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The definition ofpersonality. IKenneth F. WalkerPublished online: 17 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Kenneth F. Walker (1941) The definition of personality.I, Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 19:2, 172-175, DOI:10.1080/00048404108541164

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DISCUSSION.

THE DEFINITION OF PERSONALITY.

I° By KENNETH F. WALKER.

MR. OIBB, in his ar t ic le "The Definition of Persona l i ty" in the December issue of the Journa l , has done psychologists good service by demons t ra t ing the appall ing au ra of confusion which at present sur rounds the concept of "personal i ty" . I t is high t ime tha t something was done to e l iminate ambiguous usage and the arguments about words in which psychologists excel. The definit ion adopted by Mr. Gibb, however, is not completely sat isfactory, and, as a result, will not achieve his purpose of providing a convention of communicat ion which we might all observe in the interes ts of clari ty.

Fo r Mr. Gibb "persona l i ty" is "a socially revealed hierarchical in tegra t ion of the innate disposit ions and habit react ion tendencies of the individual" (p. 253). The crux of the definition is the phrase "social ly revealed". W h a t is i t tha t is socially revealed? We are told tha t i t is the "self", which is defined as " the organisa t ion of all mental t ra i t s" . "This", writes Mr. Gibb, "is the inner system, not necessari ly revealed socially" (p. 251). Wha t does Mr. Gibb mean here? Does he mean tha t i t is only by knowing the "persona l i ty" tha t we know the "se l f"? Or does he mean tha t the "self" can be known independent ly of the "personal i ty" , but only by the agent himself?

The crucial poin t is how we come to know "the organisa t ion of all menta l t ra i t s" . Clearly, we do not observe it. We observe behaviour and infer certain uniformit ies in it. We never observe the "personality", unless all tha t is mean t by the "persona l i ty" is the behaviour of the agent. There is no point in using the term in this way; it would

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Discuss ion . 173

only mul t ip ly confusions. The only use for the t e rm is to describe a concept. If , therefore, Mr. Gibb means t h a t we can know the "sel f" only by knowing the "persona l i ty" , he involves himself in saying ei ther t h a t we observe behaviour, infer the "pe r sona l i t y" and f rom the "pe r sona l i t y " infer the "self", or tha t the "pe r sona l i ty" is behaviour , which is valueless. The first pos i t ion is l ikewise untenable , ex hypothesi, for, if the "self" be " the o rgan isa t ion of all menta l t r a i t s " , the "persona l i ty" mus t e i ther be coextensive wi th i t or a sub-system of it. I f i t is coextensive wi th the "self", why use the t e rm "pe r sona l i t y" a t all ? Bu t Mr. Gibb expl ic i t ly avoids us ing "persona l i ty" to mean a sub-system of the "self". I f he is consistent, then, Mr. Gibb mus t equate "pe r sona l i ty" wi th behaviour, which is a steri le procedure.

On the other hand, Mr. Gibb migh t mean tha t the "self" can be independent ly known, though only by the agent. I f this is l i te ra l ly t rue , the "self" can never be an object of scientific study. Science can deal only wi th d a t a which are the common p r o p e r t y of all scientists. Otherwise no tes ts of the t ru th or fa l s i ty of propos i t ions could be made. I f a person 's experience conta ins da t a which he cannot com- munica te to ano the r person in some fashion, nobody can possibly check his s t a t emen t s about them. The s implest case of this is the t rave l le r who is the only person ever to visit an unknown country . No one can ever check Sinbad ' s state- ments. I f the agen t knows the "self", then, i t is of no help to the scientific psychologis t unless the agent can communica te his knowledge in some way. Psychology has no use for the not ion of the "sel f" if any th ing is mean t by the t e rm other than a concept, a cons t ruc t ion based on the da t a of "publ ic" experience. Mr. Gibb expl ic i t ly defines the "sel f" in this l a t t e r sense. If , then, the "self" is an inference f rom cer ta in data , and not an inex t r i cab ly p r iva te experience of the agent, the quest ion is: has the agen t access to any da ta to which the externa l observer has no access ?

The evidence is decidedly to the con t ra ry . The ma jo r cont r ibut ion of F r e u d has been to demons t r a t e t ha t in many

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174 Discuss ion .

cases the agent is jus t as l ikely to be wrong abou t the forces producing his behaviour as the externa l observer. Indeed, in m a n y cases he is more l ikely to be wrong. The repor t of the agent is no more t r u s t w o r t h y than the r epor t of the ex te rna l observer. F o r mos t psychologists , the demons t ra t ion t ha t the agent ' s repor t is of ten u n t r u s t w o r t h y will be sufficient to convince them t h a t his knowledge of the "self" is no different f rom our own knowledge of it, and tha t , like ours, i t m u s t be checked wi th all the avai lable evidence before being accepted. To the view t h a t while the agen t ' s inference of his men ta l processes can be no more accura te t han t ha t of the observer, the agent is in possession of more da ta , in the fo rm of his immedia te experience, the coup de grace was long ago given by James . He po in ted out t ha t our experience is never of the present but of the jus t pas t , and t h a t our " immedia te" experience is therefore inferent ia l too. "The a t t e m p t a t intro- spective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch i ts mot ion, or t ry ing to tu rn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks" (Principles of Psychology, Vol. I , p. 244).

I f the agent has no be t te r knowledge of the "sel f" than the observer, there is no po in t in d is t inguishing between the "socia l ly revealed" "sel f" (i.e. the "pe r sona l i ty" ) and the unrevealed "self". There is no unrevealed "sel f" tha t can be s tudied by psychology.

The upshot of al l this is t ha t there is no room for both the concept of the "sel f" and the concept of the "per- sona l i ty" as Mr. Gibb has defined them. One of the t e rms m u s t go, or be different ly defined. I t would be be t te r to keep Mr. Gibb's defini t ion of "pe r sona l i ty" (d ropping the r e d u n d a n t "social ly revea led") , and define the "self" as a sub-system of the "persona l i ty" . A man migh t then be said to have several "social selves", according to the social g roups of which he is a member .

Mr. Gibb could r e t a in his usage of the t e r m "self" by defining "pe r sona l i ty" as a sub-system of the "self". An in idvidual would then be said to have several "personalities".

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DISCUSSION. 175

Such a position is no different from the one just outlined, except that the terms are reversed. I t has the disadvantage of a possible confusion of the several "personalities" with the phenomenon of dissociation known as "multiple personality".

The important thing is to realise tha t we cannot regard the "personality" as the socially revealed "self" without implying that "personality" is synonymous with behaviour. Only if the term be defined as a sub-system of the "self" can a place be found for it, as well as for the concept of "self", as defined by Mr. Gibb. I t would, I think, be less confusing to reverse the terms, making "personality" the more inclusive concept. Provided that Mr. Gibb defines "personality" as a sub-system of the "self", however, the difference between the two positions is not material. Nevertheless, agreement about words would clear the ground for the consideration of real issues.

II . By P. H. CooK.

MR. GIBB in the December, 1940, issue of the Journal has done a service in drawing attention to the confusion in the defining of personality by psychologists. He rightly points out that the wide range in the definitions of personality is due to the comparatively short time that psychologists have been actively interested in this topic. Unfortunately, in an at tempt to survey the subject within the narrow limits of a journal article, Mr. Gibb increases ra ther than decreases the verbal fog which clouds the whole problem.

He groups sixty-six definitions under four headings, namely social integrative, comprehensive integrative, social conglomerate and comprehensive conglomerate. Mr. Gibb's own definition is put in the first category, so I shall restrict my comments to the implications of this for his conclusions. He prefers the social integrative to the comprehensive integ- rative because the lat ter is too inclusive, including under the concept of personality "all traits, physical and mental", while

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