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The Defense Technology Base: Introductionand Overview
March 1988
NTIS order #PB88-192562
Recommended Citation:U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Defense Technology Base:Introduction and Overview–A Special Report, OTA-ISC-374 (Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, March 1988).
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-600517
For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325
(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword
Keeping ahead of the Soviet Union technologically is a central element of U.S.national security strategy, and the Nation spends a large amount of money inorder to do so. In recent years, however, there have been troubling indicationsthat the U.S. technological lead is slipping, and that it is increasingly difficultto maintain a meaningful edge.
These concerns–expressed both by the Administration and within Congress—prompted the Senate Committee on Armed Services to request that the Officeof Technology Assessment (OTA) undertake a major assessment on “Maintain-ing the Defense Technology Base. ’ This special report is the first product of thatassessment. It provides an overview of the subject, including specific concernsabout the health of the defense technology base and the related issues before Con-gress. Subsequent reports will probe aspects of this immense problem in greaterdetail.
Concern centers on the health of those industries, both defense-oriented andcivilian, that provide the technology that winds up in defense systems, and onthe management of the Defense Department technology base programs and tech-nology facilities. Within the Department, management is being reorganized in thewake of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433). This re-port reflects the state of that management system as of February 1, 1988.
The cooperation of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Secretaryof Defense are gratefully acknowledged.
Defense Technology Base Advisory Panel
Walter B. LaBerge, ChairmanVice President of Corporate Development
Lockheed Corp.
Michael R. BonsignorePresidentHoneywell International
William CareyConsultant to the PresidentCarnegie Corp. of New York
Thomas E. CooperVice PresidentAerospace TechnologyGeneral Electric
John DeutchProvostMassachusetts Institute of Technology
Robert FossumDean, School of Engineering and
Applied SciencesSouthern Methodist University
Jacques GanslerSenior Vice PresidentThe Analytic Sciences Corp.
B.R. InmanAdmiral, USN (retired)Chairman and Chief Executive OfficerWestmark Systems, Inc.
Paul KaminskiPresidentH&Q Technology Partners, Inc.
Lawrence KorbDean, Graduate School of Public &
International AffairsUniversity of Pittsburgh
George KozmetskyExecutive Associate for Economic AffairsUniversity of Texas System, andDirector, IC2 InstituteUniversity of Texas, Austin
Ray L. LeadabrandSenior Vice PresidentSAIC
Jan LodalPresidentINTELUS
Edward C. MeyerGeneral, USA (retired)
Robert R. MonroeVice Admiral, USN (retired)Senior Vice President, andManager, Defense and SpaceBechtel National, Inc.
William J. Perryl
Managing PartnerH&Q Technology Partners, Inc.
Richard PewPrincipal ScientistBBN Laboratories, Inc.
Herman PostmaSenior Vice PresidentMartin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.
Judith ReppyAssociate DirectorCornell Peace Studies Program
Richard SamuelsProfessor, Department of Political ScienceMassachusetts Institute of Technology
John P. ShebellManager, RAMP EngineeringCustomer Service Systems EngineeringDigital Equipment Corp.
Michael ThompsonExecutive DirectorIntegrated Circuit Design DivisionAT&T Bell Laboratories
S. L. ZeibergVice President Technical OperationsMartin Marietta Electronics and Missiles
Group
‘Ex officio member from OTA’S Technology AssessmentAdvisory Council.
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Project Staff—Defense Technology Base
Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTAEnergy, Materials, and International Security Division
Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager
Alan Shaw, Project Director
Gerald L. Epstein
William W. Keller
Congressional Research Service
Michael E. Davey
Contributor
Administrative Staff
Jannie Home Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson
Contractor
P. Robert Calaway
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CONTENTSPage
Part I: OverviewChapter 1: Introduction and Principal
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Why Be Concerned? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Principal Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Chapter 2: Summary.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7What Is the Defense Technology
Base? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Department of DefenseMechanisms for MakingTechnology Policy and TechnologyInvestment Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 10
DoD Technology Base Funding . . . . 12The Management of Government
Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Foreign Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13“Dual-Use” Civilian High-Tech
Industries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Defense Industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Supply of Scientists and Engineers 18
Exploiting the Defense TechnologyBase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . 18
How the Defense Department Makesand Implements TechnologyPolicy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Roles of the Component ResearchInstitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Department of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . 24The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration . . . . . . . . . . . 24Other Federal S&T Activities . . . . . 24University Research Programs . . . . 25
Part II: Background and AnalysisChapter 3: Maintaining Defense
Technology Capacity: PolicyOverview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Introduction: An InteractivePerspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Policy and the Health of the DefenseTechnology Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
DoD Technology Base ProgramManagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
DoD Technology Base ProgramFunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
PageManagement of Government
Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Military Dependence on Foreign
Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Health of the Dual-Use Commercial
High-Tech Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Problems in the Defense Industries 46Supply of Scientists and Engineers 51
Chapter 4: Managing Department ofDefense Technology BasePrograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Funding Categories for DoD’s
RDT&E Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54An Overview of Defense Research
Programs (6.1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Technical Review of Research
Proposals and Programs . . . . . . . . 57An Overview of DoD’s Technology
Base Activities in theLaboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Special Technology Base Initiatives 58Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Oversight and Management in theOffice of the Secretary of Defense 61
The Department of the Navy . . . . . . . 64Management of the Navy’s
Research (6.1) Program . . . . . . . . . 64Management of the Navy’s
Exploratory Development andAdvanced TechnologyDevelopment Programs (6.2&6.3A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
The Department of the Air Force, . . . 71Management of the Air Force’s
Research (6.1) Program . . . . . . . . . 72Management of the Air Force’s
Exploratory and AdvancedTechnology DevelopmentPrograms (6.2 and 6.3A) . . . . . . . . 73
The Department of the Army. . . . . . . 75Management of the Army’s
Research (6.1) Program . . . . . . . . . 77Army’s Management of
Exploratory and AdvancedTechnology DevelopmentPrograms (6.2 and 6.3A) . . . . . . . . 78
The Defense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency (DARPA) . . . . . . 80
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CONTENTS—Continued
Page
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Programs and Priorities . . . . . . . . . . 81
The Strategic Defense InitiativeOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82Chapter 5: Research Institutions and
Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Defense Department Laboratories . . . 85
Army Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . 8588 Navy Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Air Force Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . 90Department of Energy National
Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Organization and Management . . . . 93Multiprogram Laboratories . . . . . . 95
National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration Laboratories andCenters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Background, Organization, andManagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Field Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99Other Federal Activities . ..........103
National Science Foundation .. ....103Department of Commerce . .......103Department of Transportation ....105Other Federal Agencies . .........106Small Business Innovative
Research (SBIR) Program . ......107Private Nonprofit Laboratories. .. ...108
Federally Funded Research andDevelopment Centers . ..........108
University Affiliates . ............109Independent Nonprofit
Laboratories . . . . ..............109Glossary of Acronyms . ..............111
FiguresFigure No. Page
1.
2.
3.
4.5.6.7.8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Technology Base Funding,1964-1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Management of the Department ofDefense Technology Base Program . 62Navy Organization for Science andTechnology . . . . . . . . . . . . 65Office of Naval Research. . . . . . . . . . 66Office of Naval Technology . . . . . 68Navy 6.2 Program Structure . . . 69Navy 6.2 Program Strategy . . . . . . . 70Air Force Systems Command R&DOrganization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Air Force Office of ScientificResearch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Army Research and DevelopmentOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Army Materiel Command R&DOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Army Technology Base InvestmentStrategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79Management Structure for DOEField Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93National Bureau of Standards .. ...104
TablesTable No. Page
1.
2.
Department of Defense Fiscal Year -
1988 Funding of Technology BasePrograms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Department of Defense Fiscal Year1988 Funding of Technology BasePrograms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
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Part I: Overview
Chapter 1
Introduction and Principal Findings
WHY BE CONCERNED?
For roughly three decades, U.S. nationalsecurity planning has rested heavily on thepremise that superior technology can offset So-viet advantages in numbers of military per-sonnel and major military equipment. But inthe past few years there has been mountingconcern that the United States is not main-taining the necessary technical lead. If theUnited States cannot maintain a meaningfultechnological lead and there are no fundamen-tal changes in the competition between the twosuperpowers, the nation will be faced with achoice among accepting a significantly de-creased level of security, relying more heavilyon our allies, or making major increases in thesize of its armed forces.
There are several ways to assess a techno-logical lead, but in defense the most importantindicator of technological advantage-perhapsthe only one that ultimately matters—is thetechnological lead in fielded military equip-ment. Wars are not fought or deterred by engi-neering drawings, but by existing forces.1 How-ever, major technical advances that are stillunder development can have profound effectson superpower relationships, as the StrategicDefense Initiative (SDI) has illustrated.
Maintaining a technological lead in fieldedmilitary equipment is a far more difficult taskthan catching up.2 It requires a dynamic, crea-tive, and innovative technology base, as wellas an efficient industrial structure that can rap-idly translate technical developments intomeaningful numbers of effective products in
‘Quality of equipment is not the only factor that matters. Num-bers, particularly numbers of the most advanced equipment ac-tually in the field, are important. So are factors such as train-ing, leadership, geography, and logistics.
‘The difficulty of maintaining a meaningful technological leadmay itself call into question the validity of relying on a strat-egy that requires such a lead. That, however, is a separate topic.This report begins with the premise that the United States seeksto maintain its technological lead.
the field. In trying to close the technology gap,the Soviets have the advantage of followingrather than leading. They can learn from U.S.successes and failures, saving billions of dol-lars by adopting existing technology andavoiding activities already demonstrated to beunpromising. Furthermore, their massive mil-itary production capacity can quickly turn newsystem designs into large numbers of fieldedsystems. The Soviets could never overcome ourlead if they only played catch-up, but they canalso draw on a large and improving technol-ogy base of their own.
There are troubling indications that the U.S.technological lead in fielded equipment, as wellas in some underlying technologies, is eroding.The Defense Department’s position is that “Inrecent years, the U.S.S.R. has significantly re-duced the lead previously held by the UnitedStates and its Allies in technologies of mili-tary importance.”3 Both the time to producethe next generation of major items of equip-ment (tanks, airplanes, ships, missiles, etc. ) andthe time to translate new technological discov-eries into fielded equipment are increasing. Thelatter is particularly ominous because once atechnology is discovered, the United States ismore or less in a race with the Soviets to getit into the field. If, for example, the UnitedStates develops a particular technology 3 yearsbefore the Soviets learn about it, but takes 4years longer than the Soviets do to turn it intofielded equipment, the U.S. lead will have beennegated. Furthermore, if each year the Sovietsproduce three times as many pieces of equip-ment using that new technology as the UnitedStates does, the United States will find itselfbehind in fielded capability.
U.S. equipment tends to be complex andcostly, and therefore tends to get built slowly
‘U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1986,p. 103.
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once production starts. Much time is taken get-ting the “bugs’ out of new systems and train-ing crews to be proficient in their use. Thisreflects a technological emphasis on higher mil-itary performance at the expense of factorssuch as cost and maintainability, and an em-phasis on the technology of design over thetechnology of production. Cost reductions onthe subsystem and component levels generallyfail to translate into less costly systems. Onthe bright side, once the bugs are out, manyrecent U.S. systems have proven more relia-ble, available, maintainable, and operable thantheir predecessors. And as Soviet equipmentbecomes more complex it also tends to beplagued with the problems attributed to U.S.systems.
Congress is concerned over the health of thedefense technology base. Particular concernsinclude the apparently lengthening time totranslate laboratory advances into effectiveand dependable fielded systems; declining U.S.leadership in vital high-technology industries;and a downward trend in the proportion of thedefense budget devoted to the technology base.The Senate Committee on Armed Services hasasked the Office of Technology Assessment(OTA) to examine the health of the U.S. de-fense technology base and suggest options forexploiting its strengths and remedying its
weaknesses. This special report is the firstproduct of that project. It describes the de-fense technology base, presents significanttechnology base problems now facing the Na-tion, and discusses the issues Congress willconfront in dealing with those problems. It alsodescribes how the Department of Defense isorganized to manage its technology base pro-grams and discusses the roles of the major gov-ernment research organizations that contrib-ute to the defense technology base. In thecourse of the discussion it mentions, but doesnot analyze, solutions that have been proposedto some of the problems. These suggested so-lutions, and others, will be explored in laterOTA work.4
The remainder of this chapter presents theprincipal findings of this special report. Be-cause this is an interim product, these arelargely observations of the staff and outsideexperts. Chapter 2 is a summary of the report,which elaborates on the principal findings andprovides background material. Chapters 3through 5 present the data and analyses onwhich these findings are based.
‘Solutions have been suggested and analyzed in the 1987 De-fense Science Board Study on Technology Base Management,Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, March1988.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
The health of the defense technology basedepends on many complex factors and is af-fected by policy in diverse areas. It respondsto actions Congress takes regarding the De-fense Department technology base programs;overall government science and technology pol-icy; and industrial, trade and fiscal strategiesthat are relevant to vital high-technology in-dustries. In deciding what to do about the de-fense technology base, Congress faces twobroad issues:
1. Are the government programs that affectthe health of the defense technology baseappropriately organized, staffed, man-
aged, and funded; and what can be doneto ensure that they are?
2. Do government policies toward industrysupport the existence and maintenance ofa healthy industrial technology base, bothdefense-oriented and commercial, fromwhich defense developments can bedrawn; and what can be done to ensurethat they do?
Resolving these broad issues will entail ad-dressing a number of component issues.
● The defense technology base resides in abroad range of institutions that includes
DoD laboratories, other government labora-tories, universities, private research facil-ities, defense industries, and ‘‘dual-use’ ci-vilian industries. As the civilian industriesmove increasingly to the cutting edge oftechnology, the defense technology base be-comes embedded in—and largely inseparablefrom-the national technology base. The De-fense Department technology base pro-grams are major contributors to the defensetechnology base, but they are far from allof it.
The Defense Department’s system for man-aging its technology base programs hasrecently been overhauled as part of the gen-eral reorganization of the acquisition sys-tem. But it remains to be seen whether thiswill lead to fundamental improvements inthe way technology base programs are plan-ned and managed. One basic question iswhether the system works as well as can beexpected, or whether major improvementscan be brought about.
● Observers in government and industry be-lieve that DoD is finding it increasinglydifficult to attract and keep the skilled man-agement personnel necessary to the func-tioning of its technology base programs.This appears to be, at least in part, a resultof Civil Service salary structures and Con-gress’ efforts to limit the movement of per-sonnel between industry and the DefenseDepartment.
● Funding for technology base programs isparticularly vulnerable during times of tightbudgets. The rapid spend-out rates of tech-nology base programs mean that cuts inR&D go farther toward reducing deficitsthan similar size cuts in procurement pro-grams. And the lack of obvious, tangible out-puts from R&D projects makes the valueof individual programs difficult to define.Technology base programs are particularlyvulnerable to “raiding’ to support programsin procurement or the later stages of devel-opment. Congress will have to determinewhat it thinks are proper levels of funding,which may entail acting as an advocate for
5
technology base funding when DoD seeksto reduce it. The optimal level of funding isdifficult, if not impossible, to gauge ac-curately. However, funding that fluctuateswidely from year to year is inefficient andcan be very disruptive. Congress faces thevery difficult decision of whether it shouldbe actively involved in the selection of tech-nology base programs and the determina-tion of specific funding levels, or whetherinstead it should give DoD managers widelatitude to construct programs withinagreed overall funding levels.
The government laboratories that togetherperform about one-third of the technologybase program work have been the subjectof a vast amount of study and discussion.There has been significant concern over thequality and value of their work, and the abil-ity of the laboratories to attract and keeptop-quality personnel. Many experts per-ceive them as uneven in quality and utility.Suggestions have been made regardingchanging the relationships of some labora-tories to their parent organizations, alter-ing laboratory management structures (i.e.,removing them from Civil Service), and im-proving their ability to compete for and com-pensate researchers.
The United States is becoming increasinglydependent on foreign sources for defensetechnology. Some of this-like increasing in-volvement in NATO cooperative programs—is intentional. But much of it is a conse-quence of the movement abroad of high-tech-nology industries, particularly those thatdeal primarily in the commercial market-place. Reliance on foreign sources makesmore technology available, distributes thecosts of technical advances, and ties the Na-tion closer to its allies. But dependence onothers risks losing access to technology, ifpolitical or economic conditions change. TheUnited States faces basic policy issues ofhow much dependence on others for defensetechnology is advisable, and how much theNation should spend to retain domesticsources of technology.
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The foreign dependence issue is most pro-nounced in the “dual-use” sector: those high-technology industries that sell primarily inthe international commercial marketplace,but provide important technology and prod-ucts as components of defense systems.High-technology products are increasinglymanufactured outside the United States,raising concern that the ability to design atthe leading edge will follow manufacturing,reducing DoD’s access to the technology itneeds. Other nations have national policiesto attract, nurture, and protect high-technology industries. These tax, trade, andother policies contribute to the continuingdeterioration of U.S.-based industries. Fail-ure to counter conditions which cause U. S.-based companies to move offshore will al-low the deterioration to continue, affectingnational defense. If Congress chooses to ad-dress these issues, it is important that na-tional security be part of that consideration.
The defense industry is highly regulated.Government controls and regulations tendto discourage innovative small- and me-dium-sized companies from entering thebusiness and create competitive advantagesfor those companies with experience in thespecifics of selling to the government.Detailed specifications for military hard-ware tend to limit the availability of com-mercial products for defense needs. More-over, many in industry believe that thegovernment maintains an adversarial rela-tionship with industry, to the detriment ofthe defense effort.
There is concern that, in the defense sector,government regulations inhibit both prod-
uct innovation and the application of ad-vanced manufacturing technology to plantmodernization. Companies can recover partof the cost of innovation from the govern-ment through the Independent Researchand Development (IR&D) reimbursements.But this program has been controversial, inpart because it has become complex and dif-ficult to understand.
Despite the United States’ superior gradu-ate education programs, there is concern—particularly within DoD and the defenseindustries-that U.S. citizens are not becom-ing scientists and engineers at a sufficientlyhigh rate.
Many experts believe that the long delaysin getting new technology into the field arisenot in the technology base, but in the subse-quent programs that translate the productsof the technology base into new systems.Full-scale development and productiontimes are increasing, and the longer it takesto develop and build a system, the older itstechnology will be when it finally reachesthe field. Unfortunately, adding new tech-nology to a system already under develop-ment is likely to delay it still further. Insert-ing new technology through retrofittingfielded systems or block upgrades of sys-tems in production might get new technol-ogy into the field faster than waiting foran entirely new system to be developed.Changes in the organizational links amongdevelopers, planners, operators, and tech-nologists also have the potential for speed-ing the progress of technology into the field.
Chapter 2
Summary
WHAT IS THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE?The defense technology base is that combi-
nation of people, institutions, information, andskills that provides the technology used todevelop and manufacture weapons and otherdefense systems. It rests on a dynamic, inter-active network of laboratory facilities, commer-cial and defense industries, sub-tier componentsuppliers, venture capitalists, science and engi-neering professionals, communications sys-tems, universities, data resources, and designand manufacturing know-how. It includes lab-oratories run by the Department of Defense(DoD), other government departments andagencies, universities, and industrial concerns.It draws on the work of scientists and engi-neers in other nations. Information circulatesboth through formal routes dictated by chainsof command, research contracts and otheragreements, and through informal contactswithin specialized technical communities, in-terdepartmental projects, seminars, etc.
Department of Defense technology base pro-grams-and the accumulated results of theseprograms-are an important part of the de-fense technology base, but are far from all ofit. Although DoD officials tend to speak of thedefense technology base and the Departmentof Defense technology base programs inter-changeably, they are not the same. The defensetechnology base is an accumulation of knowl-edge, skills, capabilities, and facilities, whilethe Defense Department’s technology baseprograms are a collection of thousands of in-dividual research projects funded through theDoD budget, the results of which contributeto the defense technology base.
Almost all research and technology develop-ment can be drawn upon in producing defensesystems, so that with the exception of classifiedresearch available only for defense applications,the defense technology base is largely the sameas the national technology base as a whole. Ofcourse, not all technology is of interest for de-
fense applications, and not all is equally acces-sible to defense. Any research published in opensources (e.g., scientific journals) is availablefor use by engineers and scientists for defenseapplications. This includes foreign researchand development, even work done in the So-viet Union. Proprietary work that is conductedby private companies, and remains unpub-lished in order to preserve competitive advan-tages, may also find its way into defense sys-tems as those companies build the systems,subsystems, or components.
There are some practical limitations-ampli-fied by recent government policy–on thetransfer of technology between the defense andcivilian sectors. ’ First, much defense technol-ogy is classified. Hence it is only available tothose working on defense projects. Second, re-searchers and engineers working on defenseprojects tend to forma community that inter-acts through mechanisms such as defense-related professional society meetings. Commu-nication with those in similar fields doing non-defense work exists, but is often more limited.Indeed, in companies that do both defense andcommercial work, engineers in either “side ofthe house” tend to be isolated from those inthe other.
There are also mechanisms that reduce tech-nology transfer and communication from non-defense areas to researchers and engineers do-ing defense work. Companies that develop com-mercial products seek to protect their invest-ments by concealing their best technology aslong as possible. Thus, cutting edge technol-ogy may remain inaccessible to DoD until af-ter it has been introduced into the commercial
‘For example: Department of Defense Directi\e 5230.25, NOIT.6, 1984; and Executi\’e Order 12356. For more detail see Sci-ence Policy Stud~’ Background Report No. 8. Science SupportBy The Department of Defense, prepared by the CongressionalResearch Ser\ice for the Task Force on Science Polic~’ of theHouse Committee on Science and Technology, December 1986.
7
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marketplace. Additionally, some scientists andengineers prefer not to do defense-related work.Finally, regulations on doing business with thegovernment tend to enforce a separation be-tween companies that work for the governmentand those that do not—including separationsbetween divisions of the same company. Know-ing how to do business with the governmentcreates a competitive advantage for some,while government regulations and contractingprocedures present barriers against others. In-deed some observers argue that the problemsof doing government business—close scrutiny,regulation of profits, and excessive militaryspecification of product characteristics-tendto discourage innovative small- and medium-size companies and steer them away from gov-ernment work.
Thus, while in principle the defense sectorcan draw from a very wide technology base,there is some degree of isolation. Not all of thatmore general technology base flows into de-fense applications with equal ease.
DoD organizes its technology base programsinto three categories which provide a workingdefinition of the kinds of work and informa-tion that are considered part of the technol-ogy base. DoD’s technology base programsconsist of research into basic and applied sci-ences (funded under budget category 6.1), theexploratory development of practical applica-tions of that research (budget category 6.2),and the building of prototypes to demonstratethe principle of an application (budget category6.3A). Work funded under the remainder of theDefense Department’s budget for research, de-velopment, test, and evaluation (most of DoD’sRDT&E budget) is not part of the technologybase.’ In DoD jargon, “the tech base is 6.1,6.2, and 6.3 A,” but the defense technology baseis actually the accumulated results of those 6.1,6.2, and 6.3A programs and much more.
‘Strictly speaking, by the Office of the Secretary of Defensedefinition, the technology base programs are 6.1 and 6.2. Tech-nology base plus 6.3A are the science and technology programs.However, these definitions are often used interchangeably, andin recent years common useage has been to refer to 6.1, 6.2,and 6.3A as technology base programs while 6.3B and 6.4 arespecific system developments linked closely to procurement.
Basic research, by definition, is almost en-tirely non-specific in its potential applications.Most could lead just as easily to defense ap-plications, commercial applications, or no prac-tical applications whatsoever. There are, how-ever, a few areas in which the Department ofDefense has a specific interest in basic researchbecause the connection to defense systems isclear. Examples are underwater acoustics (im-portant for submarine detection and hiding)and the physics of explosive nuclear reactions(of obvious application to the nuclear weaponsprograms run by the Department of Energy(DOE)).
As science leads to technology, potential ap-plications become clearer, and a sharper deline-ation of technologies with defense applicationsbecomes possible. Some technologies are almostentirely military while others have little, if any,defense application. This separation is height-ened as military programs become classified.Nevertheless, many technology areas are pur-sued for both military and commercial appli-cations.
As technologies lead to the development ofdefense systems, developments that had beenpursued primarily for commercial reasons can,and do, work their way into the defense sys-tems. Prime contractors call on subcontractorsfor subsystems, and subcontractors call onlower tier suppliers for the components of theirsubsystems. Many of these lower tier supplierssell to both military and commercial buyers,and use their commercial technology to developproducts that are used in defense systems.Commercial components are sometimes de-signed directly into defense subsystems.
A diverse group of organizations contributesto the defense technology base. A large por-tion of basic research is performed at univer-sities, which also train the next generation ofscientists and engineers. University researchis funded by the Department of Defense, otherparts of the federal government (e.g., the Na-tional Science Foundation and the Departmentof Energy), industry, and various private fundsand endowments. DoD’s university researchprogram is growing and appears to have gen-
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erated significant interest in the academic com-munity. There appears to be more interest andcapability than available funding permits DoDto support.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force maintainsystems of research laboratories. Of the morethan 140 individual laboratories, research andengineering centers, activities, and test facil-ities run by the Armed Services (Army, Navyand Air Force), about half contribute signifi-cantly to the technology base. The rest con-centrate on activities such as testing pro-duction aircraft. In addition to conductingresearch, some of these laboratories fund andmonitor research by other organizations.
Other government laboratories–primarilythe Department of Energy national labora-tories, the National Bureau of Standards, andNASA’s research centers–contribute bothdirectly and indirectly to the defense technol-ogy base. DoD contracts with the national lab-oratories and engages in cooperative researchprojects with NASA in areas of mutual inter-est. The results of research conducted at theseinstitutions is generally available to organiza-tions engaged in defense work.
A substantial part of the defense technol-ogy base is embedded in the defense industrialbase, and in the broader national industrialbase. Much of the technology that finds its wayinto defense systems is developed by defensecontractors and subcontractors, and by com-mercial high technology companies. In addi-tion, some companies —e.g., AT&T, IBM, andUTC–run research laboratories that do a greatdeal of basic and applied research, most ofwhich is available for defense applications.
The large defense contractors—e.g., Lock-heed, Martin-Marietta, General Dynamics,McDonnell-Douglas, Rockwell–primarily de-sign, develop, and produce weapons and otherdefense systems. They develop technology in-house and draw on technology developed else-where. They are both users of, and contribu-tors to, the defense technology base. Becausethe defense industry sells only to the govern-ment, it operates under a special set of regula-
tions. 3 And because there is only one customer(albeit one with many branches) and a limitedtype of competition, the defense market hasevolved a unique set of business characteris-tics. There is controversy over whether thisis the most efficient way to produce defensesystems, and how to maintain sufficient ca-pacity to meet surge requirements in the eventof a conflict. These production issues are nota focus of this study, but the business struc-ture of these companies strongly influenceshow they invest in technology. A more rele-vant issue is identifying the best methods forstimulating these companies to develop cut-ting edge technology for defense applications,draw on developments elsewhere, and incor-porate the latest technology into products andproduction.
The industrial sector includes not just thedefense industries that produce major defensesystems, but also civilian industries. The so-called “dual use” industries, which produce pri-marily for the civilian market, provide com-ponents for defense systems, and stimulatetechnological advances that find their way intodefense systems. Perhaps the best-known ex-ample of a dual-use industry is the semicon-ductor industry, the subject of a recent DefenseScience Board study. In addition, laboratoriesrun by companies that do very little defensework provide important basic technology thatis eventually engineered into defense systems.
In some areas, civilian industries merelykeep pace with or lag behind technologies thatare being developed in the defense sector. Butin other areas it is the commercial firms thatdrive the pace of technological development.In general, the Department of Defense exertsstrong influence on industries that are primar-ily devoted to defense and on newly emergingtechnologies. But DoD has far less influencewith industries that have large commercialmarkets. For those industries it is very mucha minor customer: the civilian market shapesthe industry and dictates the large investmentin and consequent rapid progress of technical
‘Those divisions of defense companies that sell in the civilianmarketplace operate differently.
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development. Defense production is a con-sumer of technology from these industries; de-fense interests are far less able to stimulatetechnology development in these industriesthan they are in the defense industries. If tech-nologies that are dominated by the commer-cial market could not be transferred into de-fense applications, the defense sector wouldhave to rely solely on technology developed inisolation, and would likely end up buying lessadvanced technology than is available in thecommercial marketplace.
A major focus of this OTA study is identifi-cation and evaluation of the factors behind theerosion of important dual-use U.S. industries atthe leading edge of technology, and the implica-
tions of this erosion for national defense. Theconcern here is much less shaping technologydevelopment—defense is often a minority cus-tomer with only limited leverage on the indus-tries–than it is ensuring that the technologyand technical capacity will be available whenneeded. If these industries deteriorate substan-tially, the source of the technology will be inquestion, and if they leave the United States,DoD may find that the technology is no longeravailable and secure. Thus DoD has a vital in-terest in the future of these industries. The gov-ernment as a whole has an interest both froma national security perspective and a nationaleconomic perspective, although these two per-spectives may not always coincide.
ISSUES
Maintaining this diverse defense technologybase raises a large number of individual issues,which fall generally into the following sevencategories:
1. DoD’s mechanisms for making technologypolicy and determining investment strat-egy to implement that policy;
2. funding for DoD technology base pro-grams;
3. the management of DoD laboratories andother government research institutions;
4. foreign dependence;5. dual-use civilian high-technology indus-
tries;6. the defense industries; and7. the supply of scientists and engineers.
This section discusses these individual issuesand the concerns from which they arise. Theseissues and concerns raise analytical questionsthat are not generally amenable to definitiveanswers, but provide a basis for analysis andinformed debate. This section also presents—but does not analyze-some solutions thathave been proposed. OTA reports these sug-gestions because they appear to merit explo-ration as Congress considers the issues, butOTA does not endorse them. OTA will exploresome of these proposed solutions in furtherwork on this project.
Department of Defense Mechanismsfor Making Technology Policy andTechnology Investment Strategy
The DoD science and technology programis a complex and sometimes bewildering arrayof 160 program elements encompassing thou-sands of individual projects, whose success isoften difficult to judge. Consequently, thereis widespread uneasiness that DoD may notbe making the most effective use of its tech-nology budget, and that its program may notbe efficiently run. Some critics charge thattechnology base programs do not receive at-tention at a sufficiently high level, that Pen-tagon bureaucracies have no equivalent of acorporate vice president for research and de-velopment. Recognizing this problem, DoD hasrecently taken steps to address the situation.Other observers believe that the managementsystem has developed the wrong focus: thatperformance is emphasized too highly over costand quality, and product technology is empha-sized to the virtual exclusion of process (man-ufacturing) technology.
There is also concern that “requirementspull” and “technology push” may be out ofbalance. Some argue that overly strict appli-cation of relevance tests in determining
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projects to be funded maybe stifling creativity,while others point out that excessive loosen-ing of the ties between research projects andmilitary needs could lead to a technology baseprogram that produces little practical benefit.There is an overriding concern that communi-cations between developers of technology andmilitary operators and planners are not suffi-ciently well developed. Developers could bemore aware of military needs and plannerscould be more attuned to technological oppor-tunities.
Research is by nature disorderly and risky,Its twin goals of seeking breakthroughs–including serendipitous, unanticipated discov-eries—and evolving previous discoveries intouseful applications are somewhat contradic-tory. Overconcentration on either is a prescrip-tion for disaster sooner or later. It maybe thatthe apparent chaos of defense R&D programsis a reflection of these contradictions, and thatit cannot and should not be managed in anymore orderly fashion than it now is. Or it maybe that valuable gains can be made throughmore effective management. Clearly, orderlyevolution can benefit from orderly programs,but overly focused and controlled programswill inhibit the wide-ranging exploration thatproduces breakthroughs.
An area of growing concern is that of highlyclassified or "black" programs.4 Congressionaland bureaucratic oversight of these programsis very limited. Critics charge that black pro-grams retard the diffusion and exploitation ofimportant technology, while providing coverfor poorly managed programs. Others claimthat freedom from excessive oversight allowsmuch more rapid progress and more efficientmanagement. Some observers claim that tech-nology transfers out of black programs slowly,if at all, but others claim that much of the tech-nology in black programs came from “white”programs and only became highly classifiedwhen potential applications were identified.5
‘See, for example, Alice C. Maroni, “SpecialAccess Programand the Defense Budget: Understanding the ‘‘Black Budget, ‘‘Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief IB87201, Dec. 2,1987,
‘Of course, these contentions can only be verified by thosewith access to the black programs. However, both are logical.
Some observers suggest that large-scaledemonstration programs ought to be pursuedas engines of technological innovation. Theypoint out that projects such as Polaris andApollo have served to focus the efforts of crea-tive people and have produced much impor-tant technology. Like Apollo, such projectsneed not be confined to military goals. Somecite SD I and the National Aerospace Plane ascurrent examples of such large-scale technol-ogy drivers. Others fear that such programsconsume too much funding, driving less dra-matic efforts out of existence, and that whileproviding a dramatic stimulus to technical andscientific development they are an indirect andinefficient path to developing the technologythat is desired. These critics argue that suchprograms take on lives of their own, and thatas funding levels decrease the secondary goalof spinning off technology is sacrificed to theprimary goal of completing the program.
Each Service runs its own R&D program,and the Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) coordinates these along with the effortsof the Defense agencies, the Strategic DefenseInitiative Organization, and a few special proj-ects. The Armed Services have different sys-tems for setting R&D policy and for imple-menting that policy. These systems, and OSD’s,have recently been reorganized. (Current orga-nizations for making R&D policy are describedbriefly in a later section of this summary andin more detail in the main body of this report.)It is reasonable to ask whether each Service’smanagement system is optimized for its uniqueneeds, or whether organizing them all alongthe same lines would be preferable, taking thebest features of the three existing systems.Some observers believe that it would be use-ful to adopt management techniques used byother organizations that plan and manageR&D activities, such as private corporationsand foreign governments. They claim thatsome of these organizations are better thanDoD at setting and realizing technological
If few people know about a project, there will be few opportuni-ties to envision other applications for the technology. Very lit-tle technology is born highly classified; it only becomes worth-while to limit access to information when its potentialapplications have been identified.
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goals and moving technology forward intoproducts. Some in industry believe that DoD’ssystems suffer from the lack of a chief techni-cal officer at a very high level, and from an em-phasis on managing programs rather than set-ting policy.
Some observers argue that DoD’s ability toattract and keep skilled management person-nel is declining. They point out that skilled peo-ple can work effectively within a flawed sys-tem, but that even a perfect system cannotfunction well without top-quality people. Theysee these problems flowing at least in part fromlegislated restrictions on career paths, particu-larly those aimed at closing the “revolvingdoor” between industry and government. Peo-ple may be willing to sacrifice salary to servetheir country, but are much less willing to sac-rifice their careers.
Congress faces some fundamental issues re-garding technology base program manage-ment, including that of whether the DoD orga-nization needs yet another shakeup, or a radicalnew management approach. Even if the sys-tem is less than ideal, it may not make senseto reorganize it frequently rather than allowit to settle down and do its job. Congress willbe making implicit or explicit decisions regard-ing the extent to which it should be involvedin detailed problems like organizing the DoDstaff or selecting R&D programs and specify-ing their funding levels. Congress may wishto involve itself in the complex process of se-lecting technologies to be pursued and deter-mining funding levels for each program. Al-ternatively, it may choose to limit its role toensuring that the technology base programshave proper goals, adequate funding, and ca-pable management.
DoD Technology Base Funding
Intimately tied to the issue of how DoDmanages its technology base programs is thatof the funding levels for those programs. Thisis a more immediate issue, since Congress wres-tles with the budget each year. There are con-cerns that current levels may be inappropri-ate, and that within the overall totals funding
may be misallocated. Imbedded in this latterconcern is a worry that tech base programfunding may not be adequately protected from“raiding” to support specific systems devel-opments that are well beyond the tech base.Similarly, there is concern that large develop-ment programs like SD I or the Advanced Tac-tical Fighter tend to drain funds from technol-ogy base programs, and that the increasingemphasis on prototyping will be funded notwith new dollars, but out of the existing tech-nology base program. If the diversion of tech-nology base budgets to support other pro-grams turns out to be a significant problem,Congress may wish to consider taking mea-sures to protect technology base programfunding.
Gauging a proper level of technology basefunding is difficult, as is the allocation of fund-ing within that overall level. Since the outputof a technology base program cannot be meas-ured with any precision, the effect of addingor subtracting any particular sum of moneycannot be calculated as it could be for programssuch as procurement or maintenance. Some ob-servers believe that it is most important tomaintain a level of funding that is predictableand avoids dramatic fluctuations: constantchanges in funding make it difficult to attractand keep staff.
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ac-counts for more than 40 percent of the tech-nology base funding, and almost all of the in-crease in technology base funding since 1981.But SDI is outside the system that controlsthe remainder of the technology base pro-grams. Major changes in SDI could have im-plications for technology base funding as awhole, particularly since many programs thathave more general utility are funded throughSDI.
If Congress sets, or endorses, guidelines onbasic R&D policy issues–such as the properbalance within the program between the or-derly exploration and exploitation of knownphenomena and the search for new break-throughs in areas that are not yet recognized–is there a straightforward methodology that
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can be employed to determine the allocationof funding to implement those guidelines?
The Management ofGovernment Laboratories
There is concern that the large array of gov-ernment research institutions that contributeto the defense technology base does not forma coherent system to support technologyneeds. At issue is whether it could, and whethercoherence is, on balance, desirable. There is alsoconcern that some reorganization or consoli-dation may be in order, particularly among theDoD laboratories, and that they could func-tion more productively if the organizationsthat operate them—or their relationships tothose organizations—were changed.
Many of the Service laboratories are at-tached to systems commands with charters todevelop specific classes of military hardware(e.g., airplanes, communications equipment,missiles). These laboratories are more like prod-uct centers run for their ‘customer’ than theyare technology centers. Others, like the NavalResearch Laboratory, which the Navy viewsas a corporate lab and not a product lab, havegreater latitude in their technical programs.There is concern that important areas of tech-nology may be overlooked because of the nar-row focus of parent organizations, and thatinnovative technologies that might ultimatelybenefit the overall mission of the command willbe overlooked because they do not support thecurrent major products of that command. Fur-thermore, unlike the contractor-operated De-partment of Energy laboratories, DoD’s lab-oratories appear to have a relatively difficulttime shifting as the focus of technology shifts,or otherwise adapting to change. Others be-lieve that a product focus is necessary andproper if the labs are to produce anything use-ful, pointing out that ultimately the task is toput systems into the field. They claim thatmany labs are not responsive enough.
The actions that Congress may wish to takewill depend on understanding whether thereare laboratories with unnecessarily redundantprograms, substandard programs, unnecess-
sary functions, or functions that could be per-formed more effectively elsewhere. Dependingon the answers to these questions, Congressmay wish to take measures to ensure more ef-ficient use of government laboratories—e.g.,closing, merging, or consolidating facilities;altering the command of Service laboratories;making greater use of non-DoD laboratories;or setting up systems to enhance technologytransfer.
Service R&D managers claim that it is be-coming more difficult for the Service labora-tories to attract and keep top technical talent,and that the United States may be risking de-terioration of these important assets that havebeen built up over many years. Civil Servicesalary scales, never competitive with industry,are now in many instances not competitivewith academia either. Aging physical plantsare becoming increasingly less attractive rela-tive to industry and academia. Finally, gov-ernment service is becoming less prestigious.If these trends continue, are there measuresthat Congress could take to make defense lab-oratories more attractive to top scientists andengineers? Changing the management struc-ture of these laboratories to allow compensa-tion beyond that permitted under Civil Serv-ice rules has been suggested. This is being triedon a limited basis at the Naval Weapons Cen-ter (China Lake).
Foreign Dependence
This issue is intimately bound up with thenext two—erosion of important civilian high-technology industries and problems in the de-fense industries. The United States is part ofa global economy, particularly in high-technol-ogy industries. Foreign components are engi-neered into important defense systems, andother nations lead us in some areas of technol-ogy that are key to building defense systems.This is, at least in part, a result of the successof post-war U.S. policy to build up the econ-omies of friendly states. Many economists ar-gue that the United States has no choice butto buy what it wants on a dynamic global mar-ket, and that to do otherwise will have majoradverse effects on our own economy.
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But we are caught on the horns of a dilemma.The least-risk approach from a national secu-rity perspective is to satisfy all our needs fromdomestic suppliers, so that our ability to getwhat we need is under U.S. control alone. Thisis, however, almost certainly not the least-costapproach. And it may ultimately risk losingaccess to important technology that either isnot developed here or can only be developedhere at a prohibitive cost or with a significantdelay. Saving money through foreign sourc-ing, while generally appealing as a principle,can become much less attractive on a case-by-case basis when the specific economic impactsof funding a foreign project rather than itsAmerican alternative are examined.
Thus, some argue that the United States isbecoming (or is in danger of becoming) too de-pendent on others for our defense technology.Others take the opposite position, that we aremissing out by failing to take full advantageof the technological capabilities of our friendsand allies.
Foreign dependence can be helpful and de-sirable, harmful and avoidable, or just unavoid-able. In general, it is a mixture of all of these,complicating policy formulation. In a perfectlycompetitive world market, exploiting the tech-nology of our allies would permit a more effi-cient division of labor, with each nation con-centrating its technological efforts on what itdoes best, rather than duplicating effort andspreading national resources too thin. It wouldallow us to exploit superior foreign technologywhere it exists, by contracting for foreign tech-nology development, licensing foreign technol-ogy, or buying foreign products. In the realworld of today’s marketplace, realizing thesebenefits may require taking measures to en-sure that the U.S. share of this pie is main-tained. Some observers have suggested thatthe United States make a serious effort toexploit foreign technology by establishingorganizations to target, transfer, and exploitleading edge foreign technology. This mightinclude reverse engineering of foreign products(i.e., analyzing them to understand how theyare designed).
But this dependence risks cut-off of suppliesfor either economic or political reasons. For-eign high-technology companies may be reluc-tant to commit resources to design specificitems required by DoD when they find it moreprofitable to turn their energies in other direc-tions. If the United States lacks a base of tech-nical knowhow in a particular technological dis-cipline in which foreign sources cannot beinduced to make developments in militarily sig-nificant directions, the Nation would be facedwith a choice between stimulating domesticdevelopment or doing without the desired tech-nology.
If other nations dominate industries basedon technologies that are important to U.S. de-fense efforts, the United States will have todecide either to buy what it needs from for-eign sources, or to invest whatever is neces-sary to develop and keep a viable domestictechnology and production base. This latterapproach might involve inefficient measuresto ensure domestic markets for domestic sup-pliers.
Ultimately, interdependence among nationsmay prove more advantageous to the UnitedStates than dependence on others. As theUnited States gets more deeply involved inreciprocal buy/sell relationships with its allies(particularly those with whom we have formalalliance ties), the risk inherent in relying onforeign suppliers is mitigated by mutual andinterlocking military and economic depen-dence. Ties and interdependence are the polit-ical basis of alliance cohesion. This is qualita-tively different from a situation in which theUnited States buys high-technology productsin the international marketplace, and is at themercy of the policies (or whims) of othernations.
Interdependence appears to be increasing inboth the defense and commercial sectors.Within NATO, the United States participatesin a number of groups working on cooperativedevelopment programs, and is involved in sev-eral major international development pro-grams. The international nature of high-tech-nology industry has led to interdependence
among companies in various countries for com-ponents and finished products.
Congress is faced with the complex issuesof whether the United States should: 1) exploitforeign technology to a greater degree; 2) lookfor ways to reduce foreign dependence; or 3)encourage development of strategic U.S. high-technology capabilities, insulating them fromforeign competition, or at least preventingdamage from unfair competition. A basic pol-icy issue is how much the United States shouldbecome involved in cooperative defense pro-grams, thereby increasing its dependence onallies and third parties for military technology.The United States will also have to decide howto respond to the movement offshore of high-technology industries that ultimately supplykey technologies to defense systems, and toforeign ownership of U.S. high-technologycompanies.
Resolving these issues will involve under-standing whether, on balance, it is in the na-tional interest to rely on friends and allies forselected military technologies and to allowthose capabilities to diminish in the UnitedStates. This will, in turn, depend on how con-fident we are that our friends will remain ourfriends and technology will remain available.Fostering economic, political, and defense in-terdependence may help. It will also dependon developing criteria to identify those areasin which increased foreign dependence wouldbe desirable or undesirable, and on determin-ing the risks to national security of certaintechnologies moving offshore. Ultimately, theUnited States will have to identify those tech-nologies for which it is most important to main-tain a domestic technology base. It maybe thatsome technologies are so important to nationalsecurity that the United States cannot acceptforeign dependence under any circumstances.This may be particularly so in the case of tech-nologies that are important to many systems.Some believe that dependence for any impor-tant military technology is unacceptable. Real-istically, what are the options to stop thismovement and/or to take compensatory meas-
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ures that will preserve a domestic technologybase despite market forces?
“Dual-Use” CivilianHigh-Tech Industries
The foreign dependence problem is most pro-nounced in those industries—e.g., semiconduc-tors, computers, machine tools, structural ma-terials, and optics— that are vital lower tiersuppliers for defense projects, but do most oftheir business in the commercial marketplace.These industries are the sources of much ofthe innovation in their fields. But the Depart-ment of Defense has relatively little influenceover them.
The degree of foreign dependence varies fromindustry to industry. In some, such as semi-conductors and machine tools, foreign compa-nies hold a majority of the market and controla major share of the technology. In industrieslike computers and materials, the UnitedStates still holds a decisive lead in the tech-nology, but foreign companies are taking anincreasing share of the market. As the marketshares move to foreign companies, the tech-nology is likely to follow. In the past, manymajor technologies began in the defense sec-tor and expanded into commercial markets, re-ducing DoD’s share and leverage. This patternis still strong, although perhaps not as preva-lent as it once was.
These industries are strongly influenced bythe global market. If political or market forcesmove them toward foreign manufacture, for-eign management, or foreign ownership, oraway from developments of interest to defense,that is where they are likely to go. There is atwofold danger in this. First, defense contrac-tors may find it increasingly difficult to ob-tain the latest high-technology products. SomeU.S. manufacturers believe that foreign sup-pliers of machine tools and computer parts sellU.S. companies products employing technol-ogy that is 2 to 3 years behind that of the prod-ucts they sell their domestic customers. Sec-ond, DoD may find it increasingly difficult toinduce those foreign companies that dominate
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a technology to use their R&D talents to de-velop specialized devices for military applica-tions that are remote from most of their busi-ness. Ultimately, if the technical expertisemoves entirely out of the United States, theServices would have little idea what new tech-nical developments they should request of theforeign suppliers. This latter stage would meanan obvious decline in U.S. technological leader-ship over the Soviets, and to some degree aleveling of U.S. and Soviet access to the sameadvanced technology.
The government faces two problems with re-gard to these industries. First, from both de-fense and national economic perspectives, itfaces the problem of keeping these industriesviable here in the United States. Second, it hasthe problem of keeping the companies inter-ested in doing business with the Departmentof Defense.
A number of rules and regulations pertain-ing to doing business with the Department ofDefense inhibit companies from seeking gov-ernment business and limit the flow of com-mercial products into defense systems. Inno-vative small- and medium-sized companies areparticularly discouraged by conditions such asclose scrutiny of their business, “red tape, ”and regulation of profits. Military specifica-tions (MILSPECs) can have much the sameeffect, keeping out high-technology productsthat might be able to do the job but have notbeen designed to meet a complex list of speci-fications. These regulations by and large serveuseful functions, but their utility should beweighed against the roles they play in keep-ing companies and products out of defense.6
They have served to create a situation whereexperience in doing business with the govern-ment is an important company asset in com-peting for more government business, and lackof such experience is a major obstacle to com-panies trying to enter the market. Indeed,within some companies separations exist be-tween divisions that sell to the government andthose that do commercial business, stifling thetransfer of technology within the company.
‘Some in industry see many of these regulations as unfair.
Most modern industrial nations have indus-trial policies and specific bureaucratic organi-zations responsible for industry. The move-ment of high-technology industries offshorecan be attributed, at least in part, to other gov-ernments following policies that nurture theseindustries more effectively than do U.S. pol-icies. Partnerships with industry, and the avail-ability of ‘patient capital, which encourageslong-term results rather than short-term re-turns, are examples of the ways in which othergovernments encourage their industries. De-veloping and marketing high-technology prod-ucts tends to be capital-intensive. The cost andavailability of capital affect both the abilityof companies to undertake long-term develop-ments (which pay off handsomely but not soon)and their ability to rush a product to marketonce it is ready. The schedule for bringing aproduct to market can have a major effect onits share of the market. Some observers believethat the United States should be building thestructure for a government-industry partner-hip to replace the current adversarial relation-ship. As Congress grapples with these prob-lems, it will be important to understand therelationship between government policies andthe deterioration of domestic high-technologyindustries that are important for defense. Arethere realistic policy options that could reversethese trends?
This problem will raise before Congress theissue of whether the United States should havea more active national industrial strategy, andif so, what it should be, and what governmentagency should be responsible for it. It will benecessary to determine how defense needswould be taken into account and balancedagainst other needs in the formulation and im-plementation of that policy. Should the UnitedStates seek to maintain a viable domestic basefor all industrial technologies that are of valuefor defense? Or would it make more sense tostimulate the international competitiveness ofsome U.S. industries and rely on the world mar-ket to meet the needs U.S. companies cannotprovide? If the former is chosen, should theUnited States attempt to maintain, throughgovernment-funded projects, technical capa-
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bilities that are being lost in the commercialsector?
Defense Industries
For most technical developments of militarysignificance, the road from laboratory to fieldruns through the large defense contractors.Each of these companies can perform a vari-ety of important tasks, but their major rolesare as prime system integrators, the compa-nies that assemble the products of subcontrac-tors and component developers into finishedmissiles, airplanes, submarines, etc. Thesecompanies, which both consume and developnew technology, have a unique niche in theeconomy, which results in unique business con-ditions.
There is longstanding concern that theseconditions can inhibit technical developmentand efficient application of new technology.Like many corporations selling in the commer-cial market, defense contractors in the last fewyears have tended to plan for the short termrather than the long term. This de-emphasizesthe value of investing in new technology whichmay only pay off 5, 10, or more years down-stream.
Government procurement habits tend toreinforce this mode of planning. The methodof government contracting has also tended todiscourage both plant modernization and prod-uct innovation: the higher costs of operatinginefficient plants can be charged to the cus-tomer, but the risk of failure due to trying newtechnology cannot. Much of the benefits fromplant improvements–particularly large-scaleimprovements that pay back over relativelylong terms—accrue to the government, furtherdecreasing incentives for companies to fundsuch improvements. Of course, a company thatcan bid lower costs, because it will employ mod-ern manufacturing technology or can producea more capable product due to better technol-ogy, has an advantage in the competition fora contract. But it risks losses if it loses the com-petition despite investing in better technology.Congress may wish to consider whether gov-ernment policies are inhibiting investment in
modern manufacturing technology and what,if anything, should be done to stimulate thesecompanies to develop and invest in better man-ufacturing technology. Related issues arewhether (and how) government policies inhibitthe transfer of technology to defense compa-nies, discourage the entry of innovative com-panies into defense work, or encourage short-term planning rather than long-term planning.What options are available to correct theseproblems?
The IR&D (independent research and devel-opment) program has been controversial, espe-cially within Congress, for many years. IR&Dallows companies to recover some part of thecost of research programs initiated and fundedby the company by treating it as a cost of do-ing business with, and developing products for,the Department of Defense. The cost is recov-ered as an allowable expense, similar to over-head, in contracts with DoD.7 The companiesdecide what areas to work in and keep the com-mercial rights to their work. DoD judges therelevance of the work to defense needs and de-cides how much of the cost can be recovered,within an overall ceiling set by Congress. Theremainder of the company’s R&D costs arefunded out of corporate profits.
In the view of the participating companiesand other experts, IR&D benefits DoD becauseit allows the companies to stay current in areasof technology that are important to defense,and it encourages the generation of researchideas by company scientists and engineers.IR&D is treated very seriously by most com-panies and receives high-level corporate scru-tiny. Industry spokesmen point to long listsof specific systems that have originated inwork funded through IR&D. The companiescontrast this to contract research-which theyalso do—in which, for the most part, govern-ment officials decide what areas to pursue, andexercise greater control over research projects.The companies are concerned that what theysee as overcontrol by DoD will strangle IR&D.
‘The results of IR&D recovery (reimbursement) improve a com-pany’s competitive position by improving its technology base,but the addition to the company’s cost basis reduces its com-petitiveness on future contracts.
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DoD, on the other hand, is concerned aboutkeeping IR&D relevant to defense needs. Theprogram tends to create friction between OSD—which supports the latitude for innovationthat IR&D is supposed to provide–and theServices, who want greater control over howtheir money is spent. Both DoD and industryagree that one benefit of the IR&D programis the communication it forces between gov-ernment and industry researchers.
Congressional and other critics see IR&D aslittle more than a government giveaway, let-ting the companies bill the government for ex-penses they would incur anyway. They assertthat the program is being abused. There is alsoconcern that the incentives of the IR&D pro-gram are oriented toward short-term applica-tions in which relevance can be demonstratedand cost recovered quickly, rather than to long-term advanced technology. One significantproblem of IR&D is its complexity: even if allparties could agree that its goals are worth-while, understanding the mechanisms of theprogram is very difficult. Some have suggestedthat the IR&D program be abolished in favorof simpler means to support company-initiatedR&D.
Supply of Scientists and Engineers
Ultimately, a vibrant domestic defense tech-nology base depends on a steady supply ofhighly capable scientists and engineers. Yetin recent years the rate at which U.S. citizens
become scientists and engineers has fallen be-hind that of our allies and the Soviet Union.Furthermore, a large percentage of graduatestudents studying technical disciplines in theUnited States are foreign nationals, often sup-ported by State and Federal grants and subsi-dies. Although about two-thirds remain in theUnited States at least 5 years after complet-ing their degrees, many go home once their edu-cation is complete (or a few years thereafter),and contribute their talents to foreign compa-nies competing with U.S. high-technology com-panies. As long as these foreign nationals re-main in the United States, they contribute tothe technology base. The fact that so manychoose to study in the United States is an in-dication of the quality of U.S. technologicaltraining.
This raises the issue of whether there is aneed for additional scientific and engineeringmanpower-either across the board or in se-lected disciplines–to satisfy both nationalsecurity and commercial needs, and if so, whatsteps Congress could take to increase the sup-ply. These might include measures to increasethe attractiveness of science and engineeringcareers to U.S. citizens, and measures to in-crease the general quality of education. Con-gress may wish to consider the role of foreignnationals in the defense technology base, andwhether steps are necessary to influence thenumber of foreign graduate students in U.S.universities.
EXPLOITING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE
An important element of getting new tech- cited the VHSIC program as an example ofnology quickly into the field is how well the DoD’s failure to get new technology rapidlytechnology base can be exploited. Indeed, some into the field:observers believe that the major problems lienot in developing or maintaining the technol-ogy base, but in exploiting it, and that the ma-jor source of delay in getting technology fromthe laboratory to the field is not producing anddeveloping the technology, but successfully de-signing it into military systems once it hasbeen developed. Dr. Robert Costello, the Un-dersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, has
While over 60 systems have VHSIC prod-ucts in their plans, VHSIC parts are only inone current, deployed system . . , The technol-ogy is available and proven; and the Japaneseare already using equivalent technology incommercial applications . . .8
8Quoted in Defense Daily, Dec. 3, 1987, p.203.
Exploiting the technology base is not,strictly speaking, part of maintaining it. Butin practice, the two are inseparable. No clearline separates developing technology from de-veloping technology for applications. Part ofcreating a technology is developing the meansto build something based on that technology.It is precisely in this area of manufacturingtechnology that many observers believe theUnited States has sustained the greatest lossesin technological capability. They believe thatthe United States is not so much slipping inapplied science and the development of prod-uct technology, as it is in the craft and know-how of manufacturing devices: process tech-nology must develop along with product tech-nology if the product technology is to appearin actual devices. Moreover, designing a newtechnological advance into a useful device isitself a technology and may draw on severaldisciplines. For example, now that materialshaving superconducting properties at rela-tively high temperatures can be produced, thesearch is on both to find applications for thesematerials, and to fabricate them into usefulforms.
A related problem is that many programmanagers are reluctant to design new technol-ogy into their systems. Over the several yearsit takes a system to go through full-scale de-velopment and into production, the technol-ogy in some of its subsystems and componentsis likely to fall behind the state of the art, espe-cially in areas that are evolving rapidly. Ig-noring new technology results in a system thatis behind the leading edge, but changing thesystem to include new technology will intro-duce delays. Adding, new technology carriesa risk that unforeseen factors will lead to ad-ditional delays. Thus, Service program man-agers have incentives to stay with the tech-
19
nology they know in order to minimize risksof schedule slippage.
One proposed solution is to insert new tech-nology in retrofits to existing systems. Retro-fitting takes less time than new developmentsand, therefore, gets the technology into thefield faster. It also has the advantage of up-grading fielded capabilities without waiting fora new generation of major equipment.
A related approach is to include new tech-nology in scheduled block upgrades of systemsin production. Introducing new technologysubsystems would not have to wait for the de-sign and introduction of an entire new genera-tion of the major system. A company that isnow building a particular fighter airplanemight also be working on an upgraded designthat it would switch over to in a year or two.Both of these approaches are now used to someextent. Both require some degree of prior plan-ning to ensure that new technology can be in-serted with minimum disruption.
Yet another approach is through the organi-zational links between technology and systemsdevelopment. For example, the Air Force hasreorganized its technology base programs tobe closely linked to the systems commandswhich are responsible for developing and buy-ing equipment. This is an approach with at-tractive features, because it is supposed tomake program managers more aware of newtechnology and make technology developmentmore responsive to the needs of program de-velopment, thereby speeding the introductionof technology into systems. But linking tech-nology too closely to development also risksstifling creativity-especially in areas that pro-gram managers do not currently recognize asbeing relevant to their missions.
HOW THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MAKES ANDIMPLEMENTS TECHNOLOGY POLICY
The Defense Department’s ability to man- fiscal year 1988 DoD invested $8.6 billion inage its technology base programs is central to technology base activities. (See table 1.) One-maintaining the defense technology base. In third of the work was conducted “in-house;”
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Table 1 .—Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1988 Funding of Technology Base Programs(in millions of dollars)
Army Navy Air Force DARPA TotalResearch (6,1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $169 $342 $198 $ 8 3 $ 902’Exploratory development (6.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $556 $408 $557 $512 $2,033Advanced exploratory development . . . . . . . . . $319 $227 $754 $202 $1,502Total services and DARPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,437Strategic Defense Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3,604Other defense agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 564Total DoD technology base programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $8,605aThis sum Includes $I1O miflion forthe URl which OSD has not yet allocated among the three SWViCes and DARPA.SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment, 1988, from data supplied by the Officeof the Secretaryof Defense
more than half was contracted to industry,anduniversities performed the rest. Efficient man-agement of the program-deciding what tech-nology base policy is, allocating resources toimplement that policy, avoiding unnecessaryduplication of effort, and ensuring that impor-tant areas donot’’fallbetween the cracks’’thatseparate the elements of the program--will be-come all the more important if budgets becomeincreasingly constrained.
Generally speaking, each Service depart-ment assembles a technology base program tosuit its particular needs. OSD exercises over-sight, and attempts to ensure that these pro-grams are balanced and coordinated into a co-herent whole with those of the defense agenciesand the Strategic Defense Initiative Organiza-tion (which accounts for over 40 percent ofDoD’s technology base program funding). Howall this works in detail is rooted in the struc-tures of the various organizations within OSDand the Services that make R&D policy, butis not entirely determined by them. Thesestructures are still undergoing reorganizationin the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorgani-zation Act (Public Law 99-433). Consequently,what follows may well change in the monthsahead. Once the structures are settled, it maytake even more time for the process to adjustto the structure.
The three Services and the defense agencies(particularly the Defense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency (DARPA)) formulate theirtechnology base programs with overall guid-ance from OSD. The Under Secretary of De-fense for Acquisition has principal responsi-
bility for all RDT&E activities except thoseof the Strategic Defense Initiative Organiza-tion (SDIO), which reports directly to the Sec-retary. For the Services, the principal focusfor this guidance and the principal point ofcontact is the Deputy Under Secretary of De-fense for Research and Advanced Technology(DUSD(R&AT)), a deputy to the Under Secre-tary of Defense for Acquisition. After the Serv-ices have formulated their programs, the roleof the DUSD(R&AT) is to structure the over-all program across service lines in order to elim-inate gaps and overlaps, and enhance the re-turn on investment. DUSD(R&AT) workscontinually with the services to help themachieve mutual interests and balance in theirscience and technology programs. DUSD(R&AT) coordinates activities with other gov-ernment agencies and the scientific com-munity.
Although DUSD(R&AT) is involved in co-ordinating Service programs with those ofDARPA and the other defense agencies, hedoes not have oversight for the technologybase programs of the defense agencies. How-ever, since DARPA contracts most of its pro-grams through the Services, much of its effortin fact receives DUSD(R&AT) oversight. TheDUSD(R&AT) and the directors of all the de-fense agencies except DARPA report directlyto the Director of Defense Research and Engi-neering (DDR&E), who reports to the UnderSecretary for Acquisition. The Director ofDARPA is also the Assistant Secretary of De-fense for Research and Technology (ASD(R&T))and reports directly to the Under Secretaryfor Acquisition.
DUSD(R&AT) runs some programs directly.The Computer and Electronics TechnologyDirectorate of the DUSD(R&AT) manages: theVery High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC)program; the Microwave/Millimeter WaveMonolithic Integrated Circuit (MIMIC) pro-gram; and the Software Technology for Adapt-able Reliable Systems (STARS) program.
The three Service departments maintainstructures for managing their technology baseprograms that are similar in some ways, butnonetheless have significant differences. Eachhas been planned to take into account the pe-culiar needs of the Service, and each is rootedin its own history. Each of the Services con-ducts an annual “top down, bottom up” plan-ning exercise. From the top, each receivesOSD’s annual Defense Guidance Manual (aswell as specific Service guidance), and from thebottom each research institution contributesa technology base plan. Outside advisorygroups and in-house technical directors andstaffs also contribute. Planning includes a re-view and evaluation of the previous year’s pro-grams. It culminates with decisions to startnew programs, continue or terminate existingprograms, or transition programs into a newcategory (e.g., from 6.1 to 6.2).
Of the three Services, the Navy has removedits technology base management institutionsfarthest from its procurement institutions. Butrelevance to Navy needs remains a powerfulfactor in selecting projects, particularly thosebeyond 6.1. Although it has the smallest over-all technology base program, it has the largestresearch (6. 1) program, and performs the larg-est fraction of the work in-house. The 6.1 and6.2 programs are run, respectively, by the Of-fice of Naval Research and the Office of NavalTechnology, both of which report to the Chiefof Naval Research, who in turn reports directlyto the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and theAssistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,Engineering, and Systems. Some Navy labora-tories are run by the Office of Naval Researchand others are run by the Space and NavalWarfare Systems Command (SPAWAR),which also reports directly to the CNO. Untilrecently the laboratories now run by SPAWAR
21
were run by the “buying commands” such asthe Naval Air Systems Command and the Na-val Sea Systems Command. The decisions re-garding 6.2 work to be done in SPAWAR lab-oratories are made by the Office of NavalTechnology. Of the three Services, the Navyhas the smallest advanced technology demon-stration (6.3A) program; it is run directly bythe Office of the CNO (OPNAV).
In contrast to the Navy’s program, whichis structured for finding and developing newtechnology of use to naval missions, the AirForce structure puts greater emphasis on get-ting technology into the field. The Air Force6.3A program, which the Air Force sees astransition money, is five times as large as theNavy 6.3A budget. The technology base pro-grams are run by Systems Command, the in-dividual divisions of which are the Air Force’s“buying commands. ” These divisions run thelaboratories which conduct and manage the 6.2and 6.3A programs. Roughly two-thirds of thework is contracted out. The 6.1 programs areadministered by the Air Force Office of Scien-tific Research, which is also part of SystemsCommand. Within Systems Command, theDeputy Chief of Staff for Technology and Planshas oversight responsibility for the science andtechnology programs, but these programsmust be approved by the Director of Scienceand Technology Programs in the Office of theAssistant Secretary of the Air Force for Ac-quisition. The Air Force has recently taken adecision to treat its technology base programas a “corporate investment’ that deserves afixed fraction of the total Air Force budget.
The Army’s structure is perhaps the mostcomplicated and decentralized of the threeServices. The Army has the smallest headquar-ters staff and relies the most on elements out-side headquarters to run the technology baseprograms. Some aspects of the Army systemare analogous to the Air Force system, whileothers are similar to the Navy ’s. About three-fourths of the science and technology programsare run by the Army Materiel Command (AMC);other S&T programs are run by the SurgeonGeneral of the Army, the Corps of Engineers,and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
22
Personnel. The offices within these organiza-tions that are responsible for the S&T pro-grams all report for oversight by Army head-quarters to the Deputy for Technology andAssessment who, in turn, reports to the com-bined Office of the Assistant Secretary of theArmy for Research, Development, and Acqui-sition (RD&A) and the Deputy Chief of Stafffor RD&A. Within the Office of the Deputyfor Technology and Assessment, it is the Di-rector of Research and Technology who hasresponsibility for planning and coordinatingthe entire technology base program. The ArmyMateriel Command is analogous to the AirForce Systems Command.9 It is organized into
mission-specific “buying commands, ” whichrun laboratories and technology base pro-grams, and Laboratory Command (LABCOM)which, like the Office of Naval Research, runslaboratories and conducts generic research.Under LABCOM, the Army Research Officeis responsible for AMC’s 6.1 programs. Unlikethe Office of Naval Research, the Army Re-search Office has no in-house capabilities andcontracts all of its work out.
The Navy equivalent, the Naval Material Command, was elim-inated a few years ago in a reorganization. The componentcommands-e. g., the Naval Air Systems Command-now re-port directly to the CNO.
ROLES OF THE COMPONENT RESEARCH INSTITUTIONSNearly 200 Federal Government labora-
tories, research and engineering centers, activ-ities, and test facilities contribute to the de-fense technology base. About 65 of these playa major role. Of these major centers, roughly50 belong to the Army, Navy, and Air ForceDepartments, and the rest are run by the De-partment of Energy, the Department of Com-merce, and the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA). Many of the Depart-ment of Energy laboratories are GovernmentOwned Contractor Operated (GOCO) facilities,permitting the hiring of personnel outside theCivil Service system. The defense agencies donot operate laboratories; however, DARPAmaintains a close liaison with some Service lab-oratories.
Army
Within the Army Materiel Command, six“mission specific’ systems commands run re-search, development, and engineering centersthat conduct exploratory and advanced tech-nology development into areas that are specificto the command’s mission, while the Labora-tory Command (LABCOM) operates labora-
tories that are focused on generic research anddevelopment, primarily at the 6.2 and 6.3levels. The Army’s research (6.1) program isalmost entirely contracted out. Some of themission-specific centers are more influentialthan LABCOM, and greatly influence thestructure and priorities of the Army S&Tprogram.
LABCOM runs the Electronic Technologyand Devices Laboratory, the Materials Tech-nology Laboratory, the Human EngineeringLaboratory (the Army’s lead lab for man-machine interface and robotics), the BallisticResearch Laboratory, the Atmospheric ScienceLaboratory, and the Vulnerability Assess-ments Laboratory. It also runs Harry Dia-mond Laboratories, which is involved in a va-riety of areas including ordnance electronics,electromagnetic effects, and advanced elec-tronics devices. These laboratories do most oftheir work in-house, but contract out a sub-stantial portion.
The facilities belonging to the systems com-mands conduct some exploratory develop-ment, but the main thrust is toward the ‘‘ma-
23
ture” end of the S&T program, leading tocomponents, products, and systems. Thesecenters conduct some in-house work, but thebulk is contracted out. For the most part, theybear the names of their parent commands, andtheir missions are specified by their names: theArmaments, Munitions, and Chemical Com-mand; the Aviation Systems Command; theMissile Command; the Tank Automotive Com-mand; the Communications Electronics Com-mand; and the Troop Support Command.10 TheMissile Command Research and Developmentand Engineering Center has the capability tocarry a concept nearly to production almostwithout outside help. The Night Vision andElectro-optical Laboratory, run by the Com-munications Electronics Command, is a rec-ognized leader in infrared and other night vi-sion devices for all three Services.
Navy
The in-house R&D capabilities of many Navylaboratories are substantial, through the techbase and into full-scale engineering develop-ment. Some can carry a system through de-velopment and almost to production, like theArmy’s Missile Commmand Research and De-velopment and Enginering Center does. Atleast one Navy laboratory–the Naval Re-search Laboratory—does a substantial part ofits work as the result of proposals by lab per-sonnel to conduct R&D for the other Servicesand other parts of the government. The Na-val Weapons Center has developed major mis-sile systems to the production stage.
The Office of Naval Research oversees theactivities of several laboratories—including theNaval Research Laboratory, the Naval OceanResearch and Development Center, and theNaval Environmental Prediction Research Fa-cility. The Naval Research Laboratory is theNavy’s principal research laboratory and, insome areas, DoD’s. It conducts a broad-basedprogram that includes such diverse fields as
‘°For example, the Armaments, Munitions, and Chemical Com-mand runs the Armament Research, Development, and Engi-neering Center and the Chemical Research, Development, andEngineering Center.
computer science, artificial intelligence, devicetechnology, electronic warfare, radar, materi-als, directed energy, sensor technology, spacetechnology, and undersea technology.
Aside from ONR’s laboratories, all Navy de-velopment centers and activities are assignedto the Space and Naval Warfare Command.Although these facilities perform 6.2 and 6.3Awork, the emphasis is on development. The ma-jor centers are the Naval Air Development Cen-ter, the Naval Ocean Systems Center, the Na-val Weapons Center, the Naval Ship Researchand Development Center, the Naval SurfaceWarfare Center, the Naval Undersea SystemsCenter, and the Naval Coastal Systems Cen-ter. Science and technology programs in thesecenters include electro-optics, acoustics, micro-waves, artificial intelligence and knowledge-based systems, ocean science, bioscience, elec-tronic materials, structural materials, shipmagnetics, hydrodynamics, and charged par-ticle beams.
Air Force
All of the Air Force laboratories are run bythe systems divisions of Systems Command—Armaments Division, Aeronautical SystemsDivision, Electronic Systems Division, SpaceDivision, and Human Systems Division—insupport of the division’s specific mission. Ex-ploratory and advanced development (6.2 and6.3A) are funded directly by the divisions, whileresearch (6.1) is funded and managed by theAir Force Office of Scientific Research. Thecenters are the Air Force Armaments Labora-tory, the Rome Air Development Center, theGeophysics Laboratory, the Air Force Weap-ons Laboratory, the Air Force AstronauticsLaboratory, the Human Resources Labora-tory, the Aeromedical Laboratory, and theWright Aeronautical Laboratories. The WrightAeronautical Laboratories is a cluster whichincludes the Aeropropulsion Laboratory, theAvionics Laboratory, the Flight DynamicsLaboratory, and the Materials Laboratory.Managed outside Systems Command, but co-ordinated with it, is the Air Force Engineer-ing and Services Laboratory.
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Department of Energy
The Department of Energy’s laboratory sys-tem, established during World War II to de-velop nuclear weapons, has grown dramaticallyin scope and size. About 60 institutions em-ploying 135,000 people and having a replace-ment cost of about $50 billion conduct researchinto physics, chemistry, cosmology, biology,the ecosystem, geology, mathematics, comput-ing, and medicine, as well as a broad range oftechnologies that spring from these disciplines.Nine multiprogram laboratories and 30 spe-cialized laboratories are involved in these fun-damental science and technology activities.These laboratories maintain close ties with aca-demic researchers, often subsidizing part oftheir work at the DOE facilities.
A primary focus of DOE work for nationaldefense is the nuclear weapons programs.Moreover, some of the major multiprogramlaboratories–Sandia National Laboratory,Los Alamos National Laboratory, LawrenceLivermore National Laboratory, and OakRidge National Laboratory–do 10 to 15 per-cent of their work under contract to DoD ondefense related research not directly relatedto nuclear weapons, and most of their work isavailable for exploitation by DoD or its con-tractors. Several other laboratories—Argonne,Brookhaven, Lawrence Berkeley, Idaho Na-tional Engineering Laboratory, and PacificNorthwest Laboratory–do little or no workfor DoD, although they do basic and appliedresearch that is available for exploitation fordefense purposes.
The National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA)
NASA runs a number of major facilities,many of which are dedicated almost exclu-sively to the design and testing of space-launchsystems and space systems. Several others,while they also support the space program,have a broader mandate. The major NASAfield centers are the Ames Research Center,the Lewis Research Center, the Langley Re-search Center, the Goddard Space Flight Cen-
ter, the Marshall Space Flight Center, theJohnson Space Center, the Kennedy SpaceCenter, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.These centers conduct work in aeronautics,space, communications, propulsion, and com-puters, among other fields.
Other Federal S&T Activities
By far, the majority of federal science andtechnology activities with potential defense ap-plications are conducted within DoD, DOE,and NASA. There are pockets of activitywithin other agencies that can, and do, con-tribute to the defense technology base.
The National Science Foundation fundsthree times as much university research asDoD. But NSF conducts no research of its own,and does not contract for research; it funds un-solicited proposals. NSF supports researchprojects in almost every area of science andtechnology.
The Commerce Department’s National Bu-reau of Standards conducts a number of ap-plied research projects that contribute to thedefense technology base. NBS researchers, inpartnership with others from industry, gov-ernment, or academia, investigate areas suchas electronic technology, information process-ing, biotechnology, chemistry, and manufac-turing technology. This partnership arrange-ment is designed to get the technologiesquickly into applications. NBS technical workis carried out in the National MeasurementLaboratory, the National Engineering Labora-tory, the Institute for Computer Sciences andTechnology, and the Institute for MaterialsScience and Engineering.
The Department of Transportation-partic-ularly the Federal Aviation Administrationand the Coast Guard-the Department of Agri-culture, the Department of Interior’s U.S. Geo-logical Survey, and the National Ocean andAtmospheric Administration all share inter-ests with DoD, and conduct some research anddevelopment with potential defense appli-cations.
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University Research Programs
University laboratories perform a substan-tial portion of the basic and applied researchconducted in the United States. They work inall areas of basic research and most areas ofapplied research and exploratory technology.University research is an area of potentiallyhigh leverage for DoD, since DoD funds lessthan 25 percent of it, but has access to almostall of it. DoD has generated great interest in
its new programs for university research; manymore requests have been received than couldbe funded. The two most significant are theUniversity Research Instrumentation Pro-gram, to upgrade laboratory equipment, andthe University Research Initiative, most ofwhich goes to multidisciplinary research pro-grams and programs to promote scientifictraining. DOD has also put money into creat-ing university “centers of excellence” inselected disciplines.
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Part II
Background and Analysis
Chapter 3
Maintaining Defense TechnologyCapacity: Policy Overview
INTRODUCTION: AN INTERACTIVE PERSPECTIVE
The technology base on which our defensivestrategy and capacities rest is a dynamic, in-teractive network of commercial and militaryindustries, laboratory facilities, sub-tier com-ponent suppliers, venture capitalists, scienceand engineering professionals, communicationsystems, universities, data resources, anddesign and manufacturing know-how. Thesehighly interrelated elements of the technologybase are driven by and react to internationalmarket forces and policies of foreign govern-ments that cannot be precisely anticipated bymilitary or civilian planners, Congress, the ex-ecutive branch, Wall Street, or anyone else. YetCongress, even if it cannot exert close control,can do much to affect the general directionsin which the technology base moves—if it isclear about its objectives and willing to incurthe costs.
Conceptually, domestic technological struc-ture can be divided into four broad groupings:1) technologies and industries that are defenseoriented, 2) those dual-use technologies thatrespond both to defense and to commercial de-mands, 3) those that are commercially domi-nated, but are useful for some defense pur-poses, and 4) those that are purely commercialin nature. There will always be extensive grayareas and overlaps when it comes to specificcases. It is also not unusual for particular tech-nologies to start in one area and end up inanother. Historically, analysts have arguedthat the direction of the progression has beenpredominantly from the defense sector into thedual-use arena. But there is substantial evi-dence that the flow from commercial industryhas increased markedly in recent years.
If this shift corresponds to a change in thecenter of gravity for militarily relevant tech-nological innovation and development, then it
may presage or necessitate large-scale altera-tions in the way that business is conductedwithin the Pentagon and in the military sec-tor of the economy. Some analysts argue thatDoD will ultimately have to adapt its procure-ment regulations and contracting proceduresto accommodate private sector business prac-tices if it is to draw efficiently on the vast re-sources of the commercial economy. This wouldentail the elimination of many bureaucratic andregulatory barriers that have inhibited rela-tions between DoD and commercial industryin the past. At a minimum, they suggest, DoDwould have to exchange military for commer-cial specifications where possible.
The use of gallium arsenide (GaAs) wafersfor semiconductor fabrication illustrates thefluidity of technology transition among themilitary, commercial, and dual-use sectors ofthe economy. GaAs wafer technology was de-veloped by the military because of specializedneeds for higher speed processing and radia-tion hardness. Today, it is entering the dual-use category as evidenced by increasing Japa-nese commercial R&D and marketing of GaAsprocesses and products. Japanese Governmentand industrial sources predict that the mar-ket for GaAs and related compound semicon-ductors could exceed $5 billion by 1992.1 Insuch a market, the Defense Department wouldstill be a major customer. But if the marketfor GaAs-related products and processes fol-lows the pattern set by silicon-based microelec-tronics, it would increase by an additional or-der of magnitude by the late 1990s and wouldbecome dominated by the commercial sector.And in that case, significant barriers between
‘Richard C. Eden, et al., “Integrated Circuits: The Case forGallium Arsenide, ” IEEE Spectrum, December 1983, p. 33.
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DoD and civilian suppliers-or a failure of U.S.GaAs producers to enter commercial markets—would have serious implications for the avail-ability of such technologies for weapon sys-tems in the future.
Each year the military Services compile listsof key technologies that are critical to the na-tional defense. These include such dual-useitems as fiber optics, high-temperature super-conductivity, advanced semiconductors, verylarge-scale integrated (VLSI) circuit chips,supercomputing, biotechnology, and advancedmaterials. These are pervasive technologiesthat cannot easily be protected by special ar-rangements between the prime defense con-tractors and the Department of Defense. Inmany cases, they depend on continuous inno-vation on a scale that can only be stimulatedby the competitive forces and the massivecapitalization generated by commercial mar-kets. At the same time, national assets in dual-use technologies appear especially vulnerableto erosion by world market forces as well asdomestic fiscal, monetary, antitrust, and taxpolicies which have tended to encourage off-shore production.
An initial step in disaggregating the tech-nology base is to isolate a specific technologyand ask how and to what degree it contributesto the national security. Is the orientation pri-marily to promote military security, or is it tocontribute to economic competitiveness, orboth? When this exercise is conducted, sometechnologies appear uniquely military in char-acter, such as “brilliant” guidance, high-powerdirected energy, and broad spectrum signaturecontrol. It is difficult to imagine civilian ap-plications to which these technologies couldprofitably be put. Indeed, some are contra-indicated, such as the application of stealthtechnologies to commercial aviation.
But the matter does not end there. What themilitary calls brilliant guidance is a subspeciesof precision navigation, and precision naviga-tion technologies are used in commercial prod-ucts. If the technology is traced backward fromthe military systems or prime contractor level,
many of the subsystems and componentswould have much in common with a range ofcommercial products. The subsystems that gointo brilliant guidance include computers, so-phisticated microchips, sensors, mapping sys-tems, and inertial guidance equipment. Theseare usually produced to military specificationby second and third tier military subcontrac-tors. But if these subsystems are further dis-aggregate, it is clear that some of the enabl-ing and many of the pervasive2 technologyproducts will have been ordered off the shelffrom suppliers whose business is primarily ori-ented toward civilian buyers.
The task of specifying technologies that arecivilian or uniquely commercial is equally dif-ficult. Even agricultural and medical technol-ogies that are developed and marketed specif-ically to the commercial sector of the economyhave military applications. Food produced bymeans of new fertilization, genetic alteration,and pest control technologies will be consumedby soldiers. And many commercial medicaltechnologies, which are quickly adopted by mil-itary doctors, would become even more valu-able and critical to the Armed Services in timeof war.
The question is not whether a particular tech-nology contributes to national security or toeconomic competitiveness goals, but rather,what actions Congress can take to ensure thatDoD will be able to obtain technology that isnecessary for the national defense in the fu-ture. In part the policy question turns on theissue of how the Department of Defense shouldinvest $170 billion annually in procurementand RTD&E to maximize military security. Itis also a question of how best to stimulate andorganize the techno-industrial infrastructurethat supports both national economic and secu-rity goals.
‘The term “enabling technology is used in some military cir-cles to designate a technology that makes possible the develop-ment of a specific weapons system, and “pervasive technologies”are those that can be applied to more than one—hopefullymany—system concepts. Project Forecast 11, Find Report [u],vol. 1, Director’s Report [u], June 1986, pp. 7-8.
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POLICY AND THE HEALTH OF THEDEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE
In OTA’s discussions with OSD and the in-dividual Services, and with lab directors, aca-demics, contractors, critics, businesspersons,congressional staff, high-ranking military offi-cials, and others, a wide array of questions andconcerns were voiced regarding the overall vi-tality of the technology and industrial sectorson which the national defense relies. These aregrouped below in seven issue areas: 1) DoDtechnology base management, 2) funding forDoD technology base programs, 3) manage-ment of government laboratories, 4) militarydependence on foreign technology, 5) healthof the dual-use sector, 6) problems in the de-fense industries, and 7) supply of scientists andengineers.
DoD Technology BaseProgram Management
The fiscal year 1988 DoD Science and Tech-nology Program is an $8.6 billion enterpriseinvolving a complex matrix of DoD labora-tories, research and development centers,universities, non-profit organizations, and in-dustry. It includes the technology base pro-grams of the Services, as well as those of theStrategic Defense Initiative Organization(SDIO), the Defense Advanced Research Proj-ects Agency (DARPA), and the other defenseagencies. (The structure of the DoD technol-ogy base program is described in chapter 4 ofthis report.)
Perhaps because of the magnitude of theS&T program, DoD technology policy lacksfocus when it is compared to R&D programsin industry. There is no single chief technol-ogy officer as is found in large corporations.Instead, science and technology policy andstrategy are formulated by a network of indi-viduals located in diverse offices spread acrossthe formal structure of the DoD S&T program.A principal concern is that this network maynot be capable of producing a coherent, coordi-nated policy, and that techniques used to im-
plement current policies may be insufficientto manage effectively an enterprise of this mag-nitude.
Stemming from this concern, recent discus-sion has focused on four basic issues that af-fect the overall shape and functioning of sci-ence and technology programs within DoD.First, is the question of how best to balance“technology push” against “requirementspull. ” On the requirements side, the basicthrust is to organize technology base programsin response to the user and the situation hewill face under battlefield conditions. If thewarfighting requirement, for example, is forfirepower with a designated range and accu-racy, then technologies can be refined or in-vented for that purpose. Proponents of this ap-proach often cite NASA’s Apollo Program asa very successful example of requirements pull,where the President specified the goal of put-ting a man on the moon, and technologies weredeveloped to satisfy that requirement.
Critics contend that requirements pull andrelevance tests dominate the planning processwithin the DoD science and technology pro-grams. They argue that radically differenttechnological solutions—technology push—can change the nature of warfare and the waythat we think about it. The introduction of nu-clear weapons and satellites come readily tomind. These kinds of capabilities are not gen-erated as a response to specific requirementsin the field. Instead, major dramatic applica-tions become apparent when new ideas are ex-tended to their logical and technical limits.Some SDI technologies, such as high-energylasers and railguns, have been funded on thisbasis—where the possibility of an applicationis suggested because the physics and princi-ples of the potential technology are under-stood. On the negative side, some analysts ar-gue that these SD I technologies demonstratethe weaknesses of technology push strategiesin R&D management. They contend that enor-
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mous sums have been pumped into weaponsystems that cannot be made to work and willnever be deployed. The difficulty, of course,is to ascertain the best mix of both approaches,so that the specific threat is met, but at thesame time, new technological opportunities arefully realized.
A second and closely related problem is thequestion of how much managerial emphasisshould be placed on evolutionary developmentof known technologies as opposed to reachingfor revolutionary breakthroughs where theU.S. achieves technical advances that its ad-versaries cannot quickly counter or duplicate.With the evolutionary approach, it is reason-able to expect technological progress that grad-ually enhances the military capacity of vari-ous systems over time. In this environment,it is easier to predict the magnitude of the in-vestment that is required, and to balance itagainst the nature of the upgraded capability.In striving for revolutionary technological ad-vances, there is greater uncertainty, both withregard to costs and with respect to the ulti-mate success of the project. But the potentialpayoff—both in terms of new military capaci-ties and in terms of deterrence—may be verygreat indeed.
R&D management strategies that supportincremental approaches tend to place the allo-cation authority in the hands of midlevel man-agers in the Services, who assess the state ofa particular weapon system and ask what R&Dis necessary to improve performance of the sys-tem. The alternative strategy would favor plac-ing the funding decision in the hands of labdirectors (or within special programs), and en-couraging them to support higher risk projectsdesigned to generate qualitatively differenttechnical approaches. In many technology baseprojects, however, the greatest “measure ofmerit” is how quickly the new technology canbe injected into weapon platforms or made op-erational in the field. Critics contend that thisemphasis introduces a conservative bias intothe technology development process, minimiz-ing the likelihood that significant and unex-pected breakthroughs will occur.
When it comes to allocation of resources,there will always be a tension and a need forbalance between concentration on moving newtechnology out to the field as quickly as pos-sible, and funding more indirect research thatmay have broad potential implications thatcannot now be explicitly stated or exactly en-visioned. Responsible and seasoned opinionsupports both sides of this question. Some ob-servers contend that the technology base pro-grams must methodically provide new and im-proved technology to the user on a regularbasis. Others emphasize the importance of sup-porting more abstract work by talented scien-tists who may make dramatic progress if theyare permitted to operate in an environmentwhere they can set the direction of the enquiry.
A third concern focuses on the appropriatemanagement role that the Office of the Secre-tary of Defense should assume in the overallDoD Science and Technology Base Program.The issue is how much OSD should centralizeand directly manage tech base programs, andhow much authority it should exert in coordi-nation and oversight of the Services. In recentyears, an increasing percentage of research anddevelopment has been consolidated withinOSD. The establishment of the SDIO in 1983effectively split the Science and Technologyprogram into two parts, planned and organizedby two different administrative structures. TheS&T program that preceded the establishmentof SDIO is largely conducted by the individ-ual Services and DARPA. In fiscal year 1988,it includes Research (6.1), Exploratory Devel-opment (6.2), and approximately one-third ofDoD’s Advanced Technology Development(6.3A). All phases of the Strategic Defense Ini-tiative (SDI), however, are administered byOSD, and are funded under 6.3A. In fiscal year1988, SDI accounted for about 41 percent ofall DoD Science and Technology funds.
Those who adopt a Services-oriented per-spective on this question argue that the Serv-ices need to operate the technology base pro-grams and in-house labs so that they are ina position to obtain technology not only forfuture systems, but also for those in full-scale
33
engineering development (FSED) or procure-ment. As it stands today, the linkage betweenR&D resources of the Services and projectsthat are already in or beyond FSED is weakbecause there is a tendency to contract out forneeded technology, which could overlook rele-vant work in the universities and the DoD labs.Increasing OSD control over the S&T programwould only encourage the Services’ buyingagents to ignore technology in the DoD labsbecause they would see the labs as outside oftheir primary organization and areas of influ-ence and responsibility. In this view, the properrole for OSD is to provide general guidance andcoordination, and to act as an advocate withCongress for the specific programs of the AirForce, Army, and Navy. Moreover, effectivescience and technology base programs mustbe geared closely to the needs of the user inthe field, at sea, and in the air. The only wayto ensure this fit is for the Services to conducttheir own largely independent programs, con-stantly subjecting them to the scrutiny ofthose for whom they are ultimately developed.
Advocates of a stronger, more assertive rolefor OSD contend that a more integrated man-agement system, beginning at the R&D level,is necessary to overcome longstanding inter-Service rivalries, and to obtain maximumcross-fertilization of research efforts. Some ar-gue that it is necessary to promote common-ality and inter-Service operability of militarysystems at the earliest possible stage of de-velopment. This can best be accomplished ifthe S&T programs are more directly controlledby a central authority. They suggest thathigher level coordination is necessary to con-tain waste and eliminate duplication of effortwhich results from a decentralized system. Asan example, they point to the fact that theServices have developed independent andlargely incompatible communication systemsfor the field.
Some observers believe that DoD could learna great deal from the organization, policies, andworking methods of successful, large-scaleR&D operations in foreign nations. Althoughthe tremendous scale and scope of DoD pro-
grams tend to place the agency in a class byitself, important lessons might be learned byexamining management techniques used byother governments as well as some private sec-tor R&D functions. Japanese officials appear,for example, to be able to identify promisingnew areas of technology development at a na-tional level, and then to assist industry witha variety of state resources to exploit thoseareas for economic gain.
Questions regarding congressional guidanceand oversight of DoD’s technology base pro-grams raise a final set of concerns. With re-spect to the DoD Science and Technology pro-gram, there is considerable controversy as towhat congressional action, if any, would beproductive and appropriate—given the extra-ordinary complexity and technical breadth ofDoD’s activities in this area. Advocates of astrong oversight role for the Congress arguethat the committees of jurisdiction should re-view the specific program elements (PEs) andallocate funds based on that review.
Those who reject the idea of congressionalmicro-management of defense programs urgecaution. They point out that the DoD Scienceand Technology program is comprised of ap-proximately 160 program elements, which arethe basic “building blocks” of DoD’s Planning,Programming, and Budgeting System, andthat each PE is subdivided into many projects,which number in the thousands. Congresswould be wasting its time to try to look intothe intricacies of the S&T program-becausethis is daunting even for specialists who spendall of their time doing nothing but trying tounderstand and manage the existing system.In this view, Congress should confine itself tosetting an overall direction for the S&T pro-gram consistent with the larger issue of na-tional security policy, leaving the supportingscience and technology apparatus in the handsof professional administrators.
Some Members of Congress have chosen toconcern themselves with the overall health andmaintenance of the defense technology basein the United States. Part of that choice in-
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volves developing some yardsticks with whichto judge the organization, management, andcontent of DoD science and technology baseprograms. Does the present system result inthe most efficient and equitable division of ef-fort and funding? Does it provide an overallapproach with sufficient integration and co-ordination? Does it result in an optimal bal-ance between technology push and require-ments pull, and between evolutionary andrevolutionary R&D strategies? And finally,what lessons might DoD learn from other orga-nizations that manage large-scale technologyprograms?
DoD Technology BaseProgram Funding
Funding for DoD Science and Technologyprograms (budget categories 6.1,6.2, and 6.3A)
has varied considerably over the past 20 years.The funding issue has generated a great dealof confusion, even among persons generallyknowledgeable in defense matters. There areseveral distinctions that can help to clarify thesituation, and there are unmistakable trendsthat can be sorted out. S&T funding must beclearly distinguished from the larger Research,Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)budget, of which it is only about 20 percent.Figure 1 shows both RDT&E funding and S&Tfunding from the early 1960s to the late 1980s.The graph on the left shows the magnitude ofthe S&T budgets in relation to the much largerRDT&E budgets. In its discussions, OTAfound that many persons mistakenly believethat funding for basic research (6.1) was sub-stantially increased during the Carter-Reagandefense buildup because they knew that fund-ing for RDT&E had increased by almost 100
Figure 1 .—Technology Base Funding, 1964-1987 (1988 dollars)Total Department of DefenseResearch, Development, Test,
& Evaluation
40 Science & Technology.
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percent. But a quick glance at the graph onthe right indicates that in constant dollarsfunding for basic research has been relativelystable over the past 20 years and has not ben-efited substantially from recent increases indefense spending.
On the other hand, funding for exploratorydevelopment (6.2) fell dramatically from a highof approximately $4.6 billion3 in 1964 to about$2.6 billion in 1974, reaching $2.5 billion in1984. The trend for advanced development(6.3A), however, more nearly parallels the fund-ing history of basic research (6.1), if the fundsfor SD I are excluded. The non-SD I advanceddevelopment (6.3A) figures are approximatelyas follows: $0.9 billion for 1964, $0.8 billion for1974, and $1.7 billion for 1984. When thefigures for 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3A are aggregated,exclusive of SDI, the overall trend is a sharpdrop in funding throughout the late 1960s intothe late 1970s with a modest recovery thatlevels off at about $5.2 billion after 1984. Thisrepresents a real decrease in funding of about25 percent from 1964 to 1984.
Recent trends look very different if fundsfor SD I are considered as part of the S&T pro-gram than if they are treated as a separate‘‘add-on. The graphs in figure 1 indicate thatthis is a matter of some significance becausethey were authorized by DoD and treat SDIas a distinct category. The Strategic DefenseInitiative has accounted for over 40 percentof the S&T budget for the past two fiscal years,and has been exclusively funded through theadvanced development (6.3A) budget category.Some analysts believe that SDI funds do notcontribute substantially to the overall DoDS&T program, that R&D conducted by theSDIO is highly specific to anti-ballistic mis-sile (ABM) warfare. Others contend that SDIOprograms make and will continue to make astrong contribution to R&D throughout DoD’sScience and Technology base programs.
If SD I funding is aggregated with the restof the S&T budget, then the numbers alone in-
3A11 budget figures in this and the following paragraph aretaken from figure 1 and are in constant 1988 dollars.
dicate a dramatic increase in advanced devel-opment (6.3A), which almost doubles overallS&T funding since 1983. But even in this case,basic research (6.1) which has not been affectedby SDIO funding has remained constant, evenin a period of rapid buildup of defense spend-ing. Accordingly, any substantial reduction infunding for basic research to accommodateoverall decreases in defense appropriationswould reduce basic research to its lowest levelin 20 years. The same argument can be madefor exploratory development (6.2). Finally, ifSDI funds are excluded, a reduction in fund-ing for advanced development (6.3A) of $0.8billion would put that budget category at itslowest level in 20 years. These kinds of figureshave led to a concern that Congress and mili-tary planners may not have provided for ade-quate reinvestment in the technology base.
Two major considerations bear on the ques-tion of whether congressional appropriationshave been sufficient to maintain the DoD tech-nology base. The first centers on the difficultyof measuring the impact of research and ex-ploratory development on the military secu-rity of the Nation. Most observers accept theprinciple—as an article of faith-that researchbuilds the foundation on which future techno-logical advances rest. But the connection be-tween today’s specific research projects andfuture military products and technologies isnot obvious, cannot be quantified, and is ex-tremely difficult to render in explicit terms.’As a result, while everyone agrees that re-search is important, it is difficult to make anargument that research funding should be sup-plemented in any given appropriation.
By contrast, it is comparatively easy to ar-gue that a particular weapon system would en-hance the force structure and contribute to the
“’Studies of technological innovations have shown them todepend on research results that are decades old and often inseemingly unrelated fields . . . A highly successful basic researcheffort may never generate technological innovation or economicpayoff if other factors in the economy are not conducive to tech-nological change, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-ment, Research Funding as an Investment: Can We Measurethe Difference? OTA-TM-SET-36 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-ernment Printing Office, April 1986), p. 5.
military security of the Nation. While the con-tribution of today’s research may not becomeevident for 10 to 15 years or more, funds allo-cated for anew missile or bomber can be justi-fied as necessary expenditure to meet a clearand present threat. Moreover, the results ofcutting funds for technology base programsmay not show up for years, and even then, itwould be difficult to demonstrate a one-to-oneor causal type relationship between insufficientR&D funding and future weaknesses in theforce structure. It is far easier to grasp the im-plications of cutting funds for new militaryhardware-where a budget cut of $100 millionwould translate into a definite reduction in thenumber of new tanks or fighter aircraft thatcould be procured. For these reasons, whilealmost everyone would advocate increasedR&D funding in the abstract, few are willingto trade more tangible programs for the va-garies of indefinite technological advances inthe future.
These circumstances have contributed to alow priority status for technology base funds.But perhaps more important is the dispropor-tionate vulnerability to which R&D funds aresubjected during a period of budget reduction.Suppose, for example, that the Navy is in-structed by the Secretary of Defense to cutout-lays by $150 million. This could be achievedin a number of ways. One method would beto cut all programs across the board. Oppo-nents of this strategy contend that it fostersmediocrity by strapping the really good pro-grams and by prolonging the lifespan of in-ferior projects. Another way to achieve the re-duction would be to cancel the decision to builda new aircraft carrier. This is an unlikely deci-sion because it would sacrifice a $3 billion car-rier to save only about $150 million in the firstyear.
R&D, on the other hand, has a very high pay-out of approximately 50 percent. By cutting$300 million in R&D funding (which would, ofcourse, be a draconian measure), the controllercould gain the same savings as canceling anentire carrier. Thus funding for technologybase programs is subjected to a kind of dou-ble jeopardy. In the first instance, its promot-
ers and advocates are few and far between. Andin the second, there are strong incentives forpowerful program and budget managers to‘‘raid’ R&D funds as a means of saving moreadvanced, more visible and, therefore, morepressing programs.
The second funding issue focuses on inter-nal allocation of funds within the technologybase programs that takes place subsequent toand largely independent of congressional ap-propriation. There is concern that technologybase funds (6.1 and 6.2) may not be allocatedmost efficiently among a variety of compet-ing interests, that they may ultimately not findtheir way to the areas in which the most im-portant technology research is taking place.There is a tendency for funds to go where itis easiest for them to go, instead of where theywould do the most good. This is often tied toinstitutional mechanisms, and to historicallybased claims that may be difficult or impossi-ble to resist. Critics argue, for example, thatsome DoD laboratories, which may not con-tribute significantly to the technology base,are nevertheless funded because closing themwould be politically unpopular.
The policy issues related to funding of thetechnology base have not received a great dealof attention in the past. Is it necessary to takemeasures to change the allocation of fundingamong technology base programs? Is the tech-nology base adequately funded relative to theoverall DoD budget? With regard to this ques-tion, analysts have pointed out that technol-ogy base programs are historically the first tobe cut during a budget crisis, and that theyare among the last to be restored when fullerfunding becomes available. Some have arguedthat the technology base functions best whenfunding is level and predictable. And they sug-gest that even if it may not be possible or advis-able to put all of DoD on a multiyear budgetcycle, it might make sense to put R&D pro-grams on such a footing. And finally, is theresignificant misallocation of funding within thetech base programs? Are technology basefunds redirected toward projects that are nottech base, and if so, what actions can Congresstake to correct the situation?
Management of GovernmentLaboratories
The U.S. Government supports an extensivenetwork of laboratories funded principally bythe Department of Defense, the Departmentof Energy, and NASA. Over the past decade,these labs, and particularly those run by DoD,have been the subject of many studies whichhave focused on problems such as inadequatepay, aging facilities, quality of work, and in-appropriate allocation of workloads and re-sources.
There is considerable concern that the net-work of government laboratories does not forma coherent system to support technology needs—not for the military and not for commercialendeavors that also support military produc-tion. This concern is closely linked to the prob-lem of hiring and retaining first rank scientificand engineering talent, particularly in the DoDlaboratories. Some analysts suggest that thequality of personnel recruited for the defenselabs will not be raised significantly until sala-ries are made competitive with industry. Insome instances, they note, salaries in the DoDlabs have failed to keep pace with salaries forsimilar positions in the universities.
Policy questions concerning the role of thegovernment labs in the defense technologybase focus on four concerns. First, is the workof the DoD labs skewed too strongly towardthe development side of R&D and, if so, whatare the implications of this trend? In recentyears, basic research at DoD has become aprogressively smaller proportion of the admin-istration budgets. By any measure, researchis a minuscule part of the Federal budget. Andwithin DoD, basic research consumes onlyabout 10 percent of Science and Technologyfunds.
Some observers argue that basic research isslighted or overlooked because its value as anactivity cannot be quantified and does not re-sult directly in new products or weapon sys-tems in the field. Basic research is treated insome quarters as an expendable activity, theysuggest, because it has few long-term advo-
3 7
cates who are in a position to remind Congressand the public of its value. High-level appoin-tees at the Pentagon tend to gloss over the im-portance of the research function in favor ofhigh profile, big ticket acquisitions. Most holdtheir jobs for no more than a few years, andcannot be expected to take the long-term, apo-litical perspective which is needed to under-stand and promote funding for basic researchin a highly competitive, acquisition-dominatedDoD environment.
Advocates of increased funding for basic re-search argue that of all R&D-related activities,basic research is probably the most amenableto centralized coordination and funding mech-anisms. This is because the objective is to an-swer questions about the nature of physicalreality and technology, and not to apply whathas been learned. Applied research necessitatesa specialized dialog, usually between the re-searcher and the ultimate user, to make surethat the products of the former are compati-ble with the needs of the latter. This relation-ship favors a decentralized organization. Basicresearch, on the contrary, presupposes no enduser, and could, accordingly, be organized ina highly centralized manner. Proponents ofsuch a move believe that consolidation of gov-ernment research into a central organizationwould not only create new efficiencies, butwould also give this activity the sponsorshipand visibility that it presently lacks.
A second area for policy consideration con-cerns the role of the DoD labs as intermedi-aries between the government and industry.To what extent should the labs maintain in-house capacities as opposed to contracting outresearch and development work? There areclearly two extremes that most observers agreeshould be avoided. The first is for the govern-ment to contract out so much R&D that it losesthe capacity to assist the Services directlywhen a need arises, or loses the ability to setdirection for and evaluate the work of contrac-tors. At the other extreme, a lab or system oflabs might find itself in direct competition withindustry, denying commercial or contractor ac-cess to proprietary information developed ingovernment labs.
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Some industry spokespersons contend, forexample, that the Navy does what it wants todo in its labs, and keeps what it does for theNavy. They claim that the Navy, which con-tracts out approximately 40 percent of itsR&D, maintains excess in-house capacity. Inthis view, some major research facilities haveset up rigid barriers that have introvertedoperations, withholding valuable informationfrom DoD contractors. Some contractors feelthat they are in competition with the Navylabs, and are, accordingly, far less willing toshare their data and results with the Navy.They agree that the Federal TechnologyTransfer Act may help to ease this situation,but argue that the root of the problem is thatgovernment should not be in competition withthe private sector.
Some observers suggest that the boundarybetween the government labs and industryneeds to be a good deal more fluid than it pres-ently is. Government labs should not be con-ducting research that has already been com-pleted successfully in industry and vice versa.In this view, DoD needs to institute somemechanism to ensure that the labs and indus-try cooperate more closely and do not dupli-cate each others research when it is unnec-essary.
The question of rigid mission orientationversus a more flexible approach to R&D formsa third issue area for laboratory management.All three Services attempt to construct plansand budgets on a mission-oriented basis. In-deed, the Congress required this approach inthe 1974 Budget Reform and ImpoundmentControl Act. But there is considerable differ-ence of opinion, both within and outside of Con-gress, concerning the interpretation of this re-quirement. Some suggest that the linkagebetween technology base activity and specificmilitary mission ought to be tenuous and ten-tative in character.
If the work of the labs and their contractorsis too closely tied to a particular mission orapplication, they contend, then the overall fo-cus for R&D will be short range at best, andmay lead to a kind of tunnel vision. This is par-
ticularly true of basic research, where the fu-ture applications and benefits of today’s workcannot be known—almost by definition. Someobservers argue that the Services should placea higher priority on basic research, and takea longer range view of the whole problem ofgenerating technology for future weapons sys-tems. Such a scenario is politically difficult be-cause there is tremendous pressure to getequipment into the field as soon as possiblein order to meet the threat and to have some-thing to show for vast outlays of taxpayer andborrowed dollars.
A final policy problem centers on increas-ing coordination and cooperation between theextensive laboratory operations of the DoD,DOE, and NASA. Within DoD, there are dif-ferent laboratory commands for each of theServices, and some believe there are too fewinstitutional mechanisms for cross-fertilizationbetween the DoD operations and the more ex-pansive laboratory facilities both at NASA andat DOE. Some analysts suggest that the pres-ent decentralized system is necessary to meetthe highly individualized needs of the variousdifferent organizations. They suggest that ifthe individual Services had to rely on a cen-tralized system for R&D, it would greatly in-hibit the process by which technology is tran-sitioned into engineering development, and theessential connection to the end-user would belost.
Others contend that the United States paysa price for operating a highly fragmented sys-tem with diverse R&D agendas. Such a sys-tem could result in unnecessary duplication ofeffort and in government support of labs thathave long since stopped contributing to theleading edge of technology research and devel-opment. They believe that the present config-uration of laboratory facilities is a consequenceof tradition and uneven historical growth,rather than rational planning geared to late20th century conditions of high-technologywarfare and international economic competi-tion. Some analysts suggest that the UnitedStates should identify a set of national tech-nological goals, and then reorganize and con-
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solidate its system of national labs to meetthose goals. They attribute the success of theApollo project to the fact that a goal was set,and resources were organized to meet the goal.They believe that the United States might al-ready be in a good position to take a lessonfrom the Japanese, who have achieved remark-able success by selecting national technologi-cal milestones and working toward them. Vari-ous schemes—ranging from a single executivetechnology agency to a system of lead agen-cies, each associated with a different nationaltechnological goal-have been proposed. Pro-ponents argue that the resulting benefits couldbe realized both by the military and by the com-mercial sector at the same time.
What steps, if any, should Congress take toensure more efficient use of government lab-oratories, including closing, merging, or con-solidating facilities? What actions might betaken to enhance technology transfer amongthe various labs and between the governmentand the commercial sector? What impedimentscould be removed? Are there measures thatcould be taken to make government labora-tories more attractive places to work? Are pro-grams being unnecessarily constrained be-cause of the narrow focus of their parentorganizations, and are important areas of re-search being overlooked? What alternatives tothe present system might contribute signifi-cantly to the health of the defense technologybase in the future?
Military Dependence onForeign Technology
In recent years, complex weapon systemshave come to exhibit some of the internation-alization of labor, materials, and componentparts that has long characterized the commer-cial sector. There is increasing concern thatDoD is not immune from the larger economicforces that have produced the world car.
A coherent policy on military dependence onforeign technology will have to balance bene-fits obtained from access to foreign technol-ogy and products against the loss of technol-
ogy base capacities that results from long-termdependence on other nations. It should bebased on an assessment of whether or not in-ternationalization of the defense technologybase poses a threat to military security, andif so, it should take cognizance of the reasonsfor the decline of key technology areas in theUnited States. This, in turn, may suggest strat-egies that the United States can pursue to re-sist or reverse dependence on foreign sources.5
Policy should be informed with the reality thatsome forms of dependence maybe harmful andavoidable, others helpful and desirable, andsome others unavoidable whether we like it ornot.
There are two significant dimensions to theproblem of increasing military dependence onforeign technology. The first centers on grow-ing foreign leadership and market dominationin important dual-use technologies, i.e., tech-nologies that have significant commercial aswell as military applications. In some instancesthe United States appears to be losing mar-ket share in high-technology products as wellas the leading edge in development of new tech-nologies. In others, advanced technology al-ready exists in foreign countries, but is notproduced competitively in the United States.In part, this problem is compounded by con-tinuous pressure for DoD to take advantageof efficiencies and superior products that in-ternational competition has brought to thecommercial world. In the future, DoD may bedriven to buy a larger share of foreign militaryproducts, particularly if foreign suppliers canachieve economies of scale, high quality, andlow cost that have eluded domestic producersin recent years.
There are significant potential liabilities independence associated with commercial lossof capacity in dual-use technologies. It maybe that the United States will be forced tomaintain certain technologies because of theirstrategic importance. Military dependence on
‘This dependence has not yet reached significant proportionsin a great many technological areas. Many analysts believe thatthe United States still holds a commanding lead in most tech-nologies that are military in character.
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foreign dual-use technology will always haveto be scrutinized when the technology is per-vasive in character-i. e., essential to the pro-duction and maintenance of a great many mil-itary systems—especially when the domesticcapacity is appreciably below state-of-the-art.
This is precisely the situation that the De-fense Science Board (DSB) addressed in astudy recommending the establishment of asemiconductor manufacturing technology in-stitute, since named Sematech. The DSB re-port stated that U.S. military strategy dependson leading edge electronics, and specifically onsemiconductors, that are essential to supportU.S. warfighting strategy and capabilities. TheDSB argued that decreased competitivenessby U.S. semiconductor makers would soontranslate into loss of manufacturing know-howand the ability to fabricate future generationsof semiconductors. At some point, loss of man-ufacturing technique would lead, inexorably,to an inability to design the most sophisticatedchips domestically. The study concluded, ac-cordingly, that the military would shortly de-pend on foreign sources to supply advancedsemiconductors, and that this is an unaccept-able condition.
Some observers argue that the Sematechconcept addresses the symptoms and not theheart of the problem. The real issue, they con-tend, is the question of how the United Statescan stay at the leading edge of technologiesthat are crucial to the military defense of theNation. Sematech may provide the near-termability to design and fabricate silicon-based dy-namic random access memory chips, but it willdo nothing to maintain state-of-the-art capac-ity if global market forces push subsequentgenerations of equipment into gallium arsenideor optically based technologies. From this per-spective, the real question centers on how tostructure policy and markets to keep and main-tain technological capacity in the UnitedStates.
Dependence on pervasive, dual-use technol-ogies might be a critical factor even in peace-ful and prosperous times, when trade is mutu-ally advantageous between two countries.
Consider a scenario, perhaps in the year 2000,when DoD would place an order for the nextgeneration of sophisticated GaAs-based in-tegrated circuits made only in Japan. The Jap-anese, who reportedly expect a substantialcommercial market by the turn of the century,might then be unwilling to produce the partsto military specification, at a price the UnitedStates could afford. The DoD order might notbe large enough to justify the cost of new man-ufacturing technology or the diversion of tech-nical resources from more profitable commer-cial markets. In this scenario, the alternativewould be to attempt to build the chips in theUnited States. But if the domestic industrywas not already fabricating the chips for com-mercial markets, the cost would be prohibitivebecause the order would have to pay for newfactories as well. It is even possible that thecapacity to design the desired product mightno longer reside in the United States. And with-out recent experience, it is likely that the chipsthat could be produced would not match Jap-anese performance and reliability. Consider-ing the military need for enhanced computa-tional speed and for radiation hardness, suchdependence would clearly be undesirable, evenin the best of times.
On the other hand, depending on allies foradvanced dual-use technology can be benefi-cial on a number of grounds. First, it increaseseconomic interdependence which, if properlymanaged, leads to strong incentives for con-tinued alliance and cooperation. Second, it canprovide access to state-of-the-art technologiesthat simply are unavailable in the UnitedStates. In today’s global economy, it is nolonger possible for the United States to domi-nate—and at present the United States is noteven competitive in— a full range of commer-cial technologies and markets. And finally, inmany cases, internationalization of technologymakes possible a wide range of economies ofscale and manufacturing expertise that wouldbe difficult to achieve domestically.
The second significant dimension of the is-sue of military dependence on foreign technol-ogy arises because DoD prime contractors pro-
duce major weapon systems that incorporatecomponents and subsystems developed by for-eign defense firms. Both economic and politi-cal considerations contribute to “offset” agree-ments where U.S. allies contract to buy aportion of the run for a particular missile, air-plane, or submarine, thereby lowering the unitcost of procurement and increasing militaryand economic cooperation within the alliance.In return, the prime contractors agree to pur-chase a certain percentage of the componentsand subsystems from participating allies. Inaddition, the United States has entered intoa number of cooperative agreements for con-ventional defense development programs withits NATO allies pursuant to congressionaldirection.
There are substantial benefits to be realizedfrom mutual and interlocking dependenceamong allies in the development of militarytechnologies. To this end, the United Statesparticipates in the NATO Conference of Na-tional Armaments Directors, is a major sup-porter of the SHAPE Technical Center locatedin the Hague, and is a member of the NATO-sponsored Advisory Group on AerodynamicResearch and Development in Paris. Techno-logical interdependence tends to strengthenthe alliance itself because it raises the costsfor any ally that would choose to withdrawfrom the alliance. International division of la-bor also creates an opportunity for the UnitedStates to gain access to superior military com-ponent technologies that it cannot get at home.Few observers believe it is still possible in aglobal economic environment for any countryto maintain leading edge technology across theentire range of significant military capabilities.Just as international competition creates win-ners and losers in commercial markets, inno-vation and leadership in military technologiesis increasingly dispersed across a spectrum ofhighly capable firms with different national ori-entations and loyalties. Under these condi-tions, maintaining state-of-the-art military ca-pabilities requires that the United States drawon the best products emerging from an inter-national defense technology base.
On the other hand, certain liabilities are asso-ciated with dependence on foreign componentsused in U.S. weapon systems. One can envi-sion an international division of labor wherethe United States would produce the compo-nents and systems for which it had developedthe requisite technology base, and then wouldbuy or trade with its allies to procure partsand systems supported by their leading edgetechnologies. While this kind of cooperationis probably necessary and unavoidable in sometechnology areas, it presupposes a peacefulworld in which free and open trade are the normin an interdependent world economy. Citingrising international economic tensions andincreasing regional military conflict, someanalysts argue that the relatively stable post-war economic and political order may be rockedby significant changes in the future. For thisreason, they caution that excessive militarydependence should be avoided, even with al-lies and friendly trading partners.
There is, in addition, the issue of timely de-livery of parts or components of military im-portance. In some cases, it might be more lucra-tive for a firm to delay its deliveries to theDepartment of Defense, giving priority to apreferred customer. If the company is locatedin the United States, DoD or the prime con-tractor would have more leverage to press fordelivery of scarce items. It is much more diffi-cult to ensure continuity in timing and sup-ply when the firm in question is located inanother country.
Governments now and in the future will seekto create market advantages for their own do-mestic firms irrespective of whether they areorganized primarily for commercial or militaryproduction. While a blanket policy that op-poses military dependence on foreign technol-ogy might enhance security in the near term,it might also tend to undermine significant ben-efits that are realized through selected and in-telligent cooperation with our allies, eventhough such relationships might ultimatelylead to a system of interlocking dependencies.
It is, accordingly, important to look at theissue of foreign dependence not as an article
42
of faith, but rather in relation to specific tech-nologies, industrial sectors, and political andeconomic realities that constrain our choices.Under what circumstances should the UnitedStates rely on its allies and trading partnersfor selected military technologies, even whensuch reliance leads to diminished domestic ca-pacities? By what criteria could areas be iden-tified in which the United States should reducedependence on foreign technology? What poli-cies—R&D, tax, trade, or otherwise—mighthelp minimize dependence, and at what cost?And finally, what and how severe are the risksto United States national security when se-lected dual-use technology industries moveoffshore?
Health of the Dual-Use CommercialHigh-Tech Sector
Strong interaction between the military andthe civilian economy has characterized thegrowth of high technology in the United Statesin the post-WWII period. Today, commerciallyproduced dual-use technologies-e. g., micro-electronics, computers, fiber optics, and ad-vanced composites—are necessary for the de-sign and production of a wide range of weaponsystems. Recent losses in competitiveness andleading edge technical capacities by commer-cially oriented domestic firms raise concern,principally for two reasons.
The first is that DoD depends on the dual-use sector to develop and transfer new tech-nologies that are of military significance. Thiscan be a critical resource, even when the mili-tary uses only a small fraction of the productsresulting from a given technology. Civilian con-tributions to new and evolving technologiesare especially important because military hard-ware in some fast-moving areas can be 5 ormore years behind the leading edge of the com-mercial sector.
The second cause for concern is that the mil-itary relies on commercially oriented firms forhigh-technology products that are incorpo-rated into military hardware. In general, thePentagon will designate a single prime contrac-tor both for the development and manufacture
of a major weapon system. If the project is onthe scale of a nuclear submarine, for example,the prime will contract, in turn, with hundredsof subcontractors for the design and produc-tion of subsystems and specific components.Some of the subcontractors may execute addi-tional agreements with other companies, andsoon down the line. At some point in this chain,many of the components and parts that endup in the final product will be bought off theshelf from corporations that do most of theirbusiness in civilian markets.6
In terms of defense technology policy, de-cline in critical dual-use high-technology indus-tries can be addressed both from an in-houseand from an economy-wide perspective. In thefirst case, DoD can create a new capacity, or“farm industry, ” within the defense contrac-tor community and in the government labora-tories to meet specified needs for advancedtechnology. In the VHSIC (very high speed in-tegrated circuit) program, for example, OSDsought to extend conventional silicon technol-ogies and to increase the pace of developmentin design tools, advanced production equip-ment, and semiconductor device designs.7 Buthigh-ranking Pentagon officials indicate thatthe VHSIC technologies have only been de-ployed in one weapon system to date. This kindof remedial action is extremely expensive, andcan probably only be maintained on a modestscale.
The second option is to stimulate, directly,those high-technology industries in the com-mercial sector that are deemed necessary tothe development and manufacture of the nextgeneration of military hardware. In manycases, however, the DoD share of the marketfor a given technology is not enough to pullthe industry forward. Under such conditions,the resources and capital formation of commer-cial markets are necessary to stimulate devel-opment and leadership in high technology. It
‘In addition, the Pentagon buys a great deal of office equip-ment, such as computers and typewriters, directly from com-mercial firms.
‘Kenneth Flamm, Targeting the Computer: Government Sup-port and International Competition (Washington, DC: Brook-ings Institution, 1987), pp. 77-78.
43
is likely, for example, that loss of competitive-ness in high-volume semiconductor marketsby U.S. companies would lead, in time, to mil-itary dependence on foreign sources for a widerange of enabling technologies. Accordingly,the continued ability to produce state-of-the-art weapon systems that are superior in thefield may finally depend on the Nation’s ca-pacity to produce high-technology productsthat are competitive in world commerce.
Because both of these options have severelimitations, it maybe necessary to go beyondthe arena of defense policy and to consider ad-ditional alternatives from a broader economicperspective. Some analysts argue that avoid-ing dependence on foreign high technologyrequires a better understanding of the relation-ship between the development of new knowl-edge, the manufacturing process itself, and theformation of capital for industrial purposes.They suggest that one strategy, sometimespursued by the Japanese, is to begin operat-ing in a technology area where an industrymust accept a certain degree of foreign depen-dence at the outset. But a primary objective(en route to establishing a viable market share)is to acquire technological know-how and themanufacturing ability as a national asset,severing relations with foreign industry as do-mestic capacity increases. To accomplish thistransition, industry must have access to do-mestic arrangements and sources for capitalformation that are superior to those extendedin foreign countries.
Executives in high-technology industries ar-gue that when the venture is capital-intensive,the ability to design new leading edge prod-ucts will be closely tied to the manufacturingprocess, which will be physically located wherethe most advantageous arrangements for capi-talization can be made. It will also be tied tothe ability to transition new concepts and tech-nology breakthroughs into an efficient produc-tion process. In this view, the capacity to mobi-lize the technology base is a technology in itsown right—one that must be mastered beforecompetitive new products can be introducedto the marketplace. For example, it requiresspecialized skills and techniques to discover
a new high-temperature superconductor. Butonce it is made the first time, and the researchis published, other researchers can duplicatethe process. Even so, designing high-tempera-ture superconductors into products that areuseful and producible is extremely difficult. Itis costly and will require sophistication andfurther research in a wide range of tech-nologies.
In addition, the capital requirements formobilizing a new technology-of bringing newideas out of the universities and into efficientmass-market production operations—can beenormous. The difference between a capitalcost of 7 percent and one of 9 percent may makethe difference between success and failure. Costof capital affects the time it takes to get theproduct to market, and determines, in part, thekinds of activities that stockholders are will-ing to fund. When two companies are in com-petition to produce a comparable product, theone that can acquire an equity base that ena-bles it to get its product to the market 1 yearbefore the other will win. Some business per-sons are concerned that government does notunderstand the relationship between the costof capital and the capacity of their companiesto transition new technology into the market-place. They cite the easy credit arrangementsthat governments of some Pacific Rim andEuropean nations extend to industry. They be-lieve that anti-trust law can significantly dis-advantage American manufacturing, particu-larly in high-technology sectors, because it hastended to block the formation of combined cap-ital resources that may be required if an in-dustry is to survive in the international com-petition.
Under such conditions, a failure to providecapital incentives to locate high-technology in-dustries in the United States will have predict-able consequences on the process of technol-ogy innovation. These can be expressed asthree distinct steps in losing a technology. Inthe first, an industry moves its manufactur-ing operations offshore, perhaps becausecheaper capital can be obtained or because pro-duction costs, including labor, are lower. TheUnited States may also retain a manufactur-
44
ing capability, but may not be able to produceat a competitive cost. Second, when the tech-nology evolves to the next generation, the U.S.part of that industry may find that it has lostthe ability to manufacture the new productson a stateof-the-art, competitive basis. At thisstage, costs of getting back into the manufac-turing end of the business maybe prohibitive.And finally, when the technology evolves yetagain, and is now two or three generationsaway from the original product line, it will bedifficult, if not impossible, for U.S. companiesto design leading edge new products. To do so,the industry would have to find designers withaccess to the proprietary information gener-ated in the production process associated withthe previous generation. In this scenario, a na-tion loses a high-technology industry becauseit fails to pursue capital incentives sufficientto keep the industry at home, and this leads,in turn, to a simultaneous degeneration of proc-ess and design know-how which may be com-bined with loss of market share and investmentcapital.
Some observers believe that government pol-icies have contributed to an overall decline inthe competitiveness of American industry.They argue that government has not onlyfailed to stem the migration of U.S. factoriesto foreign countries, but has also neglected tosupport the interests of American business athome and abroad. In this view, U.S. compa-nies have had to compete with foreign indus-try that enjoys advantages-such as protectedhome markets, low cost capitalization, andR&D subsidies-that are the constituent partsof carefully orchestrated national industrialstrategies. One result, they claim, is that thedual-use infrastructure of domestic technologyis weakening. In addition, fiscal and monetarypolicies have, until recently, kept the dollar ar-tificially propped up against foreign curren-cies, making imports relatively less expensivethan domestically produced goods. A massivetrade imbalance, high interest rates, and ex-cessive foreign investment have exacerbateda comparative disadvantage in capital forma-tion for domestic firms. In addition, some ar-gue that tax incentives, like the investment
tax credit, are not carefully enough tailoredto benefit most industries upon which the mil-itary depends.
Others think that U.S. free trade policieshave led Congress and the administration tobe indifferent to the inability of technologicallyoriented American companies to compete moresuccessfully in world markets and with foreigncompetitors at home. They argue that Amer-ican business cannot “go it alone’ against un-fair combinations of state power and industrialmight in the international marketplace. Thebelief that American companies can sustainmarket share against the concerted nationaleconomic policies of their trading partners is,they contend, a potentially disastrous holdoverfrom a bygone era of American military andeconomic hegemony.
There is great diversity of opinion as to whatCongress should do about the loss of worldmarket shares of some American high-technol-ogy industries, and the resulting damage tothe dual-use technology base in the UnitedStates. Some observers believe that Congressshould do nothing because it is faced with whatamounts to an intractable dilemma. If the Pen-tagon pursues a policy of buying the best avail-able high-tech products at the lowest price,then it will introduce foreign dependence to theweapons procurement process over the longrun. This course of action would tend to advan-tage foreign competitors at the expense ofAmerican companies. But these circumstancesmight also create strengths in the military ca-pacity of our allies, encouraging them to shoul-der more of the defense burden in the future.On the other hand, if the United States adopteda policy to buy only from American companies,then it would lose access to some state-of-the-art technology, and might have to pay exces-sive costs associated with domestic produc-tion. In this view, Congress should continueto stay on the sidelines because any course ofaction is likely to create extensive dislocationand unacceptable adjustment costs.
Advocates of a more coherent industrialstrategy argue that the United States cannotafford to lose certain essential industries. They
45
point out that other countries have taken stepsto avoid such losses, steps that have, in somecases, damaged U.S. economic interests. Un-der these circumstances, the United Statesshould now consider legislative action not onlyto protect critical high-technology markets,but also to adopt tax and monetary policieswhich guide American business toward greaterproductivity and profitability. Such a perspec-tive, they acknowledge, envisions a more cen-tral role for government in the affairs of busi-ness. But they also contend that such measureswill be necessary if U.S. corporations are toremain competitive in the face of what amountsto concerted Japanese and European economicpolicies that are structured to create advan-tages for domestic firms in foreign markets.At a minimum, they argue, government shouldadjust macro economic and other policies toslow or halt the decline of American high-technology industry. They do not expect a re-turn to the overwhelming economic and mili-tary leadership that the United States enjoyedin the immediate postwar decades, but theywould hope to arrest its decline.
Others oppose both the “do nothing” andthe “high-tech industrial strategy” scenariosin favor of a negotiated middle ground. Theycontend that Congress must not allow the de-mise of a range of technological capabilitiesand industries that are of strategic militaryimportance. They seek national economic self-sufficiency and independence for a limitedgroup of high-technology industries that arenecessary for numerous weapon systems.While it is not possible for the Department ofDefense to underwrite every industry thatproduces high-tech products for military sys-tems, careful planning and prudent investmentmight support a stable of technical capacitiesthat are essential to the national security.
Some argue that DoD could do a great dealmore to support the dual-use technology basein the United States. In this view, DoD hasconcentrated too many of its resources in asmall number of defense prime contractors onthe assumption that R&D and procurementfunds will ultimately filter down to the lower
tier subcontractors where many dual-use tech-nologies are developed. They contend that theR&D base for the dual-use infrastructure ofAmerican industry could be enhanced if DoDwould commit a greater percentage of its fundsdirectly to the sub-tier industries. But they alsonote that this approach would require majorsimplifications in DoD contracting and report-ing processes, as well as substantial substitu-tion of commercial for military specificationsin future weapon systems.
Many analysts believe that the UnitedStates should seek to avoid dependence on for-eign manufacturers for high-technology prod-ucts that are critical for the defense of the Na-tion. This objective is particularly difficult toachieve in many dual-use industries, where theDepartment of Defense is at best a minor cus-tomer. Nevertheless, if the United States is toavoid foreign dependence, then state-of-the-artdesign and manufacturing capacities must re-main in the United States for an array of tech-nologies that are critical to the developmentof defense systems.
A central difficulty is that for many of themost important technologies, the pace anddirection of rapid innovation are driven by de-velopments in the commercial sector by indus-tries that are typically multinational in scope.Moreover, the capital requirements for R&D,design, and manufacture of successive gener-ations of many high-technology products areenormous. Because DoD cannot fund the fullspectrum of technologies that are essential tothe national defense, the health of these indus-tries will depend on profits from sales in thecommercial marketplace.
High-technology manufacturing in theUnited States cannot be expected to surviveif the American market is dominated by for-eign imports. The United States has pursueda trade policy that assumes fair and open trade,and encourages Americans to purchase goodsof the lowest price for a given quality, regard-less of where they were made. In pursuit oflowest cost or access to foreign markets, manyAmerican firms have moved manufacturingoperations offshore. In addition, many foreign
46
firms sell goods in the United States. At thesame time, many foreign governments prohibitU.S. firms from selling similar products in theirhome markets.
Recognition of the power of governments tocreate and alter international economic envi-ronments through trade, tax, non-tariff bar-riers, and various industrial policies has ledsome observers to propose new approaches tostructuring the U.S. high-technology marketand industrial base that go well beyond thelimits of existing U.S. policy. One such ap-proach would impose prohibitions against im-porting key high-technology products made byforeign industry as well as by American-ownedoperations located in foreign countries. In-stead, both U.S. and foreign-owned firmswould be required to manufacture those keyproducts in the United States if they intendedto sell them in the United States. Such a pol-icy would force some definite portion of thehigh-technology manufacturing base to be lo-cated permanently in the United States. Pre-sumably, other countries would institute sim-ilar restrictions. Reciprocal arrangementswould have to be negotiated to establish mutu-ally acceptable manufacturing and merchan-dizing rights among participating nations,with the result that each nation would considerthe interests of the larger trading block in form-ing its own policies. Proponents agree thatwhile this approach might create more stablemanufacturing conditions, the turmoil of tran-sition would be unprecedented.
Most observers agree that it is essential toview the issue of the health of the dual-use in-dustries both in terms of military needs for thenext generation of weapon systems, and fromthe perspective of structural dislocation of thewider economy. Is it necessary and feasible toestablish policies to preserve selected high-technology industries, together with govern-mental institutions to carry them out? If so,how would DoD’s interests be represented?What degree and kind of government interven-tion, if any, will be necessary to ensure the fu-ture health of the dual-use sector of the Amer-ican economy? Are there specific governmentpolicies that have weakened important domes-
tic high-technology industries? Are there areaswhere government inaction has contributed tothe problem?
Problems in the Defense Industries
For most technical developments of militarysignificance, the road from laboratory to fieldruns through a select and highly concentratedgroup of large defense contractors. While thesecompanies can perform a variety of majortasks, their principal role is to act as prime sys-tem integrators. These are the companies thatassemble the products of subcontractors andcomponent makers into finished missiles, air-craft, submarines, and other defense systems.Over time, the prime contractors have devel-oped a unique relationship of mutual depen-dence with the government. Unusual businessconditions have created a situation in whichthere is only one buyer, the Department of De-fense, and following contract award, only onesupplier. The trend over the past quarter cen-tury has been toward greater concentrationand fewer contracts, resulting in winner-take-all sweepstakes for many major weapon systems.
Because the defense industry both consumesand develops new technology, there is long-standing concern that its unique relationshipwith the government may inhibit technical de-velopment and the most efficient applicationof new technology. The most prominent ofthese concerns fall into three closely relatedareas, each of which influences the health ofthe defense technology base: 1) unstable busi-ness conditions, 2) inducements for corporateR&D, and 3) outmoded manufacturing tech-nology.
The Department of Defense and the primecontractors have argued for years that Con-gress should adopt a multiyear budgeting cy-cle which would provide greater stability in thecomplex and demanding business of buildingadvanced technology weapon systems. If DoDcould authorize a prime contractor to produce500 aircraft at a rate of 50 per year for 10 years,stable business conditions could be achieved.Instead, economies of scale and other efficien-cies are sacrificed when Congress appropriates
4 7
funds for limited production runs on a year-to-year basis. Or, alternatively, OSD or one ofthe Service buying commands may decide toshift funds away from a particular program,creating the same perturbations. Under thesecircumstances, rational business principles andplanning processes cannot readily be applied.
Critics argue that unstable business condi-tions exist in all markets, and that establish-ing predictability is what planning and mar-keting is all about. Like many firms in thecommercial sector, defense contractors tendto plan only in the short term of 12 to 24months. Preoccupation with near-term salesdiscourages the defense sector from makinglong-range investments in basic and appliedresearch. Such practice, they contend, deem-phasizes the value of investing in new techni-cal developments, a kind of investment thatmay not pan out for as much as 5 to 10 years.Government procurement processes and reg-ulations may reinforce this trend, providingfew inducements for defense contractors to putmoney back into the technology base.
A second and highly related problem con-cerns independent research and development(IR&D), a principal mechanism through whichgovernment encourages the defense contrac-tors to develop technologies that can result innew products with defense applications.8 Aspresently constituted, IR&D is a major fac-tor in building and maintaining the defensetechnology base because the cost to DoD isequivalent in size to approximately one-fourthof the overall science and technology baseactivities (6. 1-6.3A, including SDI) funded bythe Department of Defense. As it stands now,administration of DoD’s funding of IR&D isso complex that even senior administratorsand experts who study the problem have dif-ficulty agreeing on the basic components andconcepts of the program. Accordingly, a cen-
8For a comprehensive review of the history and present sta-tus of the IR&D question, see U.S. Congress, CongressionalResearch Service, “Science Support by the Department of De-fense” (transmitted to the Task Force on Science Policy, Com-mittee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representa-tives, Science Policy Background Report No, 8, Serial II,Washington, DC, December 1986), ch. VIII.
tral policy issue is the question of what incen-tives the IR&D mechanism actually providesfor industry, and whether it is an efficient de-vice for meeting national goals. Congress maywish to leave it alone, adjust its operation, orabolish the IR&D mechanism—substitutingin its place a program that offers significantinducements for company R&D, but which canbe more easily monitored and evaluated.
In general, research and development con-ducted by the DoD contractors is either care-fully specified under contract with the govern-ment or it is initiated independently (and notunder any contract). Under the IR&D fund-ing mechanism, a portion of the costs of inde-pendent research is recovered as part of anoverhead charge on all contracts which a com-pany enters into with DoD. Typically, majordefense contractors will present to DoD adescription of the IR&D they propose to con-duct–to receive a technical evaluation, and tonegotiate the terms and conditions for reim-bursement. Although it is often referred to asa “program” by DoD officials, and Congressannually approves a ceiling for IR&D on anadvisory basis, there is no line item for IR&Dfunds in the defense budget.
Companies that choose to conduct IR&D,and receive DoD approval of their work, areable to recover a portion of their IR&D costsas an additional, negotiated increment of over-head (historically about 2 percent of the con-tract cost) on their contracts with the Depart-ment of Defense. In addition, these companiesretain proprietary and data rights for the R&Dthat is conducted. Such rights become a sig-nificant asset for the company, can generatefuture contracts with DoD, and can lead to ad-ditional future IR&D.
Within DoD there are actually two mechan-isms–IR&D and B&P (bid and proposal)–which are managed as essentially a single ele-ment, although the objectives and criteria ofeach are different. IR&D is research, develop-ment and design activity conducted by defensecontractors that is not directly in support offunded DoD contracts. The word “independ-ent” is used to indicate that the companies re-
48—. -. — —
tain final authority on what research is con-ducted, but it is somewhat confusing becauseDoD usually reviews and evaluates the re-search in advance. In addition, the term is usedto distinguish non-contractual (independent)R&D from R&D that is performed under con-tract with DoD. (It can also refer to R&D thatthe company performs on its own that is notsubmitted to DoD for reimbursement.) Theterm “B&P” refers to costs that contractorsincur when they respond to government RFPs(request for proposals) or prepare unsolicitedproposals directed toward anticipated militaryneeds.
DoD requires that B&P efforts not be di-rected toward actual design and development.In addition, data rights do not result fromactivities conducted with B&P funds becausethe purpose of these reimbursements is to off-set the costs of submitting project proposalsto the Department of Defense. In actual prac-tice, however, companies do intermingle IR&Dand B&P funds, and it is difficult for DoD toimpose accountability and control mechanismsin this area. Indeed, regulations now permitcompanies to shift costs between prenegoti-ated B&P and IR&D cost ceilings for any givenyear, and B&P is not monitored as closely asIR&D. Critics charge that companies are ableto conduct virtually any type of activity theydeem necessary to gain and maintain a com-petitive edge, and that the government payswithout obtaining any rights to the design dataor the right to procure the product fromanother source. While it is true that govern-ment does not acquire proprietary or datarights, and the companies do have wide lati-tude in the selection of IR&D projects, DoDhas placed substantial controls on IR&D/B&Preimbursements in an effort to ensure that suchwork, when conducted by industry, is directedtoward the needs of the national defense.
There is considerable debate as to the effec-tiveness of the DoD regulations that controlIR&D. Many industry leaders and some DoDmanagers believe that DoD regulations go wellbeyond those envisioned by Congress when itenacted Section 203 of Public Law 91-441,which contains the requirement that IR&D
activities show potential military relevance(PMR). Due to ambiguity in the language ofSection 203, however, some projects that areused to calculate the IR&D/B&P ceilings donot meet the PMR test. DoD administratorsmaintain that they have brought this matterto the attention of Congress, and that Congresshas not taken corrective action. In the absenceof further congressional direction, DoD re-quires that “the total portion of the ceiling al-locable to DoD contracts must be matched byIR&D work having a potential relationship toa military function or operation, ” even thoughindividual IR&D funded projects may not meetthe PMR requirement.9
Detailed IR&D Technical Plans are preparedby participating companies each year. Thesesubmissions include future plans as well as areview of past activities. Through OSD, themilitary Services review these plans to ensurethat a potential military relationship exists,and to assign numerical scores, based on thetechnical quality of the plans. In addition tothis technical documentation by each companyand the rating process by DoD, onsite reviewsof IR&D efforts are conducted at major com-panies on a 3-year cycle. These reviews areoften quite detailed, typically requiring 2 or3 days of presentations to the review team.
While this review process is costly and time-consuming, the fact remains that the bulk ofthe defense contractors receive almost auto-matic approval of their IR&D plans. In addi-tion, IR&D is highly concentrated in a fewcompanies. Roughly 90 companies receive 95percent of IR&D funds, with wide distributionof the remaining 5 percent to approximately13,000 firms.
The initial funds to conduct IR&D/B&P ac-tivities are committed by the individual com-panies, and the portion of the costs deemed“allowable” by DoD negotiators is acceptedfor allocation to all of the company’s business.DoD does not permit the entire costs of com-pany R&D to be recovered, and government
‘DoD fact sheet entitled “DoD Implementation of Public Law91-441, Section 203. ”
‘‘share’ is negotiated annually.10 For example,in fiscal year 1986, US defense contractors toldDoD that they spent roughly $7.39 billion forIR&D/B&P ($4.97 billion for IR&D and $2.42billion for B&P). Of that, DoD recognized $5.26billion ($3.51 billion for IR&D and $1.75 bil-lion for B&P) as costs that could legitimatelybe associated with products sold both to gov-ernment and to commercial customers. Of thistotal, the government’s share came to $3.50billion ($2.16 billion for IR&D and $1.34 bil-lion for B&P). The overall ceiling for IR&D isset annually by Congress.11
The propriety of IR&D/B&P reimburse-ments has been questioned by several Com-mittees of Congress, and has been the objectof sustained controversy over the past 20years. The defense contractors argue thatIR&D is the lifeblood of their business, pro-viding a means for them to conduct innova-tive research that contributes to the mainte-nance of the defense technology base in theUnited States and results in major new weaponsystems. From their perspective, it is analo-gous to new product R&D conducted in thecommercial sector, with the difference that theelement of risk is largely shifted to the gov-ernment because DoD has agreed to cover itsshare of the costs in advance.
A panel of senior officials with extensive de-fense experience has concluded that:
the substantial R&D undertaken by U.S.defense industry (reimbursed in part by theDepartment of Defense) has changed sig-nificantly in its character. While this effortwas highly innovative in the 1950s and
‘nThe government “share’ of accepted costs is allocated asoverhead to government contracts and the government’s “al-locable share” is determined as a percentage of the total busi-ness that the firm does under contract with the government.The level of costs to be allowed is usually negotiated. Firmsrecover a larger portion of B&P costs then IR&D costs fromDoD, either as a percentage of incurred or accepted costs. SeeU.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, 4’Defense-Related Independent Research and Development in Industry, ”(prepared by Joan Dopico Winston, CRS Part No, 85-205S,Washington, DC, Oct. 18, 1985), app. III.
11 In fiscal Vear 1986, DoD tended to be more generous in itsreimbursem~nt for B&P than for I R&D, reimbursing 76.6 per-cent of recognized B&P and only 61.2 percent of recognizedIR&D.
49
1960s, it has become increasingly conserv-ative in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, it hasbecome far more an effort to reduce techni-cal risk than to innovate. In some measurethe Pentagon is responsible for the new em-phasis. The main criterion for reimbursement used to be the innovativeness of thework; today the controlling question is aptto be whether industry’s R&D is sufficientlyrelated to an ongoing weapons program.12
Defense industry executives argue thatIR&D is the mechanism through which theircompanies build up internal technology bases.They contend that IR&D is not a partnershipwith the government, but rather that relationswith DoD are sometimes strained and thatthere is a good deal of tugging and pulling overthis issue. Many see IR&D as a creative alter-native to government regulation. In this view,when the government lets an R&D contract,it is DoD bureaucrats and not industry tech-nologists who determine the direction of R&Dprograms within industry. The IR&D mecha-nism has the benefit that it originates in thedefense companies and represents the bestthinking on technology that the private de-fense sector can provide. It is, they contend,the central mechanism that enables industryto tell the government where major R&D em-phasis and projects should be placed. Accord-ing to industry executives, IR&D proposalsreceive internal corporate review at the high-est levels of management and represent fun-damental decisions concerning the directionof future corporate research.
Some observers contend that IR&D is, atbest, an inefficient means of supporting re-search in the defense industries, and at worst,a gigantic government giveaway. They pointout that the bulk of IR&D goes to fewer than20 contractors, and argue that it tends tostrengthen existing companies and to inhibitcompetition by handicapping new firms thatare not already doing business with DoD.Others are concerned that IR&D funds are tar-geted toward short-term technical applications
1 jFrom ‘‘Discriminate Deterrence, Report of the Commis-sion on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (January 1988), p. 46.
5 0
for which relevance can easily be demonstratedand costs recovered quickly. In this view, itcontributes little to long-term research and de-velopment on which the health of the defensetechnology base depends.
Are the interests of government best servedby the IR&D/B&P system as presently consti-tuted? Is industry technically enhanced as aresult of IR&D, or could these funds more ef-fectively support the defense technology basethrough some alternative mechanism? Doesthe system of IR&D reimbursements discour-age new companies from contributing to thedefense technology base? Does IR&D inhibitDoD from drawing more widely on the com-mercial sector?
A third area of concern centers on antiquatedand inefficient manufacturing practices withinthe defense industries. For more than two dec-ades, DoD has supported the ManufacturingTechnology Program (ManTech) and, more re-cently, the Industrial Modernization Incen-tives Program (IMIP).13 But these efforts havenot provided sufficient incentives to encouragemodernization of many plants that build ad-vanced weapons systems. The result is thatinefficiencies and excessive costs, that wouldnot be tolerated in the commercial sector, havecome to characterize a large portion of the de-fense industries.
Critics charge that many prime contractorshave largely neglected the manufacturing proc-ess, despite the fact that a few have built state-of-the-art demonstration facilities. In this view,contractors have tended to emphasize labor-intensive product technologies that strive toreach the outside limits of performance. Theycontend that many contractors concentrate onfancy, expensive new product technologies
lsThe Nation~ Rese~ch Council concluded, “The actual im-
pact of the [ManTech] program, however, was limited . . . Sev-eral groundless but widely held myths have been used to sup-port the erroneous belief that manufacturing technology waseither an unimportant or an inappropriate concern of DoD. Con-tinued acceptance of these myths could be devastating for thenext generation of weapon systems. ” National Research Coun-cil, Manufacturing Technology: Cornerstone of a Renewed De-fense Industrial Base (Washington, DC: National AcademyPress, 1987), p, 16.
that will catch the eye of some project managerin DoD. When the contract comes through,they assert, the defense companies have notdeveloped sophisticated manufacturing facil-ities capable of delivering the new product ontime, at agreed costs, and up to military speci-fications. They conclude that a myopic focuson super high-tech, complex systems, has ledto shortfalls in manufacturing technologiesthat cannot be sustained indefinitely.
Other observers contend that the system ofgovernment contracting, particularly the cost-plus-fee instrument, creates disincentives forfirms that would like to modernize their man-ufacturing processes.14 They argue that suchcontracts encourage high production costs be-cause profit, overhead, and other fees are cal-culated as a percentage of the total cost of pro-duction. In the defense industry, where firmsare comparatively more insulated from inter-national competition, supply, demand, andother market forces, there is less incentive (andless progress) to contain costs and to increaseefficiency by upgrading outmoded manufactur-ing practices. Indeed, increased manufactur-ing costs can translate into increased profitsand other fees on future contracts.
There are additional disincentives. If a con-tractor attempts to modernize manufacturingtechnology, he must face the risk that the newprocess may not work in the short run, or mayintroduce significant delays into productionthat may result in angry program managers,negative publicity, investigative reporting, au-dits, and congressional ill will. In addition,some analysts contend that government hasfailed to provide sufficient inducements to sup-port research, development, and implementa-tion of costly new process technologies, Man-Tech and IMIP to the contrary notwithstanding.
And finally, some observers argue that whenindustry makes major investments in more ef-
14’’ The defense procurement system creates a business envi-ronment that provides inadequate incentives for process im-provement. Both the nature of competition among contractorsand the contract pricing policies act to inhibit emphasis on pro-duction efficiency.” National Research Council, The file of DoDin Supporting Manufacturing Technology Development (Wash-ington, DC: National Academy Press, 1986), pp. 10-11.
51
ficient process technology and manufacturingplant, the benefits accrue only to the govern-ment, and may even damage the position ofthe defense contractor. This would occur typi-cally when a future contract is negotiated withthe government, and the company’s cost baseis reduced, decreasing profits and other fees.In such circumstances, the company might beunable to recoup the investment that it hadmade in new manufacturing technology. Thismechanism, it is argued, encourages small andincremental improvements where the costs canbe recovered in a single contract run. It is adirect disincentive to major upgrading of man-ufacturing facilities, and acts particularly tothe detriment of small companies that cannotwithstand losses which would result from lessfavorable terms on future contracts.
With regard to the defense industries, thepolicy question turns on the issue of what canbe done to stimulate large defense contractorsto plan and invest in longer range technology,and to invest in modem manufacturing or proc-ess technologies. Should Congress substan-tially alter the relationship between DoD andthe defense contractors? Do government pol-icies inhibit the transfer of technology to de-fense companies or the entry of innovativecompanies into the defense business? Does theemphasis on short-term planning inhibit tech-nological innovation and, if so, what govern-ment policies would have to be changed to re-verse this orientation?
Supply of Scientists and Engineers
Because the vitality of the defense technol-ogy base ultimately depends on the supply ofqualified scientists and engineers, demo-graphic trends that forecast shortfalls and achange in the national character of the supplyhave aroused widespread concern. Is there amilitary or economic requirement that a cer-tain number of American citizens be trainedas scientists and engineers? If so, is it likelythat sufficient numbers of Americans will en-ter advanced degree programs in technicalfields over the next decade?
Various studies indicate that over the next10 years the United States will experience adecline of up to 25 percent in the number ofyoung people entering college. This includesan expected increase of 20 to 30 percent in thenumber of minority students who, historically,have not entered advanced degree programsin science and technology in large numbers.If these trends persist, they could exacerbatean already significant decline in the numberand percentage of U.S. citizens receiving ad-vanced degrees in science and engineering. Inprevious work, however, OTA has found thisscenario unconvincing. OTA concluded in 1985that “it is entirely possible that supply of peo-ple trained in science and engineering will notdecline at all, despite the drop in college-agepopulation."15
The decrease of U.S. citizens entering theseadvanced degree programs has generated spe-cial concerns both within DoD and in the de-fense industries because demand for engineersand scientists in specialized fields significantlyoutpaces supply. In 1981, for example, therewere 10 jobs for each new degree holder in com-puter sciences and 4 jobs for each new nuclearengineer. Defense analysts also cite shortfallsin the area of aeronautical engineers, and inthe fields of avionics, computer software, andelectrical systems, among others.l6
Recent strong demand has been coupled witha long-term increase in the number and per-centage of foreign nationals enrolled in grad-uate degree programs in science and engineer-ing. In the 20 years between 1964 and 1984,the proportion of foreign Ph.D. candidates inthese disciplines increased from 17 to 26 per-cent. Among engineering Ph.D. candidatesalone, the proportion of foreign nationals ad-
‘sU.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Demo-graphic Trends and the Scientific and fi~ngineering \$’orkForce-A Technical Afemorandum, OTA-TM-SET-35 (\f’ashing-ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1985), p.4. Issues concerning the supply of technical personnel are dis-cussed further in the forthcoming OTA assessment, 13ducat-ing Scientists and Enp”neers: Grade School to Grad School,OTA-S13T-377 (in press), anticipated to be released in May 1988.
l~Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Univer-sity Responsiveness to National Security Requirements, Janu-ary 1982, DTIC ~ADA 112070, pp. 2-3 and 2-4.
52
vanced from 22 to 56 percent.17 Some observersare alarmed at the growth in the percentageof U.S.-trained foreign scientists and engineers,which has occurred at the same time as a re-duction in the number of U.S. citizens trainedin technical areas. The total number of stu-dents in graduate school has increased, whilePh.D. degrees have remained the same.
If present trends continue, the DoD labs andthe companies that do business with the mili-tary will be faced with three choices. Theycould elect to employ fewer persons, but hireonly American citizens. They could maintainthe number of American scientists, but paymore to attract them. And finally, they couldelect to hire increasingly more foreign nationalsover time. A principal security considerationis that it is difficult to exercise effective na-tional controls over persons whose citizenshipand allegiance is with another country.
The broader problem, of course, centers onthe possible loss of domestic capacity to un-dertake leading edge scientific research and de-velopment. Here, the dual-use technology in-dustries are as much at risk as the government
*’U.S. General Accounting Office, “Plans of Foreign Ph.D.Candidates: Postgraduate Plans of U.S. Trained Foreign Stu-dents in Science/Engineering,” GAO/RCED-86-102FS, p. 7, TheGAO data is taken from “Foreign Citizens in U.S. Science andEngineering: History, Status and Outlook, ” NSF 86-305 (Wash-ington, DC, 1985).
laboratories and contract industries specifi-cally associated with the Department of De-fense. Some analysts suggest that the role forforeign scientists may be in the industrieswhich support both commercial and militarytechnologies. They assert that increasing num-bers of foreign scientists and engineers planto live permanently in the United States, andthey urge immigration authorities to facilitatethe stateside plans of these valuable persons.
The other side of the coin is that many U. S.-trained scientists and engineers return to theirown countries. Indeed, many Japanese andEuropean nationals have received their train-ing in the United States, but have gone to workfor firms at home that are in direct competi-tion with companies in the United States.
The policy question centers on what steps,if any, should be taken to increase the numberof projected U.S. scientists and engineers, andwhether it is necessary or wise to take stepsto affect the number of foreign graduate stu-dents in U.S. universities.18 Is there a need foradditional scientific manpower to satisfy bothnational security and commercial needs? Whatroles should foreign scientists play in the de-fense technology base in the United States?
“See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, J3du-cating Scientists and Engineers: Grade School to Grad School,OTA-SET-377 (in press), ch. 4, anticipated to be released in May1988.
Chapter 4
Managing Department of DefenseTechnology Base Programs
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense (DoD) appropri-ation for its technology base programs1 ex-ceeds $8.6 billion in fiscal year 1988, of whichalmost half (see table 2) is funding for the Stra-tegic Defense Initiative (SD I). This representsless than 4 percent of the entire DoD budget.Nevertheless, many inside and outside of thePentagon consider DoD’s technology base pro-grams a crucial investment in the Nation’soverall national security. The military’s tech-nology base programs consist of a broad spec-trum of ‘front-end” technology development,beginning with a broad base of basic researchsupport and extending through the demonstra-tion of technology that may make up futuredefense systems. The scope of interests withinDoD’s technology base programs rangesacross diverse technological concerns frommeteorology to autonomous guided missilescapable of differentiating among varioustargets.
‘For purposes of this study, technology base programs referto budget categories 6.1 (basic research), 6.2 (exploratory de-velopment), and 6.3A (advanced technology development). DoDusually considers 6.1 and 6.2 as its technology base programs,with 6.1 through 6.3A normally referred to as its “science andtechnology programs. ”
In fiscal year 1988, more than half of the Pen-tagon’s technology base program was per-formed by industry, another third by DoD’sown in-house laboratories, and the remainderby universities. According to DoD, each ofthese performers plays an important part inthe successful operation of its technology baseprogram, and extensive cooperative effortsamong the three groups yields a significant re-turn on DoD’s investment.
The universities perform over 50 percent ofDoD’s basic research activities. In addition,DoD contends that its in-house laboratoriesprovide the Armed Services with the abilityto meet special military needs that cannot bemet by the Nation’s industrial base. These lab-oratories focus attention on short- and long-term defense needs, and they enable the mili-tary to act as a smart buyer of technology andequipment. The primary role of private indus-try is to develop technology and apply it innew military systems. z
‘Martin, Dr. Edith W., “The DoD Science and TechnologyBase Programs: Some Management Perspectives, ” Army Re-search, Development, and Acquisition Magazine, Sept. -Oct.1983, p. 3. At the time this article was written the author wasDUSD(R&AT).
Table 2. —Department of Defense Fiscal Year 1988 Funding of Technology Base Programs(in millions of dollars)
Army Navy Air Force DARPA Total
Research (6.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $169 $342 $198 $ 8 3 $ 902’Exploratory development (6.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $556 $408 $557 $512 $2,033Advanced exploratory development . . . . . . . . . $319 $227 $754 $202 $1,502Total services and DARPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $4,437Strategic Defense Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3,604Other defense agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 564Total DoD technology base programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $8,605‘Thl~ ~u~ ,nClud~~ $110 ~llllOn for the URI ~hl~h OSD has not yet allocated ‘fllOflg the three services and DARPA
SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment. 1988, from data supplied by the Off Ice of the Secretary of Defense.
53
54—
Goals and
According to DoD,
Objectives
its diverse technologybase programs attempt to achieve six majorgoals:’
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Offset Soviet Numerical Superiority. TheU.S. does not attempt to match the So-viet Union and the Warsaw bloc on a per-son-for-person or weapon-for-weapon ba-sis. It relies instead on technology toachieve the desired military advantage.Keep Ahead of the Growing Soviet Threat.Although this is increasingly more diffi-cult, the United States must maintain itstechnological lead in order to offset theSoviet threat.Reduce Complexity and Costs. The tech-nology that is produced by the militarymust be designed to reduce the cost andcomplexity of future weapon systems.Improve Productivity of the IndustrialBase. Maintenance of a strong industrialbase, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, is one ofthe most important advantages for theUnited States.Sponsor the Highest Quality of Scienceand Technology (S&T) Work. DoD mustmake sure that the S&T work performedby industry, universities, and its in-houselabs is of the highest quality and scien-tifically sound.Enhance Return on Investment. Finally,DoD always tries to receive the greateestpossible return on its S&T investment.
The Department of Defense contends thatthe military’s science and technology programshave played, and will continue to play, a cru-cial role in maintaining the military and civil-ian science and technology (S&T) base. Exam-ples of this include:
● early development of lasers and incorpo-ration of their unique capabilities intoweapon systems;
● early development of integrated circuitsand their application to mission-critical ca-pabilities;
‘Ibid., p. 4.
development of aircraft technology whichprovides substantially improved capabil-ities in maneuverability, flight, fire con-trol, and firepower; anddevelopment of the carbon-carbon com-posite material nosetip for the TRIDENTD-5 re-entry vehicle.
Funding Categories for DoD’sRDT&E Activities
The Department of Defense does not employthe National Science Foundation’s (NSF) fa-miliar categories of basic research, applied re-search, and development when reporting itsResearch, Development, Test, and Evaluation(RDT&E) activities.’ Instead the Pentagonuses a series of six RDT&E functional catego-ries numbered 6.1 to 6.6. They are defined byDoD as follows:5
●
●
6.1 Research. Includes scientific study andexperimentation directed toward increas-ing knowledge and understanding in thosefields of the physical, engineering, envi-ronmental, biological, medical, and behav-ioral-social sciences related to long-termnational security needs. It provides fun-damental knowledge for the solution ofmilitary problems. It also provides partof the base for subsequent exploratory andadvanced development in defense-relatedtechnologies and of new or improved mil-itary functional capabilities in various sci-entific fields.6.2 Exploratory Development. Includesall the efforts directed towards the solu-tion of specific military problems, shortof major development projects. This typeof effort may vary from fairly fundamen-tal applied research to quite sophisticated
‘Accordimz to NSF, when DoD rxovides NSF with its RDT&E.spending levels, DoD breaks it down into NSF’s three cor-responding categories in the following manner: 6.1 research isreported as “basic research’ 6.2 exploratory development isreported as “applied research”; and categories 6.3-6.6 are re-ported as “development.”
5U.S. Department of Defense, INST 7720.16 (OPNAV3910. 16). enclosure(3), p.2-7 and 2-8. Department of the Navy,Budget Guidance Manual, 7102.2. Quotations in the followingsection are from this source; the remaining material isparaphrased from this source.
breadboard hardware, study program-ming efforts.
. . . The dominant characteristic of thiscategory of effort is that it be pointedtoward specific military problem areaswith a view toward developing and eval-uating the feasibility and practicabilityof proposed solutions and determiningtheir parameters.
6.3 Advanced Development. Includes allprojects which have moved into the devel-opment of hardware for experimental oroperational test. It is characterized by lineitem projects, and program control is ex-ercised on a project basis. The focus of Ad-vanced Exploratory Development (6.3A)lies in the design of items being directedtoward hardware for testing of operationalfeasibility, as opposed to items designedand engineered for eventual Service use.6.4 Engineering Development. Includes allthose development programs being engi-neered for Service use but which have notyet been approved for procurement oroperation. This area is characterized bymajor line item projects and program con-trol by review of individual projects.6.5 Management Support. Includes re-search and development efforts directedtoward support of installations or opera-tions required for general research and de-velopment use. Included would be: testranges; military construction; mainte-nance support of laboratories, operationsand maintenance of test aircraft and ships;and studies and analysis in support of theR&D program. Cost of laboratory person-nel, either in-house or contract-operated,would be assigned to appropriate projectsor as a line item in the Research, Explora-tory Development, or Advanced Develop-ment Program areas, as appropriate. Mil-itary construction costs directly relatedto a major development program will beincluded in the appropriate element.6.6 Operational Systems Development.Includes research and development effortsdirected toward development, engineeringand test of systems, support programs,vehicles, and weapons that have been ap-
5 5
proved for production and Service employ-ment. 6.6 is not an official category as are6.1-6.5, but is a term used for conveniencein reference and discussion. Thus, no pro-gram element will exist numbered 6.6.
All items in this area are major lineitem elements in other programs. Pro-gram control will thus be exercised byreview of individual research and devel-opment effort in each Weapon SystemElement. Activities in categories 6.3-6.6receive the bulk of RDT&E funding (91.5percent in fiscal year 1987 estimated).
Funding for DoD’s technology base pro-grams is appropriated to the individual Serv-ices, SDIO, and the Defense agencies such asthe Defense Advanced Research ProjectsAgency (DARPA) and the Defense NuclearAgency (DNA). As table 2 indicates, in fiscalyear 1988, SDIO supported the largest tech-nology base program, followed by the Air ForceArmy, Navy, and DARPA.
An Overview of DefensePrograms (6.1)
Research
The Armed Forces have supported researchsince the early days of the Nation. The 1804expedition of Lewis and Clark, for example,was funded by the Army. With the establish-ment of the Office of Naval Research (ONR)in 1946, the military became the first Govern-ment organization to support a major programof university-based basic research. This com-mitment continued with the establishment ofthe Army Research Office (ARO) in 1951, andthe Air Force Office of Scientific Research in1952. The Advanced Research Projects Agency(ARPA, later DARPA) was established in 1958as part of the U.S. response to Sputnik.
DoD funded the bulk of federally sponsoredresearch prior to the establishment of suchFederal research agencies as the National Sci-ence Foundation and the National Aeronau-tics and Space Administration. In the 1950sand early 1960s, DoD sponsored about 80 per-cent of all federally funded basic research.However although DoD funds about 66 per-
56—
cent of all Federal R&D, it is the fourth largestsupporter of basic research, accounting for ap-proximately 13 percent of all federally spon-sored basic research.
In fiscal year 1988 DoD will spend about 2.1percent of its RDT&E budget ($902 million)on basic research. This is down from an aver-age of 4.6 percent in the 1960s and 3.6 percentin the 1970s. During fiscal year 1988, approx-imately 50 percent of DoD’s research will beperformed by universities, with another 30 per-cent by DoD’s in-house laboratories, and theremaining 20 percent by industry and non-profit organizations.
The Department of the Navy will supportthe largest research program in fiscal year1988, funding 37 percent of all DoD’s research.The Army and Air Force will support about19 and 23 percent respectively, with DARPAand the other Defense agencies supporting theremaining 21 percent.
The Pentagon views its research program asa crucial source of its future technology. How-ever, DoD research activities differ from othertechnology base activities because research isnot necessarily expected to result directly ina military product. The Services support re-search into the nature of basic processes andphenomena, and contend that they select re-search projects based on the quality of scienceand their potential relationship to the DoDmission.
The three Services and DARPA support re-search activities in such fields of science as:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
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●
physicsastronomyelectronicsmathematicsmechanicsmaterialsoceanographyatmospheric sciencesbehavioral sciencesradiation sciencesastrophysicschemistrycomputer scienceenergy conversion
●
●
●
aeronautical sciencesterrestrial sciencemedical and biological sciences
Work in these fields is applied to space tech-nology, computer science, electronics, surveil-lance, command and control, communications,propulsion, aerodynamics, night vision, chem-ical and biological defense, structures, medi-cal and life sciences, and other areas of mili-tary importance.6
Most successful research programs lead tofurther efforts in exploratory development (cat-egory 6.2) which focus on more applied con-figurations with military relevance. This re-search and development process led, forexample, to the injection of laser technologyinto military systems. The laser was primar-ily supported by DoD soon after the time ofits invention, when its potential military rele-vance appeared quite remote.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)and the Services contend that research accom-plishments are transferred or quickly passedonto the military R&D community and poten-tial laboratory program managers.
Extramural contractors, primarily univer-sities and industry, are not expected to justifytheir (6.1) research proposals in terms of pos-sible DoD applications. However, in-house re-searchers, because of their laboratory associa-tion, are expected to demonstrate a closerassociation to specific military applications.The most important criterion for funding re-search is the quality of science, followed by itspotential relationship to the DoD mission.Other criteria include:
●
●
●
●
�
the potential of the proposed research tolead to 6.2 work;whether a civilian R&D agency shouldsupport the proposed research;the possibility that the research will leadto radically new scientific discoveries;the track record of the researcher(s) sub-mitting the proposal; and
8C01. Donald I. Carter, ‘‘The Department of Defense State-ment on Science in the Mission Agencies and Federal Labora-tories, ” before the Task Force on Science Policy of the HouseCommittee on Science and Technology, Oct. 2, 1985, p. 7.
5 7
● the extent to which a proposal fits intoa particular Service’s 6.1 funding pri-orities.
The basic research programs in the threeServices are comprised of three major programelements (PE):7 Defense Research Science; theIn-House Laboratory Independent ResearchProgram (ILIR); and the University ResearchInitiative (URI). The Defense Research Scienceprogram is the largest of the three programs,making up 90 percent of the 6.1 budget. At6 percent of the research budget, ILIR is de-signed to give laboratory directors flexibilityin order to take advantage of new technologi-cal opportunities and to help maintain a re-search base in the laboratories. (DARPA andthe Army do not support ILIR programs.) Theremaining 4 percent of the research budget isdevoted to the URI program.
Pursuant to the 1984 Competition in Con-tracting Act, all of the Services and DARPApublish an annual broad agency announcement(BAA). The BAA outlines the specific researchinterests of each Service and DARPA, and theprocedures for submitting research proposals.DoD contends that all proposals falling withinthe guidelines of each BAA are considered com-petitive and satisfy the Act.
DoD believes that supporting 6.1 work is im-portant for its in-house laboratories. By sup-porting the military’s research program, DoDfeels laboratory researchers are able to keepabreast of new discoveries and engage in im-portant interactions with the scientific com-munity. According to DoD, laboratory per-formance of research increases the technicalabilities of the laboratories and helps to attractimaginative scientists and engineers.
Technical Review of ResearchProposals and Programs
Each of the Services, and DARPA, conductsan extensive technical review of all research
‘The PE is the basic building block in DoD’s program, plan-ning, and budgeting system (PPBS). There are approximately180 PE’s in DoD’s entire technology base program, with eachPE consisting of all costs associated with a research activityor weapon system.
proposals. The Army Research Office subjectsproposals to a three-level technical review proc-ess: a peer review in the external scientific com-munity for technical excellence, an Army lab-oratory review both for excellence and militaryrelevance, and an ARO internal review to makea final funding decision. The Services en-courage researchers to discuss their proposalideas with the appropriate DoD technical per-son before submitting a formal proposal. Thoseresearchers who follow this suggestion havean approximate 50-percent success rate, com-pared to a lo-percent funding rate of proposalsreceived without prior contact.
The Navy’s technical review is completedprimarily in-house by their scientific officers.Of the three Services’ research programs, theOffice of Naval Research has the largest num-ber of staff scientific officers, about 80. Dueto a smaller professional staff, the Army Re-search Office (ARO) and the Air Force Officeof Scientific Research (AFOSR) rely primar-ily on outside review of their research proposalsalthough they also use in-house expertise toreview proposals. (Each has about 40 profes-sional people located at its research office.) TheNational Academy of Sciences (NAS) has a con-tract with the ARO and AFOSR to arrangeformal technical reviews of research proposals.DARPA relies primarily on the three Servicesand the external scientific community to re-view its research proposals.
In most cases, the Service laboratories formtechnical review panels, made up of the lab-oratory director and various technical programdirectors, to decide which research proposalswill be funded within the laboratory. The Na-val Research Laboratory, for example, uses aResearch Advisory Committee, consisting ofthe laboratory and program directors, that de-termines which in-house research proposalswill be supported.
An Overview of DoD’s TechnologyBase Activities in the Laboratories
The Department of Defense laboratories per-form research and development in diverseareas of science and technology in support ofmilitary and civil works programs of DoD.
8 3 - 2 0 7 - 0 - 88 - 3
58
There are currently 68 DoD RDT&E labora-tories (31 Army, 23 Navy, and 14 Air Force)that have a combined annual cash flow ofnearly $10 billion for technology base and otherdevelopment activities. The responsibilitiesand operations of the various laboratories dif-fer within the three Services in order to meettheir individual mission requirements. DoD’slaboratories actually perform only about one-third of the technology base activities, whileindustry performs over 50 percent and the Na-tion’s universities and nonprofit organizationsperform the remainder.
The Pentagon contends that its laboratoriesplay a crucial role in solving science and engi-neering problems, deficiencies, and needs thatare unique to the military. DoD states that theprimary purpose of its laboratories is to de-velop new technologies to support each of therespective Service’s missions. According toDoD, the role of the laboratories in the devel-opment and improvement of technology andweapons systems is fundamental to improvingnational security. DoD believes that the lab-oratories have a responsibility to maintain astrong continuity of scientific activities, freefrom commercial pressures, directed towardmeeting specific military needs. Further,according to DoD, the laboratories provide afast reaction capability to solve immediate crit-ical problems that may confront the Services.Other responsibilities include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
ensure the maintenance and improvementof national competence in technologyareas essential to military needs;avoid technological surprise and ensuretechnological innovation;pursue technology initiatives through theplanning, programming, and budgetingprocess; allocate work among privatesector organizations and governmentelements;act as a principal agent in maintaining thetechnology base of DoD;
Where is about an equal number of other centers that do notperform traditional RDT&E activities, but rather are specialfacilities with very specific missions, such as flight testing newor refurbished aircraft. The R&D activities of DoD’s labora-tories are discussed fin-ther in chapter 5.
5. provide material acquisition and operat-ing system support;
6. stimulate the use of technical demonstra-tions and prototypes to mature and ex-ploit U.S. and allied technologies; and
7. interface with the worldwide scientificcommunity; provide support to other gov-ernment agencies.9
The Pentagon asserts that its technologybase capabilities should serve as a strong com-plement to the civilian technology base, as em-phasized in a recent DoD report to the SenateArmed Services Committee:
A strong free enterprise economy and in-dustrial base–here and abroad–are the es-sential underpinning of our defense posture.Investment in our technology base and main-tenance of our technology strength are criti-cal to the long term security of the U.S. andour allies.l0
Over the past several years DoD officialshave been trying to resolve a number of diffi-cult laboratory issues. The Pentagon has beenstruggling with such concerns as improvingcommunications within and among the differ-ent laboratories, increasing the managementflexibility of the individual laboratory direc-tors, meeting scientific and technical person-nel needs, upgrading facilities, developingmechanisms for evaluating the performanceof the laboratories, and improving DoD’s over-all management of its laboratories.
Special Technology Base Initiatives
DoD has initiated a number of special pro-grams to help address specific technology baseproblems. Most of these initiatives centeraround such concerns as communication be-tween DoD and various research performers,scientific communications and technologytransfer, and support of the research infra-structure.
In 1982, DoD established the 5-year, $150million University Research Instrumentation
‘U.S. Department of Defense, “Report (for the Committee onArmed Services) on the Technology Base and Support of Univer-sity Research, ” Mar. 1, 1985, p. 42.
IOIbid., p. 53.
Program (URIP) to improve the capability ofuniversities to perform research in support ofthe national defense. This program providesfunding for large items of equipment ($50,000to $500,000) that would not be funded in a typi-cal research grant.11 This program was consid-ered a success by DoD. But judging by the re-sponse, it will not come close to meeting allthe instrumentation requests; in the first yearalone, it received 2,500 proposals seeking a to-tal of 646 million dollars’ worth of equipment.
In 1983, at the recommendation of the De-fense Science Board, DoD established the DoDUniversity Forum. The Forum consists of analmost equal number of DoD and universitymembers and was originally co-chaired by theUnder Secretary of Defense for Research andAdvanced Technology and the President ofStanford University. The Forum has issuedreports dealing with such subjects as scientificsecrecy and technology export control, engi-neering and science education needs, andDoD’s response to those needs. More recently,the forum’s working group on engineering andscience education issued a report which en-dorsed the major components of the Univer-sity Research Initiative (URI) to foster greaterDoD-University cooperation.
According to the Department of Defense, theURI would “address some of the concerns ex-pressed by Congress regarding DoD supportfor the infrastructure of science and technol-ogy in the United States, ” particularly at col-leges and universities.12 DoD proposed tospend $25 million in fiscal year 1986 and $50million in fiscal year 1987 for the UniversityResearch Initiative. Congress responded by ap-propriating $88.5 million in fiscal year 1986,$35 million in fiscal year 1987, and $110 mil-lion in fiscal year 1988.
DoD’s URI program consists of two majorprogram elements. The first element consists
1‘According to DoD, funding for a typical l-year single inves-tigator research contract would fall in the range of $50,000 to$100,000.
“CO]. Donald I. Carter., USAF Acting Deputy Under Secre-tary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology, Testi-mony Before the Subcommi ttee on Research and Developmentof the House Armed Services Committee, Apr. 2, 1985.
59
of multidisciplinary research contracts de-signed to enhance interdisciplinary researchefforts between universities, industry, andDoD laboratories. Generally, these contractswill receive support for 3 to 5 years, with re-view and evaluation after 3 years. These re-search centers will conduct research in a rangeof disciplines (mathematics, engineering, andthe physical, biological, and social sciences) im-portant to the Pentagon. The centers will in-crease overall defense funding for high riskbasic research in support of critical defensetechnologies, as well as continue support (inplace of URIP) for equipment and instrumen-tation. 13
The second major URI program element isthe “Programs to Develop Human Resourcesin Science and Engineering. ” This program ele-ment is designed to increase DoD’s supportfor fellowships, postdoctoral, young investi-gators, and scientific exchange programs, inorder to promote interaction between scientificand engineering personnel in DoD laboratoriesand universities conducting DoD-sponsored re-search.
DoD asserts that its laboratories are in theforefront of the effort to transfer technologi-cal expertise from the Federal Government toState and local governments and private in-dustry. The Federal Laboratory Consortiumfor Technology Transfer was originally estab-lished by the Department of Defense in 1972.Further, in response to the Stevenson-WydlerTechnology Innovation Act, the Departmentof Defense established its domestic technol-ogy transfer program under the responsibil-ity of the Deputy Under Secretary for Researchand Advanced Technology. The primary goalof this effort is to accelerate the domestic trans-fer of unclassified technical and scientific ex-pertise to both the university community andthe private sector.
DoD sponsors a number of educational pro-grams to help ensure an adequate supply of
‘3U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretaryof Defense for Research and Engineering, fiscal year 1986University Research Initiative Program Overview, December1985, p. 2.
60
highly trained scientific and engineering per-sonnel. All three Services support a large num-ber of science and engineering graduate stu-dents as well. DoD’s direct funding for researchat universities provides the Pentagon with itslargest base of graduate student support. A1980 study, conducted by the Office of NavalResearch, estimated that on average a milliondollars of university research funding sup-ported 10 to 15 full-time or part-time gradu-ate students. Based on those figures, the Pen-tagon estimated that it supported between4,000 and 4,500 graduates students in fiscalyear 1987.
At the graduate level all three Services spon-sor activities to increase the supply of scien-tific personnel. The fellowship programs ofboth the Army and Navy support graduatestudents in such fields as computer sciences,electrical engineering, and life sciences. The AirForce fellowship program is aimed at moremission-specific activities, sponsoring studentsin such areas as advanced composite structuresand aircraft propulsion technology. Accordingto DoD, the Services supported about 200graduate fellowships in fiscal year 1987; of thistotal, the Navy supported about 145. The Serv-ices also provide opportunities for faculty andundergraduate and graduate students to con-duct research at various DoD laboratories dur-ing the summer months.
Planning
All of the Services conduct an extensive an-nual top-down, bottom-up planning exercisein order to develop a 5-year program objectivememorandum (POM) and annual technologybase investment strategy. From the top theServices receive the annual Defense GuidanceManual, prepared by the Office of the Secre-tary of Defense, which provides them withguidance on developing their entire RDT&Eprograms. Planning usually begins with a re-view and evaluation of the previous year’sresearch activities. When this review is com-pleted, the Services decide which activities tocontinue, which to transition (e.g., from 6.1 into6.2 programs), and which activities to stop.Each of the Services develops an annual tech-
nology base strategy, such as Army’s MissionArea Material Process, or utilizes special stud-ies—such as the Air Force Forecast II proj-ect—which serve as major guides for theirrespective research programs.
The laboratories attached to a particularArmed Service contribute to its technologybase plan. Outside advisory bodies such as theNational Academy of Sciences, the NationalScience Foundation, individuals in the scien-tific community, and in-house technical di-rectors and their respective staffs also makerecommendations. The Services also have sci-entific advisors or science boards that partici-pate in planning activities. The individual Serv-ices can also request that their science boardsconduct a review of some particular area of thetechnology base programs to assure its scien-tific merit and/or responsiveness to particu-lar Service needs. There are inter-Service co-operative groups, such as the Joint LogisticsCommanders and the Joint Directors of Lab-oratories, which meet and review past and fu-ture laboratory activities to reduce duplicationwhile increasing awareness of existing labora-tory activities.
Finally, DoD has an elaborate scientific andtechnical advisory mechanism, with ad hoc andpermanent scientific advisory committees atmany levels, to advise individual laboratories,military Service chiefs, and OSD. At the levelof the Office of the Secretary of Defense, theDefense Science Board deals with both specificand broad policies that address such issues asscientific manpower, defense industrial pre-paredness, the quality of the technology base,technology transfer, and standardization ofweapon systems in NATO. Each branch of themilitary also has a scientific advisory bodyanalogous to the DSB: the Army ScienceBoard, the Naval Research Advisory Commit-tee, and the Air Force Scientific AdvisoryBoard.14
“Science Policy Study Background Report No. 8, “ScienceSupport by the Department of Defense, ” prepared by the Con-gressional Research Service for the Task Force on Science Pol-icy, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Rep-resentatives, 99th Congress, p. 405. Hereafter referred to as“Science Support by the Department of Defense. ”
61— —
OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE OFFICE OFTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Office of the Secretary of Defense ex-erts oversight responsibility for all of DoDtechnology base programs. Oversight refersto the process of formulating and developingpolicy guidance for a particular program, inthis case DoD’s technology base programs. Itincludes: developing an investment strategyfor a particular program; assigning manage-ment responsibility for the program; coordi-nating research programs; establishing policy;developing program evaluation procedures;and recommending appropriate programm a t i cchanges.
OSD is primarily concerned with makingsure that DoD’s technology base programs arewell balanced and reflect the overall needs ofDoD. In addition, the Services and DARPAeach assign specific individuals within theirrespective organizations oversight responsibil-ities for technology base programs. At thislevel, individuals responsible for oversight areprimarily concerned with protecting and help-ing to manage and coordinate their organiza-tion’s technology base programs.
Programmatic management involves the di-rect day-to-day management of a certain tech-nology base activity. Programmatic manage-ment includes responsibility for the successfulcompletion of an R&D activity, including:timely completion of R&D tasks; meeting pro-jected costs; evaluation of R&D activities; andfacilitating the transitioning or phasing outof research activities. The Services, DARPA,and SDIO each assign specific individuals,within their respective organizations, day-to-day management responsibility of varioustechnology base activities.
As a result of the Military Reform Act of1986 (sometimes referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act), DoD has reorganized the man-agement of its RDT&E activities. The Actabolished the office of Under Secretary of De-fense for Research and Engineering andreplaced it with the Under Secretary of Defensefor Acquisition (USD(A)). The legislation also
re-created the Director of Defense Researchand Engineering (DDR&E), who reports to theUSD(A).
Until 1986, the Under Secretary of Defensefor Research and Engineering had responsibil-ity for the research and development activi-ties of DoD and chaired the Defense SystemAcquisition Review Council (DSARC), whichmade decisions about which major weapon sys-tems to purchase. In 1985 the functions of theOffice of the Under Secretary were trimmedwhen Secretary of Defense Weinberger re-moved from the office “primary responsibil-ity y for overall production policy and some keyproduction decisions. ” The effect of the reor-ganization, according to Science magazine, wasto drive a wedge between those responsible forresearch and development and those respon-sible for production, with the hope that fewerfaulty weapon systems would get from the lab-oratory to the factory.15 The President’s Pri-vate Sector Survey on Cost Control (known asthe Grace Report) and the Packard Commis-sion had criticized the combination of researchwith production. Consequently the Goldwater-Nichols Act created the Under Secretary forAcquisition (USD(A)) and the DDR&E tomaintain a separation between R&D and ac-quisition decisions. ’G
The USD(A) has oversight responsibility forDoD’s technology base program, with the ex-ception of SDIO (see figure 2). The DDR&Ehas oversight responsibilities for the Servicesand the DNA’s technology base programs.
According to the USD(A), the DDR&E hasfive primary responsibilities: 1) to oversee de-velopment and acquisition of weapon systemsthrough full scale engineering development; 2)to oversee force modernization; 3) to overseedesign and engineering; 4) to oversee develop-
‘5R. Jeffrey Smith, “DoD Reorganizes Management, ” Science,Feb. 8, 1985, p. 613.
“For further details see Science Support by the Departmentof Defense, ” p. 63.
83-207 - 0 - 88 - 4
62—
Figure 2.-Management of the Department of Defense Technology Base Program
Secretary ofDefense
Director,Strategic Defense
InitiativeOrganization
[, ‘
Under Secretaryof Defense,Acquisition
[USD(A)]
I 1
Director, DefenseResearch and Assistant Secretary of Defense,Engineering
[DDR&E]Research and Technology[ASD (R&T)]; and Director,
Defense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency
Deputy Under
Executive Director,Secretary of Defense,
Defense ScienceResearch and Director, Defense
BoardAdvanced Nuclear Agency
Technology[DUSD (R&AT)]
I
mental test and evaluation; and 5) to overseebasic research, exploratory development, andadvanced technology development. As figure2 indicates, the Director of the Defense Nu-clear Agency and the Executive Director of theDefense Science Board, which is the principaladvisory body within the OSD, also report tothe DDR&E.
As a “corporate guardian” of DoD’s entiretechnology base program (except for SDIO),the DDR&E is responsible for ensuring thatthe technology base programs of the three
Services, DARPA, and DNA are followingoverall technology base guidance developed bythe OSD. The DDR&E also acts to ensure thatdisagreements pertaining to technology baseresponsibilities and priorities are settled in away that best represents the science and tech-nology interests of the Department of Defense.
According to DoD, the Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Research and Technology—ASD(R&T)—will also serve as the Directorof the Defense Research Projects Agency(DARPA). The Director of DARPA reports to
the USD(A), but will work closely with theDDR&E to coordinate DARPA’s technologybase programs, which are contracted throughand managed primarily by the three Services.Prior to the recent reorganization, the DeputyUnder Secretary of Defense for Research andAdvanced Technology (DUSD(R&AT)) reporteddirectly to the Under Secretary of DefenseAcquisition (USD(A)). However, the DUSD(R&AT) now reports to the USD(A) throughthe DDR&E. The primary responsibility of theDUSD(R&AT) office is to provide oversightfor the three Services’ technology base pro-grams, and to serve as their DoD point of con-tact. The primary functions of R&AT are to:structure the technology base program acrossService lines, in order to eliminate overlaps andgaps; resolve technical differences; and en-hance return on investment.
The R&AT office also develops the planning,programming, and budgeting system (PPBS),writes the technology base portion of the De-fense Guidance Manual, and if required re-sponds to the Services’ Program ObjectiveMemoranda. The R&AT office must also re-view the 2-year budget proposals of the Serv-ices and assure that those expenditure planshave the appropriate balance among the vari-ous proposed programs. Finally, the DUSD(R&AT) is supposed to work continually withthe Services to help them achieve mutual sci-ence and technology interests.
With overall guidance from the Office of theSecretary of Defense and the R&AT office (pri-marily through the annual publication of theDefense Guidance Manual), the three Servicesand DARPA formulate their technology baseprograms. Determining the scope of technol-ogy base work involves an evaluation of theoperational needs of each participant and thetechnological opportunities for meeting thoseneeds. The needs are primarily derived througha comparison of the future projected militarythreat with planned U.S. military capabilityand doctrine. Finally, the R&AT office mustbe sure the Service technology base programsestablish new research initiatives in order tomeet the long-term science and technology re-quirements of the three Services.
63
The Research and Advanced Technology of-fice has itself recently been reorganized intofive major directorates, as shown in figure 2.There are approximately 30 professional sci-entists and engineers spread among the fivedirectorates. The Research and LaboratoryManagement Directorate is responsible for:oversight of the Service research (6.1) pro-grams; oversight of the DoD laboratories; re-lated research and development in the indus-trial sector, including Independent Researchand Development (IR&D);17 and the flow of sci-entific and technical information. The officemeets with representatives from the threeServices, DARPA, and SDIO to: coordinateresearch-related policymaking; help facilitateinter-Service cooperation; suggest solutions tomanagerial problems; and address urgent re-search needs. In addition to coordinating re-search in-house, the Research and LaboratoryManagement office also works with differentFederal R&D agencies, such as the NationalScience Foundation (NSF), and with the U.S.scientific community. The remaining four di-rectorates have oversight responsibilities-andin one instance management responsibility—for exploratory (6.2) and advanced technologydevelopment (6.3A) conducted in-house byDoD labs or extramurally by outside con-tractors.
The Electronic Systems Technology Direc-torate is responsible for oversight of programsin surveillance, communications, electronicwarfare, optical countermeasures and tacticaldirected energy weapons. In the area of searchand surveillance, concepts are being refinedto improve day/night/all-weather capabilities.This particular research complements thrustsin precision-guided weapons and activities todevelop automatic high-resolution target iden-tification, classification, and tracking tech-nology.
The Engineering Technology Directorate isoften referred to as the “firepower and mobil-ity” directorate, with oversight responsibilityfor four related areas: combat vehicles, propul-
‘7 See ch. 3 for a discussion of IR&D.
64
sion and fuels, conventional weapons, and ma-terials and structures. One of the major goalsof the directorate is to facilitate technologytransition through advanced technology dem-onstration to better match the technologicalneeds of the various Services. Consequently,this directorate has oversight responsibilitiesfor a large portion of DoD’s advanced technol-ogy development activities (6.3A). This direc-torate also has responsibility for spacecraftpropulsion and the National Aerospace Plane,for logistics R&D, and for the Army Corps ofEngineers laboratories.
The Environmental and Life Sciences Direc-torate deals with four supporting disciplines:training and personnel technology; medicineand life sciences; chemical warfare and chemi-cal/biological defense; and environmental fac-tors. In the area of training, work is being con-ducted in the area of computer-based trainingand performance aids for operations and main-tenance tasks. In the environmental sciences,major efforts involve modernizing data acqui-sition and processing capabilities and the up-grading of DoD’s radar technology, tacticalsensors, and tactical decision-aid capabilities.
The Computer and Electronics TechnologyDirectorate operates differently than the otherfour directorates. This directorate is what DoD
refers to as a “thrust directorate” becauseit manages considerable program funding. Inaddition to oversight responsibilities, its direc-tor has a direct management role in the plan-ning, execution, and evaluation of various pro-grams. The director has direct managementresponsibility for the SEMATECH program,l8
the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC)program, the Microwave/Millimeter Wave Mon-olithic Integrated Circuit (MIMIC) program, theSoftware Technology for Adaptable Reliable Sys-tems (STARS) program, and several others.
DoD contends that this directorate’s directmanagement responsibilities address three im-portant management needs: 1) to focus the mili-tary’s needs on computer and electronics-related technology, 2) to ensure that both thehardware and software receive appropriate at-tention, and 3) to place more emphasis on thetransition of computer and electronics technol-ogy to operational systems.
‘sThe SE MATECH program will attempt to rectify the prob-lem of U.S. competitiveness in worldwide semiconductor mar-kets by pooling the resources of the semiconductor industry,with assistance from the Federal Government. These resourceswill be used to create a central production facility from whichnew manufacturing processes would be made available to theU.S. semiconductor industry. Congress has agreed to begin fund-ing for this proposal and has provided $100 million in funding(to be managed by DoD) for fiscal year 1988.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
The Office of Chief of Naval Research (seefigure 3) is responsible for the Department ofthe Navy’s basic research (6.1) and exploratorydevelopment (6.2) programs. The Chief of Na-val Research reports to the Assistant Secre-tary of the Navy for Research, Engineering,and Systems and to the Chief of Naval Opera-tions for policy guidance, planning, and exe-cution of the Navy’s basic research and ex-ploratory development programs. The Chiefof Naval Research serves as the scientific advi-sor to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) andthe Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).Since 1985 he has also had oversight respon-sibility for all Navy’s laboratories.
Management of the Navy’s Research(6.1) Program
The Office of Naval Research (ONR, see fig-ure 4) is responsible for the daily activities ofthe Navy’s research programs. The directorof ONR reports to the Chief of Naval Research,who is ultimately responsible for planning, re-view, and approval of the Navy’s various re-search activities. ONR was established by Con-gress in 1946 as the first Federal organizationto support university-based basic research.ONR was responsible for developing a numberof mechanisms which are still in use today to
Figure 3. –Navy Organization for Science and Technology
Secretaryof theNavy
SOURCE: Office of the Chief of Naval Research
support research at the Nation’s universities.They include:
●
●
●
●
funding project grants for individual re-searchers at colleges and universities;establishing a peer review process toevaluate research proposals;purchasing of expensive specializedequipment;funding the construction of large facilities,operated by a consortium of universities;and
65
● funding for special-purpose research at in-stitutions such as Woods Hole Oceano-graphic Institute.l9
According to ONR, the primary goals of itsresearch programs are:
● to sustain U.S. scientific and technical su-periority for Naval power and security;
“U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Research,Federal Research and Development Programs Hearings, Nov.18., 1963, p. 33.
66—
Figure 4. -Office of Naval Research
Office ofNaval Research
Planning and.Assessment
SOURCE: Office of Naval Research
Naval ResearchLaboratory
(NRL)
Naval OceanResearch andDevelopment
Activity(NORDA)
● to provide a source of new concepts andtechnical options;
● to support theoretical and experimentalresearch in each directorate;
● to retain a vigorous scientific manpowerand laboratory base; and
● to apply the results of research to Navalwarfare and warfare support areas.
The research program of ONR supports abroad spectrum of scientific disciplines. ONRplans to fund 342 million dollars’ worth of re-search in fiscal year 1988. Sixty percent ofthose funds will go to universities. ONR’s fourlaboratories (the Naval Research Laboratory,
Institute forNaval
Oceanography(INO)
NavalEnvironmental
PredictionResearch Facility
(NEPRF)
the Naval Oceanographic Research and Devel-opment Activity, the Institute for NavalOceanography, and the Navy EnvironmentalPrediction Research Facility) will receive 21percent; other Navy laboratories will get 12percent; and for-profit and nonprofit organi-zations will receive the remaining 7 percent.
Founded in 1923, the Naval Research Lab-oratory (NRL) is the principal laboratory ofONR. It receives almost 90 percent of the 6.1funds that go to the ONR laboratories. Thisresearch funding is about 24 percent of thelaboratory’s total in-house funds, and it playsa major role in NRL's total in-house operation.
67
The NRL performs and supports research ina broad range of areas including computer sci-ence and artificial intelligence, directed energyweapons, electronic warfare, space science andtechnology, materials, radar, information man-agement, surveillance and sensor technology,environmental effects on Naval systems, andunderwater acoustics.
ONR relies on four major research direc-torates to carry out its contract research pro-grams: Mathematics and Physical Sciences,Environmental Sciences, Engineering, and LifeSciences. As might be expected, the directoratewhich receives the largest share of researchfunds is Environmental Sciences, with its fo-cus on oceanography activities. The Navy’sOcean Sciences Division covers the range ofdisciplines from physical oceanography of boththe open ocean and coastal zones, throughocean biology and ocean chemistry, to marinemeteorology.
A fifth ONR directorate, the Applied Re-search and Technology Directorate, has pri-mary responsibility for adapting and extend-ing generic basic research toward appliedresearch, thereby helping to transition researchresults into the Navy’s exploratory develop-ment program. This directorate is also respon-sible for working closely with the Navy’s ex-ploratory development program in order toidentify and implement high-leverage oppor-tunities for joint research and exploratory de-velopment funding. The Navy is the only Serv-ice that operates a research directorate withthis type of responsibility.
The Applied Research and Technology Di-rectorate is also an agent and a project man-ager for selected programs sponsored by theDeputy Chief of Naval Operations for Subma-rine Warfare, DARPA, the Strategic DefenseInitiative Organization (SDIO), and other de-fense organizations and industry. The ONR,with the assistance of this directorate, man-ages the largest SDIO basic research programof the three Services. ONR expects to managebetween $80 and $90 million, primarily in theresearch category, for SDIO in fiscal year 1988.
Forty percent of ONR’s research programconsists of Accelerated Research Initiatives(ARIs) designed to concentrate resources inspecific areas of research which offer a particu-larly attractive scientific or Naval opportunity.ARIs, which are normally funded for 5 years,are sprinkled throughout the four researchdirectorates and the laboratories of ONR.These initiatives represent an accelerated orenhanced program in a basic scientific areawhich is potentially attractive to future Navyneeds.
Some of the ARI research areas include: arc-tic oceanography, composites, interracial sci-ence, and electrochemical properties of mem-brane proteins as the basis of specializedcellular functions. ARIs are selected from re-search options developed by the scientific com-munity and by ONR’s scientific officers, andare reviewed and ranked as part of ONR’s an-nual research planning and budgeting process.ARI selection is based on how well the pro-posed activity meets the goals of the Navy’sresearch program and is done through an ex-pert panel-based peer review process.
Management of the Navy’sExploratory Development and
Advanced Technology DevelopmentPrograms (6.2 & 6.3A)
The Navy’s entire exploratory developmentprogram is managed by the Office of NavalTechnology (ONT) within the Office of Chiefof Naval Research. ONT (see figure 5) was cre-ated in 1980 by the Secretary of the Navy to“provide for a more clearly defined process ofplanning, execution and transition of programswithin the technology base and into advancedtechnology development . . .“ ONT currentlyhas a professional staff of 55 people to carryout its responsibilities.20
‘°From 1980 through 1985, ONT reported to the Deputy Chiefof Naval Material (Technology) [DCNM(T)]. In May 1985, whenthe Naval Material Command was abolished, the CNR was as-signed the additional responsibility of managing those NavalR&D Centers that had reported to the Chief of Naval Material.In 1986, management of the Navy’s R&D centers were placedunder the newly created Space and Naval Warfare Systems Com-mand (SPAWAR).
68
Antiair/AntisurfaceWarfare and
Surface/AerospaceTechnology Directorate
●
AntisubmarineWarfare and UnderseaTechnology Directorate
Support TechnologiesDirectorate(see below)
Low ObservableDirectorate
Support Technologies Include:
● Command, Control, and Communications
● Mission Support Technologies(Personnel and Training; Biomedical; Logistics; Chemical/Biological/Radiological Defense)
● Systems Support Technologies(Electronic Devices; Materials; Human Factors; Oceanography; Computer Hardware, Software, and Architecture;Artificial Intelligence)
SOURCE: Office of Naval Technology
ONT is primarily responsible for all program-matic oversight of the Navy’s exploratory de-velopment program, which includes such activ-ities as program planning, approval, funding,review, and evaluation. One of the most im-portant activities of the ONT is the develop-ment of the investment and mission area strat-egies, which are the heart of the 6.2 programmanagement system. These strategies are de-veloped in consultation with OSD, the Officeof the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, theCommandant of the Marine Corps, ONR, theDirector of Navy Laboratories at the Space andNaval Warfare Systems Command(SPAWAR), and the other Naval SystemCommands.
The Director of Navy Laboratories (DNL)at SPAWAR, where about half of the ONT’s6.2 program is performed, is responsible forestablishing laboratory policy and manage-
ment procedures. This includes resolving dis-putes-between the laboratories involving re-search emphasis and responsibilities. However,the DNL does not have any responsibilities forthe development and selection of researchprojects that are supported by the variousSPAWAR laboratories.
Through its R&D Centers, the Navy per-forms much more of its 6.2 and 6.3A programin-house than do the other Services, for which6.3A work is primarily performed by industry.Navy R&D Centers have a much stronger em-phasis on development activities beyond thetech base than do the laboratories of the otherServices.
In fiscal year 1988, the Navy will supportthe smallest exploratory development programof the three Services, conducting 59 percentof its 6.2 activities in-house. Industry will con-
duct 31 percent, universities 7 percent, and theremainder will be conducted by other govern-ment agencies. Although the Navy has over20 laboratories, the majority of 6.2 and 6.3Aactivities are performed by the eight SPAWARR&D Centers and the three ONR laboratories.
As figure 5 indicates, ONT consists of sixmajor directorates. Three of them—the Anti-air/Antisurface Warfare and Surface/Aero-space Technology Directorate, the SupportTechnologies Directorate, and the Antisubma-rine Warfare and Undersea Technology Direc-torate—fund about 80 percent of the Navy’s6.2 program. The remaining three directorateshave specific responsibilities primarily withoversight and coordination of related explora-tory development programs.
The Industry IR&D Directorate is respon-sible for all oversight of the Navy’s IR&D pro-grams. The office is responsible for workingwith industry insetting IR&D priorities, evalu-ating IR&D activities, and maintaining yearlyrecords of what type of IR&D activities areactually conducted.
The entire 6.2 program is built around theNavy’s 13 mission area strategies. ONT con-ducts an extensive top-down, bottom-up proc-ess to define its key mission area strategies.Since the six different Navy systems com-mands (SYSCOMS) are the ultimate users ofthe technology, they play an important rolein the overall development of the Navy’s ex-ploratory development investment and mis-sion area strategies. Besides the SYSCOMSand the laboratory/center technical directors,other inputs are sought from the Navy Secre-tariat, from the maritime strategy developedby OPNAV, from the CMC, and from internaland external scientific advisory groups.
The Navy develops a strategy for each of its13 mission areas based on such concerns ascurrent mission deficiencies, near-and far-termtechnological opportunities, the needs associ-ated with DoD’s overall maritime strategy, andpotential military threats. According to ONT,a mission area strategy should be describedwhere possible in terms of objectives that re-late to a specific technology. For example, the
69
Navy has broad mission strategies for anti-surface ship warfare, anti-submarine warfare,and mine warfare. Because mission areas donot often change, the focus of this activity ison updating the strategy associated with eachmission area.
In developing each mission area strategy,ONT establishes what it calls technologythrusts (see figures 6 and 7). According to ONTeach technology thrust has a single opera-tional/performance objective or several veryclosely related ones supporting the warfight-ing objectives of its mission area. ONT utilizestwo definitions of technology to help identifya particular technological thrust:
● a science or engineering discipline specificto an application, such as:–laser communication technology,
Figure 6.–Navy 6.2 Program Structure
ResearchPerformer
}
cIai
mants
23)
—
ONT
ONT Directorates (3)
Program Elements (14)
Mission Areas (13)
Thrusts (95)
SOURCE: Office of Naval Technology
70
Figure 7.–Navy 6.2 Program Strategy
MissionArea ● Offensive Antiair Warfare
Objectives● Long-Range Missile
TechnologyThrust ● Wide Area Surveillance
Objectives ● Long-Range Target
● Propulsion TechnologyProjects ● Guidance and Control
SOURCE: Office of Naval Technology
–fiber optic sensor technology, and—optical signal processing; or
● a group of technologies applied to thesame or closely related warfare, weapons,or platform objectives, such as:—ocean surveillance technology,—airborne electronic warfare,—air launch weaponry, and—torpedo propulsion.
In fiscal year 1987, the Navy supported its95 technological thrust areas through theestablishment of 62 block programs. A blockprogram is an integrated group of technologyprojects with closely related applicationsand/or technical objectives; each block pro-gram is assigned to a given lead laboratory orSYSCOM program manager. For example, theNaval Air Development Center is responsiblefor a block program in airborne surveillance,while the SPAWAR SYSCOM is responsiblefor the block program in directed energy tech-nology. Usually a block program encompassesthe 6.2 program’s effort (with an average fund-ing level of $7 to 8 million) in a warfare tech-nology area, as identified above. It is most
often composed of a number of projects, eachof which may address a different technologythrust and/or mission area. Each project con-sists of a number of specific tasks performedby a particular researcher or group of re-searchers.
Beginning in the fall of each year, all blockprograms are reviewed by ONT and the vari-ous SYSCOMS. This review is followed by anevaluation of the current mission area strate-gies, which leads to the establishment of newtechnological thrusts as well as new block pro-grams for the following fiscal year.
ONT also sponsors an Independent Explora-tory Development program, which providesthe technical directors of the Navy R&DCenters with a small amount of funding (usu-ally about 5 percent of their 6.2 programs) tosupport activities aimed at achieving thecenters’ assigned missions. Through this mech-anism, the technical directors are allowed tosupport innovative programs without the for-mal approval process which could delay fund-ing of a new idea. Normally, a specific programcannot be supported with Independent Ex-ploratory Development funding for more than3 years.
The Navy’s advanced technology demon-stration (6.3A) program, with a proposed fis-cal year 1988 budget of about $30 million, isthe smallest of the Services’. The Navy is theonly Service that manages its 6.3A programseparately from its 6.1 and 6.2 activities.Within the office of the Assistant Secretary ofthe Navy (Research, Systems, and Engineer-ing), the Director of Research, Development,and Requirements (Test and Evaluation)—DRD&R(T&E)–has oversight responsibilitiesfor the 6.3A program. The 6.3A program ismanaged by the Technology Assessment Of-fice, which reports to the DRD&R(T&E). TheNavy is now in the process of rebuilding itsAdvanced Technology Demonstration (ATD)program. In fiscal year 1988, the ATD programwill sponsor three to five advanced technologydemonstrations. The technologies are selectedby the ATD director with the assistance ofOPNAV, the SYSCOMS, and ONT, and areperformed at the appropriate SYSCOM for upto 3 years.
71
THE DEPARTMENT
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Technologyand Plans- DCS(T&P)-of Air Force SystemsCommand (AFSC) is responsible for the dailyoperations and oversight of Air Force technol-ogy base programs (see figure 8). The DCS(T&P) reports to the Commander of the AirForce Systems Command, who reports to theAir Force Chief of Staff. The DCS(T&P) wascreated in October 1987 with the merger of theoffices of DCS for Science and Technology withthe DCS for Plans and Programs. The primarypurpose of the merger was to enhance commu-nication and coordination between the office
Aircraft
● Aircraft Programs
● AeromechanicsTechnology
● AvionicsTechnology
OF THE AIR FORCE
Figure 8.–Air Force Systems Command R&D Organization
responsible for evaluating and planning newweapon systems and the office that is respon-sible for conducting the research and advancedtechnology development for the new systems.
Within the office of the Secretary of the AirForce, the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition–ASAF(A)–is responsible for the entire AirForce’s RDT&E program. And within theASAF(A) office, the Director of Science andTechnology (DS&T) is responsible for over-sight of the Air Force technology base pro-grams. The DCS(T&P) (in the headquarters of
Deputy Chief of Staff,Technology and Plans
AdministrativeServices
● Offensive Systems● Defensive Systems
● Air Base Operability● Human Systems
Command, Control,Communications,
andIntelligence (C31)
● Plans and Programs . C3I Technology. Technology ● C3 I Programs
● Computer Technology
m
InternationalR&D
● Cooperation. Disclosure
Plans and Programs
● New Concepts andInitiatives
● Program Control● Investment Planning
SOURCE Air Force Systems Command
72
AFSC) works with the DS&T (in the Office ofthe Secretary of the Air Force) in developingboth an annual and a 5-year technology baseinvestment strategy for the Air Force. One ofthe primary responsibilities of the DS&T is toensure that the DCS(T&P) investment strat-egy is well balanced and capable of meetingthe short- and long-term needs of the diverseAir Force technology users.
To help raise the visibility of its science andtechnology programs, the Air Force now treatsits entire technology base program asa‘‘corp~rate investment. ” Consequently, when budgetsare being examined by the Air Force, the en-tire technology base program, rather than the44 individual program elements, is examinedfor proper balance and emphasis. The goal isto raise technology base funding to 2 percentof the Air Force’s total obligational authority.The technology base program is now classifiedas 1 of the 35 executive Air Force programs,equal in stature to such executive programsas the Advanced Tactical Fighter.
Management of the Air Force’sResearch (6.1) Program
The Air Force Office of Scientific Research(AFOSR) is responsible for the planning andmanagement of the Defense Research Scienceprogram and the University Research Initia-tive program of the Air Force. The In-HouseLaboratory Independent Research Program(ILIR) is managed directly by each individuallaboratory director. The Commander of theAFOSR reports to the Systems CommandDCS(T&P), who has oversight responsibilitiesfor AFOSR programs and for the integrationof 6.1 research with 6.2 and 6.3A programs.AFOSR supports research which has a “po-tential relationship to an Air Force functionor operation. ” It conducts a program of ex-tramural research contracts and grants (pri-marily grants); oversees the research programs(in-house and extramural) of the Air Force Lab-oratories; and manages three subordinate units.
The three subordinate units are the Euro-pean Office of Aerospace Research and Devel-
opment in London, AFOSR Far East in Tokyo,and the Frank J. Seiler Research Laboratoryin Colorado Springs. The London and Tokyooffices gather information about foreign re-search and act as liaisons between Air Forcescientists and engineers and their foreign coun-terparts. The Seiler Laboratory performs in-house research in such areas as optical physics,aerospace mechanics, fluid mechanics, andchemistry.
Of the $198 million the Air Force will spendon research in fiscal year 1988, about 60 per-cent will be given to colleges and universities.The Air Force in-house laboratories will receive15 percent, industry and nonprofits 20 percent,and the remaining 5 percent is for overhead.
As figure 9 indicates, the AFOSR scienceprograms are divided into six areas: AerospaceSciences, Chemical and Atmospheric Sciences,Electronic and Material Sciences, Life Sci-ences, Mathematical and Information Sci-ences, and Physical and Geophysical Sciences.Each of the program areas has a scientific di-rector, who is responsible (along with the Com-mander and Technical Director of AFOSR) forplanning, managing, and implementing thevarious research programs. As might be ex-pected, the majority of AFOSR research fundsare spent in aerospace sciences, chemical andatmospheric sciences, and electronic and ma-terial sciences.
The AFOSR supports a number of specialresearch programs to further strengthen theAir Force technology base program. They in-clude the Air Force Thermionic EngineeringResearch Program, the Research in AircraftPropulsion Technology Program, the Univer-sity Resident Research Program, the ResidentResearch Associateship Program, the Labora-tory Graduate Fellowship Program, the Ad-vanced Composite Structures Program, theGraduate Student Summer Support Program,and the Summer Faculty Research Program.
In conjunction with industry, the AFOSRsponsors university-based manufacturing re-search centers at Stanford University and atthe University of Michigan. Students perform
I
Figure 9.-Air Force Office of Scientific Research
Contracts
staffJudge
Advocate
I
AerospaceSciences
Electronic andMaterialsciences
I
European Officeof Aerospace Research
a n d
I Reserve I
73
Life sciences
SOURCE: Air Force Office of Scientific Research
LAir Force Officeof Scientific
Research, FarEast
1Physical andGeophysical
sciences
Mathematical andInformation
Sciences
research at the university centers or at par-ticipating companies. The Air Force providesthe assistantship funds for M.S. and Ph.D. can-didates, with Stanford and Michigan respon-sible for selecting the students. AFOSR fund-ing for the two centers is scheduled to bephased out at the end of fiscal year 1988 asindustry support increases.
Management of the Air Force’sExploratory and Advanced TechnologyDevelopment Programs (6.2 and 6.3A)
The DCS(T&P) serves as the “corporatemanager” of the Air Force’s technology baseprogram and is primarily responsible for devel-oping the overall investment strategy that
74
guides laboratory operations. The primaryresponsibility of the DCS(T&P) is to ensureproper integration and balance of these pro-grams, while meeting the needs of the variousoperational commands, in line with OSD andAir Force Headquarters guidance. While hav-ing traditional oversight responsibilities for the6.1 and 6.2 programs, the DS&T in the AirForce Secretariat exerts more active influenceand direction on the large advanced technol-ogy development (ATD) program.
The office of the DCS(T&P), with approxi-mately 70 professionals, consists of five ma-jor research directorates: Aircraft; Armamentand Weapons; Strategic and Space; C3I; andCombat Support. Each of the five Directoratesworks primarily with a particular AFSC prod-uct division and has oversight and coordina-tion responsibilities for that division’s lab(s).The Director of the Aircraft Directorate workswith the four laboratory directors assigned tothe Aeronautical Systems Division. The Ar-mament and Weapons Directorate coordinateswith the Armaments Laboratory of the Arma-ment Division and the Weapons Laboratoryof the Space Technology Center of Space Di-vision. The Strategic and Space Directorateoversees the activities of the other two SpaceDivision laboratories. The Director of C3I isresponsible for the research activities of theone laboratory assigned to Electronic SystemsDivision. Finally, the Combat Support Direc-torate works with the three laboratory direc-tors of the Human Systems Division and theAir Force Engineering and Services Center.
However, this laboratory oversight arrange-ment does not mean that the director of a par-ticular laboratory conducts research for onlyone of the five directorates. Obviously, the in-terdisciplinary nature of research requires thevarious laboratory directors to manage 6.2 and6.3A activities for a number of product divi-sions and applications that cut across the ma-jor air commands.
Within the office of the DCS(T&P), the di-rector of Plans and Programs works with thedirectors of the five research directorates to
ensure their broad technology base investmentstrategy considers both the near- and long-term technological needs of the various AirForce users. The Plans and Programs officealso works with the directorates to ensure thattheir respective technological thrusts are ca-pable of meeting current and future needs ofthe Air Force.
Since 1980, the laboratories of the Air Forcehave been aligned under the parent productdivisions: Electronics System Division (ESD),Armament Division (AD), Human Systems Di-vision (HSD), Space Division (SD), and Aero-nautical Systems Division (ASD). Each of theDivisions has responsibility for one or morelaboratories which perform research, explora-tory development, and advanced developmentin support of that division’s mission as wellas the missions of other divisions. For exam-ple, the Materials Laboratory, under ASD,meets the technology needs of Space Divisionas well. Unlike the other two Services, the AirForce laboratories are not full spectrum R&Dlaboratories. With the exception of the RomeAir Development center, which performs some6.4 work, the remaining laboratories primar-ily conduct 6.1-6.3A activities. The Air Forcesupports the smallest in-house technology baseprogram, actually conducting only 20 percentof its activities in its 14 laboratories. In con-trast, the Air Force supports the largest 6.3Aprogram, reflecting its interest in technologytransition.
The directors of the laboratories have a dualreporting responsibility. The directors reporttheir laboratory activities and accomplish-ments to both the DCS(T&P) as well as to thecommander of their respective product divi-sions. (The four laboratory directors at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base report through theCommander of the Wright Aeronautical Lab-oratories to the Commander of ASD.) As withthe other Services, each of the laboratory di-rectors is ultimately responsible for the ac-tivities in his laboratory. This includes deter-mining research priorities, developing newinitiatives, determining who will be responsi-ble for managing various research projects,
75
whether to use in-house or outside expertise,and when to transition or stop a researchactivity.
The Air Force contends that placing its lab-oratories within the product divisions increasesthe linkages between the developers and ulti-mate users of the various weapon systems. TheAir Force asserts that closer interaction be-tween the product divisions and their respec-tive laboratories will strengthen long-termtechnology base planning capabilities and thetransition of mature technologies into systemsapplications. Further, the Air Force believesthat this closer coupling will reduce the timeit takes to develop and deploy more reliableand less expensive weapon systems.
The Air Force’s advanced technology devel-opment (ATD) program has grown from $159million in fiscal year 1975 to almost $754 mil-lion in fiscal year 1988 (see table 2). The ATDprogram represents 50 percent of the entireAir Force technology base program. Almostall of the ATD program is conducted by de-fense industries under contract to the differ-ent product division laboratories. The AirForce believes that its contractors will incor-porate new technological advances more rap-idly if they actually participate in the suc-cessful development and testing of a newtechnology.
Like the other Services, the Air Force con-ducts an annual iterative planning activity.Much of the planning and programming a c t i v -ities at the Air Force laboratories are primar-ily driven by the future needs of the combatcommands. This process begins in the secondquarter of each fiscal year, when the DCS(T&P)develops an investment strategy to guide plan-
ning for the next 5 years. The results of thisinvestment strategy, along with other guid-ance from DS&T, OSD, and inside and outsidescientific advisory groups, are used to refineshort-term plans and develop long-term plansby the laboratories. As part of their overallplanning responsibilities, the product divisionsidentify a number of potential next generationsystem concepts to meet future warfightingneeds. These warfighting requirements, inturn, are defined by the users.
The Air Force’s Project Forecast II isanother key consideration for developing anoverall technology base strategy in the labora-tories. Completed in 1986, the primary goal ofForecast II was to identify potential techno-logical opportunities that could change thenature and design of future systems, while con-comitantly improving the Air Force’s warfight-ing capabilities. The Project was chartered bythe Secretary of the Air Force and directed bythe Commander of Air Force Systems Com-mand (AFSC). It was supported by a team of175 military and civilian experts drawn fromwithin AFSC, the operational commands, andvarious outside advisory panels. From theideas generated by the Air Force laboratories,industry, universities, and technology panels,40 technological initiatives were identified forfunding within the technology base. Researchprogress in these technological initiatives ismonitored, and appropriate changes of empha-sis are made as the technology matures. Thepurpose of this planning activity is to ensurethat the Air Force technology base programis sufficiently broad to prevent technologicalsurprise by potential adversaries, while at thesame time is in position to take advantage ofnew technological opportunities.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
The newly created office of the Deputy for ASA(RD&A)–who replaced the Deputy ChiefTechnology and Assessment (DT&A) is re- of Staff for Research, Development, and Acqui-sponsible for the Department of Army’s en- sition—DCS(RD&A) —(see figure 10). Thetire technology base program. The DT&A Army has combined both military and civil-reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army ian oversight responsibilities for its RDT&Efor Research, Development, and Acquisition— program in one office.
76
Figure 10. -Army Research andDevelopment Organization
Secretary of the Army
■
I IAssistant Secretary of the Army(Research, Development, and
Acquisition)
1Director,
Director,
InternationalProgram and
CooperationTechnologyAssessment
■
I
Director,Director,
Research andSpace and
Technology strategicSystems
SOURCE: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research , Development, and Acquisition).
As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,the Army has also designated the DT&A asits Program Executive Officer (PEO) for thetechnology base programs. The DT&A pro-vides programmatic planning guidance to theArmy’s 31 Research and Development orga-nizations. DOD’s planning guidance is usedby the Army to help develop its annual and5-year technology base Program ObjectiveMemorandum (POM).
Subordinate to the DT&A is the office of theDirector of Research and Technology (DR&T,see figure 10), which is responsible for plan-ning and coordinating the Army’s entire tech-nology base program. The remaining threeoffices under DT&A, the Director of Interna-
tional Cooperation, the Director of Programand Technology Assessment, and the Direc-tor of Space and Strategic Systems, work withthe DR&T on various special aspects of thetechnology base program. Since this is a com-pletely new organization, the exact responsi-bilities of these offices have yet to be de-termined.
The Army operates its technology base pro-grams differently from the other Services andtends to have a more complicated organiza-tional structure. The Army divides its tech-nology base programs among four major com-ponents: the Army Materiel Command (AMC),the Surgeon General of the Army (TSG), theCorps of Engineers (COE), and the DeputyChief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). Foroversight purposes, the directors of all four ofthese organizations report to the Deputy forTechnology and Assessment at Army head-quarters.
AMC is responsible for the development andacquisition of all the Army’s combat and com-bat support systems (see figure 11). AMC re-ceives 75 percent of the Army’s technologybase funding and is programmatically r e s p o n -sible for eight research, development, and engi-neering (RDE) centers, seven army labora-tories, the technology base work of the project
Figure 11.-Army Materiel CommandR&D Organization
Army Materiel Command
I
I I
9 other Army LaboratoryCommands Command
I II
8 Research, Development 17 Labs and theand Engineering Centers Army Research Office
SOURCE: Army Materiel Command
77
manager for training devices, and the ArmyResearch Office. The Surgeon General man-ages 14 percent of the technology base pro-grams and is responsible for medical R&Dactivities at the Army’s nine medical labora-tories. The Corps of Engineers operates fourlaboratories and utilizes 6 percent of the tech-nology base funding to support research insuch areas as construction engineering, coldweather combat, and hydrology. The Army Re-search Institute for Behavioral and Social Sci-ences (ARI), which reports to the DCSPER,receives about 1 percent of the technology basefunding for research in personnel-related areas.The remaining 4 percent is for overhead andthe ILIR program. However, due to budget-ary constraints the Army did not propose anyfunding for ILIR in fiscal year 1988.
Management of the Army’s Research(6.1) Program
The Army is the only Service that managesits basic research program through more thanone office. The majority of the 6.1 program ismanaged by the Army Research Office (ARO),located at Research Triangle Park in NorthCarolina. ARO is under the Army’s Labora-tory Command (LABCOM) structure, with theDirector of ARO reporting to the DT&Athrough LABCOM and AMC. Compared toequivalent organizations in the other Services’research offices, ARO is lower in the chain ofcommand and appears to have less visibility.In fiscal year 1988, AMC will receive a littleover two-thirds of the Army’s 6.1 budget. Halfof AMC’s 6.1 funding will go to the ARO andthe other half will go to the AMC laboratoriesand RDE centers. Although ARO does notmanage the portion that goes to the Army lab-oratories and centers, it does make recommen-dations to the Director for Research and Tech-nology, Army Headquarters, regarding thein-house research program content and size.
The ARO program is a mix of short- andlong-term programs that are responsive to theneeds of the Army laboratories. Recently, AROhas worked closely with the Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and itsschools to assist in shaping ARO’s researchprogram according to Army mission areaneeds. TRADOC, along with AMC, is respon-sible for evaluating the current and future tech-nological needs of the Army.
The ARO provides the major interface be-tween the Army and the university commu-nity. The university community receives 83percent of ARO’s 6.1 budget; industry gets 10percent and nonprofit organizations receive theremaining 7 percent. The ARO research pro-gram consists of seven divisions: Electronics,Physics, Chemistry and Biology, Engineering,Material Science, Mathematics, and Geo-sciences.
The laboratories’ in-house research programsare organized along the lines of the labora-tories’ mission responsibilities. For example,each laboratory research effort is supportedby a single project fund (SPF) more closely tiedto its mission, rather than to some specific sci-entific discipline. The content of each SPF isdetermined by each laboratory’s technical di-rector and his staff. Research in the laboratoryis really designed to be the first step in the de-velopment chain. ARO contends that researchtasks within an SPF are intended to lead even-tually into development programs. The tech-nical content of each SPF is reviewed annuallyby each Command headquarters and by the Dep-uty for Technology and Assessment (DT&A).
Since 1982, ARO has sponsored a “centersof excellence” program, supporting selectedcolleges and universities. ARO operatescenters in five research areas: electronics,mathematics, rotary wing aircraft technology,artificial intelligence, and optics. These centersare usually funded from 5 to 10 years. Eachcenter has a program advisory panel with mem-bers from the different universities, ARO, theappropriate laboratory within AMC, and in-dustry. For example, the Army Aviation Sys-tems Command Research Development andEngineering Center works with three univer-sities that are the Army’s rotocraft centers ofexcellence.
78
Army’s Management of Exploratoryand Advanced Technology
Development Programs (6.2 and 6.3A)
The Director for Research and Technology(DR&T) is also responsible for the exploratoryand advanced technology development pro-grams of the Army. There are four Deputy As-sistant Directors that have specific responsi-bilities for various aspects of the Army’sscience and technology programs. These fourareas are: 1) aviation—unmanned air vehiclesand missiles, etc.; 2) ballistics-sighting mech-anisms, armaments, munitions, chemical war-fare, etc.; 3) electronics-artificial intelligence,command, control, communications, and intel-ligence, robotics, etc.; and 4) soldier support–ground combat, troop support, and ground ve-hicles.
Within the office of the DR&T there are fivescience and technology professionals (the Di-rector and the four Deputy Assistant Direc-tors) responsible for planning, budgeting, andsetting priorities for the Army’s technologybase programs. Consequently, the Army uti-lizes a much more decentralized managementapproach in operating its laboratories than dothe other Services. Although the DT&A hasprimary oversight for planning, budgeting, andsetting priorities, many of these activities aredirected and performed by the Army MaterialCommand (AMC) office and the newly createdLaboratory Command (LABCOM) (see figure11).
The Army’s LABCOM has only been in ex-istence for a little over 2 years. According toArmy officials, the long-term goal of AMC isto have ARO and the seven laboratories un-der LABCOM primarily responsible for generictechnology base work, while the eight Re-search, Development, and Engineering Centerswould be primarily responsible for engineer-ing and development activities that are moresystems related. The goal is to have the lab-oratories “hand-off” certain technology baseprograms to the RD&E centers to initiateappropriate systems engineering and develop-ment activities.
In 1986 LABCOM published its first com-prehensive technology base investment strat-egy. According to the Army, the purpose ofthe investment strategy is to meet future userbattlefield requirements while preserving theArmy’s ability to exploit technological oppor-tunities. The investment strategy is also usedto determine resource allocation for technol-ogy base activities, and it provides a strate-gic vehicle for articulating the direction of theAMC technology base activities. The AMCbreaks its strategy into four basic elements(see figure 12): next generation and notionalsystems (NGNS); emerging technologies (ET);chronic problems; and supporting analyticalcapabilities.
Nearly half of the AMC’s technology baseresources are planned for next generation/no-tional systems. Next generation systems areusually defined as those beyond the systemscurrently in engineering development; theyrepresent relatively well-defined solutions tobattlefield problems of the next 5 years. No-tional systems, on the other hand, are moreconceptual solutions to problems anticipated10 to 15 years down the line. This distinctionprovides a range of targets for technology baseefforts, from mid-range to long term.
As figure 12 indicates, emerging technol-ogies support 25 percent of the technology basestrategy. These are technologies such as ro-botics, artificial intelligence, and biotechnol-ogy which may not yet have coalesced into specific systems applications. The Army admitsthat the difference between ETs and NGNSis “fuzzy;” nevertheless, ETs are judged to beso important that they deserve special empha-sis through visibility and funding emphasis.Most of the ET activities are focused on ex-ploring new technological concepts that couldbe used by the Army 15 to 30 years in thefuture.
Certain chronic problems, such as corrosionprevention and manufacturing problems, areendemic to the ability of the Army to performits mission but often do not receive technol-ogy base support. Although these may be less
79
Figure 12.-Army Technology Base Investment Strategy
●
●
●
Artificial Intelligence
Robotics
Directed Energy Weapons
Acoustic Devices
Advanced Materials/Material Processing
Advanced Signal Processingand Computing
Biotechnology
Power Generation/Storage/Conditioning
Space Technology
Low Observables
System Science
●
●
●
●
●
●
LReduction
CPrev/Contro
Physical/FunctionalSurvivability
Lightening the Force
Manufacturing Technology
Manprint/Human FactorsEngineering
Training
● Hardware in the LoopSimulators
● Modeling/Simulation
● Assesment Technology
● Test and Evaluation
● Special Purpose Equipment/Computers
SOURCE: Army Materiel Command/Laboratory Command
glamorous than developing new weapon sys-tems, 15 percent of the technology base sup-port is now devoted to these concerns.
Supporting analytical capabilities includemodeling, simulation, advanced demonstrationprojects (ADP), and other infrastructure activ-ities aimed at increasing the Army’s abilityto perform quality R&D and improve its ac-quisition across the entire spectrum of the ma-terial life-cycle. This category, representing theremaining 10 percent of technology base fund-ing, is devoted to future operational capabil-ities and improving the research infra-structure.
The Army asserts that the AMC laboratoriesand the RD&E centers, ARO, and to a lesserextent the Corps of Engineers’ laboratories are
required to formulate their technology basestrategies within this investment strategyframework. However, this does not necessarilymean that every lab or center must be work-ing on every element of the strategy, or thatits budget must reflect the exact percentageallocation for each element. Nevertheless itdoes mean that:
... each organization should plan their tech-nology base work to address (within their mis-sion area) the technological barriers repre-sented by the specific set of NGNS, and thatthey should give emphasis to the other ele-ments of the strategy before pursuing otherwork, which may nevertheless be importantin its own right. 2 1
“A LAl?COM White Paper “The AMC Technology Base In-vestment Strategy, ” June 7, 1987, p. 43.
80
The technology base investment strategy isdeveloped through an annual analysis of theArmy’s 13 major mission areas (e.g., close com-bat (light), close combat (heavy), air defense,mine/counter-mine, etc.). The mission area anal-yses, which are conducted by TRADOC withsupport from AMC, COE, TSG, and ARI, re-sult in the publication of a Battlefield Devel-opment Plan that outlines both near- and mid-term battlefield deficiencies and opportunities.Directed by AMC, the Army then conductswhat is called a mission area materials proc-ess (MAMP) to address the various deficien-cies and opportunities in the context of the fourelements of the mission area strategy.
The technology base investment strategyand the MAMP drive the technology baseactivities in several ways. They are used asstrategic planning tools, laying out the pro-jected development time schedules of the sys-tems planned for the future. Further, bothTRADOC and AMC review the 13 mission areastrategies for duplication and opportunities forcollaborative efforts among the labs andcenters to help meet deadlines and reduce tech-nology base costs.
Since the next generation and notional sys-tems are intended to focus on near- and long-term technological barriers, a large percent-age of the 6.2 and 6.3A budget is spent in thisarea. For example, almost all of the 6.3A bud-get is spent on approximately 60 specific tech-nology demonstrations. Each year the Armypublishes a document that describes the “Top-20’ demonstrations and identifies the labora-tory responsible for managing the demonstra-tion. Each demonstration can last from 3 to5 years.
Like the other Services, the Army performsan annual top-down, bottom-up guidance anddirection exercise. This evaluation beginsin the fall when each lab and center presentsa review of its accomplishments, along withplans for meeting next year’s technology basestrategy. The Army utilizes a Technology BaseAdvisory Group to set project priorities. Thisgroup works with representatives fromTRADOC and the Department of the Armyheadquarters in establishing the overall projectpriorities for the technology base investmentstrategy.
THE DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY(DARPA)
At just under $800 million in fiscal year 1988,the technology base program of the DefenseAdvanced Research Project Agency (DARPA)is larger than those of the other defense agen-cies combined. The other agencies are: the De-fense Nuclear Agency (DNA); the DefenseCommunications Agency (DCA); the NationalSecurity Agency (NSA); and the Defense Map-ping Agency (DMA). DARPA was establishedin 1958 partly due to the pressures forced bythe launching of the Sputnik satellites. ThePresident and Congress also recognized thatDoD needed an organization which could takethe “long view” regarding the development ofhigh-risk technology. DARPA was thus setupto be DoD’s “corporate” research organization,reporting to the highest level (currently theUSD(A)) and capable of working at the “cut-
ting edge” of technology. DARPA’s organiza-tion allows it to explore innovative applicationsof new technologies where the risk and pay-off are both high, but where success may pro-vide new military options or applications—orrevise traditional roles and missions. In the-ory, since DARPA has no operational militarymissions, it should be able to maintain objec-tivity in pursuit of research ideas which prom-ise quantum technology advancement.
DARPA executes its programs mainlythrough contracts with industry, universities,nonprofit organizations, and government lab-oratories. DARPA now has a limited in-house contracting capability. This means thatDARPA can contract directly with defensecontractors, rather than going through the
81
Services. However, the Services and other gov-ernment agencies usually provide this function.In these cases, technical monitoring and sup-port are often provided as well, thus establish-ing a “joint program atmosphere. Accordingto DARPA, close relationships with the Serv-ices facilitate subsequent technology transferwhen research projects reach a mature stageand are linked to operational requirements.
Organization
The DARPA organization is tailored for theagency’s role and is often “adjusted” to ac-commodate priorities. DARPA consists of theDirector’s office (including the new PrototypeOffice and two Special Assistants-one forStrategic Computing and one for the NationalAerospace Plane), two administrative supportoffices, and the following eight technicaloffices:
1.2.3.4.
5.6.7.8.
Tactical Technology Office,Strategic Technology Office,Defense Sciences Office,Information Science and TechnologyOffice,Aerospace Technology Office,Naval Technology Office,Directed Energy Office; andTechnical Assessment and Long-RangePlanning Office.
—
DARPA’s programs are divided into twobroad categories: Basic Technology Projectsand Major Demonstration Projects. The BasicTechnology Projects focus on long-term re-search in the areas that are related to a spe-cific technical office. As some of these tech-
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE
Headed by a Director who reports directlyto the Secretary of Defense, the Strategic De-fense Initiative Organization (SDIO) is a cen-trally managed defense agency with both tech-nical and administrative offices. The officesaddress ongoing scientific research, broad pol-icy issues, and overall funding issues. Thereare five technical program directorates (Sur-
nology investigations begin to show promise,feasibility demonstrations are conducted, oftenin cooperation with the military Services, inan attempt to transfer the technology as rap-idly as possible into system development—thus matching technology with requirements.
The Prototyping Office was established thispast year in response to a recommendation ofthe Packard Commission on Defense Acquisi-tion. Prototype projects will consist of “brass-board” models, feasibility demonstrations, andexperimental vehicles. Some concerns havebeen expressed that this new responsibility,if improperly managed, could jeopardizeDARPA’s basic charter-that of examininghigh-risk technologies, proving feasibility, andquantifying risk without the pressures for dem-onstrating military applications. It is too earlyto tell if this concern is justified.
Programs and Priorities
DARPA’s scope of programs and responsi-bilities is broad and appears to be growing asmore joint programs are being added toDARPA’s overall responsibilities. Among thekey projects underway are the X-29 AdvancedTechnology Demonstrator, being conducted inconjunction with NASA Ames Research Cen-ter; the X-Wing Demonstrator; AdvancedCruise Missile Technology; Particle BeamTechnology; Strategic Computing; and a high-priority effort to examine technology for ar-mor/anti-armor. DARPA also has a growingmaterials program investigating advancedcomposites, other complex materials, and elec-tronic materials including gallium arsenide.
INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION
veillance, Acquisition, Tracking, and KillAssessment; Directed Energy Weapons; Ki-netic Energy Weapons; Systems Analysis andBattle Management; and Survivability, Le-thality and Key Technologies) and a programmanager for Innovative Science and Technol-ogy. Although the entire SDI program isfunded under the Advanced Technology De-
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velopment category (6.3A), much of the work through the Services (Army, Navy, and Airsupported by the Innovative Science and Tech- Force), with some additional efforts throughnology office could be classed as generic re- other executive agents including DARPA,search or exploratory in nature. DNA, the Department of Energy, and the Na-
As with the “traditional” S&T program, spe tional Aeronautics and Space Administration.
cific SDI projects are executed primarily
SUMMARYThe Department of Defense will invest
almost $9 billion in technology base activitiesin fiscal year 1988. DOD’s complex technol-ogy base program is planned, organized, andimplemented by DARPA, SDIO, and the threeServices, with oversight and guidance providedby the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).The majority of the technology base programis conducted by industry (50 percent), withuniversities performing 20 percent and theDOD in-house laboratories conducting the re-maining 30 percent. The primary goal of thetechnology base program is to counter Sovietnumerical manpower and weapons superioritythrough the development of superior technol-ogy for future weapons systems. Thus, DODcontends a growing technology base programis critical to the successful execution of the Na-tion’s defense policies.
Within the last 3 years, each of the threeServices and the OSD have reorganized theirtechnology base programs. As a result of theGoldwater-Nichols Act, the USD(A) was estab-lished and given responsibility for all RDT&Eactivities except for those of the Director ofSDIO, who reports directly to the Secretary ofDefense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also rees-tablished the Director of Defense Research andEngineering (DDR&E) as the primary spokes-man for DOD’s technology base activities.
Within OSD, the DDR&E is primarily re-sponsible for providing an overall corporateemphasis and balance for DOD’s entire tech-nology base program, except for SDI. Once theServices have formulated their technology baseprograms, the primary role of the DUSD(R&AT) is to ensure that their proposals haveresponded to OSD guidance. The Deputy for
R&AT must also be sure that the Services’ pro-grams are well balanced, do not duplicate ef-fort, and attempt to meet the current and fu-ture technological needs of DOD.
Each of the three Services operates and man-ages its technology base activities differently.The Army uses a more decentralized approachin managing its technology base programs; itrelies its major field commands-AMC head-quarters, the Corps of Engineers, the SurgeonGeneral, and the DCS for Personnel–to helpdevelop and implement its technology base in-vestment strategy. This is primarily due to thesmall size of the Army’s technology base head-quarters staff. The Deputy for Technology andAssessment (DT&A) is considered to be theArmy’s Program Executive Officer (PEO) forthe technology base programs. The DT&A isresponsible for coordinating technology baseprograms of AMC, the Surgeon General, theCorps of Engineers, and the DCS for Person-nel. AMC headquarters is responsible for over-sight and management of the Army’s eight lab-oratories, seven RD&E Centers, the projectmanagement training device, and the ArmyResearch Office.
Unlike the other Services, the Navy, whichrecently reorganized its laboratory organiza-tion, performs the majority (60 percent) of itstechnology base programs in-house. Many ofthe Navy laboratories are considered to be fullspectrum labs, capable of performing the en-tire range of RDT&E activities. The Navy’sbasic research program is the oldest andlargest of the Services, whereas its advancedtechnology demonstration program is thesmallest. The Navy contends it is in the proc-ess of rebuilding its advanced technology de-
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velopment program, which, unlike the otherServices, is not managed in the same office asits 6.1 and 6.2 programs.
As of November 1, 1987, the Deputy Chiefof Staff for Technology and Plans was estab-lished to oversee the Air Force technology baseprograms. The DCS(T&P) is also the PEO for,and the single manager of, the Air Force tech-nology base program. The Air Force Chief ofStaff has recently designated the technologybase program as a “corporate investment” tohelp raise its visibility and to provide a long-term stable funding base. The Air Force oper-ates the largest extramural technology baseprogram. Its technology base activities aremore centralized than those of the other Serv-ices. The Air Force laboratories are moreclosely linked to product divisions than arethose of the other Services, and this linkageinfluences the types of 6.2 and 6.3A activitieseach laboratory performs.
The role of DARPA appears to be changingwith the recent establishment of the Prototyp-
ing Office. There is some concern that thismight compromise DARPA’s support of high-risk technologies (only 11 percent of DARPA’sbudget is for research), as well as its role ofproving feasibility and quantifying risk with-out the pressure for demonstrating militaryapplication. The majority of DARPA’s bud-get is contracted through the three Servicesto industry (75 to 80 percent) and universities(20 percent), with only a small fraction ofDARPA’s technology base activities actuallyconducted by the military.
The SD I program is centrally managed withits director reporting to the Secretary of De-fense. Less than 5 percent of the SDI budgetis spent on basic research, with the remainderdivided between exploratory development andadvanced technology development. The major-ity of SDI projects are executed through theServices, with some additional efforts throughother executive agents including DARPA,DNA, the Department of Energy, and the Na-tional Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Chapter 5
Research Institutions and Organizations
The Department of Defense technology base and it also discusses how civilian governmentprogram has been described in chapter 4 of this agencies foster the technology base that isspecial report, and the contribution of private drawn on by the Department of Defense. Inindustry is addressed in chapter 3. This chap- addition, various types of nongovernment,ter describes the contributions made to the de- nonprofit laboratories are discussed at the endfense technology base by government-funded of the chapter.laboratories—both defense and non-defense—
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT LABORATORIES
Defense Department laboratories are ownedand operated—under a variety of differentphilosophies-by the military services. Theiractivities are coordinated, to some degree, bythe Office of the Secretary of Defense, and theyare staffed mostly by Civil Servants and somemilitary officers rotating through on shorttours of duty.
Army Laboratories
Department of the Army technology basework is performed by 31 research and devel-opment organizations attached to the ArmyMateriel Command (7 laboratories, 8 research,development, and engineering centers, theArmy Research Office, and the Project Man-ager Training Device), the Office of the Sur-geon General of the Army (9 laboratories), theArmy Corps of Engineers (4 laboratories), andthe Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Per-sonnel ( 1 laboratory). The major Army labora-tories are described below.
Army Materiel Command (AMC)
Laboratory Command (LABCOM).–Lab-oratory Command, within the Army MaterielCommand, operates seven facilities that areresponsible primarily for 6.2 and 6.3 researchin specialized areas of technology relevant toArmy requirements. These are:
Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory (ASL),White Sands Missile Range, NM (390).1–TheAtmospheric Sciences Laboratory is AMC’sprincipal laboratory for atmospheric andmeteorological technology and equipment de-velopment. Basic investigations into atmos-pheric sensing technologies and applicationsare conducted to assess the potential impactof atmospheric conditions on advanced Armyweapons and systems.
Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL), Aber-deen Proving Ground, MD (730). –This labora-tory conducts research into the vulnerabilityand lethality of Army weapons (e.g., guns, can-nons, missiles). It addresses weapons systemsfrom the drawing board to the field and fromsmall arms and ammunition to large missilesand their warheads.
Electronics Technology and Devices Labora-tory (ETDL), Ft. Monmouth NJ (310).–Thisis the primary Army laboratory for electronics,electron devices, and tactical power supplies.This laboratory is the lead laboratory for theArmy for the Very High Speed Integrated Cir-cuit (VHSIC) and Microwave/Millimeter WaveMonolithic Integrated Circuit (MIMIC) pro-grams.
‘The numbers in parentheses give the total work force (scien-tists, engineers, managers, support staff, administration, etc.).
8 5
83-207 - 0 - 88 - 5
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Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Adel-phi, MD (730).—Harry Diamond Laboratoriesis involved in exploratory and advanced de-velopment of a variety of technologies includ-ing fuzing, target detection and analysis, ord-nance electronics, electromagnetic effects,materials, and industrial and maintenanceengineering. This laboratory is AMC’s lead laboratory for fluidics and nuclear weaponseffects.
Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL),Aberdeen, MD (220).–This laboratory is re-sponsible for the “man-machine’ interface foradvanced Army systems. It has assumed therole of lead Army laboratory for robotics re-search and human factors engineering.
Materials Technology Laboratory (MTL),Watertown, MA (660).–The Materials Tech-nology Laboratory is responsible for manag-ing and conducting research and exploratorydevelopment programs in materials and solidmechanics, including basic research in ad-vanced metals, composites, and ceramics.
Vulnerability Assessment Laboratory(VAL), White Sands Missile Range, NM(260).–This laboratory provides an independentassessment of the vulnerability of Army weap-ons and communications electronics systemsto hostile electronic warfare (e.g. jamming).
Research, Development, and Engineering(RDE) Centers.–The six Systems Commandsof the Army Materiel Command each operateone or more research, development and engi-neering centers which conduct exploratory andadvanced technology development in supportof the specific commands’ mission responsi-bilities. These centers are organizational enti-ties and are not necessarily physically locatedat a single site. (If there is no single primarysite, the location given below is that of the par-ent Systems Command.) Although the RDECenters conduct some in-house research anddevelopment, the bulk of their work is con-tracted out to industry (the largest contribu-tor), nonprofit organizations, and some univer-sities. The centers are oriented toward thedevelopment end of the technology program,leading to components, products, and systems.
Armament RDE Center (ARDEC), Pica-tinny Arsenal, NJ (4,150).—ARDEC concen-trates its efforts on two main areas-weaponsand munitions. ARDEC is managed by theArmaments, Munitions, and Chemical Com-mand (AMCCOM), centered at Rock Island,IL.
Chemical RDE Center (CRDEC), AberdeenProving Ground, MD (1,400).–CRDEC is theDefense Department’s lead laboratory forchemical and biological defense-related mat-ters. Like ARDEC, CRDEC is an RDE centerfor the Armaments, Munitions, and ChemicalCommand.
Aviation RDE Center, St. Louis, MO (1,430).–This center, operated by the Aviation Sys-tems Command (AVSCOM), is responsible forArmy aviation research and development in-cluding airframes, propulsion systems, andavionics. Two major activities are operated insupport of Army aviation R&D efforts. Firstis the Aviation Research and Technology Ac-tivity, co-located with NASA’s Ames ResearchCenter, Moffett Field, CA. This Activity hassubordinate offices at (or near) two otherNASA centers: Lewis Research Center andLangley Research Center. These locations re-flect the close relationship between Army avia-tion and NASA’s research into advanced shorttakeoff and landing (STOL) flight concepts andpropulsion systems. The second Activity sup-porting the Aviation RDE Center is the Avi-onics Research and Development Activity, Ft.Monmouth, NJ, which is co-located with theArmy’s electronics and communications ex-perts—the Communications-Electronics Com-mand and the Laboratory Command’s Elec-tronic Technology and Device Laboratory.
Communications-Electronics Command(CECOM) RDE Center, Ft. Monmouth, NJ(1,930).–The CECOM RDE center is respon-sible for research in the areas of command, con-trol, communications, intelligence, and electronicwarfare. In addition to the Ft. Monmouth ef-fort, a number of subordinate facilities andcenters focus on specialized electronics and sen-sor research and development. The Night Vi-sion and Electro-Optical Laboratory, Ft. Bel-
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voir, VA, is a recognized leader in infrared andother night vision devices for all three Serv-ices. The Signals Warfare Laboratory, VintHills Farms Station, VA, conducts programsrelated to surveillance, reconnaissance, andelectronic warfare (including signals intelli-gence, communications intelligence, electroniccountermeasures and electronic counter-coun-termeasures). Other activities under theCECOM RDE Center include: the ElectronicWarfare and Special Sensors group; the Air-borne Electronics Research Activity, Lake-hurst, NJ; the Center for C3 Systems; and theLife-Cycle Software Engineering Center.
Missile Command (MICOM) RDE Center,Redstone Arsenal, AL (1 ,470).—This center isresponsible for the development, acquisition,and production of all Army missile systems.It is the Army’s lead organization for guidanceand control, terminal homing, and high power/high energy laser technology. With the capa-bility to carry a concept through to prototypealmost without outside help, it is very influen-tial in the overall direction and progress ofArmy guided weapons programs.
Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) RDECenter, Warren, MI (810).–This center is re-sponsible for technologies and systems asso-ciated with vehicular propulsion, structure,and advanced armor. As exemplified by itslocation, it has a close relationship with theU.S. automotive industry. Substantial explora-tory work is also underway on robotics, vetron-ics (integrated vehicle electronics), propulsion,and vehicle survivability.
Belvoir RDE Center, Fort Belvoir, VA(1,080).–The Belvoir RDE Center is respon-sible for combat engineering, logistics support,materials, fuels, and lubricants. It falls underthe Troop Support Command (TROSCOM),headquartered in St. Louis, MO, which is re-sponsible for developing systems and equip-ment to support the soldier.
Natick RDE Center, Natick, MA (l,090).–The Natick RDE Center, also falling under theTroop Support Command, is dedicated to en-suring the maximum survivability, supporta-bility, sustainability, and combat effectiveness
of the individual soldier in all combat envi-ronments.
Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG)
The Army Medical Research and Develop-ment Command, under the authority of theSurgeon General of the Army, operates ninelaboratories that investigate medical areas ofinterest to the Army. These laboratories em-ploy a total of 2,710 personnel. The largest isthe Walter Reed Army Institute of Research(1,000 personnel), which performs research inthe areas of military disease hazards, combatcasualty care, Army systems hazards, andmedical defenses against and treatments forchemical weapons. Other facilities also exam-ine these topics and others such as crew work-load and stress; treatment of dental injuries;investigation of the problems, complications,and treatment of mechanical and burn injury;the biomedical effects of military lasers; theeffects of temperature, altitude, work, and nu-trition on the health and performance of sold-iers or crews; acoustics; and vision.
Corps of Engineers (COE)
The Corps of Engineers operates four lab-oratories.
Cold Regions Research and EngineeringLaboratory (CRREL), Hanover, NH (300).–This facility investigates problems faced bythe Corps of Engineers in cold areas of theworld.
Construction Engineering Research Labora-tory (CERL), Champaign, IL (260).–This lab-oratory conducts research and development infacility construction, operations, and main-tenance.
Engineer Topographic Laboratories (ETL),Fort Belvoir, VA (300).–This laboratory pro-vides the military community with researchand development in topographic sciences andterrain analysis.
Engineer Waterways Experiment Station(WES), Vicksburg, MS (1,660).–The five tech-nical laboratories at this facility-the Hy-draulics, Geotechnical, Structures, and En-
88
vironmental Laboratories and the CoastalEngineering Research Center–support themilitary and civilian missions of the Army,other federal agencies, and allied nations.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnell/ArmyResearch Institute for Behavioraland Social Sciences
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel(DCSPER) operates one laboratory, the ArmyResearch Institute for Behavioral and SocialSciences (ARI). This lab, employing 400 per-sonnel, is the Army’s lead lab for soldier-oriented research.
Navy Laboratories
The Navy’s research and development sys-tem, as described in chapter 4, incorporatesa greater in-house research and developmentcapability than that of the Army or the AirForce. Many Navy laboratories and develop-ment centers not only have the capability toconduct in-house research and exploratory de-velopment (6.1 and 6.2), but also can carry adesign almost to the production level throughthe more “mature” stages of advanced sys-tems development (6.3B) and engineering de-velopment (6.4). The various Navy laboratoriesare described below.
Office of Naval Research (ONR)
The Office of Naval Research operates fourlaboratories.
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Washing-ton, DC (3,540/l,550).2 -Founded in 1923, NRLis the Navy’s principal “in-house” research lab-oratory. Indeed, in some areas of technology,it is DoD’s principal laboratory. NRL conductsa vigorous research program in the fields ofcomputer science, artificial intelligence and in-formation management, device technology,electronic warfare, materials, directed energy
*The first number in parentheses gives the total number ofemployees at the lab and the second gives the number of scien-tists and engineers. Note that the definitions of scientist andengineer may vary from facility to facility, and therefore thesenumbers may not be directly comparable.
weapons, surveillance and sensor technology,and undersea technology. In addition, a ma-jor space systems technology effort has re-cently been undertaken by the Laboratory.Roughly one-fourth of NRL’s activity is fundedby the Navy’s research budget. The balanceof the activity is funded as a result of proposalsby NRL personnel to conduct R&D for Navydevelopment work, other DoD/Service labora-tories, and other U.S. Government depart-ments. The “contracts” won by NRL involve6.1, 6.2, 6.3A/B, and 6.4 activities. NRL alsomaintains an active exchange program withother laboratories, both in the United Statesand internationally, and with universities.
Other ONR Laboratories (490/250).-In addi-tion to the Naval Research Laboratory, the Of-fice of Naval Research operates smaller lab-oratories conducting research in specializedsubject areas. The Naval Oceanographic Re-search and Development Activity (NORDA)and the Institute for Naval Oceanography(INO), in Bay St. Louis, MS, conduct research,development, test, and evaluation programsin ocean science and technology and in oceanforecasting, respectively. The two labs employ424 people, 215 of whom are scientists or engi-neers. The Navy Environmental Prediction Re-search Facility (NEPRF) in Monterey, CA, con-ducts research and development in variousareas of atmospheric science.
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command(SPAWAR)
Prior to the 1985 reorganization of the Navyscience and technology program, each of themajor Naval Systems Commands (e.g., NavalAir Systems Command) had responsibility forthe operation of mission-specific developmentactivities and centers. This concept has beenreplaced by one wherein the Space and NavalWarfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)serves as the focal point for most exploratory(6.2) and advanced technology (6.3A) develop-ment activities. The other Systems Commands(e.g., the Naval Air Systems Command, theNaval Sea Systems Command, and the NavalSpace Command) have primary responsibilityfor developing “platforms” (e.g., aircraft,
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ships, space systems). Basic “safety-of-flight’or “sea-keeping” equipment remain their re-sponsibilities as well, but mission payloads andother specialized equipment are increasinglybecoming the responsibility of SPAWAR. Inline with this philosophy, all Naval Develop-ment Centers and activities have been assignedto that Command. This gives SPAWAR a“high-leverage’ role in the Navy’s overallstrategy for systems development.
In addition to their responsibility to SPAWARfor carrying out the science and technology pro-gram, the Centers retain a role in providingtechnical management for major systems pro-grams. In this capacity, the Centers are respon-sible to their pre-1985 “masters”; i.e., the Sys-tems Commands charged with developing therespective air, sea, and space systems. Sevenmajor development centers are now the respon-sibility of SPAWAR.
Naval Air Development Center (NADC), War-minster, PA (2,310/1,510).—This Center is re-sponsible for the development of aircraft andaircraft systems, including electronic warfareand anti-submarine warfare systems. In addi-tion to weapons system development, scienceand technology programs there involve electro-optic, acoustic, and microwave technologies.
Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), SanDiego, CA (2,970/l,540).--The Naval Ocean Sys-tems Center is the Navy’s lead Center for sur-face command and control and for combat di-rection systems. It has been a continuingleader in ocean surveillance systems (e.g.,acoustic, electromagnetic, etc.), and is emerg-ing as a leader in artificial intelligence andknowledge-based systems to support theNavy’s combat-decision-aid programs. TheCenter is also the Navy’s development orga-nization for undersea weapon systems. S&Tactivities include ocean science, bioscience,electronics, and electronic materials research.
Naval Weapon Center (NWC), China Lake, CA(4,970/1,820).-China” Lake is responsible for thedevelopment of air-to-air weapons and Navalair-delivered ordnance. The AI M-9 Sidewindermissile was developed initially by China Lakemore than 20 years ago, and versions of the
missile are still state-of-the-art as a result ofthe Center’s continuing efforts. The develop-ment of anti-radiation missile technology andweapons has been carried to a mature stateby China Lake. Additionally, China Lake engi-neers and scientists are considered leaders insensor technologies (infrared, electro-optic) andmissile engineering.
China Lake is of particular interest in thatit is one of the sites where the Navy is ex-perimenting with a more flexible salary struc-ture for scientific and technical personnel. Gov-ernment laboratory managers have stated thatCivil Service pay scales for technical person-nel, lagging behind industry and even acade-mia, have hampered efforts to maintain high-quality technical staffs.
David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and De-velopment Center (NSRDC), Carderock, MD andAnnapolis, MD (1,130/580).—This Center is re-sponsible primarily for hull designs and ad-vanced ship protection systems (e.g., demag-netizing systems, etc.). It maintains majormodeling and test facilities and provides tech-nical management for surface and submarinepropulsion systems. Its S&T activities includeship acoustics, magnetics, materials and struc-tures, hydrodynamics, advanced propulsion,and ship survivability.
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), WhiteOak, MD (4,870/2,430).—This Center, with itsmajor subordinate facility for weapon systemsat Dalghren, VA, serves to develop Naval sur-face warfare systems, including weapons andsystems for the detection and attack of sur-face and subsurface targets. In addition toweapons system development, NSWC also hasa strategic role, serving as the Program Of-fice for the submarine-launched ballistic mis-sile. A broad range of S&T activities are sup-ported at the Center, including energeticmaterials, charged-particle beams, and sensors.
Naval Undersea Systems Center (NUSC), New-port, RI (3,490/1,930).—AS the Navy’s primaryorganization for anti-submarine warfare, theNaval Undersea Systems Center is responsi-ble for advanced developments in sonar andother undersea detection technologies. The
Center also provides technical direction forsubmarine combat systems.
Naval Coastal Systems Center (NCSC),Panama City, FL (1,130/580).-This Center is re-sponsible for mine countermeasures and shal-low water undersea weapons. Significant testand evaluation facilities are maintained andoperated there.
Summary
The Navy’s laboratories and DevelopmentCenters have historically been influentialthroughout the acquisition cycle, up to–andincluding-production phases. The manage-ment reorganization in 1985 that eliminatedthe Chief of Naval Material-the Navy ana-logue of the Army Materiel Command and theAir Force Systems Command-consolidatedall Naval Development Center activity underSPAWAR. Nevertheless, the job functions,reporting responsibilities, and priorities ofmany of the scientists and engineers in the fielddid not change substantially.
Air Force Laboratories
Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)
The exploratory (6.2) and advanced technol-ogy (6.3A) development elements of the AirForce S&T program are conducted under thefive Systems Divisions which report directlyto AFSC: Aeronautical Systems Division, Ar-maments Division, Electronic Systems Divi-sion, Human Systems Division, and Space Di-vision. Each Division provides oversight forone or more laboratories, through which re-search, exploratory development, and ad-vanced technology development are conductedin support of Air Force-wide requirements. Thelaboratories in the AFSC organization are de-scribed below, with staffing levels given inparentheses for each laboratory. Not explicitlydescribed here is the Air Force Office of Sci-entific Research, also part of Air Force Sys-tems Command. This Office is responsible forthe Air Force basic research (6.1) program,which is conducted primarily outside the AirForce laboratories. The AFSC laboratories are:
Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories(AFWAL), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,OH (see staff breakdown below) .–Under theAeronautical Systems Division (ASD) is a“cluster” of laboratories which comprise theAir Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories—four laboratories, a staff and a Signature Tech-nology Office.
The Aeropropulsion Laboratory (490) is re-sponsible for exploring and developing tech-nologies associated with aircraft and aerospacevehicle power, including turbine engines, ram-jets, aerospace power components, fuels, andlubricants.
The Avionics Laboratory (870) is the leadAir Force laboratory for the development ofavionics systems and technologies. Major ef-forts are underway in microelectronics, micro-wave devices, advanced electro-optics, targetrecognition technologies, radar systems, andelectronic warfare.
The Flight Dynamics Laboratory (1,000) isresponsible for aerodynamics, aircraft design,aerospace structures (including research intoapplications of complex composites), andflight-control systems such as fly-by-light sys-tems. Basic investigations are being conductedinto advanced flight mechanisms includinghypersonic flight, short take-off and landing,and advanced maneuvering technologies. TheForward Swept Wing (X-29) Program has beena major effort in conjunction with DARPA andthe NASA Ames Research Center.
The Materials Laboratory (420) is responsi-ble for materials research and development,including electronic and electromagnetic ma-terials, metals, composites, and the recentlydiscovered high-temperature superconductors.The Materials Laboratory conducts compre-hensive nondestructive testing and nonde-structive evaluation programs as part of itsongoing effort to develop advanced, high-strength, low-weight structures for aircraft andaerospace vehicles.
Air Force Armament Laboratory (AFATL),Eglin Air Force Base, FL (530).—This labora-tory reports directly to, and is co-located with,
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the Armaments Division. It is charged by theArmaments Division to explore technologiesapplicable to Air Force non-nuclear weapons,both offensive and defensive. Thus substan-tial efforts are underway in munitions, seekers(electro-optical, radiofrequency, etc.), struc-tures, and advanced guidance systems for air-to-surface and air-to-air weapons. Althoughmuch of the effort involves technology devel-opment, a substantial analytical capability canbe found there, particularly in the areas of vul-nerability, weapons effectiveness, and simu-lators.
Rome Air Development Center (RADC),Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (1,210).–Rome AirDevelopment Center is the only laboratoryoperated by the Electronics Systems Division.Among its main activities are investigationsinto advanced C3 concepts, information proc-essing, and ground-based and strategic surveil-lance systems. It is conducting a vigorous program in support of SDIO’s battle management/C3 effort. RADC maintains two directoratesat Hanscom Air Force Base, MA—Electro-magnetics and Solid-State Sciences. The firstis involved in basic investigations into an-tennas and electromagnetic phenomena, andthe second focuses on solid-state electronics,devices, materials, and systems. An effortunderway at the latter facility is focused onradiation-hardened electronic technologies—of interest to both SDIO and the Air Force’sstrategic C3 missions.
Air Force Geophysics Laboratory (AFGL),Hanscom Air Force Base, MA (560).-This lab-oratory reports to the Air Force Space Divi-sion through the Air Force Space TechnologyCenter, a management headquarters at Kirt-land Air Force Base, Albuquerque, NM. It sup-ports the Air Force’s mission in developing anddeploying space, airborne, and ground-basedsystems. Research is conducted into atmos-pheric science, Earth sciences, infrared tech-nology, and other disciplines related to thespace and terrestrial environment.
Air Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL), Kirt-land Air Force Base, NM (1,110).—The Air ForceWeapons Laboratory, like the Air Force Geo-
physics Laboratory, reports to Space Divisionthrough the Space Technology Center. It is thelead laboratory involved in the developmentof technologies related to nuclear weapons ef-fects, directed energy weapons, and radiationhardening. A close association has thereforedeveloped between the Air Force WeaponsLaboratory and the two Department of Energylaboratories in New Mexico that are involvedin nuclear weapons–Sandia National Labora-tories and the Los Alamos National Labora-tory. The Air Force Weapons Laboratory hasassumed an increasingly important role in theSDI program, especially with regard to theweapons development efforts. The Labora-tory’s experience and ongoing activities in ad-vanced radiation technology and high-powerlaser technology have placed it as a leader indirected energy weapon research.
Air Force Astronautics Laboratory (AFAL),Edwards Air Force Base, CA (400).-The Astro-nautics Laboratory, formerly the Rocket Pro-pulsion Laboratory, is the third laboratoryreporting through the Space Technology Cen-ter to Space Division. It plans and executesresearch, exploratory development, and ad-vanced development programs for interdis-ciplinary space technology and rocket pro-pulsion.
Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL),Brooks Air Force Base, TX (410).—The HumanResources Laboratory manages and conductsresearch, exploratory development, and ad-vanced development programs for manpowerand personnel, operational and technical train-ing, simulation, and logistics systems.
Harry G. Armstrong Aerospace Medical Re-search Laboratory (AAMRL), Wright-PattersonAir Force Base, OH (980).—The three divisionsof AAMRL seek to protect Air Force person-nel against environmental injury and provideprotective equipment; study human physicaland mental performance so that human capa-bilities can be integrated into systems withmaximum effectiveness; and identify andquantify toxic chemical hazards created by AirForce systems and operations.
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Air Force Engineering and Services Laboratory(AFESL), Tyndall Air Force Base, FL (100)
Not formally part of Air Force Systems Com-mand, the Engineering and Services Labora-tory is the lead agency for basic research,exploratory development, advanced develop-ment, and selected engineering developmentprograms for civil engineering and environ-mental quality technology. It is part of the AirForce Engineering and Services Center, whichhas responsibility for developing and provid-ing the technology base for the tools and train-
tively contract with industry, rather than per-forming substantial research and developmentin-house. This philosophy brings programs outinto private industry earlier, introducing com-petition at an earlier stage. Therefore, AirForce labs are not generally viewed as beingin competition with the private sector; in fact,Air Force exploratory development programsare viewed by industry as important “seed”programs that will serve to build a company’sfuture business base.
ing of the military engineer.
Summary
Unlike the Navy, the Air Force philosophyemphasizes developing the expertise to effec-
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES
Background
The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Na-tional Laboratory structure is comprised ofabout 60 facilities, including the nuclear weap-ons production facilities, that are involved ina broad range of research, advanced develop-ment, and production. With activities locatedin almost every State, the fiscal year 1986 bud-get for this complex was over $10 billion (ex-cluding the Strategic Petroleum Reserve andthe Power Marketing Administrations). Ap-proximately 135,000 people are now employedwithin this Laboratory system. Only about 5percent of these are Federal employees; there-mainder are employed by the industries anduniversities which operate most of the facil-ities. The replacement cost of all field facilitiesis estimated to total well over $50 billion.
Stemming from the Manhattan Project ofWorld War II, the DOE National Laboratorysystem has now evolved in several major direc-tions. One major responsibility is the designand production of all U.S. nuclear weapons,including uranium enrichment and special nu-clear materials (e.g., enriched uranium andplutonium) production. DOE is also responsi-ble for development and production of nuclear
reactors for the Navy’s submarine fleet. Re-search and development, production and main-tenance, and nuclear materials production fornuclear weapons and other defense activitiesare each funded at a level of about $2 billionannually.
The research functions and capabilities ofthe Department of Energy have also broadenedbeyond their original concentration on nuclearphysics to encompass a wide spectrum of re-search into fundamental sciences. The presentscientific and technological capabilities of theDOE National Laboratories make possible in-vestigations including the study of chemicalreactions, cosmology, the operation of biologi-cal cells, the process of genetic information cod-ing, the ecosystem, the geosphere, mathe-matics and computing, and medicine. There arenine “multiprogram” laboratories and some30 specialized laboratories involved in thesefundamental science and technology activities,accounting for slightly more than 40 percentof the total field budget and employing morethan 60,000 people—more than half of whomare scientists, engineers, and technicians.DOE research and technology areas of inter-est, and its major test and evaluation facilities,
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make possible significantareas of direct relevance tonology base.
contributions inthe defense tech-
The DOE laboratories interact with privateindustry and with the academic communitythrough mechanisms such as cooperative pro-grams, visiting staff appointments, patentlicensing, subcontracting, and use of DOE fa-cilities. Major, capital-intensive, and oftenunique experimental facilities located at theDOE laboratories are made available to aca-demic researchers for fundamental scientificexperiments without cost, provided that theresearch results are published. Cooperation ex-tends to major U.S. universities, industrial re-searchers, and international scientists.
Organization and Management
The complexity of DOE’s mission and thediversity of its laboratory complex have re-sulted in an equally complex managementorganization. Figure 13 outlines the manage-ment structure emanating from the Washing-ton, D.C. headquarters. Of particular concernto the defense technology base are the activitiesand responsibilities of the Energy Research,Defense, and Nuclear Energy programs. Thekey functions of the DOE headquarters man-agement offices are summarized below.
Energy Research
The Office of the Director of Energy Re-search (figure 13) manages the bulk of DOE
Figure 13.– Management Structure for DOE Field Facilities
Secretary ofEnergy
AssistantSecretary,
Conservationand Renewable
Energy
Laboratories
Power Marketingand Transmission
AssistantSecretary,
FossilEnergy
Energy TechCenters
ReservesOther Special
Projects
AssistantSecretary,
NuclearEnergy
LaboratoriesNaval ReactorsGaseous
DiffusionPlants
I
Director,E n e r g y
Research
MultiprogramLabs:
Argonne-- Brookhaven
LawrenceBerkeleyOak Ridge
-- PacificNorthwest
Other Labs
Assistant Secretary,Defense
Programs
MultiprogramLabs:
IdahoLawrence
LivermoreLos AlamosSandia
Other LabsProductionWeapons
SOURCE: Department of Energy
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fundamental scientific research programs, in-cluding: high-energy physics; nuclear physics;the physical, biological and mathematical sci-ences; magnetic fusion energy; and environ-mental and health effects. It also supportsuniversity research and university-based edu-cation and training activities. Moreover, theDirector of Energy Research serves as scien-tific advisor to the Secretary of Energy for allDOE energy research and development activ-ities. The Office also maintains oversight ofthe multiprogram and other laboratories un-der the jurisdiction of the Department, withthe exception of the nuclear weapons labora-tories. Five multiprogram laboratories and 14program-dedicated facilities are administra-tively assigned to the Office of Energy Re-search.
Defense Programs
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for De-fense Programs (figure 13) manages DOE’sprograms for:
. nuclear weapons research, development,testing, production, and maintenance;
● laser and particle-beam fusion;● safeguards and security programs;● international safeguards programs; and● information classification.
In addition, this Office is responsible for thenuclear materials production program, the de-fense nuclear waste programs, and oversightof the DOE nuclear weapons productioncomplex.
Nuclear Energy
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nu-clear Energy (figure 13) manages DOE pro-grams for:
●
●
●
●
●
nuclear fission power generation and fueltechnology;the evaluation of alternative reactor fuel-cycle concepts, including nonproliferationconsiderations;development of space nuclear power gen-eration systems;Navy nuclear propulsion plants and re-actor cores; andnuclear waste technology.
Much of the Nuclear Energy effort is di-rected toward technology and engineering de-velopment programs.
Conservation and Renewable Energy
The Office of the Assistant Secretary forConservation and Renewable Energy (figure13) manages a series of programs focused ondeveloping technologies to increase usage ofrenewable energy sources (including solar heatand photovoltaic energy, geothermal energy,biofuels energy, and municipal waste energy)and to improve energy efficiency (e.g., trans-portation, buildings, industrial, and commu-nity systems, etc.). These programs involve thesupport of high-risk, high-payoff research anddevelopment that would not otherwise be car-ried out by the private sector; results of thisresearch are disseminated to private and pub-lic sector interests.
Fossil Energy
The Office of the Assistant Secretary forFossil Energy (figure 13) has the responsibil-ity to develop technologies that will increasedomestic production of fossil fuels. Specifi-cally, this office supports long-term researchtoward an improved capability to convert coaland oil shale to liquid and gaseous fuels, andto increase domestic production and use of coal.
Laboratory Management
Eight major operations offices and a seriesof specialized field offices provide administra-tive services and day-to-day oversight of themanagement and operation of DOE’s fieldcomplex. Much of DOE contracting for R&Dand other services is done by these operationsand field offices. With the exception of its na-tional security activities, DOE uses its bud-get more as a catalyst for the development ofgeneric technologies than for acquiring goodsand services for its own use. This process in-volves a significant Federal assistance effortwith universities, non-profit organizations, andstate and local governments.
A unique feature of DOE laboratory man-agement philosophy is the “GovernmentOwned–Contractor Operated” (GOCO) con-
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cept in extensive use throughout the labora-tory system. This concept, which was initiatedduring the Manhattan Project, permits DOEto provide the massive capital investment nec-essary to create and maintain field facilitiesand, at the same time, obtain experienced man-agement under contract with industry anduniversities.
Multiprogram Laboratories
DOE nuclear weapons R&D and nuclear ma-terials production are of obvious interest toDoD, but the DOE multiprogram laboratoriesalso make extensive contributions to the de-fense technology base in general. These lab-oratories all conduct defense-related researchand development not directly associated withnuclear weapons. Some of them–notablyLawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and SandiaNational Laboratories–have DoD as a signif-icant “customer,” with an average of 15 per-cent of these laboratories’ work done undercontract to DoD. However, DOE restricts theamount of “work-for-others” that its labora-tories can perform to keep them from becom-ing too dependent on funding not under DOEcontrol. The missions and program prioritiesfor the nine multiprogram laboratories are de-scribed below.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL),Albuquerque, NM; Livermore, CA;Tonopah, NE (8,250 total employees)
The principal mission of Sandia NationalLaboratories is to conduct research, develop-ment, and engineering for DoD’s nuclearweapon systems —except for the nuclear ex-plosive itself. Operated by AT&T Technol-ogies, Inc., Sandia also conducts energy re-search programs in fossil, solar, and fissionenergy and in basic energy sciences. In theseand other fields, Sandia has the capability toconduct large, interdisciplinary engineeringprojects that are sophisticated, but are con-sidered technologically risky. Sandia’s man-agement seeks to combine fundamental under-standing with technological development—thus generating new products and processesthat are unlikely to be produced as readily inuniversities or industrial laboratories. Nearly
60 percent of Sandia’s work is dedicated to nu-clear weapon development and production, and17 percent represents more broadly based re-search and advanced development for DoD.Much of this research is related to SDI.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),Los Alamos, NM (8,010)
The Los Alamos National Laboratory wasestablished in 1943, as part of the World WarII “Manhattan Engineer District,” to developthe world’s first nuclear weapons. Operated bythe University of California, Los Alamos’ pri-mary mission today is the application of sci-ence and technology to problems of nuclearweapons and related national security issues.Nuclear weapon R&D thus remains a primaryresponsibility, including the design and testof advanced concepts. A broad spectrum ofenergy-related research in nuclear fission andnuclear fusion technologies is also conductedat Los Alamos, with additional programs inlife sciences, health, environmental sciences,and basic energy sciences. The latter involvematerials; chemical, nuclear, and engineeringsciences; and geoscience.
Nuclear weapons research and developmentaccounts for nearly one-half of Los Alamos’DOE-supported activity; an additional 15 per-cent is in support of DoD programs includingSDI, non-nuclear weapons research, conven-tional ordnance, and materials technology. Anemerging role for Los Alamos, in conjunctionwith the Air Force Weapons Laboratory andSandia National Laboratories, is support of theSDI program. The Laboratory has also beenconducting research into the manufacture ofhigh-temperature superconductors and is seek-ing a major national role in this area.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory(LLNL), Livermore, CA (8,060)
The University of California operates theLawrence Livermore National Laboratory asa scientific and technical resource for the Na-tion’s nuclear weapons programs. While Liver-more is involved in other programs of nationalinterest, the Laboratory’s primary role—likethat of Los Alamos–is to perform research,development, and testing related to design
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aspects of nuclear weapons at all phases in aweapon’s life cycle. Other important programsunderway at Livermore involve inertial fusion,magnetic fusion, biomedical and environ-mental research, isotope separation, and ap-plied energy technology.
Nuclear weapons-related programs at Liver-more account for nearly 50 percent of theLaboratory’s DOE-funded activities. Another12 percent of the lab’s activity is “on-contract”work for DoD.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL),Oak Ridge, TN (4,960)
This Laboratory is primarily involved in allaspects of the nuclear fission fuel cycle, witha secondary but growing involvement in thedevelopment of nuclear fusion energy technol-ogy. Oak Ridge National Laboratory also con-ducts generic research into problems relatedto energy technologies such as materials, sep-aration techniques, chemical processes, andbiotechnology. Energy technology develop-ment includes residential and commercialenergy conservation, renewable energysources, and coal conversion and utilization.The Laboratory is also the major nationalsource of stable as well as radioactive isotopes.Oak Ridge is operated by Martin MariettaEnergy Systems, Inc.
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL),Argonne, IL (3,900)
Established by the Atomic Energy Act of1946, Argonne National Laboratory conductsapplied research and engineering developmentin nuclear fission and other energy technol-ogies. A primary Argonne role is to developand operate research facilities for members ofthe scientific community. In doing so, it main-tains a close relationship with universities andindustry and aids in the education of futurescientists and engineers. To fulfill this role, Ar-gonne directs scientific and technical effortsin several related areas. Nuclear fission pro-grams focus mainly on breeder and other ad-vanced reactor systems. These programs em-phasize fast-reactor physics, reactor safety and
analysis, steam supply, and the exploration ofnew design concepts for reactor facilities using“inherently safe” features and cost-competi-tive design. In the field of fossil fuel energy,ANL concentrates on advanced conversionsystems, including instrumentation and con-trol and related technologies. Argonne also hasapplied research programs in nuclear applica-tions, materials, and solar conversion systems.
Argonne conducts a variety of basic researchprojects in areas such as chemistry, atomic andnuclear physics, materials science, and biologi-cal and environmental sciences concerning nu-clear and non-nuclear effects on organisms. Thelaboratory is operated under contract by theUniversity of Chicago and performs nearly 90percent of its work for DOE; 2 percent of thelaboratory’s work is “on-contract” for DoD.
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL),Upton, NY (3,220)
The Brookhaven National Laboratory, oper-ated by Associated Universities, Inc., designs,develops, constructs, and operates research fa-cilities - for studying the “-fundamental prop-erties” of matter. Brookhaven also conductsbasic and applied research in related technol-ogy areas, including high energy, nuclear, andsolid-state physics; chemistry; and biology.The physical, chemical, and biological effectsof radiation, and chemical substances involvedin the production and use of energy, are alsostudied. Other research programs are directedtoward combustion research (processes andemissions, physical and chemical cleanup ofcombustion gas, meteorological dispersion,etc.), atmospheric chemistry, structural biol-ogy, the development of radiopharmaceuticals,and nuclear medicine applications. The re-search facilities at Brookhaven include: the 33GeV Alternating Gradient Synchrotrons; theHigh-Flux Beam Reactor; the Tandem van deGraaf Facility; and the National SynchrotronsLight Source. In addition, there are severalsmaller accelerators, a medical research re-actor, and two scanning transmission electronmicroscopes. DoD work, such as evaluating the
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effects of radiation on microcircuits, consti-tutes 1 percent of Brookhaven’s budget.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL),Berkeley, CA (2,520)
Operated by the University of California, theLawrence Berkeley Laboratory was foundedin 1931 to advance the development of the cy-clotron invented by Ernest Lawrence. Today,LBL’s primary endeavors include conductingmultidisciplinary research in energy sciences,developing and operating national energy ex-perimental facilities, educating and trainingfuture scientists and engineers, and linkingLBL’s research programs to industrial appli-cations. The Centers for Advanced Materialsand X-Ray Optics have been created to en-hance interaction with industry.
In addition to LBL’s experimental pro-grams, major research efforts are underwayin nuclear and high-energy physics, materialsscience and chemistry, medical and biologicalscience, energy conservation and storage, envi-ronmental dynamics, instrumentation, and ad-vanced accelerator designs. Advanced electronmicroscopes and heavy-ion accelerators areoperated at LBL and are available for use byindustrial and other researchers. DoD-spon-sored research constitutes a very small frac-tion of LBL activities.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory(INEL), Idaho Falls, ID (5,750)
This Laboratory was established in 1949 pri-marily to build and test nuclear reactors andsupport equipment. The Idaho National Engi-neering Laboratory now focuses on nuclearwaste management. Among its tasks are re-processing and recovering of spent nuclear fuelfrom selected test reactors, the Navy’s nuclearfleet, and other nuclear noncommercial re-actors, and the processing of liquid waste intocalcine form for intermediate storage. To ac-complish these tasks the laboratory operatesa radioactive waste management complex forstorage and disposal of low-level waste, andit conducts associated programs in materialstesting, isotope production, irradiation serv-
ices and training, and test support. OtherINEL activities include:
●
●
●
●
serving as the lead laboratory for themulti-megawatt space reactor programand fusion reactor safety research;supporting DOE non-nuclear energy re-search (e.g., research and development ingeothermal and industrial conservation);supporting R&D by other laboratories (atINEL) on defense and civilian nuclearpower; anddirecting the Three Mile Island “Techni-cal Information and Examination Pro-gram. ”
With the exception of nuclear waste transpor-tation and management, INEL conducts vir-tually no work for DoD—basic research orotherwise.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL),Richland, WA (2,570)
The Pacific Northwest Laboratory has twoprincipal missions: first, to develop and applytechnologies for energy security; and second,to provide technical support and environ-mental surveillance for operations at the co-located Hanford weapons material productionreactors. Current applied research programsinclude advanced nuclear reactor systems, nu-clear waste management, dense materials pro-duction, energy conservation, and renewableenergy systems. PNL also studies the environ-mental and health effects of radionuclides, in-organic chemicals, and complex organic mix-tures encountered in energy production.
PNL maintains a staff of scientists and engi-neers skilled in the relevant disciplines. Thesedisciplines are grouped to form technical “cen-ters-of-excellence” in life sciences, materialssciences and technology, earth sciences, chem-ical technology, engineering development, andthe information sciences. Operated by BattelleMemorial Institute, PNL works closely withthe private sector and also maintains strongties with university research teams. PNL’sactivities include a substantial percentage ( 10percent) dedicated to DoD research and devel-opment.
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATIONLABORATORIES AND CENTERS
Background, Organization,and Management
The National Aeronautics and Space Admin-istration (NASA) was established in 1958 asa successor to the National Advisory Commit-tee for Aeronautics (NACA) to oversee the Na-tion’s efforts in the research and explorationof technologies related to aeronautics andspace flight. The program has grown into amultidisciplinary effort which involves themanagement of a diverse complex of labora-tory activities and flight test centers. For fis-cal year 1988 the NASA budget is $9.0 billion.
NASA Headquarters in Washington, DC,exercises management over the space-flightcenters, research centers, and other installa-tions through six program offices. These officesformulate programs and projects; establishmanagement policies, procedures, and perform-ance criteria; and evaluate progress at allstages of major programs. Because of thehighly public nature of NASA’s work and theresulting political sensitivity, there appears tobe a stronger “top-down” management empha-sis than in DOE—or even DoD.
The Office of Aeronautics and Space Tech-nology is responsible for planning, executing,and evaluating all of NASA’s research andtechnology programs. These are programs con-ducted primarily to provide a broad fundamen-tal technology base and to evaluate the feasi-bility of a concept, structure, component, orsystem which may have general application tothe Nation’s aeronautical and space objectives.This office is responsible for Ames ResearchCenter, Mountain View, CA; Langley ResearchCenter, Hampton, VA; and Lewis ResearchCenter, Cleveland, OH.
The Office of Space Flight is responsible fordeveloping concepts and systems for mannedspace flight and other space transportationsystems. The Office plans, directs, executes,and evaluates the research, development, ac-quisition, and operation of space flight pro-
grams. Included in these programs is the Na-tional Space Transportation System, of whichthe Space Shuttle is a key element. The Officeof Space Flight also develops and implementspolicy for all shuttle users and promotes im-provements in safety, reliability, and effective-ness. Further responsibilities of the Office ofSpace Flight include the use of expendablelaunch systems for NASA and other civil gov-ernment programs and other developmentalspace-based transportation systems. The Of-fice of Space Flight has institutional respon-sibility for the Johnson Space Center, Hous-ton, TX; the Kennedy Space Flight Center, FL;the National Space Technologies Laboratory,Bay St. Louis, MS; and other facilities suchas the White Sands Test Facility in New Mex-ico and the Slidell Computer Complex inLouisiana.
The Office of Space Station is responsiblefor overall policy and management aspects ofthe Space Station program. This has becomea highly visible office in light of the “politicaland fiscal heat” the program is taking-heatthat is likely to continue. The goals of theprogram include developing a permanentlymanned Space Station by the early 1990s, en-couraging other countries to participate in theprogram, and promoting private sector invest-ment in space through enhanced space-basedoperational capabilities. NASA centers respon-sible for the Segments, or principal portions,of the Space Station are the Johnson SpaceCenter, Marshall Space Flight Center, God-dard Space Flight Center, and Lewis ResearchCenter.
The Office of Space Science and Applicationsis responsible for NASA’s unmanned space-flight program. Directed toward scientific in-vestigations of the solar system, the programutilizes ground-based, airborne, and space tech-niques, including sounding rockets, Earth sat-ellites, and deep-space probes. This has histori-cally been one of the most successful andcost-effective U.S. space programs, and its sci-
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entific contributions have been continuous andsubstantial.
This Office is responsible for research anddevelopment leading to the application of spacesystems, space environment, and space-relatedor space-derived technology. These activitiesinvolve engineering and scientific disciplinessuch as weather and climate, pollution moni-toring, Earth resources survey techniques, andEarth and ocean physics; active programs arealso underway in life sciences and microgravitysciences and applications. The Office is respon-sible for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasa-dena, CA, and Goddard Space Flight Center,Greenbelt, MD.
The Office of Space Tracking and Data Sys-tems is responsible for activities related to thetracking of launch vehicles and spacecraft–and for the acquisition and distribution of tech-nical and scientific data obtained from them.This Office is also responsible for managingNASA’s communications systems and foroperational data systems and services.
The Office of Commercial Programs is re-sponsible for encouraging the commercial useof space. The Office is responsible for the“Technology Utilization Transfer” program,the Small Business Innovative Research pro-gram, new commercial applications of exist-ing space technology, “unsubsidized” initia-tives for transferring existing space programsto the private sector, and establishing Centersfor the Commercial Development of Space.
Field Centers
Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA(3,500 employees at Moffett andDryden facilities)
Founded in 1940 by the National AdvisoryCommittee for Aeronautics as an aircraft re-search laboratory, the Ames Research Centerbecame part of the new NASA organizationin 1958. In 1981, the Dryden Flight ResearchCenter (see below) was merged with Ames, andthe two installations are now referred to as“Ames/Dryden” and “Ames/Moffett.”
Ames/Moffett specializes in scientific and ex-ploratory research and applications for spaceand aeronautics in a wide and growing num-ber of fields. Today, the Center’s programinterests include computer science and appli-cations, computational and experimented aero-dynamics, flight simulation, flight research,hypersonic aircraft, rotorcraft and powered-lift technology, aeronautical and space humanfactors, space sciences, solar system explora-tion, airborne science and applications, and in-frared astronomy. As the lead NASA centerfor research in the life sciences, continuing pro-grams relate to medical problems of mannedflight, both space and atmospheric.
The Center also provides technical supportto DoD programs, the Space Shuttle, and civilaviation projects. Recent NASA/DoD effortsinclude providing design leadership for the air-frame studies for an advanced, supersonicshort take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) air-craft, a joint U.S./U.K. study effort. These “ex-tramural” projects and responsibilities willevolve as NASA’s internal needs (and budgets)change.
Roughly 60 percent of the personnel at thetwo Ames facilities are Federal employees,with the balance being contractor personnel.Ames maintains a close link with universitiesthrough cooperative projects; a significantnumber of university students and universityfaculty members work at the center.
Ames Research Center/Hugh L. DrydenFlight Research Facility, Edwards, CA(staff included in Ames/Moffett total)
Ames/Dryden provides NASA with a highlyspecialized capability for conducting flight re-search programs. The facility’s location, at Ed-wards Air Force Base in California’s MojaveDesert, is at the southern end of a 500-milehigh-speed flight corridor and is adjacent toa 65-square-mile natural surface for landing.The site provides almost ideal weather forflight testing.
Primary research tools include a B-52 “car-rier” aircraft, several high-performance jetfighters, and the X-29 Forward Swept Wing
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aircraft. Ground-based facilities include a high-temperature, loads-calibration laboratory forground-based testing of complete aircraft andstructural components under the combined ef-fects of loads and heat, an aircraft flight in-strumentation facility, a flight-systems labora-tory (capable of avionics system fabrication,development, and operations), a flow visuali-zation facility, a data-analysis facility for proc-essing flight research data, a remotely pilotedresearch vehicles facility, and extensive testrange communications and data transmissioncapabilities. The Facility participated in theapproach and landing tests for the Space Shut-tle Orbiter Enterprise and will continue to sup-port Shuttle orbiter landings and ferry flights.
A close association has naturally evolved be-tween Ames/Dry den and DoD S&T programs—especially with Dryden’s “collocation” at Ed-wards AFB with the Air Force Flight Test Cen-ter. One of Ames/Dryden’s major DoD coop-erative projects is the X-29, in which NASAand DARPA are exploring a variety of ad-vanced technologies. Another joint NASA/DoD program is the Advanced Fighter Tech-nology Integration F-1 11, conducted in con-junction with the Air Force Flight DynamicsLaboratory.
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, OH(3,690 total staff)
NASA’s Lewis Research Center was estab-lished in 1941 by the National Advisory Com-mittee for Aeronautics, and developed an earlyreputation for its research on early jet propul-sion systems. Today Lewis is NASA’s lead cen-ter for research, technology, and developmentin aircraft propulsion, space propulsion, spacepower, and satellite communications. In thisrole, numerous joint programs have been con-ducted with DoD components, with one of themost recent being the development of enginesto power advanced supersonic STOVL aircraft.Lewis also had managed two launch-vehicleprograms, the Atlas-Centaur and the Shuttle-Centaur; however, the Shuttle-Centaur pro-gram was terminated after the explosion of theSpace Shuttle Challenger.
Lewis has recently assumed the responsibil-ity for developing the space power system forthe Space Station, the largest ever designed.In addition, the center will support the Sta-tion in other areas, such as auxiliary propul-sion systems and communications. In supportof the Department of Energy’s Solar Energyprograms, Lewis is working on wind energysystems. Initial testing is on a 100-kilowattwind turbine—with larger sizes to follow. So-lar photovoltaic arrays are also being testedand demonstrated under this effort.
Major facilities include a zero-gravity droptower, wind tunnels, space environment tanks,chemical rocket-thrust stands, and chambersfor testing jet-engine efficiency and noise.Lewis also operates NASA’s Microgravity Ma-terials Science Laboratory, a unique facilityto qualify potential space experiments. TheCenter is staffed by 2,690 Federal employeesand approximately 1,000 onsite contractors.
Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD(3,680 Civil Service personnel)
This Center has one of NASA’s most com-prehensive programs of basic and applied re-search directed toward expanding NASA’sknowledge of the solar system, the universe,and the Earth. It is responsible for the devel-opment and operation of several near-Earthspace systems, including the Cosmic Back-ground Explorer, which will measure radiationgenerated early in the universe’s history whenthe universe was much hotter and denser thanit is today; the Gamma Ray Observatory,which will gather data on the processes thatpropel energy-emitting objects of deep space(e.g., exploding galaxies, black holes, and qua-sars); and the Upper Atmosphere ResearchSatellite, which will look back at the Earth’supper atmosphere to gather data on its com-position and dynamics. Goddard also has re-sponsibility for the development of science in-struments and the operations, maintenance,and refurbishment of the Hubble Space Tele-scope—a large, space-based optical telescopeto be deployed by the Space Shuttle.
Goddard is also the responsible Center forNASA’s worldwide ground and spacebornecommunications network, one of the key ele-ments of which is the Tracking and Data Re-lay Satellite System with its orbiting Track-ing and Data Relay Satellite and associatedground tracking stations. One of the prime mis-sions for this system will be to relay commu-nications to and from the Space Station.
For the Space Station, Goddard is responsi-ble for Segment III, an external, free-flyingplatform to be placed in polar orbit. The Cen-ter is also responsible for developing instru-ments attached to the outside of the Stationand the orbiting platform.
A portion of the Center’s theoretical researchis conducted at the Goddard Institute forSpace Studies in New York City. Operated inclose association with universities in that area,the Institute provides supporting research ingeophysics, astronomy, and meteorology. God-dard’s Wallops Island Facility, located offthe coast of Virginia, prepares, assembles,launches, and tracks space vehicles, and ac-quires and processes the resulting scientificdata. Its facilities are utilized by NASA’s sci-entists and engineers, other governmentalagencies, and universities.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL),Pasadena, CA (4,110 total staff)
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a federallyfunded research and development center man-aged by the California Institute of Technology,is engaged in activities associated with auto-mated planetary and other deep-space mis-sions. These activities include subsystem andinstrument development, data reduction, anddata analysis. JPL also has the capability todesign and test flight systems, including com-plete spacecraft, and to provide technical direc-tion to contractor organizations. In additionto the Pasadena site, JPL operates the DeepSpace Communications Complex, one stationof the worldwide Deep Space Network locatedat Goldstone, CA.
Current JPL projects include the planetary/solar probes Voyager, Galileo, Magellan, and
the Mars Observer, and major instruments forother NASA missions. Non-NASA work atJPL currently includes tasks for DoD, DOE,and the Federal Aviation Administration. JPLhas been supporting DoD programs in manyareas, including artificial intelligence, tactical-data fusion, and specialized training systemsbased on “Expert System” technology.
Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA(2,910 Civil Service personnel)
Langley’s primary mission involves appliedresearch and development in the fields of aer-onautics, space technology, electronics andstructures. The Center also conducts programsfor environmental monitoring, having devel-oped a range of instruments for atmosphericmeasurements.
In aeronautical technologies, programs havebeen directed primarily toward improving theefficiency of transport aircraft and high per-formance supersonic military aircraft. The Cen-ter is also developing technology for futuretransonic transport aircraft and has been ac-tive in studies of hypersonic powerplants. Avariety of wind tunnels are available to sup-port basic and applied aeronautical research.
Research interests at Langley include ma-terials, flutter, aeroelasticity, dynamic loadsand structural response, fatigue fracture, elec-tronic and mechanical instrumentation, com-puter technology, flight dynamics, and controland communications technology. Langley isnow assuming a role in developing technologiesfor the National Aerospace Plane, and has con-tinuing work on the Space Shuttle and SpaceStation (e.g., experiments, sensors, communi-cations equipment, and data handling sys-tems). Other research programs include inves-tigations of effects such as heat, vacuum, noise,and meteoroids on space vehicles; the use ofadvanced composite and polymeric materialsfor structures and thermal control systems;and electronics technology.
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL(3,450 Civil Service personnel)
Marshall serves as one of NASA’s primarycenters for the design and development of
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space transportation systems, elements of theSpace Station, scientific and application pay-loads, and other systems for present and fu-ture space exploration. It has the principal rolefor large rocket propulsion systems, Spacelabmission management, the design and develop-ment of large, complex, and specialized auto-mated spacecraft, solar and magnetosphericphysics, and astrophysics. Using the gravity-free environment of space, Marshall seeks todevelop materials processing techniques to en-hance Earth-based processes and to fabricatespace-unique materials.
Marshall has responsibilities for mannedspace vehicle development such as the Space-lab and has sustaining engineering duties insupport of the Space Shuttle. Advanced pro-gram efforts focus on the analysis and defini-tion of propulsion/transportation systems tomeet the nation’s needs over the next 25 years.Marshall is currently leading the planning foran unmanned cargo version of the Space Shut-tle called Shuttle-C; efforts for an AdvancedLaunch System are also underway.
Marshall also plays a principal role in pay-load development, instrument development,and mission management for space science andapplications missions as assigned. Responsi-bilities include the Hubble Space Telescope,the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility,and automated servicing/resupply/retrievalkits. Its Space Station responsibilities includethe development of pressurized structures,crew and laboratory modules, logistics, envi-ronmental control, and life support.
Two other sites are managed by Marshall:the Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans,LA, where the Space Shuttle external tanksare manufactured, and the Slidell ComputerComplex, Slidell, LA, which provides computerservices support to Michoud and Marshall.
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center,Houston, TX (3,440 Civil Service personnel)
Johnson Space Center manages the design,development, and manufacture of mannedspacecraft; the selection and training of as-tronaut crews; and the conduct of manned
space flight missions. Its principal roles includeSpace Shuttle production and operations, pro-duction of the replacement Orbiter, and sup-port to NASA Headquarters management forthe Shuttle system. It also has responsibilityfor the development of new manned space ve-hicles and supporting technology.
Johnson is a major development center forspecific Space Station elements, including thetruss structure, airlocks and nodes, and addi-tional subsystems. It has principal programactivity in the field of life sciences and medi-cal research to solve space medical problems,and it has supporting roles in lunar and plane-tary geosciences, technology experiments inspace, and remote sensing. It is also responsi-ble for directing the operations of the WhiteSands Test Facility, located on the westernedge of the U.S. Army White Sands MissileRange in New Mexico.
Kennedy Space Center, FL(2,200 Civil Service personnel)
Kennedy Space Center, located east ofOrlando on the Atlantic Ocean, serves as theprimary NASA center for the test, checkout,and launch of space vehicles. This responsibil-ity includes ground operations for Space Shut-tle preparation, launch, and landing and re-furbishment. Other responsibilities includeExpendable Launch Vehicle operations. TheSpace Station effort at Kennedy Space FlightCenter includes system integration and engi-neering, operational readiness, and delegatedground support equipment program man-agement.
National Space Technology Laboratories,Bay St. Louis, MS (150 Civil Service personnel)
The National Space Technology Labora-tories provide NASA’s prime test facility forlarge liquid propellant rocket engines andpropulsion systems such as the Space Shuttlemain engines. It also conducts applied researchand development in the fields of remote sens-ing, environmental sciences, and other selectedapplications. The Laboratory provides facil-ities and support through interagency agree-ments to other Federal government agenciesand the States of Mississippi and Louisiana.
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OTHER FEDERAL ACTIVITIES
By far, the majority of Federal Science andTechnology activities with potential defenseapplications are conducted within DoD, DOE,and NASA. There are “pockets” of S&T activ-it y within other government departments andagencies which contribute to the defense tech-nology base. However, because of the magni-tude of investment in military technology byDoD, one often finds the reverse is the case;for example, U.S. Coast Guard technologiesand systems often result from U.S. Navy re-search and technology programs.
A major exception in which non-DoD fund-ing dominates research in a field of relevanceto the defense technology base is medical tech-nologies. The National Institutes of Health(NIH) of the Department of Health and Hu-man Services will finance more in health re-search in its fiscal year 1988 budget than DoDwill spend in its entire research and explora-tory development (6.1 and 6.2) program. NIH’sfiscal year 1987 research budget was near $6.0billion, $3.6 billion of which supports univer-sity research. For reference, the entire FederalFY87 budget for basic research was $9 billion,of which the DoD 6.1 program constituted lessthan $1 billion. Less than $0.5 billion of thoseDoD 6.1 funds supported university research.
In the past, biological sciences have not beenas important to the defense technology baseas physical sciences and engineering. In thefuture, however, biotechnology will likely be-come increasingly important to the defensetechnology base, and more of the governmentinvestment in life sciences may have direct relevance to DoD needs.
National Science Foundation
The National Science Foundation (NSF) wasestablished in 1950 to advance scientificprogress in the United States. NSF supportsscientific and engineering research and relatedactivities, and under congressional pressurehas more recently devoted some attention toimproving science and engineering education.NSF does not conduct research itself nor does
it typically contract for research. It providesmost of its support in the form of grants inresponse to unsolicited research proposals.Proposals are evaluated through a review proc-ess that selects primarily on the basis of sci-entific or technical merit. Most NSF grantsresult from proposals submitted by academicinstitutions. Small businesses also submitunsolicited research proposals and receiveawards; however, most NSF awards to smallbusinesses are grants made in response toproposals under the Small Business Innova-tive Research program.
NSF supports basic research projects innearly every conceivable area of science andtechnology, including physics, chemistry,mathematical sciences, computer research, ma-terials research, electrical, computer, and sys-tems engineering, chemical and processingengineering, civil and environmental engineer-ing, mechanical engineering and applied me-chanics, physiology, cellular and molecular bi-ology, biotic systems and resources, behavioraland neural sciences, social and economic sci-ences, information science and technology, as-tronomical sciences, atmospheric sciences,earth sciences, ocean sciences, and interdis-ciplinary combinations of these. NSF also sup-ports science resources studies, policy researchand analysis, and studies in industrial science,technological innovation, and other scientificand technical areas.
For fiscal year 1987, NSF-sponsored univer-sity basic research totaled about $1 billion, ap-proximately twice that of DoD. The total NSFR&D budget that year was $1.5 billion.
Department of Commerce
National Bureau of Standards
The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) isthe Nation’s central reference laboratory forphysical, chemical, and engineering measure-ments. The measurement and data servicesthat NBS provided in 1987 included calibra-tions, production and distribution of standard
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reference materials and data, and laboratoryaccreditation. The Army, Navy, Air Force, andDefense Agencies (including their contractors)make extensive use of these services.
While the Federal Government has a sub-stantial capital investment in instrumentationand facilities at NBS, the actual research bud-get is modest and is augmented by coopera-tive research projects conducted jointly be-tween NBS and other organizations. NBSconducts specialized research programs for theDepartment of Defense on a contractual ba-sis. These programs draw on NBS’s unique ca-pabilities, and range from fundamental physicsand chemistry studies to more applied work,such as developing calibration techniques fora particular piece of defense hardware. Re-search topics encompass fields such as electro-optics, microwave and millimeter wave meas-urements, electronics, physical measurements(e.g., temperature, pressure, shock, and vibra-tion), automated metrology, materials charac-terization, and applications of computer sys-tems. NBS also hosts technical conferencesand workshops for DoD and consults on a va-riety of subjects, particularly those relatingto instrumentation and measurement.
NBS is the only Federal laboratory with aprimary mission of supporting U.S. industry.To accomplish this mission, NBS is organized
into four laboratories and institutes (figure 14):the National Measurement Laboratory, theNational Engineering Laboratory, the Insti-tute for Materials Science and Engineering,and the Institute for Computer Sciences andTechnology.
The National Measurement Laboratory(NML) conducts research in physics, radiationchemistry, analytical chemistry, and chemicalproperties and processes. NML produces fun-damental measurements and data that under-lie national measurement standards. It alsofurnishes advisory and research services toother government agencies and provides stand-ard reference data and calibration services.
The National Engineering Laboratory (NEL)conducts research in electronics and electricalengineering, chemical engineering, manufac-turing engineering, mathematical sciences, andthe construction and performance of buildingsand fire protection. This laboratory producesnew engineering knowledge, techniques, anddatabases for the design, development, predic-tion, and control of industrial processes. Im-proved quality assurance and reduced costsof manufacturing are two principal goals of thework.
The Institute for Materials Science andEngineering (IMSE) performs research in ma-
Figure 14. –National Bureau of Standards
Programs, OFFICE OFAdministration
Budget and THE DIRECTORand Staff
Personnel Functions
Institute forMaterials Scienceand Engineering
SOURCE: National Bureau of Standards
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terials characterization, nondestructive evalu-ation, metallurgy, polymers, and ceramics; itproduces measurement methods, standards,data, and other technical information on proc-essing, structure, properties, and performanceof materials. The goal of these activities is tosupport generic materials technologies to per-mit manufacture of advanced materials withincreased reliability and quality and reducedcost.
The Institute for Computer Sciences and Tech-nology (ICST) performs research in computersciences and engineering. This research is de-signed to establish Government-wide stand-ards and guidelines for automated data proc-essing systems. The Institute also providestechnical support for the development of na-tional and international voluntary standards.
Under Public Law 100-202, the Final Omni-bus Appropriation Bill for fiscal year 1988,NBS is to establish “Regional Centers for theTransfer of Manufacturing Technology. ”These centers will be designed to acceleratetechnology transfer to organizations that needto implement new automated manufacturingtechniques. Such techniques are being devel-oped for the Navy in NBS’s Automated Man-ufacturing Research Facility. This facility isdeveloping applications of automated manu-factur ing technology in p iece -part manufactur -ing at shipyards and depots.
NBS fiscal year 1988 appropriations are$145 million. Total resources for the same year,totaling $314 million, include $95 million inwork for other Federal agencies, $22 millionfrom the sale of calibrations, testing services,and standard reference materials, and $52 mil-lion in private sector contributions of staff andequipment. Total full-time equivalent NBSstaff for fiscal year 1988 is 3,090.
National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration
The National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA) explores, maps, andcharts the global oceans and their mineral andliving resources. The agency monitors and pre-dicts the characteristics of the physical envi-
ronment and warns against impending hazardssuch as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, seismicsea waves, and other destructive naturalevents. NOAA monitors the gradual changesof climate and environment and predicts theimpact of such changes on food production, re-source management, and energy utilization.
NOAA provides a focus within the FederalGovernment for the objective scientific assess-ment of the ecological consequences of specificactions, such as petroleum exploration, devel-opment, and shipment, and marine mineral ex-traction. The major operating elements ofNOAA are:
●
●
●
●
●
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the National Weather Service,the National Ocean Service,the National Marine Fisheries Service,the National Environmental Satellite,Data, and Information Service,the Environmental Research Laboratory,andthe Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Re-search.
Department of Transportation
The Federal Aviation Administration andthe U.S. Coast Guard-components of the De-partment of Transportation (DOT) –developand acquire hardware and systems. However,the bulk of DOT’s research is analytical in na-ture and is directed toward setting and enforc-ing regulations and toward investigating devi-ations (e.g., accidents). DOT’s research branchis the Research and Special Programs Admin-istration, which has the responsibility for plan-ning and management of programs in all fieldsof transportation research and development.
Research and Special Programs Administration
The Research and Special Programs Admin-istration (RSPA) maintains the capability toperform program management, “in-house” re-search and development, analysis in transpor-tation planning and socioeconomic effects, andtechnological support in response to DOTpolicies. Particular efforts are made on trans-portation systems problems, advanced trans-portation concepts, and on “multi-modal”
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transportation. RSPA also develops and main-tains vital statistics and a related transporta-tion information database.
RSPA is composed of the following func-tional groups:
The Transportation System Center pro-vides support to DOT and other Federalagencies in the fields of technology assess-ment, industry analysis, strategic plan-ning support, and research managementfor transportation systems.The Materials Transportation Bureau isresponsible for the safe transportation ofall hazardous materials. As part of thismission, it establishes and enforces haz-ardous materials and pipeline safety reg-ulations.The Office of Program Management andAdministration coordinates the universityresearch program, which focuses on high-priority transportation problems (e.g.,issues pertaining to transportation sys-tems engineering, advanced transporta-tion planning, and telecommunications).Its Transportation Safety Institute, lo-cated at the Mike Monroney Aeronauti-cal Center in Oklahoma City, OK, developsand conducts training programs.The Office of Emergency Transportationcoordinates the development and reviewof emergency preparedness policies, plans,and related programs.
Federal Aviation Administration
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)has a research and development program thatis largely oriented toward establishing stand-ards for the design and performance of aircraftmonitoring, communications, and navigationequipment and toward the acquisition andmanagement of air traffic control systems. Inthis regard, there is a substantial convergenceof interest and activities with DoD—especiallythe Air Force. For example, the structure andmanagement of the Nation’s air traffic controlsystem and planned conversion to the micro-wave landing system require close cooperation
with the Air Force. Because of the size of theAir Force budget in these areas, the “technol-ogy transfer” from the Air Force to the FAAmay be substantially greater than vice versa.However, the joint USAF/FAA responsibili-ties and interests remain, with attendant con-tributions to defense technology.
U.S. Coast Guard
The U.S. Coast Guard is involved in the de-velopment and acquisition of the communica-tions systems and facilities, aircraft, and ves-sels which are required to accomplish itscoastal monitoring mission. A close associa-tion naturally exists between the Navy and theCoast Guard in this regard and a significanttechnology transfer process exists. The CoastGuard simply does not have a budget of suffi-cient size to conduct a broad and independentR&D program; it must rely on the Navy re-search budget. However, Coast Guard require-ments and deployment concepts contribute tothe formulation and execution of Naval andother DoD research science and technologyprojects. Thus there is, as with the FAA/AirForce relationship, a synergistic effect–albeitnot substantial in financial terms.
Other Federal Agencies
There are scores of other Federal agencies,departments and special groups involved insome way in science and technology whichwould have applications to and could contrib-ute to the defense technology base. The De-partment of Agriculture and the Departmentof the Interior/U.S. Geological Survey conductmodest research programs which can have de-fense technology base fallout.3 Examples arethe remote sensing programs which are spon-sored in these departments. Utilization of datafrom LANDSAT, defining collection require-ments, and supporting spacecraft and sensordevelopment programs can complement DoD’s
me Department of Agriculture supports a university researchprogram which amounts to roughly $200 million per year.
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image processing and remote sensing require-ments. Although the magnitude of fundingavailable on the defense side may “overpower’these programs, the expertise growing in ap-plications and the cost-effective utilization ofremote sensing systems could have beneficialreturns to defense programs.
The Federal Communications Commissionexerts influence over telecommunications pol-icies, which can affect DoD programs. Thus,the Commission’s activities are closely coordi-nated with DoD, and its actions impact on re-quirements (if not on actual programs them-selves).
Small Business Innovative Research(SBIR) Program
An interesting government program offer-ing incentives to the private sector that canstimulate contributions to the defense technol-ogy base is the Small Business Innovative Re-search program.4 The SBIR program was es-tablished with the enactment of the SmallBusiness Innovation Development Act in1982. In 1986, the program was reauthorizedthrough fiscal year 1993. Under SBIR, Fed-eral agencies with research and developmentbudgets which exceed $100 million must estab-lish an SBIR program, with the funding con-tribution derived from fixed percentages estab-lished for each participating agency. ElevenFederal agencies now participate in SBIR:
Department of Agriculture,Department of Commerce,Department of Defense,Department of Education,Department of Energy,Department of Health and HumanServices,Department of Transportation,Environmental Protection Agency,
‘For additional information on this program, see the SciencePolicy Study Background Report No. 8, “Science Support bythe Department of Defense, ” prepared by the CongressionalResearch Service for the Task Force on Science Policy, Com-mittee on Science Policy, U.S. House of Representatives, 99thCong., pp. 310-314.
● NASA, National Science Foundation, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The program consists of three phases of con-tracting and is designed to encourage smallbusiness to overcome their “angst” when deal-ing with the Federal Government (e.g., toomuch paperwork, complete auditing proce-dures, etc.). Phase I contracts are focused on
evaluating the scientific and technical meritand/or feasibility of an idea. Awards are nor-mally up to $50,000, with an average periodof performance of 6 months. Under Phase IIthe results of Phase I feasibility studies areexpanded to pursue further any developmentopportunities. Only those small businesseswhich have conducted Phase I contracts areeligible for Phase II. The size of the contractsare normally $500,000 or less and the periodof performance roughly 2 years. Under PhaseIII, the government seeks to commercialize theresults of Phase II through the use of private,or non-SBIR Federal, funding (e.g., DoDRDT&E funds).
The participating agencies and departmentspublish their lists of SBIR solicitation topicson a quarterly basis. DoD—the Departmentsof the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency; the De-fense Nuclear Agency; and the Strategic De-fense Initiative Organization-lists hundredsof topics. Most of these topics would be classedin the research and exploratory developmentcategories of DoD’s S&T program. Since theprogram’s inception in fiscal year 1983, morethan 5,000 Phase I and 1,000 Phase II con-tracts have been awarded and the total dollaramount is in excess of $655 million. In fiscalyear 1986,$98 million in Phase I and $200 mil-lion in Phase 11 programs were awarded androughly $400 million will be awarded for bothphases in fiscal year 1987. A quick review ofthe DoD topic list reveals that the return indefense-related technology development couldbe substantial.
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PRIVATE NONPROFIT LABORATORIESA considerable amount of DoD technology
base work is performed by federally funded re-search and development centers (FFRDCs) andother nonprofit laboratories that, in manyways, have organizational characteristics be-tween those of government laboratories andthose of private corporations. Like governmentlaboratories, these facilities need not considerpotential profitability in their choice of re-search activities. However, they have moreflexibility in their operating procedures—andparticularly in their personnel policies—thando government laboratories.
FFRDCs serve various branches of the Fed-eral Government. Ten are sponsored by De-partment of Defense. Six of these–the Cen-ter for Naval Analyses, the Institute forDefense Analyses, three divisions of the RandCorp. (Project Air Force, Rand National De-fense Research Institute, and the Arroyo Cen-ter), and the Logistics Management Institute—primarily conduct studies and analyses forthe Services and the Office of the Secretaryof Defense and do not perform much technicalresearch or development. The other four—TheAerospace Corp., the MITRE Corp. C3I Divi-sion, the Software Engineering Institute, andLincoln Laboratory–have a significant tech-nical role and are described below.
Other nonprofit institutions, organizeddifferently than FFRDCs, also perform signif-icant technical work for the Defense Depart-ment and other federal agencies. Their man-agement structures range from universityaffiliates to independent, nonprofit organiza-tions. Selected examples of these institutionsare also presented below.
Federally Funded Researchand Development Centers
The Aerospace Corp., El Segundo, CA(3,800/2,100)5
The Aerospace Corp. performs technicalwork on military space systems and related
‘(Total Staff/Scientists and Engineers).
technologies. Its services are provided prin-cipally for for the Space Division of the AirForce Systems Command, although it alsoworks for other agencies. Aerospace Corp. pro-vides general systems engineering and inte-gration services, which involve formulatingrequirements, designing specifications, moni-toring technical progress, resolving problems,certifying completion, and assistance duringoperation. Its single largest responsibility in-volves certifying spacecraft and launch vehi-cles for launch.
The MITRE Corp., C3I Division, Bedford, MAand Washington, DC (4,000/2,140)
The C3I division of MITRE Corp. performssystems engineering and integration servicesin the field of command, control, communica-tions, and intelligence (C3I) under Air Forcesponsorship. Its primary sponsor is the Elec-tronic Systems Division of the Air Force Sys-tems Command. (Metrek Division, another di-vision of MITRE Corp., serves as a nonprofitcontractor for civil agencies of the gov-ernment. )
Software Engineering Institute,Pittsburgh, PA (14O/1OO)
The Software Engineering Institute is oper-ated by Carnegie Mellon University under con-tract to the Electronic Systems Division of theAir Force Systems Command. However, itworks for all the Services to promote use ofthe most effective technology to improve thequality of operational software in mission-critical computer systems.
Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA (2,100/760)
Lincoln Laboratory’s particular emphasis ison electronics. It is operated by the Massachu-setts Institute of Technology under prime con-tract with the Electronic Systems Division ofthe Air Force Systems Command. Establishedin 1951 to assist the Air Force with the then-emerging technology of digital computers, itcontinues as a pioneering technical center inthe areas of radar, communications, and com-
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puters. Programs range from fundamentalsolid state science to the design, development,and demonstration of prototype systems. Itworks for all the Services and for several DoDagencies. The Air Force limits the degree ofparticipation of other clients to less than 50percent.
University Affiliates
Many federally funded laboratories are man-aged by universities under a variety of differ-ent structures such as FFRDC (e.g., LincolnLaboratory, managed by MIT for the AirForce) and management contract (e.g. LosAlamos, Lawrence Livermore, and LawrenceBerkeley National Laboratories, managed bythe University of California for the Depart-ment of Energy). Yet another management ap-proach is as an independent university divi-sion, such as the Johns Hopkins AppliedPhysics Laboratory. This laboratory, and otherexamples of university-affiliated researchcenters, are described below.
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory,Howard County, MD (2,800/1,600)
The Applied Physics Laboratory is a divi-sion of the Johns Hopkins University, operat-ing in parallel with the university’s academicdivisions. The lab is run primarily under a sin-gle contract with the Navy’s Space and NavalWarfare Systems Command, but it performswork for all DoD-sponsored activities and mostother Federal activities. With a history of workin proximity fuzes, guided missiles, and sys-tems engineering, the lab currently works inthe areas of Navy ship systems, submarine sys-tems, strategic systems, naval warfare analy-sis, space research and development, aeronau-tics, and biomedical research. Basic andapplied research are also conducted in a num-ber of areas that underlie current and futurelaboratory interests.
Georgia Tech Research Institute,Atlanta, GA (1,360/580)
The Georgia Tech Research Institute is anonprofit organization affiliated with the Geor-gia Institute of Technology. It performs engi-
neering, scientific, and economic research inelectronics, electromagnetic, energy, materi-als sciences, and a number of other areas. Vari-ous defense and non-defense government agen-cies are the principal clients, but up to 20percent of the work is done for private in-dustry.
IIT Research Institute, Chicago, IL(1,750/1,200)
The I IT Research Institute is a nonprofit re-search organization affiliated with the IllinoisInstitute of Technology. It works for both gov-ernment and private clients, with the numberof projects about evenly split between the two,but with Federal contracts representing about80 percent of its funding. Research topics in-clude electronics, communications, toxicology,chemical defense, environmental science, pe-troleum research, ordnance, and advancedmanufacturing technology.
Independent Nonprofit Laboratories
Battelle Memorial Institute,Columbus, OH (7,800)
Battelle is an independent, nonprofit, inter-national organization providing research anddevelopment, technical management (primar-ily management of the Department of Energy’sPacific Northwest Laboratory), and technol-ogy commercialization services. Battelle’s re-search and development is now being concen-trated primarily in the areas of advancedmaterials, biological and chemical sciences,biotechnology, electronics, engineering andmanufacturing technologies, and informationsystems.
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory,Cambridge, MA (2,000/1,000)
Draper Labs, at one time affiliated with theMassachusetts Institute of Technology, is nowan independent nonprofit research institution.Its major business activities are avionics, stra-tegic systems, undersea vehicle systems, pre-cision pointing and tracking, and advancedspace systems. Draper has had major respon-sibility for guidance, navigation, and control
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systems for strategic ballistic missiles, NASAspacecraft, and a variety of Air Force systems.
SRI International, Menlo Park, CA (3,600)
SRI International is an independent non-profit research institute once affiliated withStanford University. It is organized into fourdivisions–Engineering; International Busi-
ness and Consulting; Sciences (Physical andLife); and the David Sarnoff Research Center.The Sarnoff research center, originally theRCA corporate research laboratory, was soldto SRI when RCA was acquired by GeneralElectric. About 60 percent of SRI’s work isfor the Federal Government, with the re-mainder for private clients.
Glossary of Acronyms
AD
ADP
AFAL
AFATL
AFESL
AFGL
AFOSR
AFSCAFWAL
AFWL
AMCAMCCOM
ARDEC
ARI
ARI
AROARPA
–Armaments Division (AirForce Systems Command)
—Advanced DemonstrationProject
—Air Force AstronauticsLaboratory (Air Force SystemsCommand)
—Air Force ArmamentLaboratory (Air Force SystemsCommand)
–Air Force Engineering andServices Laboratory
—Air Force GeophysicsLaboratory (Air Force SystemsCommand)
–Air Force Office of ScientificResearch
–Air Force Systems Command–Air Force Wright Aeronautical
Laboratories (Air ForceSystems Command)
–Air Force Weapons Laboratory(Air Force Systems Command)
–Army Materiel Command—Armaments, Munitions, and
Chemical Command (ArmyMateriel Command)
–Armament RDE Center (ArmyMateriel Command)
–Accelerated Research Initiative(U.S. Navy)
–Army Research Institute(Army Deputy Chief of Stafffor Personnel)
—Army Research Office–Advanced Research Projects
Agency (now DARPA)ASA(RD&A) –Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Research,Development, and Acquisition
ASAF(A) –Assistant Secretary of the AirForce for Acquisition
ASD —Aeronautical Systems Division(Air Force Systems Command)
ASD(R&T) —Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Research and Technology
ASL —Atmospheric SciencesLaboratory (Army MaterielCommand)
ASN(RE&S) –Assistant Secretary of theNavy for Research,Engineering, and Systems
ATD
AVSCOM
B&PBRL
C3I
CECOM
CMC
CNOCNRCOE
CRDEC
CREL
CRREL
CRSDARPA
DCA
DCS(T&P)
DCSPER
DDR&E
DMADNADNLDoDDOEDOTDR&T
–Advanced TechnologyDemonstration
–Aviation Systems Command(Army Materiel Command)
–Bid and Proposal—Ballistics Research Laboratory
(Army Materiel Command)–Command, Control,
Communications, andIntelligence
–Communications-ElectronicsCommand (Army MaterielCommand)
–Commandant of the MarineCorps
–Chief of Naval Operations–Chief of Naval Research–Corps of Engineers (U.S.
Army)–Chemical RDE Center (Army
Materiel Command)–Construction Engineering
Research Laboratory (ArmyCorps of Engineers)
–Cold Regions Research andEngineering Laboratory (ArmyCorps of Engineers)
–Congressional Research Service–Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (formerlyARPA)
—Defense CommunicationsAgency
–Deputy Chief of Staff forTechnology and Plans (U.S.Air Force)
–Deputy Chief of Staff forPersonnel (U.S. Army)
–Director of Defense Researchand Engineering
–Defense Mapping Agency–Defense Nuclear Agency—Director of Navy Laboratories—Department of Defense–Department of Energy—Department of Transportation–Director of Research and
Technology (U.S. Army)DRD&R(T&E)–Director of Research,
Development andRequirements, Test andEvaluation
111
112
DSARC —Defense System AcquisitionReview Council
DSB –Defense Science BoardDT&A –Deputy for Technology and
Assessment (U.S. Army)DUSD(R&AT)–Deputy Under Secretary of
ESD
ETETDL
ETL
FAA
FFRDC
FSED
GaAsGOCO
HDL
HEL
HSD
ILIR
IMIP
INEL
INO
IR&D
JPL
LABCOM
LBL
Defense for Research andAdvanced Technology
—Electronic Systems Division(Air Force Systems Command)
–Emerging Technologies–Electronics Technology and
Devices Laboratory (ArmyMateriel Command)
—Engineer TopographicLaboratory (Army Corps ofEngineers)
–Federal AviationAdministration (U.S.Department of Transportation)
–Federally Funded Researchand Development Center
—Full-Scale EngineeringDevelopment
—Gallium Arsenide–Government Owned/Contractor
Operated–Harry Diamond Laboratories
(Army Materiel Command)–Human Engineering
Laboratory (Army MaterielCommand)
—Human Systems Division (AirForce Systems Command)
—In-House LaboratoryIndependent ResearchProgram
—Industrial ModernizationIncentives Program
–Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory (U.S. Departmentof Energy)
–Institute for NavalOceanography (Office of NavalResearch)
–Independent Research andDevelopment
–Jet Propulsion Laboratory(National Aeronautics andSpace Administration)
–Laboratory Command (ArmyMateriel Command)
–Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory(U.S. Department of Energy)
ManTech
MICOM
MILSPECMIMIC
MTL
NADC
NASNASA
NATO
NBS
NCSC
NEPRF
NGNS
NIHNOAA
NORDA
NOSC
NRL
NSANSFNSRDC
NSWC
NUSC
NWC
–Manufacturing Technology(Program)
–Missile Command (ArmyMateriel Command)
–Military Specifications–Microwave/Millimeter Wave
Monolithic Integrated Circuit–Materials Technology
Laboratory (Army MaterielCommand)
–Naval Air Development Center(Space and Naval WarfareSystems Command)
—National Academy of Sciences–National Aeronautics and
Space Administration–North Atlantic Treaty
Organization–National Bureau of Standards
(U.S. Department of Commerce)–Naval Coastal Systems Center
(Space and Naval WarfareSystems Command)
—Navy Environmental PredictionResearch Facility (Office ofNaval Research)
–Next Generation and NotionalSystems
–National Institutes of Health–National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration(U.S. Departmemt ofCommerce)
–Naval Oceanographic Researchand Development Activity(Office of Naval Research)
–Naval Ocean Systems Center(Space and Naval WarfareSystems Command)
–Naval Research Laboratory(Office of Naval Research)
–National Security Agency—National Science Foundation–Naval Ship Research and
Development Center (Space andNaval Warfare SystemsCommand)
–Naval Surface Warfare Center(Space and Naval WarfareSystems Command)
–Naval Undersea SystemsCenter (Space and NavalWarfare Systems Command)
–Naval Weapons Center (Space
113
ONRONTOPNAV
OSD
OTA
O T S G
P E OP M RP N L
POM
P P B S
R&ATR&DRADC
RD&A
R D E
RDT&E
RFPRSPA
S & TS B I R
SCC
and Naval Warfare SystemsC o m m a n d )
–Off i ce o f Naval Research–Off ice o f Naval Technology–Office of the Chief of Naval
Operat ions–Office of the Secretary of
Defense–Off ice o f Technology
A s s e s s m e n t–Office of the Surgeon General
(U.S. Army)–Program Execut ive Of f i cer—Potential Military Relevance–Paci f i c Northwest Laboratory
(U.S. Department of Energy)—Program Object ive
M e m o r a n d u m–Planning, Programming, and
Budget ing System— s e e D U S D ( R & A T )–Research and Development–Rome Air Development Center
(Air Force Systems Command)–Research , Development , and
Acquis i t ion–Research , Development , and
Engineering–Research , Development , Test ,
and Evaluat ion–Request for Proposal—Research and Special Programs
Administrat ion (U.S.Department of Transportation)
–Science and Technology—Small Business Innovative
Research–Sl idel l Computer Complex
(National Aeronautics and
Space Administration)S D —Space Division (Air Force
Systems Command)S D I –Strategic Defense Init iat iveS D I O —Strategic Defense Initiative
Organizat ionS E M A T E C H – S e m i c o n d u c t o r M a n u f a c t u r i n g
SPA WAR
SPF
STARS
STOVLSYSCOMTACOM
TBAG
TRADOC
TROSCOM
TSGURIURIP
USD(A)
VAL
VHSIC
VLSIWES
Technology Institute “–Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command (U.S. Navy)–Single Project Fund (U.S.
Army)–Software Technology for
Adaptable Reliable Systems—short take-off/vertical landing–Systems Command—Tank Automotive Command
(Army Materiel Command)–Technology Base Advisory
Group (U.S. Army)—Training and Doctrine
Command (U.S. Army)–Troop Support Command (U.S.
Army)–Surgeon General of the Army–University Research Initiative–University Research
Instrumentation Program–Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition–Vulnerability Assessment
Laboratory (Army MaterielCommand)
–Very High Speed IntegratedCircuit
—Very Large Scale Integration—Waterways Experiment Station
(Army Corps of Engineers)
8 3 - 2 0 7 ( 1 2 4 )
