The Development of Tokyo’s Rail Network - · PDF fileThe Development of Tokyo’s Rail Network Haruya Hirooka ... Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 25 trains to

22 Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000

Evolution of Urban Railways

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Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

The Development of Tokyo’s Rail Network

Haruya Hirooka

Tokyo as Megalopolis

As an introduction to Tokyo’s complexrailway system, let’s look first at how Tokyodeveloped into today’s megalopolis.In 1995, the population of Tokyo-to (anadministrative area of 23 wards (orboroughs) plus some 27 neighbouringcities) was 11,773,605, making it one ofthe world’s biggest cities at the time. ButTokyo is actually much bigger if we defineit not as an administrative area but as theTokyo Metropolitan Area (TMA) extendingto cities such as Yokohama and Kawasakiin neighbouring prefectures. Metropolitancentres in other parts of the world, too,include surrounding areas that are underthe administration of other localgovernment entities. Tokyo is no exceptionbut the area it draws toward its centre isfar larger than that of other worldmetropolises.

Academics do not always agree abouthow the area encompassing a large cityshould be classified. In Japan, a ‘greatercity’ is considered to extend to include thedaily commuting distance. In 1995, thepopulation within this Greater TokyoCommuting Zone totalled 31,987,117 or2.7 times more than the population ofTokyo-to.This zone is almost circular with a radiusof 50 km centred on JR East’s Tokyo Station,which is located in the city centre. If weexclude regions where the public transportsystem does not permit easy dailycommuting, the area within this roughcircle is 10,117 km2. This is less than onethird the area of greater New York, whichcovers 33,020 km2. However, Tokyo’spopulation is about 1.5 times larger thanNew York’s, meaning that its populationdensity is 4.5 times higher. London andParis are smaller than New York, makingTokyo the world’s largest metropolitan

region at this time. Actually, until 1965,greater New York’s population was higherthan that of the TMA. However, theirrelative positions reversed over the next 30years as New York’s population remainedrelatively stable while Tokyo’s wasincreasing dramatically.Figure 1 shows the extent of the TMAtransport network. The city centre exertsa gravitational pull. Adjacent to the centreare sub-centres, sub-sub-centres, andother commercial urban cores. Apredominant feature of this megalopolisis its extensive network of railways andexpressways serving the huge population.As John Michael Thomson pointed out inGreat Cities and Their Traffic, if ametropolis is to have a dominant citycentre, it must have a well-developedrailway network that creates transitcorridors within the city proper. London,Paris, New York and Tokyo all meet thisrequirement.When we examine Tokyo’s railway networkagainst this backdrop, it is true that Tokyo’ssubways do not extend as far as subwaysin New York, London and Paris. But Tokyo’ssubways carry far more passengers. Inaddition, suburban lines operated by JR Eastand the private railways have developedvery extensive links to Tokyo’s centre—suburban residents in New York, Londonand Paris do not have such substantial links;the lines from Tokyo’s suburbs carry aconsiderable proportion of all railwaypassengers in the metropolis (Tables 1and 2).

Railways—The Backboneof Tokyo

As I mentioned, the population of the TMAsurpassed that of greater New York after1965, but the distribution changeddramatically too. From 1970 to 1995, therewas a considerable population decline inTokyo’s 23 wards; a 40% drop in the threecentral wards, a 33% in another eight, anda 10% drop in a further eight. On the other

Table 2 Shares of Various Transportation Modes

Source: 1998 Annual Report on Urban Transportation published byInstitute for Transport Policy Studies

JR Privaterailways

Subways Rail total AutomobilesTrams Buses

Distance (route-km)Passengers in Tokyo's central 23 wards (million)Passengers in TMA (million)

876.4

3,520

5,452

Fiscal 1996

996.2

2,852

4,974

270.4

2,541

2,671

2,143.0

8,913

13,098

17.2

40

40

10,996.7

633

1,972

2,078

8,354

Table 1 Subways in World’s Four Major Cities


Route-km Numberof lines

Numberof stations

Rolling stock (number of cars)

Annual number of passengers

New York (1996)London (1995)Paris (1995)Tokyo (1997)

393.2392.0316.5248.7

29121712

481261359235

6,1413,9224,3423,155

1,170 (million)784

1,3802,640

23Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000Copyright © 2000 EJRCF. All rights reserved.

hand, the population in three adjacentprefectures of Saitama, Kanagawa andChiba jumped from 6.97 million in 1955to 20.80 million in 1995. Likewise, theTama district which is within Tokyo-to butoutside the 23 wards, saw its populationrise from 1.07 million to 3.81 million during

the same time period. This indicates apopulation shift—at least at night—to thesuburbs. However, the daytime workingpopulation continued to increase until1990, so Tokyo has not experienced theso-called inner-city crisis of some Europeancities. Figures 2 and 3 show population

curves and changes in distribution over thelast four decades or so.One result of this move to the suburbs istremendous tidal flows of commuterstravelling between home and work orschool from the three neighbouringprefectures and from the Tama district to

Figure 1 Tokyo Metropolitan Area Transport Network

AtsugiAtsugi

OdaOdawarara

KamakurKamakura

Yokokohamaohama

MachidaMachida

Shin Shin YururigaokaigaokaMusashiMusashikosugiosugi

JiyugaokaJiyugaoka

HanedaHanedaKamataKamata

KaKawasakiasaki

NoborNoborito ShinagaShinagawa

AkabaneAkabane

KaKawaguchiaguchi

NishiarNishiaraiai

ShinmatsudoShinmatsudo

MatsudoMatsudo

ShinjukuShinjuku

ShibShibuyuya

Tokyokyo

UenoUenoIkebebukuroukuro

FunabashiFunabashi

ChibaChiba

SogaSoga

MakuharMakuhari

Musashi Kyuryo Koen

Kawagoe

TachikawaMitaka

Chofu

Tama New Town

Narita New Town

Chiba New Town

Chiba New Town

Chiba-Ichihara New Town

Kohoku New Town

SeisekiSakuragaoka

Hachioji

Hashimoto

Machida

Noborito

Shin YurigaokaTama Plaza Musashi

kosugi

Jiyugaoka

Shinjuku

Shibuya

Shinagawa

Tokyo

UenoIkebukuro

Akabane

Kawaguchi

Nishiarai

Shinmatsudo

Matsudo

Noda

Mitsukaido

TsukubaTsuchiura

Toride

Kashiwa

Funabashi

Makuhari

Chiba

Kisarazu

Mobara

Soga

Togane

Narita Airport

Haneda Airport

Narita

SakuraYukarigaoka

Aoto

Urayasu

HanedaKamata

Nerima

Hibarigaoka Hikarigaoka

Nakano

Atsugi

Hiratsuka

Odawara

Yokosuka

Kamakura

Totsuka

Yokohama

Kawasaki

Fujisawa

Tokorozawa

Ome

Omiya

Urawa

Tobu Dobutsu Koen

Saitama Prefecture

Ibaraki Prefecture

Chiba Prefecture

Tokyo

Kanagawa Prefecture

Sagami Bay

Tokyo Bay

Kasumigaura

1630s

1850~68

1910

1945

1993

Railway

Expressway

Planned expressway

Prefecture boundary




Figure 2 Population Increase in TMA

Source: National Land Agency

25

20

15

10

56.97

3.03

8.65

15.37

1.07

7.39

3.81

7.97

20.80

(million)

01955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

Adjacent Saitama, Kanagawa & Chiba prefectures

Tokyo's 23 wards

Tama district

Figure 3 Office, Day and Night Populations of Tokyo’s Wards(1970 Population index: 100)

Source: Compiled by Metropolitan Areas Development Bureau of the National Land Agencyusing National Census data of Management and Coordination Agency

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

150 150146

137

129

125 121120

107

90

67

60

108

92

71

65

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

Office workers in 3 central wardsOffice workers in 8 central wardsOffice workers in 23 wards

Day population in 3 central wardsDay population in 8 central wardsDay population in 23 wards

Night population in 3 central wardsNight population in 8 central wardsNight population in 23 wards

Notes: (1) 3 central wards: Chiyoda, Minato and Chuo(2) 8 central wards: Above 3 wards and Shinjuku, Shibuya, Bunkyo,

Taito and Toshima(3) Office workers = Total of workers in specialized and technical fields,

managerial staff, and office workers as classified by national census(4) 1995 figures include passengers of unknown ages

Tokyo’s 23 wards, especially to the citycentre. The daily figures are enormous; in1995, the commuting population was650,000 from the Tama district, 970,000from Kanagawa Prefecture, 1,050,000 fromSaitama Prefecture, 870,000 from ChibaPrefecture, 80,000 from Ibaraki Prefecture,and 70,000 from other prefectures. Thismakes a total of 3,690,000 commutersevery working day!Commuters travel up to 65 km to the threecentral wards (Fig. 4). Indeed, more thananother 31,000 commute from evenfurther away by shinkansen. Because ofthese great distances, commuting time forone quarter of workers and studentstravelling to the central three wards is atleast 90 minutes one way, or more than 3hours each day.The vast numbers of commuters use thepublic transportation system at the sametime each morning and evening, sorailways must provide tremendouscapacity to satisfy the demand. As I willexplain later, postwar improvements inTokyo’s railway network have involvedcontinued effort and huge investments,creating a transit system with immensecapacity (Table 3). Although the systemcan handle the demand, there iscongestion at times but studies show thatthere is a limit to what can be done toalleviate this congestion.Table 3 lists the major lines forming theextensive railway network that serves theTMA. However, the only lines carryingpassengers to the city’s centre are JR East’sYokosuka, Tokaido, Keihin Tokohu, Chuo,Keiyo, and Yamanote lines. All the otherlines terminate at massive stations such asShinagawa, Shibuya, Shinjuku, Ikebukuroand Ueno on the circular Yamanote Line.If all passengers disembarking at thesestations were to transfer to JR trains enteringthe city’s centre, the congestion would beunimaginable and the transfer stationswould not be able to handle the extra load.This problem has been avoided to someextent by through operations of suburban


trains to the city’s centre on subway linesand underground railway lines built afterWWII (Table 4 and Figure 5). This solution,more than any other, made Tokyo’s railwaysystem the efficient marvel it is today. Itenables hundreds of thousands ofpassengers to travel from the suburbs to thecity centre without making a difficult andtime-consuming transfer at the YamanoteLine.

Development ofTokyo’s Rail Network

The TMA railway network has shownremarkable development down throughthe decades to the present. Figure 6 showsthis evolution, demonstrating how theexpansion of Tokyo’s centre, sub-centres,and commercial districts was directlyrelated to the construction of metropolitanrailway lines.Japan’s first railway line was opened in1872, some 42 years after the first Liverpool& Manchester railway began operations inGreat Britain. It was short—a mere 29 kmfrom Shimbashi to Yokohama and usedBritish technology and rolling stock.The Meiji government of the time initiallydecided to develop a state railway system,but two factors intervened. First, thegovernment lacked the necessary capital.Second, the private sector was eager toinvest in the new technology. As a result,the government changed its policy,permitting private businesses to build andoperate railways and even offeringfinancial assistance. This public–privatecooperation resulted in a network ofprivate lines covering 4674 km by 1900.This was 3.5 times longer than thegovernment railways’ lines, whichextended only 1325 km.The 1906–07 nationalization of majortrunk lines belonging to 17 private railwaycompanies reversed this situation almostovernight, causing a sudden expansion ofthe government railways’ network at theexpense of the private railways.

Table 3 TMA Railway Transport in 1996 (one way)


From southwestJR Yokosuka LineJR Tokaido LineJR Keihin Tohoku LineOdakyu LineTokyu Toyoko LineTokyu Den’en Toshi LineKeihin Kyuko Line

From westJR Chuo Line (rapid service)JR Chuo Line (all stations)Keio LineKeio Inogashira LineSeibu Shinjuku Line

From northwestSeibu Ikebukuro LineTobu Tojo Line

From northJR Keihin Tohoku LineJR Saikyo LineTobu Isezaki Line

From northeastJR Joban Line (rapid service)JR Joban Line (all stations)

From eastJR Sobu Line (rapid service)JR Sobu Line (all stations)JR Keiyo LineKeisei Line Keisei Oshiage Line

Loop linesJR Yamanote LineJR Musashino Line

11192429272827

3023302826

2927

241944

1022

1826171819

2411

143247240272216280264

300230300140240

266270

240190368

150220

234260164132152

26488

39,59074,46081,15074,33055,75276,59251,600

95,58032,19070,78730,56059,333

71,55260,423

81,74063,30082,354

46,15074,990

64,20084,66043,50028,02032,610

90,06026,940

Railway LineDuring peak hour

Numberof trains

Numberof cars

Number of passengers

During day

108139279375327230293

275255356296324

358333

279187440

107168

141241180239208

323115

1,3641,6032,7903,3032,6162,3002,046

2,7502,5503,1261,4802,794

3,0683,262

2,7901,8703,136

1,4601,680

1,8012,4101,7101,6001,608

3,553898

136,930208,480284,670305,047242,556287,405174,677

366,170175,140271,215135,822232,156

280,358247,152

310,180224,230252,156

145,900180,880

186,257302,600157,14099,08072,650

339,33086,610

Numberof trains

Number of cars

Number of passengers

A second railway construction boomlasted from the 1910s to the mid-1930s.The government railways’ trunk networkwas basically completed, so it shifted itsefforts to laying branch lines. The privatesector built new lines (many electrified)to serve cities and adjacent districts. Thebasic configuration of Japan’s railway

network as it exists today—with theexception of the shinkansen—wasestablished by the mid-1930s.Japan first adopted railway technology inTokyo, so it was natural for Tokyo to bethe central hub of a trunk-line networkradiating to every part of the country.These trunk lines naturally determined the




directions in which commercial districtsexpanded within the city and out towardneighbouring areas. In addition, thedevelopment of private railways gaveimpetus to the expansion of Tokyo’ssuburbs. As a result, Tokyo and itssurrounding districts developed morerapidly than other parts of the country.Table 5 shows the growth of Tokyo’s

railway lines, which had basically beenestablished by the 1930s. The postwarhigh-economic growth period and Tokyo’sfurther expansion promoted even moredevelopment along the rail corridors. Thispopulation growth led to increaseddemand, which in turn prompted railwaysto run longer trains at shorter headways.When these measures proved unable to

cope with increased ridership, other stepswere taken, such as quadrupling tracksand constructing overpasses. Moresubway lines were also built during andafter the 1960s to carry the growingnumber of commuters disembarking fromthe suburban railway lines. These effortsgave the TMA its interconnected transitsystem described above.The first public transportation system in thecommercial centre was started in 1882 inthe form of a private company operatinghorse-drawn carriages on rails. Ridershipwas high. Then, in 1903, the samecompany started Japan’s first tramway linefrom Shimbashi to Shinagawa. Othertramway lines were soon built by differentcompanies. The three tramway companieswere amalgamated in 1906 to form TokyoRai lway (Tokyo Tetsudo) , whichsubsequently became publicly owned in1911, reflecting the then worldwide trendtowards government control of tramwayoperations.Trams formed the backbone of Tokyo’stransit system from the 1910s to the 1950s.Ridership was high, and the networkextended in many directions. But thetrams did not run on private right-of-wayand had to share the increasinglycongested roads with cars in the 1950s.As road congestion caused increasingtimetable problems, passengers beganabandoning trams at the very time that thetramway companies’ operating costs wererising. The inevitable deficits led to thedecision to abandon tram operations infavour of buses and subways. By the late1960s, Tokyo had only one remainingtramway line.Today, there are calls to revive the tramconcept as light rail. But this will onlywork if the lines have exclusive right-of-way, and if demand warrants theinvestment.Here, it is worth mentioning the efforts inTokyo to construct elevated lines overroads and waterways for exclusive use bymonorail and new transportation systems.

Figure 4 Commuting Ratio to Tokyo’s Three Central Wards

Source: Population Census of Management Coordination Agency

3% – 5.9%

6% – 9.9%

10% – 19.9%

20% – 29.9%

30% or more

TRTA–Tokyu through trains at Naka Meguro Station. TRTA’s Series 3000 leaving for Tokyu’s Hiyoshi Station (left),Tokyu’s Series 7000, leaving for Kita Senju via TRTA Hibiya subway line (middle), and another Series 7000 boundfor Tokyu’s Shibuya terminal (right). (Photographed in August 1964 by Satoshi Kubo)


Cars and taxis carry relatively few peoplein the city centre and sub-centres, becausepopulation densities and traffic congestionare high, and because the few availableparking spaces are very expensive.However, the car is assuming greaterimportance in the nearby Tama district andin neighbouring prefectures (Table 2).

Financing Rail Improvements

Very high land prices in the city centre andsurrounding commercial areas make itimpossible for the railways to obtain cheapland for further development. It is

Figure 5 1985 Master Plan for Tokyo Rail Network Expansion

Shiki

NishiTakashimadaira

OizumiGakuencho

Hoya

Ogikubo Nakano

Honancho

Shinjuku

Ikebukuro

Hashimoto

NakaMeguro

Shibuya

FutagoTamagawaen

Meguro

NishiMagome

Shinagawa

Tokyo

Shin Kiba

Katsu

tada

i

MotoYawata

Asakusa

Komuro

Matsudo

Kameari

Kita Ayase

KitaKoshigaya

Higashi Urawa

1

2

2

23

4

46 7

7

7

8

8

8

8

9

9

9

10 10

11

11

11

11

12

12

12

12

12

13

5

5

5

Karakida

Line 1 Nishi Magome/Shinagawa—Komuro (TMG/Keisei/Hokuso Kaihatsu)Line 2 Naka Meguro—Kita Koshigaya (TRTA/Tobu)Line 3 Shibuya—Asakusa (TRTA)Line 4 Ogikubo/Honancho—Ikebukuro (TRTA)Line 5 Nakano—Katsutadai (TRTA/Toyo Kosoku)Line 6 Nishi Takashimadaira—Meguro (TMG)Line 7 Meguro—Higashi Urawa (TRTA/Saitama Kosoku)Line 8 Hoya—Kameari/Shin Kiba (Seibu/TRTA)Line 9 Karakida—Kita Ayase (Odakyu/TRTA)Line 10 Hashimoto—Moto Yawata (Keio/TMG)Line 11 Futago Tamagawaen—Matsudo (Tokyu/TRTA)Line 12 Shinjuku—Oizumi Gakuencho (TMG)Line 13 Shiki—Shibuya (Tobu/TRTA)TMG: Tokyo Metropolitan GovernmentTRTA: Teito Rapid Transit Authority

Table 4 Suburban Railway–Subway Through Operations

Keihin Kyuko LineKeisei Oshiage LineTokyu Toyoko LineTokyu Den’en Toshi LineOdakyu LineKeio LineJR Chuo LineSeibu Ikebukuro LineTobu Tojo LineTobu Isezaki LineJR Joban Line

Toei Asakusa LineToei Asakusa Line Eidan Hibiya LineEidan Hanzomon LineEidan Chiyoda LineToei Shinjuku LineEidan Tozai LineEidan Yurakucho LineEidan Yurakucho LineEidan Hibiya LineEidan Chiyoda Line

Suburban Railway Subway




exceedingly difficult to obtain land at all—and any successful purchase involves muchexpense of time and astronomical amountsof money. These problems can be avoidedto some extent by building elevated linesand by building underground, butconstruction costs rise in proportion todifficulty. The postwar economic boomexacerbated these problems.Conditions were more favourable torailway construction from the 1880s to1930s—the golden decades for railwayinvestment—when a considerableproportion of total investment was spent inrailways. This spending both stimulatedthe economy and helped develop the socialinfrastructure. In those days, rail investmentprepared for future growth. On the otherhand, postwar railway investment hasusually been a (futile) attempt to catch upwith spiralling demand caused by higheconomic growth and rapid urban sprawl.In many cases, the high cost has negativelyaffected the railway companies’ finances.During the 1910s and 1920s, privaterailway companies invested considerablesums in construction of metropolitan andsuburban lines. An examination of theircapital procurement practices duringthese decades shows that:(1) When raising capital, the companiesdepended to a great extent on increasingcapitalized stock. They had few retainedearnings to draw on.(2) Because they had little of their ownequity, the companies borrowed capital.For example, they issued corporate bondsand secured loans through railwayfoundation mortgages. Bank loans formedonly a small part of borrowed capital.(3) The companies greatly increased thevalue of fixed assets used for non-railway-related business, and the value of theirinvestment securities. In other words, theyinvested in railways while expanding theirinvestments in other business sectors aswell.These facts show that railway companiesdisposed of a considerable percentage of

Figure 6 Development of Urban Rail Network and Expansion of Tokyo

1883 1890 1920 1930

1960 1980

Source: Research Report on Tokyo’s Development into Multi-centric Metropolisby Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 1959

JNR’s newly opened Musashi Koganei EMU Depot on Chuo Line in western suburb of Tokyo. As the number ofcommuter trains increased around Tokyo, many new depots had to be built during the 1960s and 1970s.

(Photographed in December 1961 by Satoshi Kubo)


their profits through payment of dividends,and that their retained earnings werenegligible. This trend was even remarkedon before 1913. Railway investmentcould not be self-financed throughretained earnings, and any increasedprofits were eaten up by paying out moredividends. Stocks rose in value, increasingthe ability of shareholders to underwritenew investments in stocks. This in turncreated positive signals that promptedfurther investment.For its part, the government introduced asystem of subsidies that stimulated theprivate railways to further development.The Light Railway Subsidy Law of 1911provided government subsidies to newprivate railway companies for 5 years aftertheir establishment. The size of subsidiesdepended on profits, but was limited to aceiling of 5% of construction costs. The5-year limit was raised to 10 years afterthe law was amended in 1914.These subsidies were a boon for railways.For example, the Tokyo Yokohama ElectricRailway (now Tokyu Corporation) enjoyed

government subsidies for 11 years—thesubsidies were of great help during the 6years it took the railway to go from start-up to profitability (before depreciation).During this period, the company was onlyjust able to continue paying 6.6%dividends. In another example, theOdakyu Electric Railway started receivingsubsidies in 1929, and was able to turn aprofit and pay dividends of 5%.Subways became the focus of most newrailway construction in metropolitan areasafter WWII. Subway construction isimmensely expensive and some fundswere raised by contributions from localgovernments, but most were in the formof borrowed capital from other sources.As a result, the costs of this borrowedcapital weighed down operations formany years.In 1962, the government introduced anew subsidy system for subways to lightentheir debt load, ensure stable operations,and promote further construction. Thesesubsidies were small at first, only coveringpart of the interest on loans. Gradually,

the subsidies and subsidy ratios wereraised over time, and the payment systemwas modified to the subway operators’advantage. At present, subsidies canamount to as much as 70% of all eligibleconstruction costs, and payment can bemade as one lump sum during the fiscalyear when construction is undertaken.The national and local governments sharethese subsidies equally, but even withthese generous pay outs, all the ninepublicly operated subway companies inJapan, except the Teito Rapid TransitAuthority (Eidan), suffer deficits each year,and their accumulated debt is continuingto mount.Major private railways in the metropolitanregion continue to operate lines that werebuilt before WWII. Since the war, they haveimproved rail services mainly by operatingmore and longer trains. This has involvedpurchase of more rolling stock andlengthening of platforms. Other steps toincrease basic capacity have includedbuilding elevated track in certain areas,quadrupling tracks, and constructing shortnew track sections to permit throughoperations to subway lines. This newinfrastructure has required very largeinvestments, with most of the capital beingexternal loans at relatively high interestrates. Another problem is that theinvestments are aimed at alleviatingcongestion, not generating much newrevenue, so construction tends to drag on.To deal with these problems, in 1986, thegovernment introduced a law to facilitateinvestment in infrastructure for specifiedurban railways. Under this law, fares canbe adjusted an extra amount upward byadding an amount to the fare increasedetermined according to the conventionalrate-base method. This extra is set asidein an untaxed reserve account at adesignated financial institution, forminga surplus for each specified railway. Fundsin this reserve are then used to payconstruction costs. One condition is thatthe reserve cannot exceed 25% of the

Table 5 Growth of Tokyo Rail Network and Population

Track length(km)

DecadePopulation of

Tokyo's 23 wards (10,000)

Track-km per 10,000

people

Populationof TMA

(10,000)

Track-km per 10,000

people

1880189019001910192019301940195019601970198019901995

100140180200217207677583831884835816796

0.261.683.133.605.717.702.643.422.271.922.242.482.69

2,1472,5842,8653,198

0.790.720.710.67

26.9235.8562.5720.2887.7

1,242.21,432.61,491.01,530.11,699.31,873.52,025.52,143.0

Notes: (1) Track length: Total length of government railways, JNR, JR, major private railways, subways, monorails, and new transportation systems, at decade end

(2) Population: Data from Japanese Economic Statistics, Japan—100 Years of Facts and Figures, and Metropolitan Traffic Report of Japan Statistical Research Institute




Haruya Hirooka

Professor Hirooka is President of Tokyo Junior College of Transport. He graduated from the School of

Economics at the University of Tokyo in 1950 and taught for many years at Hosei University where he

is now Emeritus Professor. His extensive publications include Citizens and Transport (1987, in

Japanese), and he is also the editor of Modern Transport Economy (1997, in Japanese) and Cities

and Transport (1998, in Japanese).

construction costs that the fund is intendedfor. In this way, passengers pay a higherfare up front, and this extra revenue is usedto increase rail capacity and decreasecongestion, which ends up benefiting thepassengers. Another advantage forpassengers is that fares should increaseupwards to a lesser degree in the future,since the railways will not need to borrowand pay interest on as much capital.However, unlike publicly supportedrailway companies, the private railwaysoperate under the premise that they willpay shareholders a dividend of 10%. Norailway companies in other cities of theworld operate like this.Before the 1987 privatization and breakupof the Japanese National Railways (JNR),the management took a number ofimportant steps to improve capacity.Some tracks were quadrupled, andpassenger and freight l ines wereseparated. Some new lines initiallyplanned as freight lines became passengerlines. Typical examples are the MusashinoLine, a circular suburban line aroundTokyo, and the Keiyo Line from TokyoStation to Soga in Chiba Prefecture alongTokyo Bay. After the JNR privatization andbreakup, the JR group of companies haveattempted to ensure profitability byadopting the principle that investment inconstruction should remain within thebounds of depreciation expenses involvedin such construction. Investments by theJR Group are mainly for upgrading stationbuildings and rolling stock, increasing thenumber of passenger trains, raisingcomfort levels, achieving greaterefficiency, and raising competitiveness.

Conclusion

The collapse in the early 1990s of Japan’sso-called Bubble Economy marked thestart of a long and continuing recessioncharacterized by the country’s firstnegative growth since WWII. There is stilllittle sign of recovery and it seems likelythat growth will remain negligible forsome time. In addition, it appears thatdevelopment potential in the Tokyo andmetropolitan region had reached itsmaximum by the early 1990s, and thatthe expansion days are over. The numberof rail passengers increased each yearafter the war until 1994 but has slowlydeclined since then. Railway operatorsare beginning to realize that they can nolonger assume that ridership and profitswill continue to rise.And yet many passengers using themetropolitan railway system must endurecrowded trains and a long commute.They want these problems addressed. Ifrailways cannot improve the situationusing their own financial resources, publicsubsidies are necessary. But the nationaland local governments are hamstrung bymounting debts, and have little room tomanoeuvre.Furthermore, subways will soon find itphysically impossible to construct newlines. The solution should be found notonly through better rail services but alsothrough comprehensive metropolitanplanning that promotes dispersal of certaingovernment functions to other regions,and the return of some residents to the

city centre. But such measures wouldundoubtedly mean that railway companieswould have to stop trying to boostrevenues by increasing ridership from thedistant suburbs. And the end result couldbe that the railways will have lessincentive to invest heavily in measures toincrease capacity. �


New Rail Expansion Master Plan for Tokyo Metropolitan Area(Recommended by Transport Policy Council, January 2000)

Futamatagawa

Okurayama

Azamino

Kawasaki

Otorii

Kamata

Osaki

Meguro

Shibuya

Mitaka

HikarigaokaIkebukuro Ueno

Tokyo

AriakeShin Kiba

Shin Urayasu

Tsudanuma

MatsudoAkabaneIwabuchi

Oizumi Gakuen

MinumadaiShinsui Koen

Noda

Hasuda

To be opened by 2015

Under construction by 2015

Prefectural boundary

Existing lines except Tokyo and Yokohama subways, and shinkansen

Tsukuba

IBARAKI

CHIBA

SAITAMA

TOKYO

Shin Yurigaoka

Yokohama

TsurumiKANAGAWA

On 27 January 2000, the Transport PolicyCouncil (an advisory body to the Minister ofTransport) submitted a report, recommending amajor revision of the 1985 master plan to expandTokyo’s urban rail network.This new master plan covers 426 km of railwaysections of which 233 km are entirely new(including new l ines and extension orquadrupling of existing lines), as well as sectionscurrently under construction. The plan alsoincludes some monorails and automated guidedtransit systems. Notable new sections include:1. A new double track between JR East’s Tokyoand Ueno stations enabling trains from theTohoku, Takasaki and Joban lines to reach TokyoStation; 2. Extension of the TRTA Yurakuchosubway line to Noda (Chiba Prefecture) viaKameari on the JR East Joban Line; 3.Construction of Saitama Kosoku Railway toHasuda (Saitama Prefecture), connecting toTRTA Namboku subway line at AkabaneIwabuchi; 4. Extension of the JR East Keiyo Linefrom Tokyo Station to Mitaka on the Chuo Line;5. Construction of a new line from the OdakyuElectric Railway’s Shin Yurigaoka Station to JREast Kawasaki Station to provide a mass transitsystem to Kawasaki for residents of northKawasaki.The report recommends completion of urgentsections by 2015 with construction of remainingsections to start by the same year. Passengercrowding, which is currently at an average of183% of capacity, should be eased to 151% ifall proposed sections are completed.The total construction costs are estimated at ¥7.2trillion with ¥4.7 trillion of this being for the 233km of new sections. However, the number ofrail passengers in the Tokyo Metropolitan Areahas been decreasing in recent years as a resultof the stagnant economy and the agingpopulation. Consequently, rail operators arereluctant to make further infrastructureinvestments. The Council expects thegovernment to arrange new financing, but thecentral and local governments are both facingserious deficits, making the whole situationmuch more difficult than in 1985. �

T. Suga

New Master Plan for Tokyo’s Urban Rail Network

Editor’s Desk

Documents

The Development of Tokyo’s Rail Network - · PDF fileThe Development of Tokyo’s Rail Network Haruya Hirooka ... Japan Railway & Transport Review 23 • March 2000 25 trains to