34

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SWAZ1

LABOITK MARKET IfMMI - 19tiU

In the growing body of l i t e r a t u r e on African labour history of

the past decade . Swaziland has figured ha rd ly at a l l . The reason.

no doubt , l i es in the numbers . No more than 4 per cent - often less

- of mine labour in the Wi twate rs rand ' s catchment a rea was of

Swazi o r i g i n . Nor did the Swazi d is t inguish themselves in other

ways - a s expert shaft s i n k e r s , for ins tance , or as t roublemakers.

It is the purpose of th is paper to shed some light on the Swazi

labour market and i ts development, and to show t h a t , numbers

a s i d e , i ts study can yield some useful f ind ings . This is especially

t rue of the post-World War 1 twentieth cen tu ry , when loca l ly , in

response to cap i t a l pene t ra t ion , a competitive market for Swazi

labour was crea ted which no government or monopoly was able to

regu la te to i t s sa t i s fac t ion . It was a market in which wage

s t ruc tu res and working condit ions became b a r g a i n a b l e items in the

a t t r ac t ion of l abour , employers ' efforts notwi ths tanding , and

con t ra ry to the colonial s t a t e ' s ear ly des ign .

A fur ther aim of th is paper is to suggest that the re la t ive

35

neglect of research in Swaziland stems from i ts simple ca tegor ­

isation as one of the BLS Terr i tor ies - an oversimplification that

has led to some mistaken assumptions and inapp rop r i a t e compar i ­

sons. What has been overlooked is the significance of set t ler cap i ta l

• penetration da t ing back to mineral -era South Africa, which has

largely determined the cha rac te r of the labour market from the

earliest d a y s , making Swaziland more reminiscent of Char les van

Onselen's Rhodesia than of i ts des ignated s i s te r s t a t e s , Lesotho and

Botswana.

A detai led study of the Swazi labour market merits at tent ion

for several r ea sons . F i r s t , there is no c l ea re r example of a

calculated and meticulously planned s t r a t egy for land depr ivat ion

and surplus extract ion aimed at p ro le ta r ian iza t ion by a colonial

state in ear ly 20th century Africa. That it did not succeed as

planned had as much to do with the changing na tu re of European

settlement and cap i t a l penetra t ion as anything e l se .

Second, African labour his tory is replete with examples of work

forces coerced into labour ing for wages and under condit ions

decreed by cap i t a l and enforced by the s t a t e . Recent research has

focussed on the emergence of worker consciousness a t t endant to

class formation, and pa t t e rns of res i s tance that followed. In

Swaziland the case was qui te different . There, competition for

labour between local and foreign c a p i t a l , and within the country

between British and South African c a p i t a l , c rea ted a market which

the Swazi played with increas ing shrewdness for bet ter wages and

conditions. This phenomenon was most notable dur ing the post-war

labour shor tages of the la te 1940's and ea r ly 1950*s, but its roots

stretch back to the turn of the cen tu ry . It meant, among other

things, tha t the development of worker consciousness and res is tance

patterns emerging in pos t -war Swaziland reflected the position of

relative leverage enjoyed by the labour force. And one r ea l ly

needs, f ina l ly , to view the development of Swazi cash cropping and

cattle marketing aga ins t the backdrop of the changing forces

driving the labour market .

What l i t e r a tu re there is on Swazi labour his tory revolves

36

almost en t i re ly around the period 1888-1930, when the land was

concessioned away by a beguiled king Mbandzeni, the concessions

(some over lapp ing four deep) were confirmed, d isputed, and

confirmed aga in ( tha t time for good) by the British colonial state;

and the Swazi were expelled from two-thirds of the i r lands in 1914.

A ser ies of d i s se r t a t ions t race these developments. Phi l ip Bonner's

d i sse r ta t ion gives the definitive in terpre ta t ion of the concessions.

(1) Two other unpublished works, by Balam Nyeko and Francis

Mashasha, c a r r y elements of the story up to the Great Depression.

(2) Jonathan Crush deals with the ear ly phase of European

settlement and cap i t a l penetrat ion in a mas te r ' s thes i s , port ions of

which have been publ i shed . (3) Martin F ransman ' s disser tat ion

t races the themes of c lass formation, worker consciousness, and

res i s tance throughout the t rans- independence period. (4) Literature

is being produced by anthropologis t s , sociologists and economists

which deals mainly with the effects of labour migrancy on recent

social change in Swaziland. (5)

Research for th is pape r , as yet incomplete, draws from the

l i t e r a tu re mentioned and from arch iva l sources in Swaziland and

South Africa. The most notable of these include the Swaziland

National Archives at Lobamba, the a rch ives of the Native Recruiting

Corporation (hereaf ter , NRC) at the TEBA offices in Si teki , and the

Allister Miller pape r s at the Killie Campbell Library in Durban.

European se t t le r influence and capi ta l penetrat ion may be said

to have commenced in the ea r ly 1980's, when gold was discovered in

northwest Swazi land. This led to an immediate inflow of conces­

s ion-seekers , l a rge ly Br i t i sh . It was they who dealt so c lever ly and

decis ively with Mbandzeni, in the absence of effective adminis t r ­

a t ive control of Swaziland by e i ther the British or the Transvaal

governments . During the k i n g ' s final years (1887-1889) the

concessions were gran ted promiscuously - so much so that two

commissions were es tabl i shed to verify and to sort them out, one in

1890, and the second (and c ruc i a l ) one in 1904, after the

establ ishment of British colonial r u l e . Martin Fransman categorises

the European concess ionar ies into three types :

37

1) Mining a n d (to a l e s se r ex t en t ) mercan t i l e a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l

i n t e r e s t s , main ly B r i t i s h .

2) Graz ing a n d (to a l e s se r ex t en t ) fa rming i n t e r e s t s , mostly

Afrikaner of T r a n s v a a l o r i g i n s .

3) Concession a n d l and s p e c u l a t o r s , of both n a t i o n a l i t i e s .

Fransman a n d Jona than Crush desc r ibe in a d m i r a b l e fashion

the a c t i v i t i e s and Report (1907) of the Concessions Commission,

which a w a r d e d t w o - t h i r d s of the l and to the c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s , a n d

there is no need to r e - cove r t h a t g r o u n d h e r e . (7) Two or th ree

points may be added for i n t e r e s t ' s s a k e . F i r s t , the Concess ions

Commission was staffed a n d c h a r g e d so as to p rede te rmine the

outcome. The Commission had been e s t a b l i s h e d in 1904 by the Br i t i sh

High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner , whose intent was to "dea l

with Swaz i l and a s n e a r l y a s pos s ib l e on the same l i n e s a s an

ord inary d i s t r i c t of the T r a n s v a a l " . (8)

Milner c o n s e q u e n t l y p l a c e d , a s head of the Commission,

Johannes Smuts, the R e g i s t r a r of Deeds of the T r a n s v a a l . (9) A

second Commission member was W.H. Gi l f i l l an , Su rveyor -Genera l of

the T r a n s v a a l ; and a t h i r d , J . C . Krough, who, a s spec ia l

Commissioner for Swazi land when it h a d been unde r T r a n s v a a l

adminis t ra t ion (1884-1889), had imposed a t a x on the Swazi so

burdensome a s to accomplish his object of " i n d u c ( i n g ) the n a t i v e s to

work". (10) Smuts himself, who had served as Br i t i sh Consul in

Swaziland d u r i n g those same y e a r s , had advoca t ed a " g e n t l e

compulsion or i ncen t ive (to l a b o u r ) such for i n s t a n c e a s the

admirable Glen Grey Act of the Cape Colony, ( a s ) in the best

in teres ts of the n a t i v e s t hemse lves" . (11)

Thus it should come a s no s u p r i s e t ha t the f i r s t ou t l i ne of the

Commission's " f i n d i n g s " l a t e r announced in the 1907 Land Proc lam­

ation, had been d e s p a t c h e d over two y e a r s beforehand by the new

British High Commissioner, Lord Se lborne , to the Colonial Office

(12).

A major cons ide r a t i on in f loa t ing the 1907 Proc lamat ion seems

to have been, as Crush summar i ze s , a fear of Swazi r i s i n g ,

possibly j o in ing with the Zu lu , if the l and e x p r o p r i a t i o n were

38

overly cruel in timing or degree . So, Selborne reported to the

Colonial Secretary , the Swazi would be granted just enough land to

ward off "serious t rouble"; (13) and the actual expulsion of the

Swazi would be delayed for five y e a r s , so that " their imagination

would not be confronted with the sudden loss of r igh t s over great

t r a c t s of Swazi land". ( K ) The Colonial Secretary himself (Lord

Elgin) furthered the ruse by a s su r ing the Swazi protest deputation

despatched to London by the Queen Regent that enough of the

Government-withheld Crown Lands would be forthcoming to the Swazi

so that "it is not too much to say that half the land will be in

(Swazi) occupat ion" . (15)

A second point concerns the nature of the capi ta l penetrat ion,

to whose in te res t s the Government was responding . Swazi land 's

economic potential was considered, unt i l roughly the time of the

First World War, to have been in minerals (p r inc ipa l ly gold and

t i n ) ; and the extract ion of minerals was almost to ta l ly under the

control of British c a p i t a l . A close look at the delineation of the

post - 1907 land settlement shows a massive bias in favor of those

mining in t e r e s t s . Afrikaner g r az ing and farming cap i t a l was

provided for, to be su re , and a fair amount of the bet ter farmland

fell into the Native Areas. But the requirements of mining - which

was both a l abour - in tens ive and water - in tens ive unde r t ak ing , were

provided for before a l l e l se .

Labour was provided for by ensur ing that the Native Areas

(numbering 32 in a l l ) would not support their human and cat t le

populat ion for more than a few years at best , and not at a l l in a

few c a s e s . It was Allister Miller, an or ig ina l concessionaire ,

adv i se r to Mbandzeni, en terpreneur nonpare i l , publ i sher of the

Times of Swazi land, and t rus ted confidante of both Selborne and

Milner before him, who had a r t i cu la t ed the European se t t le r case

for Swazi p ro l e t a r i an i za t i on . "We hope", he wrote to Selborne in

1906, " that the nat ive settlement will be so devised that it will

pave the way to (European) tenure and respons ib i l i ty and the

denat ional iza t ion of the Swazis " "If these people a re to be

saved" , he went on, "it is my opinion that they must be forced

39

from the exclusiveness of t r i b a l l i f e . . . . (which) is enabl ing

the idler to l ive in id leness" "We believe that if the na t ive is

provided with sufficient land to meet the requirements of the

present and next generat ion he will be amply accomodated". (16)

Mil le r ' s p lan , as ca r r i ed out, proved even more effective than

devised in d r iv ing the Swazi to l abour . George Grey, selected by

Selborne to del ineate the Native Areas, outl ined his intent to the

High Commissioner in drawing the boundar i e s . Gold and t in , and

the water to mine them, were left in British hands . The most

desirable g raz ing (sweet ve ld , g razab le the year around) went to

the British as wel l . What was more, huge t r ac t s of the finest

grazing and farmland were held out from the settlement as "Crown

Lands" - for future European settlement and cont ro l . (17)

"We have been thrown back from our ga rdens amongst s tones , "

(18) the chiefs complained, but poor qua l i ty of the land was only

compounded by i ts insufficiency. Everyone knew tha t , in Allister

Miller's words, "nat ive . . . . communes are doubling their populat ion

every 25 y e a r s " . (19) Grey ' s del ineat ion provided for only enough

land, at those ra tes of growth, to l as t unt i l 1921. What is more.

Grey was assuming in his ca lcu la t ions a " typ ica l " Swazi family of

seven persons possessing five head of c a t t l e . But the l a t t e r figure

was a massive underes t imate , stemming from the ca t t le pandemic of

the previous decade , which had killed off no 'less than 90 per cent

of the Swazi h e r d s .

So by the time of the Pirn Report (1932), the Native Areas had

become overpopulated, and were subject to "serious overstocking

and erosion", with a ca t t le count not 5/7ths of the human

population, but 2\ times as g r e a t . (20) By World War I I , British

medical officers were repor t ing the greates t r a t e s of child

malnutrition and a t tendant d isease in those same a r e a s - the Native

Areas s i tuated in the south and west of the count ry . (21) Those

same a r e a s would become the grea tes t genera tors of labour

outmigration in subsequent y e a r s .

Water was secured, a l so , to European mining and ( l a te r )

farming interes ts at the expense of the Native Areas, by provision

40

of the Swaziland Water Proclamation (No, 11 of 1910), both for

current use and future growth. By the mid 1920's the European

Advisory Council (a set t ler lobbying group) was complaining of a

"p reca r ious" water s i tuat ion in the south - the same region of the

grea tes t Native Area underdevelopment. A 1927 Government report

a s se r t ed : (22)

"Many of the water courses in Swaziland which formerly

were perennia l a re now dry except in the wet season, and

many streams cease to flow except in the summer months".

Consequently, on July 1, 1914, the Swazi were expelled from

the lands which they had h i s to r ica l ly claimed as t he i r s . Perhaps an

eighth of them - 20,000 by one estimate - remained on the lands of

the new European owners , as t e n a n t s . (23) The remainder were

removed to the Native Areas which, by des ign , would not support

them for very long, if at a l l . All were taxed at the highest ra tes of

any "na t ive" populat ion in Southern Africa. (24) Thus were the

foundations of the labour market la id by the colonial s t a t e .

Let us now turn to the development of that market . Earliest

records indica te some Swazi workseekers at Kimberley as ea r ly as

the 1880's - how many we do not know. Most e a r l y (1890's)

outmigrat ion was a good deal more localized - to the gold and tin

mines in northwestern Swaziland, and across the border to the

Barberton gold mines, as well as the first of the market farms in

the eas tern Transvaa l and nor thern Natal . The first significant

Swazi numbers migrated to the r and mines after 1902, in o rder , it

is sa id , to earn the money to replenish cat t le herds decimated by

r inderpes t and East Coast Fever dur ing the preceding decade . (25)

Certain features d i s t ingu ish the ear ly migra t ions , which would

remain re l a t ive ly constant throughout the twentieth cen tu ry . First

was the pa t t e rn of government inducement / coercion which

const i tuted a p r inc ipa l "push factor" to outmigrat ion. F. Enraght—

Moony in his f irst report as Special Commissioner for Swaziland

(1903) remarked on the reluctance of the Swazi to enter the "labour

marke ts" , and on the "efforts . . . . b e i n g made to overcome t h i s " .

That heavy taxa t ion was one of the measures was evident from the

Al

relentless government response to Swazi complaints over t axe s : there

was plenty of work in the mines. (26) And in spi te of Lord E l g i n ' s

assurances, no Crown Lands became ava i l ab l e to rel ieve Swazi

overcrowding in the Native Areas, save one parcel of 14,000 morgen,

sold in 1914 to heip soften the blow of a new tax i nc r ea se . (27) (No

significant sa les of Crown Lands to the Swazi nation occurred until

the World War II e r a ) .

A second feature was the pa t te rn of response to these p ressures

by the Swazi monarchy itself: the encouragement of migrancy, and

even par t i c ipa t ion in i ts recrui tment . Most often th i s seems to have

been done in order to finance the purchas ing back of concessioned

lands, but tha t was not a lways the ca se .

In 1899 King Bhunu awarded J .J . Grobler a 15 year concession

granting him the exclusive r ight to recrui t labour in Swazi land.

(28) In 1905, 1907, 1909 and 1914, the Queen Regent (Labotsibeni)

and her son, Prince Malunge, encouraged men to "go out" to the

mines in order to earn the money to repurchase expropr ia ted l a n d s .

Levies were var iously set at £3 and £5 per head - the l a t t e r

figure amounting to one qua r t e r of an annua l mine wage. (29) There

was also a contract a l legedly signed by the Queen Regent 's

advisor, Josiah Vil ikazi , to supply 5,000 men to Witwatersrand

mines for a capi ta t ion fee of £2 per head , to ra i se revenue for some

litigation in connection with a cancelled royal concession. (30) And

there was an alleged agreement between Malunge and Swaziland

Tin, Ltd. (1906), whereby the prince was to supply 500 labourers to

ihe company for a fee of 10/- per head . (31) Records indicate that

royal involvement in support of labour recrui t ing continued unt i l at

least the late 1940's, when the Paramount Chief was s t i l l ca l l ing

meetings to ass i s t Native Recruiting Corporation (hereaf ter , NRC)

activities, no doubt in the belief that such support benefitted the

society as a whole. (32)

A th i rd constant was the competition between local and foreign

(South African) cap i ta l for Swazi l abour . Some time before he was

replaced as High Commissioner (1905), Milner met with represen t ­

atives of the Swaziland Chamber of Mines and Indus t ry , notably

42

Allister Miller and David Forbes. Among the topics discussed were

methods by which to retain labour within the Swaziland borders

(The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association - "Wenela" - having

placed an agent in Mbabane as ear ly as 1903). Miller wanted a tax

rebate g ran ted to labour which stayed in the country , to alleviate

the short supply of labour which "began to fall off in 1898".

Presumably the 1907 Proclamation and the subsequent Swazi

expulsion obviated the need for t h a t . (33)

The labour which Miller, Forbes and Milner had in mind was

o r ig ina l ly dest ined for the local mines - t in at Havelock and gold

a t Forbes Reef; but as hopes for big mineral s t r ikes receded by the

time of World War I, British cap i t a l in teres ts shifted to farming ano

ca t t l e r a n c h i n g . The Swaziland Corporation, headed by Miller,

es tab l i shed Ubombo Ranches in the eas t , and implemented the

Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme which (along with the post-war

Returned Sold ie r ' s Settlement Scheme) was designed to populate the

concessions and Crown Lands with a "des i rab le c l a s s " ( i . e . British,

not Afrikaner) of se t t l e r .

The colonial s ta te fully cooperated in that effort. Given tht

condit ions crea ted by the land pa r t i t i on , there ought to have been

plenty of l a b o u r . In 1914, se t t ler - farmers entered into written or

informal cont rac t s with those Swazi who after July 1 were to become

disowned, to remain on the land in return for l abour . Atypical

arrangement called for 6 months ' labour for each adult male at 10/-

per month. Transvaa l farmers holding graz ing concessions in

Swaziland commonly required the labour to be performed on their

farms in the Union. An occasional farmer required a male or two

per family to contract themselves to the rand mines, with the

cap i t a t ion fee (commonly £2 per head) rever t ing to him. Those

refusing the terms, or who were not required as farm labour , were

removed to the Native Areas, by s ta te force if necessary , thus in

theory becoming ava i l ab l e for local mine work. (34)

It was a tidy scheme - what Selborne had referred to as

"farming kaf f i r s" (35) - perfectly suited for what the Swaziland

Corporation had in mind for i ts vast farm hold ings , cotton

41}

production a n d , l a t e r , tobacco. But theory and prac t ice did not

coincide, for aggress ive labour recru i te rs from the Witwatersrand

(dominated by British capi ta l as well) moved in a n d , unopposed by

the Government, soaked up a v a i l a b l e labour- "A ba t ta l ion of labour

recruiters from South Africa has i n v a d e d , " complained a f rus t ra ted

Allister Miller in 1910, "and disorganised the local labour s u p p l y " .

(36) Various remedies - short of r a i s i n g wages - were proposed by

local c a p i t a l , some of which they persuaded the colonial s ta te to

adopt. Farmers insis ted on writ ten cont rac t s with t e n a n t s , which

placed the l a t t e r under provisions of the Master and Servants Law

(Transvaal Law No. 13 of 1880, in force in Swaziland unt i l 1961),

which provided for ha r sh penal t ies for in f rac t ions . Farmers

proposed tha t the Government r equ i re 2 months ' notice before a

squatter could re l inguish t e n a n c y . (37) A measure was adopted

preventing a t tes ta t ion for labour outside Swaziland of any male

whose tax receipt was endorsed a s employed by a local e n t e r p r i s e .

(38) Petitions were made - and rejected - which would have reduced

taxes paid by local farm labour , and (since farms and mines were

resorting increas ingly to the employment of child labour ) denying

travelling passes to workseekers under age 18. (39) Ultimately local

capital turned for i ts solution to importing labour itself -

Mozambican labour ( "c landes t ines" ) , which poured across the border

seeking better condi t ions . "We do not an t ic ipa te any difficulty in

getting raw hands to pick cot ton", reported the Swaziland

Corporation to i ts shareholders in 1907; " . . . t h e r e will be an

inexhaustible supply as women from Portuguese Tongaland would

readily cross over the border to pa r t i c ipa te in the p i ck ing" . The

Mozambique Labour Convention of 1909 theoret ical ly had made the

recruitment of any but Witwatersrand-dest ined mine labour i l l ega l .

but under the colonial s t a t e ' s blind eye ihe flow of c l a n d e s t i n e

never abated until the 1960's in Swaziland. (40)

The Swaziland government responded only selectively tc :occ-.l

capital's demands for l abpur , because it was answerable to the

needs of South African cap i t a l as well . Wenela, es tabl i shed tc

recruit " t rop ica l" labour in Mozambique and the te r r i tor ies north of

44

22° south, operated in Swaziland from at least 1913. The Native

Recruiting Corporation (NRC), incorporated in 1912 to recruit in

South Africa and in the British High Commission Terr i tor ies , leased

i ts first t rac t of l and for a rec ru i t ing office in Mbabane in 1913.

(41) By the 1920's the NRC operat ion became well established, its

h e a d q u a r t e r s at Stegi adminis ter ing the ac t iv i t i es of a dozen or some

storeowners / recru i te rs in or near the Native Areas , who woried

for cap i ta t ion fees and who in turn employed "nat ive runners"to

frequent the ca t t le d ips and beer dr inks looking for likely

prospec ts . Recruiters and runners worked p a r t i c u l a r l y the oust of

underdeveloped Native Areas in Swaziland where the labour outflow

was a lways the g r ea t e s t , in south and west, and also the growing

populat ion centers of Mbabane and Bremersdorp ( la te r Manzini).

Stegi was , in add i t ion , responsible for recru i te rs in northern

Natal (Maputa and lngwavuma) and the eastern Transvaa l (Piet

Retief). It was a lso the h e a d q u a r t e r s for the Wenela operation in

southern Mozambique, providing an a l t e rna t ive to the heavy flowof

l abour through the main a t tes ta t ion point at Ressano Garcia . Stegi

"output" from all these sources , the exact composition of which

awai t s further research , averaged between 3,500 and 6,500 recruits

annua l ly up unt i l World War I I . (42)

Pressure to cease the flow of c landes t ines to local farms and

indus t r i es came not so much from the Government after the 1920'sas

it did from the NRC/Wenela headqua r t e r s at Stegi . That office

ul t imately entered an arrangement with the colonial s ta te whereby

the c landes t ines were rounded u p , and ei ther repa t r ia ted or

del ivered to the NRC for a t tes ta t ion to the Witwatersrand. (43) That

p rac t i s e was in fact a v a r i a n t of one used t r ad i t iona l ly by the

s ta te to funnel labour to the NRC elsewhere in Swaziland, which

involved periodic police sweeps for tax defau l te r s , who were

brought before magis t ra tes and given the choice of a ja i l sentence

(hence convict l abour ) or a NRC con t r ac t . (44) It became standard

p rac t i ce , in fact , for NRC rec ru i t e r s to frequent tax collection

camps, where they paid men 's taxes and / or fines as a recruiting

device, (45)

45

In th is manner a c lass of migrant labour was produced in

Swaziland, men s igning on for s ix , e igh t , a dozen or more 6-month

mine tours in a ca ree r , before " r e t i r i ng" to labour less dangerous

and demanding, and closer to home, on p l an ta t ions or (after 1938)

the new asbestos mine at Havelock. (46) Swazi homesteads on farms

or in Native Areas were preserved intact by means of de legat ing one

or two sons to a mine ca ree r , leaving the family predominantly

agr icu l tura l (though less p roduc t ive ) .

If one looks at the total market numbers in Swaziland just

before the Second World War, a p ic ture emerges which i s

substant ia l ly different from the one which perceives the Swazi as

only 3 to 4 per cent of the rand mine ros te r s . In 1936 the NRC sent

7,852 Swazi labourers to the mines. Another 4,824 Native Trave l l ing

Passes (NTP's) were issued to those "seeking work on own accord" -

contracts and a choice of mines. (47) Another 3,711 NTP's were

issued to "v is i t ing and p r i v a t e " , a category for the most par t

seeking work on farms and in watt le p lan ta t ions in the eas tern

Transvaal , as domestics, or as cane cut ters in Nata l . The total

(which does not include the unknown hundreds - t housands ,

possibly - who slipped across the border i l l ega l ly r a t h e r than pay

the one - sh i l l ing NTP fee) amounts to 67 per cent of the male

working population which left the country to seek work that y e a r .

(48) By 1939, the yea r of the war , another 6,300 men were employed

in-country by local c a p i t a l . It i s therefore no mystery why

Swaziland, a surp lus food producer unt i l the ca t t le pandemics of

the mid-1890's, became a chronic g ra in importer dur ing the

twentieth cen tu ry . (49)

World War II brought subs t an t i a l changes to the Swaziland

labour market . A contingent of Swazi went off to war , near ly 4,000

strong, as the African Pioneer Corps. (50) That did not reduce the

numbers going off to the mines, which, from NRC f igures , averaged

upwards of 10,000 to i4,000 dur ing those y e a r s . The f igures were

reflective of two fac tors : Swazi loyal ty to the Allied cause , no

doubt; and a 24 per cent increase in wages on the Witwatersrand

during the war y e a r s . In fact , the g rea t worry in the High

46

Commission Terr i tor ies was that the Pioneer Corps was siphoning off

not mine labour as much as food producers . (51) That it affected

farm labour in Swaziland there was no doubt; the Swaziland

Farmers ' Association, c i t ing a c r ipp l ing labour shor tage , tried to

induce the Government to res t r ic t al l recru i t ing l icenses, and to

stop labour outmigration except to the gold mines, pet i t ions which

were denied. It may have been at this point that the tried and true

se t t le r - farmer pa t t e rn of res t r ic t ing labour mobility r a t h e r than

r a i s i n g farm wages broke down, although there is no way of

knowing for s u r e . (52)

Whatever the specific of t h a t , three developments set the

post-war labour market in Swaziland a p a r t from the ea r l i e r period:

the development of wage competition resul t ing from massive capital

penetra t ion; the growth of worker consciousness; and the beginnings

of labour r e s i s t ance .

In i t i a l l y , as in the previous e ra , the new cap i t a l was

predominantly Br i t i sh . An ambitious i r r iga t ion scheme was capital­

ized by the Colonial ( l a te r Common-wealth) Development Corporation

(hereaf ter , CDC), which added s u g a r , c i t r u s , and (eventua l ly) rice

to the cul t ivat ion of cotton and tobacco as important irr igated

c r o p s . The CDC and Barclays Bank underwrote the first commercial

timber schemes in the nor th , la ter to be bought out by the

Anglo-American Corporat ion. (53) During the 1960's and 1970's,

South African, J apanese , Taiwanese and American cap i t a l added

mining, food process ing , l ight manufactur ing, and re ta i l industr ­

ies . All transformed the pol i t ical economy of Swaziland, and

reshaped i ts labour market .

Wages had been successfully excluded from the a rena of labour

competition in Swazi land. Farm wages, 20 / - per month maximum in

1917, rose to 3 0 / - per month in the 1920's, only to fall back during

the Depression. (54) The Witwatersrand mines had ac tua l ly reduced

wages between the wars , from £36 per annum to £33 per annum,

subs t i tu t ing something far more effective in lur ing r e c r u i t s : the

" a d v a n c e " . (55) Introduced into Swaziland by 1923, the advance

provided work-seekers £5 cash to pay t axes , f ines , debts to

47

storekeepers (many of whom doubled as r e c r u i t e r s ) , and family

expenses, the money to be repaid dur ing the contracted mine work.

It was an enormously effective rec ru i t ing tool, enough so tha t the

local farmers attempted to have it outlawed. (56) Only in 1939 was

rand mine compensation adjusted in any fashion - tha t being when

the Chamber of Mines commenced paying r a i l fares for r e c r u i t e r s , in

response to pressure from the In te rna t iona l Labour Organ i sa t ion .

(57) The NRC d id , however, offer handsome incent ives to i ts

recrui ters (30 / - per recru i t in ear ly d a y s , up to a maximum of

£2.5.0 per head after the w a r ) , and recru i te rs in turn pa id

capi ta t ion fees to the i r runners ave rag ing 5 / - per r ec ru i t . (58)

The subs tan t i a l NRC output thus generated (16,000, including

Mozambicans via Stegi in 1954) was compounded, in i ts p ressure on

the local labour supply , by the increas ing demands of local

indust ry , and by corresponding requirements from an expanding

South African i n d u s t r y . Recruit ing for South African coal mines,

begun as a war measure, was ins t i tu t ional ized with the pos t -war

establishment of two recru i t ing o rgan iza t ions , Anglo-American

(Witbank Col ler ies) , and the Natal Coal Owners' Labour Organ i s ­

ation (NCOLA). (59) The burgeoning Transvaa l wattle i n d u s t r i e s ,

and the s isal and sugar p lan ta t ions at Pongola and to the South in

Natal, scooped up even more surp lus labour . (60) In Swazi land,

timber became voracious in i ts labour requirements - Peak Timbers

alone p lan t ing 60,000 acres of trees and bui ld ing 750 miles of roads

during the la te 1940's and ear ly 1950's. (61) I r r iga t ion cana l s and

construction projects added to the demand.

The resu l t ing pic ture of the labour scene that emerges belies

the t r ad i t iona l image of a compliant "na t ive" labour force

responding to the dic ta tes of colonial c a p i t a l . Company vehicles

from timber and suga r es ta tes toured the (southern) lowveld region

- where " su rp lus" population remained most concentrated - engaging

labour and re tu rn ing it on weekends. The Transvaa l wattle indust ry

began to pay advances , and the NRC recru i te rs at Piet Retief began

embussing r ec ru i t s in order to escape the "wattle estate g a u n t l e t . "

The NCOLA used miner ' s ph th i s i s as an a rgu ing point aga ins t the

48

•

NRC. Usutu forests , caught up in i ts own p lan t ing scheme,

peti t ioned the NRC to send over its re jec t s . Local indus t r ies began

paying capi ta t ion fees to Swazi s torehands - 10/- twice what the

NRC paid i t s runners - to produce r e c r u i t s . They also took to

paying the fines of c landest ines ar res ted a t the Mozambique border

and hi r ing them on. Labour competition by 1952 had become, in NRC

Superintendant Whitt le 's words, "phenomenal". (62)

The Swazi response to these new conditions was to become very

selective in the i r choice of employment. What became most apparent

to rec ru i t e r s was a strong local desire to labour close to home - a

wi l l ingness , even, to accept lower wages if necessary to do so.

Local indus t ry complied. Timber buil t new q u a r t e r s for its labour

which, in Whitt le 's opinion, were "cer ta in ly bet ter than tha t which

the raw Swazi is accustomed to at home". One timber concern began

bui ld ing accomodations for workers ' families on s i t e , most of them

added recrea t ional fac i l i t ies and improved the qual i ty of the food;

al l of them bussed workers home on weekends. (63) Local

i ndus t r i e s , an exaspera ted Superintendant Whittle informed his

super io r s , were underworking and "overpay( ing) the i r Natives".

"The Swazi", he complained, "is most independent - he has plenty

to choose from and sel ls his labour where and when he wishes".

(64)

In i t i a l l y , se t t ler farmers responded to th is new evidence of

worker consciousness in the tr ied and true manner, br inging

pressure to bea r on the colonial s t a te , and on " the i r" l aboure rs .

They petit ioned the Government to cancel l icenses of a l l r ec ru i t e r s ,

local and South African, except essent ia l gold mine represen ta t ives .

They urged i t to enforce that section of the Master and Servants

Law which made offering higher wages and benefits a criminal

offence. (65) To labour they showed the mailed f is t . They warned

the i r farmworkers that if they took up mining employment, their

families would be "victimised" in the i r absence . They mis-endorsed

pa s se s , p revent ing the i r - men from being at tested at the border .

They shangha ied h i tchhikers by d a y , and they crossed borders and

"poached" labour in the dead of n i g h t . (66)

49

St i l l , labour made itself scarce to undes i r ab le employment.

"The Natives" Whittle reported to Johannesburg , "select the type of

employment they fancy at times to sui t the i r convenience". (67)

Farmers took to frequenting cat t le dips with the i r automobiles,

•offering to employ labour and re turn the men home, sometimes

t ranspor t ing ent i re families to and from work each d a y . (68)

Local indus t ry was able to br ing more effective pressure to

bear on the colonial s ta te by v i r tue of i ts dominance of the

European Advisory Council (since 1922 a powerful influence on the

colonial government) , and the Chamber of Commerce and i n d u s t r i e s .

In 1949 it persuaded the s ta te to decree a policy of different ial

advances : local indus t ry was permitted to offer £5 ; "outside"

indust r ies ( including the NRC and Anglo-American / NCOLA) were

allowed to advance only £3- I t was enough to d r ive out the coal

r ec ru i t e r s , even tua l ly , but NRC output dropped not at a l l . The

reason was wages; for the first time since the war the Chamber of

Mines ra i sed i ts basic wage 12/6- to £4 per month, a full 10 per

cent. (69)

So began a sp i ra l of wage increases in every indus t ry

operating and / or recrui t ing in Swaziland, that lasted from 1949

until well into the 1970's. Timber wages rose from 2 / 3 - per day in

1947 to £1/10- per day in 1976. The basic wage on the

Witwatersrand dur ing the same period rose from 5 / - per day to

£1/5- d a i l y . In 1953 the NRC introduced a bonus scheme to

compensate runners for increased output , and it lowered the

contract length of a mine tour to 6 months. (70) Local indus t ry

responded with increased pay and shor ter (as l i t t l e a s 2 month)

contracts , using the old lure of the la rge advance differential over

the NRC to full a d v a n t a g e . "These short contrac ts with big

advances", Whittle reported with a d i scern ib le sense of pa in , "a re

tying up a lot of a v a i l a b l e l abour" . (71)

The answer was to make other labour a v a i l a b l e . To ease the

cr is is , local indus t ry turned more and more to imported l abour , and

to the employment of women and c h i l d r e n . There a r e only h in t s of

the numbers involved. Havelock mines were employing Mozambicans

50

and Nyasans as from 70 to 80 per cent of their labour force by the

late 1940's. In the mid-1960's , there were at least '5,000

Mozambicans employed in Swaziland, mostly as cane cut ters and

farm laboure r s , performing work which the Swazi men shunned. (72)

Peak Timbers dur ing its p l an t ing and road bui ld ing years used

women and ch i ldren as 60 per cent of i ts work force - without whom *

it could not have car r ied out its program. (73) It is important to bear in mind tha t what colonial officials and

r ec ru i t e r s were seeing dur ing those years as Swazi laz iness and

sloth w a s , in fact , the beginnings of a sense of discrimination with

which a workforce, becoming conscious of i tself and of i ts new

opt ions, was making i ts selections of employment. "It often happens

that a new place of employment a t t r ac t s labour" , Whittle explained

:o Johannesburg , "as the Native l ikes to ' t r y it out ' to see how it

compares with mining work and p a y , e t c . " Usutu Forests was a

perennia l bridesmaid to the NRC in the recrui t ing bus iness because

timber work was unpleasant in cold, wet weather , and because it

acquired a reputa t ion for low pay and poor l iving condi t ions . The

Company, Whittle wrote, "only obtained the ' l e f t -overs ' from the

N.R.C Men go to Usutu, and when they find that there is only

forest work ( ins tead of mill work) , they dese r t " . (74)

Swazi workers also figured out how to play the "advance game"

deft ly, by sol ici t ing the £5 advance from one timber company after

ano ther , deser t ing after a d a y ' s work at each , working the sugar

es ta tes on the lowveld in the same manner before skipping off to

Johannesburg with the NRC. Companies were so desperate for labour

they would not su r render the malefactors when identif ied; that

became the task of the Swaziland and the South African Police. (75)

One other aspect of labour market consciousness bears

mentioning h e r e , al though the w r i t e r ' s research for it remains

ske tchy . Swazi workers , l ike other workforces through Southern

Africa (consistent with the design of mining c a p i t a l ) , re ta ined the i r

roles as homesteaders as a source of supplementary income. The

t r ad i t i ona l ca t t l e economy was made more l iquid after 1945 when the

Government es tab l i shed a ser ies of ca t t l e auct ions throughout the

51

country . The Swazi became more adept at what they had a lways

been proficient in , the management of ca t t le as an investment .

There came to be a connection between the marketing of ca t t le and

job seeking, the de ta i l s of which requi re fur ther r esea rch ; but

cat t le appea r to have become a source of income which became a

conscious a l t e r n a t i v e to unacceptable work condi t ions . Prudent

investment in , and shrewd marketing of cat t le provided the

wherewithal for, among other u n d e r t a k i n g s , avoiding work which

was considered unremunera t ive , unp leasan t , demeaning, or dange r ­

ous. Ini t ia l research indica tes a negat ive correlat ion between ca t t l e

prices and NRC output . Cer ta inly the recru i te rs were convinced of

tha t . This is a l l the more in t r iguing because there does not seem to

be a correlat ion of any s ignif icance between, s ay , crop fa i lure or

droughts , and NRC ou tpu t .

The beginnings of labour res is tance in Swaziland can thus be

seen in the ways in which the workforce played the market

conditions, for the best rewards in wages and condi t ions .

withholding the i r labour a l together if necessary , other means of

support being a v a i l a b l e . But the acute labour shor tage which gave

these re la t ive advan tages to Swazi workmen lasted only unt i l the

early 1960's. Slackening of the labour market , a resul t of

population growth and a levell ing off of cap i ta l investment, led

companies at that time to withdraw concessions previously granted

in order to a t t r ac t labour , and to enforce more s t r i c t ly the exis t ing

regulat ions . Timber companies cracked down on absenteeism, while

the NRC reverted to the unpopular 9-month con t rac t .

The Swazi labourer responded to these developments by

unionizing ( loca l ly , where he could) , and by s tag ing a ser ies oi

strikes and job actions throughout 1963 and 1964. The most notable Bend

unrest occurred a t the B i g / s u g a r complex, serious enough that a

British army contingent was flown in to restore order , remaining in

Swaziland until 1968. Although the s t a t e , backed by the monarchy,

suppressed unionism thereaf ter , overt labour res is tance continued

on for another two y e a r s , and continued less d iscern ib ly well after

52

independence in 1968. (7&)

Conclusion

What s t r ikes the researcher in the study of the Swazi labour

market , in cont ras t to, say , the Basotho exper ience, is the galvanic

effect which free market forces can have on worker consciousness

and percept ive response . On the subject of labour h i s to ry , it is

almost as if there were two Swazilands pre -and post-1945. Before

the war , the removal of the Swazi from the means of production,

and the extract ion of their surp lus at the hands of set t ler capital

in league with the colonial s t a t e , reads like a textbook example of

how it is correct ly done. Royalty and chiefs , p ro tes t ing , are

suppressed , deceived, even humiliated, while the i r control over the

p r e - i ndus t r i a l economy and society is careful ly preserved by the

s t a t e . Peasan t s , thus impoverished, labour for set t ler farmers on

set t ler terms, or go off to the mines under mineowners' conditions.

What competition there develops between local and Transvaa l mining

cap i t a l i s adjudicated by the colonial s ta te for the benefit of all -

save the Swazi l abou re r .

Post-1945* massive capi ta l penetrat ion replaced this relatively

comfortable accomodation with conditions of ha r sh competition for

labour gone sca rce , which the worker, once a l e r t ed , pa r l ayed with

shrewdness and ski l l to his own benefi t . Only when labour once

aga in became plentiful in the ear ly 1960's did labour manipulation

of the market (a form of res is tance) turn into more discernible

pa t t e rns of opposi t ion, unionization and s t r i k e s . The degree to

which local indus t ry turned to female and child l abour , and foreign

(notably Mozambican* workers , is one indicat ion of the vola t i l i ty of

the market of which the Swazi took a d v a n t a g e .

Furthermore, one gets the feeling (though th is r equ i res further

research) t ha t worker consciousness produced by these conditions

was but one dimension of family consciousness . Family surv iva l was

subjected to many h r*a t s in twent ie th-century Swaziland, both

n a t u r a l and man-made, iiic a r r a y of defenses which the family

53

e r e c t e d , t h e s o l u t i o n s i t c h o s e , i n v o l v e d d e c i s i o n s o n w o r k , c r o p s ,

c a t t l e , c o n f l i c t i n g l o y a l t i e s , a n d a h o s t of o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

F a m i l y s u r v i v a l i n t h e 1 9 5 0 ' s m a y h a v e d i c t a t e d , for e x a m p l e , t h a t

t he f a t h e r r e m a i n e d b e h i n d o n t h e h o m e s t e a d t o m a x i m i z e c r o p

p r o d u c t i v i t y w h i l e t h e w i f e a n d c h i l d r e n w e n t off t o U s u t u t o p l a n t

t r e e s - H o m e s t e a d p r o d u c t i v i t y w a s a f a r g r e a t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n a m o n g

the S w a z i t h a n c o l o n i a l o f f i c i a l s g a v e t h e m c r e d i t f o r : w i t n e s s t h e

l e g e n d a r y d r o u g h t of 1964, w h i c h t h e NRC c o n f i d e n t l y e x p e c t e d t o

g e n e r a t e a h e a v y o u t p u t ' . E x a c t l y t h e o p p o s i t e h a p p e n e d : t h e

9 -mon th c o n t r a c t s o t h r e a t e n e d S w a z i p r o d u c t i v i t y t h a t men s t a y e d

home , p l o u g h e d g r e a t e r a c r e a g e s , a n d s o l d off t h e i r c a t t l e in o r d e r

to s u r v i v e . ( 7 7 )

R e s e a r c h on f a m i l y h i s t o r y w i l l p r o v i d e u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n

a b o u t how a s e m i - p r o l e t a r i a n i z e d s o c i e t y r e s p o n d e d t o t h e c h a l ­

l e n g e s a n d t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s p r o v i d e d b y t h e p o s t - 1 9 4 5 l a b o u r

m a r k e t c o n d i t i o n s , w h a t f a m i l y p r i o r i t i e s w e r e , a n d how t h e y w e r e

met . T h e r e i s n e e d for f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h a l s o on w h a t f a c t o r s

g e n e r a t e d w h a t t y p e s of w o r k s e e k i n g . T h a t w i l l r e q u i r e e x t e n s i v e

q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a n d a n a l y s i s of d a t a , b u t h o p e f u l l y we c a n t h e r e b y

a r r i v e a t some h e l p f u l c o n c l u s i o n s o n c o r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g s t a g r i c u l t ­

u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y , l a b o u r o u t p u t , a n d s o c i a l c h a n g e , i n a p o s t - w a r

S o u t h e r n A f r i c a n l a b o u r m a r k e t w h e r e e l e m e n t s of c h o i c e a c t u a l l y

e x i s t e d - a n d , for a w h i l e , f l o u r i s h e d .

Footnotes

1 Philip L. Bonner. Kjngs^ Commoners and Concessionaires. Camb­ridge University Press, forthcoming. I9S2.

2 Francis J. Mashasha. "The Road to Colonialism: Concessions a rd the Collapse of Swazi Independence. 1875-1926", unpublished PH.D. dissertation. Oxford University. 1977: Balam Nyeko. "The

Swazi Leadership's Response to Colonial Rule. 1902-1900." unpub­lished Pi .D. dissertat ion. Makerere University- 1977-

3 J.S, Crush. "The Spatial Impress of Capital anc" the Colonial Stair in Swaziland." unpublished M.A. thesis, La-urier University. 1978: J.S. Crush. "Thi Colonial Division of Space: The Significance of the Swaziland I.ard Parti t ion". International Journal of Afi ican Historical Studies. XIII. 1 U980). 7rap;'"JT£«~£Tush; "The'GonesTs of tTolcniaT "Tard Poiicv in Swaziland". The South African Geogra-pj iu-aj joutnal . L X l I . ' l (1980). 73-86: J7S. C"rus"nT~*TTn~e~~Para­meters of Drpt r.c'encc in Southern Africa: A Case Study of Swaziland". J u'"na_!_ of Southern African Affairs, VI. 1 (1979). 55-66: J .S. CrusfT. "Settler Estate Production. Monopoly Control and the Imperial Response: The Case of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd.". African Economic History. Fall 1979. 183-198.

54

2 Uari ln j . F ransman. "The Plat*? and Development in Swazi land. ^60 -1977 . " unpubl ished PH.D. d i s s e r t a t i on . Universi ty of Sussex. 197$,

3 Fion de V l e t t e r , "Migrant Labour in Swazi land: C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . A ' l i i udes . and Policy Impl ica t ions" . In te rna t iona l Labour Organ-

Findings of a Socio-Economic Survey Undertaken Jointly by the United States Agency for In te rna t iona l Development (USAID) and the Univers i ty College of Swazi land" , 1981, mimeo; S.G. Heilbronn, "KaTer Laws. Prior Rights and Government Apportionment in Swazi land . Southern Africa". 1981, mimeo; A.R.C. Low, "Migration and Agr icu l tura l Development in Swazi land" , 1L0, Migration for Employment Project , i977. mimeo; Beth D. Rosen-Prinz and Fred"^ erick ~~A~~' Pr inz . ""''Migrant Labour and Rural Homesteads: An Inves t iga t ion Into the Sociological Dimensions of the Migrant Labour System in Swaziland"* ILO, Migration, for Employment Project• 1978. mimeo.

6 ; ' . ] . Fransman, "The Colonial State and the Land Question in Swazi land. 1903-1907", ICS Seminar p a p e r . SSA/77/9, Universi ty of London. 1977. p . 2 .

7 Cf. f n s . 2-6 above . 8 Milner to Enraght-Mocny (Resident Magis t ra te for Swaz i l and ) , 18

September 190£, J62.'0£, Swaziland National Archives (hereaf te r , SNA'.

9 RCS 3*9/19, SNA 10 Telegram (Confidential J. Smuts to Milner, 5 August 1898. S U D.

SNA 11 Smuts to Lord Bishop. L November 1897. S 14 F2. SNA. 12 Selborne to -ord Lyit leton, Colonial Secre ta ry , 10 July 1905.

J138/05. SNA 13 Selborne to Lord Elgin, Colonial Secre ta ry , 29 October 1906.

J220/06. SNA 14 I b i d . ; Crush . "Genesis of Colonial Land Pol icy ," p . 78. SNA. 15 "TTTrTutes, Meeting of the Swazi Chiefs with the Earl of Elgin,

London. 21 November 1907, J45/07. SNA 16 Miller to D. Malcom, P r iva t e Secretary to Selborne, 21 December

1906 MS Mil 1.08.16 (MS 429), Miller P a p e r s , Killie Campbell** L ibra ry (he rea f t e r , KCL).

17 Grey to Selborne (Conf ident ia l ) , 7 December 1908, D09/2 SNA. 18 Minutes, Meeting of the Resident Commissioner (hereaf te r . RC) s

with the Queen Regent and Chiefs, 26 August 1913. RCS 478/13.SNA.

19 Miller to Malcom, 21 December 1906, o p . c i t . 20 Sir A. Pirn, "Report of the Commission Appointed By the Secretary

of State for Dominion Affairs to Inquire Into the Position of Swaziland from the Financia l and Economic Points of View", London. HMSO, 1932.

21 B.T. Squ i r e s , M.D., "Report on the Nutri t ional Status of Swazi Ch i ld ren" , 1945; Dr. S. Selby, "Report on the Nutri t ional Condition of Swazi Ch i ld r en" , 19*5. File 986, SNA,

22 Hei lbronn, "Water Laws", p p . 4 -5 ; Miller P a p e r s , MS Mil 1 08 2 (MSS 184F and 404B). KCL. By 1927 water was being d iver ted far more for i r r i g a t e d farming than for mining pu rposes .

23 Lord Har lech, High Commissioner (hereaf te r , HC). to C .L . Bruton, RC. (Secre t ) , 20 J a n u a r y 1942, RCS 434/41. SNA.

24 Selborne to E lg in . 14 May 1906, J /06, SNA. 25 "Report on Swazi land" , 18 September 1903. J50/1904. SNA:

in te rv iew, Maboya Fakudze , Lobamba, Swazi land. 2 November 1980.

26 Enraght-Moony to Queen Regent. 28 April 1903: "Let ( the) young men go out to l abour for money". J82/03 SNA; Milner to Queen Regent, 13 July J904: " *" South Africa . . . . t h e r e ( i s ) a lways p lenty of good work and good wages for n a t i v e s " . J138/05. SNA.

27 HC to RC, 2 April 1914, RCS 434/14.SNA. One morgen equa ls

55

approximate ly two a c r e s . 28 3 May 1899. S 7 A, SNA. The concession was l a t e r dec lared by the

Government to have been automat ica l ly terminated upon the k i n g ' s d e a t h .

29 Enraght-Moony to R.T. Coryndon, 24 October 1905, J294705; Enraght-N'^ony to Rodwell. Imperial Secre ta ry , 18 J a n u a r y 1907, J13/07; R.T. Coryndon. RC. to Rodwell. 3 July 1909. D09/88: Assistant Commissioner (hereaf te r , AC), Hla t iku lu . to Government Sec re ta ry , Mbabane. 29 April 1914, RCS 371/14, SNA.

30 Correspondence and Telegrams (Confidential) between HC and RC, J a n u a r y 1907. J13/07. SNA.

31 Correspondence between D. Honey, RC. and Swaziland Tin, L td . . J a n u a r y - February 1915. RCS 100/15. SNA.

<2 F.A.L. V'hittle. District Super in tendent , NRC, to C.R. Latimer. Acting Government Sec re ta ry , 16 August 1918, RCS 404/42,SNA.

33 Meeting notes , handwr i t t en , J152/06; Enraght-Moony. "Notes or. Swazi land" , 18 September 1903. J50-04, SNA.

3i AC, Hla t iku lu . to Government Secre ta ry , 29 April 1914. RCS 371 /U; AC, Peak District to Government Secre ta ry , o November 1914. RCS 854/14; RC to HC, 19 June 1915, RCS 277/15; Government Secre tar \ to AC ' s . 28 Mav 1915. RCS 328/15, SNA.

35 Selborne to Elgin, 29 October 1906, J220/06, SNA. 36 Crush, "Swaziland Corporat ion" , 187. 37 Petition of Hlat ikhulu Fa rmers ' Association. October 1924, RCS

474/24; Honey to Pr ince Arthur of Connaught . HC. 20 J a n u a r y 1921, RCS 564/18, SNA. The High Commissioner refused the 2 months' notice provis ion . Pr isoners convicted under the Master and Servants Law provided free labour to build r o a d s , b r i d g e s , and other publ ic works - in effect a form of s t a t e subs idy to the set t ler popula t ion .

38 Miller to Government Sec re ta ry , 14 September 1915: Government Secretary to Miller, 25 September 1915. RCS 514/15. SNA.

39 Petition of Hlatikulu Farmers ' Association, September 1917. RC5 489/17; Petition of Hlat ikulu Farmers ' Association. 23 J a n u a r y 1919. RCS 92/19; Meeting. High Commissioner with Chiefs, Mbabane

12 March 1923. RCS 70-23. SNA. £0 Crush, "Swaziland Corporat ion, "188-189; Government Secre tarv to

AC's. 10 December 1928. File 1437, SNA. £1 RCS 669/13. SNA. £2 Ruth First e t . a l . . The Mozatabican Miner: A Study in. t h e . Export

of Labour <f977). t ab l e between p p . 24 and 25. £3 File 1437, SNA. U Meeting of Senior Officials Mbabane, 29 July 1923. RCS 682-32.

SNA. 45 Swaziland Annual Report. 1913-1914; Monthly Report . Mbabane.

April 1949- Native Recruit ing Corporation P a p e r s . Si teki , Swazi­land (hereaf ter . NRC).

46 In 1932 the mine contract adminis tered by the RCS was increased to 9 months, which proved immediately and un ive r sa l l y unpopular with the Swazi worker because it cut into the a g r i c u l t u r a l season, and hence reduced homestead produc t iv i ty . Thus more and more Swazi opted to "go out" under the Assisted Voluntary Scheme (AVS; system, whereby a workseeker t ravel led to Johannesburg at h i s own expense , i n i t i a l l y , but under a 6-month, or a 4-month cont rac t , and sought out h i s own work from mines with opening? there .

47 Cf. fn. 46 above . 48 Swaziland Annual Report. 1936; Swaziland Census, 1936. The

Census category of "Mature males, 15-50 years '" was adjusted to th~e more t r ad i t iona l age 18-45 definition of a "working male populat ion" in order to a r r i v e a t th i s pe rcen tage .

£9 Pirn Report (1932); Swaziland Annual Report, 1939. By 1939 the asbes tos mine at Havelock was employing 2 000. half of whom were said to be Shancaan "c l andes t i ne s " . "Labour at H.ivelock Mine".

56

i7 October 193S- Box 741a-770b. SNA. 50 File 304 11 S i l l . SNA: I.S.M. Matsobuia. A History of Swaziland

U972*. p . 105-107. 51 "Output" f igures from NRC s t a t i s t i c s . Tho Employment Bureau of

Africa iTEBA* office. Mbabane. Agon! for ihe High Commission Terr i tor ies to the Government Secre tary . Maseru, Basuioland, 27 April 1942. RCS 416/42, SNA: Francis Wilson. Labour in the .South African Gold Mines 1911 - 1969 11972). p- 46. As Wilson poin ts ou t . in real terms, there was no wage increase al a l l .

32 Meeting oT~ the Swaziland Farmers ' Association with the RC, 16 October" 1940. RCS 93/40; Special Meeting of ihe Swaziland Farmer*' Associat ion. 19 July 1941. RCS 404/42, SNA.

53 In terv iew. Robert P . Stevens . Piggs Peak, Swazi land, i5 June 19? 1.

5i HC's Visit to Swazi land. September 1917. RCS 489/17 and 493/17: RC to HC. 15 Juno 1923. RCS 440/23: Meeting of Chiefs, 30 March 1932. RCS 73/32. SNA.

55 AC Hlatikulu to Government Secre ta ry . 11 September 1917. RCS 493'17: Agent fci' the High Commission Terr i tor ies Co Government Sec re ta ry . Maseru, Basute land, 1 September 1942. RCS 512/42, SNA.

56 Honey to Cannaugh t . 15 June 1923, RCS 440/23: Meeting of European Advisory Council with RC, 30 September 1923, RCS 645/23. SNA.

57 W.H. Clark (HO to C.L. Bruton (RC). 8 December 1939. RCS 433/37. SNA.

5S "Labour Conditions in Swazi land" , 30 April 1954 and 21 January 1955. File 5^4; '"Labour Condit ions", 4 May 1949. File 919. SNA. Beginning in the l a te 19^0's, the NRC moved away from the cap i t a t ion fee system toward a force of s a l a r i e d professional r e c r u i t e r s , p a r t i a l l y to reduce cos ts , and p a r t i a l l y to stop abuses by the t r a d e r s / r e c r u i t e r s , which were being scru t in ised by the 1LO. Interview with F .A.L. Whittle, Johannesburg , South Africa, 23 June 1981.

59 NRC Output d a t a . TEBA offices, Mbabane; Monthly Reports, Piel Retief, June 1948 and December 1950, NRC.

60 Annual Report, District Super in tendent (F .A.L . Whit t le) , 1950, NRC.

61 In te rv iew, Robert P. Stevens, Piggs Peak, Swaziland, 15 June 1981.

62 Monthly Reports : Mbabane, November 1948; Piet Retief, J anuary 1950; Mbabane , December 1950; District Super in tendan t , June 1951 and September 1952, NRC.

63 Monthly Reports : District Super in tendan t , February 1951; Mbaba­ne, March 1951, NRC.

64 Monthly Reports: District Super in tendant , J a n u a r y and March 1953, NRC.

65 Special Meeting of the Stegi Farmers ' Association, 11 March 1946, File 919. SNA.

67 Monthly Report, District Super in tendant , May 1954, NRC. 68 Monthly Reports : Piet Retief, April 1953; District Super in tendan t ,

June 1954. NRC. 69 Whittle to Government Secre ta ry , 12 May 1949, File 1735, SNA;

Monthly Report , District Super in tendan t , October 1949, NRC. 70 Monthly Reports : District Super in tendant , August 1947, July 1952,

J a n u a r y 1953: Bremersdorp, April 1953; Mbabane, May 1976, NRC. The NRC adjusted i ts contrac t length as much a s i ts wages offered, in order to effect e l a s t i c i ty of labour supply on Ihe r a n d . It re in t roduced the 9-month contrac t in 1961; reduced it to 6 months in 1965; and re - lengthened it a g a i n to 9 months in 1971.

71 Monthly Report , District Super in tendan t , June 1957, NRC. 72 "Foreign Natives in Swazi land" . 1949. File 1437; "Foreign Labour

in Swazi land" , 14 June 1965, Secretar ia t Box 597, SNA. 73 In te rv iew, Robert P . Stevens . Piggs Peak, Swaziland, 15 June

1981.

57

1L Monthly Reports, District Super in tendant , October I960 and July 1961, NRC.

75 Monthly Reports: Mbabane, March, April and August I960; District Super in tendan t , June I960. NRC. These and other ac t i v i t i e s cons t i tu te what Robin Cohen ca tegor izes as "amplifying social d i s tance and c rea t ing a work -cu l tu re" , aspects of h i s "hidden forms of worker consc iousness" , Robin Cohen, "Resis tance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Amongst African Workers". Review of African Poli t ical Economy, 19 (September - December 1980),

76 Fur ther research will e s t ab l i sh the r e l a t ionsh ip between f luc tu­a t ions in the labour market and the levels of l abour r e s i s t encc . The Government i nqu i ry into the causes of the Big Bend d i s tu rbances affords some ins ight into the o r ig in s of th i s ag i t a t ion , but labour res i s t ance in Swaziland, as th i s paper at tempts to make c l e a r , can be traced back a lot fu r the r . Cf. especia l ly Fransman, "The State and Development in Swazi land" , chapte r 4; Swaziland Government t Confidential Report of the Committee of Enquiry In to Unrest i ^ Swaziland, jr^th" june-!Tt"H"" July I9b3i Mbabane, "HS6i5; Swaziland " Government, Bfg~ Bend ?tri1<c~:~fhc. Report of the Commission of Enquiry , Mbabane, T^KJT

77 "Monthly Reports , District Super in tendan t , May and June 1964, NRC*