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FIVE

The Demographic Factor in China’s Transition1

WANG Feng and Andrew Mason

During the last two and a half decades, China has witnessed demographic change of

historic proportions. It has transformed from a “demographic transitional” society,

one where reductions in mortality led to rapid population growth and subsequent

reductions in fertility led to slower population growth, to a “posttransitional”

society, where life expectancy has reached new heights, fertility has declined to

below-replacement level, and rapid population aging is on the horizon. In the not-

too-distant future – in a matter of a few decades – China’s population will start to

shrink, an unprecedented demographic turn in its history in the absence of massive

wars, epidemics, and famines. In this process, China will also lose its position as

the most populous country in the world.

Demographic changes in China are monumental for reasons in addition to

the shifts in traditional demographic parameters – mortality, fertility, population

growth rate, and age structure. During its economic transitions of the last two

and a half decades, China has also seen migration and urbanization processes

that are unprecedented in world history for their sheer magnitudes. Population

redistribution is inextricably tied to the broad social and economic transitions that

China has undergone, and at the same time, it has also shaped important underlying

conditions, as opportunities and constraints, for China’s economic transition.

At the start of China’s economic reform in the late 1970s, the post-Mao Chinese

leadership established population control as one of its top policy priorities. Having

witnessed rapid population growth during the preceding decades, the leadership

believed population control to be a key measure for ensuring growth in per capita

income – its new political mandate. Discourse on population control led to the

framing of population growth as the root of all evils, shifting public attention to

“overpopulation” and away from political and social problems of the late socialist

era. This neo-Malthusian perspective (Lee and Wang, 1999) led to the elevation of

1 The authors thank Robert Retherford, Yong Cai, Fang Cai, Martin K. Whyte, and Kam WingChan for helpful suggestions and Maliki, Comfort Sumida, and Turro Wongkaren for theirresearch assistance. Mason’s research was supported in part by NIA, R01-AG025488-01.

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The Demographic Factor in China’s Transition 137

population control, along with economic reform, as a “basic state policy” and to

the implementation of the draconian policy of one child per couple (Wang, 2005).

Two and a half decades later, following China’s success in its transition to a

market economy and its phenomenal economic growth, public discourse about

the adverse development effects of China’s large population has faded from view.

The discussion, to the extent that it still exists, has shifted to environmental and

natural resource issues, subsumed under a new mantle of “sustainable develop-

ment.” The demographic factor, curiously, is virtually being “counted out” insofar

as its relationship with economic development is concerned. Despite the change

in discourse, economic success, achievement of low fertility, slower population

growth, and a rapidly aging population age structure, China’s population policy

has remained largely intact. The lack of a serious examination of China’s demo-

graphic realities and its current population policy, just as the lack of a serious debate

on China’s draconian population-control policy two and a half decades ago, denies

the Chinese public and its policymakers the opportunity to understand fully the

role demographic factors have played in China’s economic transition in the past,

and the role it will play in the future.

In this chapter, we focus on three aspects of China’s demographic change during

its economic reforms of the past quarter century. First, we review and summa-

rize major demographic changes in China during this time period. Second, we

consider whether China’s economy experienced a “demographic dividend” that

complemented other favorable development forces during the past quarter cen-

tury. We also consider how future economic prospects are likely to be influenced

by demographic factors. Third, we identify and highlight a number of the social

consequences of China’s recent demographic changes.

TWO AND A HALF DECADES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

Substantial reductions in death- and birthrates predate the implementation of

economic reform programs in the late 1970s.2 Impressive mortality declines raised

life expectancy by more than 50 percent, from the low forties to the high sixties,

between 1950 and 1982, the first post-reform year for which data are available

(Table 5.1).3 Under the government’s family-planning program that promoted

later marriages, fewer births, and longer birth intervals (wan, xi, and shao), the

2 For a review of demographic changes up to the late 1980s, see Lavely, Lee, and Wang (1990).A more in-depth summary and analysis of the Chinese demographic behaviors can be foundin Lee and Wang (1999). Scharping (2003a) provides a comprehensive review and analysis ofChina’s birth-control programs.

3 No reliable estimates of life expectancy exist for the early 1950s. Available estimates of lifeexpectancy at birth based on census and mortality survey data give 42.2 for males and 45.6for females for the period of 1953–1964 (Banister and Preston, 1981; Coale, 1984). Mortalityestimates based on a retrospective fertility history survey conducted in 1987, consisting of atwo-per-thousand sample of China’s population, reported life expectancy of 37.9 and 40.0 forthe period of 1945–1949 and 46.7 and 49.2 for 1950–1954, for males and females separately


138 WANG Feng and Andrew Mason

Table 5.1. Summary demographic indicators, China, 1950–2000

Year

Indicator 1950 1982 1990 2000

Population size (millions) 551.96 1,016.54 1,143.33 1,265.83

Percent urban 11.18 21.13 26.41 36.22

Birthrate (per thousand) 37.0 22.28 21.06 14.03

Death rate 18.0 6.6 6.67 6.45

Rate of natural increase 19.00 15.68 14.39 7.58

TFR – 2.9 2.3 1.6∗

Mean age at first marriage (F) – 22.4 22.1 24.15

Life expectancy (M) 42.2 66.43 66.91 71.01

Life expectancy (F) 45.6 69.35 69.99 74.77

Infant mortality rate (M) 145.85 36.47 32.19 20.78

Infant mortality rate (F) 130.18 34.54 36.83 29.15

Mean household size – 4.41 3.96 3.44

Sources and notes: ∗ indicates authors’ estimate. Population size, percent urban, and crude vital rates are

from various published official Chinese sources; TFR before 1995 are from China Population Yearbook

(1995 and 2000; see discussions in the text); marriage age from China Population Yearbook (2003); life

expectancy under 1950 is for 1953–1964 and is from Coale (1984); infant mortality rates under 1950

are for 1950–1954 and are from Yan and Chen (1993); other mortality numbers are from Li and Sun

(2003).

female mean age at first marriage rose from 19.7 to 22.8 during the 1970s. The

total fertility rate (TFR) declined from 5.7 births per woman in 1970 to 2.8 births

per woman in 1979 (Coale and Chen, 1987).4 By international standards, China

had by and large completed its fertility transition, in the absence of its more recent

one-child policy, by the time its economic reforms began at the end of the 1970s.

Such extraordinary demographic accomplishments did not deter the post-Mao

Chinese leadership from adopting a population policy that was in sharp contrast

to its economic policy. Economic reforms over the last two decades gradually

relaxed the state’s control and returned the right of decision making to families and

individuals. Population policy, on the other hand, further asserted the right of the

state to regulate reproductive decision making that previously had been reserved for

couples and their families. In 1980, the one-child-per-couple policy was formally

announced and promoted nationwide. Popular resistance led to subsequent policy

modifications in the 1980s and spared much of rural China from the one-child

policy by allowing them a second child (Greenhalgh, 1986). Urban China has been

subject to a strict one-child policy for twenty-five years, despite the initial claim that

this was to be an emergency measure. Continued state intervention in reproduction,

(Yan and Chen, 1993). These estimates, however, have only limited value, given the nature ofthe data and the methods by which these estimates were created.

4 The total fertility rate is the average number of births per woman, given current age-specificbirthrates.



in combination with the state’s withdrawal from economic and migration control,

forms the important institutional background for China’s demographic changes

of the last two and a half decades.

Institutional Background of Demographic Change

Three sets of institutional changes are crucial to understanding the demographic

changes occurring in China since the late 1970s. First, economic and social reforms

have shifted the locus of economic decision making from the state to the family

and the individual. Second, a strict birth-control policy, with a recent important

reorientation of family-planning programs, remains in place. Third, a fundamental

shift in migration policy has allowed people to move freely across administrative

boundaries.

In sharp contrast to the socialist planned economy era, when much of the cost

of childbearing was assumed by either the state or the collective, China’s emerging

market economy has increasingly placed the financial burden of raising children on

the shoulders of the Chinese family. Such changes have profound impacts on behav-

iors that relate to demographic changes, ranging from health care and mortality,

to marriage, fertility, and living arrangements. Dissolution of collective farming in

rural China and termination of guaranteed lifetime employment in urban China

increased economic risks among adult Chinese and posed serious concerns for

parents planning for their children’s economic livelihood. Emergence of a labor

market that rewards human capital has clearly intensified the desire and compe-

tition to provide increased and improved schooling for children. With the end of

free education, beyond the government’s nine-year compulsory schooling require-

ment, the cost of education has skyrocketed. Collapse of the rural public health

system and abolition of free health care in urban areas have added health care

cost as a substantial expenditure borne by Chinese families. Finally, an emerging

consumer culture is also encouraging Chinese households to divert expenditures

from rearing children to investment in and expenditures on housing, automobile,

consumer durables, clothing, and recreational activities (Davis, 2000).

The impact of institutional changes associated with economic reform on demo-

graphic behavior is difficult to assess in light of another set of institutional factors:

the Chinese government’s continued policy and efforts in controlling population

growth. Already two and a half decades into its implementation, China has not

signaled if and when it would phase out its one-child policy. The most important

change in China’s birth-control program in the past decade has been improvements

in how the program is implemented, not changes to the policy itself. Starting in

the mid-1990s, implementation of the birth-control program has shifted from

pure reliance on administrative coercion to greater emphasis on service provision

(Winkler, 2002; Kaufman, 2003; Merli, Qian, and Smith, 2004). Stringency of the

birth-planning policy is revealed by a recent analysis of fertility policies at local

levels. By aggregating fertility policies of more than 400 prefectures, the authors



report that at the end of the 1990s, the national fertility level as stipulated by local

policies should be 1.47, well below the replacement level of 2.1. According to these

policies, the majority of Chinese couples, 63.1 percent, could have only one child,

35.6 could have two children, and 1.3 percent could have three children (Wang,

2005; Gu et al. 2007).5 Moreover, the political pressure generated by a 1991 policy

that links birth-control achievement to cadre evaluation has not only encouraged

local officials to compete for lower birthrates within their jurisdictions (Green-

halgh, Zhu, and Li, 1994), but also resulted in false statistics that have corrupted

the nationwide birth-reporting system (Smith, 1994; Zeng, 1996; Merli, 1998; Merli

and Raftery, 2000; Scharping, 2003, 2007).

Chinese demographic behaviors of the last quarter century are further affected

by a third important institutional change, the huge increase in domestic labor

migration following the government’s reversal of its earlier migration-control pol-

icy. The massive volume of migrants from the Chinese countryside to cities, and

between cities and rural areas, has not only fueled China’s economic growth, but

also brought a number of far-reaching demographic consequences. The role of

migration in demographic processes goes far beyond its simple effect of damping

fertility by separating young couples. Young and unmarried women and men often

choose better earning opportunities over marriage and having children early in

their lives. Migration exposed many to the urban consumer culture and the urban

low-fertility environment. At the same time, as often portrayed by the Chinese offi-

cial media, population migration has made monitoring and controlling births more

difficult. Migration opportunities have also resulted in a new household division

of labor and new living arrangements at both the origin and the destination.

Major Indicators of Demographic Change

Population Growth and Fertility

Despite the low fertility level already achieved on the eve of China’s economic

reforms, China experienced a substantial population increase. This increase was

due to population momentum resulting from a large number of young people

entering the reproductive ages, itself a result of the high fertility and declining

mortality of the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1978 and 2000, China’s total pop-

ulation rose from less than 1 billion to more than 1.25 billion, a net increase of

31.5 percent. The population added during these two decades, slightly over 300 mil-

lion, is roughly equal to the increase during the two preceding decades. The rate of

population growth during the 1980s and the 1990s, however, was the slowest in the

life span of the People’s Republic. During the three decades between 1950 and 1980,

5 Couples who could have only one child include those who reside in the one-child policyregions, comprising 35.4 of China’s population, and those who reside in 1.5 children policyregions but could have only one child because their first child is a son. More than half ofChina’s population, 53.6 percent, live in regions with a 1.5 children policy, where a couplewhose first child is a daughter is allowed to have a second birth (Gu et al., 2007).



the population grew at annual rates of 1.82, 2.26, and 1.73 percent each decade.

The growth slowed to 1.46 percent per year in the 1980s and 1.02 percent in the

1990s.6

While it can be said with certainty that China’s population growth rate has

declined to low levels, the exact level of Chinese fertility cannot be stated with the

same degree of confidence, primarily due to a virtual collapse of the birth-reporting

system in the 1990s. In the 1980s, demographic variables were measured with great

detail and accuracy. By the 1990s, few could trust demographic data, particularly

fertility data, which were collected and released by government agencies. From

the early 1990s, scholars report as many as 30 percent of births were not counted

by the family-planning-registration system in selected locales. Problems in birth

reporting and registration started to spread to other official demographic data-

gathering sources, including the midterm census, annual population surveys, and

special fertility surveys. China’s 2000 census, while asserting an underreporting

rate of only 1.8 percent, itself a sixfold increase from the 1990 census, revealed

many apparent anomalies. For instance, the survival ratio between 1990 and 2000

aged 0–4 in 1990 was found to be 1.05 for males and 1.07 for females, suggesting

either undercounting of births in the 1990 census or, less likely, double counting

in the 2000 census (Li and Sun, 2003, p. 38). In addition, most survival ratios for

groups aged 20–29 in 1990 exceed 1.0, an impossible demographic outcome in

the absence of flawed data (or significant in-migration). Not long into the 1990s,

the two main government agencies responsible for collecting fertility informa-

tion, the State Family Planning Commission and the National Bureau of Statistics,

simply gave up their attempt to provide reliable and detailed information on fertil-

ity. Instead, fertility was reported to be “around the replacement level of 2.1 births

per woman.”

The most recent official report of China’s fertility level came with the 2000 pop-

ulation census, but with a number that caused more controversy than comfort.

The census reported a TFR of 1.22 for China as a whole. While releasing such

a number showed courage and candidness on the part of census personnel, no

one in China, including the data collectors, believes it. Such a low number would

put Chinese fertility at a level on par with Italy, lower than Japan, and at about a

third of the level for less developed countries.7 This result was both a surprise and

an embarrassment, because it came after repeated government appeals to report

births accurately in the census and despite promises of not punishing those who

disclosed previously unreported births. It also confirmed the long-held suspicion

that government-released fertility numbers were no longer to be trusted. In a care-

ful political and demographic analysis of six Chinese sources that release fertility

6 These rates are calculated based on annual population numbers published in official Chinesestatistical sources.

7 China excluded from the group of less developed countries. Data for other countries or regionare from the Population Reference Bureau, at http://www.prb.org.



numbers, Scharping (2007) makes a convincing case for confusion and messiness

in Chinese fertility statistics.

The demise of the Chinese fertility-data-gathering system and the unbelievably

low fertility numbers based on official statistics should not be used to dismiss the

possibility of any genuine fertility reduction in recent years. While the Chinese

fertility level in the 1980s showed only a modest downward movement in spite of

the forceful implementation of the one-child policy (Feeney and Wang, 1993), a

number of arguments have been made to suggest that in the 1990s fertility declines

were greater. The broad economic changes in the society and a continued stringent

population-control policy combined have further affected Chinese young couples’

fertility preferences (Merli and Smith, 2002). A direct piece of evidence to such a

change is the postponement of marriage and childbearing in recent years. As shown

in Table 5.1, the average age at first marriage for females rose by nearly 10 percent

in the 1990s, from 22 to 24. Postponement of childbearing due to delayed marriage

and further delaying within marriage can result in a substantial reduction in the

total fertility level and the number of births (Guo, 2000; Guo and Chen, 2007).

Also, while some still believe that current Chinese fertility, at around 1.8 births per

woman, remains at a level not far below replacement, others have maintained that

this number is simply too high (Zhang and Yuan, 2004; Zhang and Zhao, 2006; Guo

and Chen, 2007). Among other reasons, a simple argument is that if the national

TFR is indeed at a level of 1.8, it would imply that the 2000 census missed a third of

all births nationwide, a possibility not many are willing to accept. Moreover, results

from three recent and careful analyses all suggest that the fertility level is around 1.6

children per woman (Cai, forthcoming; Retherford et al., 2005; Zhang and Zhao,

2006).

Mortality and Health

Dissolution of the rural public health care system and reform of the urban public

health care system raised concerns at the start of the reform about their potential

detrimental effect on Chinese health statuses. Early concerns focused particularly

on infant and child health, as immunization and other basic care had previously

been delivered largely by the public health care system. Indeed, mortality improve-

ments stalled during the 1980s (Table 5.1). During the 1990s, however, mortality

decline continued at a pace similar to that found in other developing countries.

Life expectancy increased by about four years for both men and women during

the decade. The level of life expectancy in 2000, 71 years for males and almost 75

for females, is well above the average level for less developed countries (61 and

64 in 2003, respectively) and approaching that of developed countries (72 and 79

for males and females, respectively; http://www.prb.org). A major contributor to

improvements in life expectancy has been a further reduction in infant mortality.

There are, however, strong reasons to believe that these most recent mortality

numbers are too rosy due to underreporting of deaths in the 2000 census (Li and

Sun, 2003). Hence, it is difficult to assess the extent to which mortality conditions



improved during the 1990s, and it is possible that the gains were more moderate

than what is revealed by the 2000 census. Among its many important effects, China’s

continued one-child policy may have had a negative impact on female infant and

child survival, an issue we will return to in a later section of the chapter. An even

more difficult issue to assess is the extent to which reform of the health care system

accounted for the slower declines in mortality.

Migration and Urbanization

In contrast to fertility and mortality declines that began before China’s reforms,

increased migration and an accompanying urbanization process are clearly the

products of the reform era. This is especially the case for a new category of migrants

called the floating population, a unique product of the Chinese political economy

system. Constrained by a number of institutional arrangements, ranging from

household registration control to the land tenure system, these migrants leave

their place of residence for employment elsewhere but do not change their place of

household registration or their place of permanent residence. They are therefore

migrants who float on the surface of society (Chan and Zhang, 1999; Solinger, 1999;

Wang, Zuo, and Ruan, 2002). Over the past two decades, it is the drastic increase

of migrants in this category that has accounted for the rapid increase in the overall

volume of migrants. At the start of the reforms, the number of Chinese migrants in

comparison to its total population was minuscule. Even in 1987, when the Chinese

census first included information on migration, only 15.2 million out of over

1 billion, or about 1.5 percent, reported themselves to be migrants away from their

place of household registration for more than six months (Chan, 2001, p. 131). By

1990, the size of this population increased to 30 million and by 1995, 56 million.

The 2000 census counted 80 million Chinese as members of the floating popula-

tion. Including migrants who had spent less than six months at their destination

would put the estimated number of temporary migrants at 120 million, up from

88.5 million in 1995 (Liang, 2003). Similarly, the annual population sample survey

conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics reports that in 2002, one out

of every ten persons was living in a place (town, township, or subdistrict) that

was not the location of the person’s household registration. In the economically

most dynamic regions of China, such as Guangdong, Fujian, Shanghai, and Beijing,

20–30 percent of current residents had household registrations elsewhere.8 Urban

population growth during the 1990s was also one of the most rapid in China’s

history, with a net gain in the urban population of 157 million. This increase

almost equals the sum of the preceding four decades combined. Massive rural–

urban migration was the most important force for urbanization, accounting for

60 percent of all urban population growth during the 1990s (Chan and Hu, 2003).9

8 Calculated from Yearbook (2003, p. 102).9 The remainder of the growth was roughly equally attributed to rural to urban reclassification

and urban natural population growth (Chan and Hu, 2003).



Household Type and Living Arrangement

Decreased fertility, increased life expectancy, and increased migration have also

contributed to notable changes in the size and composition of Chinese households.

In 1982, a history of high fertility, housing shortages, and other conditions led to

an average household size of 4.4. By 2000, the average household size had declined

to 3.4 (Table 5.1). For urban China, the average household size was barely above

3, reflecting both the rapid decline in fertility over the last two and a half decades

and changing preferences in living arrangements.

A major contributing factor to the decline in household size has been an increase

in the number of one-couple households, not a reduction in the number of

multiple-generation households (those with three generations or more). One-

generation households rose from 4.7 percent of all Chinese households in 1982 to

12.7 percent in 2000. As a result of this change, the percentage of households that

are one generation (including both one-couple and one-person households) rose

from 13.9 in 1982 and 13.5 in 1990 to 22.3 in 2000. While the percentage of three- or

more generation households scarcely changed, the share of two-generation house-

holds dropped from 66.6 in 1982 to 55.9 in 2000 (Zeng and Wang, 2003). Many

of these newly emerged one-generation households are Chinese elderly who live

by themselves. In 1982, 10.7 percent of the male elderly population aged 65 and

above lived alone, 16.9 percent lived with a spouse only, and 67.9 percent lived with

their children. By 2000, these numbers had changed to 8.4, 28.8, and 59.9 percent

respectively. Similar changes are also seen for the female elderly population, but

with a higher share living alone than males: 13.7 percent in 1982 and 10.7 per-

cent in 2000. In urban China, households with elderly only are more prevalent,

with 33.7 percent of the male elderly living with only a spouse in 2000 and only

55.8 percent living with their children (Zeng and Wang, 2003).

IS CHINA’S FERTILITY DECLINE YIELDING DIVIDENDS?

The rationale for China’s one-child policy was a neo-Malthusian perspective on

the relationship between population and development, a view largely dismissed

by mainstream economists. The architects of China’s population policy can point,

however, to the post-reform economic record as evidence of the success of the policy.

This assertion can be questioned on two grounds. The first, discussed earlier, is

the extent to which the transition to low fertility was accelerated by the one-child

policy. The second, considered in this section, is the extent to which fertility decline,

the slowdown in population growth, and changes in age structure contributed to

China’s economic success.

The demographic transition interacts with a fundamental feature of any

economy – its life cycle variation in consumption and production. Humans have

an extended period of economic dependency at the beginning of their lives and,

in modern industrial societies, at the end. During these ages of dependency or

deficit ages, individuals on average consume more than they produce. During the

prime working ages or surplus ages, individuals produce more than they consume.



0.5

0.0

1.5

1.0

2.5

2.0

3.5

(a)

3.0

0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84

Producers

Consumers

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

(b)

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90Age

Po

pu

lati

on

(m

illiio

ns)

1982 2000

2050

Figure 5.1. (a) Age profiles of consumption and production, urban China, 2000 (Note:Profiles normalized to total to one hundred. Source: China National Bureau of Statistics,2000.); (b) Population by age, China, 1982, 2000, and 2050 (Note: Population 85 and olderuniformally distributed in the 85–90 age groups. See text for sources and methods.)

Detailed information about the life cycle of production and consumption in China

is limited. However, the estimated profiles for urban China in 2000 (Figure 5.1a)

are similar to those found in other countries.10

10 The production and consumption values given in Figure 5.1a are estimated from the 2000Urban Family Income and Expenditure Survey for China. Both profiles are normalized toaggregate to 100. Details of the estimation procedure are available from the authors.



Unlike many other populations in the world, China’s population age profiles

contain drastic fluctuations resulting from its unique histories of fertility and mor-

tality change. As shown in Figure 5.1b, in 1982 China’s population age profile

reveals a clear deficit among those aged around 23, a direct result of the Great Leap

Forward famine of 1959–1961. The famine was followed by a baby boom during

much of the 1960s, leading to the excess population aged roughly 15–20 in 1982.

Fertility decline starting in the early 1970s, meanwhile, resulted in a steady decline

in the number of annual births, as shown by the reduction in the number of people

from around age 10 and below. These relatively large and small birth cohorts, as

well as other fluctuations in the population age structure, are carried over to year

2000 and 2050 (projected).

The divergence between production and consumption interacts with changes

in population age structure to generate what is called a demographic dividend

(Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Mason, 2001; Bloom et al., 2002) or more recently

described as two demographic dividends (Mason and Lee, 2006). The first div-

idend arises because the demographic transition induces changes in population

age structure that raise the share of the population concentrated at the productive

ages. The second dividend arises as individual behavior and public policy respond

to anticipated changes in population age structure, for example, increases in the

importance of retirement, as discussed in more detail later. An important point

that is emphasized later is that the demographic dividends are not independent

of the policy environment in which population change is occurring, especially in

China.

The First Dividend

The first dividend measures increases in income per capita that occur because the

productive population is growing at a faster rate than the total population over

part of the demographic transition (for details, see the Appendix to this chapter).

The dividend is not always positive, however. As the demographic transition pro-

ceeds, growth in the working-age population will be slow relative to the retired

population. The effect will be to depress growth in per capita output or per capita

consumption.

Analysis that emphasizes only the variation in productivity with age is incom-

plete. Consumption also varies with age. If the population share of age groups

with low productivity and high consumption increases, the aggregate effects are

magnified in comparison to the consequences of an increased share for an age

group with low productivity and low consumption. Thus, the analysis presented

here uses the support ratio – the ratio of the effective number of producers

to the effective number of consumers – to quantify the first dividend (Mason

and Lee, forthcoming). The support ratio is the ratio of the effective number of

workers (weighted by age-specific productivity) to the effective number of con-

sumers (weighted to allow for variation in consumption by age) (Cutler et al.,



1990).11 Given age profiles of productivity and consumption, output per effective

consumer increases at the same rate as the support ratio grows, which depends, in

turn, entirely on changes in population age structure.

The magnitude and sign of the first dividend vary substantially over three periods

that can be clearly distinguished (Figure 5.2a). From 1982 to 2000, the demographic

dividend was especially favorable, as changes in the support ratio had a strong

positive effect on output per capita. The support ratio increased by 28 percent or

at an average annual rate of 1.3 percent (Figure 5.2a). During the same period,

real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (purchasing-power parity adjusted)

grew at an annual rate of 8.4 percent per year (World Bank, 2004). Thus, the

first demographic dividend accounted for 15 percent of China’s economic growth

between 1982 and 2000.

For the most part, the gains from the first demographic dividend have been

reaped in China. Between 2000 and 2013, the projected support ratio continues to

rise but at a much slower pace. For the entire period the first dividend yields an

increase in output per capita of 4.0 percent, an annual growth rate of 0.3 percent.

The support ratio reaches a peak in 2013 and then begins a sustained, gradual

decline. By 2050, the projected support ratio is only 85 percent of the level reached

in 2013. Growth in output per capita is reduced by 0.45 percent per year between

2014 and 2050 as the first demographic dividend unwinds.

Trends in the support ratio combine changes in the effective labor force and the

effective number of consumers that are of interest in their own right. These are

decomposed in Figure 5.2b. The growth rate in the effective labor force – producers –

peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s at 3 percent per annum. Currently, the

rate of growth is about half that at 1.5 percent per annum and declining steadily.

Growth will cease altogether by 2020 and turn strongly negative thereafter.

These broad demographic trends conceal important subnational variation. In

urban China, where population aging is more rapid, the supply of new labor

market entrants from within cities has already started to shrink. In rural China,

a more lenient birth-control policy and a later start of fertility decline imply a

slower aging process and a stronger labor supply. Thus, better job growth in urban

China combined with urban–rural demographic differences will continue to fuel

urban–rural migration.

In China – and elsewhere – the first dividend is a persistent but ultimately tran-

sitory phenomenon. In China, output per capita is higher by about 10 percent in

2050 than in 1982 due to the first dividend. Were the projection extended further

into the future, the net effect would be even smaller. The contribution to annual

growth in output per worker during the roughly seven decades tracked is negligible.

11 The effective number of producers is measured using the age profile of productivity shown inFigure 5.1 to weigh the population. The effective number of consumers uses the age profileof consumers. Rural profiles are not available, although we hope to explore this more in thefuture (see Appendix for details).



0.8

0.9

1.1

1.0

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

(a)

1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047−1.0

−0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

Support Ratio

Year

Growth Rate ofSupport Ratio

−1.5

−0.5

−1.0

0.5

0.0

1.5

1.0

2.5

2.0

3.5

(b)

3.0

1982 1992 2002 2012 2022 2032 2042

Producers

Consumers

GR

Figure 5.2. (a) Economic support ratio, China, 1982–2050; (b) Effective producers andconsumers, annual growth rate, 1982–2050

However, output per capita is substantially elevated over the demographic transi-

tion. This is an event of considerable economic significance to those alive during

this era. Moreover, the first dividend can have long-lasting effects if it is reinvested

in the form of physical capital, human capital, and/or institutional development.

This possibility is explored in more detail in the next section.

China’s experience is not dissimilar to that of other East Asian economies (Mason

and Lee, forthcoming). To compare China’s demography with that of others, we



Table 5.2. Average annual rate of growth in the support ratio(percent), 1982–2050, China and other selected societies

1982–2000 2000–2013 2013–2050 1982–2050

China 1.28 0.28 −0.45 0.15

Taiwan 1.07 0.01 −0.60 −0.04

Japan −0.18 −0.24 −0.60 −0.42

United States 0.44 −0.46 −0.04 0.01

France 0.40 −0.41 −0.17 −0.06

Note: All values calculated using the income and consumption profiles for 1999

urban China.

Source: For China population data, see text; for Taiwan population data, Depart-

ment of Manpower Planning (personal communication); for Japan, the United

States, and France, the United Nations (2003). Single year of age data interpolated

using Sprague multipliers.

have constructed the support ratio, using the same productivity and consumption

weights employed in the analysis of China, but demographic data for each of the

economies shown in Table 5.2. Taiwan’s pattern is very similar to China’s, although

its transition occurred somewhat earlier. Japan also experienced a dividend, but it

came much sooner than in other East Asian countries. Throughout the 1982–2050

period, Japan’s support ratio is in decline, depressing growth in per capita output

by 0.4 percent per annum for the entire period. Many countries in the West also

experienced rapid growth in their support ratios primarily because of the baby

boom, but many, as illustrated by the experience of France and the United States,

are now in a period of decline (Table 5.2).

Population Aging and the Second Dividend

The first dividend quantifies the effects of the support ratio holding output per

worker constant. The second dividend arises because changes in age structure

influence the processes that lead to the creation of wealth (for details, see the

Appendix to this chapter). A possibility – one that has occurred in other East Asian

economies – is that population aging will lead to rapid accumulation of capital. If

this occurs, the capital intensity of the economy and hence, output per worker will

rise. Traditionally, the effect of population on capital deepening is considered in the

standard neoclassical model that assumes the saving rate is constant (Solow, 1956).

The approach taken here, however, builds on elaborations of the neoclassical model

that treat saving and wealth as endogenous (Tobin, 1967; Mason, 1987; Willis, 1988;

Lee, 1994).

A second possibility is that population aging will produce a rapid increase in

transfer wealth rather than capital. This will be the outcome if the consumption

needs of retirees are met through familial or state-sponsored transfer programs.



Such programs can effectively redistribute resources across age groups, but they do

not create capital and often involve tax policies that undermine work incentives.

With increases in life expectancy, the expected duration of retirement rises.

Individuals must accumulate additional wealth or face substantial reductions in

standards of living during old age. This wealth can come in several forms, however.

One possibility is the accumulation of additional capital. The other is the accu-

mulation of transfer wealth – increases in the obligations of future generations to

provide old-age support either through public pension plans or as part of familial

support systems. Either form of wealth can meet the retirement needs of a grow-

ing elderly population, but increases in capital influence the level of output and

economic growth, while increases in transfer wealth do not (Lee, 1994). A third

possibility is that neither transfer wealth nor capital is accumulated. In this case,

favorable effects on productivity are not achieved and standards of living among

the elderly deteriorate.

The analysis presented here relies on a highly stylized model of the economy.

Suppose the cross-sectional age profiles of production and consumption – the

shape but not the level – are held constant. The profile of production reflects

persistent effects of experience and obsolescence. We abstract from changes in

labor force behavior, for example, changes in retirement behavior and changes

in returns to experience related to increases in educational attainment or other

forces. The profile of consumption reflects preferences about own consumption

and preferences about the consumption of others, reflecting altruism or political

processes.

Under these conditions, changes in China’s population age structure lead to a

substantial decline in the resources that must be reallocated from working genera-

tions to children and a substantial increase in the resources that must be shifted from

workers to the elderly. The shift is quite evident in Figure 5.3a–c, which presents the

distributions of aggregate consumption and labor income by age for 1982, 2000,

and 2050 and the associated age reallocations. These charts are constructed using

the profiles and population age distributions shown in Figure 5.1a,b.12

Two interage flows, from workers to children and from workers to the elderly, are

summarized by the arrows shown in Figure 5.3. The foot of the arrow is located at

the mean age of the outflow from workers and the head of the arrow is at the mean

age of the inflow to recipients. The width of the arrow is the per capita reallocation.

Given golden-rule, steady-state growth, the area of each arrow is equal to aggregate

life cycle wealth that must be maintained to support each age reallocation (Lee,

1994; Lee, 2000). In the case of downward flows from older to younger age groups,

the life cycle wealth is negative because those who are alive are obligated to make

transfers to those who have not yet been born.

12 For a detailed discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of intergenerational transfers, seeLee (1994).


0 5 10 15 20 25AC AY l30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 90

Reallocations to Children

Reallocations to the Elderly

ProductionConsumption

(a)

1,362205

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 90



Production

Consumption

(b)

1,202

377

AC AY l

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 90



Production

(c)

Consumption

617

885

ACAY l

Figure 5.3. (a) Consumption and income profiles, China, 1982; (b) Consumption andincome profiles, China, 2000; (c) Consumption and income profiles, China, 2050

151



Table 5.3. Mean ages and life cycle wealth variables

1982 2000 2050

Mean age of consumption 28.0 32.5 44.4

Mean age of production 37.3 37.8 41.8

Ratio of life cycle wealth to labor income

total −9.2 −5.3 2.6

Support of child dependents −11.2 −7.8 −4.5

Support of elderly dependents 2.0 2.5 7.1

Note: Calculations use age profiles of household consumption and labor

income estimated from the 2000 Urban Income and Expenditure Survey. Esti-

mate of life cycle wealth for the support of child dependents is based on the

mean age at childbearing in 2000 from the population projection for China.

Life cycle wealth calculations assume golden-rule, steady-state growth.

The effects of age structure on life cycle wealth are quite pronounced (Table 5.3).

In 1982, transfers are strongly downward from workers to children, and total life

cycle wealth is more than nine times total labor income and negative – dominated

by the downward flow to children. As population aging proceeds, flows to children

decline and are dominated by flows to the elderly. By 2050, steady-state life cycle

wealth will be 2.6 times labor income. Steady-state life cycle wealth required to sup-

port consumption by the elderly will rise to 7.1 times labor income. The important

implication of Table 5.3 is that population aging in China must lead to rapid growth

in the capital stock, to an enormous expansion of public or familial-based transfer

programs, or to a significant decline in living standards among the elderly.

The magnitude of the second demographic dividend thus depends on the par-

ticular mechanisms used to reallocate resources. Economic reform complicates

the picture in China because the institutions and mechanisms used to achieve

reallocations are a fundamental features of China’s political economy.

Resources can be reallocated from surplus ages to deficit ages in different forms,

relying on different institutions (Table 5.4). Three forms are available in complete

economies: capital, transfers, and credit. Capital can be accumulated at surplus ages;

later, at deficit ages it yields capital income and can be liquidated. An important

point to note is that capital can only be used to reallocate resources from younger

to older ages. Second, those in deficit ages can rely on current transfers from those

in surplus ages. Third, individuals can rely on credit markets. Those at surplus ages

can lend to children relying on loan repayments later in life when they are at deficit

ages. Credit markets play a small role in interage reallocation systems, however,

because of constraints on indebtedness.13

13 Credit could play an important role if children financed their own consumption by borrowingfrom adults with a life cycle surplus. The debt would be repaid when children reached life cyclesurplus ages and their creditors reached life cycle deficit ages. When children’s consumption is



Table 5.4. Reallocation system

Institution

Form Family Market State

Capital Housing Factories Public infrastructure

Consumer durables Inventories State-owned enterprise

Education Farms Funded pension plans

Transfers Childrearing costs Public debt Public education

Support of elderly Public health care

Bequests Unfunded pension plans

Credit Familial loans Consumer credit Student loans

Source: Adapted from Lee (1994).

In a market economy, three institutions are involved in reallocations. In many

societies, the family is the principal institution responsible for reallocating resources

across age groups, and in virtually all societies, families dominate reallocations to

children. Two other institutions, the market and the state, vary in their impor-

tance depending on the economic system. In pre-reform China, market institu-

tions played little or no role and the state played a dominant role. In post-reform

China, the emergence of a market economy and the recognition of private property

have expanded the mechanisms available for resource reallocations with important

economic implications.

Suppose, throughout the entire history under consideration, that the realloca-

tion system for the elderly relied entirely on capital. Prior to reform, this would

assume that the state was implicitly funding pensions by investing in state enter-

prise. After reform, capital accumulation became a combined responsibility of

the family, market, and state. Demographic conditions in 1982, under steady-

state, golden-rule assumptions, would imply a capital–output ratio of 2.6. Demo-

graphic conditions in 2050, again under steady-state, golden-rule assumptions,

imply a capital–output ratio of 7.1. Given simple assumptions, an increase in the

capital–output ratio of this magnitude would lead to a doubling of output per

worker.14 The impact on the rate of growth of output per worker depends on the

time frame over which the capital deepening occurs. Evenly spread over a century,

financed through transfers from parents and, to a lesser extent, the state, there is little demandfor credit for life cycle purposes.

14 Given a Cobb–Douglas production function, the relationship between output per worker andthe capital–output ratio is

Y

L=

(K

Y

) β

1−β

.

Given an elasticity of output with respect to capital (β) of 0.35, a rise in the capital–outputratio from 2.0 to 7.1 would produce essentially a doubling of output per worker.



output per worker would have to grow at 0.7 percent per year. Spread over fifty

years, output per worker would grow at 1.4 percent per year as a result of capital

deepening.15

These calculations are suggestive and omit many complexities. One is that in

pre-reform China a large portion of life cycle wealth, perhaps all, was held as

transfer wealth rather than as capital. Life cycle wealth represented the pension

obligations or the implicit debt of future generations as embodied in the state and

its organs, for example, state-owned enterprises (SOEs). To an unknown extent,

economic reform destroyed that life cycle wealth. A continuing issue in China

will be through what mechanisms and to what extent life cycle wealth should be

replenished. Transfer wealth will necessarily play a major role, because the greatest

obligations are to those who are near or who have already reached retirement. For

them, accumulating capital is not an option, only transfer wealth. The question

then is the extent to which pension obligations are absorbed by the state (taxpayers),

shifted to private firms including SOEs that are privatized, or shifted to families.

A second complication for China is separating the transitional issues associated

with economic reform from the ongoing issues that arise with population aging.

Establishing a large-scale PAYGO pension system would most readily meet the

short-term objective of fulfilling obligations to current pensioners. Such a strategy,

however, could commit China to a path that foregoes the second demographic

dividend.

Direct econometric support for the existence of a second demographic dividend

comes in the form of studies of the effect of demographic factors on aggregate

saving. Saving rates must rise above their equilibrium level to produce an increase

in the capital–output ratio. There is no doubt in East Asia that aggregate saving

rates are well above equilibrium, but there are many competing hypotheses about

why saving rates are so high in East Asian economies. A number of studies have

found evidence to support the view that saving rates have been influenced by

changes in age structure (Mason, 1987, 1988; Kelley and Schmidt, 1996; Higgins

and Williamson, 1997; Deaton and Paxson, 2000) and life expectancy (Bloom

et al., 2003; Kinugasa, 2004). The magnitudes of estimated effects are sensitive to

the methods and data employed.

The available evidence supports the conclusion that the demographic tran-

sition has led to more rapid growth in output per capita in many East Asian

countries where the demographic transition has been especially rapid. China has

clearly enjoyed significant gains in output per effective consumer as a result of the

first dividend. Whether China will enjoy a second dividend remains to be seen.

Demographic change offers an opportunity for significantly more rapid economic

growth, but only if the policy environment is supportive.

15 See Lee, Mason, and Miller (2003) for a dynamic simulation analysis of Taiwan. The simulatedtransition from a low-to-high capital-intensive economy required closer to fifty than to onehundred years.



It would be a serious error, however, to reach any welfare conclusions about

demographic change, in general, and fertility decline, in particular. Two reasons

for this seem to be of particular importance and warrant emphasis. The first is

that capital deepening is achieved by reduced consumption. The resulting growth

in output per worker is not a free lunch but comes at the expense of reduced

material standards of living among those who are saving at such high levels. The

second point is that rapid fertility decline in China may have involved an enormous

sacrifice on the part of parents forced to have a single child. We do not know how

many children would have been born in the absence of the one-child policy. Nor

do we know how to value the costs imposed by the loss of reproductive freedom.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

In addition to the real and potential economic impacts we have examined earlier,

demographic changes in China have also resulted in social consequences that will

have a broad and lasting impact on Chinese society. In the foregoing paragraphs,

we discussed the economic consequences of a rapid aging process in China in terms

of capital accumulation and output. The same aging process will also have other

economic and social consequences, including rising health care expenditure and

the need for family support of the elderly. In the following, we highlight three

further social consequences of China’s recent demographic change: the rising sex

ratio at birth and excess female infant and child mortality, social stratification in

marriage, and increasing regional demographic disparities.

Rising Sex Ratio and Female Child Survival

In the past two decades, following China’s one-child policy, especially the gender-

specific fertility policy that permits rural couples with a firstborn daughter to have

a second child, both the sex ratio at birth and the excess female infant mortality

shot up (Cai and Lavely, 2003; Zhu and Li, 2003).16 In 1982, the sex ratio at birth

was 108.5, only marginally above the normal range of 104–106. After 1982, it rose

sharply, to 114.1 in 1990 and 117.1 in 1995 (Figure 5.4). The most recent census

reported a sex ratio at birth of 116.9 in 2000 (not shown in the figure). While some

female babies are missing due to either sex-selective abortion or heightened female

infant and child mortality, many are simply hidden from government officials and

unrecorded in government censuses and surveys. The 2000 census, for instance,

revealed more surviving individuals aged 10–14 in 2000 than those counted at ages

0–4 in the 1990 census. It also displays a more balanced sex ratio among the same

birth cohorts.

16 A preference for sons will influence the sex ratio at birth to any significant degree only if couplesare resorting to sex-selective abortion. The reported sex ratio at birth may be influenced bygender-specific infanticide. Thus, the one-child policy affects the sex ratio to the extent that itencourages the use of these mechanisms to achieve the desired sex.



0.1

0.0

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995104

106

108

110

112

114

116

118

Excess Female Infant Mortality Sex Ratio at Birth

Figure 5.4. Rising sex ratio and excess female infant mortality, China

Underreporting, however, cannot account for all the missing girls and certainly

not for most of the sharp increase in excess female infant mortality. It is common

to avoid reporting the birth of a female child, but much less common to fake

a female infant death. As indicated by the figures given in Table 5.1, while male

infant mortality experienced two decades of consecutive decline, roughly 40 percent

overall, female infant mortality declined by only about 15 percent, with all the

reduction occurring during the 1990s. In 1982, Chinese female infant mortality was

lower than that of males, similar to most populations without deliberate practices

of gender discrimination against female babies, while in 1990 and 2000, the pattern

was reversed.

A declining trend that can be traced to at least the mid-1930s (Coale and Banister,

1994) has been reversed, with excess female mortality at young ages on the rise

following the implementation of the one-child policy. As shown in Figure 5.4,

excess female infant mortality increased sharply, from around 10 percent in the

late 1970s to 60 percent in 1995.17 Whereas underreporting of female births may

inflate the female mortality rate at young ages, it cannot explain all the increase in the

ratio between male and female infant mortality, as underreporting exists for both

male and female births, though more seriously in the case of females. Moreover,

excess female mortality is not confined to the first year of life, but extends to the

17 Female excess infant mortality is calculated as the percentage of observed female infant mor-tality that is above the expected level. In the absence of deliberate human intervention, maleinfant mortality is normally higher than the female infant mortality rate, by about 20 percent.The expected level of female infant mortality is calculated by multiplying male infant mortalityfor the same period by a factor of 0.833.



young ages of 1–4 as well (Choe, Hao, and Wang, 1995; Zhu and Li, 2003).18 Such

an injustice to females so early in life is one of the most glaring forms of social

inequality directly resulting from China’s birth-control policy.

Social Stratification in Marriage

Demographic abnormalities caused by state policies may combine with other social

forces to produce new forms of social inequality, such as increased social stratifi-

cation in marriage. Public attention has focused on the likely effects of the rising

sex ratio on marriage prospects for men. The reality is that poor Chinese men will

likely be the only victims of the shortage of women.

In the last two decades, there has been a return of the sharply stratified marriage

pattern by social status. Following decades of increasing male marriages, as reflected

in a declining proportion of male bachelors at age 40 and the declining significance

of social status in the likelihood of marriage (Wang and Tuma, 1993), male mar-

riage once again has become an indicator of social privilege. In the early 1980s,

whereas only 0.5 percent of university-educated men were unmarried by age 40,

15.0 percent of illiterate or semiliterate peasants of the same age were still single.

In 1990, the share of unmarried bachelors among the rural poor at age 40 rose

to 19 percent (Lee and Wang, 1999, pp. 80–81). The most recent census reports

that in 2000, nationally only 3.8 percent of males aged 40 were never married.

Among those residing in the countryside, and those with the least amount of

formal schooling, the percentage was 26.5.19 At the highest level of educational

attainment, college and above, only 1 percent of men were bachelors. Such a social

concentration of unmarried males may well worsen as cohorts with increasingly

imbalanced sex ratios reach marriage age. In 2000, for instance, among the least

educated 30-year-old males, about two in five, 44.8 percent, were still unmarried.

Regional Disparities

Regional demographic differences have become more pronounced in China as

economic stratification deepens following the reforms. Differences between urban

18 One encouraging exception to this disturbing reversal of gender patterns is an observedimprovement in female adult mortality. Between the ages of 25 and 50, while male mor-tality rates calculated from the 2000 census are no more than 10–20 percent below that in the1990 census, female mortality rates are consistently more than 30 percent below the levels adecade ago (Li and Sun, 2003, p. 41; Figure 5.4). Both reduced childbearing and improvedmaternal health care can be credited for such an improvement.

19 This and other numbers on marriage are calculated from China’s 2000 population censustabulations (Table 5.3, Long Form). The 2000 census used schooling level instead of literacylevel as a measure of education for those with below a primary school education. The lowestschooling group here includes those who never attended school or attended only adult schools.Adding primary school educated to this group decreases the percentage to 10.98, a numbernearly three times the national average.



and rural areas and between rich and poor provinces portray a demographic profile

that resembles the whole world. China’s most urbanized provinces have fertility

levels that are well below the replacement level and are increasingly relying on a

large influx of migrant laborers to sustain their economic growth. These provinces

are also years ahead in terms of the health status of their populations, compared

with poor provinces.

Estimates of life expectancy based on the 2000 census, for instance, show coex-

istence of a first and a third world in parts of the same country. In 2000, rural male

and female Chinese residents had a life expectancy that was 7.4 and 8.0 percent

below city residents (5.6 and 6.3 years, respectively).20 In 1981, these gaps were at

5.0 and 6.0 percent and in 1989–1990, 3.6 and 5.5 percent.21 These numbers cannot

be interpreted simply as evidence of a growing health gap between urban and rural

China because of changes in the urban–rural definition in the data. There is little

doubt, however, that a persistent gap has existed.22 In 2000, just as in 1981 and 1990,

life expectancy in China’s most urbanized regions, the three centrally controlled

coastal municipalities (Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin), exceeded those of China’s

poorest provinces and those with high concentrations of minority populations by

more than ten years.

Moreover, as shown by the numbers given in Table 5.5, over a period of nearly

twenty years, the mortality gap between these two extreme groups of Chinese

provinces has not closed. While the poorest provinces are among those with the

largest gains in life expectancy, the richest ones are also in this same group. Although

it is more costly and more difficult to reduce mortality at a higher level of life

expectancy, the improvement in life expectancy in China’s poor provinces is rather

modest in comparison with the richer provinces.23

In addition, published data on causes of death report that death due to respira-

tory diseases nearly doubled in rural China between 1980 and 2000, rising from 79

to 142 per 100,000 to become the leading cause of death during the last decade. In

urban areas, respiratory disease ranked fourth, after cancer, cerebrovascular, and

20 Chinese residing in cities (shi) had a male life expectancy of 74.95 and a female life expectancyof 79.2. Those residing in the countryside (xian), had life expectancies of 69.4 and 72.88 formales and females, respectively (Li and Sun, 2003, p. 43).

21 In 1981, the city population had life expectancies of 69.08 and 72.74 for males and females,respectively; countryside populations had life expectancies of 65.56 and 68.36, respectively.In 1989–1990, life expectancies for males and females were at 70.1 and 75.05 for the urbanpopulation, versus rural life expectancies of 67.6 and 70.9 (China population statistics).

22 Urban life expectancy numbers in 1981 and 1989–1990 included population residing in towns(zhen), whereas the numbers in 2000 included population only in cities, not towns. Populationsliving in townships, who are not included in the 2000 urban numbers, had slightly lower lifeexpectancies than those in cities (73.18 and 77.68 for males and females in townships, comparedwith those given in footnote 20).

23 According to the 2003 World Population Data Sheet published by the Population ReferenceBureau (www.prb.org), life expectancy for developed world averaged seventy-six years and forless developed world (excluding China), sixty-three.



Table 5.5. Mortality change in China’s provinces during the reform era

Life expectancy level Percent of national levelLife expectancy

Year Year index (2000)

Province 1981 1990 2000 1981 1990 2000 1981 = 100

Shanghai 72.9 74.9 78.1 108 109 109 107

Beijing 72.0 72.9 76.1 106 106 107 106

Tianjin 70.9 72.3 74.9 105 105 105 106

Zhejiang 69.6 71.8 74.7 103 105 105 107

Shandong 70.1 70.6 73.9 104 103 104 105

Jiangsu 69.6 71.4 73.9 103 104 104 106

Liaoning 70.7 70.2 73.3 104 102 103 104

Guangdong 71.3 72.5 73.3 105 106 103 103

Jilin 69.0 68.0 73.1 102 99 102 106

Hainan – 70.0 72.9 – 102 102 –

Fujian 68.6 68.6 72.6 101 100 102 106

Hebei 70.5 70.4 72.5 104 103 102 103

Heilongjiang 68.3 67.0 72.4 101 98 101 106

Anhui 69.4 69.5 71.9 103 101 101 104

Shanxi 67.8 69.0 71.7 100 101 100 106

Henan 69.8 70.2 71.5 103 102 100 102

Guangxi 70.2 68.7 71.3 104 100 100 102

Sichuan 64.1 66.3 71.2 95 97 100 111

Hubei 65.7 67.3 71.1 97 98 100 108

Hunan 65.6 66.9 70.7 97 98 99 108

Ningxia 65.7 66.9 70.2 97 98 98 107

Shaanxi 65.0 67.4 70.1 96 98 98 108

Inner Mongolia 66.8 65.7 69.9 99 96 98 105

Jiangxi 66.1 66.1 69.0 98 96 97 104

Gansu 65.9 67.2 67.5 97 98 94 102

Qinghai 61.1 60.6 66.0 90 88 92 108

Guizhou 61.6 64.3 66.0 91 94 92 107

Yunnan 61.1 63.5 65.5 90 93 92 107

Xinjiang 60.7 62.6 64.7 90 91 91 107

Tibet – 59.6 64.4 – 87 90 –

National 67.67 68.55 71.40 106

Source: Life expectancy numbers for 1981 are from Mortality Statistics of CPIRC and for 1990 and

2000 are from Yearbook (2003, p. 117). Chongqing and Hainan provinces are not included due to their

recent establishment.

heart diseases. In 2000, the death rate in rural China due to injury, trauma, and

toxicosis more than doubled, compared with 1980 figures, and was twice as high

than in urban areas (Zhao, 2007). These and other demographic disparities will no

doubt further shape China’s regional economies and require more interregional

links.



CONCLUSION

In many ways, China has always been a demographic early achiever. Its mortality

rates declined early and rapidly under a socialist planned economy and public

health system. In this regard, China was much more successful than most other

countries with similar income levels. China’s fertility also declined much faster and

earlier in the development process than elsewhere – due partly to a government

birth-control program that finds no equal in the extent to which it intruded on the

reproductive decisions of couples.

Such a compressed demographic transition positioned China to reap a relatively

large demographic dividend at an opportune time. China’s first demographic div-

idend, deriving from fertility decline, materialized at the same time that China

underwent its most radical economic transitions and faced the strongest unemploy-

ment pressures. The demographic factor was thus favorable in China’s economic

growth during the last quarter century.

Should one conclude that China’s one-child policy was the right course of action?

On several counts, the answer is no. First, fertility was declining rapidly even

before the one-child policy was implemented; thus, only a small portion of the

first dividend can be attributed to the policy per se. Second, more rapid economic

growth came with a potentially large and unmeasured cost. Parents were forced

to have fewer children than they wanted. There is no reason to suppose that the

economic gains outweighed the direct costs on parents who suffered under the one-

child policy. Third, analysis that focuses exclusively on the record to date would

also be fundamentally flawed, because the economic implications of demographic

change will be felt for decades to come.

Being an early achiever brings with it a cost. As we have discussed earlier, as

consequences of such a forced demographic transition, China will soon enter a long

period of decline in labor supply and face a rapid increase in the elderly population

that cannot be reversed easily and quickly. Whereas this aging process may bring

with it a second demographic dividend, this favorable outcome depends heavily

on the achievement of a suitable institutional environment. State-enforced fertility

decline has also resulted in a collapse of the birth statistics collection system, caused

a sustained and sharp increase in the sex ratio and in excess female mortality at

young ages, and forcefully altered the kinship structure for many Chinese families.

These social costs are not only severe but also long lasting.

Moreover, many of the demographic challenges that China faces in the future

will vary sharply by region. China’s rapid aging process, for example, will not take

place evenly across the country, but will vary widely across different locales due to

the history of differential birth-control policies. Urban and rural China, as well as

China’s different regions, vary in almost every demographic aspect: fertility, mor-

tality, age structure, and migration patterns. These demographic differences will

play an important role in defining China’s future economic and social landscape



and will simultaneously increase the need for interregional exchange and interde-

pendence.

APPENDIX: CALCULATING THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND

THE FIRST DIVIDEND

Given the age profile of production, an increase in the population concentrated at

high-productivity ages must lead to an increase in per capita output. The extent to

which the standard of living rises as a consequence may be exaggerated, however,

because consumption, and indeed physiological needs, also varies by age.

The effects of age variation in production and consumption are easily incor-

porated into a simple neoclassical growth model (Cutler et al., 1990; Mason

and Lee, forthcoming). Define the effective number of producers as L (t) =∑a w(a)P (a, t), where w(a) measures age variation in productivity and P (a, t) is

the population of age a in year t. The effective number of consumers is defined in

similar fashion as N(t)=∑a c(a)P (a, t). Output per effective consumer, y(t), is

Y (t)

N(t)= L (t)

N(t)× Y (t)

L (t)(5.1)

or the product of the support ratio (L/N) and output per worker (Y/L).

The rate of growth in output per effective consumer (y) is equal to the rate of

growth of the support ratio (the excess of the rate of growth in the effective labor

force over the rate of growth of the effective number of consumers) and the rate of

growth of output per effective producer ( yl ):

y(t) = L (t) − N(t) + yl (t). (5.2)

The first dividend is captured by changes in the support ratio, that is, the first

two right-hand-side terms in equation (5.2).

Computation of the support ratio requires estimates of age-specific productivity

and consumption weights. These are estimated for China using the 2000 Urban

Survey of Income and Expenditure. The productivity weights are assumed to be

proportional to labor income and the consumption weights are assumed to be

proportional to estimated consumption.

THE SECOND DIVIDEND

The concept of life cycle wealth and its relationship to population age structure is

central to understanding the second demographic dividend. The lifetime budget

constraint implies that the current life cycle wealth of an individual, a cohort, or a

population must equal the present value of the future stream of consumption less



the present value of the future stream of labor income.24 In the absence of intergen-

erational transfers (familial support, PAYGO pension systems, bequests, etc.), life

cycle wealth consists entirely of capital, that is, real assets held by each individual,

a cohort, or the population. Capital represents one form of life cycle wealth.

Transfer systems create another form of life cycle wealth for its participants –

transfer wealth, the present value of net lifetime transfers received by an individual,

a cohort, or a population. A familiar example of transfer wealth is social security

or pension wealth that arises from PAYGO pension programs and consists of the

present value of benefits to be received in the future less the present value of taxes

to be paid in the future. A less familiar example of transfer wealth arises from

childrearing. During childhood, individuals receive transfers directly from parents

or indirectly from taxpayers – schooling, for example. When they become adults,

individuals make transfers to children, directly to their own children or indirectly

to all children in their capacity as taxpayers. Childrearing transfer wealth is the net

present value of all transfers associated with childrearing.

Life cycle wealth is closely related to the direction of resource flows. The life

cycle wealth associated with upward flows – from younger age groups to older

age groups – is positive. Current members of the population can expect to receive

more in benefits than they pay in costs in present value terms. This is possible

because the current population’s wealth includes transfers that will be received

from generations that are not yet born. The flip side of transfer wealth is the

implicit debt imposed on future generations.

The life cycle wealth associated with downward flows – from older age groups to

younger age groups – is negative. Many members of the population have already

received benefits but they have not yet incurred the costs associated with downward

transfers. A newly married couple, for example, faces childrearing costs but may

anticipate few additional transfers from their parents. Hence, their childrearing life

cycle wealth is strongly negative.

Changes in age structure have a major influence on aggregate life cycle wealth. As

shown earlier, China’s young age structure in 1982 must have led to resource flows

that were strongly downward. China’s projected age structure in 2050 will lead to

resource flows that are strongly upward under the assumptions stated earlier. As a

result, the changes in age structure will lead to a shift from negative to positive life

cycle wealth.

The relationship between life cycle wealth and age structure can be readily sum-

marized given sufficiently strong assumptions. Lee (1994) has shown that given

steady-state, golden-rule growth, the ratio of life cycle wealth (W) to labor income

(or consumption) is equal to the difference between the mean age of producing

and the mean age of consuming (AY l − AC ):

W

Y l= W

C= AY l − AC , (5.3)

24 Any bequests are included in consumption.



where the mean ages of producing and consuming are

AY l =ω∫

0

a N(a)Y l (a)da

/ ω∫0

N(a)Y l (a)da

(5.4)

AC =ω∫

0

a N(a)C (a)da

/ ω∫0

N(a)C(a)da.

The mean ages are “dollar-weighted” average ages. The difference between the

two measures the lag in years between the age at which a dollar is earned and the

age at which it is consumed. The greater this lag, the greater is life cycle wealth.

If the population consumes before it produces, on average, its life cycle wealth is

negative.

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