 2007 X X X Yemen 2011 X X X X Yemen 2014 X X X X

30

Appendix B2. Items included in operationalization of Religiosity dimensions

Belonging Doctrinal orthodoxy Religious ingroups orientation Attendance

Country year To w

hat

ext

ent

do

yo

u c

on

sid

ers

you

rsel

f as

relig

iou

s (n

ot,

so

mew

hat

, rel

igio

us)

Are

yo

u a

rel

igio

us

per

son

? Ye

s, n

o (

incl

co

nvi

nce

d

ath

eist

)

Ho

w im

po

rtan

t is

re

ligio

n in

yo

ur

life?

(0

-3)

Div

orc

e

Suic

ide

Dri

nki

ng

alco

ho

l

Euth

anas

ia

Par

tici

pat

e in

a lo

tter

y

Ch

argi

ng

inte

rest

co

ntr

adic

ts Is

lam

Ch

argi

ng

inte

rest

mu

st b

e fo

rbid

den

no

t p

rayi

ng

is a

n o

bst

acle

in a

ccep

tin

g th

e m

arri

age

of

firs

t d

egre

e r

elat

ive

(0-3

)

fro

m d

iffe

ren

t re

ligio

n/d

eno

min

atio

n is

ob

sta

cle

in

acce

pti

ng

mar

riag

e o

f fi

rst

deg

ree

re

lati

ve

(0-3

)

Imp

ort

ant

child

qu

alit

ies:

rel

igio

us

(no

/yes

)

Imp

ort

ant

for

con

sid

erin

g w

ho

is a

su

itab

le s

po

use

for

son

or

dau

ghte

r: p

rayi

ng

(0-3

)

Imp

ort

ant

for

con

sid

erin

g w

ho

is a

su

itab

le s

po

use

for

son

or

dau

ghte

r: f

asti

ng

(0

-3)

Mo

st im

po

rtan

t fo

r co

nsi

der

ing

wh

o is

a s

uit

able

spo

use

fo

r so

n/d

augh

ter

(fas

tin

g o

r p

rayi

ng

)

Do

yo

u a

tten

d F

rid

ay p

raye

r? (

0-4

)

Ho

w o

ften

do

yo

u a

tten

d r

elig

iou

s se

rvic

es?

(0-4

)

Do

yo

u p

ray

in C

hu

rch

or

Mo

squ

e (n

o, y

es)

Ho

w o

ften

do

yo

u a

tten

d F

rid

ay p

raye

r o

r Su

nd

ay

serv

ices

(0

-3)

Algeria 2002 X X X X X X X X Algeria 2006 X X X X X X X Algeria 2011 X X X X X Algeria 2013 X X X X X X X Bahrain 2009 X X X X X X X Egypt 2001 X X X X X X X X Egypt 2011 X X X X Iraq 2004 X X X X X X Iraq 2006 X X X X X Iraq 2011 X X X X X Iraq 2013 X X X X X X X X Jordan 2001 X X X X X X X X Jordan 2006 X X X X X X X Jordan 2010 X X X X X Jordan 2014 X X X X X X Lebanon 2007 X X X X X X X Lebanon 2011 X X X X X Lebanon 2013 X X X X X X X Libya 2014 X X X X X X X Morocco 2001 X X X X X X Morocco 2006 X X X X X X X Morocco 2007 X X X X X X X Palestine 2010 X X X X X Palestine 2013 X X X X X Saudi Arabia 2003 X X X X X X X Saudi Arabia 2011 X X X X X Sudan 2011 X X X X X Tunisia 2011 X X X X X Tunisia 2013 X X X X X X X Yemen 2007 X X X X X X X Yemen 2011 X X X X X Yemen 2014 X X X X X X X

31

Appendix C1. Descriptive statistics of micro-level variables

Variable Mean s.d. Min Max Frequency

TOLERANCE

Ethno-religious social tolerance 0.00 0.73 -3.62 2.05

RELIGION

Belonging (Religious identification) 0.02 0.86 -11.77 1.60

Majority status

Muslim 94.3

Non-Muslims 5.7

Doctrinal orthodoxy 0.01 0.83 -2.94 6.13

Religious in-group orientation 0.02 0.91 -4.28 2.04

Attendance 0.00 1.00 -5.74 1.68

CONTROLS

Employment

Employed 62.6

Retired 3.7

Housewife 20.1

Student 6.6

Not employed other 7.0

Education

No education 27.7

Primary completed 22.3

Secondary completed 27.8

At least some tertiary 22.2

Sex

Male 51.2

Female 48.8

Age (in 7 cat.) 1.77 1.42 0 6

Marital status

Married 64.5

Single 30.4

Other (incl. divorced, widowed) 5.1

32

Appendix C2. Macro-level scores per country or country year

Country year

Religious Fractionalizationa

Religious-based violenceb

Orthodox Islam being suppressedc

Islamist regulated sermonsd

Algeria 0.0091 0.54 Algeria 2002 0 0 Algeria 2006 0 0 Algeria 2011 0 1 Algeria 2013 0 1

Bahrain 0.5528 0.39 Bahrain 2009 1 1

Egypt 0.1979 0.77 Egypt 2001 1 0 Egypt 2011 0 0

Iraq 0.4844 0.80 Iraq 2004 0 0 Iraq 2006 0 0 Iraq 2011 0 0 Iraq 2013 0 0

Jordan 0.0659 0.44 Jordan 2001 0 0 Jordan 2006 0 0 Jordan 2010 0 0 Jordan 2014 0 0

Lebanon 0.7886 0.63 Lebanon 2007 0 0 Lebanon 2011 0 0 Lebanon 2013 1 0

Libya 0.0570 0.82 Libya 2014 0 0

Morocco 0.0035 0.33 Morocco 2001 1 0 Morocco 2006 1 0 Morocco 2007 1 0

Palestine 0.1719 0.74 Palestine 2010 -1 0 Palestine 2013 -1 0

Saudi Arabia 0.1270 0.59 Saudi Arabia 2003 -1 0 Saudi Arabia 2011 -1 1

Sudan 0.43071 0.58 Sudan 2011 -1 0

Tunisia 0.0104 0.43 Tunisia 2011 -1 0 Tunisia 2013 0 0

Yemen 0.0023 0.66 Yemen 2007 -1 0 Yemen 2011 -1 1 Yemen 2014 -1 1

A) Source: Alesina et.al (2003); B) Source: Own calculations based on GRRD data; C) Source: coded by author; D) Source: based on GRRD, Spierings, Smits & Verloo (2009) and Spierings (2015) Notes: 1) This figures is from before South Sudan became an independent country; however, taking this into account when assessing the macro-level plots does not suggest this has caused refuting the hypothesis on the moderation impact of religious fractionalization.