The Development of Kantian Thought Vleeschauwer

THOMAS NELSON AND SONS LTDParkside Works Edinburgh 936 Park Street London WI

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Originally published asL'Evolution de fa pensee Kantienne

Presses Universitaires de France, 1939

English translation© A. R. C. Duncan 1962

Author's Preface

This book is not an original work in the strict sense of thatterm. Between 1934 and 1937 I published an extensivestudy of the Critical philosophy under the general title ofLa Diduction transcendantale dans l' CEuvre de Kant. This threevolume work had a dual purpose. First, it was intended tooffer a textual commentary on that part of the Critique ofPureReason known as the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Secondly, it sought to trace the development of thewhole Critical problem which comes to a central point in theTranscendental Deduction. The kind reception accordedto this work made it impossible for me to ignore thesuggestion made by several colleagues that I should give ageneral account of the evolution of Kantian thought.

The use of the historical method makes an authorcautious about a priori schemas in any attempt to determinehistorical reality; it also forbids him to be guided in hisresearches by any preconceived idea of the nature of theCritical philosophy. An almost religious respect for thedocumentary evidence is for the historian a matter of professional duty. Twelve years devoted to the study of theKantian corpus, to the comparison of Kant's letters with hispublished works, to cautious use of his Nachlass, to inquiryinto the cultural state of Germany in the eighteenth century,constituted a powerful defence against any temptation to apriorism. Close personal study of the facts led the writer topay attention to the lesson of the facts themselves.

From my willing acceptance of the demands of tIlehistorical method has come a new conception of some aspectsof Kant's intellectual career, and consequently I have beenforced to contradict some of the critical cliches to be foundin many of the textbooks. The interest in the exact sciel1cesshown by Kant at the beginning of his career no longerappears to have the mysterious and revealing cllaractercommonly attributed to it. The recognition of the admirable unity which can be traced in Kant's thought, in spite of

vii

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

frequent deviations in the solution of special problems,springs directly from a rutWess rejection of the Hegeliankind of interpretation typified by Kuna Fischer. Myemphasis on the importance of the psychology of Tetens inthe structure ofth.e Critical philosopllY may also be attributedto my use of the historical method. The same method ledme to the paradoxical, but none the less true, view that thesecond edition of the Critique is not a reaction againstidealism itself, but a reaction against the subjectivity inherentin some forms of idealism, which led Kant to a gradualreinforcement of his own idealism by a more and morepronounced constructivism. My atten1pt to deal with thevaried fortunes of the Kantian systen1, its reception both by]1is disciples and his opponents, and my inclusion of aconsideration of the Opus Postumum in the story ofhis development, are the natural outcome of my adoption of the:historical method.

I am personally convinced that the account of Kant'sintellectual life, which I offer in this book, owes whataccuracy it has to the methodological principles employedin it. The reader must judge for himself to what extent Iam correct in this opinion. For myself I can only expressmy personal conviction. I certainly do not claim to havesaid the last \vord in this matter-very far from it. Myearlier work, despite its size and the austere nature of theargument, was given a favourable reception by the philosophical public. This leads me to believe that, after aperiod of Kantian philology which has been the source of amultitude of special studies, my commentary served auseful purpose and indeed came at an opportune moment.The present work is a gesture of gratitude in response tothis sympathetic reception ofmy commentary and is intendedto give my readers wllat they themselves have asked for. Noone need look in tIlese pages for a close exposition of theCritical teaching or for any detailed explanation of obscurepassages. I am not writing as a philosopher. My purposeis more modest. I should like to be considered as thehistorian of a great system and the biographer of a greatmind.

I have deliberately refrai:r;.~d from any attempt to turnVlli

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

this historical sketch into a scholarly treatise. The reader isexpected to be familiar with the problems of the subject andwith the general structure of the Critical synthesis. Hencethe usual scholarly apparatus ofnotes, references, and quotations has been ruthlessly omitted. I must reassure thereader's professional conscience, however, by pointing outthat in tIle earlier work, of which this is an abbreviatedversion, will be found everything which scientific integritydemands of a writer. To Illake access to the sources easier,I indicate at the l1ead of each chapter the relevant pages inthe earlier work, where the documents are quoted. I haveadopted the following abbreviations:

La Deduction (followed by volume and page number) refers toLa Deduction transcendantale dans l' (Euvre de Kant (Anvers-ParisLa flaye).

Volume I The Deduction before the Critique (1934), pp. 332Volume II The Deductionfrom I78I-7 (1936), pp. 597'Volume III The Deductionfrom 1787 up to the Opus Postumunt

(1937), pp. 70 9·

Revue BeIge refers to an article entitled ' L'Annee 177 I dansl'histoire de la pensee de Kant' in the Revue Beige de Philologieet d'Histoire, Vol. XIII, nos. 3-4, pp. 713-32 and Vol. XIV,no. I, pp. 49-83 (1934-5).

Mind refers to another article entitled 'Les Alltinomieskantiennes et la Clavis universalis d'Arthur Collier' in Mind,Vol. XLVII, No. 187, pp. 3°3-20 (1938).

I-I.-J. de Vleeschauwer

IX

Writings by Kant

referred to by de Vleeschauwer

In his account of the development of Kant's thought, de Vleeschauwerrefers to three different classes of writings by Kant:

A. PUBLISHED WORI<S

In the following list the abbreviation or descriptive phrase usually adoptedby de Vleeschauwer is given first in italics: then follow the full Germanor Latin title, date of publication and English translation of the title.Where an English translation of the book, partial or complete, is available, this is added. The works are listed under the Chapter sections inwhich they are either first n1entioned or explicitly discussed.

Chapter I Section 2

Lebendige f(riifte. Gedanken von den wahren Schatzung del' lebendigenKrafte, 1747 (Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces).

Selected passages translated by Handyside in Kant's Inaugural Dissertation(Open Court, 1928).

Naturgeschichte. Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels,1755 (Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens).

Translated in part by W. Hastie in Kant's Cosmogony (Maclehose & Sons,1900). This work also contains a translation of the article by ThomasWright.

De Igne. Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio, 1755(A Brief Outline of Some Meditations on Fire).

Dilucidatio. Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae novadilucidatio, 1755 (A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge).

Translated in the Appendix to England's Kant's Conception of God (Allen& Unwin, 1929).

Monadologia physica. Metaphysicae cum geometria junctae usus inphilosophia naturali cujus specimen I continet Monadologiam physicam,1756 (The Use of Metaphysics in Combination with Geometry in NaturalPhilosophy, the first section ofwhich contains the Physical Monadology).

Neuer Lehrbegrijf. Neuer Lehrbegriff cler Bewegung und Ruhe und clerdamit verknupften Folgerungen in den ersten Grunden cler Naturwissenschaft, 1758 (A New Doctrine ofRest and Motion and its Implicationsfor Natural Science).

xu

WRITINGS BY KANT

Chapter I Section 3

The essay on the syllogism. Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen, 1762 (The Mistaken Subtlety of the FourSyllogistic Figures).

Translated by T. K. Abbott in Kant's Introduction to Logic (Longmans,Green & Co., 1885).

/vegativen Grossen. Versuch den Begriff der Negativen Grossen in dieWeltweisheit einzufuhren, 1763 (An Attempt to Introduce NegativeQuantities into Philosophy).

Beweisgrund. Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstrationfur das Dasein Gottes, 1763 (The only possible Foundation for a Proof ofthe Existence of God).

Beobachtungen. Beobachtungen tiber das Gefuhl des Schonen undErhabenen, 1764 (Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and theSublime).

Deutlichkeit or Preisschrift (Prize Essay). Untersuchung tiber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der naturlichen Theologie und der Moral, 1764(An Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theologyand Morals).

Translated by L. W. Beck in Critique of Practical Reason and other writingSin Moral Philosophy (University of Chicago Press, 1949).

Chapter I Section 4

Nachricht. Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in demWinterhalbenjahre von 1765-66, 1765 (Programme of Lectures forWinter Semester 1765-6).

Triiume. Traume eines Geistersehers erHiutert durch die Traume derMetaphysik, 1766 (Dreams of a Spiritseer explained through the Dreamsof Metaphysics).

Translated by E. F. Goerwitz (Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London,1900).

Chapter I Section 6

The little dissertation or essay on space. Von dem ersten Grunde des U nterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, 1768 (On the First Ground of theDistinction of Regions ~n Space).

Sections translated by Handyside (in volume quoted above).

Dissertatio. De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiisdissertatio, 1770 (Inaugural Dissertation on the Form and Principles ofthe Sensible and Intelligible World).

Translated by Handyside (in volume quoted above).xiii

WRITINGS BY KANT

Chapter III Section I

The theoretical Critique. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. First edition, 1781.Second edition, 1787 (Critique of Pure Reason).Translated by Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan, 1933).Prolegomena. Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Metaphysik die alsWissenschaft wird auftreten kennen, 1783 (Prolegomena to any FutureMetaphysics) .Translated by Lewis \Vhite Beck (Liberal Arts Press, 1951).Anfangsgrunde. Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft,1786 (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science).

Translated by E. B. Bax in Kant's Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundationsof Natural Science (Bell & Sons, 1883) (This includes the importantfootnote referred to on page I 14) .

Chapter III Section 2

Grundlegung. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785 (Founda..tions for the Metaphysics of Morals).

Translated by Lewis White Beck (in volume quoted above).

The practical Critique. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique ofPractical Reason).

Translated by Lewis White Beck (in volume quoted above).

Chapter III Section 3

The third Critique. Kritik cler Urteilskraft, 1790 (Critique ofJudgment).

1'ranslated by]. C. Meredith (Oxford, 191 I).

Chapter IV Section I

Entdeckung. Ueber eine Entdeckung nach der aIle neue Kritik der reinenVernunft durch eine altere entbehrlich gemacht werden soIl, 1790 (Ona discovery according to which any new critique of pure reason isrendered unnecessary on account of an earlier one).

Chapter IV Section 2

Fortschritte. Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitz's und Wolff's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?1804 (What real progress has been made by metaphysics in Germanysince the time of Leibniz and Wolff?).


The Declaration against Fichte. ErkHirung in Beziehung auf Fichte'sWissenschaftslehre, 1799 (Declaration concerning Fichte's Doctrine ofScience).

xiv

WRITINGS BY KANT


Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793(Religion within the Limits of Reason alone).

Translated by T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (Harper and Brothers,New York, 1960).

Perpetual Peace. Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795. Translated by Lewis WhiteBeck (in volume quoted obove).

Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797 (The Metaphysics of Morals).

The first part of this work, the section on law, has been translated byW. Hastie in Kant's Philosophy ofLaw. (T. and T. Clarke, 1887). Partsof the second half, the section on ethics, have been translated by LewisWhite Beck (in the volume quoted above).

B. LETTERS

These include both letters written by Kant to his friends and letterswritten to Kant. The page references are to Volumes X and XII of thePrussian Academy edition. The letters are listed under the Chaptersections and in the order in which they are referred to in the text.

Chapter I Section 5

Lambert to Kant

Kant to Garve

13 November 1765

Chapter I Section 6

21 September 17g8

Prussian AcademyEdition

Vol. X p. 48

Vol. XII p. 254

Chapter I Section 7

Lambert to Kant 13 October 1770 Vol. X p. g8Sulzer to Kant 8 December 1770

"p.l06

Mendelssohn to Kant 25 December 1770 " p.l08Kant to Herz 7 June 1771 " p. 116Kant to Herz 21 February 1772

" p. 123

Chapter II Section I

Kant to Herz end of 1773 Vol. X p. 136Kant to Herz 24 November 1775 " p. 184Kant to Herz April 1778 " p. 21 4Kant to Herz 28 August 1778 " p.224Kant to Herz 15 December 1778

"p. 228

Kant to Herz January 1779 " p. 230XV

WRITINGS BY KANT

c. THE NACHLASS

Kant's personal papers not intended for publication are collectivelyreferred to as the Nachlass. These are largely made up of:

(a) marginal notes written by Kant either on textbooks which he wasusing as a basis for his lectures or as corrections on works of his own.

(b) various personal papers, never intended for publication, which maycontain a mere phrase, a line, or a fairly lengthy argument.

The definitive edition is to be found in Volumes XIV to XIX of thePrussian Academy edition of Kant's collected works. De Vleeschauwerhowever refers to three in1portant works which appeared before theAcademy edition :

(i) Erdmann B., Reflexionen Kants, Leipzig, 1884 (2 vols.) (usuallyreferred to as Reflexionen).

(ii) Reicke R., Lose Bliitter aus Kants Nachlass, Konigsberg (3 vols., 1889,1895, 1899) (usually referred to as Lose Bliitter).

(iii) Haering T., Der Duisburg'sche Nachlass und Kants Kritizismus um 1775.Tubingen, 1910.

This work contains a special study of some of the more importantfragments already published by Reicke, and is usually referred to asthe Duisburg'sche Nachlass.

Under this general heading may also be included two other importantworks:

(a) a compilation of notes taken at Kant's lectures between 1775 and1780, referred to as the Vorlesungen tiber Metaphysik (Lectures on Metaphysics). Two editions of these have been published. The first byPolitz in 182 I is incomplete and unreliable: the second is by Heinzeand is available in a volume entitled, Konigliche Sachsische Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften. Philosophische Historische Klasse.Abhandlung v. 14. Published in Leipzig in 1894.

(b) Kants Opus Postumum dargestellt und beurteilt von Erich Adickes,Berlin, 1920. Referred to as the Opus Postumum.

2,491) XVI

Chapter I

The Preparation of theCritical Synthesis

1

THE PHILOSOPI-IICAL CLIMATE

Praise for the superhuman genius of Kant conjoined withthe claim that he changed his mind every decade like adizzy fool who cannot master the direction of his ownthought is surely evidence of a fundamental contradiction.The majority of biographies devoted to him, however,appear content to accept a contradiction of this nature.I-lis numerous publications, the hundreds of letters whichare still accessible, the resolutions which he formed throughout an eventful career, make us realise to what extentKant was hostile to the type of intellectual flirtation whichcharmed many of his contemporaries, and yet how sensitive he was to signs of spiritual activity in. l1is in1nlediatesurroundings. This explains to a great extent the varietyof his rn.editations, the breadth of his interests, and theencyclopedic character of his lectures. It is neverthelesspossible to detect certain unmistakable converging lines inthis disconcerting variety. Kant steadfastly pursued aunique and precise objective which it is essential to clarifybefore beginning a full study of the history of his thought.

Unfortunately this is not to be found where it has beencuston1ary to look for it. The nineteenth-century fashionof allowing Cartesianism to take the place of the historicalDescartes has been matched by a tendency to substitute theCritical philosophy and its later developments for the real11istorical Kant. Positivism found it advantageous to claimphilosophical patronage for th.e scientific methodologywhich resulted in a limitation of knowledge to the realm of

(2,491) I 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT

phenomena, and it was not unaware that the Critique of PureReason could be represented as its own justification avant lalettre. There is indeed no real need to find fault with thischoice when it is remembered how Kant never ceased to overwhelm metaphysics with biting sarcasm. It certainly cannotbe denied that Kant criticised many things, metaphysicsincluded. 011 the other hand, if we look a little moreclosely, we see that a constructive effort accompanied theactivity of destruction. For fifty years Kant dreamed andplanned to establish the future of metaphysics, and for l1imto proclaim its downfall amounted to discrediting it temporarily in order to lay secure foundations for it. Hiscomplaints are directed against a particular metaphysicsand a particular method. At the same time he himselfconstructed, at least in rough outline, a different metaphysics and elaborated another method. To discoverultimately the correct philosophical method and by meansof it to construct an eternal metaphysics were the aimscherished by Kant.

In seeking to achieve both these ends, however, Kantdid not follow a straight line. The constant search for themethodological foundation of metaphysics gives his careerits unity and overall harmony, and reveals the intellectualstability which continued to characterise him through thevicissitudes of his life. This search, however, demanded thedestruction of a particular historical metaphysics as its preliminary condition. The drama of Kant's intellectual lifelies in the fact that it was his painful duty to destroy theWolffian metaphysics so that he could construct an eternalmetaphysics. Kant never placed himself under the tutelageof Hume. This is the first conclusion which will be drawnfrom our investigation.

Our second general conclusion will also separate us fromour predecessors. Since Kant did not seek either his methodor his metaphysics in one uniform direction, we must tracethe curve which illustrates the developn1ent of the supremeproblem. The great caesura in this evolution is to be foundin 178 I with the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason.Nevertheless, when it is realised that this work itself marksa stage on the way to the discovery of a possible foundation

2

THE PREPARATION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

for metaphysics, the caesura is stripped of the revolutionarycharacter which historians have always attached to it. Kant,as we have said, did not change his system with disconcertingmobility. From the beginning he made no attempt to hidehis dislike of the compact mass of Wolffian doctrine. Thefirst life-buoy to which he clung consisted of direct criticismof certain leading theses of this system, and his criticism isadmirably outlined against the background of current philosophical and scientific discussions. He then sought for apanacea in the Critical philosophy. This was not discoveredby a sudden stroke of intuitive genius but allowed slowly andpainfully to reach ripe elaboration. Absolute confidence inthis critical foundation of metaphysics merged, from 1781onwards, with his conception of the future of metaphysicsitself.

If this viewpoint is adopted, a different pattern of thefacts ill the intellectual biography of Kant begins to emerge.The twenty years which precede the Critique may be seen toconstitute a period ofpreparation when comparedpostfactumwith the Critical synthesis. Kant was seeking to find hisway through the labyrinth of the scientific activity of histime and he participated in all its movements. 1'his apprentice period of learning is sustained by waves of optimism andshot through with disappointmellts, but all the while thefundamental Critical principles sort themselves out quietlyand steadily. From then on Kant has no other purpose thanto establish metaphysics by the thorough working out of theCritical philosophy. This period, which is the least problematic, occupies the years 1781-9°. This is the periodwhich gives us the Critical trilogy. It is therefore essentiallyconstructive. The third period, which begins in 1790, isdominated by a· growing confusion in Kant's mind betweenthe future of metaphysics and the future of his own system.This period is defensive ill character and, although it is theleast known and the least studied up to the present, i,t ispeculiarly significant for the historian. Kant had to defendthe integrity of his patrimony both against the assault of theWolffians and against that defection of his followers whichformed the prelude to tIle rise of the Gernlan romantic philosophy. I have called this period the' clash of two epochs'.

3


This is correct because it is really a matter of the clashbetween the Aufklarung and Romanticism. Kant bore thebrunt of the historical transition. He was too deeply rootedin the past to be able to abandon it without regret, but toocommitted to the future not to be aware ofwhat was happening. The Opus Postumum allows us to see Kant caught in themeshes and wedged between the two, an easy target ofcriticism.

It was on the first centenary of the death of Descartesthat Kant entered the scientific world. This was the age ofthat majestic development of physics which in all countriesof advanced culture was to provoke one of the most profound conflicts in the history of western ideas. Stemmingdirectly from Descartes there was a great flowering of philosophical systems, of ,,yhich those of Spinoza, Malebranche,and Leibniz were the most in1.portant. Their common originexplains how both Jew and Christian, atheist and mystic,were moved by the same pride in the achievement of physicsand why they were all excited by the unexpected efficacy ofthe deductive method. If it is true that Descartes broughta message to Europe, that message can only consist in theillusion of method applied to the conduct of the mind. Heintended his method to fortify the mind against its discursiveimperfection and against a naIve belief in the informationprovided by the senses. Starting from one original piece ofevidence (datum), the Cartesian method proposed to makethe whole deductive chain of knowledge flow with perfectrational coherence from this first datum, after the mannerof mathematics which finds in the ratiollal connection of itspropositions its supreme certainty and its high intellectualauthority. From Descartes to Leibniz the human mindsought to establish, more geometrico, a metaphysical andphysical system of the world. Faith in this procedureinculcated a great respect for mathematics which, by meansof the Cartesian type of analysis, descended from the idealheights of pure quantity to the expression of physical values.It was also Descartes who realised that the science of matterand the science of space are so connected that the lattersketches out the main lines of the· former. Possessed ofa vivid imagination like all mathematicians, Descartes

4


projected his dreams and his mathematical boldness intophysical reality and reduced it to simple n1athematicalelements.

The reader is sufficiently aware of the course of history toknow that Cartesian physics was not able to stand up to thetest offact and to the lessons of experience. Some importantinvestigations by Chr. Huyghens made that clear, and fromthat time doubt in regard to the certainty of the Cartesiandeductions in the domain of weight, in the calculus of forcesand of motion, and in the explanation of yet other phenomena, grew steadily until Newton's Principia Mathematicabrought to an end the great li11e of physicists who usedthe Galileo-Baconian method to arrive at a picture of thephysical world. The school of Newton, however, like thatof Descartes, en1phasised the primacy of method. Thisis not surprising since the brilliant achievernents of Newtonian physics, including the crowning conception ofgravitation, depended upon the methodological discipline to whichNewton insisted on submitting himself. The natural outcome was several substantial corrections in the greatCartesian dream. Furthermore, this method could beapplied universally. It could be applied in the inorganicas well as the organic realm, to historical, medical, andchemical research, and in these different domains its application yielded results which could be brought into line withthe gravitational physics of the English Galileo. The correctll1ethod i11 the field of concrete and observable facts was tostart from the observation of phenomena, to determine byconstant experin1ent the causal nexus which binds them, andin this way to construct a general picture of the behaviourofthe things which make up the texture of the whole physicalworld. This method sought to do more than to describe; itsought to explain by means of causes, and this explanationpreserved the element of truth in the mathematical concepti011 of matter, while rejecting the exaggerated mathematicism of Descartes.

Newtonian induction, which is the reverse of the Cartesian method, was bound to clash with the Cartesian method,for it forbade men to regard observable nature as a giganticgeometrical system. For it, nature was composed ofsimple

5


elements discoverable only by experience, and was notreducible to purely mathematical elements. Furthermore,Newtonian induction was less audacious and nlore suitedto the human condition. Whereas metaphysics explains thevisible and observable by reference to the invisible (that is,the fact by reference to its principle, where this principle,if a cause at all, was not a secondary cause), tIle causalregression followed by induction is 1110re modest, finding itscausal order in an observable chain of phenomena.

The Dutch physicists who set the tone of learned societyin Europe at the turn of the eighteenth century (men like'8 Gravesande, Boerhaave, Mussenbroek), the Royal Societyof London which ruled the scientific life of the island and theContinent, and all the positive scientists scattered throughoutEurope, ranged themselves around Newton and the methodwhich he had given to scientific research. The traditionalpositions of philosophy were shaken by tIle rising scientificmovement; philosophy stood on the defensive and withvisibly weakening resistance. The interpenetration of thesephysical and metaphysical discussions is not surprising inview of the fact that a number of the nl0st important andmost widely canvassed problems in physics are also metaphysical problems. It was nevertheless inevitable that competition should develop between the metaphysics whichderived its inspiration from Descartes and the physics ofNewton.

Within the limits of logic, induction is incompatible withthe innate ideas of Descartes and with the occasionalism andpre-established harmony substituted by Malebranche andLeibniz. It was only to be expected that from the beginningof his Essay Locke should rally the empiricists against thelaziest of the solutions to the problenl of the origin of ourideas. In the field of metaphysics, the whole of Europe wasa prey to controversies about the concepts of matter, substance, and cause, and a ceaseless attempt was nlade toreach an agreed account of the nature ofspace. The debatesabout the absolutist and relativist conceptions of space wereconducted with a ferocity which is well known. Thesedebates were singularly complex and difficult to follow, partlybecause of the number of protagonists, partly because the

6

THE PREPARAT10N OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

issues were difficult to isolate from other theological andmetaphysical questions, and partly because of the largenumber ofdistinctions which must be made in the respectivepositions of the different adversaries if historical reality isnot to be seriously misrepresented. TIle conflict broke outin connection with the correspondence between Clarke andLeibniz which was published in England in 1717 and inGerIflany in 1720. When the original authors disappearedfrom the scene, they were succeeded by numerous partisanswho rapidly divided themselves into rival schools. InEngland Leibniz found allies among the adherents ofidealism, while Clarke recruited his from among the mysticsand scientists. In Germany the whole Wolffian pack followed its national philosopher in serried battalions, whilethe scientific world attached itself to the coat-tails ofNewton,releasing its grasp of them only very reluctantly. In theface of such extremes it was natural that some writers, andamong them not the least important, should attempt toharmonise the views about space held by Newton andLeibniz. Euler, Beguelin, and others made this the mainpurpose of their lives.

The question of metllodology, however, divided philosophers and scientists much more sharply than did thesecontroversial topics. The long-standing antagonism betweenthe Cartesian and Newtonian methods simply developedinto a conflict between the sciences which made use ofthem, namely mathematics and philosophy (the latterincluding physics according to tIle contemporary use ofthe term). In an endeavour to interpret th.e simple andirreducible elements of matter ill purely quantitative termsCartesian physics invested pure thought with a power ofinvestigation by conceptual analysis. Leibnizian philosophyis in the end simply a grandiose specimen of a physics anda metaphysics in which reason discovers the simple constituents of physical reality. Newtonian induction, whichbecame, the instrument of the empiricists, identified thesimple element which it also sought with the ultimate,irreducible, and unanalysable empirical element. Henceforward, the relatively simple element found in experiencewas opposed to the absolutely simple elen1ent of mathe-

7


matics. From then on it becan1e imperative to circun1scribe precisely the areas belonging to mathematics and tophysics. All the scientists saw the necessity, and all thephilosophers saw the danger, of such a demarcation ofboundaries, a fact which enables us to understand why thistopic should have been of such widespread interest. Theclearly conceived objective was to prohibit the philosopherfrom using the Cartesian method in the science of reality.We shall see that this prohibition was to become one of theconstant preoccupations of Kantian thought.

It can be said without hesitation that when Kant cameupon the scene towards 1750 Newton had won the field.Philosophy and physics adopted the Newtonian canon inEngland, in France, and in Germany. Furthermore, thesuccess of the new method in physics gave birth to a confidence in its universal applicability, which in turn gaverise to a widespread interest in descriptive research. Ethics,psychology, sociology, and aesthetics benefited greatly by it.This descriptive method, withi11 the competence of everyoneand applicable to practical affairs, was in harmony with thedemocratic tendencies of the age of enlightenment. Culturewas to be put within the reach of an enlightened bourgeoisiewhich expected from this practical and utilitarian culture afuture which would be progressive both n10rally and politically. This alliance with the democratic spirit enabledscientific culture to escape more and more from its naturalenvironment, the university, and to flourish beyond thesphere of influence of these backward and musty centres.Knowledge became popular and, in. becoming popular,changed its uniform. Its natural n1edium of expressionwas no longer the learned treatise, dry and carefully para- .graphed; it sought the newer and more opell forms provided by th.e short essay or the article after the birth ofthe periodicals. Finally, whole systems of popular philosophy, inspired by the ideas and the needs of this livelybourgeoisie, which was generous in sentiment but thin inideas, grew up on the virgin soil of this enlightened democratism. Tl~e close alliance between the new scientificmethodology and the pre-revolutionary ideology becamean accepted fact.

8


It was in this way that England, France, and Germanycame to form a single scientific and cultural community,disciplined by the same method, inspired by the sameexamples, and moved by the same hopes. For the lasttime, common themes, methods, solutions, and objectivesmade science the basis of a genuine international feeling inEurope. The trade in books, the rise of periodicals, andthe existence of learned societies created a unified cosmopolitan culture which survived more than one political andmilitary conflict. It is scarcely necessary to add thateach of the participating nations manifested peculiaritiesarising from its own traditions and from its own specialsituation.

TIle peculiarly national note sounded by Germany inthis cosmopolitan concert is the existence of a system ofmetaphysics which was the first truly national metaphysicalsystem in the Germanic countries and the last system ofCartesian inspiration in Europe: this was the metaphysicsof Leibniz reduced to handbook form and popularised bythe indefatigable activity of Chr. Wolff. The Leibniziansystem held all the winning cards quite apart from anyquestion of its philosophical validity. Solidly established inthe German system of higher education, it was taught fromall the university chairs, without any notable exceptions, toever-changing generations of students. It was strengthenedby the alliance between the official Protestantism, thesobered pietism, and the modified liberalism of its defenders.Moreover, in this period of intellectual uncertainty, spiritualanarchy, and political and moral confusion, it respected thevalues which formed the very essence of the old regime andthus appeared as a conservative force tending to order andtraditionalism. The whole history of eighteenth-centuryGermany can be epitomised in terms of the rivalry betweenLeibnizian conservatism and the progressive internationalismadopted by the scientists and abused by the discontented.Frederick the Great, the prince who forged the future greatness of a great nation, furnishes the most astonishingspectacle. In order to achieve his purpose, he became aprogressivist and, by means of regulations and patronage,

9


transformed the liberated spirit of the discontented into thenational spirit.

Almost without his compatriots being aware of what washappening, Leibniz had given his country the first deductivemetaphysical system which Germany could claim as her own.Wolff, to whom almost all means of propaganda were available, undertook to publicise it. Reality is completelyrational, that is, the clear knowledge which we find inscience corresponds exactly to the transcendent order ofthings. The activity of thought under these conditionsconsists in the intellectual operation w11ich leads from theobscure awareness found in the realm of the sensible to theclear ideas characteristic of intelligence. Sensibility andunderstanding are conceived as faculties differing only indegree but not generically distinct. Since the activity ofthought manifests itself always in the form of judgment, itis an analytic activity: it explicates the concept of thesubject by expressly attributing to it one or more of itsconstitutive marks with the result that a relation of identitybinds subject to predicate. The basis of the necessity of thejudgment, or the justification of the objective determinations of the subject, lies always in the formal principles ofidentity and of contradiction which, on account of the initialpostulate of the rationality of the real, immediately acquireontological significance. Such was Wolff's position. Leibniztoo had arrived at similar views but he had made use of theprinciple of sufficient reason. The relation between ourknowledge and its objects is both necessary and apriori, andcan be known by pure reason. The formal principles ofthought are sufficient to procure for us all the guaranteesthat we can desire in this connection.

The characteristics of this system, which illuminates thehistory of German thought from 1720 to 1750, may bedescribed as follows. The system of Leibniz is distinguishedin the field of epistemology by the .introduction of theprinciple of sufficient reason and in the field of metaphysicsby the monadology. The principle of sufficient reasontransforms Cartesian mechanism into a teleological systen1,while the monadology transforms the static Cartesian systeminto a dynamic one. The points at which the astonishing

10


imagination of the librarian at Hanover were bound toclash with the solid convictions of the Newtonian scientistscan already be seen. The deductive procedure adopted byWolff in developing the metaphysical system contained inhis endless series of manuals was modelled on the Cartesianmathematical method: he applied it without distinction tothe realms ofthe real and the ideal. Newton, and the AngloFrench empiricists who were so set on induction, denied theefficacy of deductioll in the realm of the real. The philosophers who made this question the object of their reflectionsimitated their foreign colleagues in marking off the areas inwhich the method of nlathematics could be applied fromthose in which the methods of philosophy could be applied.This questioll, however, includes two distinct sub-questions:first, the opposition between the methods in the two types ofsciences, and secondly, the inevitable interpenetration ofmathematics and physics. The solutions which de Maupertuis and d'Alembert presented to the French-speaking publicwere presented to the Gernlan public by Crusius, Lambert,alld Kant.

The principle of sufficient reason, elevated by Leibniz tothe rank of leading principle in the science of things, seemedto round off the deductive system of the rationalists and hadthe good fortune to be adopted by the main body of Wolffiansfrom Bilfinger to Mendelssohn by way of Meier and Baumgarten. This principle, to wllich causality was subordinatedas the sufficient reason of becoming, was an absolutely universal principle. It could not be otherwise in a rationalisticsystenl which granted to pure thought a power of investigatiOll in the domain of the real or in that of existence. Finally,the monadology transformed the mechanistic idea of substance characteristic of Cartesian thought by attaching to itthe notioll of force, while the pre-established harmony, itsindispensable adjunct, was to explain communicationbetween substances, first in the human being, and then intIle universal order of things.

Under the empirical Newtonian influence the scientificspirit attacked the whole mass of doctrines characteristic ofWolffianism with the result that these doctrines becamesubjects of passionate discussion around the year 1750.

I I


Along with Keill in England, de Maupertuis and d'Alembertin France, Rudiger, Beguelin, Lambert, and above allCrusius, took part in the discussion of these doctrines. Itgoes without saying that they anticipated Kant in markingoff the boundaries between mathematics and philosophy,and the boundaries which they assigned to these subjectsdo not differ essentially from those established by Kant.Their common thesis was in effect that conceptual analysiscan never attain to existence and that in consequence thesynthetic Cartesio-Wolffian method is ineffective in the orderofexistence. The discussion in which they all shared centredaround the detection of the simple and irreducible elen1entwith which the pre-Critical works of Kant have made usfamiliar. The simple elements of physical reality become,not the residue of a purely logical analysis, but the irreducible and unanalysable element of concrete experience.

It was again Crusius who anticipated Kant in his profound discussion of Wolff's extension of the principle ofsufficient reason. In the strictly Wolffian school, the focalpoint of the discussion was the reducibility of the principleof reason to that of contradiction. Its opponents, however,kept on raising objections against the way in which it wasrelated to causality. Crusius distinguished between logicalreason and real reason, and denied to logical reason anytrue efficacy in the order of the real. Logical reasons andreal reasons, sufficient reason and causality, principles ofreason and principles of causality, are pairs of convergingideal factors. This discussion was further stimulated whenHume's criticism reached Germany, eve11 although it did notbring about the minor revolution wllich the biographers ofKant have written about. The fact that Hume was broughtinto the discussion caused the Academy in Berlin to take aninterest in this quaestio disputata. This is shown by thememoirs sent by Sulzer, Beguelin, and the Frenchmande Maupertuis, in response to a competition set by theAcademy. Kant became interested in this general movement of ideas and opinions. He was to find in it his pointof departure. He was to borrow from it, first of all hisown positions, and then his metl10d of going beyond them.

The third Leibnizian theme was the monadology. This12


ofcourse revived the great conflict which had arisen towardsthe end of the seventeenth century about the paradoxes ofthe infinite. The Frenchman P. Bayle in his Dictionary onceagain raised the problem of these paradoxes under the heading of his article ZENO. When real existence is attributed tomatter, he pointed out, it is necessary to affirm both thatmatter is infinitely divisible, alld that nevertheless it is composed of sinlple elements which in being simple must therefore be indivisible. He made this difficulty a groulld forrejecting realism in favour of an idealisnl of the Malebranchian type. A violent debate centred around thisarticle both in England and in Germany. The attentionof Leibniz had been drawn to the paradoxes of the continuous independently of his personal metaphysics, but assoon as the monadology took shape they thrust themselvesmore forcibly upon his attention. The monad is indeed asimple element and an indivisible constituent of matter,whereas mathematical considerations force us to believe thatspace and matter are infinitely divisible. The direct conclusion drawn by Leibniz was tllat space is not absolute.The English idealists, like Collier and Berkeley, deducedfrom their examination of the same paradoxes the basicsoundness of the Malebranchian epistemology and alsorejected the absolute character of space. However, theNewtonian school, which fought as one man against therelativity of space, had to be reckoned with, as also hadthe English Platonists, whose leaders, More, Cudworth, andClarke, took the side of Newton for metaphysical reasons.It was this topic which stimulated the famous correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke which was published inGermany in 1720 at the instigation of Wolff. In a shorttime this correspondence became a European affair. Ifweleave out of account the English writers and the Frenchmende Maupertuis and d'Alenlbert, it may be said that all theWolffians in GernlallY followed Leibniz in supporting therelativity of space, while the physicists, like Plouquet andBoscovitch, althougll more or less involved in Wolffianism,were drawn in the opposite direction and dreamed ofdeveloping a middle-of-the-road solution to this irritatingproblem. The Kantian meditations on the problem of

13


space, and his later meditations on the antinomies, mustbe placed within this historical framework. It is quiteevident, furthermore, that Kant was also inspired by theexample of Leonard Euler who for the last thirty years hadbeen working at the reconciliation dreamed of by Plouquetand Boscovitch.

The related doctrines, the monadological theory of substance and the doctrine of the pre-established harmony inthe communication between substances, were doctrineswhich had not passed with equal ease into the vVolffiansystem. Wolff attached only a superficial importance tothem, and when the Leibnizian harmony became thesubject of attack by Foucher and Bayle the more sensibleWolffians capitulated rapidly and replaced the harmonyby the system of physical influxion. Furthermore, theadherents of mechanism were opposed to the introductioninto physics of a hypothesis which looked so t11eological,and t11is discouraged the Newtonians from adopting it.Konigsberg seems to have been a peculiarly active centreof opposition to the pre-established harmony. It had beenattacked by two of Kant's teachers, Schultze and, above all,M. Knutzen who claimed to close the debate by his ownspecial version of the idea of physical influxion.

Conflict between induction and deduction, or, in otherwords, between the analytic and synthetic methods; conflict between mathematics and philosophy; conflict betweenthe principle of sufficient reason and that of causality; conflict between the logical and the real; conflict betweenmonadology and geometry; conflict between the absoluteand the relative conceptions of space; conflict between thepre-established harmony and physical influxion: all theseconflicts arose from the clash between Newton's PrincipiaMathematica and the Leibnizo-Wolffian metaphysics. It isindeed· the whole history of German thought which. issummarised in these conflicts. It was in meditating uponand discussing these conflicts over a period of twenty yearsthat Kant was to serve his apprenticesl1ip in philosophy.


2

THE FIRST PHYSICO-METAPHYSICALESSAYS

cf. La Deduction I, 87-92, 105-8, 117-22, 130-4, 190-3

When Kant as a young man of sixteen placed himself inthe hands of his bellefactor Schultze, the University ofKonigsberg was going through a period of relative calm.Schultze had conlbined in his own person elenlents of bothWolffianism and Pietism, and Wolffian rationalism hadbegun to undermine the weak Aristotelianism which hadso far reigned there. In 1734 he llad called Martin Knutzento the chair of philosophy and physics. Kant had the goodfortune to find in this young man of twenty-one a daringteacher who was hard-working, well informed, and sympathetic to the enthusiasms of the new generation. In 1735Knutzen had defended a thesis entitled Systema causarume.fJicientium which was devoted to the refutation of the doctrineofpre-established harmony. Leibniz was very nluch attachedto this doctrine, Wolff very much less so, and !(nutzen notat all. At Konigsberg he had in any case been anticipatedin this field by a man called Marqllardt. Just at the timewhen Knutzen was attempting to bring the interminabledebate to an end, the last blows were directed at the Leibnizian myth by Reuss and by Gottschedt (who sometinlesdabbled in philosophy). However, Knutzen not merelyrefuted it, but developed a new system of physical influxiollwhich departed considerably from the Aristotelian notion ofthe efficient cause to which the physicists had already givellthe coup de grace. It was not surprising that mechanism,space, and idealism-Foucher had even objected that theexternal world is unnecessary on the Leibnizian hypothesiswere all to play some part ill the debate. The substance ofKnutzen's thesis had no doubt been passed on in his teaching,and in 1756 Kant was to nlake use of it in the MonadologiaPhysica.


It was th.is far-sighted and liberal Wolffian whose task itwas to teach Kant the first principles of Wolffian metaphysics, and to introduce him to the teaching of Newton.Both through personal instruction and the loan of books heaccorded Kant the generous support of his own youthfulenthusiasm. The teaching of Knutzen prepared Kant forbotll a philosophical and a scientific career. The degree ofmaturity and the breadth of knowledge shown by Kant inthis double domain on the occasion of his first publishedwork indicate that his teaching must have been of a veryhigh quality. After following punctiliously a somewhatcurious plan of studies under the supervision of Schultzewith the willing collaboration of Knutzen, Kant left l'Alber- .tine in 1746 with a dissertation On the Estimation of LivingForces, which he was to publish ill 1749 with the help ofbenefactors generous enough to ulldertake the cost of printing. There we have Kant at the age oftwenty-two, launchedupon the world, burdened by the poverty of his materialcircumstances yet possessed of great scientific ambitions. Inthese days ambition could not easily be reconciled withpoverty. In order to secure that preliminary easing of hiscircumstances, which was a condition of independence andliberty, Kant resigned himself to the work of family tutor,spending the years between 1747 and 1755 in several aristocratic and upper-middle-class houses in East Prussia. Thisself-chosen withdrawal, however, did not have the characterof a period of exile. On the contrary, the evidence showsthat Kant still maintained his connections with scientificcircles in his native town and that he remained in permanentcontact witll the scientific life of Germany. However, thereis some uncertainty about the kind of occupation whichengrossed him and about the objects which attracted hisattention during th.ese nine solitary years. If from what weknow took place in 1755 it is legitimate to draw any inferenceabout the immediately preceding years, we can form ageneral, ifvague, idea about what was happening.

In all probability Kant followed first and foremost hisbent for physical studies. In 1749 he published his doctoraldissertation on living forces, but immediately afterwardsdecided to develop it in new directions. First, he included

16

THE PREPARATION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTliESIS

a discussion of the problem of the plurality of worlds, asubject which had been passionately discussed by theEuropean public for about seventy-five years, and addedto it a discussion of plurality in types of space. Secondly,he included a reconciliation of his personal views aboutliving forces with the universal harmony. His recollectionof the teaching of Knutzen is still clearly to be seen in thisproject. In 175 I the Hamburger freier Urteilen und Nachrichtenpublished an account of the cosmogony of the EnglishmanWright, and in 1752 Kant was able to read, in theHamburgischen Magazin, an account of a book by Bradley ona sin1ilar subject. Under their stimulus he worked on hisNaturgeschichte, which he probably completed in 1754. Atthe same time he decided to send to the Berlin Academy amemoir on the rotation of the earth about its axis, butinstead of addressing it to the Acaden1Y he eventually published his reflections in a weekly magazine in his native city.rrhe same thing was to happen in September of the sameyear with another memoir in which he discusses the question:does physics allow us to say that the earth grows old?

In 1754-5 he decided the time was ripe to come back toKonigsberg and to return to the University. In April 1755he won the title of Magister by defending a physical thesiscomposed in Latin and entitled De Igne, but as he wished toqualify himself to give courses in philosophy he was obligedto defend yet another thesis on a philosophical subject. Thisthesis was entitled Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicaenova Dilucidatio and ,vas published in September 1755. Hisdesire to become a Privat Dozent in philosophy shows that hisinterest in physical matters was not exclusive. The conflictwhich he had perceived between his own theory of forcesand the universal harmony was in effect a philosophicalconflict, and we know in any case, thanks to Reicke, tllatKant had thought of taking part in a competition organisedby the Academy on the optimism of Pope. In general,however, there is no doubt that Knutzen had oriented hispupil towards the exact sciences, and this orientation wasto continue for quite some time. After having qualified asPrivat Doze11t Kant devoted himself to writing a numberof short popular works. In 1756 he discussed the Lisbon

(2,491) 17 3


earthquake which had left such a profound impression on thewhole of Europe. In the same year he expounded a theoryabout the winds which was original and not without merit.Again in 1756, with the intention of supporting his candidature for a university chair, he published the Monadologiaphysica. In 1757 he announced officially in a printed programme his courses on physical geography and on philosophy. Finally in 1758 he was to produce a Neuer Lehrbegrijfder Bewegung und Ruhe.

Apart from his scientific work there is little to relateabout this period of his life. Kant was received favourablyby the student population and by the educated public ofthe town. There are indications that Kant adapted himselfwithout difficulty to the successive military occupations bythe Russians and by the Prussians. In short, the son of thehumble couple in the Sattlergasse, despite the existing socialbarriers, gradually became a public figure of some note.Academic authority was less favourable towards him: flO

permanent chair was found for him until 1770. For therest-all is legend. The stories about the solitary Kant wholived like a hermit and who never left his native city, theKant whose life was regulated like the mechanism of a clock,the Kant who was stripped of everything and on the vergeof starvation, are all very romantic, but they suffer from thedisadvantage of being false.

Generally no man of sensibility fails to respond to thecharm or sadness of circumstances and a man's thought isoften coloured by the emotional elements in his environment. No such factors, however, seem to have directlyinfluenced the course of Kant's thought. It has often beenalleged that Kant was a physicist before he was a philosopher, and even tl~at he became a philosopher simplythrough professional duty. This seems to me quite false.The boundaries between physics al~d philosophy were notclearly marked and Kant always treated physics from aphilosophical standpoint. A predominating interest inn1ethodology is characteristic of each of the Kantian dissertations of this period. The Lebendige Kriifte discussesprincipally, not the mathematical estimation of livingforces, but the modus cognoscendi of this estimation. The

18


Naturgeschichtereconciles nlechanical and teleological explanation of the universe. The Monadologia physica bears as itssub-title 'The Use of Metapllysics in conjunction withGeometry in Natural Philosophy'. And although Kantalways discusses physics as a philosopher, it is with theclearly avowed intention of showing how, both in physicsand metaphysics, everything depends on metllod.

In the light of these facts it is clear that far from beingan especially chosen field which he had to abandon becauseof the hard exigencies of life, Kant's physico-mathematicalactivity is blended with the great, and I should even say thesale, Kantian problem: the method of metaphysics. Arapid glance over the physical writings makes this quiteplain. It was at the instigation of IZnutzen that Kant inhis doctoral dissertation undertook to reconcile the Cartesianformula (MV) for forces with the Leibnizian formula (MV2).

The solution which he gave to his problem is actually false,but that is not what concerns us most. It is more importantto notice the ease with which the young man conducts himselfin a physical discussion which had occupied the attentionof the whole of Europe, and to see how well informed he isabout all the opinions which had been expressed, except,unfortunately, that of d'Alembert, which was the only soundsolution. It is important also to trace the ramifications ofthis pllysical problem through all his thinking. Attributingthe false Cartesio-Leibnizian calculations to an error ofmeth.od, he was led to seek the true modus cognoscendi of thesetvvo thinkers. His real objective was the discovery of amore appropriate method, which would take its point ofdeparture from a careful differentiation ofscientific domains.Both nlathematics and physics and mathematics and philosophy give answers to different questions and demanddifferent modes of treatment.

The confusion between the methods of mathematics andthe methods of physics was the real cause of the errors towhich deductive physics was exposed. The generalisationof the mathematical method led necessarily to the falseCartesian estimate; the physical method led to the formulaof Leibniz. The body of mathematics, alone accessible toDescartes, knew nothing of living force: Leibniz on his

19


side knew about it through his dynamism, but he measuredits value falsely using the method of mathematics. Kant, inestablishing the value, saw how important it was to metaphysics to distinguish carefully between two types offorce.

It was in the course of generalising the views on methodwhich he expounded on this occasion that he finally arrivedat metaphysics. He was not satisfied with the method of thereigning metaphysics which, in its desire to be eine grosseWeltweisheit, neglected to be at tIle same time thorough.An ambition to examine current methods and to put a brakeon the tendency of metaphysics to extend its boundaries atthe expense of thoroughness is quite rightly selected byAdickes as underlying the demands for thoroughness whichKant directed towards contemporary metaphysics. Howvery little of this can be called Wolffian !

Further review of his physical works sho,vs how everywhere there is a tendency to bring the methodologicalproblem to the fore. The Naturgeschichte provides theearliest evidence of this tendency. Although in his dissertation Kant had not advocated the Newtonian methodas the Inethod which in future would be sure not to lead,to errors similar to those of Descartes and Leibniz, hissolitary meditations while acting as family tutor had nevertheless borne their fruits, and he undertook in his cosmogonyto give an account of the genesis of the universe by meansof the Newtonian method alone. Further, he had prefacedit with a resume of Newtonian principles for the benefit ofthose who were still unaware of then1. The history of theworld as determined by natural laws was therefore to bedescribed mechanistically. In this Kant followed Wrightand anticipated Laplace. But-and here the philosopherquarrels with the physicist-physics goes no farther thannatural laws. These laws themselves remain unexplainedunless they are connected with a teleological principle, aconclusion which makes it possible to reconcile Leibniz andNewton. The theologians, seeing the finger of God everywhere, make nature out to be a perpetual miracle, and theatheists see the operation of chance at the beginning ofeverything. Kant, plotting a middle course, transcendedthe Newtonian explanation of the world, which cannot be

20


applied to the order of laws (or, let it be said in passing, tothe organic realm). This transcendence again marks themetaphysical orientation of a cosmogonical essay which isnot lacking in greatness.

All the other physical writings are also based on Newton.In the De Igne an account of nature is given which is bothempirical and geometrical. The Monadologia physica, intendedto correct Leibniz by Newton, is perhaps the most remarkable of Kant's smaller writings at this time. He no longeraims sin1ply at a reconciliation of the Cartesian and Newtonian methods in the constitution of physics, but at theirintimate collaboration. Their collaboration makes it possible to resolve certain difficulties (I am even tempted tosay certain antinomies) resulting fron1 their separate application. The metaphysics of which Kant speaks is the monadology with its simple and indivisible elements as ultimateconstituents: geometry on the other hand advocates theinfinite divisibility of n1atter. Kant had closely followed thelong debate about the paradoxes of the infinite and he wasgoing to offer a solution acceptable to both sides. The spiritwhich had presided over the solution of the problem offorcesshowed itself again. In the Critique Kant will find the twosides 011ce again hostile, but he will keep them apart. Here,on the contrary, both win their case on condition that competing sciences and methods ren1ain within their respectivefields. In physics experience furnisl1es the point ofdepartureand its data are explained by geoll1etry, from which it followsthat in physical construction the experimental and mathen1atical methods are of equal value because they are equallyi11dispensable. The role of metaphysics begins at the pointwhere the two methods have exhausted their usefulness. Ifwe refuse to go beyond them, legum originem et causas exponerenon possumus. Our little dissertation therefore is noteworthyfrom more than one point of view. First, in that it furnishesindisputable evidence of Kant's interest in the discussionsabout the infinite. The antinomies of pure reason go backto this work as to their distant and indirect origin. It isnoteworthy also in what it reveals of the significance ofKantian physics which is in effect only a chapter of metaphysics, the value of which is subordinated to the estimation

21


of the methods employed in it. Finally, it is noteworthybecause it throws a different light on the subject which hetreated in the only philosophical work belonging to thisperiod.

This philosophical work, presented in 1755 in order toobtain the right to lecture (venia legendi) , is entitled PrincipiorumPrimorum Cognitionis l\;[elaplzysicae Nova Dilucidatio. In it Kantdoes not discuss the question ofmethod ex professo, but discussesthe foundations of metaphysical knowledge. These foundations, however, are elucidated in the bright light of themethodological debate. In this philosophical discussionKant found a precursor in Crusius who, along with nlanyothers before Kant, had rebelled against the metaphysicalmathematicism of the Wolffians. Kant, still dazzled by theprestige of this mathematicism, shared most of the convictions which lay at its foundation: the rationality of thereal, the clarifying role of understanding (with the consequent distinction of degree, not kind, between the facultiesinvolved in the structure of knowledge), the analyticalcharacter of judgment, and the objectifying role of theformal principles of identity and contradiction. His conviction, however, was shaken on two points. He detectedthe paralogism in the Cartesio-Leibnizian version of theontological proof, and he saw that existence is not a constitutive part of the essence of a thing. He also saw thatthe principle of identity is the justifying norm of the rationalform of judgment, and tlIat the norm which justifies thecontent is the principle of sufficient reason.

The Dilucidatio is a treatise devoted to the principle ofsufficient reason and Crusius is the dominating influence.Like Crusius, Kant distinguishes two senses of sufficientreason, the reason of being which determines the existenceof something and the reason of knowing which determinesour knowledge of it. Sufficient reason, understood in thesense of a logical necessity, leads to the principle ofidentity.Its objectifying role therefore scarcely goes fartller than thatof the formal principles of identity and contradiction. If therelation in question is a relation between existing things thediscussion turns quite naturally to the problem of causality,but Kant does not resolve it in the way we might well

22


anticipate from him. In spite of his assertions that the ratiojiendi and the cause are identical, and that they are bothdifferent from the ratio cognoscendi, he blunts the point of thisdistinction when he claims to know causal relations by meansofidentity. In this matter "\Ive must accept the fact that Kanthas a very long way to go before he n1asters this importantproblem.

What in fact led Kant to the examination of causalitywas a moral discussion about liberty, and a metaphysicaldiscussion about the existence of God. Crusius had deniedthe universal applicability of the principle of causality sinceour voluntary actions are not subject to it. Kant, on thecontrary, subjects these acts to its domination and consequently maintains the universality of the principle in thisdomain. The causal factor which determines the will is aninternal motive. This alone prevents the will from beingarbitrary and yet allows it to escape the natural determinismwhich necessitates an external constraining factor. Hereagain the conflict foreshadows, though in quite a differentdimension, the third Critical antinomy and signifies onKant's part a defence of the principle of causality againstthe objection of Crusius. However, he was to abandon thissame universality when faced with the problem of theexistence of God, for he held that th.e principle is not applicable to the supreme Being. If therefore it is universal, it isuniversal only for contingent being. Necessary being escapesit and its universality cannot be saved by saying that Godhas his reason wit11in himself, because then a being wouldbe the cause of itself, th.at is, would exist before it existed,which is absurd.

The same question don1inates the Kantian conception ofexistence, his distinction between being and thought, betweenthe real and the logical. There is no question here-and it isworth insisting on t11is point-of any problem of realism;Kant never gives it a thought. It is simply a question of themanner in which we know existing reality. He becomes.aware oftwo ways in which this new problem can be attacked.The first is that of the Dilucidatio. Kant discusses the distinction that must be made between logical reason and realreason in the principle of sufficient reason. The other path,

23


which he follows only occasionally in this work, is the wayof natural theology. The second way is related to a greatdebate which had occupied European thinking since theMiddle Ages. It is again Crusius who precedes Kant inthis path. Descartes had rehabilitated the ontological proofof the existence of God: we construct the concept of abeing which contains the wl101e of reality, to which in consequence it is necessary to attribute existence. However,since this Ens realissimum is postulated as a concept, that is,ideally, it is ideal existence and not real existence whichmust be affirmed of it. In order to affirm real existence ofit, it would be necessary to prove the reality of the conceptof an Ens realissimum. But a concept is valid when itsopposite is absolutely impossible. Hence the impossibilityof the divine non-existence is equivalent to its necessaryexistence. But this non-existence is absolutely impossiblebecause there is possibility, and possibility can be conceivedonly througl1 the real. It is clear that the Kantian proof isalso a proof by concept and that he has not yet seen thethesis which was to come, according to which existencecannot be known by way of concepts.

The formal subject of the Dilucidatio leads to the sameproblem. The distinction between logical reason and realreason points towards that between the reason of truth andthe reason of existence. The reason of the truth. of a judgment is revealed by the identity of the subject with thepredicate. The reason of existence does not determinewhether something exists but that by which it exists. Thereason of existence becomes confused with the cause. Infact all the problems raised in the Dilucidatio are treated ina confused manner, and all the solutions are equivocal. Letus not forget, however, that this estimate of its value isperhaps the result of a latent confusion of which we ourselvesare guilty, in imposing on this period, perhaps unconsciously,the standard oflater solutions which were given to these sameproblems. Ifwe were permitted to forget all that Kant wroteafter 1770, the Dilucidatio would undoubtedly appear to us tobe rationalist, but not self-contradictory as is often alleged.

The same is true of the problem of space, the lastLeibnizian theme bitterly discussed in the first half of the

24


eighteenth century. The cosmological orientation of histhought led Kant quite naturally to tackle it. For Leibniz,space is an ideal construction consisting in the obscureknowledge of th.e order existing between monads, an orderwhich results from their simple coexistence. Newton, onthe contrary, preached the reality and substantiality ofspace, the condition of all subordinate spatial relations.For Leibniz, space is the consequence of things. For Newton,it is the presupposition of things. It is erroneous to claimthat Kant followed J-Aeibniz in the period which we arediscussing, simply because like him he professed the relativity of space. Here again !(ant adopts an intermediateposition: he follows Leibniz in claiming that the relativityof space is the order realised by substances, but he is noless close to Newton in denying that this order is the consequence ofpure coexistence. As an adherent of the doctrineof physical influxion, he conceives the monads to be capableof transitive action and it is their interaction which determines spatial order and relations. Space is therefore theconsequence of the dynamical laws of n1atter.

This conception is invariably to be found on everyoccasion that Kant happens to discuss space after theLebendige Kriifte. Kant never considers space after themanner of l\Tewton, but every day he gets a little closerto him. The problem plays a considerable role, as wehave seen, in the Monadologia physica, but !(ant had notyet enrolled himself under the banner of the Englishman.Adickes says quite rightly that Kant is for Leibniz andagainst Newton in so far as relativity is concerned, but forNewton and against Leibniz in so far as the reality ofspace is concerned. On the same occasion he tackles theantinomy, or the paradoxes of the infinite, about whichvve spoke above. Kant does 110t choose between the metaphysical body composed of simple monads and geometricalspace which is infinitely divisible. He declares that betweenthese two conceptions there is no real contradiction becausethe division of space does not necessarily imply the separation of parts.

In reality therefore Kant finds himself half-way betweenLeibniz and Newton in the problem of space as in many

25


other problen1s which he discussed. This is the general toneof Kant's first scientific efforts. It cannot be said that he isa Wolffian; on the contrary, he is generally aware, even ifonly vaguely, of the defects of rationalism. He approachesNewton, not by any clear and indisputable act ofsubmission,but by reconciling theses which try to overcome the sharpdivergencies between the two schools, of which Newton andLeibniz were the acknowledged leaders. But in spite of theseuncertainties, these equivocations, these incomplete and provisional solutions, and despite the physical subjects which heprefers to discuss, it is undeniably true that Kant's activity isphilosophical in character.

3

A METAPHYSICS IN GESTATION

cf. La Deduction I, 92-100, 108-16, 119-30, 135-6,139-4 1, 142-6, 193-201

After qualifying in 1755 as a university teacher, Kant tookno part in philosophical discussion until 1763. Here wehave a first period of silence, lasting for eight or nine years,about which we know almost nothing. The only pointerwhich we have, and it is vague enough, is to be found inthe Beweisgrund: 'I give here the outcome of long meditations but their exposition is still imperfect and incompletebecause other preoccupations have not left me enough time'.If this text is to be trusted-and there is no reason why weshould not trust it-Kant must have ruminated in silenceover the subject-matter of the Beweisgrund where, it is true,we see coming to the surface all the problems which hadbeen left in suspense in the Dilucidatio of 1755. Hence itseems pointless to search for foreign influences on his thought.Having discovered, after Crusius, the error of Cartesian ontolagism, Kant owes to his continued reflection on this problemwhat it is customary to call his empiricism. There is noquestion then of revolution, but there is rather a slow andin some ways even painful evolution. But the silence and

26


prolonged isolation bore fruit: oriented towards cosmologyin 1755, Kant's thought began to turn towards epistemology.Slowly Kant extricated himselffrom the discussion ofspecialised problems in philosophy. He became preoccupied witha much more decisive problem: the possibility of metaphysics.

The commentators have treated all the writings whichKant published between 1762 and 1769 as belonging to onesingle amorphous group. If the usual fault in this type ofdiscussion is an excess of separatism, the contrary has beenthe case here. It is quite essential to distinguish betweenthree groups of writings in this decade. To the first groupthere belong the essay on the syllogism, the essay on negat~ve

magnitudes, the essay on the foundation of a den10nstratio11of the existence of God and the Prize Essay on the clearnessof the principles of metaphysics. These are evidence of considerable work done between 1762 and 1764, and they areoriented towards the past both in the presentation of theproblems and in the general terms of their solution. Asecond group contains only one actual publication, theTriiume eines Geistersehers, and otherwise consists of aprogramme of his lectures, commonly referred to as theNachricht seiner Vorlesungen, and the correspondence withMendelssohn. Finally, a third group is made up of thecorrespondence with Lambert, the essay on the distinctionof regions within space, the Dissertatio, and the letters toMarcus Herz up to 21 February 1772. In tb.e first groupKant resolved the problem of the possibility of metaphysicsby means of the Newtonian meth.od. Th.e second groupseems at first sight to question the possibility of metaphysics,but from 1766 onwards it is once again indubitably foremostin Kant's mind. In tl1e present section only the first groupwill be discussed.

The burning question of influences, which always arisesin any discussion of the evolution of Kant's thought, is partlyresolved by means of this grouping. It is astonishing that inthis connection no-one has ever invoked a text which couldgive an accurate picture of the actual state of affairs. Herderattended Kant's lectures from 1762 to 1764. Thirty yearslater, in 1795, he described the teaching which he had

27


received in terms which are perhaps more exact than iscommonly believed. In any case they seem to be eminentlydescriptive: 'Mit ebendem Geist, mit dem er Leibniz, Wolf,Baumgarten, Crusius, Burne prtifte und die NaturgesetzeKeplers, Nevvtons, der Physiker verfolgte, nahm er auch die/damals erscheinenden Schriften Rousseaus, seinen Emil undsein Heloise, sowie jede ihm bekannt gewordene Naturentdeckung auf, wurdigte sie und kam immer zurtick aufunbefangene Kenntnis der Natur und auf moralischen Wertdes Menschen.'l Three verbs, priifte, verfolgte, wiirdigte. Hecritically examines the Wolffians, Crusius, al~d Hume; heexpounds Newton and the physicists as one of their followers; he praises Rousseau. The reference to criticismand to the intellectual acceptance ofNewton's views expressesexactly the spirit of the first group of writings. In thesecond group we are going to encounter the intellectuallegacy of his enthusiasm for Rousseau. There is no questionofscepticism, or ofI-Iume. Kant knows the writings ofHume,because he critiCIses them, but they do not exercise anyperceptible influence on him. On the contrary, tl~e problemsdiscussed in 1755 are again brought to the fore; the solutions which will be given are more unequivocal and aremore clearly freed from Wolffian influence. The solutionswhich they receive are those which Newton would havegiven if metaphysics had tempted him. They are in factthe solutions given by Newtonians such as de Maupertuis,d'Alembert, Euler, or Lambert and Beguelin. On th.eother hand, the philosophical attitude which inspires thesolutions is not new either for Kant or for his contemporaries,for, if we exclude the link with Newton, the problems andtheir solutions are already anticipated in the Crusian criticism of Wolffian rationalism. The quaestiones, disputatae arethe same as those engendered by the metaphysics of Leibnizdescribed above: the problem of method discussed by Kant

1 'In the same spirit in which he examined Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, 'and Hume, and expounded the natural laws of thephysicists Kepler and Newton, he .?llso took up the works of Rousseauwhich. were then appearing, his Emile and his HelOise, and any newnatural discovery known to him, and gave his appraisal of them, alwayscoming back to disinterested knowledge of nature and to the moralworth of man.'


in the Preisschrijt, the distinction between being and thoughtestablished in the Beweisgrund, the discussion of causality towhich the essay on negative magnitudes is devoted, theconflict about th.e conception of space indicated in thePreisschrijt or Deutlichkeit. Let us examine the nature ofthese soiutions, bearing in nlind the logical order governingthem.

The years 1755 to 1764 mark a general tendency onKant's part to align himself with Newton. The method ofmetaphysics is not the synthetic, n1athematical, Cartesianmethod of Wolff, but the analytic method of Newtonianphysics. This tendency is already evident in the little essayon the syllogism, especially in the conclusion which alone isof interest to us. Judgment analyses the concept given inthe subject. The analysis of the concept into its constituentnotes is intended to clarify it. This is the classical conception- ofjudgment which as yet shows nothing of the construc-tive operation of 1787. Judgment does 110t enlarge the fieldof knowledge; it is limited to clarifying knowledge whichhas been acquired, and is therefore invariably the sameoperation. However, judgment does not seem to be the

. whole of knowledge, for in knowing we add to our information, we discover truths hitherto unknown. Because of itsanalytical structure judgment does not fulfil this function.Consequently a conflict arises betwee11 the analytical(:haracter of the judging function and the real aims ofscience. In the second place, all judgments are made inthe realm of concepts and have no transcendent import.Judgment is not the organ which is capable of graspingexisting things. Knowing things therefore does not consistin clarifying and developing a material content, but in therecognition both of the nature of things and of the reaspnfor their existence.

It is therefore indispensable to distinguish clearly betweenthe judgment about a thing and the thing itself. There isbetween these two the same distinction which exists betweenthe real and the logical, between being and thought. It isin the Beweisgrund then that Kant is going to establish thedistinction in question with all the consequences which itcarries with it. Kant warns us that he meditated eight or

29


nine years on the problem of the existence of God and onthe problems which this mode of existence raises. Thisproblem had already been raised, accidentally and henceimperfectly, in 1755, but in the present work the discussionis firmer and more close-knit and the solution is one ofprinciple and definitive. It makes little difference whetherthe causal problem led Kant to our distinction or whetherthe very distinction between being and thougl1t gave rise toa further treatment of the causal problem.

The ontological proof of tIle existence of God furnishesthe occasion and the theme of the debate which Kant isgoing to institute. The concept of being includes twodistinct elements: first, the concept of an essence or apurely ideal existence; secondly, the position of thisessence in the realm of the transcendent or real existence.Transcendence adds nothing to essence. It is therefore nota property of a thing and cannot constitute a predicatewhich can be attributed in a judgment. The analysis ofthe subject, the proper function ofjudgment, makes explicitthe essence from which existence is formally excluded.Affirmation of real existence therefore never has the analysisof the subject as a foundation. This amounts to saying thatreal existence cannot be determined by pure reason. Theexistence postulated in judgment will always be relativeexistence, while transcendent existence is absolute. Theassertion' God is all-powerful' is equivalent to the assertion, If God exists, he is all-powerful'. On the other hand, theassertion' God exists' states that some existing thing is God,and we have there the absolute positing of God.

This at once raises the problem: how mayan absoluteexistence be known? It appears to be soluble in only oneway. If thought, that is, judgment, cannot grasp it, thenwe must turn to experience and determine it empirically.An exception must certainly be made for one absoluteexistent, namely God. Kant does not conclude to it fromexperience, but from the concept of the possible. If weignore the exceptional character of divine existence, we caneasily see that the Kantian suggestion can be extendedwithout difficulty to the whole domain of metaphysics. Ifexistence is a fact of experience, can any validity still be

3°


attributed to this science which deliberately deprives itselfof the guarantee of experience? A question of this kindwill underlie the whole Kantian activity from this n1.omenton. In the essay on the syllogism he tells us that only whatis included in the subject can be demonstrated. As thesubject does not include real existence, the latter cannot beanalytically demonstrated. A distinction between thenlethods of the sciences dealing with the real and tIle idealwas therefore inevitable. Here both the striking unity andsingle-mindedness of Kantian thought and also his personalcharacter are evident. The empirical elenlent in his thoughthas led his interpreters to connect him with Hume. Thisinterpretation seems to be false. Crusius furnished theproblem and Newton the solution. Although Kant confessed much -later that he had been awakened from hisdogmatic slumber by Hume, his retrospective glance wascertainly riot fixed on this moment in his thought.

In any case, the problem of existence is not an isolatedproblem but is closely connected with the problem ofcausality. There Kant takes up again the theme of sufficient reason which had been hotly debated ever since themetaphysics of Leibniz disturbed the habits of thought ofthe physicists. As early as 1755, we have seen, Kant madea distinction between real reason and logical reason, but heidentified real reason with causality. In 1763 he saw thatthe \'Volffiano-Crusian real reason is not synonymous withcausality. Hence the discussiol1. is not concerned with theprinciple of causality but with tl1.e idea of causation andwith particular causal relations. The Kantian argumenttakes first a plainly negative line, especially in the essay onnegative magnitudes. He wants to establish a radical distinction between logical opposition and real opposition. Inthe first we affirm and deny something of the same subject.There is therefore no substitution of one predicate foranother, but simply the negatio11 of the first predicate bythe second. The result of contradiction will in this case bea nihil repraesentabile. Real opposition, on the other hand,is not simple contradiction, but involves replacing onepredicate by another just as positive. Thus simultaneousand equally intense movement in opposite directions does

31


not produce absolute zero, but a real state, namely, rest.In logical opposition the result is nothing because in it theformal principles of tll0ught are violated and this violationcan only produce something inconceivable. In real opposition no principle is violated since ,these principles governonly the connections between representations. Under theseconditions the result will be something real which only

. experience allows us to determine.It was not difficult to apply this distinction between types

of opposition to the special case of the opposition betweenlogical reason and real reason, and the one opposition clarifiesthe other. The logical relation between ground and consequence is understood and explained by identity; thusdivisibility is conceived to be a consequence of composition.But we cannot understand or explain by way of identityhow one thing can be derived from another. There wehave the real notion of causation: how is it that one thingexists because another thing exists? The negative solutionis already included in what has preceded; it cannot beunderstood by means of the principles of identity or contradiction. The positive solution which Kant sketches is barelyarticulated; it cannot be understood by means ofjudgment,he says, but only by means of a concept. This is a reallyenigmatic reply and a veritable crux for the commentators.Judgment is the analysis of an indistinct concept with thepurpose ofnlaking it clear. Well, says Kant, it seems impossible to clarify the concept of cause, and every causal relationmust therefore be deemed inexplicable. Causality seems totake the shape of a datum, unanalysable and not capable ofclarification, which we meet in experience. Kant wasdeluded about the novelty of his solution. He thinks heinvented the whole thing himself, but in fact it is to be foundcomplete in Leibniz. However that may be, the formulafor the causal problem is not borrowed from Runle evenalthough the solution given agrees with his views in morethan one respect. Kant owes the setting of the problem toCrusius and his criticislll of sufficient reason, but the solutionwhich he gives has been greatly enriched by his discussion ofexistence and of the ontological proof of God.

We have now before us two remarkable achievements32


which show Kant's thought breaking out of the Wolffiancircle; real existence is not demonstrable by means ofjudgment, by conceptual analysis, by pure thought, nor cancausality in its turn be demonstrated by these means. It isexperience which assures us of both existence and causality.In the two cases we have data which, raised to the level ofknowledge, are ultimate unanalysable concepts. It followsthat metaphysics, the science of existing things, cannot beconstructed on the Wolffian pattern, which is based on thesynthetic mathematical method.

This will be the result at which Kant arrives in the (iPreisschrift or the Deutlichkeit, the real treatise on methodbelonging to the pre-Critical period. Up to the present, thewritings of Kant falling between 1762 and 1764 have toldus in connection with certain particular problems how metaphysics cannot be constructed. In the Deutlichkeit he informsus how it must be constructed and what is the true methodwhich governs it. Kant establishes the metaphysical methodby opposing it, like many of his colleagues at this time, tothe method of mathematics, and deals with this methodological problem without any reference to physical considerations. Here Kant is uniquely and definitively a philosopher.Mathematics is the science of pure thought. Its objects areideal existences and its leading principle is that of groundand consequence. Metaphysics is not a science of the ideal;its objects are real absolute existences and its principle isthat of causality. Mathematics is the model of a notionalscience. The function of a notional science is to clarify aconcept, to establish its objective content, in a word, todefine it. The first necessity is therefore definition. Everything may then be demonstrated because demonstration issimply the attempt to bring out the necessity of a predicative determination of the subject. Notional science knowsonly one unanalysable element, identity. Did not Wolff tryto demonstrate the principle of contradiction?

Philosophy, on the other hand, starts from data, analysesthem faithfully by a work of reflection, and leads if possibleto a definition. The empirical point ofdepartu' '.determination in the order of transcende lo£ll.dJg)4i.e ;into contact with existing things. Thi ~r given, but thei ...,~

(2,491) 33 • '-''''1''"\,4 li.


are given raw and indistinct, and experience gives noinformation about the metasensible relations with whichthey are invested. They must be clarified before they canbe assin1ilated by the understanding. This is the role ofreflection which proceeds by the same rationalistic methodof analysis. The work of reflection always takes the formofajudgment. The analysis however ends in a large numberof unanalysable elements. None of these elements has arational Begrundung because they are not susceptible of treatment by identity. Descartes sought their Begrundung ininnate ideas. Kant, who was never at any time an adherentof the t11eory of innate ideas, wanted to compensate for theabsence of a rational Begrundung by an appeal to determination in experience. Instead of beginning with the simpleand the clear, metaphysics has the indistinct and the complex as its point of departure. Hence, it is out of thequestion to proceed synthetically after the pattern of mathematicians, or, in other words, it is forbidden to begin witha definition of the given. On the contrary, that is preciselythe end to be attained and is in consequence the completionof the demonstrative process characteristic of philosophy.The only admissible point of departure is empirical determination and immediate judgment about the given. Allsynthetic deduction is forbidden to metaphysics. However,metaphysics, like other sciences, aims at clarifying what isgiven indistinctly by breaking it up into simple elements,following the procedure of the analytic method which seeksthe constitutive notes of any essence, an activity which is anintellectual reflection on the given of experience.

This analysis corresponds to the Newtonian method; thetrue method ofmetaphysics is the~;a.me method which Newtonintroduced into physics. The/'final outcome of a faithfulapplication of this method is the simple elements of whichthe given is composed. These simple elements are not furtheranalysable; they are the Elementarbegrijfe or Grundbegrijfe.There are few of these in mathematics, but in metaphysicsthey are very numerous and there will be just as manyimmediate judgments as there are elementary concepts. Theideal end set by the mind is a complete list of these materialindemonstrable judgments. The mind would find in this list

34

THE PREPARATioN OF THE CRITICAL S'YNTHES1S'

the complete plan of the real world just as later the table ofcategories will constitute the con1plete schema of our thinking activity. There is no pOil1t in searching for the key tothis change of attitude in some foreign influence to bedetected in the Preisschrift. It should simply be noted thatKant once again follows the line adopted by Germanthought in the international conflict between Descartes andNewton. With praiseworthy perspicacity Crusius had per...ceived the role of definition in the structure of the differentsciences; he had posed the problen1 of the Elementarbegrijfe ;he had seen the inevitability of some measure of empiricism in any factual science with any claims to realism.It is he vvho inspired K..ant. And Crusius was not alone inthis. In 1755 the memoir of Beguelin on the first principles of metaphysics (the very subject of the Kantiantreatise) distinguished the method of mathematics from thatof philosophy in a manner very similar to that of Kant.The Neues Organon of Lambert (1764) discussed exactly thesame problems which Crusius had left to the meditations ofhis successors, and his Architectonik of 1772 proceeds a littlefarther along the same path just at the time when Kant waspreparing to exchange Newtonianism for Critical idealism.There is really no need to invoke I-Iume in all this.

The whole affair would be simple and straightforward ifan embarrassing remark by Kant had not once again madeit necessary to reopen the whole problem. On the basis ofthe indications in the Deutlichkeit we understand the distinction between the methods of mathematics and metaphysicsas well as the domain which circumscribes their application,and we should reasonably conclude that they cannot beassimilated nor in any way interchanged. But Kant takesthe ground from under our feet by adding that the analyticmethod is provisional in character because the moment hasnot yet arrived when we can proceed synthetically in metaphysics. This means, if the words have any sense, that thesynthetic method will once again reclaim its rights whenanalysis has completed its clarificatory work. The scientificideals envisaged by mathematicians and philosophers fusetogether and their destinies are common. The distinctionbetween them depends simply on the stage which they

35


happen to have reached. This amounts to saying thatdespite the empiricism which is evident in Kant at thismoment, the ideal of an a priori construction of universalscience retains for him all its attraction and force. In spiteof everything, the ideal of Descartes and of Hegel remainsthe Kantian ideal. And this dream, great both in hopesand in disappointments, renloves Kant from the Newtonianand positivist orbit. If we set aside this distant ideal, however, the actual condition of the science, and perhaps evenof man, demands that metaphysics should follow the path ofNewton. Kant is not an empiricist. For an empiricist,experience is not only the point of departure but also formspart of the very texture of science. Kant sees in experiencea point of departure but claims that science goes beyondexperience after the manner of a rational science. Theconcepts of science do have objective validity owing to thefact that they are given to us in experience. Their objectivecharacter is indissolubly linked to the given character oftheir objects.

It is quite understandable then that Kant is going to getcloser and closer to Newton in the last problem which formedpart of the Descartes-Newton dispute, namely, the problemof space. In 1755, we have already pointed out, Kant wasexactly midway between. t11e two antagonists. In the writingswhich constitute our first group, space is not explicitly discussed but Kant studies its nature and its principal properties, using them as examples to illustrate his researchesin the field of methodology. He based the ideas which hewas forming about space on his epistemological ideas. Theorientation of his epistemological ideas does not lead him toany radical modification of the positions which he had earlieradopted. In fact, the space discussed is geometrical space,therefore mathematical space, and consequently not necessarily affected by the movement towards experience characteristic of this period. Despite that, his hesitation is pronounced. In the Beweisgrund he forbids himself to give adefinition of it, and there is in its pages a powerful Ahnungof its absolute character. Although in the treatise aboutGod no final position is sketched, it is quite different in thetreatise on method. Kant comes closer to Newtonian space.

36


He forbids mathematicians to define it or to give any accountof it. As early as the essay on negative magnitudes, he haddenied to mathematicians the right to concern themselveswith space, while granting that right to philosophers. Butphilosophers are obliged to consider it as a given, as one ofthose elementary and unanalysable concepts. The mathematical mind is not equipped to seize its essence. Thephilosopher in general and Kant in particular study spacewithout considering the substances which fill it. Thereforeit is separable from these substances, and, since it is separable, it represents something other than the simple relationof their coexistence or their co-operation. Without doubtspace is a concept, not yet an intuition, although the definitive conception is already anticipated in two lines of the textwhere Kant expresses himself in the following manner., Dergleichen Satze lassen sich wohl erHiutern indem mansie in concreto betrachtet, urn sie anschauend zu erkennen.' 1

The question is about three-dimensional space.We can say therefore by way of resume that Kant has

finally broken with Wolffianism. The silence of the years1755-62 has been beneficial. It allowed Kant, once he hademerged from it, to sketch the contours of a philosophy quiteunlike the academic philosophy of the day, but adequate asa philosophy for thinkers-scientists and philosophers-whohad been influenced by the progressive spirit of Newton.

4

THE PSEUDO-SCEPTICISM OF THE TRAuME

cf. La Deduction I, 101-4, 200-2

It is indisputable that with the first group of writings belonging to the period under review Kant seems to have reached astage which allowed him to call a halt. A rumour was alsocirculating in Konigsberg (perhaps Kant himselfwas responsible for it) that he was going to reduce his ideas to treatise

1 'Propositions of this kind can be explained by looking at them inconcreto in order to grasp them intuitively.'

37


form. He certainly found hin1self obliged to give the lie tothis rumour while writing to Lambert. Furthermore, histeaching had undergone considerable development and theNachricht seiner Vorlesungen indicates not only its extent butalso the pedagogical method whicll he proposed to follow.Kant began with a resume of the content of the Preissehriftin brief and precise propositions which allow us toappreciate how assured was his methodology. The analyticmethod definitely overshadows the synthetic method. Heassures his public that in conformity with his theoreticalattitude it is no part of his intelltion in his philosophicalteaching to furnish a finished philosophy as if he wereunwinding a skein of thread, but rather to imitate Socratesin his scientific and zetetic maieutic so that the teaching ofphilosophy will follow the heuristic path by which it isbuilt up. His purpose is not to furnish the minds of hisauditors with a finished doctrine, but to give them a discipline and a method of thought. This heuristic path beginsin the order of knowledge by an appeal to experience sothat from this point of departure it can move from thesimple to the composite. The programme of lectures forthe winter term of 1765-6 consequently confirms theNewtonianism of this period.

It becomes all the more difficult to appreciate thesignificance of tIle Triiume eines Geistersehers erliiutert durek dieTriiume der Metaphysik. This work had not been commissioned but was an occasional piece more or less forcedout of hinl, as he confessed to Mendelssohn, by the enthusiasm aroused by Swedenborg and his mysticism. It is apamphlet which very quickly goes beyond its original purpose in order to pour sarcasm on metaphysics itself.K. Fischer wanted to see a sceptical Kant in this pamphletand interpreted the sarcastic tone of its pages as a sign ofsceptical detachment on Kant's part towards metaphysics.It is unnecessary to say that we refuse to subscribe to thisopinion. To put it briefly: Kant bears witness here to hisabsolute certainty that the Wolffian metaphysics is false, andat the same time, while professing his love for metaphysics,he confesses to a certain hesitation about its possibility as ascience.


Kant recognised two things in the course of his meditations: first, that knowledge of the real has experience as itssole origin and that in consequence only ll1athematics canclaim the title of a pure a priori science; secondly, tl1attheoretical metaphysics is not indispensable as a foundationfor morality. The first thesis is the outcome of the researchesundertaken between 1762 and 1764, the results of whichappear in the writings of that period. Kant owed thesecond thesis to the influence ofJ. J. Rousseau. It must notbe forgotte11 that the spiritual life of Germany was violentlydisturbed when the Sturm und Drang noisily announced theadvent of a new generation which was to be the precursorof romanticism. Kant ventured into teaching with thepurpose of assuring a solid material foundation for hisfuture career, and in a text addressed to Lindner in 1759he confessed that he was naturally curious, a professor bynature, the living incarnation of the rationalist mentality ofthe Aufkliirung. During the summer of 1762 the Kanterbookshop had brought to Konigsberg the Social Contractwhich had been thrown to the flames in Paris. Emilefollowed in the course of the same year. It was at thismoment, according to the testimony of Herder, that Kantacquired an enthusiasm for Rousseau, that he developed averitable cult of nature and of the idea of the moral valueof man. The consequences of this new infatuation arediscernible in all Kant's work up to 1766.

Kant corroborates the story of his pupil in an indisputable piece of evidence. He had added a series of extremelyimportant marginal notes to his working copy of the Beobachtungen aber das Schiine und das Erhabene (1764). These give abroad general idea of the sort of influence exercised byRousseau. 'I am a seeker by nature', we read there,, avid for knowledge. I sincerely thought that the greatnessof man lies there and that in this way the cultivated manis to be distinguished from the plebs. Rousseau put meback on the right road. Rousseau is another Newton.Newton completed the science of external nature, Rousseauthat of the i11ternal universe or of man. Just as Newtonlaid bare the order and regularity of the external world, soRousseau discovered the hidden nature of man. It was

39


imperative to recover a true conception of the nature ofman. Philosophy is nothing but the practical knowledgeof man'. When IZant, after 1770, recovered his spiritualequilibrium, he was to criticise the sentimentalism and themethod of Rousseau. By that time the crisis was over. Butat its height, as in the Triiume, it is acute.

A metaphysical Newtonianism suggested by Crusius andby contemporary physics~~thatis the state of mind revealedby the writings of 1762-4. The fusion of this thesis with theviews of Rousseau was bound to perpetuate such distinctivefeatures as the sovereign contempt for the kind of speculationwhich has no effect on the conduct of life. It is certainlytempting to believe that his dislike for metaphysical speculation was accentuated by his reading of Hume. To limitscience to experience is to admit the uselessness of metaphysics. Its moral neutrality marks its evil character. Itis indisputable that references to Hume and his doctrinebecome more numerous -and more precise from 1762 onwards. However, if the Triiume is read with the attentionwhich it demands, scarcely any traces will be found of ascepticism which would suggest the influence of the Scottishthinker. In fact, in the diatribe against Inetaphysics allthe indications are that we must distinguish its methodfrom its spirit.

The main object of metap11ysics is to show that its errorsspring directly from a vicious method. There is nothingnew in this because the vice of method noted by Kant isthe one which he had already brought to light in thePreisschrift, namely the indiscriminate application of thesynthetic method of mathen1atics to a science of facts. Itfollows that it is not metaphysics itself which is rejected,but a special type of metaphysics, namely, that which restson the faulty methodology referred to. The method advocated by Kant as the only acceptable one is always theanalytic method of Newtonian physics.

If the methodological position of the Triiume raisesscarcely any difficulties, it is a different matter when itcomes to determining the object of metaphysics, an objectwhich immediately becomes twofold. The classical objectof metaphysics was to know things by pure reason. On

4°


this definition, said Kant, we can know nothing and everyalleged science can be nothing better tllan a doxa since wecannot proceed synthetically (synthetisch verfahren) when wewish to know an existing thing. Once again this globalcondemnation does not touch metaphysics, but only synthetic metaphysics. Having condenlned the classical conception of metaphysics, Kant proceeds to assign it a newobject. It is the function of metaphysics to study whatnlan can know on the basis of the concepts of experience,the only fOllndation of our real judgments. This amountsto saying that the task of metaphysics is to determine thearea which can be explored by a reason which is organicallyconnected with experience or, in other words, to limit reasonto empirical knowledge. It follows that Kant has clearlyseen that reason, although formally unlimited as a cognitivefaculty, is materially limited by the given of experience.

Basically this does not differ from ,,,,hat he had said in1762-4, but no very keen observation is required in orderto discern a change in tonality in Kant's thinking since thattinle. The Triiume is dominated by a scarcely hiddenexasperation and in it Kant gives free rein to his feelings.To what should this change in his attitude be attributed?To nothing else, it seems to me, than his perception of theuselessness of all metaphysical speculation in the moralconduct of life. It is therefore much more Rousseau thanHume who is responsible for Kant's alleged scepticism,which is in the end notlling but a passing bout of pessimism.When Kant sent hinl a complimentary copy of the Traume,Mendelssohn claimed to be offended by the contemptuoustone which dominated the book. Kant none the less continued to proclaim his hatred and contempt for the reigningmetaphysics. Objectively considered (objectiv erwogen) , henevertheless added, metapllysics is neither useless nor contemptible, but, as long as it proceeds by the deductivemethod, it can only go on accumulating errors. If theanalytic method is employed, its proper object shifts; itconsists in determining the limits which the given of experiellce imposes on our reason. It may be seen that, materiallyconsidered, his teaching lias suffered little change sincethe Preisschrift. The Triiume may be inserted without

41


difficulty into the methodological reflections of the preCritical period.

If we now leave method and consider the doctrine ofcausality, we reach an identical conclusion. Kant repeatsthat no causal relations can be discerned by pure reason butthat all are to be found in experience. Reason is based onthe principles of identity and contradiction. The formalprinciples, however, are not applicable in the case ofcausalitybecause there the question concerns how the existence of onething makes necessary the existence of another. Thereforethe notion of causality cannot be reduced to simpler rationalconcepts: it is one of the Grundbegriffe which have to befound, like those of force and action, in experience. Aftershowing the impossibility of a rational deduction of anycausal relation, Kant illustrates his thesis by the example of'voluntary action exercised on our bodily organs. This isthe same example which Hume had used to support histhesis. The origin of the Kantian doctrine has naturallybeen seen in Hume's Enquiry, but it is none the less curiousto note that Kant had known of this work before 1762,although it had no apparent influence. I do not think thatthe awakening from dogmatic slumber, which Kant speaksof later, can be referred to this period. Th.e account ofcausality is an exact replica of that given by Hume, but itis none the less curious to find it in the Negativen Griissen.

It may therefore be taken as established, let us say byway of conclusion, that in 'I 763 Kant read the work of Humewithout his doctrine becoming the focal point of a strikingrevolution in Kant's ideas. Newton and Crusius contributedmuch more effectively to the breakdown of the Wolffianismin his mind. It is nevertheless true that the noticeable changeof tone can be explained by one or the other method. Ibelieve that Rousseau must be held responsible for thischange of tone, for he revealed to Kant the superiority ofmorality to knowledge. It would undoubtedly be goingtoo far to follow Cassirer in holding that Kant's metaphysicalwork up to this point had no other raison d'etre than itsbearing on morality. No, metaphysics has a value in itself.'I was an investigator', confessed Kant. However, henever lost contact with ethics. The little work of 1759 on

42


optimism finds its place within the solid framework ofbourgeois optimism characteristic of enlightened Woffianisn1.The Preisschrift studied metaphysical principles in theodicyand ethics; the theoretical part was consequently a preparation for the metaphysics of morals. The future formalism is already evident, for Kant attempts to distinguish theformal principles of morality: act in the most perfect wayyou can. In the letter to Formey, which accompanied hismemoir, he is uncertain whether it is reason or feelingwhich rules in the field of morality. According to theNachricht, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, Hume, and Burke are hismodels ill 1765. The Beobachtungen is more of a moralpsychological treatise than an essay in aesthetics. Theconsciousness of moral feeling is the foundation of ethics.In the Triiume metaphysics is impossible as a science as longas it studies objects beyond the realm ofexperience; scientificevidence gives way to moral faith. The blending of Newtonianism and the sentimentalism of Rousseau thereforeaffords some explanation of the difficulties which faced Kantat this time.

5

INTIMATIONS OF SYSTEMATISATION

cf. La Deduction I, 100-4, I 16-17, 145-6

While the analytic method remained Kant's panacea, aprofound modification of the object of metaphysics may bediscerned in the Triiume. The object ofWolffian speculationis mercilessly condemned, and the metaphysics which,objectiv erwogen, retains its value, according to Kant, is thatwhich examines the limits inlposed on reason by the experiential character of the given. The problem of the limitationof reason is coming into view and for Newtonianism thereis imperceptibly substituted the theme which heralds phenomenalism. A kind of inventory of the pre-Critical periodcan now be made under the three following heads:(I) Things reveal their presence and their nature in the

43


given of experience; there is therefore no real knowledgewithout such a given. (2) Real knowledge is limited tothe content of experience. (3) Reason is 110t lin'lited initself, but it is limited in its content by experience. Ascience with any transcendent import is limited to thecontent furnished by experience. It follows that there isno ground for considering metaphysics as a source of realor transcendent knowledge. In so far as it is a priori, it ispure analysis of concepts. Can it have any object otherthan the transcendent? If it does not discover the externalworld, it can discover the conditions which a real sciencemust satisfy. These are reached as the result of an analysisof the conditions imposed on reason by the demand that itbe limited to experience.

Hence there is no a priori knowledge of things; suchknowledge is always a posteriori. This raises a very graveproblem. The true foundation of objective science is aposteriori. But this does not satisfy the demands of science,which only becomes science when the necessity and universality of its constituent elements is made clear. Butexperience is not the organ of the necessary and the universal. On the other h.and, the rationalist solution is alsodeficient. It takes account of necessity but it cannot claimany validity in reality. Kant did not know how to get outof this difficulty. He did not even see it as clearly as wemight desire. '!\Then he did eventually see this difficulty,it was going to be necessary for him to surmount it bydistinguishing in the datum of knowledge both a rationaland an irrational element. But we have not yet reachedthat point.

The Critical philosophy connects phenomenalism withthe distinction between the analytic and the synthetic judgment. It was consequently tempting to locate the discoveryof this distinction at just this point in Kant's development.Adickes, followed by Cassirer, appealed to an impressivenumber of Reflexionen to show that in his thinking aboutcausality Kant was converted to the equation: empiricalequals synthetic. I cannot accept this makeshift solutionbecause the texts and fragments are positively undatable.In any case, in the Traurae, despite the opportunity it

44


afforded for such a discussion, there is no question of synthetic judgment. It must not be forgotten th.at tIle terms, analytic' and' synthetic' have quite a different meaningwhen applied to judgments and to meth.ods. Furth.ermore,we must not allow ourselves to be led astray. The changeof front which these scholars wish to locate at this momentwas more difficult than might be imagined. The work inthe domain of methodology to which Kant had devotedhimself from the beginning of his career converged towardsa radical distinction between mathematics and philosophy.But the division of judgments into analytic and syntheticamounts to a new classification under quite a differentprinciple. It was Lambert and Leibniz who started Kantalong the new line of development which ended in thedistinction between judgments.

Between I765 and I767 there was an exchange of lettersbetween Lambert and Kant, two men with minds of asimilar cast. In a letter expounding his ideas, Lamberttold Kant that in his view the future of metaphysics dependedon the distinction between form and matter: matter cannotbe deduced from form, and any talk of form which is notapplied to an objective content of knowledge is empty verbalism. This was the basis of the Neues Organon which he hadpublished in I764. 'In all knowledge', he said, 'it isnecessary to consider both the content or matter which issupplied by perception and the form which is nothing butthe thought to be found in the laws of logic and mathematics.' It must be noted that Lambert was a lone wolfamid the philosophical movements of his time. It is all themore significant that Kant immediately declared himself inagreement with Lambert when the substance of his methodwas condensed into one pregnant sentence.

The point of view adopted by Lambert was not perhapscompletely novel to Kant. In I765 Raspe had unearthedthe Nouveaux Essais of Leibniz. Windelband rightly insisted,though possibly with some exaggeration, on the numerouspoints of contact between the doctrine of the Dissertatio of1770 and the Leibnizian work. In this posthumous work,Leibniz defended a method analogous to that of Lambert :the concepts and principles by which we represent the

45

THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN TROUGHT

material content of experience are the consciousness of intellectuallaws or functions. There is therefore for Leibniz ana priori knowledge of the laws of understanding and an aposteriori knowledge of the content of experience. This content is represented by the sensible manifestations of things.The intellectual operations; of which we become aware asthey take place, pass into Leibniz's doctrine in the shape ofcognitive forms.

But let no-one misunderstand our intentions. We wantto take note of a simple coincidence rather than to attributeto the Nouveaux Essais a determining influence in the years1765-7. It may very well be that this influence must beplaced later, provided that it be placed before 1770. However that may be, his alleged scepticism did little to preventKant from pursuing his purpose of assuring the future ofmetaphysics. On the contrary, the new object which heassigned to it gave him new confidence. At least that iswhat he says to Herder in 1767. From the moment whenHerder left l'Albertine (1764), a great change took place intIle thought of the master. Instead of directing his attentionon Newtonian empiricism as a means of saving metaphysics,he began to think about the knowledge ofthe limits ofhumanfaculties and propensities. In this way the problem oflimitation spread to the domain of knowledge and of morality.Even his confidence in ethics seems greater; he believedthat he had found the true principles of this discipline aswell as the fruitful lnethod, and this allowed him to predictthat in the course of the year he would be able to work outthe Metaphysics of Morals. In the same way, the letters toLambert open a perspective from which to view the firstintimations of an integral systematisation of philosophy.This project contains a division comparable to that of theCritical project: one part is to pursue the Hauptziel anddiscuss the method of metaphysics, and the other part is tocontain the metaphysics. The first part had to be postponedbecause Kant, on his own admission, had worked out thetheory, but had not yet found examples which would enablehim to make it intelligible. He undertook instead the secondpart which was to include the Anfangsgriinde of themetaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals.

46


Unfortunately even this limited purpose remained a mereproject although the materials were ready.

6

FIRST SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OFMETAPHYSICS

cf. La Deduction I, 147-64, 202-10; Mind, 303-20

In 1766 a second period of silence began which lasted up to178 I, since the little essay on space is only a journal articleand the Dissertatio of 1770 owes its birth to a purely professionalobligation. We do not know what made Kant giveto a local weekly the article on the distinction of regions inspace. In the Triiume there had indeed been a discussion ofthe relation of God to space, and another discussion aboutthe localisation of the soul; there is also the declaration toMendelssohn, according to which the object of metaphysicsis to know how the soul is present in the world; those twoproblems certainly deal with the relations between materialand spiritual substances and space. But neither the one northe other seems to have led to the little meditation aboutspace. On the other hand, the Newton-Leibniz disputestarted again in the course of the years 1760-70 and theproblem of space-time became again the centre of thequarrel. The Theoria philosophiae naturalis of Boscovitch andits supplement De Spatio et Tempore (1763), the Melanges deLitterature et de Philosophie of de Maupertuis (I 763-70), theDe Substantiis et Phaenomenis by Plouquet (1764), the Theoriamotus corporum solidorum (1765) and the Lettres aune Princesseallemande (1768) by Euler, the Anfangsgriinde der hiiherenMeckanik by Kaestner (1776), and L'Essai d'une Conciliationde la Metaphysique de Leibniz avec la Physique de Newton byBeguelin (1776) provide unequivocal evidence of thisfact.

The little dissertation on space informs the mathematiciansthat absolute space in the Newtonian sense is the necessary

47


condition ofthe possibility oftheir science. Space is thereforeindependent of the existence of matter, but at the same timeit is the condition of the possibility of the order which is tobe found in the material world. Kant illustrates his totalconversion to Newtonian space by demonstrating that thingspossess spatial characteristics which are not contained in theirconcept as constitutive marks and which on the other handare not explicable in terms of relative space. He invokesfirst of all the Raumgefiihl, that is, the fact that the positionof a body does not depend on the reciprocal relations of itsparts but on its relation to our own body. Relative spacecannot account for this fact. Secondly, he invokes the caseofsymmetrical objects such as a spherical triangle, our imagereflected in a mirror, the two hands, etc. This symmetrycannot be explained by the simple reciprocal relation of theparts but only by means of the relation of these objects toabsolute space in so far as they occupy different sections ofthis absolute space.

It is clear that this discovery was to reinforce Kant in hisNewtonianism. Euler had anticipated him on this point.For Euler, absolute space is the absolute condition of theprinciples of 111echanics. Kant, on the contrary, addresseshimself only to the geometers and points out to them thatthis same space is the condition of geometry. However,from this he goes on to draw epistemological conclusionswhich go considerably beyond what Euler could have taughthim. Kant agrees with Euler in concluding t11at spacecannot be considered as a purely ideal being or as a beingof reason in the manner of Leibniz. Space is somethingtranscendent and for that reason is the condition of thepossibility of outer experience. The doctrine of the transcendent nature of space was once again to throw doubt onthe rationalist hypothesis of the a priori necessity of mathematics. If space is a real existent, and if geometry is thereal science of space, then, in keeping with the Newtoniantone of this whole period, geometry had to be an empiricalscience. This is a conclusion to which Kant never subscribedand to which he could not have subscribed. But the conclusion to which he did come was that absolute space is notan object of experience and that the relation of things to

48

49


absolute space is not directly perceptible. Since space is notan object of experience, the science of space cannot beempirical, even although space makes possible all experienceand all outer sensation. So, in the end, we see that Kantrecognised in space a real being, absolute but unique, theknowledge of which contains the explanatory basis of allsensatioll. It must be considered one of the Grundbegriffe,but one of a special type because it does not seem to beabstracted fronl experience. It is intuitive.

We are therefore faced with two theses of a very differentorder: the Triiulne made the limitation of reason by experience the very object of metaphysics: the article on spaceleads us towards a space which is absolute, substantial, andconcrete, thus having the character of an intuition. TheDissertatio of 1770, which is a first exposition of the Criticalphilosophy, must now be explained by means of these twotheses. It was undoubtedly the problem of space which setthe powder on fire. We read in Reflexio 5°37: 'Wenn ichnur so viel erreiche dass ich tiberzeuge, man mtisse dieBearbeitung dieser Wissenschaft so lange aussetzen, bis mandiesen Punkt ausgemacht hat, so hat diese Schrift ihrenZweck erreicht. Ich sahe anfenglich diesen Lehrbegriff wiein einer Danlmerung. Ich versuchte es gantz ernstlich,Satze zu beweisen und ihr Gegenteil, nicht urn eine Zweifellehre zu errichten, sondern weiI ich eine Illusion desVerstandes vermuthete, zu entdecken, worin sie stacke. DasJahr 6g gab nlir grosses Licht.' 1 A further decisive piece ofevidence, a letter to Garve in 17g8, confirms this account.'Nicht die Untersuchung worn Daseyn Gottes, der Unsterblichkeit, etc. ist der Punck gewesen von clem ich ausgegangen bin, sonclern die Antinomie der reinen Vernunft.' 2

The Prolegomena informs us that the antinomies are the

1 , If I only succeed in persuading [readers] that work in the sciencemust be given up until this point has been settled, this work will haveserved its purpose. At first I grasped this doctrine only obscurely. Iattempted quite seriously to prove both propositions and their opposites,not in order to establish a doctrine of doubt, but, as I suspected thatthere was an illusion of the understanding, in order to discover whatthis illusion actually was. The year 1769 gave me great light.'

2 'It was not from any inquiry into the existence of God or theimmortality of the soul that I started, but from the antinomies of purereason.'

(2,491)


proper means of awakening the philosopher· fronl his dogmatic slumber and we are told that this awakening coincidedwith the discovery of the Critical problem. The problemreferred to by both these texts is that of the antinomies. Theantinomies are divided in 1781 into two classes: a mathematical and a dynamical class. The first concerns space,the second metaphysics. The first class dealing with spacewas the only one recognised in 1769. The fourfold divisionof the categories which governs the grouping of the antinonlies did not exist at this moment.

On tIle basis of our texts it might be concluded that theproblem of the antinomies was the cradle of the Criticalphilosophy. Let us note however the remarkable prudenceshown by the texts. 'The year 1769 gave me great· light "says Kant. Although that could certainly mean tllat theCritical philosophy found the reason for its existence in theantinomies, there is nothing yet to prevent us from readingthese texts as meaning that the finding of the Critical philosophy furnished the solution to the antinomies. In this casethe light would consist in the fact th.at the Critical philosophypermits the resolution of the paradoxes of continuity and theantinomies of infinity. However that may be, it is certainlythe adoption of a belief in absolute space that brought theproblem of antinomies to the fore. As long as Kant had notopenly taken part in the Leibniz-Clarke duel about thenature of space, there was no reason for him to get upsetabout the paradoxes of the infinite. But with the adoptionof the absolute view of space the question becanleurgent.On the one hand absolute geometrical space is infinitelydivisible, while on the other the substances which fill it arecomposed of simple, indivisible, atomic, or monadologicalelements. In an article in Mind (1938) I have alreadyexplained how the problem posed by Pierre Bayle hadexcited passionate discussion throughout the wholeEurope.

This was not the only problem for Kant. In additionto the endless discussions about the paradoxes which hadlasted for at least three-quarters of a century, there werealso the difficulties inherent in the part played by space inhis general philosophical position. Since our representation

5° _l-- _


of space is not empirical, it is not an intuition: on theother hand, being unique it is not a concept, and yet it isthe condition of the possibility of mathematics, and thereforeabsolutely necessary. This means that we know prior to allexperience an absolute being which really exists. Such aconception is scarcely reconcilable with the extreme Newtonianism advocated in the Triiume and there is nothing inKant's past thinking which would permit the solution of theenigma presented by absolute space. It is worth noting here,I think, that the texts we have quoted in order to sl1.oW thecontribution of the antinomies to Kant's thinking do not giveus any assurance that they were the only elements in andthe only objects of Kant's meditations. On the contrary, Ihave already shown how Kant found the true Leibnizianepistemology in the Nouveaux Essais brought to light in 1767.This discovery of Leibniz becomes very important from thistime on.

How are the difficulties inherent in the nature of spaceto be resolved? In general, the Critical solution consists indenying to space the character of an object, that is, in considering it not as a substantial being, but as an a priori formofknowledge. The ideality ofspace is the elld to be attained.Kant is aware of the distinction between fornl and matter,but he has just begun to envisage space as an existent being.Was it going to be necessary to return to the relativist conception of Leibniz? The Nouveaux Essais make space a pureidea originating in the understarlding, which constructs thisconcept out of sensible perceptions. Kant could have foundthere the ideality of space as the form of knowledge ofperceptions, but a serious obstacle prevented him fromsimply adopting the Leibnizian thesis. The difficulty isthat space, however it may be represented, is not a conceptor an abstract idea; its concrete unity makes it nearneighbour to intuition. If it is a concept, it is not anabstract concept, but a peculiar kind of concept.

In the eyes of Leibniz the question of origin was notprimary. Intuition and concept, sensibility and understanding only indicated differences in degrees of clearness :intuition was the obscure representation while the conceptwas the clear representation of the object. This view is, of

51


course, quite incompatible with Kant's recent ideas aboutspace. Space is not a concept, and geometry, which isfounded on it, consists of theorems which are infinitelyclearer than those of metaphysics. The distinction betweenrepresentations and faculties therefore resides elsewhere. Itmust be located in the very nature of those orders of knowledge which differ, not in degree of clearness, but in kindand origin. Two orders are going to find themselves sideby side because two faculties, sensibility and understanding,each sui generis, are going to be side by side, and bothoriginate types of knowledge which are not interchangeable.Each of these orders has its own forms or laws and its ownmatter. Sensibility therefore has its own matter and anindependent form. This latter is necessarily a priori. Space,along with time, will be tIle a priori form ofsensible intuition.The sanle will be true of understanding: Kant looks for thea priori form of understanding and, since it is too soon tothink of the categories, he takes up again the old idea ofunanalysable concepts which he now regards, it should benoted, after the fashion of Leibniz, as laws or intellectualprinciples.

The problem was solved as soon as Kant had determinedthe nature of space with all the consequences that followfrom it. There remained the second problem, namely, theobject of metaphysics which, since the Triiume, consisted inthe limitation of reason by the immediately given of experience. I-Iowever, the situation was now completely reversedby the distinction in kind between sensibility and understanding. Sensibility and its intuitions are made possibleby the a priori forms of space and time, the basis of mathematics; understanding and its concepts are made possibleby the a priori forms of unanalysable concepts, the basis ofmetaphysics. In the Nouveaux Essais perception was thesensible manifestation of things, hence the representation oftheir appearances, and to this Kant added that they arereceived in space and time. Intuition tllerefore knowsthings in their sensible appearances. 'The understanding',said Leibniz, 'knows things as they are'. Therefore, bythe intellectual forms we know things as they are in themselves, in a manner beyond any sensible mode of reception.

52


Metaphysics therefore is given an infinitely more importalltrole than before. It is no longer the analytic science whichlimits reason to experience, but it becomes the science ofthings as they are in themselves. TIle object no longerlleeds to be given to our senses in order to be known. Itis undoubtedly given to our senses, and the sensible receptionis real, but it is given as a manifestation of a manifold ofsensible phenomena. Beyond that, the object is still thoughtby pure understanding in so far as its internal essence andits metasensible properties escape the reach of sensibility.Kant did not ask himself the question how we can knowthings in their pure essence by means of pure understanding.It looks as if the pleasure he took in the discovery of idealityclouded for a moment his perspicacity.

Just at this moment, Kant, who was already knownthroughout all Gernlany, saw the possibility of obtaining aprofessorship. A chair of theology had become vacant. Inthis connection he had to defend a thesis. Thus it was thatin 1770 he reduced to writing his epistemological ideas inthe De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiisdissertatio, a work whicll is always knOWll by the last wordin its title. This work, whose meaning has been violentlydiscussed, has a dual structure as the reference to thesensible world and the intelligible world indicates. Inconnection with the sensible world Kant expounds theCritical theory of the a priori forms of sensibility which arepurely receptive: space and time are possible in so far asthey are a priori forms of intuition, which knows only theappearances of things.

With regard to the theory of the intelligible world Kantcould only expound provisional and epllemeral ideas. Hehad solved the problem of objectivity by limiting reason toexperience. The limiting condition has just been removedthrough the influence of Leibniz; metaphysics is not theformal science of reason, but a material science of things.However, in formal opposition to Leibniz, Kant basesthe difference between the two worlds on the genericdistinction between the two opposing faculties and theirfornls and principles. The distinction in degree betweenclear and obscure is replaced by a difference in kind

53


between receptivity and spontaneity. To one facultythings are given, while the other thinks thenl in its ownright.

Metaphysics is going to be rooted in understanding andits power of spontaneity. From this point of view it isnecessary to distinguish the double use which we can makeof our intellectual power according to tIle origin of thematter which it invests with an a priori form. There isfirst a logical llse, which originates sensible appearancesand universalises its object by submitting the material percept to the natural law which governs it. The result is theempirical concept whicll can never claim tIle dignity of apure idea because of the indelible imprint left on it by thesensible origin of its nlatter.

The outcome of the logical or analytic use of understanding is the concept of experience or of the empirical object,which is therefore made up of material perceptions orderedby the laws originating in intuition (space and time) andbrought to the concept. This use guarantees the knowledgeof empirical things but only so far as they are known assensible appearances. On this provisional construction ofempirical data in space and time it confers the character ofan empirical object. This part of Kant's thought is definitiveand will not be subject to further modification.

In the second or real use, understanding creates thematter and form of its own concepts. Kant still holds thatbehind all its sensible determinations tIle thing hides aninternal ontological essence which eludes all en1.piricalinvestigation. Kant's rationalist temperament is clearlyrevealed in this type of affirmation. Knowledge of theessence of things must be attained by reason and in ana priori manner. There we have the real use of reason.Through it Kant claims to know things in their own essenceby the use of a priori concepts. Where do these conceptscome from? rrhey are not derived from the sensible likeabstract concepts, but they represent rational activity itself.On the other hand they are not innate. They express thegeneral relations established by reason through the exerciseof its fundamental laws on the occasion of experience.What are these laws? Kant does not tell us. They are

54


the concepts which constitute the matter of metaphysics andof morality.

From now on these epistemological prolegomena willallow Kant to elaborate a positive method for metaphysics.In metaphysics we have the science of the principles whichgovern the real use of understanding by means of which weknow the ontological essence of existing things. The generalprinciple of the method which n'lllst be followed consists infreeing the understanding from any taint of sensible conditioning. Is this to be interpreted then as contrary to theteaching of the Triiunle and of l\Jewton? Undoubtedly itmust be. How is such a methodological principle to bejustified? In physics, the object is given, and the work ofintelligence consists in transforming the given phenomenainto experience by the logical use of understanding, throughwhich we subordinate them to a law and convert them intoan empirical object. In this operation the phenomenonacquires greater clarity and perfection. In metaphysics, theconcept of things in themselves is given by understanding.Ifin physics the method was imposed by the given characterof its matter, here the method necessarily precedes metaphysics itself, because it expounds its intellectual laws andin so doing determines the real use of understanding. Theprinciple of the metaphysical method consists in the autonomy of reason understood in such a way that the sensibleforms do not constitute its necessary limits. The absolutecondition of the possibility of metaphysics lies in the recognition that understanding has a wider domain than sensibility. Metaphysics acquires its rational purity by carefullyavoiding all contamination by sensibility or, what amountsto the same thing, by confining the sensible principles andforms to their proper field of application. If understandingis indeed automatically freed from the conditions underwhich the sensible and en1.pirical is received, then there isno reason why the schematism of rational forms should notbe ipso facto the schematisn1 of the ontological forms of aworld of transcendent things. The formal principle of thesel1.sible is the principle of the subjective reception of thegiven; its validity is subjective. If the pure concept weresubordinated to it, the subjectivity inherent in the sensible

55


would inevitably contaminate the concept. It is thereforehighly important for the validity of metaphysics that thesubjective conditions of its intuition should not be held tobe a condition of the object in itself.

Admittedly this is still limitation, but the nature of thelimitation has beell completely changed. In the Traume,sensibility was the beneficiary of the limiting imperative;in the Dissertatio, it is pure understanding. Intuition is subjective; understanding is objective. Kant here adopts astandpoint clearly opposed to the general conclusion of hispre-Critical reflection and equally opposed to the Criticalstandpoint which is to come. If, now as later, he employsthe same elements, he will keep changing the roles assignedto them. These considerations must determine the meaningof the Dissertatio and its position in the history of Kantianthought. If the essence of the Critical philosophy is heldto be the subjective ideality of tIle forms of cognition, theDissertatio clearly anticipates the Critical philosophy. If, onthe contrary, its essence is held to lie in objectivity, theDissertatio is less important. I personally believe that theproblem of objectivity is the specifically Critical problem.We see that Kant in 1770 came to believe unhesitatingly inthe objectivity ofa transcendent metaphysics because th.epureconcepts themselves have transcendent validity. Fronl thisit may be concluded that the genuinely Critical problem hasnot yet been perceived. But it will not be long before it is.All its constitutive elements are present, since all the factorswhich determine the objectivity of transcendent metaphysicsin the Dissertatio are soon going to be used as grounds fordenying such objectivity. The fate which his colleagueswere preparing for the Dissertatio is going to open Kant'seyes and annihilate in one blow all this fine but fruitlessattempt at dognlatic metaphysics.


7

THE POSING OF THE CRITICAL PROBI~EM

cf. La Deduction I, 164-72, 250-6; Revue BeIge, 713-32, 49-83

Proud of his discovery, Kant sent a copy of his work to threedistinguished contemporaries, Lambert, Sulzer, and Mendelssohn. In tIle accompanying letter Kant maintained in alltheir rigour the methodological principles of the Dissertatioeven although he was aware that his doctoral thesis had tobe corrected and added to. He had to clinlb down a littlewhen the replies reached him. Lambert accepted the distinction of kind between the faculties but objected to theidealism of the forms of sensibility. The subjective idealityof time necessarily implied that change itself is ideal, andeven an idealist cannot deny the reality of change. Thequalifications brought forward by Sulzer and Mendelssohnhappened to be of the sanle kind and the unanimity of theircriticism must have upset the author, and indeed with somejustification. Kant devoted a great deal of thought to theircriticisms, as he was to admit in 1772. Six months after thethree replies reached llim, he had not yet found a satisfactoryreply to the objection that his doctrine was a version of sub-jective idealism, an objection which was based on the a prioricharacter and subjectivity of the forms of sensibility. Kanthimself thought that the objection was due to simple misunderstanding, since he considered himself an empiricalrealist in the logical use of pure reason, and a transcendentrealist in the pure use. The misapprehension, however, was11011e the easier to dissipate.

These preoccupations oriented his meditations in anotherdirection. He turned away from the study of the forms ofknowledge with their troublesome subjective implicationsand from the pursuit of the apriori. This change ofdirectionenabled him to concentrate his attention on that aspect ofknowledge by which it represents an object. This object isa real being, a being in itself. 'It is very important', Kant

57


says to Herz in 177 I, ' to make a distinction between all thatrests on the subjective principles of mind, both sensible andintellectual, and that which belongs to objects'. Kant ismoving slowly but surely towards the problem of objectivityand a new methodological principle: he abandons the effortto avoid contamination of the intellectual by the sensibleand adopts the principle of distinguishing between formalprinciples and the object of knowledge, or between the subjective and the objective aspect of knowledge. This prin-ciple, which represents an intermediate stage between theDissertatio (1770) and the Critique (178 I), was to dominatehis thinking while ""rorking out the con1plete system of philosophy which he planned at this time. This was to includemetaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, in accordance with theprogramme conceived in 1766, by-passed in the Dissertatio,and, in spite of the satisfactory progress n1ade in the .preparatory works, postponed in its execution for fifteen totwenty years.

The next document bears the date 2 I February 1772.This second letter to Herz has very often been misunderstood.It has generally been read as putting forward a programme,whereas all the evidence suggests that it is the balance-sheetof a past. It details exactly the course of Kant's thoughtsince the Dissertatio and especially since the preceding letterof 177 I. It presents two peculiarities: first, Kant's attention has been drawn to understanding; secondly, objectivityoccupies his attention to the exclusion of· everything else.The document begins with a retrospective account startingfrom the Dissertatio: Kant reviews the plan of the Dissertatioand finds the practical part of the plan which he had outlinedso satisfactory that he allows himself to elaborate an evenwider plan, the complete plan of his philosophy.

In the theoretical part, however, which comprises ageneral phenomenology and the study of metaphysics fromthe point of view of the method employed in it, there wasa very unfortunate omission which demanded urgent attention. This omission was extremely awkward since it is the keyto the whole problem of metaphysics. The essential pointwhich he had omitted was to inquire how our representationscan represent an object. Two kinds of representation can

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be explained without difficulty: (I) sensible representation, where the object affects the subject; this is limitedto the object of the senses and the representation onlyindicates the manner in which the subject has been affectedby the object; (2) the opposite type, where understandingcreates objects as in mathematics. Neither the one northe other, 110wever, satisfies the conditions of the problem.Our ideas or concepts are pure, and sensible representationis not pure in this sense; on the other hand, we do notcreate objects by means of our concepts. The Dissertatio hadcommitted two errors or was guilty of two omissions in thisrespect: first, affirming at th.e outset that the pure conceptis not produced by th.e object, it did not add to this negativeaccount any positive indication of its origin; secondly, itneglected to inquire how our representations can relate toan object when we are not affected by the object.

The proof that Kant meditated for a long time on theseweaknesses is again to be found in the document itself.Kant adopts a position which is opposed both to the empiricism of sensible affection and to the confusion of the presentmetaphysical problem with the constructive nature of mathematics. He also reacts against the ontolog-ism which ishidden in idealism, in occasionalism, and in the preestablished harmony between concept and object attributedto Crusius. In spite of its novelty, the problem does notmark a real break in the continuity of Kant's thinking. Itextends the line of thought adopted in the Dissertatio andonce again brings into question the solution which hadbeen given to the problem of intellectual knowledge. Kantin no way doubts the conformity of concept to object, buthe asks for its rational justification. The concepts in questionare the laws of understanding; the object is the essence ofthings in themselves. It is here that the full force of theproblem makes itself felt: an a priori idea which representssomething in itself! The masked Cartesianism, as it survivesin Wolffianism after the impact of Newtonianism, is onceagain threatened by the new state of the problem.

Since the letter of 1772 is a balance-sheet and not aprogramme, we should like to be correctly informed aboutthe solution which Kant himself was prepared to give. On

59


this point, however, he hedges, although he must have hada rough idea of this solution since he promises the first partof a work intended to expound it. The solution aboutwhich we do have information is partial because it is negative. Kant knew very well that the problem which he wasposing could not be solved and he refutes opposing theories.Many commentators are of the opinion that our letterproves that Kant had settled the fate of the transcendentaldeduction. It states its problem indeed, but that is all.On the other hand, one of the actual conditions of theproblem is incompatible with the future deduction, namely,the thing in itself. If a positive solution was taking shapein Kant's mind, it does not appear as yet to have becomethe limitation ofpure understanding to experience in Hume'ssense, despite what Erdmann and Paulsen say. It showssufficiently, I believe, that this time !(ant did not experienceany outside influence, whether from Hume or from anyoneelse, in order to arrive at the central problem of the deduction and of the Critical philosophy. The avatars of theDissertatio put him on the track. Two characteristics of thispositio quaestionis confirm the view that he reached theproblem on his ovvn. These characteristics are the antiidealisnl and the anti-psychologism revealed in the very

.~ conditions of the problem. There Kant maintains thething in itself and rejects all self-creation of the object.On the otller hand, his problem is not directed at thequestion of the origin of knowledge. In the Newtonianperiod the origin decided the objectivity. Experience wastIle origin of the objective determination of things. Theintellectual a priori origin of concepts was without doubtone of the conditions of tIle problem, but not part of theproblenl itself. The problem poses the question of validityand presupposes the question of origin.

Although the solution of the future transcendental deduction is not anticipated in the letter of 1772, Riehl andPaulsen nevertheless concluded that Kant had nothingfurther to look for concerning the metaphysical deduction,that is, concerning the complete list of pure concepts withrespect to which the problem of validity had been posed. Itcannot be denied that Kant did indeed have this deduction

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in mind. He rejected the categorial system of Aristotlebecause of the arbitrary character and empirical nature ofits heuristic principle, and he asserted that he possessedanother system of categories, discovered by means of certainprinciples, but he did not tell us what kind of principles hehad in mind. TIle only thing we know is that in the Critiquea single principle is invoked, namely, the correspondence ofthe pure concept with the form of judgment. The multiplicity of principles mentioned in our letter therefore rulesout any elaboration of the deduction in the course of theyear 1771.

In short, the letter of 1772 is an admirable positio quaestionis, admirable because of the retrospective account whichit offers of its discovery. To see anything more in it is tostrain the interpretation of the document. We know exactlywhat Kant proposed to look for, but we do not know whathe found-if indeed he did find anything.

61

Chapter II

The Structure of the

Critical Synthesis

SYNOPSIS

cf. La Deduction I, 164-87

The problem which Kant proposed to solve by Criticalidealism had just been formulated in the celebrated letterto Herz of 21 February 1772. We must now concentrateour attention on studying the development and the solutionof the problem. Unfortunately, our information becomesmore and more scanty just at the point where our curiositybegins to grow. As inevitably happens when documentaryevidence is lacking, speculative hypotheses luxuriate on allsides. The state of our documentation is notoriously insufficient and does not allow us to retrace the progressivedevelopment of the Critical standpoint with absolute confidence and certainly not with anything like completeness.In a case of this kind it is preferable to reduce to a minimum all recourse to hypotheses, and I think that the readerwill be grateful if I reject all hypotheses which are notthemselves founded on some indubitable piece of evidence.The sources consist of a series of letters, most of which aremore enigmatic than instructive, thereby multiplying ratherthan solving the problems. In addition to these we arefortunate in having in the Duisburg'sche Nachlass a documentof the first importance, which is an excellent source ofinformation about the stage which the Critical synthesishad reached towards 1775. We have also the Vorlesungenuber Metaphysik (not the course published by Politz, but themanuscripts studied by M. Heinze), which throw a vividlight on the period which comes immediately after the

62

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

Nachlass. That is all. We have already explained why wereject the Reflexionen in a piece of research where chronologyis of the utmost importance.

In consequence we are for the most part short of documentary evidence just at the point where we want topenetrate more deeply into Kant's thought at a time whenhe was struggling with the new problem which faced himafter twenty years of preliminary studies. We can reconstruct the first step in his thinking by meallS of a sourcewhich at first it may seem strange to cite. Section 14 ofthe Critique offers us, as an introduction to the deduction,a positio quaestionis and a provisional reply which come closeto tIle very terms employed by Kant in the letter of 1772and which. give us an approximate idea of the probabledirection of his first meditations. We find in this paragraphthe identical disjunction between the two cases where theconformity of tIle concept and of the object is directly intelligible: the enlpirical case and the case of self-creation. Bothof them are rejected because the first contradicts the originof the concept in question and the second surpasses thecapacity of the human intellect. Despite this faithful repetition, Section 14 goes beyond the contents of the letter of1772 since Kant has now discovered that the earlier dis-junction is not complete and that the possibility of a thirdcase must be envisaged. This is the case where the conceptdoes not produce the object dem Dasein nach, but where itnone the less produces it when it is found to be the necessarycondition of its recognition as an object. In this eventualityit is not cOllstitutive of the object (in itself) but it is constitutive of the object of knowledge.

Ifwe are not overestimating the value of our hypothesis,we nlust conclude that Kant was directing his thougllttowards the object and that cOllsequently he was conlpletelychanging the meaning of this epistemological factor. In1772 the object manifestly meant a thing in itself or a transcendent existent. In Section 14 it means no less clearly theobject of knowledge. Now, such all object necessarily COllforms to the conditions of knowledge, because if it did not,it would not be known and it would not be an object ofknowledge. This object of knowledge is known under the

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double condition of intuition and concept, and it is perfectlyconsistent with the logical use of understanding found in theDissertatio. The necessity of a contribution from intuitiontherefore leads Kant back to a point of view which hethought he llad left behind in I770: objectivity is unavoidably bound to an object of experience, that is, to a unifiedbody of empirical data which, according to the thesis whichhe held since 1770, are subjected to the forms of space andtime and therefore correspond to the notion of the objectphenomenon. The letter of I772 a parte ante and theDuisburg'sche Nachlass a parte post reinforce the validity ofour hypothesis in this respect.

How are we to explain this sudden return to theses, suchas the phenomenalism ofthe Triiume, which we h.ad presumedto have been superseded? It is at this point that we mustcall to our assistance a confession made by Kant in theProlegomena. We must remind ourselves that Kant lladplaced Hume at the very forefront of the Critical philosophy. In a passage which is no doubt somewhat stylised,but none the less in keeping with the facts and trustworthyin its essence, Kant describes ill I783 the line followed byhis thinking. He was aware of the criticism which Humedirected against the notion of causality. He agreed withit in its negative aspects but did not admit the validity ofthe positive psychological explanation offered by Hume.He then tried to generalise tIle criticism of Hume andfound that causality is not the only concept in which understanding thinks in an apriori manner the connection betweenthings, but that, on the contrary, metaphysics is full of suchconcepts. He wanted to make sure of their number bymeans of a reliable principle of investigation which lay tohis hand at this moment. Pursuing this line of argument,he then grappled with the problem of justifying theirobjective validity and this allowed him to give form to aproject conceived quite a llumber of years earlier. Thestage we are discussing is the only point in all Kant's careerwhich fits this account. TIle first general solution for theproblem of objectivity was discovered through the stimulusprovided by Hume. Kant was certainly not ignorant ofHume's criticism before this time, but its disintegrating effect

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on metaphysics could only appear with such urgency at themoment when Kant, having lost confidence in the dogmatismof the real use of understanding, had clearly stated theCritical problem of objectivity.

The first letter which tells us about what was happeningdates from the end of 1773. We l~ave seen that in 1771 Kanthad elaborated the plan of a complete system of philosophy.This plan had just been upset by the form assumed by theproblem in 1772 which, by once again bringing everythinginto question, proved fatal to the system which had barelybeen conceived. In the letter of 1773 he announced to hisfriend Herz that he was obliged to postpone the executionof his plans, at least in so far as these concerned metaphysics,ethics, and aesthetics, because the state of the Criticalproblem made it necessary to suspend all otb.er work. Byway of compensation he worked feverishly at the Critique,which was to be the propaedeutic to the three disciplinesincluded in tIle plan as a whole. He was now in possessiol1of the general principle, which without doubt n~erged withthe principle of the general deduction where the problem of1772 is solved, and which is perhaps the Ol~e which we havejust borrowed from Section 14. We say' perhaps' becausenothing is to be found in the letter about the nature of theprinciple.

With the next document we find ourselves transported tothe year 1775. This time the document, the Duisburg'scheNachlass, is of considerable importance. This Nachlass iscomposed of a number of loose pages (Lose Blatter). Oneof these is carefully dated, and the similarity between it andothers is so striking that we are forced to group all of themaround the year 1775. These pages show us tl~at Kant hasbrought the essential point of his theory of experience intoclear focus. He shows us, partly by his silence and partlyby his use of his theory of experience, that the doctrine ofsensibility (or the Aesthetic) forms no part of the newproblematic and that he has mastered the doctrine ofunderstanding, which is divided in the Critique into theAnalytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles.Although he does not insist on the detail, he makes itclear that, with respect to the Critical problem, the

(2,491) 65 6


principle of the solution has been completely reversedsince the Dissertatio. He no longer finds it an imperativenecessity to avoid any contamination of understanding bysensibility. On the contrary, the solution consists preciselyin considering these two faculties as complementaryone to another in the objectivisation of knowledge.Separatism has therefore made way for an almost absoluteunIonIsm.

Furthermore, the same pages tell us about the profoundmodification which the notion of the object has just undergone. From being an object in itself it has been transmutedinto a transcendental object, that is, into synthetic unity asa trans-subjective element capable of avoiding the charge ofidealism. The solution of Section 14 seems from one angleto have been superseded, from another to have becon1e evenmore detailed. The real use of pure reason maintained in1770 is counterbalanced by the transcendental use. Theconnection of the concept with the object is made very clearsince the object, according to the Critical conception, isconstituted on the formal side by the transcendental subjectthrough the function of apperception of which the pureconcept is one of the determinate forms. We shall see inthe following section how !(ant succeeded in organising thisinto a perfectly coherent doctrine.

The date of the manuscripts belonging to the course onmetaphysics studied by Heinze falls between 1775 and 1780.These documents have the great advantage over the Nachlassthat they form an organised whole and are therefore thesystematic exposition of a doctrine. The part entitled Ontology is the first brief and precise exposition of the Criticalphilosophy. The other part contains a discussion of metaphysics in the strict sense. Certain details force us to datethis course nearer 1775 than 178o: the constant use of theterm' exposition', which is common in the Duisburg'scheNachlass but always replaced in the Critique by the term, experience', and also the complete absence of themeswhich we are ourselves going to place at a later date wouldbe enough to justify this. This course marks, furthermore,a sensible degree of progress in the business of editing thematerial. The divisions of the future Critique into the

66


Aesthetic and the Logic, divided in its turn into an Analyticand a Dialectic, are already fully settled. The Analyticitself is subdivided into an Analytic of Concepts and anAnalytic of Principles. Furthermore, Kant has discoveredthe clue for the metaphysical deduction which is to befound in its entirety, even to details, in this course. Thegeneral principle of the transcelldental deduction has notbeen changed. Kant is aware of the possibility of a transcendent use of reason but he recognises its illusory characterexcept in the field of morality. Objectivity can be explainedonly for the object of experience. We can therefore say thatthe theory of objectivity has hardly undergone any furthermodifications. The subjective conditions of the knowledgeof the object are the objectivising conditions of this object.Experience figures in these manuscripts as the Inbegriff ofobjects and as the condition of the possibility of empiricalknowledge. There is even question of synthetic a priorijudgments, and this problem already exercises its wellknown and disastrous influence on the uniformity of theproblem and of the Critical solution. We can conclude thatKant did not have very much more to learn about thisaspect of his subject.

And yet the Critique is still postponed as if some obstaclestood in the way of its completion. We have some information about this from some letters by Kant, one of 1776 andfour others from 1778 to 1779. The first tells us that in hiswork at the Critique he has arrived at the last part, theMethodology, but he is careful to add that he has justmanaged to evade the obstacle which was holding everything up and that henceforth there was nothing to preventhim from going on to the writing of his work. The fourletters confirm his decision to proceed with the writing. Thisinformation would raise no difficulty ifit was not surroundedby details which are far from reassuring. The work he hasin mind is to be brief; it is to take the form of a convenientmanual, and Kant is clearly concerned to preserve thepopular character of the text. These suggestions bear littleresemblance to the Critique. Accepting these indicationsAdickes put forward a very tempting hypothesis to the effectthat Kant actually compiled in the course of these years a

67


handbook or outline which kept on growing with the continual introduction of new material from different sources.The four letters of 1778 to 1779 do indeed suggest thatsomething of this kind must have taken place, although Ihave considerable reservations about the edition of the Critiquewhich Adickes produced on the basis of this hypothesis.

The completion of the Critique was held up for long yearsyet, despite the degree of progress which is sl10wn by theDuisburg'sche Nachlass. However, as far as the internal structure of the deduction is concerned, the Duisburg'sche Nachlassand the Vorlesungen iiber Metaphysik are silent on the subjectof the imagination and the psychological deduction in threesyntheses, and Kant still expresses himselfin a very confusedmanner with regard to the conception of reason. The firsttwo n1issing parts are those which Kant almost completelycut out in the second edition of his work in 1787. It isadvisable to determine the approximate date at which !(antclearly perceived the use which he could make of thesedoctrines (or his theory of objectivity. The Lose Blatteredited by Reicke set us on the path. The sheet BI2, datedin 1780, constitutes an outline of the theory of imaginatiollas it was incorporated in the definitive deduction. Thesheet numbered E67 contains the first indication of thededuction in three syntheses. It must also be placed inthe year 1780. The last problem which is imperfectlypresent in the earlier sources concerns the distinctionbetween understanding and reason. In several of theLose Blatter this distinction is elaborated. They must beassigned to the years 1779-80. The concillsion must therefore be drawn that these discussions were added fairly latewhen the Critical philosophy had been completely thoughtthrough, and that perhaps its codification in writing hadalready been begun by this time.

On the other hand, the origin of these additions can becompletely determined. It will have been noticed that theyare all intimately related to psychology. It can be taken asauthentic fact, on the basis of his own statement as well ason that of his compatriot Hamann, that Kant had made along and careful study of the Philosophische Versuche iiber dieMenschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung (Philosophical Essays on

68


Human Nature and its Development) by N. Tetens. This workappeared in two large volumes from 1776 to 1777; it wasintended to expound the psychological genesis of knowledgeand to analyse it into its constitutive factors. The problemsof Kant and of Tetens certainly do not cover exactly thesame ground but they are none the less related, and a briefglance through the two large volumes of the German empiricist is sufficient to reveal at once the close affinity betweentheir inquiries. Tetens distinguishes between matter andform in knowledge. He is ahead of Kant in his thesis thatthe subjective, through its formal character, is the determining reason of the objective. He foreshadows the phenomenalism which Kant was going to found on reason. Heis in agreement with Kant about the attitude to be adoptedwith regard to the criticism of Hume. Tetens developsthemes analogous to those of Kant: even in the leastfavourable case little change is required before Kant cancombine the psychological teaching of his contemporarywith his own transcendental inquiries. There is thereforelittle difficulty in admitting that Kant's reading of Tetens,and the consequences which this had for the growing Criticalphilosophy, held up the vvriting of the Critique before furnishing it with necessary complements. Finally the Critiquewas written (or revised) in great haste and launched uponan indifferent public at the Easter Fair in the year 1781.

2

THE STRUCTURE OF THE THEORY OFEXPERIENCE

cf. La Deduction I, 173-80, 257-84

In the light of Section 14 of the Critique we have seen howthe problem ofobjectivity led to the following twofold thesis:first, the transcendental object is from now on to replace thetranscendent object; secondly, the logical use is the soleemployment of pure reason which is objectively valid. The

69


Duisburg'sche Nachlass is entirely devoted to setting this doublethesis on a solid foundation. In expounding this we canmake use of the edition published by Haering. The outlineof the two theses, which we have endeavoured to constructin accordance with Section 14, has given us only the generaltheme which Kant was to develop in the solution of theCritical problem of 1772, but the detail of the solution isnot to be found there. It is precisely the detailed discussionto be found in the Nachlass which is peculiarly enlighteningconcerning the Kantian positions towards 1775. The doctrine of sensibility and understanding seems to be completelyelaborated, though the disorganised state of the fragmentsprevents us from seeing how Kant intended to develop itsystematically. We have already mentioned the missingparts which we shall return to in the last section of thischapter.

The problem, how does a concept represent an object, issolved in the pages of the Nachlass by a special conception ofthe object. The object is no longer the actually existingthing with. ontological claims, which henceforth is called theDing an sich, but it is a pure mental construction which hastwo characteristics; first, the relation of the understandingto the extra-subjective given, and secondly, the intrasubjective compulsion of thinking its unity. The wholequestion is to find the source of the compulsion to unity,the dominating character of the object. It comes, assertsthe Nachlass, from the exposition of the given by means ofthe subjective functions of the understanding. Hence wereach a result which at first sight is paradoxical, namelythat the subjective is the foundation of the objective becausethe objective coincides precisely with the necessary unity ofphenomena. By n1eans of this unity, ,primitive perception istransforn1.ed into experience.

Since the object is in this way the resultant of subjectivefunctions, the sources of these functions must be sought inthe cognitive faculties. What then is the situation with

t'regard to these? Objectivity is conceived only through theinterpenetration ofsensibility and understanding: sensibilitypresents the given, but is incapable of furnishing the form ofits necessary unity, while understanding provides this form

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without being able to produce on its own the given or thematter. Although the nature and role of sensibility havebeen definitely established-I(ant has not returned to thistheme since I77o-it is very different with understandingwhich is as yet only very imperfectly distinguished fromreason in its functions. However, Kant anticipates to someextent this distinction by a radical separation between theanalytic and the synthetic judgment, a distinction whichthus appears for the first time on the Critical horizon.Later, reason will be the intellectual a priori function whichis exercised not on sensible matter but on apriori and rationalmatter constituted by concepts. It realises therefore theunity of concepts in allowing itself to be guided in thisoperation by the principle of identity, and the judgmentwhich effects this unification of concepts by identity willnecessarily be a purely analytical operation. Reason ca11also exercise its functions of unification in a matter ofsensible origin or among intuitions, in which case it is calledunderstanding. But i11 this case the judgn1ent whichexpresses their unity can no longer correspo11d to analyticidentity, but must express synthetic functions realising theunity of a given diversity by means of a synthesis. Theproblem of objectivity arises exclusively with regard to thislast class of judgments. In these judgn1ents a given manifold affects tl1e subject and the whole cognitive process isset in motion by this affection from outside the subject.

Using the material in the Nachlass, let us now set out thisprocess in detail, starting from the primitive affection andproceeding to its highest conditio11. The object of the affection raises in 1775 as in 1781 grave difficulties. Tl1e mostlogical manner of conceiving the object of affection is certainly to see in it a thing in itself. In fact it often happensthat Kant does conceive it in this way. But there is also thecase where the object of affection is constituted by phenomena, that is, by entities already structured by means of oursubjective a priori functions. This problem is all the moreserious at this time because Kant does not have ready thesolution represented by the doctrine of double affectionwhere a double self is affected by a double object. However, the transcendental affection is always invoked to

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account for the initial movement given to our functions ofknowledge.

These sensible affections reach consciousness in beingreceived by inner sense which, as the Critical synthesisreaches completion, loses its rationalist n1eaning where itis confused with thought, in order to approach more andmore the empirical meaning which makes it the receptororgan of our inner states. The influence of Locke is dominant here. The Dissertatio made time its a priori form andinternal perceptions its a posteriori matter. In the Nachlassinner sense is al1 intermediate function between the sensiblegiven and the intellectual concept in consequence of its connection with the form of time and its three dimensions ofexistence, simultaneity, and succession. Tl1e reception ofthe given into one or other of these dimensions is the condition of its exposition in one of the three concepts ofsubstance, reciprocity, and causality. Inner sense thenforeshadows the role which imagination will play in theCritique. It should be noted that inner sense and imagination are· found in the texts in inverse proportion: the onefactor tends to replace the other. But il1ner sense playsthis part only because time is conceived in the Nachlassin two ways, sometimes co-ordinated with space as theform of inner intuition and sometimes as the form of innerexperience, including then external intuition which hasbecome conscious.

Received by inner sense, the sensible given is carried tothe concept and thus objectivised. Another factor comes onthe scene here, for the concept designates the determinationof the given by understanding, a determination which carriesthe name of' exposition of phenomena' . This term is goingto disappear in 178 I where it will be replaced by the term, experience'. It consists in the application of the functionsof synthetic unity to given perceptions. These functionsduplicate themselves into pure concepts and a priori principles. Kant has 110W discovered, contrary to his earlierconviction which was still deeply rooted in 1770, that theintellectual function is not the analysis of a given, but thefunction of a synthesis of unity on the basis of a given. Hehas acquired this l1ew conviction, with all its incalculable

72


consequences, because of the idea that the given and thephenomena contain no synthetic liaison in themselves, andthat in consequence wherever this unity is manifested itmust be mind which has furnished it. The synthesis whichunderstanding procures must be called a function in opposition to the form of intuition because the form is that in whichthe unity of the given takes place while the function is thatby which it takes place. The synthesis is not the location,but the act constitutive of synthetic unity.

It is in this way tllat the synthetic functions, concepts,and principles are presented in the form of rules which,when followed by perceptions, produce order and connection in the given. Kant repeatedly appeals to the necessityof rules which are tIle absolute condition of the necessaryunity and hence ofobjectivity. This unity and the characterof all object which the given acquires are not interchangeable: they are strictly determined and discernible one fron1.the other. The rules of synthesis are therefore applied withdiscernment and with perfect regularity. Where does thisdiscrimination in the effecting of the synthesis come from?It is here that the constraining influence of the sensible givenreveals itself. In the Nachlass the given explains 11.0t only thesetting in motion of the functional apparatus of knowledgebut also tIle specification of the regulating function in itsconcrete application. Indeed, the genesis of a rule is subordinated to the observation of three conditions: first of asensible given, secondly of the aptitude of this given tosubmit to a rule (is this the affinity of the Critique ?), andlastly the exllibiting of the rule. This exhibiting of the ruleis the synthesis considered as a function.

Here the Kantian theory conles back to th.e knowingsubject or the self as the last substratum of the functionalrules. The self in general expresses itself by an ' I think'which by itself is not a rule for perceptions but the condition of the possibility of the submission of perceptions torules in so far as it represents the absolute unity of thethinking subject. The consciousness of self is indiscriminately called, in 1775, by a deplorable weakness in terminology, apprehension, or apperception. We are conscious ofperceptions, said Kant, by their reception by inner sense :

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this is the consciousness of the empirical self, wavering,diverse, and changing according to passing contents. Theseperceptions are then fastened and integrated into the unityof the permanent and unvarying self: this is the transcendental ego. This last apperception is defined as theperception of self as thinking subject in general, or again,as consciousness of thought. It is because of this that thetranscendental unity of the ego can be the last substratumof the rules or synthetic functions and Kant can say in thisway that the ego is really the origin and the archetype ofall objects of knowledge. In this "vay the cognitive processattains its completion.

Thus we can represent the first form which Criticalidealism took in its provisional sketches. It is possible torecognise without difficulty the need for the sensible given,for its reception by formal sensibility, for its entry intoinner sense through the double function of time, themoments of which are the three ways of having consciousness of the existence of perceptions in us. In conformitywith the relations of empirical consciousness, perceptionsare tied to the ego which is identical in all moments ofconsciousness. By the recognition of the unity of the selfin transcendental apperception, perceptions are bound intoa single representation by the consciousness of the identityof the synthesis according to which the self is conscious ofitself. This single representation coincides with the object.The synthesis which produced it is the rule or a priorifunction. A synthetic object expresses itself in the concept,that is, in the representation of the necessary unity in theperceptual given. Such is the doctrine which Kant reachedin 1775 as an answer to his problem of 1772. It can beseen how the essential elements of the Critique are faithfullyreflected. It may be that the impression of similarity comesin part from the reduction to system of the numerousunsorted pages which comprise the Nachlass. But thearticulations of the system are none the less present at thisperiod. The Nachlass is made up of Vorarbeiten, all incomplete and subject to all the defects inherent in a provisionaloutline. This does not however prevent us from concludingthat in 1775 the theory of experience or the theory Of

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objectivity has fully achieved the Critical level, includingeven the weaknesses which exegesis of the Critique meets allalong the line. Certain parts of the definitive Critical positionare still lacking. But six years still have to elapse before itsfinal writing. The revision of the materials of the Nachlasswith a view to publication was still to involve very hardwork, the more so as from another side new stresses wereabout to develop which were going to affect the Criticaldoctrine which had already been elaborated.

3

THE ELABORATION OF THE CATEGORIALSYSTEM

cf. La Deduction I, 2 10-50

The problen1. of objectivity is identical with the transcendental deduction. The latter is conditioned by themetaphysical deduction, the object of which is to makethe necessarily complete list of the original property ofpure reason before seeking the conditions of its objectivevalidity by the other deduction. The two problems arethus closely bound together. In the metaphysical deduction what Kant has to do is not to prove the apriori characterof the pure concepts (which is not really in question), butto make an exhaustive inventory of them and to arrangethis inventory by means of a principle. The principle is tobe a guarantee of the necessary completeness of the list.Thus three problen1.s must occupy our attention: the searchfor the guiding pril1ciple, the establishn1.ent of the table ofjudgments, and finally the es~ablishment of tl1e table ofcategories. These problems have here been enumerated ina logical order, but the historical order in which they wereworked out is exactly the opposite. Kant first arranged thetable of categories, discovered a little later the heuristicprinciple, and finally co-ordinated the list of judgn1entswith that of the categories.

At the stage Kant had now reached, sucl1 a search for a75


complete table of pure concepts could be undertaken in twodistinct ways. Fron1 1772 onward the pure ideas of theDissertatio could have been surreptitiously becoming thecategories of logical usage, but on the other hand it is notimpossible that the idea of such a search had fused with anold rationalist conviction of Kant. Empirical concepts areinnumerable in quantity and only a divine intelligencewould be capable of en1bracing their totality. Pure concepts on the other hand are but few in number and caneasily be discovered because reason is capable of knowingitself. We do not know which way was actually adoptedby Kant. It rerrlains true that the problem itself had beenposed in 1772 but it is not necessary to infer from that thatit was resolved at that mon1ent. We are going to followthe historical ordo invenienti rather than the order found inthe Critique.

The first task undertaken by Kant was the establishmentof the table of categories. In the Prolegomena he outlined thepath which he followed, a retrospective account whichthough basically correct misleads by suppressing thestages. In the pre-Critical period and in the Dissertatio aproject of this nature had always been in Kant's mind asthe ideal end of the analytic method, and it may be said ingeneral that he was the only philosopher in the eighteenthcentury who understood the tren1endous philosophical significance of the problem of tl1e categories. This was generallythought to be merely a survival from an outdated scholasticism. Alone in his appreciation of the problem, Kantderived a first historical inspiration from his recollection ofAristotle, from whom he takes over quality, quantity, andrelation, not as categories in the true sense but rather asrubrics for categories. A second inspiration could havecome to him from Hume who enumerated in his Enquiry allthe possible relations which permit the binding together ofthe various phenomena. The analogy between the categories of relation and the triad of primary concepts inNewtonian physics (mass, force, and reaction) did not failto attract Kant's attention, more especially since the coincidence between logic and general physics depends on thesolution of the problen1 of the metaphysical deduction.

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Finally, Leibniz had defended the usefulness of a search forcategories against the criticism of this procedure made byLocke. All these considerations prompted Kant to carryonwith the plan he had made in 1772.

However, the problem was greater and the drean1 wasbolder than Kant had thought. The documentary nlaterialwhich survives consists of an unorganised mass of Reflexionenwhich, to make matters worse, is absolutely undatable. TheDuisburg'sche Nachlass, which llelped us to reCOllstruct theoriginal outline of the transcendental deduction, ought tohave shown traces of the metaphysical deduction if Kanthad already elaborated it. But apart from a reference torelational concepts nothing seems to have been done thereon this subject. We are therefore forced in spite of ourselvesto have recourse to th.e Reflexionen, taking very good care notto introduce any chronological order. Adickes divides thenotes which relate to our problem into three groups. Thefirst group brings the pure concepts close to the abstractconcepts of the intellectual laws, an expression identical withthat of the Dissertatio. These laws consist of the functions ofcomparison, connection, and separation of representations.This is doubtless the first attempt which Kant made. Thelast attempt is naturally founded on the Leitfaden or the

--critical principle which COllsists in the absolute parallelismof judgments and categories. Between these two extremesare to be found innumerable fragments which operate, withsome variations of secondary importance, with the triad,thesis, antithesis, analysis.

Although an acceptance of Adickes's chronology involvesthe belief that Kant made both successive and simultaneousattempts to solve his problen1, there is undoubtedly muchthat is sound in Adickes's results. All the information whichour sources offer show that Kant's efforts were concentratedaround 1772 on the problem of categories, but that whenafter 1775 the fornls of judgment occupied a dominatingposition, all the work had to be done again. The historicalevolution of the categorial schema may therefore be presented roughly as follows: having had his attention drawnby Leibniz to the usefulness of a doctrine of categories as anintroduction to the transcendental deduction, Kant sought

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some principle of organisation among them. In this he wasmoved not only by his characteristic love of order andsystem but also by the desire for that necessity which atotality yields when it is guaranteed by a principle. ThenKant tried successively and often even simultaneously severalheuristic principles and this explains the multiplicity and thediscordance of tIle abortive attempts in the course of theyears 1772-6. For the unsuccessful abandoned attempts arenot followed beyond 1775, the year when Kant noted theparallelism between certain categories and certainjudgments(the table of relation) without making this parallelism intoan absolute principle. But, a short time afterwards, he concluded that the principle which he had sought for so longwas no other than the functional identity between logic andscience so that the logic of things became at one stroke atranscendental logic. He can be said to have succeeded inhis endeavour to set up two parallel tables, since towards1778 only one case did not seem to have been resolved.

The correctness of the preceding sketch is confirn1ed inan absolute fashion by an examination of the Leitfaden orguiding principle of the categories. The necessity of such aprinciple had never been expressed by Kant before 1772,but from that time it never left his mind. III 1772 Kanthoped to find the abstract concepts of the laws of reason bya few intellectual principles. We do not know what theseprinciples were but we can easily understand why thisposition was rapidly abandoned as untenable. The derivation of the concepts from the formal laws of reason is withoutdoubt the sufficient criterion of their pure character and oftheir a priori nature, but no derivation was valid until theproblem of their totality, the real problem of the metaphysical deduction, had been solved. On the basis of manyReflexionen we can guess what were the laws which Kanthoped to find at this moment. They are not laws in thetrue sense of the word, but functions, and in the fragmentsof the Nachlass these functions are invariably expressed bythe verbs vergleichen, verbinden, trennen. If this is the case, it isclear that the functions in question must be inadequate forthe task. They really correspond to the other problemwhich the Critique calls reflection and the concepts of reflection

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are not constitutive of objects but represent the states ofmind by which we prepare ourselves to find the subjectiveconditions in which we can acquire concepts. Instead of atable of categories the result of our first principle wouldhave led to the transcendental topic.

It is at this point that Kant turned to another principle.Among the functions cited above was Verbindung, whichseemed to be involved in the very constitution of the object.The progress made in the transcendental deduction couldeven guarantee that liaison (let us not yet speak of synthesis)is the transcendental function par excellence. This function ofliaison is the function which resolves the problem of objectivity, that is, which constitutes and brings about the closeconnection between sensibility and understanding. Thecategories or pure concepts then represent all the diverseways in which the combination of the two faculties operatewhen integrated in our k110wledge of an object. The themeof co-ordination-subordination plays a dominating role inthe fragments which can be correlated with this stage, astage which represents two remarkable advances over theearlier stage: first, Kant has got possession of the indisputable transcendental function, and secondly, the schemawhich derives from it is more systematic than the earlierscheme which always lacked order.

Since he abandoned it, we must c011clude that Kant hadseen the insufficiency of his second principle. Once morethe Leitfaden did not answer its purpose because ifit expressesthe general principle of the transce11dental deduction it cannot be the systen1atising principle of the pure concepts. Hisrepeated failure led Kant to conclude that every effort wouldbe in vain as long as he did not possess a principle fromwhich a whole analytic of reason would flow of itself. Hehad then to seek in our logical constitution for a principleof which the different mon1ents, determinable a priori, wouldcorrespond to the synthetic functions, essential functionsrevealed by the transcendental deductio11. We do not knowwhat path Kant followed but we do know where he arrived:the identification of the pure concept with the function ofjudgment.

By means of an hypothesis we can perhaps make up for79


our lack of knowledge here. The discovery of the definitiveLeitfaden could have followed two different paths. Kantcould have borrowed a method as direct as it is systematic.The transcendental deduction revealed the ubiquity of synthesis which is what corresponds to intellectual spontaneity.It is not impossible that Kant reminded himself how in1762-3 he had already related the whole intellectual functionto that of judgment, and he might have concluded that theforms of judgment are at the same time synthetic functionsof the constitution of the concepts of an object. SomeReflexionen and the definitive metaphysical deduction seemto be following this path. There is however a second path,this time indirect, which could have been followed by Kantand the Duisburg'sche Nachlass leads us naturally to it. Without making a heuristic principle of it, Kant had noticed theparallelism between the judgments and the categories ofrelation. It may be assumed then that only chance led himto note the striking analogy between certain judgments andcertain synthetic functions already recognised. If hebroadened the field of his investigations along these linesand found them successful, he might have erected into aprinciple what had originally been merely an empiricalfact. The Nachlass itselfwould occupy in this case a posito!nexactly interlnediary between the empirical fact and theextension of this fact into a principle. My own preferenceis undoubtedly for the second path: less systematic thanthe other, it fits more naturally into the historical process ofthe elaboration of the Critical philosophy.

However that may be, it was a little after 1775 that thetrue Leitfaden was found and the metaphysical deductiongiven its definitive form. In the Vorlesungen fiber Metaphysik,which are so close to the Duisburg'sche Nachlass, the die iscast. Our final conclusion then is that the discovery which,according to the Critique, was to open the way to the organisation of the Critical philosophy was a very late contribution.There is one last problem to be dealt with: what is thesource of the table of judgments with which Kant coordinated the table of categories? Kant himself gives avery vague reply to this in the Critique when he says, ' Inthis connection tl1ere was already work done by logicians.'

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As a deduction this reference is a little inadequate, indeedtoo inadequate to be satisfactory. This straightforwardappeal to an already established tradition, more or lesscorrect, resembles an avowal of inability rather than adeduction. As it is posterior to the discovery of the Leitfaden,Kant could not have thougIlt of this last table before 1775.There is therefore no chronological problem. It is a different matter with tIle question: to which logicians didKant turn to determine the tradition of which he speaks?Opinions differ hopelessly about this and almost all thetreatises on logic which appeared ill the eighteenth centuryhave been invoked. It is again Adickes, it seems to me,who takes the right view by exercising a genuine eclecticism.

If we compare the table of judgments found in all themanuals (and these are reproduced in my book on thededuction) we see that Kant did not pose as a revolutionaryin this field. He could well have had the impression ofresting, not on the individual work of some one author buton a collective work definitive in its essentials. Only themodal judgments are taken from a particular work, theOrganon by Lambert. It is difficult to determine the manualwhich was at the basis of the Kantian systematisationbecause Kant seems to have condensed in one plan all thecurrent classifications of judgments. He no doubt took theliberty of arranging his paradigm of judgments by elementsof different origin according as the correspondence with theparadigm of categories seemed to dictate.

To cut a long story short, we conclude that while themetaphysical deduction vvas part of Kant's original intentions, it none the less belongs to those parts of his workwhich demanded from him most time and care. Theintention dates from before 1772: the achievement after1775. The historical path followed in the elaboration ofthis Critical fragn1.ent is diametrically opposed to the logicaldevelopment of the problem in the Critique. He had tracedout the programme very early: to organise all the categories according to an absolutely necessary Leitfaden. Infact he seen1.S to l1.ave followed his programn1e steadily.Kant always tried to organise the categories according to aLeitfaden, although this was not always the one found in the

(2,491) 81 7


Critique. Far from it! The successive attempts to organisethe pure concepts are the result of successive new Leitfaden.The evolution of the metaphysical deduction correspondstherefore to the evolution of his changing conception of aLeitfaden. It seen1S important to note in conclusion that thetranscendental deduction, logically dependent in the Critiqueon the metaphysical deduction, is not as dependent on it inits historical elaboration. Kant worked on the two deductions at the same time, and did not await the conclusion ofthe one before undertaking the other.

4

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TETENS ANDITS INFLUENCE ON THECRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

cf. La Deduction I, 284-329

All the early doctrinal or biographical sources outline in1776 a fairly clear curve of the evolution of the Criticalphilosophy despite some deficiencies and gaps. They revealthe Critical th.emes which Kal~t had just reached, andcomparison of these with the Critique makes it easy toenumerate the themes which are still absent. Among themissing themes is the Dialectic, and no ransacking of thesources yields any trace of it. It was referred to in thelectures on metaphysics, but it may be doubted whetherKant had yet elaborated any firm doctrine. To get thenecessary information about this massive criticism directedagainst metaphysics we must exan1.ine a number .of LoseBlatter dating from the end of the preparatory period. 1'heexamination can follow a less haphazard course and canproceed in a more reliable and better-organised fashion thanwas possible for the Analytic. The silence of our documentscan be explained in two ways. The form in which th.ecriticism of metaphysics is presented in 1781 depends onthe distinction between reason and understanding. A morelikely explanation of the silence, however, is that the

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Dialectic scarcely offered any special difficulties to Kant. Hehad discussed the problems of God and the soul since thebeginning of his career and these problems could easily beintegrated into the growing Critical philosophy. The antinomies themselves are to be found at the very heart of thiscriticism. It may well be that Kant's silence is to beinterpreted as a sign of acquiescence.

Quite apart from the Dialectic, however, a simpleexamination of the Critique shows that certain articulationsof the theory of experience are still not represented in thesources. For example, the part played by imagination inthe constitution of objective knowledge, the psychologicaldeduction with its three theses, and the distinction betweenreason and understanding. It may be said in general thatthese then1es came to Kant directly from contemporarypsychology. Chronological examination forces us to groupthese tl1emes around the years 1779-80 so that the periodof preparation for the Critical philosophy can be clearlydivided into two branches: a first branch, with the analysisof which we have finished, in which Kant debates theproblem of objectivity with the aid of a Critical conceptionof the object and of the pure concepts of understanding:a second branch, in which he attacks the same problem incloser relationsh.ip with. the psychology of his day. Thefirst part ends with. the Duisburg'sche Jlachlass; the secondappears suddenly in a number of fragments dating from1780 which certainly contain the rest of Kant's preparatorymeditations. The results of the two periods are to be seenin the very structure of the deduction of 178 I where theyappear in uneasy juxtaposition. Kant made it his duty inrewriting his work in 1787 to prune away the traces of thesecond.

The first factor which is absent from the sources isimagination. The solution of the problen1 of objectivitywas found in 1775 by using simply two elements: thesensible given and the concepts or synthetic rules. Kantcomplicates the solution, so simple in its dualistic structure, •by introducing imagination as an intermediary and mediating factor. It is the third element between the two originalelements. It is capable of adopting this role because its

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nature is itself uncertain: Kant brings it into relationsometimes with sensibility, sometimes with understanding,and the schematism erects this confusion into a principleby making imagination participate both in sensibility andin understanding. Because of its confused nature the function delegated to it is not everywhere the same and Kant isforced to mark the differentiation between the functions bydesignating them by corresponding names: it is in this waythat the theory of imagination is singularly complicated by .the distinction between empirical and transcendentalimagination, between reproductive and productive imagination. The same confusion is to be traced in the result towhich these functions give rise. At one time they produceeither the analytic or the synthetic unit; at another timeit is Gestalten which are produced to which Kant expresslydenies the character of unity. All this is to be found withremarkable fidelity in fragment BI2 of 1780, which Kantmust have had before him when he was writing the corresponding part of the deduction which operates by preferencewith the factor of inlagination.

The reader knows, in the second place, that Kant placedalongside the solution of the problem of objectivity a deduction which is commonly called psychological, characterisedby its arrangement in three synthetic functions. These areknown as the synthesis of apprehension, of reproduction, andof recognition. This deduction occupies first place in thetext of 178 I where it clearly serves to introduce the objectivededuction. The silence of our sources on this subject up to1775, and the fragment E67, which must be dated as of thesame period as BI2, show that this deduction is part of thelater additions which the text suffered under the influence ofcontemporary psychology. The fragment E67 is not ascomplete as that which treats of the imagination: it includesthe beginning of the paragraph devoted to apprehension anda brief account of the three syntheses in question. It hasbeen alleged that Kant attached very little importance tothis part because he condemned it in 1787 with the secondedition of the Critique and the reorganisation of the deduction. The preface to the Critique states the situation exactly:it grants to this introduction less demonstrative force than to

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the objective deduction, but it insists, in spite of that, on theimportance which it can clain1. Like imagination, thisdeduction in three syntheses has its roots deep in contenlporary psychology and it must have been conceived betweel11778 and 1780.

There is finally the clear distinction between reason andunderstanding which constitutes the last operative factor atthe end of our preparatory period. In the middle of thenotes corresponding to the Dialectic, there is a fragnlentC8 dated March 1780, where this distinction is unequivocallybrought out. As in the Critique, reason and understandingdo not differ organically. They represent the same functionbut it is applied to different matter. Understanding is thisfunction applied to the matter of empirical sensibility, whilereason exercises its function on a matter beyond the limits ofsensibility which is represented by concepts. Kant does notfail to point out that the absence of the sensible provokes themany-sided sop:histical use which the Dialectic does its bestto expose.

Imagination, the psychological deduction, the distinctionbetween understanding and reason are all elelnents whichKant owes to the psychology.of his day. Without being tooreckless I believe that an attempt can be made to determine still more precisely the nature of this influence. Ihave already said above that it must be sought in the Philosophische Versuche of Tetens. In my work on the deductionI devoted fifteen pages to a resume of the ideas of thislogician and psychologist who published his psychologicalsumma in 1776-7. Even in this brief resume may be seenall that Kant was able to glean usefully for his own transcendentalism. If we glance through the Versuche of Tetenswith our attention fixed on the three factors which Kanthad not even suspected before 1776, we reach the sameconclusion every tin1e, a fact which gives the general tenorof our thesis a high degree of probability if not of certainty.

There can hardly be any doubt that Kant borrowed fromhim the factor of imagination. It is divided, in Tetells as inKant, into a reproductive and a productive function whichhe calls Diclztkrajt. The reproductive function is naturallyexamined-and this is Tetens's usual method-in its nature

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and in its psychological exercise, and it is discussed withoutany allusion to any kind of synthetic power, a fact whichmarks it off from Kant's manner of treating it. Kant moreover was quite right in pointing out that he was the first tohave noticed the role which imagination plays in perceptionitself. The object of Dichtkraft or productive imagination isthe image which has no perceptual correlate and is in consequence a free creation. Tetens relates it to understanding,even although he has no idea of the specifically Kantiansynthetic function attributed to productive imagination,which consists in an operation on the a priori spatia-temporalintuitions.

The points of contact with the deduction in three syntheses are not quite so numerous but very significant intheir material content. In Tetens's work there are threefaculties: intuition, imagination, and concept, which heoften replaces by their respective functions: apprehension,reproduction, and Auskennung. The latter, like the Kantianterm Rekognition, finds itself in the relation of a Germanicterm to a foreign. Therefore the correspondence is pushedevel1 to the terminology. The analogies are multiplied whenthe detail of the discussion devoted to each of these facultiesand functions is studied separately.

The synthesis of apprehension is characterised in Kant bythe phenomenalism of the given and above all by the peculiarand quite personal thesis that perception coincides with theindivisible unity of time. We may note that the phenomenalism is the same as in Tetens and that, to our greatastonishment, the second thesis is not at all peculiar to Kant,but is clearly expressed in the Versuche of Tetens. While itis true that Kant describes reproduction as the uninterruptedrecall ofpast perceptions on the basis of association, and thathe conceives this possibility by means of a constant Vbergangof mind from one perception to another, it must be admittedthat Tetens anticipates Kant on all these points. It is onlywith regard to Auskennung or recognition that our two authorstake different paths. Kant locates the nature of Rekognitionin tl1e recognition of the identity of what is reproduced withwhat is apprehended, while for Tetens it gives the clear viewof the object in all its distinctness. The result of this last

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functio11 is, as for Kant, the concept, and when he explainsthe constitution of the concept he guides reasoning towardsthe path of apperception whicl1 is the determination of theunity of the self in all the acts which it has posited. Herewe recognise one of the great Kantian ideas which serve as afoundation not only for the psychological deduction, buteven for his whole theory of objectivity. It can hardly bedoubted that Kant profited greatly from his study of thepsychological essays of his predecessor in this field.

The story is much the same with regard to the distinctionbetween reason and understanding. Tetens makes noattempt to hide the pleasure he takes in discussing reason,but he exhibits a rather cavalier scepticism on this subject.In the first chapter dealing with it he opposes sensibleknowledge to rational knowledge. In the following chapterhe lays bare all the artifice that is to be found in the charactersof universality and necessity which are attached to rationalknowledge. Finally a third chapter is devoted to the distinc..tion between understanding and reasoning reason. Theperfect analogy between this doctrine and that of Kant willbe 110ted not only in the method offormulating the questionsabout reason which interest him and in the general solutionwhich. he reserves for them, but also in the dominating thesisthat an identical spiritual function is at work in reason andin understanding which are distinguished one from the otherby the matter with which they are called on to deal. Tetenssuspects, just like !(ant, that an internal conflict menacesreason itself, a point which Kant expounds in great detailin the chapter on the antinomies.

We can therefore conclude that the reading of Tetensmust have made a very great impression on Kant, strugglingwith the same problem although from a very different gel1eralstandpoint, when he noticed how the researches of Tetenscorroborated the ruling thesis of his own transcendentalepistemology. The impression was so great that he couldnot resist the pleasure of making not only his work but hisreaders benefit from it. He probably saw the support hisabstract demonstrations would gain when they could pointto the corresponding psychological account. Still under theinfluence of his reading, Kant attests that Tetens had said

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many profound things even although at this moment hewas fully aware of the different perspectives which characterised their work. It is hardly necessary to say that thepsychological doctrines of Tetens underwent importantmodifications during their integration into Kantian transcendentalism and that there must have been an interplayof action and reaction. But these modifications do notprevent us from concluding that Kant made more thanone identifiable borrowing from Tetens after the theory ofobjectivity had acquired its structure and its definitivearticulation. This is so striking that it does not seem possibleto give an account of the constitution of the Critical philoSOpllY without explicitly referring to the contribution ofTetens. It is gratifying to be able to insist upon thisbecause the part played by Tetens has barely been n'lentioned by commentators and yet it is clearly an indispensableaddition to the intellectual biography ofKant which deservesto be stressed. It is all the more importaIlt because Kant'sreading of Tetens at this time is no mere historian's hypothesis but a fact attested by Kant hin1self.

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Chapter III

The Completion of the CriticalSynthesis

CORRECTIONS TO TI-IE THEORETICALCRITIQUE

cf. La Deduction II, 390 -415, 419-594; III, 13-4I, 275-96

The approach to metaphysics had been cleared by theworking out of a propaedeutic which would serve as prefaceto the metaphysics of nature and of morals. The importantproblem which, omitted from the Dissertatio, had come tohis attention in 1772, had been solved by ten years of continuous effort. Kant now thought that there would be nodifficulty in resuscitating his fifteen-year-old plan. He couldsettle to work on that eternal metaphysics which was thegreat dream of his career. Circumstances, however, wereto decide otherwise. While it is true that from 1781 Kantturned to ethics and that in 1785 the m.etaphysics of naturewas at least begun, the ten years which followed the publication of the Critique were largely devoted to reorganising thetheoretical aspect of the Critical philosophy and to completing the Critical synthesis by the twofold n10ral andteleological propaedeutic. Let us see first wIlY the Critiquerequired to be revised and what that revision amounted to.

It is well known that after the publication of a11Y of hisimportant works Kant was never pleased with what he haddone. This was true of his doctoral thesis and also of l1isinaugural dissertation. It was to be the same with theCritique. However, it was never with his doctrine thatKant was displeased, but rather with the manner of exposition or the Vortrag. Kant attributed his strong feelings ofdissatisfaction to his hasty writing, to his neglect of minor

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popular touches and to faults in the construction both ofthe deduction and of the paralogisms. And these feelingscould not fail to grow more intense when it became evidentto him that these genuine and clearly perceived faults wereresponsible for the failure ofhis doctrine. The term' failure'is indeed not too strong. Far from having been a success,the Critique was received with general indifference. Evenalthough Kant himself had not counted on a quick victoryit is worth noting that the result greatly exceeded even hismost pessimistic expectations. The few readers who did notrecoil before the indigestible treatise which he had offeredthem kept on complaining bitterly. His colleagues foundhis teaching wellnigh unintelligible, despite the discursiveclarity which Kant had pursued with remarkable professionalhonesty, to which indeed he had sacrificed so much. Thingswould have been much better if they had been content witha straightforward admission of their lack of understanding.But they kept on talking and they kept on writing. Theyeven went so far as to identify the Critical philosophy withthe subjective idealism of Berkeley!

As long as only formal corrections occupied his attention,Kant was convinced that he could extricate himselffrom hisdifficulty by publishing a simple abbreviated version aimedat the general educated public. He had thought of preparing such an abbreviated version as early as the monthof May 178I. When the essential core of his teaching itselfwas threatened by the superficial thinking of his critics, thento his desire for popularity there was added the urgent duty

~. of defending his doctrine. The Prolegomena to any FutureMetaphysics was born in 1783 out of the combination ofthese two motives. It was composed after the appearanceof the sensational Garve-Feder review which reminded Kantof the similar reception given to his Dissertatio by Lambert,Mendelssohn, and Sulzer. The explanatory motif in thiswork is very simple and has scarcely any repercussions onthe strict development of Kant's thought. Indeed his teaching itself was not affected either by the attempt to restate it,this time in very short paragraphs, or by his account of theorigin of the Critical problem. The change in method,however, does bring new light to bear on the problem in

go

THE COMPLETION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

question. The synthetic method adopted in the Critiquecaused Kant to arrange his demonstration in the followingmanner: first, analysis of the a priori elements in thought,then by means of them a reconstruction of objective knowledge, and finally a reconstruction through objective knowledge of the objective sciences of the physico-mathematicaltype. The analytic method of the Prolegomena follows theopposite path: Kant presupposes the existence of the objective sciences, and by analysing them deduces their a prioriconditions. By this change in method the author couldflatter himself that he had given a more popular turn tohis difficult doctrine and one which would be more withinthe range of the public for which he was writing. Despiteall his efforts, events 011ce again showed that in this respectKant was mistaken.

The polemical element, which is to be found combilledwith the explanatory element, concerns the subjectivist interpretation of the Critique. The signal for this was given bythe Carve-Feder review which claimed that Kant denied alltranscendent existence. Kant's reply, in the Prolegomena,which he had hoped would both. persuade the public to readhis work and also silence the prejudiced critics, had at firstonly a very partial success. The explanatory text did notappear to be better understood than the original, butremained just as obscure for the ordinary reader, a judgment which is still valid today despite all that Schopenhauerhas said. However, the book did succeed in creating acurrent of interest in th.e Critical philosophy, which explai11swhy from 1785 the Critical philosophy gradually becan1e thequaestio disputata throughout Cern1any. Kant then gatheredaround himself a certain number ofsympathisers. In generalthese were men of little note whose mediocrity was to someextent balanced by their indefatigable zeal and vigorousactivity. In a comparatively short time they were able tobring about Kant's triumph in spite of all opposition. Hisfellow-countryman Scl1ultze brought hinl to the atte11tion ofthe public by his famous Erliiuterungen; Schutz warn1ly anddevotedly embraced his cause in his popular review; Biestergained for him the sympathies of the capital in his liberalperiodical; and Reinhold won over the general public and

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the University with his skilful panegyric. His opponents,however, were still much more powerful both in nun'1berand in quality. They controlled the institutions of highereducation and they had the ear of the cultivated public.Certain of them, like the eclectic Feder and the WolffianEberhard, proved intransigent from the beginning, but therewere others who were more hesitant. Mendelssohn, andespecially Professor Ulrich at lena, did not feel themselveshostile to Kant in principle but were not prepared to go sofar as to embrace the whole of a doctrine which was thesubject of such bitter controversy.

Kant, finding himself at the centre of these currentsopinion, based his attitude on that of Ulrich who, visiblyshaken by the Critical philosophy, showed considerablesympathy towards it. Certain main themes of a similargeneral tendency appeared in the infinite variety of different criticisms put forward. The Wolffians, dogmatic ingeneral like their master, interpreted the limitation of ourknowledge to the world of phenomena as a -mere imitationof the scepticism ofHume. The legend ofthe ' all-destroyingKant' and of the' Prussian Hume' became magic wordswhich echoed round the four corners of Germany. Moreannoying to Kant was the tendency to confuse the Criticalphilosophy with subjective idealism. He refused point-blankto figure as the satellite of Berkeley in the philosophicalworld. Eclectics and Wolffians both interpreted the thesisof limitation, which had been simply a matter of prudenceto its author, as the pure and simple negation of any transcendent world. Kant protested in vain that he had in mindonly our knowledge of phenomena, but was unable topersuade his critics to admit the distinction between thesetwo very different points of view.

More precise attacks against certain vital theses in theCritical philosophy were beginning to develop. Ulrich,commenting on the general solution to the Critical problemin connection with causality, had just accused it of beinga carefully disguised vicious circle whose sophistic characterwould disappear only by breaking the frame of the limitation itself. His commentary had barely appeared when ananonymous but friendly writer in Schutz's review attributed

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Ulrich's errors to the unintelligibility of the deduction, andpleaded extenuating circumstances for Ulrich on the basisof the invincible obscurity surrounding this central doctrinewhich, he clain1ed, ought to have been the most clearlyexpounded. This pressure fronl without, added to his owndissatisfaction with this part ofhis work, made Kant attributeto the deduction full responsibility for all the misunderstand- '>0

ings to which his doctrine was exposed. In the long rlln itwas the deduction which caused his contemporaries to bedistrustful of the thesis oflimitation, and it was the deductionalso which led naturally to the subjective-idealist interpretation of the Critical philosophy.

The explanatory tendency and the defensive tendency,which between 1782 and 1787 were reinforced from day today by various developments, combined in Kant's mind tobring about some almost unconscious changes which werecentral to his teaching. First of all, a new formulation ofthe positio quaestionis was inevitable. In 178 I this centred 1

around the problem of the objectivity of our a priori knowledge, a problem which had arisen in connection with theconformity of the a priori concept to the object of experience.This had been solved ·by the demonstration that the pureconcept is objectively valid because it is the condition ofexperience and consequently also the condition of the objectsof experience. Now, in the Prolegomena the problem isaltered so that the true nervus probandi is the universal validityof the judgment of experience. It was in 1785, in a note tobe found in the Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschajt, that Kantsuddenly and completely altered the situation and, by asharp return to th~ standpoint, of the Triiume, substitutedfor the problem of objectivity that of the limitation of purereason to phenomena as the real Critical demonstrandum.An element of the solution in 1781, the limitation becamethe problem to be solved. In Kant's reorganisation of the~

deduction in 1787, as we shall see, the limitation is treatedboth as the problem to be solved and as the condition ofits solution. It is a condition in Sections 16-21 of thededuction; it is a problem in Sections 22-6. This showsthat Kant had reached this positio quaestionis only by stagesand that it is the end of a fairly long evolution. It is

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOU GHT

consequently a matter of importance to consider the stagesin some detail.

In 1781 Kant solved the enigma of the objectivity of thepure concepts by showing that they are the conditions ofthe objects of experience and that it is this which constitutestheir objectivity. They are therefore not only the ratiocognoscendi of phenomena but at the same time their ratiofiendi or structural principle. This meant that synthesis wasin essence the constructive act around which the wIlole

~ procedure of the deduction rotated. The latter thereforerepresented a schematic construction of the intuitive worldat the moment of experience through the superposition ofsynthetic operations by the subject upon the diversity of theindeterminate given. Now, the pure concepts are preciselythese functions of synthetic unity applied to sensible matterand in consequence the conditions of the intuitive worldeven· when considered as object of experience.

This simple and concise solution forms an integral partof the Kantian conception of experience. To make it acceptable it is certainly essential to distinguish between sensibleperception and experience. Experience is formal, and is tobe found in the necessary system of perceptions organised bythe a priori laws of reason or by the categories which thesubject elaborates in a mass of perceptions which, possessingno structure of their own, await their form, their structure,and their determination as representations from the subject.In this way it is the mind which constructs experience .as anecessary and objective process. This shows that perceptions must be submitted to the categories in the syntheticact of tIle subject. This submission can be understoodeither as a synthetic construction or as a process of logicalsubsumption.

In 1781 Kant preferred the latter procedure: the submission required for the constitution of objective knowledgein most cases takes the form of the subsumption of a particular diversity of perceptions under the universal forms ofapperception. Everything considered, such a procedureexplains nothing because, if it is really to have any force,it is essential to explain how the subsumptive act takesplace, this great secret of the construction of the intuitive

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world or of the object of experience. However that maybe, the general result is fairly clear. If the subsumptionof matter under the pure concept brings the object ofexperience into being, matter has neither form nor determinate structure in itself, but owes both the one and theother to the synthetic activity of the subject. In itselfmatter cannot be represented and therefore does not occuras a factor in the analysis of knowledge in its autonomyand in its ontological independence. Matter can only berepresented in the phenomenon, that is, in the structurewhich emanates from the synthetic act effected by the knowing subject.

It is in synthesis therefore that the whole mystery of themechanism of objectification is to be found. Now, this syn- ..thesis is also the direct cause of the erroneous interpretationof those readers who saw in the Critique an exposition ofsubjective idealism. Their error was indeed excusable. To110ld that the subjective is the condition of the objective isto maintain a thesis of a highly paradoxical nature. Toassert that synthesis determines the phenomenon surelymakes the latter a construction of the knowing subjectwhich has then no relation with the transcendent. Thesubjectivity of phenomena could mean that the intuitiveworld has cllanged into a tissue of appearances, and whenthis thesis is extended to the knowledge of the sel~ thisknowledge in its turn becomes deceptive and illusory.Synthesis, the psychological element which constitutes thepsychologico-transcendental process of knowledge, seems toresult in making the whole system of human knowledgeboth subjective and relative, since Kant presents it as tIleactivity of a psychological subject whose purely logicotranscendental nature has not yet been stressed.

Obviously it could only be to Kant's advantage to protect himself fronl such a misconception of his teaching. To;achieve this he made two changes: to avoid having recourseto synthesis he raised judgment to the rank of a fundamentalobjectifying operation, and then decided to bring into focusthe real significance of the deduction. It is not surprisingthat the Prolegomena, coming immediately after the Critique,should still nlerely hint at these self-corrections, but the

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Anfangsgriinde of 1785 shows that Kant had already full confidence in the new orientation which the 1787 edition of theCritique was to take. We have already pointed out that theexplanatory tendency in the Prolegomena produced changesofa methodological character in the exposition ofthe Criticalphilosophy. The Dlaterial changes which owe their origin tothe objection based on scepticism, as well as the explicitmention of the necessity for the thing in itself, are faithfullyrepeated in 1787, and will be discussed later.

However, the treatment of the Critical problem in thesecond edition presents a very special aspect since synthesishas been forced to abandon the role of objectifying principle.Faithful to the analytic method, Kant presupposes, not as anhypothesis but as incontestable fact, the validity of generalphysics and its object, material nature, that is, the Inbegriffof the objects of experience. This material nature has ascondition of its possibility complete submission to formalnature, that is, to the Inbegriff of the a priori laws of experience. For an active as \vell as a substantive sense hasreturned to the term 'experience'. At first this wordundoubtedly denoted not only the totality of the objects ofexperience but also Erfalzren itself as spiritual act, oftencalled by Kant 'possible experience'. In these circumstances there is a profound difference between perceptionand experience in the strict sense. Perception is a sensibleimpression, contingent, particular, and concrete; it represents a simple state of n10mentary consciousness, the validityof which is purely subjective, that is, limited to the subjectof the perception itself.

Henceforward ·experience is a reality of quite a differentnature. It has perceptions as matter. Therefore both conceptions have the same material powers but different formalstructure. Experience is necessary and universal. It has itsown modality. Hence the connection which it establishes isnot limited, in its legitimacy and in its validity, to the subjective consciousness of the individual subject. It establishes aconnection with consciousness in general. This correspondsto the consciousness which in 178 I Kant had called transcendental apperception, before his alarm at the charge ofidealism caused him to distrust the term. Experience

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consequently presupposes the sensible percept outside theindividual and subjective frame of the subject of perception,and this gives to it its ch,aracter of objectivity and its ownvalidity.

Perception and experience are both expressed on theplane of discursive thought in the form of judgment. Thejudgment of perception naturally bears all the characteristicsof perception, and the judgment of experience has the universality and necessity appropriate to experience. Only thevalidity of the latter judgment is questioned in the Criticalframework and demands a deduction. The deduction couldnot be developed from its original starting-point since it wasthe psychological flavour of the earlier deduction which hadprevented readers from correctly understanding the Criticalphilosophy. Something else must therefore be adopted toraise the judgment of perception to the judgment of experience. This is achieved by again following the method ofsubsumption, but this time it is concrete perceptions whichare subsumed under the necessary laws of thought. In thisway they become integrated in the necessary order whichconstitutes thought, and thus acquire universal validity,since thought in general liberates them from the particularconcretions of the individual subject and converts them intothoughts instead of mere states of consciousness. The Prolegomena is very cautious about the process of subsumptionitself. That is quite understandable because in detailingthis process Kant would inevitably have been brought backto the jungle of synthetic functions of the early days. Theoutcome is marked by a praiseworthy attempt at clarity andshows consummate dialectical skill.

From the ideological point of view, however, the positionof this exegetical-polemical work could only be provisionaland the historical situation makes that easy to prove. Kanthad promised himself great things from his popular exposition. Disappointment awaited him, for his efforts were invain. He fell back on publications which were overdue.He wrote articles on the philosophy of history which areof Iittle importance for our subject, and he pursued his project of establishing a twofold luetaphysics of morals and ofIlature. However, deep within himself th.e fate of the tlleo-

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retical Critique affected him profoundly. Constantly on thelook-out for any signs of discussion of his work, he heldhimself ready to reply to contradiction and rejoiced in theslightest success. A whole series of mental adjustments ofwhich we know only the result took place in silence. Theinterest shown by his colleague Ulrich, gifted with quickcritical sense and obviously well disposed towards him,moved him to action and probably made him recollectearlier difficulties which were already growing blurred inhis memory. The fact that Ulrich singled out the problemof the deduction, which had been considered unintelligible,makes this all the n10re likely. Little by little the desire topresent the deduction in a simplified form took possessionof him. In the course of carrying out this purpose, histeaching, consciously or unconsciously, inevitably suffereda series of changes.

The real advance in this doctrine since the first editionconsists in the elevation of judgment to the rank of fundamental objectifying operation. The Prolegomena had posedthe problem of objectivity in such a manner as to avoidmaking synthesis this operation, by making the centre ofthe Critical problem the universalisation of our perceptionsin the judgment of experience. It was in 1785, in a footnote added at the last minute to the Anfangsgrunde, that Kantsucceeded in bringing the function of judgment right intothe foreground of the deduction. How was this substitutioneffected? It had been alleged that the Critical systemdepends upon the deduction. The defects in its actualstructure, although frankly admitted by Kant, make itunnecessarily difficult and liable to rejection by the reader.The deduction is therefore the source of a serious threat tothe Critical philosophy, especially as the Critical problem isexplicitly formulated as the problem of objectivity. Kant'sfirst move to meet this situation was to deflect attentionfrom objectivity as such: the Critical problem no longercoincides with the question of objectivity, but becomes theproblem of the limitation of reason to phenomena, a problemwhich had always haunted Kant's mind since the crisis ofthe Triiume. What then can be invoked in order to set thislimitation on unshakable foundations? Apparently nothing

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but the recognition that space and time are a priori forms ofintuition and that the categories are functions of judgmentapplied to this intuition. It immediately follows that allrepresentations are knowledge of phenomena and that thecategories have no other function but to determine a sensiblecontent.

The very text of the note indicates why Kant decided onsuch a change offront. The motive for it was the imperfectstate of the deduction. In 178 I he had indeed takell greatpains to underline the inlportance of the deduction in whichthe whole question of Critical objectivity is at stake. Butnow, by placing the limitation thesis in the foreground, heshows himself ready to modify his teaching and to diminishthe importance of the deduction. The problem of tIle limitation really involves two sub-problenls, which he refers to asthe problem that and the problem how. In the problem that,the plan was to show that the categories can have no objective use except when limited to phenomena. The problemhow concerns the manner or the process according to whichthe categories make possible the object of experience. In178 I the whole deduction gave a detailed account of thisprocess. If the Critical philosophy is to be given a solidfoundation, this is both necessary and sufficient. To be ableto give an account of the second problem would undoubtedlybe most desirable, but it is not indispensable to the validationof the Critical philosophy. Kant admits that he would liketo be able to solve the second problem, although he does notsee how this would be possible. The problem that is easilysolved by showing the relations between the categories andthe general form of sensible receptivity, nanlely, time.Although the problem how was more complex, Kant hadjust discovered an equally simple way of solving it throughthe definition of judgment itself. He does not expatiate atlarge on this discovery, a general master-key in the discussion of objectivity, but simply substitutes this brief suggestionfor the original deduction. Th.is argument is too indeterminate to be clear, and we must await the recasting of thededuction in 1787 before attempting to deal with it.

Kant's chief concern at this period, however, is not thededuction. On the contrary, he developed the critique of

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practical reason which we shall discuss in the next section.In 1786 the first edition of the theoretical Critique wasrapidly becoming exhausted. The publisher wanted a newedition. This provided an excellent occasion for Kant toeffect the changes which he himself wislled to make andalso those wllich his readers were pressing on him. Thesecond edition appeared in the course of the year 1787.We are interested only in the additions made to the Criticaldoctrine. These include the following points:

(I) To meet the charge of scepticism, Kant wrote a newPreface intended to explain the positive value of the Criticalphilosophy.

(2) Against the criticism of idealism he put forward thedoctrine of phenomenalism, and protested against anyconfusion of an appearance with the ph.enomenon.

(3) He inserted in the Analytic of Principles a directrefutation of idealism, the origin of which., it seems to me,is sufficiently clear.

(4) He introduced in the body ofhis teaching a completedoctrine of the ego dealing with its existence, with innersense, and with apperception.

(5) Finally, he rewrote the chapter on the deduction.

Let us glance briefly at the general tenor of these changes.The Critique was bound to offend th.e empirical spirit of

the eclectics and the dogmatism of the Wolffians. As itpreached the unknowability of the transcendent world andlimited objective knowledge to phenomena, its opponentswere scandalised and vigorously opposed the new Pyrrhonism, which seemed even more dangerous as it was presentedunder the guise of a theory of science. In 1781 Kant hadstressed his view that the value of the Critical philosophywas negative, that is, that it lay in the claim that reasoncannot transcend experience. Now in 1787, while still maintaining this negative value in the new Preface, Kant addeda twofold positive value: namely, that the Critical philosophy is the absolute condition of the metaphysics of moralsand the condition of the metaphysics of nature.

Let us not forget that by this time the moral Grundlegung100


had found its way to the public and that the practicalCritique was ready to appear, so that Kant had firm viewsabout the possibility of the metaphysics of morals. In thethesis of the dogmatists the rational a priori is considered tobe some kind of representation of the transcendent. TheCritical thesis on the other hand rests on the distinctionbetween thinking and knowing. In itself thought is freedfrOlll the limiting conditions imposed by experience. Knowledge however must conform to experience. Hence, if themind does not set itself to know an object, the path ofthought is free. Ethics aims not at scientific knowledge, butat the a priori regulation of morality. Hence the condemnation of moral knowledge amounts to saving moral thinking.With regard to the metaphysics of nature, Kant insists onthe propaedeutic character of the Critical synthesis. Thelatter studies the organic conditions of a scientific structureof theoretical metaphysics, the supreme condition of whichis the limitation of knowledge to phenomena. Hence, bycondemning transcendent and dogmatic metaphysics, theCritical philosophy saves the truly scientific part of metaphysics.

The great· Critical lesson seems to be embodied in thephenomenalist empiricism. While in 1781 the transcendentfigured most ofte11 as a fundamental unexpressed postulate,the recasting of his teaching is distinguished by direct andfrequent reminders of the necessity for the thing in itself asthe condition of the intelligibility of phenomena. Furthermore, in view of the claim in the Garve-Feder review, inwhich Erscheinung is interpreted as Schein, that henceforwardknowledge must keep to the pure appearances of things,Kant added a whole section to the Critique in order toeliminate any such lamentable confusion. In a vigorousad hominem argument he accuses his opponent of committingthis same error in holding that space and time are bothconditions of things in themselves when considered as formsand also that they are things in themselves when consideredas objective realities. He explains again how the Criticalphilosophy saves the necessity of experimental knowledge.A similar thesis dominates the structure of the reorganiseddeduction, as we shall see presently.

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Since phenomenalism was exposed to the danger of beinginterpreted as a kind of disguised scepticism, the a prioriformalism was bound to raise a general cry of indignationfrom the dogmatic realists who read it as subjective idealism,and we know that Kant's teaching was commonly interpretedin this way. To counteract this unjustified assimilation ofhisteaching to that of a Berkeley, Kant had to take certain precautions which are evident in the new edition. In theAnalytic of Principles he added both an explicit Refutationof Idealism and a General Remark with the same purpose.Suppressing some parts and adding others, he also recastthe particularly dangerous passage dealing with noumenaand phenomena. In this cOl1nection the anti-idealist replytakes in general two forrns: (I) the demonstration of theexistence of the transcendent, and (2) the delimitation ofthe use of the categories.

The refutation of idealism, which demonstrates thenecessity of a transcendent existent, is not an absolutelynew section, bllt rather a section which has been movedto a new place. The formal idealism professed by Kantis not aimed at all at the transcendent. The debate musttherefore centre around material idealism, within whichtwo separate types must be distinguished: the dogmatictype of Berkeley which denies the existence of the 'initself' since the very idea of it is false, and the Cartesianor problematic form which simply doubts the existence ofan external 'in itself'. The Critical theory of sensibilityis itself a sufficient refutation of dogmatic idealism. TheCartesian form Kant finds plausible and worthy of carefultreatment. The lines of his argument are well known: heshows that the existence of the self, tll0Ught by Descartesto be privileged, presupposes the existence of an externaltranscendent. Knowledge of our existence is possible onthe basis of a permanent object of perception distinct fromthe self. The second form of the Kantian reply consists inlimiting the employment of the categories to phenomena,an employment which is determined by the distinctionbetween knowing and thinking. The doctrines of sensibility and of understanding, Kant says, converge to asingle point: the necessary limitation of the a priori to

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experience in the theoretical use of reason. The transcendent use extends the employment of pure concepts tothings in themselves and does not therefore correspond tothe criteria of objectivity. Any incursion of reason into thedomain of the transcendent by n1.eans of the categories istherefore to be condemned, if this is interpreted as a meansof knowing and of constructing a science of the transcendent.The science of the a priori cannot be conceived as an ontology: it is a pure analytic of reason, that is, a science whichmakes a study of understanding in its formal aspects.

The united effect of these predominantly restrictive theseswas to lead to the denial of the knowability of the selfin itself,a major scandal in the eyes ofthe Cartesian Wolffians and theenlightened eclectics. All Kant's opponents, Garve, Feder,Ulrich, Mendelssohn, etc., protested against this devaluationof the self which was inevitable within the framework of theCritical philosophy. In 1787 Kant reconstructed the doctrine of the self by first elaborating the doctrine of innersense and then by restating his teaching about the self initself. The Critical philosophy in its first form hardly mentioned inner sense because the attempt to incorporate contemporary psychology gave its functions to imagination, butin 1787 the appeal to inner sense was to bring a very seriousproblem in its train. A phenomenon presupposes a subjectof affection and an affecting matter. How can a subjectaffect itself? Clearly Kant wished to achieve a completeparallel between outer and inner sense despite the importantdifference between them. He wanted to do so, because themost important content of inner sense is represented by theknowledge of external perceptions, and because externalexperience has priority over inner experience. Despiteeverything, it remains true that for inner sense the matteris not foreign to the subject and that the subject is thereforeaffected by itself. How is auto-affection to be explained?By the distinction not of two subjects but of two momentsin the same subject. There is first an active moment: thesubject carries out certain activities in positing its representations; there is also a passive moment: the subject is capableof apprehending the material diversity of its acts, which areconsequently data in relation to this apprehension. Since

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this apprehension is sensible, the given matter is not matterin itself but phenomenal matter. Hence the deductionsubmits the knowledge ofthe selfto the normal and customaryconditions of objectivity.

Moreover, in the 1781 version oftlle Paralogisms of PureReason Kant had launched a powerful offensive againstrational psychology, refuting one after the other the doctrines of the substantiality, simplicity, and identity of thesoul. In 1787 he was less prolix but proved in a singleunitary passage that the metaphysics of the soul is a tissueof purely analytic judgments from which no objective knowledge of the self can be deduced. Knowing in fact consistsin the determination of intuition by the logical functions ofthought. Now, the unity of consciousness, the final analyticreference of representation, is a pure thought with no corresponding intuition. Its analysis therefore furnishes no knowledge of the self as object. The' I think' of apperceptiondoes not guarantee the existence of the object-self. It is anintellectual representation given on the occasion of anempirical process, that is, it is only present if all empiricalrepresentation furnishes a preliminary matter. The' Ithink' depends therefore on the exercise of the thinkingactivity, and guarantees only the existence of the thoughtand not the existence of the self in itself. The latter mustbe admitted as the correlative of internal phenomena, butthat amounts to a declaration of its unknowability. Thedoctrine of the self in the two forms just cited may thereforebe said to confirm the general thesis of Critical phenomenalism.

Thus we come to the most important and decisive changebrought about by the recasting ofthe Critique, the reorganisation of the deduction in which culminate the feelings andresentments which Kant converted into arguments in hissuccessive versions of the Critical problem between I 78 I and1787. I need make no further reference to the eliminationof the subjective part of the deduction which brought aboutthe disappearance of synthesis as the centre of gravity of

, the argument. But the changes stimulated by his lack ofconfidence in synthesis are still more profound. Synthesis,displaced from the centre, had to be replaced, and this was

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achieved by the notion of unity. Synthesis plays the partof a provisional operation belonging to ilnagination, but thetrue dominating function of understanding is unification.The categories no longer represent synthetic functions, butfunctions of synthetic unity. The definition of knowledge asthe synthetic unity of a sensible diversity gives to the deduction a direction different from that of 178I. Indeed, thisunity is constituted in and by the act of judgment so thatthe intuitive world presents itself as inevitably drawn togetherin the functions ofjudicative unity. However, the converseis not true. The function of unity is not organically boundto sensible intuition: a nleta-sensible use always remainspossible, although all objective and scientific validity mustbe denied to it. It follows that the question of validity doesnot coincide with the question of being. That is what thenew deduction is designed to explain.

In 178 I the aim of the deduction was to set up the cate- ~

gories as the conditions of experience; in 1787 tIle purposewas to demonstrate that the categories are th.e conditions ofthe empirical use of reason. The return towards phenomenalism in the Anfangsgriinde has borne fruit. However,there is no formal contradiction between these two objectives.They clearly rest on the same tlleses: the necessity ofempirical data, the phenomenal nature of these data, tIlereciprocal determination of the given and of consciousness,objectivity limited to phenomena, the unknowability of thething in itself, and the absolute rejection of any ontologicalclaim on the part of the sensible and intellectual a priori.Nevertheless, the demonstration of the new thesis is no longerprepared by a psychological-transcendental exposition givinga preliminary analysis of the logical structure of thought inobjective knowledge. It goes straight to its purpose with anundeniably objective trend, and it gravitates around a theoryofjudgment. Just as Kant expounded the original objectivededuction by beginlling first witll apperception as the highestcondition, and then by the given or the lowest condition, thesame procedure is found in 1787: in Sections 16-2 I the"deduction is developed from apperception, in Section 26from the given, while Sections 22-5 limit the objectivevalidity of the categories to their enlpirical use as a preface

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to Section 26, where the limitation is inserted as one of theconditions of reasoning.

The categories, so reasons Kant, are necessarily connectedwith the object on condition that there is a correspondingintuition: intuition is therefore an indispensable function.Must this intuition be sensible? If so, being and validitycoincide; if not, being and validity pose two differentproblems. Intellectual intuition is possible, but intuitionas it appears in the organic constitution of human knowledge is subject to spatio-temporal forms. We can thereforethink an object without taking into account the specificnature of the intuition, but in order to kno"" it allowancemust be made for tIle fact that intuition is exclusively sensible. Hence, a deduction which determines the use of thecategories for intuition in general is no longer sufficient.This use must be determined according to the human given,that is, it must be shown that the categories are the necessaryconditions of sensible intuition, or, in other words, thatperceptions themselves are constituted only by the categories. This is what Kant proves in Section 26.

This brief account of the deduction proves that it isconsistent with its predecessor of I 78 I and that Schopen-.hauer, Fischer, and company are wrong in taking exceptionto it on the ground that there has been contradiction and

'" retraction. However, this fundamental unity in his teachingis not inconsistent with the view that Kant's thought hasundergone an evolution, and that the deduction of 1 787represents an independent stage which opens new perspectives on the Critical problem for both Kant and his readers.It was necessary first to modi.fy the classical notion ofjudgment. While in 1781 judgment was a simple unification ofconcepts, it was now necessary to see in it the unificationof concepts which had been categorially determined. Farfrom finding a flagrant contradiction between these twoconceptions, .Kant simply bracketed them together in thededuction. Since unity has been substituted for synthesis,it becanle necessary to make apperception absolutely preeminent as the dominating unity, as the act and the placeof unification. The category replaces synthesis in this function. In the third place, it was necessary to provide a third

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intermediary between sensible receptivity and objectiveknowledge. The link was assured in 1781 by imaginationin view of the fact that the unifying act was synthesis.Imagination disappeared almost completely with the sub-jective deduction in which it was the principal element, andwas replaced in 1787 by a more logical factor, formalintuition.

Space and time are indeed the a priori forms of sensiblereceptivity, but they are at the same time pure representations of determined spaces and times. For these latter, then, .a spatio-temporal diversity had to be first categorially determined and unified. It is formal intuition as opposed to theform of intuition. Hence Kant finds in this formal intuitiona ground of agreement between sensibility and understanding. Formal intuition maintains a connection with receptivity in the sense that the a priori spatio-temporal matteris itself the form of receptivity; on th.e other h.and, it isconnected with intellectual unification, since this matter hasto be categorially determined in order to become actual.Here again there is no contradiction as the theory of formalintuition is limited to replacing the faculties of 1781 by theirproducts.

The obligation to protect his doctrine against false interpretations produced the phenomenalist factor which has beencalled empiricism. In 1781 the problem was set a11d solvedwithin a rationalist framework: objective knowledge, experience, and nature are possible through pure a priori concepts.In 1787 the problem was set and solved in empirical terms:the pure a priori concepts are objective through their necessary correlation with the sensible factor. This return tophenomenalism is well marked in three theses: in thedistinction between thinking and knowing which are similarin their formal structure but different in their materialcontent; in the reduction of intuition in general to sensiblehllman intuition, which makes objectivity depend on anintuitive given; in the application of this twofold thesis inall its rigour to the knowledge of the self. We are entitled ,to conclude from this that the deduction of 1787 representsan independent step and at the same time a new achievement on Kant's part in comparison with the results

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previously reached. We believe that tIle independent natureof the new deduction can be based on the view that in 1787Kant did not wish to react principally against the charge ofidealism in general, but above all against the epithet of, subjective' which accompanied the word' idealism'. Thenew orientation does not, as tradition would have it, aim ata return to realism, but establishes a Critical idealism inwhich all traces of any affinity with psychological subjectivism have been banished. This thesis is too revolutionaryto be put forward without a special attempt on my part tojustify it.

In 1781 realism appears to be the basic postulate. Thereis a transcendent in itself, but the co,nstructive character ofCritical idealism rests essentially on the intellectual spontaneity which undertakes the setting up of the intuitiveworld, the sole object of pllysico-mathematical science.Concentrating on his discovery, Kant very carefully analysesthe psychological-transcendental mechanism of this construction in the deduction. The constructive act is synthesiswhich in consequence is the essence of knowledge itself.The organic modes of synthesis or the categories thus represent the fundanlental articulations of the intuitive worlditself. By n~eans of the doctrine of affinity, this syntheticconstruction brings about a first rationalisation among thegiven in such a way that, tIle thing in itself being presupposed, the synthetic act itself produces the general formof the knowable world.

An exposition of this kind, even if correct, containsdangerous elements because of its extreme idealism. Kantcould not be offended by the accusation of idealism; heknew perfectly well that his thesis was idealist. He wasupset however when his thesis was mistaken for a denialof the transcendent, or rather when it was thought that hegranted on the one hand a creative power to mind in therealm of the transcendent while on the other he limited

".., objective science to mere fugitive arbitrary appearances.The nature of Kant's twofold reaction is fully intelligible:he 'emph.asises empirical realism or phenomenalism, and heorganises the constructivist theory in a firmer and moreintransigent manner, both by the sacrifice of certain themes

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discussed in 1781 and by the introduction of new developments.

By the suppression of the psychological aspect Kant·wanted to get still closer to the purely logical essence ofall intellectual construction. This psychological elementhad furnished him with the notion of the transcendentalobject which had increased the danger of confusion withidealism of the Berkleian type. Kant suppressed, or ratherconcealed, this danger by getting rid of the term. Thefunctions formerly attributed to the transcendental objectare firmly passed to apperception in 1787, that is, to thefinal act constructive of unity. Finally, Kant did awaywith possible experience as an operativemediull1.. It hadbeen the source of the subsumptive process between matterand form, between the a priori and the a posteriori, andbetween sensibility and understanding. What the subsumption loses in prestige, syntl1esis, or rather synthetic unity,gains. The sacrifice of these three themes is motivated ineach case by a desire to avoid subjectivism by means of a1110re assured constructive idealism.

Exactly the same thing happens "\rvith respect to thealterations in the recast deduction. These are limited tothe following four points: (a) the ' I think', (b) the distinction between knowing and thinking, (c) the theory ofjudgment, and (d) formal intuition. The' I think' takesover the functions of the transcendental object. In 1781the transcendental object oscillates ceaselessly between thething in itself and apperception, a fact which was responsible for the mistaken view that apperception is creative inthe order of the transcendent. By means of the ' I think'the function of this transcendental object is uniformly determined as apperception. Furthermore, the' I think' replacesthe very term' apperception '. The term was not to disappear, but none the less Kant preferred to be careful andto substitute' synthetic unity', a more logical expression forthe act of thought which is the ultimate reference for thewhole cognitive process.

The distinction between thinking and knowing could beinterpreted as the revenge of realism, but not necessarily so,because it will be the basis, not of a thesis concerning the

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existence of transcendent things, but of the empirical construction of the empirical object by the subject. Indeed thenecessary convergence of the act of synthetic unification andsensible forms rests on it in the construction of the spatiotemporal framework, where the irrational given is completely stripped of every suggestion of transcendence.

Judgment reappears on Kant's horizon as the principleof objectification. This means that Kant is abandoning thesubsun1ption of the empirical given under the categories asconditions of experience. Judgment consists in the actualpositing of synthetic unity or in the fundamental act ofobjective thinking, for thought actualises itself in its objectifying moments in the form ofjudgn1.ent. Formal intuitionis destined in its turn, and I must repeat this, to replacesubsumption. Indeed, the subsumption of the sensible underthe intellectual, or of the given under the categories, was arenewal of the modus vivendi concluded between the realismwhich hinted at things and the idealism which constructed

,. knowledge. Space and time very nearly became categories,that is, modalities of the constructive activity of thought.The opposition between sensibility and understanding wasmuch less sharp because of formal intuition. Time andspace certainly maintained themselves as forn1s, but theseforms are transcendental potentialities which are actualisedand which become representations in the very act of intellectual construction. By formal intuition Kant paves theway to a universal constructivism which is the source ofmathematics and general physics. The constructivism offormal intuition will be the basis from which will come theOpus Postumum (the final but unrevised version of the Criticalphilosophy) and then the objective idealisn1 of romanticism.

However, let there be no mistake about the nature ofour position. I recognise at once that there is somethingparadoxical in seeing in the Critical philosophy of 1787 areinforced idealism. The whole tradition of past Kantianscholarship sees there a more powerful realism, evidencedby empirical realism or phenomenalism and by the incessant

t. appeal to the intuitive given. If thought is conceived asthe faculty which represents a determinate reality whichis ontologically independent, the!l realism is the natural

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interpretation. But when thought is conceived as anessentially constructive faculty in such a way that thisdeterminate and ontologically independent reality no longerenters as a determining factor into this construction, realismis no longer so easily understood. And this is assuredlyKant's true position. But this certainly does not mean thatKant denies the existence of the 'in itself', autonomousand ontologically independent. Even Hegel never thoughtof that. It is undeniable that in 1787, as in 1781, theadoption of the postulate of transcendence surreptitiouslyconditioned certain analyses and that a kind of silentstruggle took place between the transcendent principle andthe constructive principle. All organisation and all formare not states of the real in itself, but on the contrarycreations of cOllstructive thought. Transcendent realismcan only obscure and taillt the purity alld clearness ofconstructivism. This is clearly what takes place in theautononlOUS stage which the second edition of the Critiquerepresents in the evolution of the Critical philosophy.

Thus, in tIle first place, the opposition between thesensible and the intellectual was neither overcome norreabsorbed, so th.at the constructing subject finds itselfdivided agail1st itself and th.e union of the two constituentsin the intellectual spontaneity scarcely rises above the levelof a kind of pre-established harmony with little explanatoryvalue. This reduplication presupposes at one end a matterwhich can be, but is not yet, ordered. The possibility ofordering this heteronomous matter, the condition ofrationalisation, is not logically derivable from intellectual functions.Only a harmonisation, still too external to explain anything,or the unity of the thinking activity invading the matter,remain possible. Indeed both alternatives are to be foundside by side in our texts but are never united into a homogeneous and perfectly intelligible doctrine.

The second inconsistency in the constructivism whichconflicts with the realist postulate is the unsuppressed opposition between form and function. The purpose of thededuction is to lay bare the a priori conditions which permita representation to become an object. These conditionscan be purely logical, and then we obtain forms. The

III


description of these forms will not reveal the origin of theobject and in consequence the real problem to be resolvedis evaded. A form indeed cannot be considered in isolationfrom the source vvhich gives it its essence. It must bebrought to its principle. But this principle is unquestionably an intellectual act. The form is certainly a reality butit is the product of an act of the subject. Pure formalismis unproductive. While Kant undoubtedly recognises theessential constructivism of thought, it is no less true thatmore tha11 one thesis supporting this constructivism carriesthe imprint of hollow formalism. By the side of the intellectual dynamism we often meet the static universal. Insteadof constructing the object, the deduction is frequentlydeflected towards tIle problem of the hierarchisation ofknowledge which results from the imposition of forms, andthe connection between these two things is not made clear.

A similar hesitation before the constructive conception ofthought appears in the distinction between thinking andknowing. I have no intention of claiming that the distinction lacks foundation, but it has perhaps been falsely presented. The representation of the object reveals a twofoldrelation: the relation of the given to the unity of consciousness, and the relation, arising from that, of the representation to the object. This distinction is meaningful onlywhen. a certain conflict continues to exist between the actand the form. Indeed the first relation furnishes the formof representative unity and the second that of the object.To unite and to objectify are the two corresponding functionsof these relations. Thus if unity and objectivity are twodistinct things, there is nothing to prove that the unity ofconsciousness is the equivalent of objectivity. The one maybe inferred from the other, when unity is objectivity itself,for then the relation is purely analytic. A rigorously logicaluse of the deduction ought to have brought the two to theabsolute unity of the act of thinking. That would naturallyhave brought about the suppression ofthe distinction betweenthe objective and subjective unity of consciousness. Fichtedid not hesitate. He suppressed the subjective unity, 'whichwas more logical though less human. T11e same objectioncould be raised against judgment. This is exact theory when

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considered without any relation to logical formalism, butKant introduced into it the conflict between form andfunction in th.e very originating act of thought. All theseinconsistencies and hesitations derive fronl a common source,namely, the equivocal character of the theory of the subject.

When all connection with psychology is to be avoided,the subject represents thought constituting the total a prioriconditioning of the object known, without relation to anyindividual concretion. Subject and object therefore coincidein this definition. N-ow, Kant is not happy with such aninterpretation even when the ontological and psychologicalself is supposed to have been definitely put on one side.The basic ambiguity in Kant's teaching is that betweenthe subject and thought. The' I think' or the unity ofconsciousness is the element which totalises the a priori conditions of the object. Now for thought he substitutesconsciousness. These are factors which are very differentone from the other. Thought is an act, consciousness is areflexive return on this act or on its product. Consciousnesshas not the same immediacy as the act of thought. On theother hand, the act of thought is indivisible and cannot beanalysed into subject-object, while consciousness is essentiallydivided and dividing.

Consciousness is thus the discursive logical transpositionof the act which it presupposes. The subject considered asthe summit of transcendental reflection is only efficacious oncondition that it unequivocally signifies this originating act.The subject conceived as consciousness is not an act; it is aform or containing unity which by subsumption acquires acontent. Thus constructivism needs a subject, the unity of"\tvhich is the very act of thought which is not yet consciousness. The latter is in some sort a sensuous subject, reflexive'and derivative. These are Kant's fundamental weaknessesin relation to the generating principle of his Critical constructivism. In comparison witll the themes of 178 I, thesecond edition of 1787 clearly reveals an independent stagein the Kantian Critical thought. It is independent becauseit is marked by a tendency towards a more consistentform of idealism vvhich is more objectively oriented thanthe preceding stage. Most of the new themes which we

(2,491) I 13 9


have just met will reappear at the turn of the nineteenthcentury, when Kant will find himself obliged to undertakea general recasting of his theory of objectivity.

2

THE MORAL SYNTHESIS

cf. La Deduction III, 299-338

The Critique of Practical Reason was ready to go to the pressjust at the time when Kant was engaged in producing asecond edition of the theoretical Critique at the invitation ofhis publisher, Hartknoch. A popular exposition of hismoral teaching had preceded the practical Critique underthe title of Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Foundationsfor the Metaphysics of Morals). The public certainly expectedsomething different. On the basis of the promises reiteratedby Kant over approximately twenty years, the ethical teaching was expected to consist of a metaphysics of morals, andyet here was Kant, both in 1785 and 1788, expounding, notthe expected metaphysics, but a critique of reason as itjudges in ethical matters. The theoretical Critique had beenpresented as the unique critico-propaedeutic introduction tothe complete system of metaphysics. It included expressly apassage dealing with the practical order in which the fundamental concept offreedom is deduced. It might l1ave beenconcluded that in 1781 Kant did not think that a preparatorycritique in the moral field would be necessary. However,nothing in the documents suggests that he devoted any timeto the preparation of a Metaphysik der Sitten (Metaphysics ofMorals). On the contrary, all the evidence we have certainly suggests that Kant was working on the Foundations,which plays with regard to the practical Critique the samerole that the Prolegomena plays with respect to the theoreticalCritique. It prepares the reader, by means of an analyticexposition, to penetrate into a new order of problems.

There can be 110 doubt that from the beginning Kant114


wished to follow this popular introduction with a critique.Indeed, the Foundations asserts, with an insistence whichmust have been intended, that the auth.or is not developingin the Foundations his full critique of morality. A preface tothe metaphysics of morals which presupposes a practicalcritique, the Foundations gives a critique in a popular abbreviated form; it was to have been immediately followed bythe corresponding Metaphysics before the definitive Critiquesaw the light of day. Indeed, Kant judged, rightly orwrongly, that the moral critique is less urgent than thetheoretical critique and that in consequence it was sufficientto give the reader a brief sketch of the main points by wayof introduction to the Metaphysics. The conclusion is thatKant had originally intended to content himself with theFoundations and then to pass immediately to the codificationof his Metaphysics. But instead of fulfilling this task, we seethat he postponed it for ten years, and with almost feverishhaste he worked out the practical Critique. If there is anyserious problerrl oforigin about Kantian etllics, it is certainlyKant's change of decision ,,,,ith regard to the Critique that hasto be explained.

At this point contemporary history comes to our assistance. Kant's whole decision was taken from a purelypragmatic standpoint. He thought that practical criticismis more easily assimilated than theoretical criticism. Thehistory of the Foundations implies an important change inthese expectations. It provoked a violent protest from thesemi-Wolffians and Kant's optimism was to emerge considerably shaken. He could only admit his error in havingtrusted so completely in common sense: the public understood the moral aspect of his Critical philosophy no moreeasily than its theoretical aspect. It was then that hechanged·his mind and proceeded to write the moral Critique.Although it had been planned as a work of apologetics,Kant did not wish his work to be a polemical piece. Heleft polemics to his friends. Although certain anonymouspolemical preoccupations can be traced in this Critique, wefind that its main characteristics are uniformly doctrinal.

In a brief account of his moral teaching, we must takeinto consideration its twofold exposition. The Foundations

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is presented under the form of a prolegomel~a or popularexposition of the Critique, but in a ratl~er special sense whichmakes this work rather different from the theoretical Prolegomena. Indeed it carries the reasoning up to just the pointfrom which the Critique will be able to take its start. TheFoundations sees in the n~oral problem a special case of synthetic a priori judgment requiring a deduction to assure usof its a priori possibility and of its objective validity. Thismakes it possible to integrate it without difficulty into thehistory of the Critical doctrine. The moral fact revealed inthe restrictive nature of the law of duty, a law which carriesthe name of categorical imperative, is expressed in a syntheticapriori judgment. Its apriori character calls for a demonstration by pure reason; the synthetic character arises from thefact that the determination of the will by an objective moralprinciple does not analytically coincide with the subjectivemaxim of the will. Hence the determination of the will doesnot result analytically from the notion of the will itself, butis the result of a synthetic submission. In the theoreticalorder, the problem of the synthetic judgment is resolved bythe detectiol~ of a third element in which the constituentsof the judgment are united. This element is intuition. Now,the third element in the practical order is the positive conception of freedom, tl~at is, a causality determined by itsown laws.

Will and autonomy are therefore reciprocal concepts. Itseems that in this case any deduction of the n~oral imperativemust necessarily involve a vicious circle and be unavoidablysophistic. Indeed, if these concepts were absolutely univocal,this would always be the case. However, the question iswhether the subject, when it appears as determined by a freecausality, conceives itselffrom exactly the same point of viewas when it appears to itself in the acts which it originates inconsequence of this causality. It seems that this is not thecase. The subject considered in the phenomenal order isaffected by objects and by their affections, therefore byheteronomous laws, while the subject in itself is revealedin the most complete spontaneity of reason free from everynatural pressure. Hence a twofold use of reason is calledfor: a use in connection with the affections which will

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conform to tIle laws of nature, and a free use uniquelyguided by its free spontaneity. It can then be seen thatspontaneous reason. can exercise a causal determination onthe will even if the natural causality of its actions takesplace entirely in the order of mechanical phenomena. Itis in this way that the vicious circle is avoided.

By this very fact the possibility of the moral principle asan a priori judgment is conceivable. There is a possiblesynthetic liaison between the subjective determination of thewill and the objective moral law, because the subject of thewill belongs to an intelligible world where it is freed fromthe mechanical conditions of the intuitive world. As aphenomenon it is seen to be subject to laws from which itescapes when considered as a noumenon. Obviously thiswhole reasoning is valid only in so far as the idea of freedom is presupposed. That is the idea which guarantees thevalidity of the moral imperative. How is this freedom itselfpossible? The Foundations finishes with the avowal of ourinability to understand this question. In this work, therefore, we are led up to the idea of freedom witll0ut beingable to justify it. It is from this idea that the practicalCritique will take its start.

Indeed, if the description and explanation of an a priorimoral given was the principal object of the Foundations, adeduction of the objective validity of the moral principlewas going to be the focal point in the moral reflection contained in the practical Critique. In the theoretical orderreason in its pursuit of knowledge is always exposed to thedanger of going beyond the limits which circumscribe objectivity, because of the a priori character of its formal concepts.A critical examination of reason is not so urgent in thepractical order where there is no question of knowledge.Reasoll is there considered purely in its practical capacityof determining a will and of bringing into existence objectscorresponding to its pure representations. The conformity ofreason to its object is evident in the practical order becausereason is itself the cause of its object. The only problemto be solved and the true object of a practical Critiquetherefore consists in asking if tllere really is a practicalreason, a reason which can determine the will in an a priori

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manner. The new positio quaestionis leads naturally to a newtype of solution.

The theoretical Critique aimed at the explanation of thea priori knowledge of objects. This presupposed sensibleintuition as matter, the pure concept as form, and certainprinciples which apply the form to the matter. Practicalreason does not ainl at knowledge but at the realisation ofobjects and that is achieved by means of a law or a practicalprinciple. The law is therefore the primary object of investigation. It is clear that such a position leaves intact thetheoretical criticism, if only for the reason that these twodomains are not commensurable. It is not enough howeverthat the two Critiques should merely be consistent with oneanother. A careful examination allows us to say that thelogical setting of the solution of the theoretical Criticalproblem maintained itself intact in Kant's mind and that,despite strong temptation, the great restrictive guaranteeswith which it was surrounded are repeated without anyweakening. I repeat-ill spite of strong temptation.Indeed, a summary inspection of the two domains seemsto reveal contradictory elements. On the one hand, nopenetration of the non-sensible world by the mind can bepermitted in the cognitive order. Therefore whateverenlargement practical reason can procure, it will neveraffect the system of knowledge which has been definitivelyestablished. On the other hand, practical reason can beconceived only as a rational penetration into the nonsensible. Hence some enlargement must be held to bepossible since it is real. The theoretical Critique admittedthat reason is drawn by its very nature towards such anextension; it did not forbid the continuation of the Criticalenterprise provided that the order of objective knowledgeand its limitations be respected. To refuse to this extensionthe character of knowledge amounts to opening other perspectives from the side of faith. A legitimate field is thusopened for practical criticism.

The principal aim of practical criticism is the deductionof the practical use of reason. Objective necessity is alwaysthe criterion of pure reason. In the practical domain, asin the theoretical domain, a necessary rule, whether of

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knowledge or of conduct, is called a law. Practical reasonis therefore manifested by the law or the moral principle.The existence of this law or principle must first be established, and then it must be recognised as the foundation ofthe objectivity of the moral order. Now, the moral law isfor Kant the object of an immediate awareness; it is a factgiven by pure reason itself, a fact which is entirely inexplicable. In this absolutely fundamental fact of the moral consciousness we recognise an a priori principle whicll determinesthe will. Since it cannot be grasped by sensible intuition,the objective reality of this principle is not demonstrable bymeans of intuition as had been the case with the categories.The awareness of the principle is indissolubly bound up withthat of freedom because the moral principle simply affirmsfreedom and the autonomy of practical reason. At this pointthe practical Critique and the Foundations come together. Themoral principle, with which we come into contact in theimmediate awareness, consists in the rational principle whichdetermines the will a priori or which is autonomous in thedetermination of the will.

At this point a very real difficulty comes to the fore. Themoral principle is a fact, something determined, animmediate given of practical consciousness; hence anydeduction seen1S to be superfluous and useless. On theother hand it is surely asking too nluch that such a principle should be admitted without any attempt at deduction,for this principle might be simply a subjective disposition onour part which was making an unfounded claim to objectivevalidity. In the theoretical domain. experience constituteda permanent guarantee, but this recourse is not availableto us in the practical domain. Therefore we are here in thepresence of a practical reason which cannot be detern1inedby experience and which is inden10nstrable a priori. On thewhole, if Kant nevertheless proceeds to a deduction, thisdeductiol1 will not be comparable to the process of reasoning which carried this name in 1781 and 1787. Indeed, thedemonstrandum of this deduction is not the moral principlein the strict sense, but something else which is akin to theprinciple, namely, freedom.

Theoretical reason was forced to deny objective validityIIg


to a causality extended beyond the realm of sensible phenomena. In spite of that, reason manifests an irresistibletendency towards such a causality, and this tendency is sostrong that such a free causality must be allowed to beconceivable. It seems now that the moral principle iscapable of transforn1ing the possibility of free causality intoa reality; first, by showing th.at the moral principle completes the system of theoretical reason in the order of freedom, and then by showing that by this means the agreementof theoretical reason with. practical reason is possible in thetheoretical field. This deduction proceeds by successivestages.

In the first stage Kant has to show that the negativeconcept of freedom, or the non-dependence on foreigndetermining causes, acquires a positive function i11 thepractical order, and that consequently it acquires the rankof a positive concept instead of being a limiting c011cept.Indeed the practical order grants to the concept of freedomthe proper function of determining the will directly bythe ideas of reason. The use which we make of reasonis not a transcendent but an immanent use; i11 otherwords, it becomes possible to show how reason throughits ideas exercises causality in the field of experienceitself.

The second stage justifies this use, a use w11ich does notviolate the restrictive conditions of theoretical reason. Thecategory of cause has no determinable object except withinthe limits of experience. In itself, however, by its a prioricharacter it can be made to function beyond th.ese limits oncondition that it does not claim objectivity, that is, does notclaim to represent an object. The practical use respects theconditions under which the objective use is valid. Thecoexistence of a rational tendency towards objective knowledge and a tendency towards the determination of the willby ideas can be easily explained, because a rational beingmust be considered under a double aspect which makes itpossible for his reason to be applied in two different ways.If the subject is considered in so far as he is temporarilyconditioned, his acts are physically determined and hencesubject to the conditions of the kno,¥ledge of phenomena;

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but when his acts are considered outside this temporal conditioning, there is no reason why the causality exercised bythe subject in the order of phenomena should be any longerphysically conditioned. It can be free on condition thatthis freedom is not taken to be a knowledge of the essenceof the subject, but simply the voluntary power of determiningthe acts of a subject according to ideas.

The deduction of the moral principle is very brief despiteits double character. The principle is a basic undeniablefact. Now this principle cannot be a fact except on thecondition that the will is supposed to have the power offreecausality. Therefore freedom shares in the factual natureof the moral principle. However, the recognition offreedomdoes not involve any positive determination of a transcendentsubject but is a pure condition of the intelligibility of themoral act or of practical reason. An object of practicalreason is a representation in so far as it is the effect of afree causality. But let us be clear about this. To performan act is a physical operation: only the willing of an actcan be the effect of this kind of causality. Therefore thepractical object is to will or not to will all act. Now, inthis case good and evil are the only objects of practicalreason, or the orlly practical categories as Kant sometimescalls them. These categories subject the diversity of ourinclinations or of our desires to the unity of the practicalconsciousness governed by the moral principle, and this isthe only deduction which we are capable of giving for it.The category of the good is a necessary but abstract rulewhich must be applied in concreto to sensible mechanicalactions. How is this application to be made? It is amatter of determining the will to a concrete act madepossible by the rule of the good. We do not seek a schemawhich permits the subsumption of a concrete case underthe general law, but rather the schema of the law itself, ifthis improper expression may be allowed. The meeting ofthe rule of the good and understanding in the practicalconditioning of an act is equivalent to asking the question:can the maxim which inclines us towards this concrete actbe clothed with the form of a natural law? Naturallaw does not determine the will, but, by the form of law

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which it includes, it furnishes the type of judgment whichwe direct on the motives of our conduct.

However, the problen1 is more complex. The moral lawis the sole foundation of the apriori detern1ination of the will.However, this determination is not purely formal, does notconsist solely in conferring the form of a universal constraintwithout any reference to matter. We find in ourselves acollection of inclinations which all manifest the form ofhappiness, but in varying degrees. The formal object ofthe moral law is the good, wllile that of inclination is happiness. As we belong to both the intelligible and the sensibleworlds, the unity of practical reason depends on the discoveryof a superior principle which goes beyond the regionsof the good and of happiness. This principle is calledthe supreme good interpreted in the sense of the completegood

How is this union of morality and happiness to berealised? This union would be perfectly intelligible if thenotion of morality coincided with that of happiness or ifthere were some synthetic bond between them. Now adeduction is all the more necessary for the supreme good,because practical reason seems to engender an internalrational conflict in consequence of the difficulty of harmonising these two constituents of the practical order. Theirharmony is not in fact determined either by identity or bya synthetic bond. Happiness does not determine moralreason and moral reason does not produce happiness.Hence the very notion of the supreme good is in doubtunless we can find a means of overcoming this conflict.Such a means seems to exist for Kant for, if the judgmentwhich expresses the subordination of the good to happinessis false, the judgment which makes happiness depend onthe good is not false in an absolute manner. The autonomyof the will forbids us to make an immediate synthetic connection between the two constituents of the practical natureof man. It does allow nevertheless a mediate syntheticconnection, an external connection between them, that is,a connection which does not arise from the very nature ofman but from the intervention of another being who wouldhave nature within his power, a being which could be no

122

FfHE COMPLETION OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

other than God. Thus morality prepares the way for beliefin the existence of God.

It might be objected that the practical order, by makinga rneta-empirical use of the category of cause, runs counterto the Critical tendency which so carefully limited that category in the theoretical order. In order to maintain the twoCritiques side by side in a unified an.d unique synthesis, it isnecessary to find a satisfactory explanation for the apparentdivergence between their conclusions. Kant was obliged onmore than one occasion in his moral work to furnish thisexplanation. It always comes back to a form of the argument which we have already come across in his writings.Use of causality in the noumenal or meta-sensible dimensionis, objectively considered, impossible. However, reaSOll hasanother task than that of knowing an object: it tends alsoto realise objects by the will. A subject which exercises thiscausality is a causa noumenon. Thus the concept of such acause is not cOlltradictory because the category is a form ofsynthetic unity. The objective use of the category is limitedto phenomena but, organically speaking, it is not submittedto this restriction. Its use may therefore be extended tonoumena 011 condition that there is no question of extending the boundaries of knowledge. If no attempt is made topenetrate the essence of the being who exercises this causality, and if its existence is simply affirmed on the basis ofbelief in the reality of a principle of a priori determinationof the will, then no obstacle arises from tIle side of thetheoretical restriction already referred to. The same is trueof the regulative Ideas of reason, freedom, inlmortality, andthe existence of God, although Kant has apparently justgiven thenl corresponding objects. However, the postulation of these three Ideas does not imply any intention toenlarge the field of our knowledge. On the other hand,while the Ideas were purely regulative for theoretical reason,they are clearly constitutive of objects in the practical use.But once again we are not trying to know their objects.We limit ourselves simply to inquiring whether there aresuch objects. Practical reason actually imposes the duty ofreplying affirmatively to this question. The refusal to penetrate the secret of their essence saves the homogeneity of the

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double Kantian doctrine. The categories are organicallybound up with knowing and with constructing the world ofphenomena on the basis of given intuitions; in additionthey have the function of enabling us to think the metasensible in so far as it is postulated by practical reason.The theoretical limitation of reason finds its counterpart inthe practical extension of the saUle reason. This is the realmeaning of the Kantian adage which is so often misunderstood: 'the suspension of knowledge is the condition of theinstallation of moral faith'. Scientific kno"Vvledge and moralfaith form the two poles of the human spirit.

3

THE CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY


Let us go back to the years 1765-6. After publishing hisEssay on the Beautiful (1764) Kant incorporated aestheticsinto the programme of his lectures. When the Dissertatiomade it possible to look forward to the realisation of a plan,conceived mucll earlier, which embraced a whole system ofphilosophy, the great Critical programme established in177 I included the study of the beautiful under the title ofa critique of taste. This plan became more detailed in1772: under the heading of metaphysics Kant intended tofollow the Critical propaedeutic with a metaphysics dealingwith nature, morals, and the principles of feeling, of taste,and of the sensible appetites. Very little is known aboutthe earlier phases of this plan and the paucity of informationis itself a source of the most hazardous hypotheses. This isespecially the case with regard to the last Critique. To makean a priori science out of a material earlier declared to bepurely empirical, to include under one heading things asdifferent as life and the beautiful, to recast the whole theoryofjudgment-there we have a group ofparadoxes more thancapable of arousing curiosity and stimulating speculation.

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The Critique of Judgment, which in 1790 completed theCritical synthesis, deals with the beautiful and witll organicteleology. It is essential to make a provisional separationbetween two objectives. We l1ave just recalled tllat a studyof the beautiful and even a critique of taste had formed partof Kant's intentions ever since the conception of his generalphilosophical plan, but that we know scarcely anythingabout the stages by which this plan was realised. The firstCritique, in explaining the term 'aesthetic' as 'sensibleknowledge', makes a distinction between that and thetheory of beauty, which, declares the text, it would befruitless to treat by rational principles, since its sources andprinciples are empirical. Organic teleology is excluded byKant from the list of categories; teleology does not figureamong the constitutive principles of nature. On the whole,the situation does not appear to be too favourable towardsthe projected critique of taste. However, while he wasrewriting the theoretical Critique and after he had writtenthe moral Critique, Kant corrected the note which I havejust cited and modified his views about the empiricalcharacter of the critique of taste. Not all the sources, butthe principal sources, are now claimed to be empirical.His earlier confidence seemed shaken. Kant saw that l1erewas a field whicll might be explored successfully by Criticalthinking.

The few letters which belong to the period bet"\tveen 1787and I 790 give very little help except one addressed toReinhold in the month of December 1787. They show,however, that tIle correction made in 1787 had not beenmere empty words but ought to be considered as a verytimid announcenlent of a real revolution in his thinkingabout a critique of taste. A Grundlegung for it had evenbeen begun in the course of this very year. The violentpolemic with Eberhard at the beginning of 1789 and theemotions which it aroused in Kant's mind, together withthe duty of self-defence in connection with the E'ntdeckung,interrupted the writing of it and delayed the completion ofthe Critical synthesis until 1790.

The Critique of Judgment presents certain peculiarities :(I) its double objective, the inclusion of both beauty and

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teleology under one principle, (2) the submission of beautyto a principle of subjective teleology, (3) the submission ofbeauty and teleology to the faculty of judgment, and(4) the rearrangement of this Critique in terms of the reflective judgment. In the absence of information it is impossible to give an account of the genesis of these peculiaritieswithout resorting to hypotheses. It does seem certain that,as early as 1787, the necessity of including both beauty andteleology under one single explanatory principle had forceditself on Kant. To be successful, any hypothesis about theorigin of these peculiarities must take account not only ofthe intentions and ideas of Kant, but also of the culturalenvironment of the period. The account which follows,then, I repeat, makes no claim to be anything more thanan hypothesis.

At this time beauty and teleology were commonly thoughtto be intimately connected. Their joint appearance in thethird Critique raised no suspicion or distrust on the part ofthe public. Kant wanted to explain the aesthetic judgmentand to discover the a priori principles which govern this field.Contemporary aesthetics treated this judgment in two ways,as expressing a feeling of pleasure or of displeasure, and assuggesting a teleological relation between man and theorganisation of his psychological faculties. According tothe scheme of the Franco-English psychology which wasuniversally adopted in Germany at this time, there are thethree distinct faculties of knowledge, will, and feeling. Tothese faculties, Kant says to Reinhold, there correspondthree fields of study, namely, philosophy, ethics, and teleology. These three fields are governed by a priori principleswhich must be found through the analysis of the mind.The human mind is divided into the three functions ofunderstanding, judgment, and reason. Understanding constructs knowledge, as shown in the theoretical Critique, reasondeals with morality, as shown in the practical Critique.Judgment will therefore be the function and the source ofa priori laws of teleology and feeling. In the theoreticalfield, judgment played the part of an intermediary adjustingthe different needs of the other two faculties. Teleologyhas the same role to play in the practical order. To all

126


this must be added the fact that from 1784 to 1790 Kant'sactivity was principally concentrated on ethics, on philosophy of history, and on the problems oforganic life. Thesepreoccupations were all converging on the organisation bya priori principles of the domains of the beautiful and theorganic. All the movements in contemporary cultural lifewere uniting to test the strength of tIle Critical philosophy.A possible explanation of the direction of the Kantianmeditations can be developed along these lines although itwill not of course throw light 011 the details. The state ofour information forbids further speculation.

The Critique of Judgment contains a long introductionwhich was substituted for one originally even longer butcondemned for this reason. III it Kant defined exactlythe place which the Critique occupies in the whole schemeof the Critical synthesis and then described the study ofaesthetic teleology and organic teleology. The introduction fixes the transcendental framework within which thevarious forms of teleology are to be found. Its systematicimportance is therefore of the very first order. We knowthat the cognitive power of man is divided between understanding which is provided with a priori principles governing the knowled,ge of objects, reason which is the repositoryof principles in the order of the will, and judgment incon11ectio11 with which the questio11 of a priori principles isactually being raised. The analogy with the other legislative psychological faculties in the order of knowledge andin the order of will is to be taken as suggesting that thesame will hold for judgment. However, it is hardly necessary to point out that the difficulties ill this case will be soconsiderable that the suggestion will force us to undertakea transcendental examination of judgment, but does notguarantee in any way the success of this enterprise. Theanalogies just cited include the most important of thesedifficulties. Indeed, what will be the specific object of athird faculty when understanding governs knowledge ofobjective causes and reason determines their realisation bya free causality? Moreover, what connection is therebetween judgment, generally defined as the power of thinking the individual content under the general, and the faculty

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of feeling? These two difficulties must be examined in thelight of the nature of judgment.

Understanding is the concept which comprehends thegeneral laws which, applied to intuitions, produce theobjective representation of phenomena. Judgment is thefunction which subsumes impressions under the laws ofintellect. This function is determinating since the qual~ty

it confers is that of a deternlinate object. In this wayunderstanding includes general laws. Besides the schematicfigures of general objects which express its identical essenceand fundamental structure, the intuitive world also presentsus with an infinity of diverse objects, of particular forms, ofkinds and individualities. Now this infinite diversity cannotbe explained by the activity of the categories; the theoretical criticism had to limit itself to their determinationin experience. There is thus no doubt that the explanationof nature is not perfect unless the specific diversity isexplained in the same sort of way as the generic identity,and hence it is legitimate to suppose that the. diversity isalso governed by laws which have so far escaped transcendental investigation.

However, judgment does not have the same role to playin the present problem. In the theoretical criticism the lawsof subsumption were known a priori and it was the functionofjudgment to find the intuitive diversity to subsume underthem. Here the specific diversity of nature is known a posteriori and ifjudgment has a role to fulfil, this role will consistin the detection of laws which will explain the diversity. Inthe theoretical ord,er there was pre-knowledge of the generalor of laws, while here there is pre-knowledge of the particular. Kant entitles such a function ' the reflective use ofjudgment '.

However, there must be no mistake about the true objectof this judgment. The particular forms of nature are notexplained by the teleological principle: only mechanicalcausality contains this explanation. The purpose of theprinciple is to guide the mind in the study of these forms.The laws which govern the reflective judgment are not lawsconstitutive of nature but laws of the faculty of judgment.Kant explains this directive law as follows: we must assume

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I THE COMPLETION OF TlIE CRITICAL SYNTlIESIS

Ithat the empirical and particular forms of nature are madeas if an understanding had established them with the purposeof allowing the mind to construct the total system of experience by means of laws of nature. This tendency of the lawstowards the realisation of the systematic aspirations of themind is not an objective law of things but a constructivelaw of the faculty of judgment. The latter has to representthe diversity of nature as forming a systematic unity and itthinks of the things of nature as having an essence similarto the essence of those things which owe their reality to therepresentation of an end.

What validity can one attribute to this postulation of ana priori principle of teleology? The deduction of its validitycannot be empirical because teleology is an apriori principle,and it cannot be psychological because while that would certainly show how we judge according to teleology, it wouldnot show how we ought to judge nature. Since we mustseek for the principle capable of governing the logical necessity of judgment, the deduction must be rigorously transcendental, that is, we are required to disengage the principleof nature itself from the faculties of knowledge. Such adeduction is not very complicated. Nature manifests certainnecessary forms which govern the permanent structure ofthe object as object of experience in general: these are thecategories. The same nature shows a specific diversity inthe particular forms of these same objects. Either this formaldiversity answers to laws or it does not. If a law does notgovern these forms, we make chance their origin and reasonis thereby forbidden to realise their systematic unity and itsown spiritual aspirations. Hence reason requires that theparticular forms, like the permanent forms of nature,correspond to a law.

It may be seen, by this very deduction, that the postulateof teleology is not required in order to understand the sensible object, but is indeed required in order to construct thescience offormal diversity. The legitimacy ofsuch a diversityis not a condition of nature, but of physical science. Hence,the sale principle which can be invoked is this: in the studyof nature, jlldgment must be guided by the general law thatthe forms of nature are so made that they can form a

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systematic totality. The teleology recognised in nature is nota teleology internal to nature itself, but a teleology of theaspirations of the faculty of judgment which sets itself thetask of building the science of nature. The principle ofteleology is therefore a pure subjective principle, that is, itinvolves only th.e exercise of the faculty of judgment. Inthis way judgmeIlt appropriates for itself its own object.While understanding studies the uniforn1. categorial structure which conditions the type of the object of experience,judgment studies the diverse structure which conditions thekinds contained under the type or the diversity of empiricalforms through the agency of the principle of teleology.

The first difficulty connected with judgment is thenresolved in that Kant has determined for it a specific object.The second difficulty concerns the connection of the samefaculty with feeling. It is again the concept of teleologywhich establishes the connection between knowledge andfeeling. The categories are necessary: their mechanismcomes into play auton1atically without understanding havingto set itself an end to realise by their activity. The particularforms of nature are intelligible only on the supposition thatthey exist because of their teleological adaptation to thefaculty of judgmellt. Thus in achieving any end a certainsense of pleasure is always experienced. The agreement ofthe percepts with the categories produces no pleasure andevokes no feeling because no end is achieved by this agreement. Establishing the agreement of empirical laws witllthe purpose which reason sets itself does provoke a feeling:success is translated into an agreeable sentiment, failure intochagrin. It is therefore again the supposition of teleology innature adapted to the rational constitution of the humanmind which permits judgment and sentiment, united in bothgood and bad fortune, to enter into the subjective organisation of this mind.

Having established the legitimacy of an appeal to teleology, Kant had to set himself another problem: does thefaculty ofjudgment pursue an absolutely identical end in allcases? No, replies Kant: there are two forms essentiallydissimilar, namely, aesthetic teleology and logical teleology.The distinguishing feature of aesthetic teleology lies in

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representation, but without any reference to anythingconnected with the object. Therefore the subjective side isalone important. Thus the subjective part, which can neverbecome the knowledge of an object, is the feeling of pleasureor of displeasure which accompanies th.at knowledge,although the pleasure does not Inake us know more fullythe object which evokes it. When perception of the formof an object is accompanied by pleasure, and when thepleasure is stimulated only by the perception of the form,we must interpret this as an example of subjective teleology,that is, the pleasure is the echo of an agreement betweenthe form of the object and the faculties engaged in itsperception.

These faculties, according to the teaching of the theoretical Critique, are imagination and understanding. If thesetwo faculties find themselves in a harmonious state in considering an object, we can say that this object is proportionedto this faculty or that it manifests an external teleologytowards it. Thus the reflective judgment announces thisproportionality or this external teleology resting on the feeling of harmony among the faculties engaged in the pureand simple consideration of the form of the object. Thusthe form of the object, of which the pure representationstimulates pleasure, is called ' beautiful'. I-Ience aestheticteleology is represented by beauty. Two tasks are set bythis new notion: its exposition or the analysis of the aestheticjudgment; its deduction or the justification of the necessaryand universal cl1aracter which we attach to this judgment.

The table of categories includes all the moments in theanalysis of any transcendental factor whatsoever. Ka11ttherefore conducts the analysis of beauty by the categorialtetrachotomy. The quality of the aesthetic judgment mustdistinguish it from the logical judgn1ent and the moraljudgment. It differs from the first because it expresses notan essence but a subjective pleasure, and it differs from thesecond because the pleasure reveals no trace of an interestinherent in the practical order. Considered according toquantity, the aesthetic judgment is universal in the sensethat, contrary to all the other feelings which do not claimto be more than purely subjective inclinations of an

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individual subject, the aesthetic feeling claims acceptance byall subjects without distinction. Its universality thereforeconsists in the general communicability of the subjective statewhich the consideration of tIle form stimulates. Knowledgeand everything connected with the exercise of the cognitivefunctions are universally communicable. But knowledge isexcluded because it is a matter of a pleasure. The enigmaof its communicability is found therefore on the side of thefaculties. The determination of imagination by the categorial understanding produces the concept of the thing orits representation. That presupposes between the twofaculties a preconceptual state where the two faculties findthemselves in reciprocal affinity, and this affinity is thesource of the pleasure represented by the sentiment ofbeauty. This harmonious preconceptual state can be sh.aredby all subjects: the universality of the causes implies thatof the effect. It is sufficient therefore to appeal to the ideathat the organisation of the cognitive faculties is constant inthe human race in order to comprehend the universality ofthe aesthetic judgment. Teleology determines our judgment on the side of reason. This teleology seems to presuppose the priority of a concept and the aesthetic judgmentdoes not admit of any such priority. 1'he teleology inquestion must therefore be a state which represents noobjective or subjective end determined in the considerationof the object. The modality of the judgment consists in thenecessity of general acquiescence in the aesthetic judgment.

There we have the characteristics of the aesthetic judgment. How is its claim to necessary universality to be justified? Basically Kant has already prejudged the question inhis very analysis when he posed the question of the generalcomnlunicability of the conditions of the aesthetic judgment.This judgment is a particular case of the synthetic a priorijudgment: synthetic because the predicate of pleasure goesbeyond the analytic constituents of the concept of the sub-ject: a priori because it claims to be universal. On whatare we to base the universality of a pleasure connected withthe aesthetic judgment of beauty? In aesthetic pleasure weexperience only the teleology of an object adapted to thefaculty of judgment in order to create a state of harmony

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between imagination and understanding. This faculty ofjudgment corresponds to certain subjective conditions. Wehave the right to presuppose in all men the same subjectivedisposition to judge. It is clear in this case that the judgment demands universal communicability of the generalconditioning of the faculty. In this way the aestheticsentiment is integrated in the transcendental organisationof the human mind.

I-I~wever, teleology does not always appear in theaesthetic form. Vve are not content with finding a teleological affinity between the form of nature and our facultiesof knowledge. In order to become aware of the existenceof these forms we often make it appear that they exist asthe product of the ends of nature. That is, we impose onour faculties the rule of considering these forms as if theyowed their existence and determinate essence to a principleof teleology. Once again then in this case we follow not aprinciple of nature but a principle governing our facultiesin the representation of nature. How can such ends exercise a particular causality? Certainly not in the manner ofefficient causality which would exercise its activity throughthe representation of an end to be achieved, since vve shouldthen interrupt the mechanical chain by introducing a completely heterogeneous causality. Therefore the explanationof the particular essences of things by the idea of teleologyis to be utterly condemned. But that is not what weclaim. We claim to submit nature to certain norms ofobservation and scientific inquiry, 110rms which are simplyrules of our faculty of judging nature in its particulardiversity.

The appeal to teleology is of a kind to provoke aninternal conflict in the consideration of nature. Theobject of experience has as determining principle themechanical chain of causes and effects. On the otherhand, the intelligibility of this chain in its diverse particularisation depends on the recognition that the causeitself has not been able to exercise its causal power without the prior representation of the effect as the end to beachieved. It does not seem possible to attribute a similarrepresentation to the things of nature since they are not

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intelligent beings capable of representations. How therefore can the phenomenon in question be at the same timecause, as the representation of the effect to be produced,and effect, as the causality which produces the effect?Kant limits the possibility and the thing to the one caseof the organic body. Such a body is distinguished frominorganic bodies because it reproduces itself as a kind,because it reproduces itself as an individual by growth,and because it reproduces itself in its parts, since there isindeed in the organism a causality of the part on the wholeand a causality of the whole on the part. The whole andthe part are reciprocally cause and effect.

This organic causality differs essentially from mechanicalcausality. A phenomenon is determinable as cause throughits necessary antecedent, that is, through the non-reversibilityof antecedent and consequent. The only ground of connection between phenomena by the category of cause is theirreversibility of their succession. Now organic causality isquasi-circular. Such a causality is not mysterious in theintelligent being because it is not strictly the effect, but therepresentation of the effect by the understanding, whichmakes this same being produce the effect and call it intoexistence. But precisely because intelligence is excludedfrom nature, it is difficult to conceive in it any analogue tointelligent causality. Despite that, organic causality seemsin certain of its details even more perfect than intelligentcausality. In the intelligent being, the object caused isexternal to the determination of the causality. In organicnature the whole exists, conserves itself, and perpetuatesitself by the causality of parts on the whole and of thewhole on the parts.

Experience does not show that in organic nature reciprocalcausality is determined by the representation of a purpose, andthe transcendental analysis of knowledge of nature also givesno such assurance. On what grounds then do we interpretorganic causality as analogous to the efficient causality of theintelligent being? It is clear that the judgment which assertsit cannot be a determining judgment: otherwise, teleologywould be a constitutive principle of nature and would rest ona category of teleology irreconcilable with that of mechanical

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causality. The judgment will then be purely reflective, thatis, teleology will be recognised 110t as a rule of nature but asa rule ofour judgment, so as to render nature intelligible andassimilable to our cognitive faculties. Every judgmentamounts then to laying down the principle that we mustconceive first organic nature and then nature in general, asif it had followed, by means of its particular objects, therealisation of a purpose both in the whole and in detail.This principle avoids both mechanism, which attributes allthe peculiarity of things to efficient causality, and alsodogmatism, which attributes the same peculiarities to divineefficient causality. It is quite false to attribute these principles to nature itself. They are a part of the logical structure of reason . Nature can be explained without then1 butnot in a manner satisfactory to reason. Reason indeedwishes to do more than to explain experience. It wantsalso to make it a unitary system. Subjective and objectiveteleology are thus not principles constitutive of experience,but principles which regulate systematising reaS011.

The general solution of the Critical problem entailednothing less than a total and complete philosophy as anatural and indispensable preface to the total system ofmetaphysics. This profound analysis of reason, which, inits daring extensions as well as in its careful restrictions,covers all the knowledge which man can attai11 withoutthe help of experience, is terminated by Kant, twenty yearsafter he had first conceived it, by the Critique of Judgment.The domain of the a priori has been explored in all therecesses accessible to the human mind, and it has beencircumscribed and limited, if not easily, at least withoutencountering insoluble difficulties. All the problems whichkept appearing in this vast domain have been solved insuch a way that, while consistent with each other, they alltend to support the transcendental edifice. This meansthat Kant has solved the main problem of his life: he hasdiscovered the method of metaphysics. In doing so he hastaken into consideration the particular conditions assignedto meta-sensible inquiry by the objective knowledge ofnature, by the objective belief in morality, and by theanalogical interpretation of the world in a teleological

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order, thus satisfying all the legitimate aspirations of humanreason.

The success of this enterprise does not mean that it wassimple. One of the major obstacles to its success was theheterogeneity of the demands to which reason itself isexposed. Understanding governs nature by the categories;reason governs morality by freedoffie Understanding connects phenomena in the rigorous mechanical order ofefficient causality; reason introduces into this order theexplosive concept of freedom. Understanding constructs inits formal laws the outline of the sensible world; reasoncreates in the moral imperative the intelligible world. Thelimitation of knowledge is such that each of th.ese worlds isforbidden to trespass one upon the other. Transcendentalismcreates a profound abyss between the scientific aspirations ofthe mind and the moral aspirations ofthe soul. The existenceof this abyss is difficult to accept. Is not this harsh breakbetween nature and reason a decisive weakness?

Kant certainly was well aware of the danger. TheCritique of Judgment is given the vital role of riveting andsoldering to one another the two separated braIlches ofhuman speculation. Science cannot admit free causalitybut it must recognise its possibility, that is, tIle conceivability of the idea, in such a way that it is no longer absurdto hold that a free causality produces effects even in theorder of phenomena. On the other hand, the exercise ofthis free causality is stimulated by the representation of afinal purpose, the achievement of wh.ich. rests on the assurance that our very nature contains the conditions of itsrealisation. A meta-sensible substratum for the order ofphenomena is possible according to the teaching of theCritical philosophy. This substratum is positively determined by the practical law. It might be claimed that thisis contradictory because this determination oversteps theobjective limits of the use of reason. The Critique ofJudgmentmeets this objection by showing in what way a n1etasensible substratum is determinable by an intellectual faculty.It does this by resolving a theoretical problem by means ofthe principle of teleology. Pure reason determines the theoretical given by teleology on condition that it is not illegi-

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timately transposed into something constitutive of the world.Since reason does not invoke this meta-sensible substratumin order to achieve knowledge, but does so with a practicalpurpose as regulative of free activity, there is no reason notto conclude that the a priori domain forms an admirableself-consistent unity and exhibits perfect coherence in itsdiverse functions, and this is true despite the apparentinconsistencies whicll are revealed by the critical reviewof their respective provinces. The Critique of ]udg17'lent isthe mediator which resolves the conflicts and wins overopponents to the systematic unity of reason. Kant hadgood reason to clain1 that his propaedeutic work had beencompleted, since the Critique of Judgment truly brings tocompletion the whole Critical philosophy.

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Chapter IV

The Defence of the Critical Synthesis

THE AWAKENING OF THE WOLFFIANS


The transcendental philosophy to which Kant had justdevoted twenty years of work ftlnctions at two levels. Tobegin with, it examines the conduct of pure reason in allthe orders of a priori knowledge. Secondly, it claims toconstruct on that basis the systen1 of pure reason underthe heading of a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysicsof n10rals. The Critical writings with their threefold structure play the part of a propaedeutic to a correspondingsysten1. They endeavour to give a preliminary detailedelucidation of the method of acquiring metaphysical knowledge. It is not surprising, therefore, that the more perspicacious of his disciples should have interpreted thewell-attested declarations of their master along these linesand should have endeavoured to erect the system which,on his own admission, he had always postponed. Fromabout 1787 onwards the normal play of critical discussionaround his doctrine blurred the clarity of this distinctionbetween propaedeutic and system, and in the sequel it wasto disappear completely. From then on the Critical philosophy slowly fused with the metaphysics and the two cameto share a kind of joint destiny. Because of this very confusion, the defence ofhis system became for Kant the defenceof philosophy itself.

Historical circumstances played a great part in bringingabout this confusion. Because it had shaken German philosophy out of its slumbers, the Critical philosophy rapidlybecame its nerve centre. It was a centre of attraction for

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THE DEFENCE OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

some, but also a target for a host of different kinds of opponents. The fortunes of the Critical philosophy eclipsed theliterary and scientific discussions, and the psychological,moral, and aesthetic disagreements became much less sllarp.In short, the number both of his disciples and of his rivalsmade Kant the master of the day. This does not mean thatat one fell swoop the whole of Germany embraced histeaching. On the contrary the critics, deriving their inspiration from many varied sources, were far from idle. Somehad their eyes turned towards the past and were engagedin defending their heritage against the threat representedby the Critical philosophy; others fixed their gaze on thefuture and misinterpreted the Critical philosophy. Thelatter derived from it consequences which th.e master hadnever had in mind and which did not have the good fortuneto please him overmuch. With his astonishing clearness ofvision he foresaw the dangers attendant 011 the bunglingstrategy of his disciples. He had therefore to defend himselfsimultaneously on two fronts: he had to defend th.e originality of his doctrine against his opponents and its integrityagainst his own disciples.

The resistance against the Kantian threat was organisedon two fronts. The leaders were animated by either theprogressive English spirit or the conservatisn1. of the Wolffianschool. The Anglo-Saxon attitude first appeared in the formof a benign eclecticism which concealed a mild empiricismderived from a popularised Locke. Like all forms of eclecticism it took refuge in a delicate synthesis of curious ideologies. It denounced the would-be scepticism of a metapl1.ysical method resting on the principle of the limitation ofknowledge to phenomena, and it attacked a priorism whichit claimed to be the result of sophistical reasoning in whichfrom the necessity of a subjective basis there was inferredthe exclusive sufficiency of this basis. These eclectics werevery numerous. Towards 1790 German scepticism tookshape under Platner, Schultze, and Maimon, a scepticismwhich placed itself under the tutelage of Hume. But Kant,despite his limiting thesis, had parted company with Humewhen he replaced psychological habit, to which Hume hadappealed, by the transcendental mechanism. By this means

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he believed himself to have conquered Hume 011 his ownground. The sceptics followed Kant in part as if he hadmade common cause with Hume, but they tried to SllOWhow great was his illusion when he published urbi et orbi hisbulletin of victory. The IIpwTov 'P'EVOOS of the Criticalphilosophy was detected and identified with the view thatobjectivity is to be found exclusively in the fact tllat thea priori concepts function as conditions of experience, butof an experience whicll can never be identified with ordinaryperception and which is itself a purely rationalist construction. The problem posed by Hume, far from having beensolved, remained untouched. Furthermore, and here it maybe seen how friends and enemies were to merge in the mindof Kant, the sceptics especially attacked the Vorstellungstheorieinvented by Reinhold and presented by him as an authoritative commentary on the Critical system. Schultze in hisEnesidemus saw in this theory a prelude to a new dogmatismand disposed of it with a masterly hand. Unfortunately, inattacking Reinhold he could not avoid touching Kant. Thiseclectic and sceptical criticism had an undoubted doctrinalsuccess which at the same time set Kant against his imprudent pupils. It was of very short duration, however, andhad no appreciable effect after 1794.

In any case it was eclipsed by the revival of Leibniz.The sceptics could hardly be described as passionatelyenthusiastic, but it was very different with the Wolffianswho had territory to defend and a tradition to preserve.Apparently dull and lifeless during the build-up of theCritical system, the Wolffian riposte came with great suddenness in 1789. The leader was Eberhard, who nevertired of pointing out that all the happier insights of theCritical philosophy could be found in the philosophy ofLeibniz and that what could not be found in Leibniz wasthe work of a sophist. Ulrich and Brastberger, two influential philosophers of the same persuasion, added weight tothis attack, but Eberhard was the warrior who acceptedand even provoked the combat. Himself the author of acomplete systenl of dogmatic philosophy, and a well-knownprofessor at the leading University of Germany, Halle a/s.,he founded in 1789 a quarterly review, the Philosophisches

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Magazin, witll the intention of crossing swords with theCritical philosophy and measuring himself against its author.The revievv had a short life, but that is of no importance asonly the first volume is of interest to us.

It must be admitted that Eberhard developed a veryclever strategy in his review. He wanted to defend the oldorder against the new, Leibniz against Kant, and he did itas an intelligent but prejudiced disciple. He protestedagainst the Kantian claim that his personal philosophy wasthe sole possible critical philosophy, a claim wl1ich involvedthe denial of all critical value to the philosophy of Leibnizand Wolff. Not content with that, he tried to make outthat the Critical philosophy, in so far as it was true, was anatrophied offshoot of dogmatism. Leibniz, he argued, hadall the a priorism of Kant, but Kant llad added to it thethesis of limitation. A priorism was true, but the thesis oflimitation was false. Tllis amounted to a refutation of theCritical philosophy by n1eans of the Nouveaux Essais. Wit}lthis in mind Eberhard subjected the whole of the Critique ofPure Reason to severe criticism. In the first volume he leftto his colleague IvIaas the task of discussing the positions ofthe Aesthetic and the Antinomies, that is, all the problemsrelating to space and tinle, and he undertook to deal withthe theory of objectivity and indirectly with the possibilityof nletaphysics.

The Copernican revolution, a striking and widelyaccepted image which had been used by Kant to announcethe Critical philosophy, consisted in holding that the objectmodels itself on the mind. The great defect of all previousmetaphysics resided in the fallacy of taking as objectivesomething which is in fact subjective. Eberhard claimedthat it was not true that the objective depends wholly onthe subjective. Objectivity was not a question of being,but of validity, and in relation to validity it was essentialto distinguish between form and matter. The correctnessof the form of our knowledge depended wholly on conformity with the principles of contradiction and sufficientreason, formal principles which govern the whole field ofknowledge. Eberhard established the objective validity ofthese two principles. As to matter, Kant had reduced the

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objective content of knowledge so as to include only thesensible spatio-temporal given because he denied to manthe capacity of intellectual intuition. This meant thatunderstanding was inseparable from sensible intuition ofthe given and from the pure discursiveness of concepts.But, according to Eberhard, this limitation of the intuitivecapacity was purely arbitrary. Consequently understandingand reason do have their own material: the universal

. essences of sensible things and the supersensible in general.As long as the uniqueness of sensible intuition rested on agratuitous supposition, it could not be said that Leibniz hadbeen refuted by the Critique.

This general defensive attitude was supported and constantly renewed by piecemeal examination of major Criticaltheses. It was in the course of doing this that Eberharddenied that Leibniz had distinguished sensibility from understanding only by the single logical criterion of clearness. Hedid not define the phenomenon as that which is representedconfusedly, but as that which is represented confusedly bythe senses,. and this definition meets all the legitimatedemands of a transcendental definition such as Kant conceived. He also denied the originality of the distinctionbetween analytic and synthetic judgments under the pretextthat in the Kantian sense the Wolffians knew it already buthad not however reduced the analytic judgment to a meretautology. Finally, he denounced the weakness of theCritical philosophy in dealing with the problem of theorigin of kn~wledge, since on Kant's view it con1pletelyescapes our powers of investigation. Empirical knowledgerests on the percept; the object of this percept is in itsturn a representation: if it were not, the object of thepercept would be the thing in itself. Therefore empiricalknowledge has no foundation outside ourselves. Neitherdoes it have any foundation within us because there too itwould be necessary to reach the Ding an sich which Kantclaimed to be unknowable. Kant did not succeed inmaking more than the simple point that the foundationof knowledge is X, an indeterminable unknown. Thesame holds good for a priori knowledge or the categories.They do not come from the senses nor consequently fron1 any

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external thing. They are not innate. Hence they come toUS, like our empirical knowledge, in some occult fashion.All these arguments have the sole object of reducing theclaims of the Critical philosophy and of showing the criticalsuperiority of the Leibnizian metaphysics and epistemology.

That was the general line of Eberhard's strategy. Howwould Kant parry this thrust? This was hardly the momentfor a vigorous counter-offensive because Kant had the Critiqueof Judgment in hand and it absorbed all his energies. However, some sort of reply seemed essential, so, along with apretty set of insults directed against Eberhard, Kant sentsome observations to Reinhold with his authority to makeuse of them at his discretion. Once he had finished withthe last Critique, Kant began to write an article directedagainst the Magazin for Schutz's review. Between September1789 and Easter 1790 this article took on the proportions ofa book which was actually published towards the end ofApril of that year under the title Uber eine Entdeckung nach deralle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine altere entbehrlichgemacht werden soll. In view of the fact that this work isan act of revolt and a work of self-defence, we might wellexpect not to have to deal with sensational new ideas. Atthe most, we might hope to find some useful attempts atclarification stimulated by the lack of comprehension shownby his opponents.

The strategy of the Wolffian Eberhard, which was conducted vvith undeniable skill, was a serious threat to theoriginality of the Critical philosophy and Kant realised thisat once. Eberhard wanted to show that the Critical philosophy was unnecessary. He based his arguments on theclaim that it depended on and was inferior to the work ofLeibniz. Setting himself up as the defender of Leibniz soas to hit harder, Kant turl1ed the tables on Eberhard. Hefollowed l1is opponent step by step and conducted hiscounter-offensive in three successive stages: first, heattacked the meta-sensible use of reason, which Eberhardwanted to save by means of his appeal to the principleof sufficient reason and to the simple element; secondly,he refuted the objections raised against the synthetic judgment; and finally, he interpreted the doctrine of Leibniz

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in such a way as to show that it foreshadows and evendemands completion by the Critical philosophy.

It is unnecessary to run over the whole content of apurely polemical work which, compared with the earlierexpositions of the Critical philosophy, hardly shows any realadvance in doctrine. A few soundings at random will besufficient to give an idea of its contents. To begin withthe synthetic judgment, Kant rebels against the lack ofphilosophical acumen shown by his opponent in trying todiminish the importance of the difference between the twotypes of judgment, which, in Kant's eyes, was really aHauptpunkt of his teaching. The real problem concealed inthis distinction is the problem of the possibility of theextension of scientific knowledge, since the increase ofknowledge is the raison d'etre of hun1a11 science in general.On what then is this extension based? In the field ofphysics we attain to genuinely new knowledge (not merelyfactors implicit in what is already known) by means ofa posteriori intuition. The problem becomes acute whenwe seek a similar extension of knowledge without the constant support of direct perception. The Critical philosophysolved the problem by showing how we reach knowledge inthe mathematical order on the basis of an a priori intuitionwhich is spatio-temporal in character. It is clear thattranscendent metaphysics, which claims to furnish us withthe true science of being, is mistaken, since it refuses to pureideas the guarantee of limitation to corresponding intuitions.Eberhard therefore only shows how little philosophical sensehe has when he reduces the problem of the synthetic judgment to a simple question of formal logic.

Eberhard also refused to see that the scope of Kant'sCritical reflection transcends the logical dimension. Hismistaken attempt to reduce the Critique to logic exposedthe pointlessness of his argument. He constituted himselfthe apostle of a dogmatism which preached the extensionof objective knowledge by pure reason without the restrictive constraint of intuition. In doing so he relied on theprinciple of sufficient reason to which he attributed absurdlyextended powers. The Critical philosophy was certainly notrendered useless by a Wolffianism which revolved around

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THE DEFENCE OF THE CRI'l'IdAt. SYNTHESIS

an analytic metaphysics incapable of extending knowledge.This type of dogmatism is essentially analytic and thereforesterile when judged with reference to the true purpose ofscience. Eberhard was mistaken with regard to the thesisoflimitation, in which he detected a concealed and arbitraryagnosticism. On the contrary, the thesis of limitation provesthat metaphysics as a science is possible but that metaphysicsis not necessarily dogmatic. It can be established by synthetic judgments, vvhich do extend knowledge, on conditionthat they are employed and deduced as necessary conditionsof the possibility of experience. The attentive reader willreadily note that Kant's defence is a powerful reaffirmationof the originality of the Critical synthesis and goes beyondthe doctrines developed in the Critique and in the Prolegomena. Eberhard's attack rested on sheer equivocation. Heattempted to identify the Critical philosophy with Wolffianism on the pretext that they resembled one another insome of their modes of expression. The sharper focus givento his position by Kant in his reply certainly makes anyattempt to identify the two positions much less easy.

An examination of the long diatribe and the tangleddialectic indulged in by Kant when he discusses the validityof the transcendent metaphysics which Eberhard took underhis protection, leads to the same result. Eberhard felt thathe had to safeguard the secular heritage of a doctrine whichhad allowed Germany to take its place in European thought.Th.e preservation of this heritage consisted for Eberhard indefending the objective validity of our meta-sensible knowledge against the extravagant Kantian doctrine whichimprisoned objective science within the limits of experience.Eberhard tried to pit Leibniz against Kant in a debatearound this question. The argument was conducted onthree levels: first, the principle of sufficient reason as thekey to our knowledge of things; secondly, simple being,which~ was the generally accepted object of any knowledgefreed from the conditions of the sensible; and thirdly, thepassage from the sensible to the meta-sensible which can beachieved by reason.

Eberhard reasoned in the following manner. As knowledge has a form and a matter, it is necessary to show the

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validity of the two elements. The objective validity of theform lies in its conformity with the formal principles ofknowledge, which are the principles of contradiction andof sufficient reason. Eberhard proves the validity of thelatter principle by deducing it directly from the former ina syllogism which may still be seen in a number of manuals.Furthermore, the principle of contradiction is absolutelyobjective, for its negation entails the destruction of thoughtitself, no matter whether it be about ideas or things. As tomatter, Kant is mistaken in saying that the only matterwhich can be justified is sensible matter. Beyond it thereis another matter, made up of non-sensible elements withoutwhich spatio-temporal images are not possible. Concretetime is a complex of simple elements which are imperceptible when isolated. Therefore the absolutely simple isfound outside sensible intuition. Space in its turn is anaggregate of simple substances although only their accidentscan be perceived. Therefore understanding is capable ofrising above the sphere of the sensible.

Kant owed it to himself to reply seriously to this aggressive return to an outmoded Wolffianism. The appeal to theprinciple of sufficient reason, says Kant, only provesEberhard's inability to understand the notion of thetranscendental. A formal principle simply concerns the conditions of the form of the judgment without any consideration of the object; a transcendental principle concerns thea priori possibility of the object. The principle of sufficientreason includes, first, a formal principle, analogous to thatof contradiction, which may be stated as follows: 'everyproposition has a ratio cognoscendi '; and secondly, a transcendental principle, ' every thing has its raison d'etre " whichcannot this time be derived from the principle of contradiction. Thus the neutral formula employed by Eberhard isthe source of a regrettable confusion between the twoprinciples, and this vitiates the proof which he outlines.

But Eberhard wanted more. He did not claim only tohave shown the de jure objectivity of meta-sensible knowledge, but he also wanted to show by a concrete exan1plethat this objectivity is de facto real. To do this he appealedto simple being which is purely intelligible and even

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underlies sensible being. To this Kant replied that tl~e metasensible was a singularly equivocal term in Eberhard's n~ind.

Sometimes it designates what can no longer be consciouslyperceived in the sensible presentation, and sometimes itdenotes a being of which no sensible image is possible.Because of tllis equivocation Eberhard can den10nstratethat space and time are composed of simple elements, and,since he is the victim of an incredible illusion, still go onto show that these simple elements are intelligible. But itis false that space and time are composed of simple beings.What is given in them is divisible into as many parts asspace and time themselves. They are infinitely divisible,in which case no simple element can be given to us. Therefore the matter contained in them is likewise divisible toinfinity. The error to be found at the basis of Eberhard'sreasoning consists in conceiving space and time as if theywere abstract concepts, in thinking of space and time ascommon notes belonging to a multiplicity of concrete timesand spaces. Actually it must be said not that they areabstract, but that they are employed in abstracto, that is,without any reference to an empirical condition. Eberhardallowed himself to be misled by a false interpretation ofLeibniz. Leibniz did speak of matter, but in his matterthe simple element was the meta-sensible foundation andcertainly not one of its constitutive fragments. This thesisis perfectly consistent with the Critical teaching.

Furthermore, it is contradictory to divide an intuitioninto non-sensible elements. It is clear that if no constitutiveelement can be perceived by the senses, then the total or th.ecomposite intuition cannot be either. The fact that an in1agedoes not correspond to an element is not enough to raise theelement to the rank of the meta-sensible: for that, theremust be a radical separation from intuition. In consequence,the two bases which Eberhard adopted as starting-points areshown to be deficient. The thesis about sufficient reasonis vitiated by an ignoratio elenchi: that about sin1ple being ismanifestly false.

What conclusion must be drawn from this about themethod of metaphysics, which Eberhard, opposing his conception to that of the Criticaltnethod, regards as involving

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a passage to the meta-sensible? The Critical method limitsthe objective use of pure reason to the domain of the sensible; Eberhard's n1ethod leads to an indefinite and indefinable extension of pure reason. Eberhard took his stand onthe two above-n1entioned tl1eses in trying to show that themeta-sensible can be discerned even in the sensible. Heheld that space and time, and consequently the sensiblephenomenon, have undoubtedly a subjective basis i11 theknowi11g subject, but also an objective foundation in theobject. Kant recognised this. He makes a concession whichcould be dangerously misleading, but which is too explicitto be treated as a simple linguistic slip. Fortunately, however, the explanation which he gives makes the concessionrelatively innocuous. What he does hold is that the objective foundation of phenomena, that is, the thing in itself,does not enter into the phenomenon, but constitutes itsfoundation outside space and time. It must be adn1itted,however, that this text could be interpreted as if Kantrecognised a degree of knowability in the world in itself,and in what followed Eberhard did not fail to interpret itin this manner.

What is quite certain in any case is that this correctionbrings the Kantian Aesthetic much closer to that of Leibniz.They are not however identical, for Kant maintains in all itsrigour the objection that the whole Leibnizian positiondepends finally on the false distinction between sensibilityand understanding. For Leibniz, the sensible "is the obscure,and the intelligible is the clear representation of the object.This means that the real problem, which is to discoverwhether there is a knowledge to which no intuition cancorrespond, is made to vanish. Kant replies to this questionin the negative, Eberhard in the affirn1ative. Kant deniesthe possibility of such knowledge because the differencebetween our faculties is more than a mere difference ofdegree in the logical clarity of our presentations. OUf

faculties are distinguished botll by origin and by content.There is therefore no fundamel1tal identity between them.It follows that one type of"knowledge cannot be transmutedinto another merely by denying generic differences.

Theoretically there was a way of saving the transcendent148


metaphysics of the Wolffians with all its claims, namely byan appeal to an intellectual intuition producing a purelyintelligible matter. The Critical philosophy had admittedthe tlleoretical possibility of such an intuition, but maintained its unreality in the human order. We have onlysensible intuition. On the other hand, innate ideas, thesupreme hope at this point, must be rejected. I hope thatit is not necessary to examine again the justly celebratedtext where Kant categorically rejects this worst of all soluti.ons to the transcendental problem. All our representationsare acquired: only the receptivity and the spontaneity ofour faculties of knowledge can be considered coexistentialwith human thought. This receptivity consists in the humancapacity to have spatial representations; it never denotes arepresentation of space. It follows that the method ofsavingtranscendent metaphysics attempted by Eberhard is fundamentally erroneous: it falsifies the nature of sensibility.This is the point where the paths of Leibniz and of Kantradically bifurcate. This is the one point where the mostingenious interpretation of the texts is bound to fail. TheCritical philosophy cannot be contained within the strictlin1its of Leibnizian thought.

Kant attempted the very opposite: in the last part ofhis work, which is more picturesque than convincing, hetried to bring Leibniz into the framework of the Criticalphilosophy. Eberhard had spoken in the name of Leibnizand had not concealed his belief that he was greater thanKant. Kant thought that it was good politics to concedeto Leibniz as much as was compatible with his own thought(without of course conceding anything to the Eberhardianinterpretation), with th.e intention of showing to the wholeworld to what extent Eberhard's mind was closed to thedeeper meaning of Leibnizian thought. His task consistedin showing how themes found in Leibniz can be consideredas timid anticipations of his own Critical themes. Kantappealed successively to sufficient reason, to the monadology,and to the pre-established harmony.

Leibniz, he says, cannot have seriously meant to erectthe principle of sufficient reason into an objective law ofnature. By the principle of contradiction we know only

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what is already part of the content of a logical subject.If we claim to know something which goes beyond it, theremust be a reason which will validate this additional information. The principle of sufficient reason sanely interpreted issimply the affirmation that in synthetic knowledge a specialground beyond the logical content of a subject is necessary.The principle therefore only opens perspectives on metaphysical inquiries which extend beyond the domain of logic.Leibniz did not carry out these inquiries. By the principleof sufficient reason 11e postulated precisely the inquiries towhich Kant devoted himself.

The monadology, on the other hand, only obscures theCritical philosophy by misunderstanding it. Leibniz wastoo good a mathematician not to be aware that the viewthat a body is composed of simple beings is i11compatiblewith the clear teaching of mathematics. Therefore themonadological conception does not apply to the body as asensible object, but relates uniquely to the unknowablesubstratum of this body, that is, to the intelligible world.The same is true of the pre-established harmony: bodyand soul are distinct as unknowable substrata of phenomena, but as phenomena they are not distinct. Since thephenomenon is a representation and unites the facultieswhich make it what it is, it is necessary to look for thetrue meaning of the Leibnizian harmony in the nlode ofunion of our faculties. Their harmony is easily discoverablea priori through their collaboration in possible experience.The schematism therefore constitutes the foundation of theharmony of our faculties in view of the formal constitutionof experience. From this formal harmony there immediatelyresults harmony in its material constitution in virtue of theCritical principle that the conditions of experience are alsothe conditions of the object of experience. Therefore theharmony seen by Leibniz in the objects of experience is thenatural consequence of the harmony of our faculties inthe constitution of experience. It is therefore probable thatLeibniz envisaged only this regulative role accorded to theidea of harmony. It expresses the obligation of the mind tounderstand ourselves and things as if they were adapted to ateleology due to a supreme causality.

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I should be the first to affirm that in the interests of hiscause Kant does manifest violence to the thought of his predecessor and that Leibniz would have seen only a travesty ofhis teaching in this appendix. This does not matter greatly,for the Kantian tactics are clear. He wished to have thegreat name of Leibniz on his own side in order to counterthe tactics of his opponent. Indeed, while reading Kant'sinterpretation we feel that Leibniz was aware of the urgencyof the problem raised and solved by Kant. The originalityand validity of the Critical philosophy is skilfully exhibited toits conten1.poraries by the demonstration that the Leibnizianmetaphysics itself is a kind of distant anticipation of theCritical philosophy. The Critical philosophy thus loses agreat part of its revolutionary appearance. Kant had goodreasons for believing that the appeal wl1ich Eberhardaddressed to Leibniz would eventually turl1. into a solemnhomage to the Critical philosophy. For by examining thebasis of Leibnizian thought the Critical philosophy constitutes a finer defence of that great philosopl1.er than doesthe outmoded Wolffianism in terms of which Eberhardwished to understand him. If we put accuracy of interpretation aside, the Entdeckung shows us that Kant was ableto conduct a public debate, that he knew how to use vigorousad hominem arguments, and tl1at 11e could extricate himselffrom a difficult situation with a skill which commands ouradmiration.

2

VARIATION ON THE SAME THEME


The class of physics in the Academy of Berlin had set acompetition in 1788 on the question of the progress realisedin metaphysics since the death of Leibniz. By son1e n1ischance this question had been lost sight of until 1790, thenthe time-limit was twice extended, first to 1792 and then to1795. This scientific body gave first prize to the memoir

15 1


presented by the Wolffian Schwab, and gave second prizesto two Kantians, Reinhold and Abicht. The Academystipulated that it would not be content with a mere list ofsystems together with the nomenclature appropriate to them.The essays were also to reflect as exactly as possible, in thenature of the reasoning adopted, the actual state of philosophy. Schwab, convinced that luetaphysics was at the endof the century still in the state in whicll Leibniz had left itwhen he died, saw no progress. The Kantians WilO distinguished themselves in the competition confined themselves to praising the excellence of their own ideas andbecame, in fact, deeply involved in self-justification. Thequestion set for the competition was of a type which naturally excited Kant's interest. Indeed it furnished him withan unhoped-for occasion to set side by side the philosophywhich he had found prevalent in the middle of the centuryand the Critical philosophy in the definitive and completeform in which he bequeathed it to his contemporaries.Furthermore, since the Critical philosophy was exposedto cOITlbined attacks both from outmoded Wolffianisrnand from the l1ascent romanticism, the competition provided too good an occasion to miss. A prize from theAcademy obtained under these conditions would havesignified more than a mere recognition of excellence. Itwould have beell an occasion of considerable historicalsignificance and would have officially established the factthat a philosophical period had come to an end and thatthe Critical era had opened victoriously with the destructionof its oppOl1ents.

Kant actually thought of taking part in the competitionsome time in 1792, that is, after the second extension of thetime-limit, but he abandoned the project for reasons unknownto us. They may have been purely personal reasons, SUCll asdifficulties of old age or fear of censure. Let us not attemptto guess. In 1800 he sent to his old friend Rink three manuscripts intended for publication which. certainly showed that,in his mind at any rate, the text was ready to be submittedto public scrutiny as a work from his pen. The three manuscripts, as well as Rink's manl1er of editing them, naturallygive rise to a host of problems, of criticisms, of explanations,

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and of attempts at reconstituting the text. I have tried todeal with these elsewhere, but it is not appropriate, I think,to undertake that task again here. Two of the manuscripts,it may be noted in passing, do not form two independenttexts, but rather two parts belonging organically to the samememoir : the third reopens the whole question, but abandonsit very quickly.

The incomplete text bears the title Welches sind diewirklichen Fortschritte die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitz's undWolf's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? It may be takenas certain that this memoir could well have been one ofthe most interesting of Kant's works. The survey of thepast contained in it would have been doubly precious.First, it throws light on his teaching, for Kant had thewhole of his system before his eyes; he was in a positionto compare it easily with Wolffianism and to give it theplace which he personally inte11ded for it. Secondly, thisincomplete work, such as it is, tells us about Kant's intellectual preoccupations. It allows us to watch the repercussions in his thinking brought about both by the aggressivereturll of WolffianislTI and by that apostasy of his pupils tobe discussed in the next section. It marks an importantstage in the process by wl1ich the distinction between theCritical propaedeutic and the transcendental system becameobscured in Kant's mind. Kant at last comes down fromthe abstract heights of pure speculation into the arena,where ideas are seen in their temporal environment andacquire historical significance. He clarifies the maill linesof the gigantic effort lying behind an intellectual careerdevoted entirely to the elucidation of one sole problem.

Kant had just contrasted the Critical philosophy withWolffianism in the Entdeckung: he takes up the same taskagain in the Fortschritte, but in quite a different fashion.This first work devoted to defence of his views stays on adiplomatic plane of conciliation: it was politic for him tobridge as far as possible the gulf which separated the twosystems. In the Fortschritte Kant abandoned polemics. Itwas now to his advantage to exhibit in all its force theoriginality of his Critical philosophy, which he interprets asthe unique advance achieved in the course of the eighteenth

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century. At the same time, the occasion allowed him todefine more accurately the essential contours of this philosophy and to introduce certain peculiarities which mark anindubitable development in the content of his thought.Among these may be mentioned the grouping of the wholediscussiol1 around the living kernel of the synthetic activityof the subject, and the increasingly important part playedby formal intuition, which makes it possible for the Aestheticand the Analytic finally to fuse together in a single creativesynthesis. No other work shows so clearly how absurd is thepositivist interpretation of the Critical philosophy accordingto which Kant is simply the grave-digger of metaphysics.Kant sees metaphysics as the most powerful spring of thehuman personality. He believes in the indestructibility ofthe metaphysical disposition. He makes no attempt touproot it but tries to render it invulnerable. It is aroundthe notion of metaphysics that Kant arranged his wholework. At first he defines it, tl1en he measures it against theCritical philosophy (which he discusses once again in itsmost important articulations), and he marks its progress bydetailing the three stages which he thinks can be distinguished in its evolution. By means of this plan it is easyto orient oneself in this memoir.

Under the direct inffuence ofEberhard and the Entdeckung,Kant defines metaphysics as the science of the passage fromthe sensible to the meta-sensible, that is, as the science whichdepicts for us the attempt of the mind to liberate itself fromthe conditions of the sensible. This notion of metaphysics isat once subdivided into a material and a formal. notion.Considered materially, metaphysics corresponds to ontologyor to the study of the whole domain of a priori knowledgewithout distinction of type, so that the distinction earlierestablished between it and transcendental philosophy disappears almost completely. This ontology can be appliedprimarily to determinate objects, but it has never beendeveloped in this way because the apriori knowledge involvedin physics has never been clearly differentiated from physicsitself. Kant uses the term 'immanent' for a metaphysicswhich codifies the a priori laws of physics. Another form ofthis metaphysics deals with the non-sensible. This was

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indeed his classical conception, which cannot simply berejected as false because Kant had recognised the positivevalue of the Critique in 1787.

In addition to this first definition based on its avowedpurpose, Kant also defines metaphysics by its method andits procedures. He sees in it the science of rational knowledge througll concepts which stresses those principles which,taken as a whole, form the system of pure theoretical philosophy. To this metaphysics falls the task of studying andevaluating the capacity of the subjective functions involvedin knowing. It presupposes the preliminary critique of purereason which determines what reason can clainl when relatedto experience or when freed from this relationship. A studyof the progress made by metaphysics since the death ofLeibniz must be a study ofmetaphysics in its double modality.But these two modalities are not co-ordinate. The primaryconcern is to concentrate on the nature and validity of metaphysics as method and as system of theoretical knowledge.This is the object of a critique of pure reason, and thiscritique must, therefore be conceived as the general propaedeutic to metaphysics.

However, an appreciation of the progress achieved by ascience presupposes some standard of measurement. Ina priori knowledge this will be the idea of what must bedone in this order, and such an idea allows us to appreciatewhat has been done. It is the theoretical Critique whichstates this ideal conception and Kant re-expounds the wholesection dealing with it. He arranges this exposition, as inthe Prolegomena, around the a priori synthetic judgment: heestablishes the reality of this type of judgment, then itsvalidity, and finally the synthetic extension of a priori knowledge. The postulation of such a judgment or even therecognition of its reality carries us immediately outside thefield of fornlallogic within which the synthetic judgment isunintelligible. Leibniz was completely unaware of it, andthe first advance made by nletaphysics since his death consequently consists in tIle recognition of this type ofjudgment.The otller advance consists in the solution of the problemwhich it poses. The essence of the Critical philosophy, andat the same time its value in the history of philosopllical

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOU GHT

ideas, lies in its having accomplished this. As to the possibility of this type of judgment, Kant repeats the argumentgiven in the Critique without any modifications. The realoriginality of the exposition given in Kant's incompletememoir is to be found in the third object of inquiry, thatis, in the distinction between the synthetic judgment andthe a priori knowledge gained by the synthetic judgment.This distinction can be interpreted in two different ways.Indeed, it includes the question, not how mathematics ispossible, but how mathematics is applicable to physicalobjects, and how this physics can be extended to the metasensible. It includes also the question of its objectivevalidity. If knowledge is always objective, and if the synthetic judgnlent is not always necessarily so, how can thesynthetic a priori, whose essence is purely formal in itself, beobjectified?

As in all the other expositions, this arrangement of thememoir around the problem of the synthetic a priori is constantly upset by the other positio quaestionis concerning thepossibility of experience. T"his is often represented as thehighest task of transcendental philosophy. The memory ofthe sceptical reviewers wh,o criticised the arbitrary characterof his conception of experience is very much in Kant's mindhere. In spite of that, this twofold formulation of the Criticalproblem does not appear self-contradictory here either,although Kant continues to leave his flank open to thesceptical objection since by extension of meaning Erfahrungand Erkenntnis are synonyms. But it may be s"een that whileKant prefers the formula of the synthetic judgment whenhe discusses questions connected with the metaphysicaldeduction, 11e prefers the formula of experience when hediscusses questions related to the transcendental deduction.In this way the possibility of intuition and of the a prioriconcept is resolved without recourse to experience, whilethe objective validity of these elements is not deduced fromthe analysis of the synthetic judgment itself.

It will be appreciated that in this essay I cannot againdiscuss in detail all the arguments in the Critical philosophywhich deal with these two problems and particularly withthe problem of objectivity. Analysis by reason can explain

156


the thought of th.ese objects. But there is no immediateinference from thought or from the concept to the realpossibility of the object. We must therefore look to anotherprocedure to show how the a priori concept functions inconnection with intuition, which is how objectivity isexplained. The manuscript entitled' No. I ' provides theexplanation following the inverse route. As in 1787 heopens the debate with the Critical notion of Erkenntniswhich is made up of the concept and intuition; he studiesthese elements from the point of view first of their possibility and then of their validity, and this corresponds to themetaphysical and the transcendental deductions. This plan,which is the result of a clear and precise retrospective viewof the internal structure of the Critical philosophy, representsa great advance over the Critique itself. At an earlier stageI accused the Critique of making inevitable the distinctionbetween Aesthetic and Analytic, thus necessitating frequentreciprocal corrections. But in the memoir the unity of thetwo parts is shown clearly in Kant's reasoning. He wasdoubtless made aware of the need for this when the doubtsand hesitations of men ·like Maimon, Beck, Schultze, andReinhold reached him. It is not without interest to notethat at the time of writing the fragments Kant was discussingthe vvhole matter with Beck. He took over from Beck theproper principle with which to face the task of solderingtogether and unifying the different parts of the Critique. Kantin any case gave his unqualified approval in the middle of1792 to the reorganisation of the Critical philosophyattempted by Beck under the aegis of the principle ofZusammensetzung.

The same purpose ofunifying the two parts of the Criticalphilosophy explains the growing importance assumed by thethesis of forulal intuition. In the Fortschritte it is made toimply the necessity of the existence of pure concepts and itpostulates the principal factor in the demonstration of theirobjective validity. Time and space as determinate representations are constructed by the subject, and the functionat work there is Zusammensetzung which is expressed by thepure concept. Time and space derive their objectivevalidity from the very constructive process which exhibits

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a concept in a priori intuition. It follows that the only non...sensible factor to be encountered in the analysis of knowledge in general is Zusammensetzung. This confirms Section 15of the Critique of 1787, for Zusamlnensetzung is to conjunctio whata German term is to a foreign term. Kant abandoned hisearlier expressions under the influence of his pupil Beck.

There can be no doubt that Kant is now entering on thepath of an intellectual dynamisn~which leads logically to theidealisation of matter, which is produced by the work ofunderstanding itself in the same manner as mathematicalconstructions. For the origin of a priori matter can only befound in understanding. The re-exposition of the doctrinein the Fortschritte shows clearly the correctness of this interpretation. The Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deductionare recast without modification. The first deepening of thedoctrine is to be found just at the point where Kant wantsto reconstruct a logical passage from this deduction to thededuction of objectivity. A similar passage occurred in1787, but in another place. The categories organically presuppose a corresponding intuition but not necessarily aspatio-temporal or sensible intuition. In themselves theyare therefore independent of the specific form il~ whichintuition is clotlled, and that will be tl~e foundation of thenecessity of a deduction of their validity. If they werealways bound to sensible intuition they would always beobjective. Therefore the problem orlly arises when objectivity is supposed to reside in the applicatiol~ of the categories to the sensible. Formal illtuition furnishes the key tothis whole demonstration.

One of the original features of the Fortschritte is the wayin which the Critical problem par excellence is solved by theopposition between en~piricism and rationalism. This cannot be found earlier. To the question whether pure knowledge presupposes sensible experience as the foundation ofits objective validity, empiricism replies yes, while rationalismreplies no. To adopt the empirical point of view is to fallinto a contradiction, since then the a priori rule of experiencewould be itself empirical. Rationalism looks for a generatingprinciple of a priori rules beyond perception and finds it inZusammensetzung. The latter is the source of the a priori

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factors involved in knowledge; it thus creates formal intuition and clothes all sensible representations without distinction in the same way. The reciprocal relation manifested bya priori intuition and the category in the constitution ofexperience is raised to the rank of the supreme objectifyingelement. Objectivity has a validity limited to the givenwherever this relation holds: when this relation does nothold there is no ground for speaking of objectivity.

The function of exhibiting the category or the Zusammensetzung in the corresponding intuition amounts to what Kantcalls the schematism, and he takes advantage of the occasionto reply to a very real criticism directed against this aspectof the Critique. I have already said on more than one occasion that the subsumptive procedure which characterises theschematism is not calculated to express the intellectualdynamism, stressed by Kant in this memoir, which allowsthe pure concept to be brought close to intuition. Kant wasaware of this, for he appealed to the synthetic act to effectthe definitive unity of the two constituents. In addition, thevery principle invoked in the Fortschritte was to draw Kant'sattention to a doctrine which the Critique did not annOUl1ce.The one unique a priori element is Zusammensetzung, hedeclares, following Beck. Taken in this way it is difficultto see how this function becomes differentiated, al1d yet itis clear that this originally single function is broken up inits concrete actualisation into a nun1ber of kinds of acts orof categories. The origin of their differentiation cannot beattributed to the llnique operation of this a priori elementwhich is essentially a source of identity. These differentiations are required to correspond with the sensible presentations of objects in space and in time. That means, it seemsto me, that the a priori diversity, the foundation of formalintuition, is the principle which differentiates the functionswhich are distinct from Zusammensetzung in general. Thisa priori diversity therefore acquires capital in1portance inthis development since it sets the whole transcendentalapparatus in action. Under these conditions it is highlyregrettable to have to report that Kant prudently abstainedfrom giving a clear and precise account of the origin of thisa priori diversity. Everything points to the conclusion that

159


at this juncture in Kant's thought it has no other originthan the activity of the logical subject. This means thatafter all it is Beck and Fichte who are right in their exegesisof the Critical philosophy.

After being subjected to severe criticism Kant had recasthis teaching arId had brought it into line with the newtendencies to which he was always sensitively alert. Do thenewly illtroduced articulations mean that Kant abjured hisearlier expositions? This conclusion is in no way necessarysince they are not contradictory. Kant was aware that" histeaching had been enlarged and developed by his pupilsand he re-thought it in terms of their method of exegesisand of their vocabulary. This explains why the Fortschritterepresents a useful additional text. Although it does notdevelop any standpoints wh.ich are absolutely new, it opensa perspective on elements in the Critical philosophy whichKant had not explored in the constructive decade from 1781to 1790, either from lack of opportunity or lack of courage.

This n1.ore or less accurate exposition of the Criticalphilosophy was not introduced simply for the pleasure ofconstantly re-hashing the same doctrine. On the contraryit had a very precise role to play. It brings to light thestandard which makes it possible to exhibit the degree ofphilosophical progress to be credited to the Critical philosophy. After he had defined metaphysics and drawn outfurther implications of the Critical philosophy, Kant completed his reply to the question which formed the subjectof the competition by studying the progress represented bythe Critical philosophy whe11' compared with the WolffioLeibnizian philosophy. The exposition of the Criticalphilosophy is not an end in itself but a means of demonstration. When it is necessary to appreciate the progress madeby the science of metaphysics, defined as a science of thepassage from the sensible to the meta-sensible, the Criticalphilosophy appears as the standard, since it alone permit~

us to determine the objective use and also the limits ofa priori knowledge and leads to the conclusion that objectiveknowledge of the meta-sensible is illusory.

Is this a complete illusion or is it only relative? Todeclare that it is complete is to fall into scepticism. Kant

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THE DEFENCE· OF THE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

was to hold to the view that it was a relative illusion andwas to discover in the critique of reason itself the elementsnecessary to support the view that it is a relative illusion.It also marks the only advance which Kant is able to detect.He believed it essential to distinguish between two kinds ofprogress in metaphysics: completely illusory progress wheremetaphysics claims to knovv the meta-sensible, and genuineprogress. Unfortunately Kant keeps on obscuring the issuebecause lle keeps on confusing the two kinds of progress.The illusory progress is always worked out in three stages:dogmatic progress, sceptical progress, and Critical progress,with these terms understood in their COUlmon acceptation.Real progress is subdivided into the same stages with thesame names, but this tilne understood in a quite peculiarsense. It is therefore worth while attempting to distinguishwhat each of them really amounts to.

The first, admittedly illusory, progress whose development is sketched by I(ant, describes a curve going fromdogmatic illusion up to Critical prudence. Dogmatismconsisted in the elaboration of a science of the meta-sensiblewithout prior examination of the possibility of a prioriknowledge in general. It rested on one hand on the misleading method of mathematics, and on the other 011 thenegative confirmation of experience which cannot contradict SUCl1 a science. Scepticism then presents reason asengaged in a retreat which cannot be halted. The universal doubt in regard to the possibility of a priori knowledgeis not significant in the case where the a priori is related tothe sensible; but it marks undoubted progress when it isinterpreted as an invitation addressed to dogmatism tocriticise its own a priori principles. Here the weakness ofdogmatism is clearly revealed; not because dogmatic metaphysics conflicts with experience, but because the criticalexamination counselled by scepticism places it before theantinomies, thereby destroying all confidence in reason itself.There is here an evident confusion between Pyrrhonianscepticism and the criticism furnished by the transcendentaldialectic. Finally, the Critical philosophy is the last stagecovered by Kant in his celebrated trilogy. Its purpose isto determine all the conditions governing the extension of

(2,491) 161 12


a priori knowledge to the sensible and to the meta-sensible.These three stages· could have perhaps settled the placewhich the Critical philosophy occupies in the evolution ofphilosophy and could have illuminated the curve of progress,if Kant had really worked out the historical stages in themanner required by the Academy of Berlin. However, hewas no historian and he quickly abandoned the first moreor less historical triad in order to sketch another doctrinaltriad which corresponded better to his systematic tenlperamente

This new triad consists in a theoretical dogmatic stagecalled Wissenschaftslehre, a second sceptical stage calledZweifellehre and, finally, a third practico-dogmatic stagecalled Weisheitslehre. The first stage constructs scientifictheoretical knowledge or a Critical system of knowledge;the second represents a discipline of reason or of rationalknowledge; the third guides us in the use of practicalreason. However, far from simply developing these threestages according to a uniform plan, Kant deligllts in theaccumulation of difficulties by confusing the points ofview contained within the framework of the new triad.In tIle manuscripts there is a first form in which the doctrineof science denotes the Aesthetic and the Analytic combined,with scepticism corresponding to the Dialectic and wisdomto practical reason. Another form is to be found, however,in which science corresponds to ontology, scepticism tocosn1.ology and psychology, and wisdom to theology. Thedescription of these three stages shows how the two formscan be reconciled when their paths cross: the first ismodelled on the structure of the Critical philosophy, thesecond follows more faithfully the classical divisions ofmetaphysics. Dogmatism consists either in the expositionof the Critique or in a critique ofWolffian ontology. Scepticism denotes in both cases the Critical Dialectic, while theCritical stage corresponds either to the practical Critiqueor to a con1.bination of the Dialectic and the practicalCritique.

In the detail of his exposition Kant gives evidence of amarked preference for the second form. In this way theexposition of the dogmatic stage is generally transformed

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into a close criticism of Wolffio-Leibnizian ontology. Inthis Kant conducts the discussion along the lines of thethree principles mentioned in the last paragraph, but tothem 11e adds a fourth, namely, the principle of indiscernibles. Kant adopts a completely changed attitudetowards his predecessor. The demands of his polemicforced Kant in the Entdeckung to reduce as far as possiblethe distance between himself and Leibniz. Th.e Fortschritteon the other hand shows that the backward movement ofthe Entdeckung should not be taken too seriously. Heaccuses Leibnizian dogmatism of moving exclusively in thelogical sphere, when, in order to explain the existence ofthings, the formal principles of reaSOll are invoked; withoutadding any new elements Kant criticises the conception ofintuition as a faculty of obscure knowledge, so that the trueprogress nlade by the Critical philosophy consists in 11avingliberated philosophy from this dogmatic leap into the realmof the meta-sensihIe.

Scepticislll corresponds to the Dialectic, which takesexception to any special metaphysics. Although it wasannounced as a critique of cosmology and of rationalpsycll0logy, it is linlited to calling attention to tIle antinomies. The mobilisation of the antinomies always hadas its object the denunciation and disarming of cosmological dogmatisnl, but here it has also a positive subsidiarypurpose. The antinomies represent the hardest test towhich reason can be subjected, and from this springs thenecessity of th.e distinction between phenomena and noumena. This recalls how tIle dynamic antinolllies hadestablished the reality of noumena and indicated a way ofaccess to the domain of the transcendent by anticipating thepractical solutioI:l which. this problem allows.

As might be expected, it is the Critical stage which istreated with the most loving care. In keeping with thedesiderata of the competition, Kant underlines in a positivesection the possibility of the passage to the meta-sensiblethrough practical reason and in a negative section rejectsthe Wolffian metaphysics. The Critique established beyonddoubt that, within the limits of theoretical reason, knowledge of the nleta-sensible must be formally rejected. Despite

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the agnosticism ofthis position, it also indicated the expedientby which reason can safely run the risk of a transcendentmetaphysics. To know nature and to understand it areclaimed to be two quite different things; to know it is toapprehend its phenon1enal reality which is rigorouslymechanical; to understand it is to consider it as if it hadproduced things according to a purpose. This hypothesisis not justified by any scientific need but by a moral need.Freedom is an indisputable fact which is intelligible only bya final purpose to be found in the supreme good, whichitself cannot be understood without the postulates of imn10rtality and the existence of God. We do not know theseobjects as they are in themselves, but as they must be ifthe supreme good is to be realised. The necessary acquiescence in an idea, or the acceptance of a theoretical proposition because of the needs of practical reason, is calledfaith. Therefore the theoretical path, or science, does notreach the meta-sensible; there is therefore no true passagefrom the sensible to the meta-sensible. On the other hand,by faith we realise these meta-sensible ideas, that is, we givethem objects. Therefore, in the practical order the passageis real, and that is the sole advance to which metaphysicscan lay claim.

It is th.e same with practical theology. The Criticalphilosophy in its negative part challenges the vain attemptsof cosmological theology to prove apodeictically the existenceof God. There is never a true, direct proof of His existence,but it is once again postulated on the basis of the final causeof man. All argumentation is then always KaT'avOpw7ToV,never KaT'dA~OE(,av. Cosmological optimisn1, or the faiththat the creation advances indefinitely towards the better,which results from cosmological theology, can never be theobject of a theoretical and scientific proof: it is a demandof our moral nature. In consequence these concepts, whichare false and unjustifiable within the theoretical framework,acquire validity and moral reality. The same is true ofpsychological theology: to prove the immortality of thesoul is a wager; to find the necessity of immortality in theprolonging and conditioning of the moral fact furnishespractical certainty.

THE DEFENCE OF TI-IE CRITICAL SYNTHESIS

In the Fortschritte therefore we are confronted with arather peculiar conception of metaphysics. It is the sciencein which the passage from the sensible to the meta-sensibletakes place. This passage is effected not by a philosophyanalogous to that of Leibniz, but directly by the Criticaltrilogy. Thus the Critical pllilosophy, or in other wordstranscendental philosophy, no longer appears as a simplepropaedeutic to a future system, but as an integral systemof metaphysics, and this metaphysics is preceded by aCritique of pure reason which fixes the limits of its cognitivecapacities. Therefore the Critique is an integral part of atranscendental philosophy and is not solely destined toserve as a support for it. Gradually transcendental philosophy merges with metaphysics itself. It includes ethicsand theology. The structure of this system, Kant says inan appendix, is determined by two ideas, namely, theideality of space and time and the cOIlcept of freedom.The ideality is the origin of phenon1enalism and it represents the main addition to the theoretical criticism. Inconsequence the deduction is only indirectly the Criticalproblem, so that the Fortschritte is closer to the note in theAnfangsgriinde than to the Critique. The ideality must belimited to opening perspectives on the meta-sensible. It isfreedom which opens the way by which we penetrate to themeta-sensible.

It must be remembered in what is to come that theFortschritte in its Critical part is characterised by a progressive tendency towards idealism through the factor of Zusammensetzung, which is the constructive principle of knowledge.The same essay is distinguished in its historico-systematicpart by a definite modification in the reciprocal relationsbetween the great divisions of the Critique. The position ofthe Critique and also of transcendental philosophy has undergone considerable modification. The Critical whole in itsthree parts is raised to the level of philosophy itself insteadof occupying, as in the tl1eoretical Critique, the modest placeof a preliminary study. These two tendencies are increasingly to develop into the new axes of the master's thought,for Kant will soon set himself to give the final retouches tothe eternal problem which filled his whole career.

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3

THE APOSTATEScf. La Deduction III, 491-551

The Critical synthesis did not face criticisn1. only from menlike Eberhard, who were rooted in the Wolffian tradition.Another surprise awaited Kant toward 1790, a surprisewhich was to arouse painful echoes in his mind during thelast decade of his life. From the anonymous mass of hisdisciples there emerged some outstanding figures who,despite their admiration for their common n1aster, weredetermined to restate the Critical doctrine in an irreproachable form. In the pursuit of formal correction, however,they were unable to avoid making certain doctrinal corrections. Reinhold, Beck, and Fichte are the most noteworthy.Their bold alterations to the original Critical teaching produced a number of centrifugal movements. On eachoccasion Kant experienced the painful shock of betrayaland with some bitterness lle watched a wind of apostasyshake his school.

The attitude of these men towards Kant was not hostile,for they were his principal lieutenants. Kant had just rU11up against the heavy opposition of the schools, and the structure of the Critical philosophy did pres~nt a certain numberof weaknesses which his enemies seized upon. The Kantiansin their turn did not expect the consolidation of the Criticalphilosophy to come from the direct refutation of its opponents, but rather from a clearer focusing of the Criticalphilosophy itself. The Critical philosophy, according to theexpress desire of the master, was to form a rigorously deductive and perfectly coherent system. Now, Kant was still ofthe opinion that the Critique did not constitute such a system,but was simply a propaedeutic. This suggested that theren1edy for several of the weaknesses was to construct thecomplete system of transcendental philosophy. The systematic search for the unique principle from which transcendentalism in its entirety would be seen to flow, constitutes

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the true motivating force of philosophy in this feverish fin desiecle. Kant rarely intervened personally in the struggle,but the two pages written against Fichte which broughthis working life to a resounding end, acquire their fullmeaning within this framework, and their psycllologicalresonance is so deep that their logical weaknesses may beregarded with tolerance.

The source of all the difficulties is the doctrine of thetranscendent, which was the cause of the contradictionbetween the agnosticism which he professed with regardto it and the role which he assigned to it. The radicaldualism between sensibility and understanding carried thegerm of this contradiction which was fatal to the doctrinalunity of the system. Jacobi set the tone for a whole generation when in 1787 he coined the famous slogan: withoutthe thing in itself one cannot enter into the Critical system;with it, one cannot stay inside it. A consistent Kantian canonly be an idealist, because idealism is the only conclusionwhich the Critique permits. That was the programme of theexuberant philosophical activity whi~h can be observed fromI 790 to 1800. A minority felt obliged to abandon the Criticalphilosophy in favour of a radical scepticism, while themajority deserted it in favour of romantic idealism.

The first apostate, malgre lui, was Reinhold, who hadpaved the way for the Critical philosophy in the learnedworld of Germany. In I789 he sent Kant his Versuch einerneuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermogens (Essqy on aNew Theory of the Human Capacity of Representation). Kantreceived it rather coldly because the success of the workcould not fail to upset Kantian orthodoxy. The Vorstellungstheorie had scarcely appeared when it was exposed to theattacks of the orthodox. It is not a commentary but itprovides material from wllich it would be possible to construct a system of philosophy on the Critical basis KaT'

JgoX1Jv• Since the Critique was only the introduction, theextension of the Critical plan alone permits us to realise thisend. The argument of the Critical philosophy was basedon the arbitrary postulation of the physico-mathen1aticalsciences as fact, and it argued regressively to the conditionsof their possibility. Reinll0ld started from the Cartesian

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principle which implies its own evidence, l1.amely, theexistence in us of representations. The Critical philosophyin consequence can accept a complement a parte ante.Atten1.pting to deal with the most important things first,Kant had neglected the true first principle. He developedthe doctrine of Erkenntnis or of the scientific knowledge ofthe object, but this doctrine must be held to be arbitraryas long as it is not preceded by a more elementary analysiswhich goes right to the genus of which knowledge is only aspecies. From the fact of consciousness Reinhold deduceda whole episten1.ology by borrowing his modes of operationfronl the storehouse of the Critical philosophy.

Reinhold had overestimated his strength. Instead ofbeing an olive branch his essay only succeeded in being abrand of discord. The Kantians considered this well-meantwork to be that of an apostate, the Wolffians unmasked itsinternal weaknesses, the sceptics dispatched it mercilessly,and the Enesidemus of Schultze gave it the coup de grace.Despite his obstinate silence, Kant noticed that what wastaking place was dangerous to him, because each blowagainst Reinhold affected him indirectly. He saw that histeaching would not emerge unharmed from the test towhich the tempestuous zeal of Reinhold vvas submitting it.More firmly than ever the conviction grew in his mindthat the Critique alone was the law from which there mustbe no deviation. This conviction explains the sort ofenslavement to the letter which he wished in future toimpose on his partisans. The curtain had barely fallen onthis first psychological drama when Beck's non pOJsumus wasto reproduce the painful experience of the Reinhold case.

Meanwhile the sceptics rapidly denl0lished Reinhold'sunfortunate essay. Maimon torpedoed tl1.e doctrine of thetranscendent and saved the unity of the Critical philosophyby reabsorbing the matter of knowledge into the cognitiveactivity of the subject. After the disastrous Enesidemus ofSchultze, Reinhold disappeared completely from the scene.At this point Kant based his last hope on his most brilliantpupil,]. S. Beck. He not only persuaded him into the pathof philosophy, but he encouraged him in the work whichwas to be the source of grave dissension. The book was of

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course an exegetical work on the Critical philosophy. Thefirst volume, which appeared in 1793, carried as its subtitleAuf Anrathen Kants, as a kind of authorisation from themaster. However, the situation deteriorated in 1795 whenBeck wanted to add to it a third volume under the title of'Einzig moglicher Standpunkt aus welchen die critischePhilosophie beurteilt werden muss' (' Only possible standpoint from which the Critical philosophy can be judged ').

Everyone, it must be remembered, had taken a disliketo the doctrine of the transcendent. Some held that theDing an sich was indispensable, while others took it to beincompatible with Critical principles. It was this problemwhich Beck proposed to resolve. It was true that Kantreferred to the thing in itself, he pointed out, but did henot do that with the intention of accommodating himself tothe conceptions of the public? Did not all the false interpretations of the Critical philosophy derive from the failureto recognise the fact that Kant wished to place himself atthe level of his readers so as to lead them by measuredstages towards his personal positions? If the answer is yes,all that is necessary is to correct the exposition of the Criticalphilosophy and to rewrite the Critique. Kant did indeed,said Beck, at first adopt the dogmatic level of his readers soas to conduct them step by step to his own transcendentallevel. To this source are to be traced all the equivocationswhich were detected in his work. It is necessary thereforeto change the method. Kant went from the given to thesynthetic unity. Beck proposed to go from the syntheticunity to the given, and therefore adopts a transcendentalpoint of view right from the start.

Beck was too much of a mathematician simply to followReinhold, who had postulated the fact of consciousness so asto seek out its constitutive acts. Beck wanted his readers toadopt the transcendental point of view by a deliberate act.The unique originative act is the act of representing, all actwhich is not taken as a fact, but as an invitation to postulatethe fact. He sincerely believed that he was sacrificingnothing of the Critical philosophy since the transcendentaldeduction seemed to him to be the description in detail ofthis constructive process of the act of knowing. Indeed,

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Kant started from the synthesis not as from the product ofan act, but as from the very act which constructs our representations. In the construction of the object by this originating act, three problems are set which are to be foundunder other names in the Kantian Critique: (I) What isthere before the originating act? (2) What specificallydetermines this first syntlletic act? (3) Wl1at specificallydetermines the representation of the general object in arepresentation of a determinate object?

Kant replied to the first question by asserting the relativeindependence of the given diversity. It cannot be deniedthat by his method of successive approaches Kant fell intodogmatic realism. Instead of seeing in the diversity something which precedes the originating activity, Beck made itthe product of the synthesis and the final term of the processof objective knowledge. Therefore a synthetic act is theabsolute incipit of this knowledge and no constraining forceeither precedes or determines this act. This first act is nevergiven as generally undetermined: it always takes the fornlof a determinate synthesis or of a category. Beck wanted toavoid the logical conception of the category according towhich it is a concept. It is a function. It is the act itself,but in its concrete determination. Now this conceptiondestroys in his mind the duality introduced by Kant betweensensibility and understanding, wl~ich is also to be seen as anattempt to adapt his doctrine to the mind of his readers.Sensibility, indeed, is not to be taken as an independentfaculty: there is no radical opposition between intuitionand concept and the basis of their apparent dissimilarity11as to be found in the synthetic act itself. Indeed Beckexplained it by saying that a representation can be constructed either by going from the parts to the whole or fromthe whole to the parts. The first n1ethod yields the extensivecategories of space, the other the intensive categories ofreality. Intuition is the representation of a totality by themovement of thought, a path which goes from part to part.The mind in this way creates the spatial character of things.To represent something by the movement of the thinkingactivity going from the whole to the part is to determine itscharacter of reality or to determine an empirical real. It

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follows that reality in all its aspects is produced by thesynthetic act itself.

Finally, Kant needed a schematism to achieve the subsumptive union between the sensible and the intellectual.Beck needed the same doctrine to resolve his third problem,but he rejected, and rightly so, the subsumption, a proceduretoo external to allow us to enter into the mechanisn1 of theact constituting the unity. The act is determined, accordingto him, vvhen concurrently with space it constructs time.The representative act was a ll10vement of thought which,in the case of spatial construction, goes from the parts tothe whole. To be aware of this movement is to fix it, orto represent a determinate time. The representation of timedetermines by that very fact the original act which hasproduced it.

This summary description of Beck's position indicatesthat it certainly diverged farther from Kant than he wasprepared to admit. Such a criticism could only come fromthe mind of a mathematician aware that mathematics avoidsthe thorny problem of the transcendent by the constructiveprocess which is its very foundation. Now in the secondedition of the Critique, the doctrine of objectivity had pr~

sented striking analogies with this procedure in the notionof synthesis which, freed from the psychological apparatus,showed its objectifying function in the creation of the object.By modelling the Critical synthesis on the n1ethod of mathematical construction, Beck considerably simplified the process of the deduction. In this way he elin1inated everythingwhich has to do with the given, and he rejected the sensitiveintellectual duality and made the whole apparatus of given,intuition, and concept proceed from the same syntheticoconstructive act. It cannot be said that Beck attempted toconceal anything from his master. He kept Kant scrupulously well informed once his personal conception of theStandpunkt seemed to him well founded.

Nothing in Kant's attitude, as it appears in his letters toBeck, gives any indication of the final disillusionment. Hemade suggestions leading to greater precision and clarity ofexposition, but there is nothing which hints at the revolutionabout to occur in the camp of the master. From 1794 on,

17 1


Kant locked himself up in the most absolute silel~ce. Buthe became concerned when Schultze, his faithful fellowcitizen, gave a very unfavourable review of Beck's work inwhich he said that it eliminated tIle Aesthetic as useless andthat it constructed things by the understanding. Now thesenovelties had been published virtually with Kant's permission, but his patronage became singularly equivocal when itwas made to cover contraband merchandise. Without intervening personally he was quite pleased when a young man,Tieftrunk by name, wished to undertake the task of makingthe reply. Although the second transcendental affair thusended with Kant's silent displeasure, it l~ad a considerableeffect on his thought. I-lis tenacity ill retaining his ownexpressions and conceptions should not mislead us. Thefunctionalism of Beck passed insensibly to Kant who,perhaps without being aware of it, proceeded to integrateit into the pages of the Opus Postumum.

Meanwhile, in the transcendentalist camp, J. G. Fichtewas carefully watching the trend ofevents. He had embarkedupon theoretical criticism fronl a sense ofobligation and uponmoral criticism from personal taste. The whole moral personality of Fichte can be summed up by saying that, with hisactive temperament and moral disposition, his need for conviction clashed with the negativism of the theoretical Critique.The latter could not have attracted the mind of the youngFichte if he had not perceived that it was an indispensableintroduction to the amazing moral philosophy which hadbrought about his suddell and total conversion to the Criticalphilosophy. He enrolled in one of Kant's courses but wasreceived rather coldly. To get into the good graces of themaster he produced his Essay on Revelation. This so alteredKant's opinioll about his pupil that he set himself to find apublisher for it.

However, Fichte never felt narrowly dependent on Kant,because he too had clearly seen the formal faults inherent inthe Critical system. As if the same spirit dominated thiswhole period, Fichte was to reject, like Reinhold and Beck,the exposition of the Critical philosophy and set out to seekthe true foundation of the transcendental philosophy, whichKant had indeed guessed at but which he had not been able

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to develop. He was to be encouraged in this decision whenhe becan1e aware of the criticism which the sceptics directedagainst Reinhold's Essay. Although Reinhold's authorityhad been totally destroyed for him, this criticisn1 made himmore and more distrustful of the Kantian doctrine. Hisfaith in philosophy qua talis survived this crisis, and theWissenschaftslehre, which he developed between 1794 and1797 in some youthful books and essays, carried traces bothof this faith and of his distrust of the comm011 master. Thedoctrine of Fichte is the science of science. The latterconsists in a whole organised by a single principle whichresides in the act of pure thought. The whole of knowledgethus begins with an absolutely first act in which the Kantianduality of subject and object of knowledge is fused into one.This act resolves itself into three subordinate acts: the thesisof the subject by itself, the antithesis of the not-self to theself, and their synthesis.

In this act the self reveals itself as an activity and thenot-self as a passivity. Contrary to Kant, who radicallyseparates receptivity and spontaneity, Fichte attached then1to one sole indivisible act of the self which posits itself assubject and as object. It is natural that this position shouldbe identified with idealism and we see Fichte eliminatingthe thing in itself. One of the original features of hisdoctrine of science consisted precisely in his account ofperception which, instead of being organically bound to aforeign given matter, once again takes its place, even morefirmly than with Beck and Maimon, among the originatingactivities of the thinking subject.

The Wissenschaftslehre in its turn started bitter controversies. But Fichte was not a nlan to listen in silence tothis unfavourable concert. He published in quick succession two introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, one addressedto Schelling and the other a reply to the orthodox Kantians.At this point the paths of Kant and of Fichte were about tocross, because the Beck affair was connected in Kant's mindwith the Fichte affair. In 1797 Kant was challenged by acertain Schlettwein to declare publicly who was to be considered the faithful commentator on his doctrine, Reinhold,Beck, or Fichte. He pronounced himself as against all of

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them and in favour of his amanuensis Schultze. With thatpronouncement the three critics were excommunicated. Thefollowing year an anonymous critic repeated in a short articlein the Literatur Zeitung of Erlangen that Kant was the master,Reinhold the propagator, and Fichte the transcendentalphilosopher par excellence, and that it was more than desirable that Kant should explain himself clearly on the subjectof the doctrine of Fichte. In 1799, probably with thecollaboration of Schultze, Kant wrote the famous' Declaration against Fichte' which constituted his last public contribution to transcendental philosophy. The Literatur Zeitungof Jena, still devoted to him, hastened to publish it on28 August.

What apparently affected Kant most deeply in theapostasy of his three disciples, and above all of Fichte,was the accusation that he had failed to con1plete theCritical philosophy. That wounded him deeply, since thecompletio11 of the Critical synthesis had obscured the plansketched in the theoretical Critique, and twenty years ofconstant reflection on transcendental philosophy had ledhim to identify criticism and philosophy. It is quite intelligible then that Fichte's claim should have appeared tohim to be a complete misunderstanding of his thought. Itis no less intelligible that his amour propre should have suffered when he became aware that the public was desertingthe orthodox version of the Critical philosophy. Fichtereacted with dignity to Kant's harsh public declarationagainst him, but it contributed to his decline. However,the one who benefited was not Kant but Schelling.

In the first part of his Declaration Kant protestedenergetically against the identification of the Critical philosophy with Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. More important forus is the other part. Fichte clainled that the Criticalphilosophy in the Kantian version is simply a propaedeutic., Well,' replied Kant, ' in tIle Critique of Pure Reason I madecompleteness the true criterion of a science of pure reason.'It is therefore quite evident that in Kant's mind the Criticalphilosophy was the complete system of transcendental philosophy. It is unfortunately 110t Fichte but Kant who is herethe victim both of an illusion and of an unfortunate slip of

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memory, since he himself had repeated ad nauseam that theCritique is not the transcendental system but the introductionto it. As the whole enterprise represented by the Criticalphilosophy neared final completion, however, the Critiquesbecame identified with the transcendental philosophy itself.It has already become apparent in Ollf study of the development of Kant's thought that from 1787 onwards the originalsimple plan sketched in the theoretical Critique (Critiquemetaphysics of nature-metaphysics of morals) underwentconsiderable modification. The transcendental philosophy,which includes the three Critiques, is as a whole the prefaceto the twofold metaphysics referred to in the past. Therefore if Fichte was in error Kant had only himself to blame.The argument which he invokes, namely, that he has madethe completeness of his achievement into a criterion of itstruth as a science of pure reason, carries very little weightin the discussioll. Indeed he nlade similar claims in theMetaphysical Deduction and in the Methodology; but,after only a few intervening pages, he w'as still referring tothe Critique as a propaedeutic.

When we cast a brief glance backwards we get theimpression of having witnessed a psychological drama, thegravity and extent of which is revealed in the Declarationagainst Fichte. We may speak even of a threefold dramarunning through tile twilight of Kant's life: a drama ofthe spirit, a drama of the heart, and the drama of an epoch.Kant saw the defects and the weaknesses of his systembeing bared to public view. His attempts to reconcile conflicting tendencies in his thinking prevent the system frombeing straightforward. It is a system full of nuances whichare the results of his constant scruples. The resultingsystem, containing within itself convictions based on diverging sources of inspiration, was packed with explosives whichat the first shock were to destroy the weak and narrowframework of his ideas. Theses like that of the existenceof the transcendent, of the duality between our faculties,and the simply provisional and introductory character ofthe Critique, are to be found side by side with the idealistphenomenalism, the tendency to unity, and the desire forcompleteness. The internal conflict of these theses in the

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Critique was destined to explode outside the work and wasbound to produce a profound schisrYl among its exponents,men whon1 Kant had himself educated and trained inCritical philosophy. The three apostates were simplyvictims of the rectitude of their thought and of their desirefor consistency.

On the other hand the end of I<'ant's career coincideswith another epoch which is in sharp contrast, in all itsoutward appearances, wit11 the rationalist and analyticAufkliirung represented by Kant in his Critical system.The completion of the synthesis coincides with the changefrom one epoch to the other. The Aufkliirung was succeededby a romanticism of which Fichte is one of the powerfulprotagonists. Since Kant belonged to the century of theAufkliirung, he was not open to the influence of numerousnew tendencies which had just taken shape and which werebeing noisily propagated throughout young Germany. Kantand his apostates were the unconscious playthings of thehistoric moira which led them ineluctably to the placeintended for them by destiny. The doctrinal lesson offeredin the years 1790 to 1800 is very slight: the historical lessonon the contrary is considerable. The Critique and Wissenschaftslehre are not two books and two doctrines which conflict with one another; they are two epochs which face oneanother. Kant and Fichte, the master and the pupil, arethe two actors who embody on the stage of history thecultural and sentimental spirit which animates these twoepochs: the one silent like all ends, the other noisy like allbeginnings. The end of Kant and the rise of Ficllte soundsin1ultaneously the retreat of the Aufkliirung and the adventof Romanticism.


4

EPILOGUE


History has rarely seen an old man more studious than Kant.From 1790 onwards he was constantly engaged in the task ofdefending and perfecting his life's work despite the fact thatthe end of the eighteenth century was a period of great political upheaval. The accession to the throne of Frederick IIIhad indeed sounded the knell of his predecessor's liberalism.The consistories were leading a violent counter-offensiveagainst the liberal peril, and were fighting it both by weedingout the teaching profession and by a strict control of publicopinion. The crowned heads of all Europe, includingGermany, formed a coalition to protect themselves againstrevolutionary expansion and were only too glad to supportthe conservative campaign in defence of the spiritual andpolitical values of the ancien regime. Kant had been. too outspoken in the past not to have attracted attention, and, asone of the spiritual leaders of liberal republicanism, he wastoo well known to escape the heavy hand of the reaction.Right in the centre of this Kulturkampf he was building up,piece by piece, his doctrine of natural religion, all extraordinarily dangerous doctrine at this moment in history.His book Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone was apublic confession of deism which the authorities interpretedat its face value, namely, as a cllallenge to the reactionaryforces in the government. It would really have beenevidence of great naivety on Kant's part if he had shownany signs of astonishment when the royal thunderboltdescended upon him in his peaceful retreat on the bordersof Prussia.

This work on religion after all owes its origin and itsstrange composition simply to the political circumstances ofthe period. However, Kant had a much too systematictemperament not to seek to integrate it at once with the

(2,491) I 77 13


Critical synthesis in the strict sense. To the royal writwhich imposed silence on him in matters of religion, Kantreplied with his Streit der Fakultiiten (Conflict of the Faculties),in which he clain1ed for philosophers absolute freedom ofthought. At the same time he gave evidence of his courageous loyalty to liberal politics in his brief but extremelywell-known essay On Perpetual Peace, and in his Rechtslehre hesystematised the political philosophy ofFrederick II. Meanwhile age began to weigh heavily on his shoulders and in1796 the moment came for him to resign the teaching postwhich he had occupied for about forty-five years. No longerable to express his thought by word of mouth, he decidedto publish his lecture-courses. He himself undertook to editthe course on Anthropology, while some friends and colleagues were asked to edit his courses on Geography, Logic,and Pedagogy.

The only works of this period which form part of theCritical system in the strict sense are the Metaphysics ofMorals(1797) and the Opus Postumum. A metaphysics of morals hadformed part of the original plan from the very beginning,but the plan had never included the two-part arrangementwhich Kant gave to it in 1797. He had th.ought of a metaphysics of morals but he had had no intention of includingwithin it a section on natural law. We have l1ad to pointout more than once that after 1787 a different plan wasgradually substituted for the original one. In the intervening years Kant had come to believe that he had furnishedan absolutely complete system of philosophy, in so far asform is concerned, in the three Critiques, but that the systemwas still incomplete from the point of view of its content.The Metaphysics of Morals undeniably adds to the moralCritique the matter which was missing from it. However,the situation with regard to the matter required to completetIle theoretical Critique is not so clear. In the Anfangsgriindeof 1785 Kant had produced not a metaphysics of nature,but a metaphysics of corporeal nature. He was aware ofthis, and for that reason he again promised in 1790 to produce a general metaphysics of nature. Immediately afterwriting the final paragraph of the Critique of Judgment heturned his thoughts to his metaphysics of morals.. It was

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110t the ethical part, but the part dealing with natural law,and especially the section on the problem of property, whichheld up the con1pletion of this work until finally it didappear in 1797.

Up to this point it may be said then that there are fewdifficulties to be solved, but the situation is very differentwitl~ regard to the metaphysics of nature. Kant published110tlling further under this actual title, but fron1 1795 to 1803he worked ceaselessly on a book about which he himselfexpressed very different opinions, calling it his masterpieceone day and condemning it to the flames on tIle next. Inconsequence the book has been even n10re severely judgedby historians. The pile of fragments knowl1 as tIle OpusPostumum is not made up of a series of ran.dom speculationsattributable to the senility of the master and therefore excusable, but is rather the swan-song of a great logician. It issimply the final stage of the theoretical aspect of the Criticalphilosophy which Kant reached in the silence of his old age.The Opus Postumum would have been a tl~ird edition of theCritique of Pure Reason if it had been properly edited andreduced in size. Kant's new preoccupations are announcedfor the first time in a letter to Kiesewetter in 1795, but thetext sends us back in all probability to the years 1788 to1790 as the period in which !(ant discovered the problemwhich was to occupy him for the rest of his days. He hadnoticed a gap between the metaphysics ofnature and physics.It seems that around 1798 he had made considerable progress in the task of working out all Ubergang between thetwo sciences which would permit their unification. Whereexactly did the gap lie? The theoretical Critique had studiedthe general forms of experience but not the particular lawsand still less the infinite variety of particular forn1s to befound among the things of nature. The Critique ofJudgment,as we have seen, had dealt with this problem. A similarproblem however must be faced in connection with matter;the Anfangsgrunde is devoted to the general laws of thebehaviour of matter. At the empirical level however thereare further laws and many natural properties to be discovered; matter reveals itself empirically as the source ofthe various processes studied by physics. If science is to

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reflect the systematic unity of nature it must be possible toconstruct an a priori science of the particular forms andproperties of nature. This is precisely what Kant sethimself to do in the Ubergang.

At first sight then his intention concerns pure physics.There is nothing so far to suggest any intention of rewritingthe theoretical Critique or transcendental philosophy. Thefragments of the manuscript however present two groups oftexts; one of these discusses the physical problem, whilethe other clearly prepares .a complete transcendental doctrine. Furthermore, the two groups give the impression ofhaving been composed at different times. The two partsdo not interpenetrate but remain simply juxtaposed. Without wishing to undertake on my own account any attemptto date the fragments after the manner of Adickes, it seemsto me beyond doubt that only the physical question interested Kant between 1790 and 1800 and there is no sign ofany desire to re-examine the Critical philosophy. From1800 onwards however such a reassessn1ent almost completelyreplaces the physical project with which he had started. Inthe dozen groups of fragments, tl1erefore, there is no dominating and unifying point of view. Some writers, of whomVaihinger is an example, extract from the heterogeneity ofthe fragments a proof that Kant really meditated not onebut two distinct works: a physical work and a Criticalwork. This does not seem to me to be the case. Indeedthe very text of the fragments of Critical origin reveals howclose were the points of connection between the physicalproblem and the Critical problem. The fragments datingfrom 1790 to 1799 (Sections 2 to 3,4,5 to 6, 8 to 9, and 12)are undoubtedly concerned with the physical problem: thefragments belonging to 1800 (Sections 10 to I I) do amalgamate the deduction of the physical problem with theCritical process of the transcendental deduction: the fragments belonging to 1800 to 1803 (Sections 7 and I) are ofa frankly epistemological nature. While all this is true, theconclusion nevertheless seems to be that Kant envisagedonly one work which was to have been devoted to theproblem of the Ubergang. The solution of the problemembodied a serious attempt to make use of Critical

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procedures, and precisely those procedures which had beenrendered questionable by the attack which the Ronlallticsdirected against him. The employment of Critical methodsdemanded a preliminary restatement of his position, andthat is the meaning of the latest sections. It seems likelythat Kant could not see any way of reducing these pagesto one clearly focused line of thought. Such as it is, thisvoluminous and extremely valuable nlanuscript shows thattIle discovery of a gap in the systematic .plan owing to theabsence of an Ubergang between metaphysics and physicsled Kant to re-examine the theoretical aspect of Criticalphilosophy and the metaphysics of the transcendent, becausethe Critical philosophy appeared to be the only way of constructing this Ubergang and therefore of closing the gap. Theproblem of the Ubergang demanded a Critical solution. TheCritical solution was not offered simply in and by itself as ithad been in the earlier days of the Critical philosophy. Onthe contrary, it was now necessary to defend it against thesceptical movemellt and against the constrllctivism of theRonlantics. The Critical solution revised in this way wasbound to have a powerful effect on the solution of the strictlyphysical problem.

If the fundamental unity of the Opus Postumum is to bereconstructed, it must not be forgotten that what Kant givesus is really only an outline sketch from which the true OpusPostumum must be extracted. The fact that there are somany points of connection between the original Criticalphilosophy and the post-Kantian Critical philosophy of theRomantics makes considerable caution necessary. This isall the more essential because, if an accurate intellectualbiograpllY of Kant is to be given, a correct understandingof this Opus Postumum is of the very greatest importance.Let us then attempt to make this reconstruction on theassumption that Kant himself did manage to construct theepilogue to his career as a Critical philosopher. This epilogue would have constituted, if we can trust the fragments,a complete transcendental philosophy having the characterof a vast theory of experience. Kant may therefore be saidto have returned to his early views. Indeed the referenceto experience in the Critical philosophy was absent only in

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANT1AN THOUGHT

1787. Its eclipse was therefore only temporary. It held aleading position in 178 I and in I 783, and we have alreadyfound it in the Fortschritte. The Opus Postumum will carry itto the very peak of the Critical philosophy.

The experience referred to, however, cannot be identifiedwith actual perception nor with the totality of its objects. Itis now, as it always had been, a construction effected byreason. It must therefore be constructed in accordance withthe principle insisted upon by Kant in the Opus Postumum :the subject knows only what it has made itself. That experience must not be identified wifh perception is proved by itsabsolute unity, which is opposed both to the multiplicity andto the diversity of perceptions. Experience therefore constitutes the synthetic unity of possible experience. It canll.otconsequently be understood as a totality of perceived objectsbut as a totality of the conditions imposed by th.e knowingsubject on the perception of objects. The collaboration ofthe subject, as an epistemological and transceD.dental factor,is then the determining character of this experience. However, the theory of experience, as it occurs in. the OpusPostunzum, is not tIle same as that in the Critique because thereKant's thought is not directed upon the same formal object.In 1781 experience played the part of the ultimate point ofreference for the objectivity of perceptions: 011ly objectivityseemed to be of interest to the Critical philosophy. From1796 to 1800 it is the ultimate point of reference of thedeterminate essence of perceptions and this is quite a different matter. There is no difficulty in understanding thatthe principles of objective unification are subjective andformal principles, but it is less easy to understand WIlY theprinciples which govern the existence of materially determined perceptions should be in their turn subjective, a priori,and formal. By all accounts their nature should be nlaterial.Experience ill the Critique represents the general contours ofthe object ilberhaupt: in the Opus Postumum it represents thegeneral contours of determined objects. The positio quaestionis is therefore far from being the same, and the physicoCritical developments which follow will show the marksof this.

The subject under discussion therefore is the material182


object or, in scientific language, body. Experience shows itas an object moving in space. Motion is therefore part ofits essence. But motion can be studied ill two ways: it canbe studied in abstracto, that is, the reciprocal relations betweenmotions can be studied without paying attention to theireffective realisation in any empirical matter, therefore simplyas something moving in space. Now, Kant tll0ught thathe had conlpleted this mathenlatico-mechanical study in hisAnfangsgriinde. But ill0tion can also be studied as it is effectively realised in some empirical matter. In that case nl0tionappears to us as the effect of a physical cause called force,and tIle laws and characteristics of these forces are given tous in experience. The whole difficulty therefore lies in thequestion: how can the mind pass from the matllematical tothe physical study of body wl1ile still satisfying the conditions of science?

The conditions demanded by science, in Kant's rationalistmind, are systematic unity and perfection. Now, physics asan empirical science can give no assurance either ofthe necessity of its total unity or of the necessary perfection of itsarrangement. It can indeed lead to an aggregate but notto a system. So there remains only the following alternative: either the scientific character of physics must be sacrificed, or it must be possible to reduce physics to systematicform by systematising physical causes or the empirical forceswhich determine the nature and the peculiar behaviour ofbody in experience. Obviously Kant chose the secondalternative, but the matter is not so simple as it appearsto be. Indeed it is a matter of anticipating actual experience. Now, the Critique showed that only the general formcan be anticipated, and, in fact, the anticipation of experience in the categorial schema concerns only the form of theobject in general. The anticipation required by physics willbe very much more complicated. The question may well beposed whether a formal schematism of all the forces whichconstitute material body can be set up in an a priori manner.It can, on condition that we can prove that the reach ofthe cognitive function does not extend only to the generalform of the object but also to the more particular determinate forms of perceived objects. The science which

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mediates between the metaphysical mathematics of matterand empirical physics will therefore necessarily be a transcendental science finding in the structure of the functionsof knowledge the formal conditions of determinate bodies,conditions allowing the discovery of the necessary schemaof all empirical forces.

There we have the demonstrandum. The demonstrationon the other hand develops after the classical manner dear toKant. The cognitive structure of the subject is analysed inthe table of categories. It is therefore necessary to derivefrom the fourfold division of the categories a similar divisionof corresponding forces. Actually, up to 1798 Kant limitedhimself to affirming the perfect correspondence between theintellectual categories and the system of forces. It was notuntil the period from 1798 to 1800 that he was successful inelaborating the justifying deduction. He fixed first the apriorisystem of possible forces; tl1en he deduced the general properties which matter manifests in experience; finally hededuced the existence of the ether as the condition of theunity of experience. No force, no property, we read inmany of the fragments, exists for us if it is not perceived,that is, submitted to the receptive forms and to the syntheticfunctions of the subject. Now, these last functions are necessarily included in the table of categories. There can therefore be no forces or perceived properties which do notconform to the synthetic moments or categories. It mustbe made quite clear however that this somewhat naivededuction does not claim to render actual experience uselessin the study of matter. By means of the deduction we arenot capable of predicting what concrete forces and whatempirical properties will appear to us hic et nunc, but thededuction circumscribes and delimits the don1ain withinwhich the forces of nature must move. Consequently italso limits the study of these forces. The categorial schemawill therefore serve simply as a guide in the exploration ofwhat is empirically real. Despite that, the deduction grantsto us the capacity of knowing in an a priori fashion thegeneral content of an empirical object, while the Critiquehad held such a priori knowledge to be impossible. TheOpus Postumum therefore constructs not the form of the object

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in general, but the fundamental marks of a material essence.This extension of the power of reason already marks a steptowards the all-engulfing constructivism to which Kant wasbeing pushed by the Romantic criticism.

Kant took yet another step in the same direction on theoccasion of his deduction of the ether. In the precedingdeduction he had just laid down the laws governing theforces and diverse properties of matter. To achieve theabsolute systematic unity of physics it was still necessary todiscover a unitary element coextensive with the unity ofmatter and with the unity of experience. This element isthe ether. By ether Kant understands a kind of matterwhich occupies absolutely all of space, which penetrates allmatter, which is identical in all its parts, and which isanimated by spontaneous and perpetual motion. Thereference to possible experience once again brings this kindof matter within the spiritual constitution of the subject.Physics adopts the ether as an hypothesis intended to explaincertain determinate phenomena. Kant's purpose goes verymuch farther. He tries to prove the absolute necessity ofits existence. Kant followed three different paths: at onetime he based his idea on the law of attraction, at anotheron the nature of empty space and empty time, and finallyon the notion of possible experience. This last argument isthe most characteristic. Possible experience is a unitybecause its form or space is a unity. Now, the unity ofexperience is a system of multiple perceptions constructedformally by understanding and having its material sourcein the activities of the forces of matter. These forces mustin their turn constitute a system if they are to conform tothe rational purpose of the unity of experience. Now, thatis possible only if in its turn there exists an object of experience, the properties of which correspond to those of theether. Therefore the existence of the ether, Kant concludes,is the a priori condition of the system of experience. Thereis no need to comment at length on the way in whichtranscendentalisn1 invades the domain of the matter ofknowledge, nor on the absurdity of an a priori deductionof the existence of real matter. The mind of Kant wouldhave reacted violently against any such deduction In the

(2,491) 185 14


period between 1781 and 1787, when he would have dismissed it quite rig11tly as sheer dogmatism. Nor need wecomment upon the doctrine of the simple or double affectio11to which I have devoted a.long chapter in my large workon the Deduction. It is not our task here to discuss thearguments used by Kant. It is sufficient simply to recordthem and to see how an entirely new epistemology is superimposed upon them.

This epistemology, which occupies I(ant's attention afterthe conclusion of his examination of physics is contained inSections 7 and 1. It does not give the impression of havingbeell brought about by the conscious abandonment of thethemes of the Ubergang, but, on the contrary, it is the logicalcontinuation of the physical deductions themselves. Sections 10 to 1 I no longer build up the system of forces andproperties, but assure their systematisation by the systematicnature of subjective thought and thus throw a new light onthe role of thought in the system of the· intuitive worldunfolded before us in experience. The deduction of theforces and properties of matter set the mark of transcendentalism on the Ubergang, and the physical problem isgiven a perfect solution. But, although the physical problem is solved, the solution itself poses a supplementaryquestion of a purely Critical nature. Is it legitin1ate tosuppose that the deduction which solves the physical problemis valid in itself? Section 7, which is essentially epistem~

logical in nature, brings into the limelight Kant's effort tosecure foundations for the physical deduction. It providesevidence that both it and the physical problem which calledit into existence derive their inspiration from the same source.

The rapprochement between physics and the categorialsystem once again calls in question the whole structure ofthe theoretical Critical philosophy because it gives to physicsa power hitherto unknown. In fact we see in innumerablefragments that Kant re-examined the nature and the role ofthe' I think' (which is the general copula of the universe),the nature and the functions of space and time, and thefunction of the transcendent. All this occupies Section 7,while Section I, the last in the chronological order, returnsonce again to full-blown Critical themes. It elaborates a

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doctrine of theoretical metaphysics dealing with the Ideasand with God and it develops for the last time a newconception of transcendental philosophy.

Even in 1787 the part played by the self was not theeasiest to understand. The self has appeared under theform of apperception and under tIle form of an object forwllich the self had to posit its own material diversity. NowKant takes up this double function of the self again but bydeploying an apparatus of the purest Fichtean idealism.There is no longer any question of the famous problem ofaffection. Affection is replaced by the terms Setzung orPosition. In the self there reigns the most absolute spontaneity. The self is stripped of all ontological significance.To posit the self is an act of thought. The self is not considered as a being, 110t even as a source of activities; theself is pure act. The doctrine follows the change in terminology and moves in its turn in the direction of Romanticidealism. It is no use trying to save face by saying withAdickes that only the terminology or the external apparatushas joined the apostates. It is more than that, as the termSetzung clearly shows.

The self actually posits itself both as subject and as object.The positing of the self as subject occurs in apperceptionwhere the subject announces itself as the formal act in whichthe form of all consciousness resides. All the fragments treatapperception as an act; the self does not posit itself as a resbut as the act of thought and as the subject of knowledge.Evidently this self is purely formal without any determinatecontent and cannot therefore be held to be knowledge of theself. All cognitive progress takes place through a syntheticact. The self-subject affirms itself in its permanent identitybut does so analytically. All knowledge is realised in judgment. The self-subject precedes all judgment. Basically,apart from some formulae, this is again the normal standpoint of the Critique on the subject of apperception. Thisact of positing coincides on the other hand with the primitiveact to which Fichte gave the name Tathandlung.

This analytic notion is not sufficient to determine theself as object because a synthetic positing is necessary forthis stage. This new positing will be effected in another

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constructive act, in another spolltaneOlls production, thepurpose of which is to provide the transcendental apparatuswhich is necessary to construct the object in general, that is,space-time, and the categories. Kant particularly stressesthe gellesis of space-tinle in the act of the self. The selfsubject at first posits its forms and a priori functions and soconstitutes itself an empirical self, that is, the self endowedwith the apparatus necessary to the construction of experience. Hence the first act does not have as its immediateresult the self-object, but rather the constitution of its formaland functional apparatus. Also space and time are not givenbut are constructed, gemacht. They are not things but functions, and they make of the transcendental subject a dabile orobject. To express the self-positing of intuitive forms by theself Kant forges the striking phrase: the self is their Inhaber(owner) because it is their Urheber (originator). In the OpusPostumum therefore the subject plays the part of this originating faculty which, according to the Entdeckung, was aloneinnate.

Hovvever, space and time are the receptive and passiveforms destined to receive a sensible matter. Is there not aninconsistency between their spontaneous origin and theirreceptive nature? Kant replied negatively because theseforms have a receptive and passive character only in relationto their further use, but are active and spontaneous in relation to their origin. Indeed the passivity of the self in intuition is not a given, but, despite the appearance of paradox,this receptivity is an activity to which the selfis spontaneouslydetermined: self is passive vis-a-vis matter. The OpusPostumum thus presents an undeniable advantage over theCritique. III the Critique the transcendental examinationstopped at tIle apparatus of knowledge; in the OpusPostumum Kant explains this apparatus itself. It does notmatter whether the doctrine be true or absurd; the intention is clear and so is the connection of this doctrine withRomantic criticisn1.

The positing of the self as object extends even farther.The self again posits the whole empirical content of consciousness, that is, all experience both internal and exterllal.Indeed, in positing its intuitive forms and categories, the

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self posits the determinate manner according to which theimpressions appear in experience and the manner in whichthey are to be unified in the object. In consequence, inpositing space, time, and the categories, that is, the empiricalself, the self posits and produces at the same time tIle wholeintuitive world. It posits the order, the unity, and theobjectivity of phenomena, and in doing this it posits itselfas objective. That means that it objectifies its own unifyingfunctions. Seeing its own la,vs and its own unity involvedin the world of impressions, incorporated in material nature,and realised in the objects of experience, the self sees beforeitselfits laws and its unity as objective things. Kant employsstrong terms to express the positing of experience by the self.It is not the transcendent which is the object of intuition, itis the act of the understanding. It is a product of the self.The world is uniquely in the self. The Ding an sick expressesthe activity of the subject. Thus the problem of theSetzung leaves a very real impression of idealism. The mindcreates the sensible world in creating its spatia-temporalforms. The forms are tllemselves the constructive rules ofintuition. The external transcendent does not co-operate inthis process; neither does the internal transcendent. Kanthas bowed before the spirit of the time. The transcendentabsolute disappears, but to replace it he foresees the absoluteof autonomous thought.

Adickes concludes that this is simply a trick on Kant'spart so that he may join h.ands with the renegade versionof the Critical philosophy by changing his terms withoutchanging his teaching. It might be said with greater precision perhaps that the infinite contortions of the OpusPostumum serve to hide a conviction and basically to conceala defeat. Does this undoubted idealism really go beyondthat of the Critique? Only one element still moves outsidethe orbit of the mind and that is the matter of perceptions.It should be noted 110wever that the notion of the matterof perceptions has itself become very relative, first becauseKant continually restricts its extension, and secondly because,on account of the autonomous function of the empirical sel(~

it is no longer very easy to determine exactly what matterreally signifies. I-Iowever, admitting that matter is not

18g


included in the constructive power of the subject, twoalternatives can still be presented: either this matter isa given which cannot be included within the rational orderand we can know nothing of it, or else it will be referredto a transcendent world and will thus carry the echo of thetranscendent into the immanent play ofconstructive thought.The problem of Setzung in the Opus Postumum no longerallows any choice between these two possibilities. It is quiteclear that the problem of the transcendent becomes moreand more urgent after the thesis of Setzung.

The Critique did not have any real doctrine of the transcendent, and this fallit was one of the principal sources ofthe confusions and conflicts which centred around it forfifteen years. Now, the Opus Postumum does have such adoctrine. Adickes has made this perfectly clear, but wemust interpret it in a slightly different manner. It is to befound in three groups of texts: the first group operateswith the transcendental object, the second with the Dingan sich reached by means of transcendental elements, thethird with the Ding an sich as the correlative of phenon~ena.Why does Kant suddenly experience this scruple and thisneed of exactitude and precision? Basically, his new attitude is determined not by his own theses but by those ofothers. A great debate, in which the realist and idealistcon~mentatorswere taking opposite sides, was raging aroundthe transcendents The realists had two sets of things: Ol~e

set exists in royal independence outside the range of thesubject, the other set exists in the subject, duplicating thefirst. Kant rejected vigorously this idea of a duplication ofthings: there are not two distinct objects but two ways inwhich the object is constituted. It is therefore the sanlethil~g which is considered as Ding an sich and as phenomenon. These are two standpoints, two ways of representing the object. At one time the object is represented in theforn~s and functions of the intuition which subjectifies it andwl~ich represents it as a real object; at another time it isconsidered out of all connection with its forms and in thiscase it is an empty indeterminate representation. The Dingan sich therefore does not go beyond the stage of an idea ofthe object. That does not mean that there are l~O real

19°


things, but they do not play any constitutive role in theobject known.

Kant's idealist friends had very little use for the transcendent. They put it ruthlessly on one side and Kanthad to offer them a new exegesis mainly composed of concessions, since, in opposition to sceptical objections, hetended to prune the thing in itself while developing aCritical doctrine within which its role became less and lessimportant. Originally Kant had expressed his faith in theexistence of the transcendent, in the theoretical necessityof its participation in the Critical synthesis as a limitingconcept, but he had concluded that it was absolutelyunknowable in its determinate essence. Kant maintainedthese positions in the Opus Postumum, adding to then1. thetheoretical indemonstrability of its existence. He maintainsthe positions however by changing his line of argument onmore than one occasion. As in 1781, he identified tIleDing an sich with the transcendental object which expressesthe law of the objective unity of phenomena and which assuch is not distinct from the thought which is its origin.The Ding an sich re-enters the scene in the Opus Postumumunder the designation of an ens rationis which, at first sight,threatens the very reality of the transcendent. However,the developments show that Kant sirnply meant that objective thought demands the idea of a thing in itself. Mostoften this expression asserts the imperative imposed onreason by the subject to discount the s·ensible conditionsof human intuition, and then the Ding an sich correspondsperfectly to tIle negative noumenon of the Critique. Finally,added Kant, the thing in itself is not a dabile but a cogitabile,that is, the conclusion of an argument starting from thephenomenon. We must therefore conclude from thesediverse determinations that the Ding an sich, as it appearsin the transcendental apparatus of knowledge, is not thetrue transce11dent but rather the representation of somethingwhich transcends the objects known.

On this matter we differ radically from the view expressedby Adickes, who appeals to Kant's private beliefin the existence of the transcendent and th.e necessity of knowing it inthe practical order. We have paid no attention to Kant's

19 1


private convictions on this subject. Our concern has beenonly with the question of the transcendent within the limitsof the transcendental epistemology. This philosophy is concentrated on two problems: the problem of objective knowledge already solved in the Critique by the doctrine ofcomplete immanence, and the problem of the constitutionof matter where the problem of the transcendent is mostacute. In spite of everything, and whatever his privateopinions may have been, Kant made the Ding an sich appearin the Opus Postumum simply as something posited by thesubject or as a transcendental object towards which all thedeterminable marks of objectivity retur11, a term which iscomparable to the constructive subject itself. Furthermore,the problem of affection by the transcendent supports ourconclusion. All the dominant theses tend to enclose transcendental philosophy in the mind without providing anywindows opening on the transcendent.

In a large number of fragments Ka11t reviewed anddeveloped the teaching of the Aesthetic and the Analyticalong these lines. If the Opus Postumum is to be consideredas a th.ird edition of the Critique in a preparatory stage,Kant must also revise the Dialectic, that is, he must onceagain undertake the examination of our highest rationalsyntheses, the world, man, and God. Section I attacksthese problems. The conclusion of Section 7 leaves uswith. two doctrines strongly tainted with idealism: thedoctrine of Setzung and the doctrine of the transcendent.By means of this same Setzung Section I expounds a strictlyidealist conception of reason, while the theme of transcende11ce vanishes to merge in a doctrine of God.

The autonomous positing of the self is extended to theIdeas of Reason in their theoretical transcendental role andin their constitutive practical role. Basically the task waseasier for Kant in the domain of reason than anywhere else,because the n1atter with which reason is concerned isalready in the rational order and presents from the beginning the character of a representation which has not eventhe appearance of passivity inherent in the representationof sensible matter. As centre of the discussion we meet, forthe first tin1e from Kant's pen, the conception of man as

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cosmotheoros, that is, man is on the one hand spectator andcreator of the sensible world through domination of theorder of phenomena by his supreme spiritual unities, andon the other hand he is a moral being through freedom.In this way man gathers into his spiritual being the intelligible world by which he transcends the requirements ofscience. In the first theoretical domain reason exercises adefinitely autocratic power in constructing the Ideas in anautonomous fashion, in being in the full sense of the wordthe Urheber of these Ideas. Reason is the ratio determinans ofthe complete systematisation of theoretical knowledge, athesis which is in complete agreement with that of the earlyCritique.

Reason has exactly the same character when its constructing power in the practical order is examined: itmakes man into a moral being and a person, that is, intoa being which has value as an end in itself. The ultimatefoundation of the personal character of man is his simultaneous membership in the sensible and the intelligibleworlds; the immediate foundatio11 is his consciousness offreedom. This consciousness in its turn is constructed byreason. It may therefore be said in general that theexamination of reason confirms the earlier Critical philosophy, but that the accent and tone are distinctly different.In the Opus Postumum reason has completely lost thecharacter of a given faculty: it has become a spontaneousfunction. It does not represent the Ideas, it constructsthem. It does not recognise man in his moral essence, itrealises this essence. It is only the Inhaber of the Ideasbecause it has been their Urheber.

Moreover, the omnipresence of the problem of God inthis section further reinforces the idealist constructivism ofthe new Kantian exposition. The doctrine is directlyinspired by the Critical theses mentioned above and it isclearly a particular adaptation of the agnostic attitudeadopted by Kant on the subject of the transcendent. Inany doctrine of God it is essential to distinguish clearlythe problem of essence from that of existence. From theessence of God Kant forges the idea of a being who is aperson and the idea of a being who represents the supreme

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unity of the universe. He never refers to God in His capa~

city as creator or supreme good. Most often the idea ofGod includes two constituents: the idea of the supremelyintelligible being and the idea of the moral person. Theessential Critical question however is to know wh.ether sucha being exists in reality. Of course it goes without sayingthat Kant had never privately doubted the existence of God.Even in the Opus Postumum God still exists for the philosopher.The question however is whether the Critical epistemologyhas not forced· Kant to be more circumspect and to silencehis convictions before the demands of the Critical philosophy.It cannot be denied that this is in fact the case. At firstKant denies the possibility of demonstrating the existence ofGod : transcendental philosophy only operates with the ideaof God, and from the idea of God there can be no inferenceto the existence of a being corresponding to the idea. However, it is another matter to know God even if He cannot bedemonstrated. Indeed, real knowledge of an existent doesnot necessarily coincide with the analytic demonstration ofit. Then the question arises whether the existence of Godis the object of certain knowledge within the framework oftranscendental philosophy. The negative reply cannot bedoubted when the doctrine of the transcendent in general isrecalled. The problem of God must therefore be posed asentirely immanent. Instead of going back to a thing initself, the idea of God takes its reality from a constructionof Reason which perceives the absolute necessity of thought.This necessity does not rest on the notion of substance buton th.e categorical imperative.

An Idea of Reason does not bear any resemblance to adiscursive concept. It represents a singular object of pureintuition. God is such an Idea, first because He is opposedto the sensible object, and secondly because the Idea hasnothing corresponding to it in experience. Kant son~etimes

calls it a Dichtung (a term which is certainly exposed tomisinterpretation), which is equivalent to a simple rationalconstruction. Indeed God takes His reality from such a construction, but being in the theoretical order only a regulativeconstruction for ordering this domain, the objective realityof the Idea of God is to be found in the practical domain.

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At the time of the practical Critique the objective idea of Gadwas part of the elucidation of the notion of the supremegood. This disappears completely in the Opus Postumumbecause Kant, for reasons unknowl1 to us, severed the connection between his moral theory and the principle ofhappiness. The idea of God depends directly on the fundamental moral fact or the categorical imperative in such away that the co-operation of God in the practical work ofreason is a clearly immanent co-operation.

To sum up. Kant did not find as many things to changein the Dialectic as in the other sections of the Critique. Hemerely applied to it his new vocabulary and reinforcedcertain theses. From the mass of sketches it is necessary toextract the masterpiece which was going to be the finalmessage of the master adapted to the new orientations ofphilosophy and to contemporary versions of the Criticalphilosophy. What could this work be in such conditions?To judge from the n1aterial accumulated over ten years itwas going to contain a physico-metaphysics of nature, acomplete Critical epistemology, and at least an outline ofthe metaphysics of n10rals. To find a suitable title and adefinition comprehensive enough to include such l1eterogeneous material was not easy. Section I plaintively notesthis insurmountable difficulty and reveals the old man ofeighty gallantly struggling with it. The title was found:around him everyone was talking about the transcendentalphilosophy. But to find a wide and accurate enough definition of this philosophy was beyond his powers. Reickecounted the attempts and found in the 160 pages of Section I

at least 150 rough drafts of the definition.Kant had rebelled against the claims of Ficl1te in 1799,

that is, just at the time when the physical problem wasalmost resolved and when he was setting himself to reexamine his attitude towards the Critical philosophy. Kant'sdeclaration 110wever did not put an end to t11e quarrel. Onthe contrary, the Wolffian Schwab started it again and in1800 provoked a minor avalanche of articles on the wholesubject of transcendental philosophy. Kant at once sethimself to provide his physical work with an episten1010gicalextension. Section 7 elaborates a version of the Critical

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philosophystrongly influel1ced byBeck and byFichte. SectionI, where Kant applies his constructivism to the domain ofreason, again pursues, alongside his meditations on theproblems of the Dialectic, the systematisation in a singlework of the physical and the Critical problems. It seemsthat Kant considered his work to be finished and that hewanted to give it rigorous systematic unity. It was a questionoffinding a scientific framework within which transcendentalphilosophy, morality, and pllysics could be set side by side asparts of one vvhole. Two titles are repeatedly suggested inthe pages of the fragments to cover this great variety ofcontent: Transcendental Philosophy and System of PurePhilosophy. The first part was to explain what we do toproduce the object, the second part what nature does toproduce it. This interpretation decisively invalidatesVaih.inger's opinion about the unity of the Opus Postumum :it is certainly a single work wl1ich Kant intended to be hisphilosophical testament for the German public.

Its comprehensive character, however, was to provoke anadjustment of the frontiers within the schematism of philosophical disciplines. The Critique foresaw a progression inthree stages, all of them theoretical: Critical philosophy,transcendental philosophy, metaphysics. The Criticalphilosophy analyses the forms, the concepts, and the fundamental principles of the intuitive world: transcendentalphilosophy includes the exhaustive study of all formal factorswithout exception: metaphysics studies the objective content of what is studied under its formal aspect in the firsttwo divisions. In the Opus Postumum a still more simple planis set out. The distinction between Critical philosophy andtranscendental philosophy has completely disappeared.~ Theonly problem which exists is the connection between transcendel1tal philosophy and metaphysics. I-Iere again, althoughtheir connection is not constant in the collection offragments,it can be seen that it also has a tendency to disappear as thelast fragment reaches its end, and the two sciences there forma single block set over against n1atllernatics. But where thebipartite division is still maintained, it belongs to the firstto point out the ideal and constructive factors of objectivescience, and to the second to study nature and morality in

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their a priori forn1.. But I must insist that this distinctiondisappears because of the invasion by subjective constructionof all dOluains which form part of a plan of philosophicaldisciplines. The identification of transcendental philosophywith metaphysics seems to have been I<'ant's last word onthis architectonic question.

The architectonic question, however, conceals importantaims. The disciple had had the audacity to criticise themaster, and the master wanted to prove that the Criticalsynthesis did really touch upon all philosophical problemsworthy oftl1.e name. The Opus Postumum would indeed havebeen a considerable work. It would 11.ave presupposedphysics and it would have detached in the Vbergang theformal metaphysical part contained in it. This Ubergangwould have directed Kant towards transcendental pllilosophy in the restricted sense of the word, that is, towardsthe study of the constitution and synthetic functioning ofmind. Furnished with this apparatus, Kant would havegone on to metaphysics in tIle strict sense, tllat is, themetaphysics of nature or the purely mathematical study ofreality and the metaphysics of morals. This twofold metaphysics would have been unified in a metaphysics of God,the absolute peak of all pllilosoph.y. That would have beenthe plan of the Opus Postumum-on. the supposition, that is,that Kant would have included within it all that he hadjust confided to the fragments.

Chance decided otherwise. Kant died before he wasable to complete his work, almost one year after havingcommitted to writing the last phrases of the manuscript.These fragments are certainly not the ne plus ultra of thethought of the master, but they do constitute the last stagein the evolution of his Critical thinking. Despite its arnor...phous state with all its ensuing faults, the Opus Postumumgives biographers an important historical lesson, even if thecommentator, purely i11terested in the teaching, hesitatesbefore these more or less unorganised thoughts. In thesepages may be perceived the paths, often obscure and sinuous,by which the spirit of an age insinuated itself slowly into thethought of a mind in love with order and set within the rigidstructure of a system.

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SO our biography comes to an end. It has not been thebiograpllY of a man, nor even of a mind, but rather of thebirth, growth to maturity, and disappearance of a livingproblem. In writing the biography of the Critical problemmy intention has been to sho\v, first, how the pursuit of thisproblem can almost be identified with the Kantian spiritand, secondly, how well it unifies his career, a career whicllwas both. serene and outstanding. Unity does not necessarily imply the absence of change. It has therefore beennecessary to trace this unity through a continuous processof evolution and through the frequent changes of perspectivewhich took place during Kant's long and studious life. Inthe interests of accuracy it has been very important to bringto light the direction of this evolution, an evolution whichis not properly understood, in my opinion, unless it is seento involve a tendency towards an increasing idealisatio11 ofthe problem of objective knowledge. The centralisation ofKantian thought around a single problem, and the strengthof the tendency towards idealism in the evolution of thesolution, have been the dominant themes in my interpretation of the Critical philosophy. There are certainly a greatmany other intellectual preoccupations connected with theCritical problem which have not been discussed or whichhave only been lightly touched upon in this volume. Theinterpretation here offered has been givel1 only in outline:the full detailed discussion is contained in my earlier work,of which this volume is merely a resume. I assume that thereader will understand that it was never my intention towrite a biography of Kant. My inte11tion has been themore modest one of attempting to give an account of hisCritical preoccupations.

Ig8

Index of Proper Names

Abicht 152

Adickes 20, 25, 44, 67, 68, 77, 81,180, 187, I8g, IgO, 191

Aristotle 61, 76

Baumgarten 1 I

Bayle 13, 50Beck 157-60, 166, 168-73, Ig6Beguelin 7, 12, 28, 35, 47Berkeley 13, go, 92, 102, logBiester glBilfinger II

Boerhaave 6Boscovitch IS, 14, 47Bradley 17Brastberger 140Burke 43

Cassirer 42, 44Clarke 7, 13, 50Collier 13Crusius I I, 12, 22-4, 26, 28, 3I, 32,

35, 40, 42, 59Cudworth 13

d'Alembert 11,12, Ig, 28de Maupertuis I I, 12, 28, 47Descartes I, 4-6, 20, 24, 34, 36, 102

Eberhard 92, 125, 140-51, 154, 166Erdmann 60Euler 7, 14, 28, 47, 48

Feder 90, 91, 92, 101, 103Fichte 112, 160, 166, 167, 172-6,

187, 195, Ig6Fischer 38, 106Formey 43Foucher 14, 15Frederick the Great 9Frederick III 177

Garve 49, 90, gl, 101, 103Gottschedt 15

Haering 70Hamann 68

Hegel 36, 1 I I

Heinze 62, 66Herder 27, 39, 46Herz 27, 58, 62, 65Hurne 2, 12, 28, 3 1, 32 , 35, 40,

42 , 43, 60, 64, 6g, 76, 92 , 139,14°

Hutcheson 43Huyghens 5

Jacobi 167

Kaestner 47Keill 12

Kiesewetter 179Knutzen 14-17, 19

Lambert I I, 12, 27, 28, 35, 38, 45,46, 57, 90

Laplace 20Leibniz 4, 6, 7, g, la, 13, 15, 19, 20,

21, 24-6, 28, 32, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52,53, 77, 140, 141-5 1, 155, 165

Lindner 39Locke 6, 72 , 77, 139

Maas 141Maimon 139, 157, 168, 173Malebranche 4, 6, 13Marquardt 15l\1eier I I

Mendelssohn I I, 27, 4 1 , 47, 57, 90,92, 1°3

More. 13Mussenbroek 6

Newton 5-8, II, 13, 14, 20, 21, 25,26, 28, 29, 31, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42,48, 51, 55

Paulsen 60Platner 139Plouquet 13, 14, 47Politz 62Pope 17Pyrrhonism 100, 161

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INDEX

Raspe 45Reicke 17, 68, 195Reinhold 91, 125, 126, 140 , 143,

152, 166-9, 172-4Reuss 15Riehl 60Rink 152Rousseau 28, 39, 40, 43Royal Society of London 6Rudiger 12

Schelling 173Schlettwein 173Schopenhauer 91, 106Schultze 14, 15, 91, 139, 140, 157,

168, 172, 174Schutz 91, 92, 143Schwab 152, 195

'8 Gravesande 6Shaftesbury 43Spinoza 4Sulzer 12, 57, 90Swedenborg 38

Tetens 69, 85-8Tieftrunk I 72

Ulrich 92, 93, 98, 103, 140

Vaihinger 180, 196

Windelband 45Wolff 9, 10-14, 15, 22, 26, 28, 29,

33, 141Wright 17, 20

Printed in Great Britain byThomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, Edinburgh

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