The Created Ego in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity

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The Created Ego in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity

April D. Capili

Published online: 3 August 2011

# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract There are two seemingly opposed descriptions of the subject in Totality

and Infinity: the separate and autonomous I and the self that is ready to respond to

the Other ’s suffering and need. This paper points out that there is in fact another way

Levinas speaks of the subject, which reinforces and reconciles the other two

accounts. Throughout his first major work, Levinas explains how the ego is allowed

to emerge as such by the Other who constantly confronts it. At certain points in that

work Levinas comes to describe the self as a creature given to itself by another. The

notion of the created ego allows for both freedom and responsibility as Levinas

understands the creature as capable of thinking critically, becoming an independent

individual, and turning to the Other in responsibility.

Keywords Levinas . Creaturehood . Subjectivity. Autonomy . Responsibility.

The Other

It is well-known that from his earliest thematic work On Escape to his later magnum

opus Otherwise than Being , Levinas has engaged questions relating to subjectivityand identity. Though it may appear that only Otherwise than Being focuses on ‘the

selfhood of the subject as always already subjected to responsibility for the Other, ’

while the first great work Totality and Infinity may be considered as concerned

primarily with ‘the epiphany of the Other ’s face and speaking’ (Peperzak 1997: 75),

it should be remembered that Levinas himself speaks of the latter as a ‘defense of

subjectivity’ that is ‘founded in the idea of infinity’ (1999: 26). We know that prior

to the descriptions of the self-revelation of the face of the radically Other, the

experience par excellence that challenges the I to re-orient its existence, Levinas

provides an account of the emergence of the separate and autonomous I. Words likethe Same, separate ego, psychism, etc., are terms in Totality and Infinity that refer to

SOPHIA (2011) 50:677 – 692

DOI 10.1007/s11841-011-0263-3

A. D. Capili (*)

Higher Institute of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Leuven, Heilige-geeststraat 6/106,

3000 Leuven, Belgium

e-mail: [email protected]



or at least have something to do with the subject. These are terms meant to convey

the separateness, autonomy, and the tendency of the subject to reduce every other to

itself. Yet, we know too that central to Levinas’ thinking is the I’s encounter with the

face of the Other that puts the existence and egoism of the I into question and calls it

to responsibility. It may appear then on the surface that there is a disjunction betweenthe ego that arises as separate and autonomous, and the self that is awakened to its

responsibility for the Other. For Levinas, these two are of course one and the same

self — however, it remains to be clarified how it is possible for a free, separate subject

that is initially and for the most part concerned only about its own being to renounce

its egoism and respond to the Other ’s appeal.

In our view, this question can be appropriately answered by pointing to and

explaining another way of referring to the subject, an alternative characterization of

the subject found in different places in Levinas’ first major work. Along with the

above-mentioned words (the Same, psychism, etc.), Levinas likewise speaks of theself as a ‘creature’ or as ‘created’ in Totality and Infinity. We hold that this is neither a

slip nor an inconsistency on the part of Levinas, but is rather a characterization of the

human person that dovetails with and supports his other descriptions of the self and

actually makes sense of them. Our aim here is to show that what Levinas means by

these terms includes the understanding of the self both as totally new and

autonomous, and as originally open and related. This will enable us to understand

how the ego he describes as tending to become self-enclosed in the course of its life

of enjoyment and its efforts to establish a human abode, nonetheless remains

susceptible to the appeal of the Other ’s face. The sense of newness, openness, andrelatedness borne by these terms accounts for the possibility of the free individual’s

turn to the Other in responsibility.

Arriving at an understanding of what Levinas means by the I’s creature-status

requires the following steps: (1) first, we will say a brief word about Levinas ’ efforts

to secure the distinctness of the I from Being, which reveal both Levinas’ genuine

concern for subjectivity and his insight that the separateness and autonomy of the I

are necessary for any ethical relation. (2) Then we will point out that the idea of an

original openness, relatedness, and indebtedness to another is constantly suggested

by Levinas throughout Totality and Infinity, specially in Levinas’ descriptions of the

emergence and life of the free and separate ego. While impersonal non-Is play a role

in the I’s coming to be as such, it is ultimately the human other ’s presence that

allows the I to become separate, autonomous, and creative. (3) Third, we will

explain the Other ’s role in the self ’s journey towards subjectivity. Levinas explains

this in Totality and Infinity by way of reflecting on language. We will see too that this

is discussed by Levinas in another text in terms of the possibility of the thinking I.

(4) Finally, we will show that the confrontation with the face of the other insinuates

another relation in which the I is originally involved, one that the encounter and

relation with the human Other mirrors and suggests. The face reminds me of my

non-primacy and my creature-status. Levinas elaborates the idea of the self ’s being

creature in three ways: (1) in terms of knowledge and self-critique; (2) as one who

has been given the space to emerge as a free individual; (3) and in terms of the

always present capacity to become moral. All of these points suggest a self that can

no longer claim sovereignty or total self-sufficiency. What is conveyed is an

understanding of the self that is preceded by, related to, and allowed to be itself, by

678 A.D. Capili



another. It is hoped that after these considerations, we would have understood that in

speaking of the I as a creature Levinas is not merely adding a name to those others

he uses in Totality and Infinity, but that by speaking of the I in this manner, he is able

to give us a realistic and convincing picture of ourselves.

Levinas on Subjectivity from On Escape to Totality and Infinity

One of the main tasks Levinas has embarked upon from his first thematic work On

Escape, through Existence and Existents and Time and the Other , to his first major

work Totality and Infinity, has been the articulation of a view of the self that ensures

its ipseity, independence, and distinction from Being, and more strongly in the book

of 1961, its autonomy and separateness. In On Escape, Levinas describes the

nauseating experience of the fact of pure being also as the experience of beingriveted to oneself. In this work, Levinas already evokes the self ’s experience of a

certain uneasiness, and so a certain exigency to escape pure being and thus also to

flee from itself (2003: 52, 67). The picture of being Levinas paints becomes more

burdensome and threatening in Existence and Existents and Time and the Other ,

where Levinas speaks of the anonymous ‘there is’ that strips the I submerged in it of

its individuality, autonomy, personality, its interiority or private existence (1988, 53).

But more importantly, in both books, Levinas accounts for the emergence of the I

through the process of hypostasis or the self-positing of an entity out of the

impersonal act of being (1988: 83). He sees the subject as consciousness arising out of an auto-positioning in the present, something achieved by attaching itself to a

base and thereby distinguishing itself from being in general. In the process of auto-

positioning the self gains mastery over being, which becomes one of the I’s

attributes. The I as consciousness, as private existence, comes to be, by withdrawing

itself from pure being and positing itself in the present.

The I’s feat of distinguishing itself from the impersonal il y a, signaled in On

Escape and developed in Existence and Existents and Time and the Other , is

described in even stronger terms in Totality and Infinity while the notion of

anonymous being is pushed to a more peripheral place (Anckaert 2006: 30). Levinas

speaks there of the I’s separation and autonomy from totality, world history, mythical

gods, and, more basically, from the milieu in which it first finds itself. Levinas

describes how the self distances itself from everything else and how it concretely

accomplishes and maintains its ipseity despite the unavoidable encounters with so

many non-Is. It is an account of how, though the world is perhaps the I’s first other,

the I nonetheless comes to be at home in it and strives to achieve and maintain

separation, autonomy, sovereignty therein. The subject is described no longer merely

as striving to become distinct from pure being but as a sovereign ego able to

accomplish its separation from and establish its dominion over everything else.

The Separate and Autonomous I

Though the starting point of Levinas’ thinking in Totality and Infinity is no longer the

fact of being or the ‘there is,’ Levinas retains the idea from his earlier works that it is

The Created Ego in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity 679



the I itself that works toward interiority, separation, and autonomy. Levinas shows us

that the ego finds itself in a milieu surrounded by various non-Is. But it comes to be

itself, that is, it becomes a separate, autonomous, and sovereign I only by living from

or on things, the ‘fruits of the earth,’ so many ‘terrestrial delights.’ I relate to things

primarily neither in terms of representation (Husserl) or utility (Heidegger), but inthe manner of a ‘care-less’ and egoist enjoyment. I live on/from food, water, wine,

my work, etc. Insofar as I need these things, I am really dependent on them. Yet,

paradoxically, Levinas points out that it is through this initial dependence that the I

achieves the feat of separation and interiority, and thus becomes autonomous. He

says thus: ‘Subjectivity originates in the independence and sovereignty of

enjoyment ’ (1999: 114). Though I need things and depend on them, through

enjoyment, I am able to master, possess, horde, and manipulate all these non-

absolute others. Thanks to the fruits of the earth and all the terrestrial delights that

nourish me and give me pleasure, I come to emerge not only as an I distinct fromthings, but an I that is more importantly, separate, free, and sovereign. The ego

accomplishes this by gaining distance from the world and the things therein.

Concretely, the distance that is translated into time to think, reflect, plan better or

more efficient ways of maintaining mastery, and securing my enjoyment is gained

through the establishment of the home. The home is the I’s protection against the

threats that the elemental brings, the base from which the ego can launch strategies

to tame the world and thereby ensure its future enjoyment. More importantly, it

allows for the crystallization of the I’s private existence, what Levinas calls psychism

or interiority.The I accomplishes its own feat of separation. It becomes separate and

autonomous through the enjoyment of things, the establishment of its home,1 its

world-transforming work, the transformation of things into possessions and

movables, and through thinking and representation. From his earliest works Levinas

has always been suspicious of any participation or communion in which the subject

merges into others and loses its identity (Peperzak 1993: 48 – 49). Levinas maintains

this position in Totality and Infinity where he insists on the separation of the I. The

separate I is at home with itself, sovereign within its self-established economy. It is

self-sufficient, self-enclosed, self-concerned, self-satisfied; in its egoist enjoyment,

though the I can be said to temporarily forget itself in its turn towards enjoyable

things, it becomes ‘entirely deaf to the Other, outside of all communication and all

refusal to communicate — without ears, like a hungry stomach’ (Levinas 1999: 134).

But even early on, Levinas saw that such an I, what he calls an ‘adult ’ existent

or an ‘atheist ’ ego that is free from communion and participation, is necessary in

the metaphysical relation. ‘Alterity is possible only starting from me,’ (1999: 40)

says Levinas, emphasizing thus that this encounter is one between two freedoms.

The recognition of alterity and the fulfillment of responsibility necessitate an adult,

separate, and autonomous I. Only such an I can enter into a genuine relation with

the Other.

1 For an appreciation of Levinas’ view of the home or the dwelling, see Harris (1995), p. 433 – 444. Harris

discusses two understandings of home, one drawn from the New Testament and the other from Levinas.

Harris emphasizes that Levinas’ ethics, which calls for the free opening of the ego’s home so as to

welcome the destitute Other, can be a corrective to an other-worldly spirituality that may be putting more

attention on the world to come or to a homecoming in another life or realm.

680 A.D. Capili



The Other in the I’s Soujourn

We glimpsed above that in the early works Levinas not only expressed the

exigency to escape being, but also conceived of the I as being able to withdraw

from the anonymous i l y a as it posits itself as a substantive. In our brief consideration of some claims in Totality and Infinity we pointed out that the I gains

autonomy and separation through its initial dependent and needy enjoyment of

things. This is how De Boer reads Totality and Infinity, as he argues that

ontologically, the self is not constituted by the Other, since the self, so to speak,

creates itself through enjoyment and use of non-Is wrested from the elemental. What

can, however, be said is that ethically speaking, the Other, in calling the I out of its

egocentrism, gives the self a new beginning or a fresh start (1997: 31). But we wish

to point out here that the presence of the Other indeed allows not only for the ‘re-

birth’

of the I in ethics, but also for the very ipseity of the self. Although there issome truth in saying that it is the I that accomplishes its own feat of separation,

Levinas also holds that the Other plays an indispensable role in the I’s ‘self-

constitution’ as a separate and autonomous entity. While the social or ethical relation

necessitates a separated being or ego, it is true too that the I’s emergence is

conditioned by something apart from the I itself. Levinas tells us that ‘the light of the

face is necessary for separation’ (1999: 151).

Let us first remark that Levinas seems to have depicted the I’s enjoyment and life

in economy as one of total isolation. Yet, in the same pages where the I’s enjoyment

and establishment of economy are described, we also read that the Other is alwaysalready present in the I’s various activities. As Levinas himself admits, the way he

rendered his account of enjoyment tends to present an abstraction while in fact ‘man

has already the idea of infinity, that is, lives in society and represents things to

himself ’ (1999: 139). The establishment of my dwelling, my economy, and all forms

of labor already presuppose or involve the presence of the Other. At every point of

the ego’s odyssey of separation, the nascent self meets not only things it can reduce

to itself, but also the irreducible Other whose call in a sense constitutes the I. Labor

implies the revelation of the face of the Other. Work involves tools that I borrow,

inherit, or share with others; thus, it ‘already requires discourse and consequently the

height of the other irreducible to the same’ (Levinas 1999: 117). Even the claim to

any possession presupposes the presence of other proprietors with whom I can

exchange goods and who validate my claim over my property. ‘Thus the possession

of things issues in a discourse’ (Levinas 1999: 162). We noted above that the

enclosed and private space that is the home makes the private life of the ego

possible. The dwelling to which the self retreats and recollects himself is already a

human abode. The home is characterized by familiarity and intimacy, thanks to the

presence of what Levinas calls ‘the feminine’ (not necessarily the ‘feminine sex’)

who is ‘the welcoming one par excellence’ (1999: 157) and whose gentleness

‘spreads over the face of things’ (1999: 155). The familiarity of the abode

presupposes intimacy with someone. The interiority and recollection of the self are

made possible by and happens already in a human world, where the self is already

welcomed by the Other. We see then that while an autonomous and egoist self is

required by the ethical relation, it is the ‘ peaceable welcome’ first indicated in the

feminine face that allows for the separation of the ego in the dwelling. ‘Inhabitation




and the intimacy of the dwelling which make the separation of the human being

possible thus imply a first revelation of the Other ’ (Levinas 1999: 151).

The presence of the Other is not only evident in the engagements of the I in the

world; as Levinas likewise points out, it is the light of the face or its original call that

enables the I to withdraw from things and thus arise from the enjoyment of them(1999: 170 – 171). The I’s meeting with the feminine in the home is only a first

encounter with another.2 Levinas tells us that it is through the confrontation with the

absolutely Other, met as the ‘stranger, the widow, and the orphan,’ who criticizes the

I’s economy and freedom that first allows it to achieve distance both from itself and

from the things it possesses and enjoys. In short, the original encounter with the

radically Other makes it possible for the I to eventually achieve separation and

autonomy.

Language and the Other

It is the Other, who first speaks to me, who allows me to gain distance from myself,

and thus gives me time and distance to break with the medium in which I am

immersed, to recollect myself, to represent things to myself, and thus also to possess

things and to transform the world through labor — in short, the Other who addresses

me makes it possible for me to emerge as a separate individual able to work, own,

and represent things to itself. ‘Over and above enjoyment — with dwelling,

possession, the making common —

a discourse about the world takes form.Appropriation and representation add a new event to enjoyment. They are founded

on language as a relation among men’ (Levinas 1999: 139).

Note that language here is to be understood not merely as a system of signs or an

instrument of communication. For Levinas it is primarily the Other ’s appeal. In first

addressing me the Other gives me to myself. That I am able to speak implies that I

belong to a language community. More particularly it means that I received language

from the Other who has first spoken to me. The active capacity of speaking implies

the receptiveness involved in a more original listening to another. Marion, who

follows Levinas on many points, echoes this insight in his discussion of the

evenemental phenomenon of one’s birth: ‘I will speak not only by means of having

[repeatedly] intuited in silence, but specially after having heard others speak.

Language is first listened to, and only then is it uttered’ (2002: 44). In speaking to

me the Other does not only give me words, for she in fact teaches me and offers me

the world as thematized and still thematizable (Levinas 1999: 92). In being

addressed, I am welcomed not only to one language community, but also to a world

of things and shared meanings. Another ’s speaking to me enables me in turn to

thematize the world and give to the Other, for as Levinas remarks, to make things

into themes is to ‘offer the world to the Other in speech’ (1999: 209). Reflection on

our capacity to speak thus reveals that one belongs to a world that is not simply one’s

own to be possessed and enjoyed, but that is shared with and in fact received from

the Other. I employ words in referring to and speaking of things. But to speak of

2 For a discussion of the significance of the feminine for the entry of the I into ethics, see Catherine

Chalier ’s essay in Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (1991).

682 A.D. Capili



things is to make of them a theme, which is in an important sense to give things or

objects to the Other. Yet my capacity for speech and thematization presupposes the

more original giving, address, or signification of the Other. Levinas stresses that this

giving of the I to the Other in conversation is preceded by a more original address,

giving, signification, or openness: ‘But it is from the welcoming of the infinity of theother that it [the subject] receives the freedom with regard to itself that this

dispossession [giving to the other] requires’ (1999: 210). In being addressed by the

Other, I am allowed to see the world beyond the perspective of my egoist enjoyment,

thereby enabling me not only to disengage myself from my enjoyment and economy,

but also gain distance from myself. The distance both from myself and from things

that thought, representation, the founding of the home, work, labor, and possession

require are given me by the Other who welcomes me and speaks to me. It is then

ultimately the Other who grants me the distance required in achieving autonomy and

separation. I become a separate, autonomous, and creative individual thanks toanother ’s giving me to myself. Autonomy is made possible by heteronomy.

In an earlier essay, Levinas also traces the very root of the structure of the

existence of the ego to the primordial relation of the I with the other. The thinking I

(and thus also the I that is able to establish his dwelling, transform the world through

his labor, and secure its future survival, enjoyment, and flourishing) arises thanks to

its encounter with ‘something’ that it cannot reduce to itself. As Davis explains:

‘Alterity constitutes the grounds which make separation possible; the self exists

because the Other is irreconcilable with it. Otherwise, both self and other would be

parts of a greater whole or totality which would invade and invalidate their separateness’ (1996: 44). The thinking ego emerges thanks to an encounter with

‘something’ that it cannot treat merely as a function of its interiority, that is, like

things and forces that it experiences as co-substantial with it, as exclusively

answering to the vital self ’s needs. That the ego belongs to the totality and yet

remains separate from it presupposes that it has become self-conscious, that it has

come to recognize its particularity. Such self-consciousness in turn presupposes that

it has come into contact with that which it cannot assimilate to itself, that which

remains exterior to it (Levinas 1987b: 27). Levinas says further that ‘Thought begins

with the possibility of conceiving a freedom external to my own. Conceiving of a

freedom external to my own is the first thought. It marks my very presence in the

world. The world of perception manifests a face: things affect us as possessed by the

other ’ (1987: 28). Thought or the thinking individual therefore emerges thanks to the

contact with the human other.

A Given Self

The self then that Levinas offers us in Totality and Infinity is not one that posits itself

in isolation from others, as though it has always been a solitary and sovereign ego

certain only of itself, but rather a self that comes to be itself and comes to understand

itself first by having reference to the Other. I am an autonomous and separate I by

virtue of the Other ’s call or thanks to the revelation of the infinite in the face of the

Other. While on this point Levinas goes against Husserl, whose monadic

transcendental ego is certain of itself first and then constitutes for itself within its




primordial sphere of ownness the Other as an alter ego,3 Levinas finds in Descartes’

third meditation the formal structure of the relation with infinity that he sees is

concretized in the relation with the Other (Levinas 1987a : 53). The certainty of the

Cartesian cogito of its own existence is conditioned by a prior and more original

awareness of the presence of the Idea of Infinity in consciousness. Such anawareness of infinity gives the subject ‘a point of view exterior to itself from which

it can apprehend itself ’ (Levinas 1999: 210), and thus allows it to become aware of its

own finitude and createdness. Levinas remarks that Descartes uncovered a relation

that involves an otherness that cannot be brought back to immanence, an alterity that

‘nevertheless does not do violence to interiority — a receptivity without passivity, a

relation between freedoms’ (1999: 211). In other words, Levinas sees that Descartes

provides us a model of subjectivity that cannot be its own ground but is rather

founded on something else, an idea of the I as a creature given to itself by another.

As we will see in a while, it is this fact of my non-primacy and my givenness tomyself that I am challenged to recognize as I find myself confronted by the Other ’s face.

While it is true that my having been given to myself, like the Other, is in a sense initially

invisible to me, this in no way lessens its significance. The fact of having been given to

myself can be understood as an event or happening that I neither saw nor could have

foreseen, much less cause to happen again. What Marion says about birth can be said too

of what the Other ’s first address gives rise to: birth is an event that happens to me — while

there was no I to speak of at its occurrence — and in occurring, it gives me to myself.

What Marion says regarding what he calls saturated phenomena and the self applies

here too:‘the ego receives itself from what it receives

’(2002: 43). Thanks to the light of the face, the ego can turn up as an individual that is autonomous and separate. Like

birth, the encounter with the Other is an event in Marion’s sense of the term, for in the

words Marion uses to speak of an evenemental phenomenon, it ‘affects me more

radically than any other, since it alone determines me, defines my ego, even produces

it ’ (2002: 42). Though it accomplishes its own feat of separation through the

enjoyment of things, the I cannot be causa sui. Birth and the encounter with the Other

attest to the I’s non-primacy.

That the I is conditioned by ‘something’ other than itself has been shown above

by pointing out that it is the light of the face that enables it to separate itself

‘absolutely’ from things that it possesses and enjoys. The confrontation with the

Other ’s face points to a truly original openness, relatedness, and givenness, which,

though not readily evident in the present where the I is autonomous, possibly self-

enclosed, and conscious of itself as its own ground, come to light nevertheless. One

could say that in the light of the human other ’s face, another primordial relation

3 For Husserl, it is in empathy that I come to be aware of another ego apart from myself. The other ego is

understood as an intentional modification of my awareness of myself as constituted in my sphere of

ownness and as an ego governing my body. There is a transfer of sense from my apprehension of my body

as animate to the alien body that enters my perceptual field and which is anticipatively grasped as havingthe same sense. To recognize another body as a lived body, that is, to transfer the objective sense of my

animated body constituted in my primordial sphere to that of the other, requires this seeing of the

‘similarity’ (apart from and beyond physical appearance) that obtains between my own lived body here

and another alien body. The similarity ‘serve[s] as the motivational basis for the “analogizing ”

apprehension of that body as another animate organism.’ In this manner, when I see another body that is

like my own, I suppose that it too is constituted within a sphere of ownness distinct from my own and is

governed by another ego. See Husserl (1960: 111).

684 A.D. Capili



shines through. Like Descartes who through reflection on his own consciousness and

its relation to the Idea of the Infinite eventually refers to the ego’s being creature

(1998: 82), Levinas too comes to speak of the self as a creature in Totality and

Infinity. This is not a superfluous description, but rather one that reinforces and

harmonizes the understanding of self as separate and autonomous, and the notion of a given and responsible self. The self as created, Levinas tells us, is able to critically

think back to that which made it possible, has been given the space to become itself

independently, and can always turn towards the Other in responsibility.

The Self Critical of its Condition

The separation of the ego is so radical that it is possible for it to forget its having been

allowed to emerge as such by others as it gains the power to determine thesurroundings that nourish and sustain it. Levinas tells us that this oblivion of the Other

attests to the separation and autonomy of the emergent subject: ‘And this possibility of

forgetting the transcendence of the Other — of banishing with impunity all hospitality

(that is, all language) from one’s home, banishing the transcendental relation that alone

permits the I to shut itself up in itself — evinces the absolute truth, the radicalism of

separation’ (1999: 172 – 173). Such a self is ‘atheist ’— not in the sense of an

individual proclaiming the non-existence of God, for the term here indicates a

situation prior to both affirmation and negation of the Divine’s existence — but in the

sense not only of breaking with participation in God, gods, or being that engulfs theindividual, but also of the possibility of exercising one’s autonomy and living

‘outside of God, at home with oneself; one is an I, an egoism’ (Levinas 1999: 58).

It is only eventually, through critical reflection, that the I can come to recognize that

it is not — and it can never be — its own ground.

Confronted by the face of the Other, I am made to recognize and acknowledge the

arbitrariness of my freedom and the injustice of my existence: the nude and

questioning face allows me to become critical of myself. For Levinas, the capacity to

be critical of oneself is the very essence of knowing. Objective and universal

knowledge is possible only because of self-critical knowledge, which in turn,

presupposes the appeal of the face of the Other who challenges me to justify my

existence. As Levinas says, ‘existence for itself is not the ultimate meaning of

knowing, but rather the putting back into question of the self, the turning back to

what is prior to oneself, in the presence of the Other ’ (1999: 88). Being critical of

myself, I may see then that my freedom is not self-grounding; I can thus trace back

to the very conditions of my autonomy. As an I, I can not only master my earthly

milieu and thereby secure my happy existence, I can also look for the ultimate

justification of my existence. Through critical knowing, I can go behind my

condition and try to reach that which has gone before and determines that very

condition. Only a self that is separate and atheist can be critical of itself; but only one

who is born, rises to autonomy, and is originally open to the Other, in short, a

creature, is capable of self-critique in its search for the principle of its freedom.

Levinas remarks that the capacity to go from one’s current situation back to what

makes that situation possible ‘describes the status of the creature, in which the

uncertainty of freedom and its recourse to justification are bound up’ (1999: 86). The




separated ego required in the ethical relation is the self that masters its condition in

enjoyment, lives outside of all participation in establishing its economy,

autonomously reduces non-selves through labor, possession, and representation,

and can critically go back to the conditions of its condition — a creature.

‘Separation and atheism, these negative notions, are produced by positive events.To be I, atheist, at home with oneself, separated, happy, created — these are

synonyms’ (Levinas 1999: 148).

Separate and Totally New

The self is certainly not causa sui. It is neither its own creator nor does it find the

ultimate signification of its existence in itself. If it were its own cause and if it were

entirely self-sufficient, perhaps relation with anything outside itself would beimpossible. Levinas remarks that to think of either the Same or the Other as causes

of themselves and not creatures ‘would be to remove from them all receptivity and

all activity, shut them up each in its own interiority’ (1999: 221). They would then be

‘windowless’ monads, totally self-enclosed and thus incapable of receiving anything

from and of taking up responsibility for the Other. (Yet even the Leibnizian monad,

self-enclosed and sufficient unto itself, doorless and windowless in relation to other

finite monads, retains a certain relatedness to an other apart from and greater than

itself.4) But no one acts in a manner totally cut off from others, since we affect and

are affected by others. Moreover, as we have shown above, in its sojourn towardseparation, autonomy, and sovereignty, the I comes into contact with various non-Is:

the elements and things in the world, the il y a, the feminine in the dwelling, co-

laborers, and other owners. More importantly, we have pointed out that the face of

the Other that criticizes my unjust economy and egoist existence enables me to break

away from my enjoyment and brings me out of my being at home with myself. The

Other ’s call, which reminds me of the inescapable and original metaphysical relation

with the truly transcendent, is constitutive of the self ’s ipseity and autonomy. But it

seems that in the thinking of Levinas, the ‘atheist ’ self ’s irreducible relation with the

Other human person calls to mind one more original and inescapable bond.

Levinas has shown us that what is first and foremost marvelous about the I is its

rise from dependence on things and its capacity to independently exist, speak, think

4 Leibniz speaks of the monad as ‘a complete being’ the nature of which ‘is to have a notion so complete

that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which

this notion is attributed’ ( Discourse on Metaphysics §8). A single monad is that which exists by itself,

independent of everything else save God : ‘in rigorous metaphysical truth, there is no external cause acting

on us except God alone, and he alone communicates himself to us immediately in virtue of our continual

dependence.’ ( Discourse on Metaphysics §28) Each monad is windowless ( Monadology §7) and as such

can be affected by nothing from without. The life of a monad is the unfolding of accidents enfolded withinit since the moment of creation. The actions of one monad are to be understood merely as expressing more

perfectly the sufficient reason of another that undergoes these actions. Each substance is self-enclosed,

needs nothing, and is relation-less. Since nothing can penetrate it, it could not be affected by any other

creature. All quoted passages are from G.W. Leibniz , Philosophical Essays, eds. and trans. Roger Ariew

and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1989). Though he conceived of the idea of the

monad’s openness to its creator, perhaps Leibniz failed to see that such an original openness allows for

genuine relations with other individuals.

686 A.D. Capili



for itself, establish its home, gain mastery over its sustaining surroundings, and

eventually to be critical of itself and come to grips with the question of its principle

and origin. In the passage quoted in the last section above, Levinas applies the word

‘created’ to the human person described as capable of such accomplishments.

Levinas, interestingly, also remarks that ‘It is certainly a great glory for the creator tohave set up a being capable of atheism, a being which, without having been causa

sui, has an independent view and word and is at home with itself ’ (1999: 58 – 59).

Let us stress here that by creation Levinas means creation out of nothing. The idea

of creatio ex nihilo bequeathed to us by the Judeo-Christian tradition means that the

universe was made neither out of pre-existing matter nor out of the substance of

God. The Biblical idea of creation breaks with ancient myths that recount how a god

or several gods reshaped some pre-existing matter and thus formed the known world

and it asserts that the universe and all things living and non-living therein were

brought to existence out of nothing by the act of God. In the context of Levinas’s

thinking in Totality and Infinity, to say that the human person is a creature means that

the I is neither something derived from a prior existence or matter nor from the

substance or personhood of another. Recourse to the notion of creation out of

nothing emphasizes a crucial element in Levinas’ understanding of the human

person, that is, that the I itself achieves separation and autonomy and is irreducible to

any totality or system. Levinas admits that understanding the person as created out of

nothing necessitates its being dependent on another. But such a dependence does not

translate into some sort of bondage or being an element of a system; the human

person is not merely one part of a totality that becomes separated and thus no longer ‘functions’ on its own. The created I is other than that which gives it to itself.

Levinas insists that what is ‘essential to created existence is its separation with

regard to the Infinite’ (1999: 105). He stresses too that the I’s very dependence on

another is the ground of its independence or its ability to become itself and maintain

its identity (1999: 104 – 105). It is because of an original dependence that

independence becomes possible; autonomy arises through an antecedent heteronomy.

This interplay of dependence and independence can perhaps become clearer if we

recall that in a certain sense we were given to ourselves by persons who immediately

preceded us, namely our parents. Not only did we come to exist through the decision

of these two individuals, we came to achieve autonomy and we acquired at least part

of our own identity because of our initial dependence on them.

The notion of creation Levinas employs offers us a way out of the Eleatic

understanding of being, since it allows for plurality in existence. In order to

understand how plurality in being is possible and so as to ensure the newness and the

freedom of the I,5 Levinas refers to the Cabbalistic idea of divine contraction, where

Infinity allows for the existence and freedom of that which is finite.6 The infinite

withdraws or limits itself so as to provide space for the turning up of the finite

creature. The basic insight here is expressed by Hartman who, in speaking of human

freedom and other implications of the creation narratives, explains that ‘God limits

His power to us to permit human development within the context of freedom ’ (2000:

5 Two essential things that Richard Cohen notes characterizes man as a creature in Levinas’ thinking. See

Cohen (1994), p. 216 – 217.6 For a basic explanation of this idea, see Ponce (1973), p.79-81.




34 – 35). The creature is given the space to emerge as a separate and free individual.

This contraction can be compared to the self-limitation exercised by parents, who to

a certain extent keep themselves from meddling in the affairs of their child, allowing

the latter to grow and develop through his or her own free decision making. Levinas

sees also in paternity this interplay of dependence and independence. Though it can be said that I, the parent, live in and through my child, he or she remains Other than

me; though in a sense my child ‘came from me,’ he or she will be living a life that is

no longer mine, possibly following paths different from those I took. The relation

between parent and child is a relation between freedoms, similar to the relation made

possible by creation. Levinas remarks thus that ‘The great force of the idea of creation

such as it was contributed by monotheism is that this creation is ex nihilo . . . [T]he

separated and created being is thereby not simply issued forth from the father, but is

absolutely other than him’ (1999: 63).

Being creature means that one is not an individual by virtue of being culled fromsomething or somebody already existing, but by virtue of separation and the

crystallization of one’s interiority, accomplishments made possible by the withdrawal

of infinity. Though certainly indebted to the father when it comes to certain traits and

dispositions, the child remains different, separate, and has her own existence. She is

able to freely define herself as another human individual. Because of radical

separation, she who is created out of nothing has her own destiny; her birth and

death have meaning apart from that which comes from history or any totality. The I

that is created or given to itself is given space to accomplish psychism or to achieve

its own inner life and the interiority of the self establishes an order apart from that of history. This independent will can assert itself and even establish ever-new starting

points in history. As De Boer points out, ‘Creation out of nothing means that man is

absolutely other, absolutely new’ (1997: 39), and as such is outside every system and

is the source of fresh beginnings. According to Levinas, the separation achieved by

the subject is so radical that the self, in being so engrossed in its own concern of

ensuring the continuity of its comfortable existence, can forget that which has given

it to itself and thus suppose that it is its own ground or condition of possibility. To

return to our illustration, the child can stand before her parents as an independent

and separate other who can question, disagree with, and even renounce them as

persons who provided the space for her to be.

Thus, as it turns out, the notion of creation points to a relation between two

‘terms’ that are separate and are irreducible to each other; it is an idea that leads us to

a relation between terms that are absolute, in the sense of being able to absolve

themselves from the relationship. We have said that the ego that emerges is an

atheistic self, different and separate from God, capable of renouncing the Infinite or

forgetting its provenance. However, the sovereign ego’s freedom is questioned, its

place and security unsettled, by the Other ’s face. The Other appears not as a thing or

a theme, but as that which measures me. Just as the Cartesian cogito’s finitude and

imperfection are highlighted thanks to the awareness of the Idea of the Infinite or of

God’s perfection, Levinas sees that ‘For me to feel myself to be unjust I must

measure myself against the infinite’ (1987: 58). Before the face of the Other, the self

can recognize its own existence as murderous and usurpatory. The first experience of

conscience is freedom’s discovery of its injustice. The movement of freedom coming

to an awareness of its injustice and becoming moral consists in a restless questioning

688 A.D. Capili



of itself. The face of the Other awakens the I’s conscience and reveals the never

effaced possibility of welcoming of the Other into its home. The face of the Other

‘appeals to my responsibility and consecrates my freedom as responsibility and gift

of self ’ (Levinas 1999: 208). I, as separated creature, can become critical of myself

and seek justification for my freedom and existence.

Created Freedom Can Always Become Moral

In the process of self-identification through the reduction of the other to the same

and in the course of achieving separation and autonomy, the ego tends to become

self-enclosed, ‘entirely deaf to the Other, outside of all communication and all

refusal to communicate — without ears, like a hungry stomach’ (Levinas 1999: 134).

Apart from this, because it was not there when it received itself from another and perhaps since it gains separation through its own efforts, the ego forgets the original

relation and may regard itself as its own principle and condition. It can, like the

Cartesian ego cogito, not only doubt everything external to and other than it, and

also look upon itself, its freedom, or existence as the first certainty — to the point of

supposing that it autonomously produces the things that it knows. But let us not

forget that even Descartes recognized that such certainty and self-awareness is

preceded by something else that simultaneously inhabits and escapes consciousness.

In his Meditations, Descartes makes the observation that ‘the perception of the

infinite is somehow prior in me to the perception of the finite, that is, my perceptionof God is prior to my perception of myself ’ (1998: 76).7 The cogito comes to a

certain self-understanding through an antecedent awareness of the presence of the

Idea of the Infinite, an idea that exceeds consciousness and that the latter could not

have autonomously produced. Levinas thus says in reference to Descartes that the

idea of infinity gives the ego ‘a point of view exterior to itself from which it can

apprehend itself ’ (1999: 210) and allows it to glimpse its non-primacy, finitude, and

createdness. In a similar manner, the Other, who comes from on high and resists my

force, moves me to see that my freedom is arbitrary and that my existence is

colonizing. In the presence of the Other, against whom I am moved to measure

myself, I discover in shame the violence and injustice of my existence (Levinas

1987a : 58).

The resistance of the face of the Other does not annul my freedom, but invests

and justifies it. The I, which exists for itself, has the initial tendency, rooted in a

naïve will to live, to dominate the non-I and to reduce the latter to itself — and

according to Levinas, ‘This imperialism of the same is the whole essence of

freedom’ (1999: 87). Yet, before the face, the ego is unable to exercise its powers. I

still possess powers to harm and kill, but the face of the Other outlaws murder. In

this situation, the Other who comes from on high imposes himself as a moral

exigency upon the freedom of the same. The face of the Other puts my autonomy

into question.

The I that is self-enclosed in its egoist enjoyment is disturbed by the face of the

Other; as its freedom is put into question and as its conscience is awakened, it is

7 See also Levinas 1987a : 58.




challenged to recognize the Other ’s alterity and is called to respond to the Other ’s

plea. Before the Other, the I is in a way reminded of its original openness and

relatedness, its givenness to itself. The face-to-face encounter is a moral experience

because one is given therein the choice of either maintaining oneself through one’s

‘murderous and usurpatory’ ways or deciding to re-orient one’s existence in favor of the welfare of the Other, ‘economically’ responding to her appeal by employing ‘all

the resources of its egoism’ (Levinas 1999: 216). We have described the I as created

out of nothing, as being capable of placing itself beyond all communion and

participation, and as the source of new meanings and starting points. But we have

also explained that being created means being capable of becoming critical of

oneself, of attempting to trace back to what makes one possible. We are now then in

a position to understand that despite its being ‘separated and capable of shutting

itself up against the very appeal that has roused it ’ (Levinas 1999: 216), the I

nonetheless remains able to recognize the Other ’s call. Let us note that Levinas says

too in one of his exegetical works (that already echoes some of the insights in his

later writings): ‘In this forgetfulness [of the original alliance with the Good] egoism

is born. But egoism is neither first nor ultimate’ (1990b: 50). While the I tends to

become oblivious to all exteriority and to that which has anteriorly made it possible,

Levinas insists that ‘In the separated being the door to the outside must hence be at

the same time open and closed’ (1999: 148). Though it can indeed shut itself up in

its own dwelling, the ‘ possibility for the home to open to the Other is as essential to

the essence of the home as closed door and windows’ (Levinas 1999: 173). It is as

though the original contact with the other or the I’s having been given to itself hasensured that the created I will always be open to alterity even though it tends to

become self-enclosed. Apart from the human creature’s capacity to achieve its own

separation, Levinas remarks too that what we can find truly marvelous about

creation is that ‘it results in a being capable of receiving a revelation, learning that it

is created, and putting itself in question. The miracle of creation lies in creating a

moral being’ (1999: 89). Its original (or as Levinas puts it in his later work, pre-

original) and irrevocable having been given to itself by heteronomy marks the I as

originally open and related, and as one who can hear and recognize the appeal at the

moment of the confrontation with the Other.

Conclusion

Among Levinas’ constant concerns is the meaning of subjectivity. We have seen that

Levinas attributes to the ego the feat of achieving separation and autonomy from the

earliest to his first major work, where it is claimed that this self-constitution is only

possible thanks to the Other ’s presence. The fact that the Other confronts the ego

allows the latter to gain distance from itself and the things around it, and is thus able

to see itself as distinct and particular. The light of the face makes separation possible

and thus allows the nascent self to think, speak, build a home, work, and possess

things. Separation is so radical that the autonomous ego may tend to forget this

indebtedness to heteronomy, the fact that it was given to itself by another. Yet,

Levinas insists that the I, when confronted by the face of the Other, hears and can

respond positively to the latter ’s plea and command. We have tried to explain in this

690 A.D. Capili



paper that acknowledging and answering the Other ’s call remains possible for the I

because of its irrevocable and original relatedness and openness. One is reminded of

this in the face to face situation, where one is put into question, made to realize one ’s

non-primacy, and challenged to take up one’s responsibility. We have seen and

explained that Levinas applies the term ‘creature’ to the self that achieves separationand autonomy and which at the same time is able to make itself available to the

Other ’s in the latter ’s suffering and needs.

We have sought to clarify what Levinas means when he speaks of the I as

creature. We have shown that the created human being can become critical of

himself, realize his non-primacy, and reflect on his origin; he accomplishes the feat

of separation as he enjoys and masters those things around him; and though he tends

to become self-enclosed in the process of establishing his economy, he remains able

to recognize the ethical summons of the Other. We have hopefully shown that the

idea of being creature gives us a faithful picture of ourselves as this idea reinforcesand reconciles both the I’s achievement of separation and freedom and its never

effaced capacity to go out of itself and give itself to the Other. Confronted by Other ’s

face, I am given the opportunity to respond freely and thereby acknowledge an

inescapable relatedness, an incontrovertible openness, and an undeniable responsi-

bility for the Other. I can respond to the call of the face and fulfill its infinite

responsibility, and thereby become more of itself since in fulfilling my responsibility

for the Other that ‘I am brought to my final reality’ (Levinas 1999: 178) — or as

Levinas would stress in his later work, what is decisive about the human creature is

not so much liberty —

though its separation and autonomy have to be safeguarded —

as its received ‘responsibility prior to all initiative’ (Levinas 1990: 171). Levinas

also says elsewhere that, ‘It is the responsibility for the creature that constitutes the

“self.” Responsibility for the creature, for that which the ego had not been the

author ’ (1996: 94). These quotations underscore the non-primacy of the ego: it

cannot be its own ground and it has to answer for other human individuals who are

apart from itself and whose existence is not grounded on its own. On the other hand,

they likewise indicate a decisive equivalence for Levinas: to be oneself is to be

responsible; subjectivity is responsibility (1981: 123).

Understanding ourselves as creatures gives us basic yet profound insights into

who we are and what we ought to do. Indeed, to paraphrase a remark of Levinas, the

narrative and the idea of creation are necessary for the self-understanding and the life

of the just man (1987: 58). Levinas’ understanding of subjectivity as creature lets us

see that we who emerge as autonomous, separate, and self-concerned remain open to

that which is totally apart, other, and exterior. We therefore constantly bear the

possibility of becoming moral and thus more human.

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Documents

The Created Ego in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity