Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of Metaphysics.http://www.jstor.orgThe Conversation That Never Happened (Gadamer/Derrida) Author(s): Richard J. Bernstein Source:The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Mar., 2008), pp. 577-603Published by:Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130978Accessed: 24-05-2015 15:09 UTCYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED (GADAMER/DERRIDA) RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN JLt wasan'improbable' encounter, but improbablethough it was, ittook place."1 ThisishowDianeMichelfelderandRichardPalmer initially described"TheGadamer-DerridaEncounter."Letmeremind you of what happened(or didnot happen). In April1981,Philippe Forgetorganized aconferenceattheGoetheInstituteinParisthat broughttogetherHans-Georg Gadamerand JacquesDerrida, aswell asanumberofotherFrenchandGermanscholarsinterestedin hermeneuticsand poststructuralism. Atthe time, theseweretwoof themost significant continental philosophical orientationsofthe twentieth century:hermeneutics,deeply rootedinGermannine teenth-centuryphilosophy; and poststructuralism, amovementthat burst upon theFrenchsceneaftertheSecondWorldWar. Gadamer, already inhis eighties, andthemuch younger Derridawere respec tivelyacknowledged tobethe leadingspokespersons ofhermeneutics anddeconstruction.Gadamer hoped thattheoccasionwould provide an opportunity to begin aseriousconversationwithDerrida.Inhis lecture, "Textand Interpretation," Gadamersketchedhisownunder standing ofhermeneutics against the background oftheir conflicting interpretations of Heidegger andNietzsche.Heindicatedthat"theen counterwiththeFrenchscene represents a genuinechallenge forme. In particular, Derridahas arguedagainst thelater Heidegger that Heidegger himselfhasnot really brokenwiththe logocentrism of metaphysics."2Bysketching thedifferentGermanandFrenchread Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, NewSchoolforSocial Research, 79Fifth Avenue, New York, NoewYork10003 xThisisthe opening sentenceofan earlyunpublished draftoftheintro ductionto Dialogue andDeconstruction:TheGadamer-Derrida Encounter, ed.DianeP. MichelfelderandRichardE.Palmer (Albany: SUNY Press,1989). 2Hans-GeorgGadamer, "Textand Interpretation," trans.DennisJ. SchmidtandRichard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction, 24. TheReview ofMetaphysics 61 (March2008): 577-603. Copyright ?2008 by TheReview of Metaphysics This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions578RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN ings of Heidegger and Nietzsche, Gadamer sought to provide abasis foraconversation. (Derrida's paper attheconferencedeconstructs Heidegger'sinterpretation of Nietzsche). Buttheconversationnever really took place. The morning afterGadamer's lecture, Derridabe gan hisbrief replybydeclaring:"During thelectureandthe ensuing discussion yesterdayevening, I began toask myself if anything was takingplace hereotherthanthe improbabledebates,counter-ques tioning, and inquiries intounfindable objects of thought?to recall someoftheformulationsweheard.I amstill askingmyself this ques tion."3Hethenwentontoaskthree questions,"taking offfroma briefremarkthatGadamermadeabout "good will."4Gadamerwas clearlyperplexed and began his response toDerrida bysaying: "Mr. Derrida's questionsproveirrefutably that my remarksontextandin terpretation, totheextent they hadDerrida'swell-known position in mind, didnot accomplish their objective. I am finding it difficultto understandthese questions thathavebeenaddressedto me."5 Ithinkthat anyone, regardless oftheir sympathies withherme neuticsordeconstructionwouldnotfindinthese exchangesany real encounter?anymeeting ofminds.Andthisisa greatpity because thereare important and consequential differencesand points ofcon tactbetweenhermeneuticsanddeconstruction.Theso-calleden counterofGadamerandDerridastrikesoneasaclassicinstanceof non-communication, oftwo philosophersspeakingpast each other; neither reallymaking substantialcontact.Asweshall see,by thecri teriathatGadamertakestobea genuine conversationor dialogue, thisisan example ofwhat happens whenaconversationor dialogue doesnot happen. MichelfelderandPalmertellthe story ofhowthe papers fromthe1981conferencewere subsequentlypublished in Frenchand German, andhow they decidedto publish translationsof the key textsfromthe1981conference together withothertextsand commentaries.6GadamerandDerridametonseveraloccasionsafter 3 JacquesDerrida, "Three Questions to Hans-GeorgGadamer," trans.Di aneMichelfelderandRichard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction, 52. 4 Gadamerremarks: "Thus, forawrittenconversation basically the samefundamentalconditionobtainsasforanoral exchange. Both partners musthavethe good willto try to understandone another"-,Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation," 33 [emphasisadded]. 5 Hans-GeorgGadamer,"Reply to JacquesDerrida," trans.DianeMich elfelderandRichard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction, 55. 6 See especially Fred Dallmayr, "HermeneuticsandDeconstruction:Ga damerandDerridain Dialogue," in Dialogue and Deconstruction,75-92; and Hans-GeorgGadamer, "Letterto Dallmayr," trans.RichardPalmerandDiane Michelfelder, in Dialogue and Deconstruction, 93-101. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHE CONVERSATIONTHAT NEVERHAPPENED579 1981, butthereisnoevidencethat they ever really hadarealdia logue.7 I wantto imagine theconversationthat might havetaken place. Ormore accurately, Iwantto explore someofthe key differencesand points ofcontactbetweenGadamerandDerrida.I hope toshowthat they standina productive tensionwitheach other;they"supplement" eachother.Tocharacterizetheir complexrelationship, I employ a metaphor from Benjamin andAdornothatI haveused before, thatofa constellation:"a juxtaposed ratherthan integrated clusterof changing elementsthatresistsreductiontoacommon denominator, essential core, or generative first principle."8 I accept theGadamerian principle thatwenever fullyescape fromourown prejudgments or prejudices when seeking tounderstandand interpret.9Although Derridadoesn't phrase theissuethis way, I believehewouldaffirmthisGadamerian thesisfor very differentreasons.Weriskthese prejudgments inthe eventof understanding, andof course, evenwithourbesteffortswe may misunderstandand misinterpret. Thisisanunavoidablerisk. Before turningdirectly totheencounterthatI wantto stage, I wouldliketociteonemoretexttosetmise-en-sc?ne.In September 2001, Derridawasawardedthe distinguished AdornoPrize givenby the city ofFrankfurt.Derridadeliveredan extraordinarilyinsightful and movingspeech thatnot only dealtwithDerrida's affinity andin debtednessto Adorno, butalsoaddressedthe larger issueofthe 7 JeanGrondindescribesthe subsequentmeetings betweenGadamer andDerridain his Hans-Georg Gadamer:A Biography, trans.JoelWeinshe imer (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress,2003), 324-8.WhenGadamerdied onMarch 13,2002, Derrida published anarticleinthe FrankfurterAllge meine Zeitung(March28,2002)entitled, "Wierechterhatte!MeinCicerone Hans-Georg Gadamer."Grondincomments: "Breaking a public silenceof over twentyyears sincetheirfirstencounterbackin 1981,JacquesDerrida, whohad recently receivedthehonorof being nameda guestprofessor(for the year2003) inthe newly endowedGadamerChairinthe University of Heidelberg, alsolethimselfbe heard";Grondin,Gadamer, 338.Afterthe 1981 encounter, Gadamerwas frequently askedaboutDerridaanddecon struction.Seehisinterviewsin Richard Kearney,ed., DebatesinContinental Philosophy: Conversationswith Contemporary Thinkers (New York: Fordham UniversityPress,2004); and Hans-GeorgGadamer, Gadamerin Conversation: Refections and Commentary, trans,anded.RichardE. Palmer (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress,2001). 81 haveusedthe metaphor ofconstellationin mybook, TheNewCon stellation:TheEthical-PoliticalHorizons ofModernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge:PolityPress,1991), 8-9. 9 Although I speak of understanding and interpretation, I agree withGa damerthatall understanding involves interpretation. All understanding de mands highlighting, andto highlight isto interpret. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions580RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN complex relationbetween twentieth-century GermanandFrench phi losophy. Inhis imaginativestyle Derridatellsus:"If one day Iwereto writethebookI dreamofto interpret the history, the possibility, and thehonorofthis prize, it wouldincludeatleastseven chapters," and he suggests thateachofthese chapters wouldconsistofaboutten thousand pages.10 His "imagined" fifth chapter isrelevanttoGada mer.Hereishissketch. 5.Adifferential history oftheresistancesand misunderstandings be tweenontheonehandthoseGermanthinkerswhoarealso my re spected friends.I mean Hans-Georg Gadamerand J?rgenHabermas, andontheothertheFrench philosophers of my generation; foralittle whilethis history hasbeen largelyover, but perhaps not yet overwith. Inthis chapter, Iwould try toshowthat despite thedifferencesbetween thesetwo great debates (direct or indirect,explicit or implicit), the mis understandingsalways occuraround interpretation andthe verypossi bility of misunderstanding?they turnaroundthe conceptof misun derstanding, ofdissensusas well, oftheotherandthe singularity ofthe event; but then, asa result,they turnaroundtheessenceof idiom, the essenceof language,beyond itsundeniableand necessaryfunctioning, beyond itscommunicative intelligibility. ... Ifthese misunderstandings about misunderstanding seemtobe calming downthese days, if notto tallymelting away, inan atmosphere ofamicable reconciliation, we shouldnot onlypay tributetothe work, the reading, the goodfaith, and the friendship ofvarious people, oftenthe youngestphilosophers inthis country.11 Ihave already touchedonsomeofthe major themesI wanttoex plore:conversation,understanding,misunderstanding,interpretation and misinterpretation.Exploring thesewillwidenthecircleofissues that separate andunitehermeneuticsanddeconstruction.I begin withabriefstatementofGadamer'shermeneuticsandthen proceed tothe questions thatDerridashouldhaveasked (thatis, whatIwould havelikedhimto ask). Letme begin withconversationand dialogue,concepts thatare centraltoGadamer's ontologicalhermeneutics, butare barely men tioned by Derrida.12"Toconducta dialoguerequires firstofallthat the partners donottalkatcross purposes. Henceit necessarily has 10 JacquesDerrida, "Fichus:Frankfurt Address," in PaperMachine, trans.Rachel Bowlby(Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress,2005), 178. 11 Ibid. 12 Gadamer frequentlyspeaks of "dialogue" and"conversation"inter changeably,although he occasionallyacknowledges differencesbetween them. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED581 thestructureof question andanswer.Thefirstconditionoftheartof conversationis ensuring thattheother person is withus."13 Actually the phrase "toconducta dialogue" is misleading; itis moreaccurateto say thatwe?the partners?participatein, orfall into, a dialogue or conversation.14Gadamer consistently seekstounderminethe legacy ofaCartesianismthat assignsontological and epistemologicalpri macy toindividual subjects. Thisis already evidentinhis phenomeno logicaldescription ofthe concept of play wherehetellsusthatthere isthe primacy of play overthe subjectivity orconsciousnessofthe players."Playclearlyrepresents anorderin whichtheto-and-fromo tionof play followsofitself."15Inthe play of dialogue, the dialogue it selfhasitsown rhythm, itsownto-and-fromovementthatcarries along the partners. Thismeansthatinaconversationonemust"allow oneselftobeconducted by the subject matter [Sache] towhichthe partners inthe dialogue are oriented."16This subject matter guides the dynamics of question andanswer. Drawing onhis interpretation ofthePlatonic dialogues wheredialecticis closely relatedto dialogue, Gadamertellsus:"Dialecticconsistsnotin trying todiscoverthe weaknessofwhatis said, butin bringing outitsreal strength. Itisnot theartof arguing(which canmakea strong caseoutofa weak one) buttheartof thinking(which can strengthenobjectionsbyreferring tothe subjectmatter)."17 ThisisthefeatureofdialecticthatGadamer seeksto integrate intohis understanding of dialogue. Buthoware thesereflectionsonconversationand dialogue relatedtohermeneu tics? 13 Hans-GeorgGadamer, Truthand Method, 2ndrevised edition, trans. JoelWeinsheimerandDonaldG. Marshall (New York: Continuum,1997), 367. 14 Gadamer emphasizes thissenseof participation whenhewrites:"We say thatwe'conduct'a conversation, butthe more genuine aconversation is, thelessitsconductlies withinthe willofeither partner. Thusa genuine con versationis nevertheonethatwewantedtoconduct. Rather, itis generally morecorrectto say that wefallinto conversation, oreventhatwebecomein volvedinit.The way onewordfollows another, withtheconversation taking itowntwistsand reaching itsown conclusion,may wellbeconductedin some way, butthe partnersconversing arefarlesstheleadersofitthanthe led....Allthisshowsthataconversationhasa spirit ofits own, andthatlan guage in whichitisconductedbearsitsowntruthwithin it?i.e., thatital lows something to 'emerge' whichhenceforth exists";ibid., 383. 15 Ibid., 104. 16 Ibid., 367. 17 Ibid. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions582RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Whatcharacterizesa dialogue, incontrastwiththe rigid formofstate mentsthatdemandtobesetdownin writing, is precisely this:thatin di aloguespokenlanguage?in the process of question and answer,giving and taking,talking atcross purposes and seeing eachother's point? performs thecommunicationof meaningthat, with respect tothewrit ten tradition, isthetaskofhermeneutics.Henceitis morethana meta phor; itis a memory of what originally wasthe case, todescribethetask ofhermeneuticsas entering into dialogue withthetext_Whenitisin terpreted, writtentraditionis brought backoutofalienationin whichit findsitselfandintothe livingpresent of conversation, whichis always fundamentally realizedin question andanswer.18 Therearetwo points thatI wantto emphasize aboutGadamer'sre flectionson conversation,dialogue, andhermeneutics. First, Gada merinsiststhathis project isa philosophical one (notmethodologi cal). Hewantstoanswerthe question?toput itintoKantianterms? howis understandingpossible? And followingHeidegger hedeclares: Heidegger'stemporalanalytics ofDasein has, I think, shownconvinc ingly that understanding isnot just oneofthevarious possible behav iorsofthe subject butthemodeof being ofDaseinitself.Itisinthis sensethattheterm"hermeneutics"hasbeenusedhere.It denotesthe basic being-in-motion ofDaseinthatconstitutesitsfinitudeandhisto ricity, andhenceembracesthewhole experience ofits experience of theworld.19 Butthereisatensionbetweenthisclaimaboutthe primacy anduni versality of understanding andtheidealized (normative)description ofconversationand dialogue. If understandingpresupposes thekind of dialogue thatGadamerdescribesthenit certainly isnot universal, butrareindeed?and perhaps, asDerrida mightsuggest,impossible. Nosuchconversationor dialogue took place betweenGadamerand Derrida.One might even question whetherwefind examples ofsuch dialogues in Gadamer'sbelovedPlatonic dialogues. Arethe partners inthese dialoguesreallyopen toeachotherandare theyguidedby the subject matter developed intheconversation?Isthere really a recip rocalrelationbetweenSocratesandhisinterlocutors?Moreoften thannotthePlatonic dialogues seemtobestudieswherethe partici pants misunderstandand misinterpret eachother. Second, whenGadamertellsusthatitis morethana metaphor to describethetaskofhermeneuticsas entering intoa dialogue witha text, wecannot gloss overthefactthereisafundamentaldifference 18 Ibid., 368. 19Ibid., xxx. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHE CONVERSATIONTHAT NEVERHAPPENED583 between engaging inconversationwitha living person whohastheca pacity to respond tousandaconversationwitha writtentext.Gada mer acknowledges thisbuthedoesn'tthinkthatthisdifferencealters the description of understanding asaconversationwithatext. Itistruethatatextdoesnot speak tousinthesame way asdoesaThou. Wewhoare attempting tounderstandmustourselvesmakeit speak. Butwefoundthatthiskindof understanding,"making thetext speak," isnotan arbitraryprocedure thatweundertakeonourowninitiative but that, asa question, itisrelatedtotheanswerthatis expected inthe text. Anticipating anansweritself presupposes thatthe questioner is part ofthetraditionand regards himselfasaddressed by it.20 HerewetouchtheheartofGadamer's ontological hermeneutics. Understanding isaconversationor dialogue withtexts?textsthat speak to us, textsthat posequestions tousandtowhichwe pose questions. Intheto-and-fromovementofour dialogue with texts, a textanswersthe questions thatwe pose. Thisis why the meaning ofa textisnot something thatissomehowintrinsictoatextand merely hastobediscovered. Understanding isa happening in which meaning emerges inand through our dialogical encounterwithtexts.Thetask ofthe interpreter asa partner intheconversationwithtextsisto"re awaken"thetext's meaning. "Thusitis perfectlylegitimate to speak ofahermeneuticalconversation. ... Thetext brings a subject matter [Sache] into language, butthatit doessois ultimately theachievement ofthe interpreter. Bothhaveashareinit."21Whattakes place inun derstanding isafusionofhorizonsofthe partners(whether thisisan other person ora text). 20 Ibid., 377.NotehowGadamerboth acknowledges and downplays the significance ofthedifferencebetweena livingdialogue between persons and the dialogue witha writtentext.Whenhe compares theconversationbe tween persons withthehermeneuticaltaskof understandingtexts, hewrites: "Thisis notto say, of course, thatthehermeneuticsituationin regard totexts is exactly thesameasthatbetweentwo people inconversation.Textsare 'enduringly fixed expressions oflife'thataretobe understood; andthat meansthatone partner inthehermeneutical conversation, the text,speaks onlythrough theother partner, the interpreter.Onlythrough himarethe writtenmarks changed backinto meaning.Nevertheless, in beingchanged back byunderstanding, the subject matterofwhichthetext speaks itself finds expression. Itislikearealconversationinthatthecommon subject matteris whatbindsthetwo partners, thetextandthe interpreter, toeach other,"ibid., 387-8. 21 Ibid., 388. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions584RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Thenotionofa horizon, whichGadamer appropriates from Nietzscheand Husserl,deepens our understanding ofhermeneutics. Ahorizonis"the range ofvisionthatincludes everything thatcanbe seenfroma particularvantagepoint.... SinceNietzscheand Husserl, thewordhasbeenusedin philosophy tocharacterizethe way in which thought istiedtoitsfinite determinacy, andthe way one's range ofvisionis graduallyexpanded."22 We always haveafinitehis toricalhorizonthatis continuouslybeingshapedby thetraditionsto whichwe belong; ourhorizonisinformed by the prejudgments or prejudices thatweinheritfromtradition.Buthorizonsarenot closed; they are open. [T]he closedhorizonthatis supposed toencloseacultureisan abstrac tion.Thehistoricalmovementofhumanlifeconsistsinthefactthatit isnever absolutely boundto any one standpoint, andhencecannever havea truly closedhorizon.Thehorizon is,rather,something into whichwemoveandthatmoveswithus.Horizons change fora person whois moving. Thusthehorizonofthe past, outof whichallhumanlife livesandwhichexistsintheformof tradition, is always inmotion.23 Itis precisely becauseofthe openness ofhorizonsthatwecan enlarge ourhorizoninand through the happening of understanding. Thisis what happens ina "genuine"dialogue orconversationwithtexts.Be causethehorizonsofthosewhoseektounderstandand interpret, al thoughfinite, arethemselves alwayschanging, it makesnosenseto speak aboutafinalor completeunderstanding of any text.Atextis alwaysopen tonewanddifferent understandings and interpretations. EversinceThomasKuhn published TheStructure ofScientific Revolutions,24philosophers inboththeContinentaltraditionandthe Anglo-American traditionhavebeenfascinated (evenobsessed) with theideaofthe incommensurability of paradigms,languages, frame works, andhorizons.The picture thathasheld many thinkers captive isthatwearesomehow prisoners withinthese paradigms andhori zons. Consequently, wecannot really understandwhatisincommen surablewiththem.Orif wearetounderstandwhatis genuinely in commensurableand alien, thenwemustsomehowlearnhowto leap outofourownhorizonand identify ourselveswiththe radically other 22 Ibid., 302. 23 Ibid., 304. 24 Thomas Kuhn, TheStructure ofScientific Revolutions (Chicago: Uni versity of ChicagoPress,1996). This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHE CONVERSATIONTHAT NEVERHAPPENED585 horizonor paradigm. Kuhnlikenedthistoa "conversion"25 experi ence.ButGadamer categoricallyrejects this picture ofincommensu rablehorizons.Heisinbasic agreement withDonaldDavidsonwho has forcefullychallenged the very ideaofthe incommensurability of conceptual schemes.26Ourfinitehistoricalhorizonsarenotbarriers to understanding;they arethe very conditionforthe possibility ofun derstanding. Thehermeneuticaltaskisto enlarge and expand ourfi nitehorizons through theencounterwiththetextsandtraditionsthat weseektounderstand.27"Inatraditionthis process offusioniscon tinuallygoing on, forthereoldandneware alwayscombining into something of livingvalue, withouteither beingexplicitlyforegrounded fromtheother."28 Although therearenobarriersto understanding, nevertheless understanding is alwayslimited; the meaning ofatext canneverbeexhausted. Gadamer, inafamous sentence, tellsusthat "Being whichcanbeunderstoodis language," andhe says this implies "thatwhichiscanneverbe completely understood. ... Thisisthe hermeneuticaldimensioninwhich Being 'manifestsitself."29 25 Thomas Kuhn, TheStructure ofScientific Revolutions (Chicago: Uni versity of ChicagoPress,1996), 159. 26 SeeDonald Davidson, "Onthe Very Ideaofa ConceptualScheme," in Inquiries intoTruthand Interpretation(Oxford: Claredon Press,2001), 183-98.Seealso my discussionsof incommensurability in"Incommensura bility andOtherness Revisited," in TheNew Constellation,57-78; andin Be yondObjectivism andRelativism (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press,1983), 79-108. 27 It might seemthatthe very ideaofthefusionofhorizons presupposes thattherearedistincthorizonstobefused.ButGadamerdeniesthatthere aredistinctfixedhorizons.Heraisesthe question:"If, howeverthereisno such thing asthesedistinct horizons,why dowe speak ofthefusionofhori zonsandnot simply oftheformationofone horizon, whoseboundsaresetin the depths oftradition?" Gadamer, Truthand Method, 306.Gadamer'san swertohisown question issubtle.In seeking tounderstanda tradition, we "project ahistoricalhorizon." "Projecting ahistorical horizon,then, is only one phase inthe process of understanding; it doesnotbecomesolidifiedinto theself-alienationofa pastconsciousness, butisovertaken by ourown present horizonof understanding. Inthe process of understanding, arealfus ing ofhorizonsoccurs?whichmeansthatasthehistoricalhorizonis pro jected, itis simultaneouslysuperseded,"ibid., 306-7. Consequently, in under standing a text, we interpreters, as partners inthehermeneutical conversation, mustalso "project ahorizon"forthetext?we speak forthe text.This projected horizon is,however,superseded inthefusionthattakes place. 28Ibid., 306. 29 Gadamer, "Textand Interpretation," 25. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions586RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Gadamer accepts the Heideggerian claimthat "'Being' doesnotunfold totally inits self-manifestation, butratherwithholdsitselfandwith drawswiththesame primordiality withwhichit manifestsitself."30 Wearenowina position tounderstandthetwo questions that Gadamer poses in"Textand Interpretation." First, Howdothe communality of meaning[Gemeinsamkeit des Sinnes], whichisbuilt up in conversation, andthe impenetrability of theothernessoftheothermediateeachother? Second,What, inthefi nal analysis, is linguisticality[Sprachlichkeit]? Isita bridge orabar rier?Isita bridge builtof things thatarethesameforeachselfover whichonecommunicateswiththeotherthe flowing streamofother ness?Orisit abarrierthatlimitsourself-abandonmentandthatcutsus offfromthe possibility ofever completelyexpressing ourselvesand communicating withothers?31 One may thinkthatGadamer's answertothe question: "Isita bridge orabarrier?"is clearly thatitis bridge andnotabarrier.Allthe paths thathe pursues inhisdiscussionsof play,dialogue, andthefusionsof horizonsleadustotherealizationthatwehavethe capacity fromour limitedfinitehistoricalhorizonstoreachoutandunderstandwhatini tially strikesusas different,alien, andother.Thisisthedominant themein Gadamer'shermeneutics.Butif we fullyappreciate whatit meanstobeafinitehistoricalcreature shapedbylivingtraditions, thenwemustalsorealizethatitis impossible?ontologicallyimpossi ble?to speak abouta complete andfinal understanding.Positively stated, therecanbeno finality totheconversationthatweare.Butif by a"barrier"wemeana "limit," thentherearelimitstoallunder standing.Furthermore, itis through theencounterwiththeotherthat we enlarge ourownhorizonandcometoa deeperself-understanding. Wenever completelypenetrate theothernessoftheother.Tothink thatwecandothisistobe guilty of logocentrism?and Gadamercat egoricallyrejects this.32Butneitherdowestandmuteordumbbefore 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 27. 32 Gadamer emphaticallysays: "AlimitationoftheGreekmodelsof thought canbedetected here, onethatwas persuasivelypointed out by the Old Testament, Saint Paul,Luther, andtheirmodern reinterpreters. Itis adi mensionof dialogue thatstilldoesnotcomeinto conceptual consciousness evenwiththecelebrated discovery ofSocratic dialogue asthebasicformof thought. ... [T]he true depth ofthe dialogicalprinciple firstenters philo sophical consciousnessinthe twilight of metaphysics, inthe epoch ofGer man romanticism, andthenisrehabilitatedinour century in opposition to the subjective biasthatcharacterizedidealism." Gadamer, "TextandInter pretation," 27.Gadameris summarizing his argument aboutthelimitations ofGreek logos thathe develops indetailin PartThreeofTruthandMethod. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED587 theothernessoftheother.Itis throughdialogue orconversationthat wecanmediatebetweenthe communality of meaning andtheother nessoftheother. I have attempted to present afaircharacterizationofsomeofthe main points Gadamer'shermeneutics?onethat brings forthits strengths. Whatisso impressive aboutGadameristhe way in which hetextureshis understanding ofhermeneuticsand integrates themes reaching backtotheGreeks. AlthoughHeidegger wasdecisivein making the ontological turnof hermeneutics, acareful reading ofGa damerrevealshowmuchhehas appropriated from Plato,Aristotle, and Hegel(as wellasfromthe long andvariedtraditionofhermeneu tics) toarticulateanddefendhisdistinctive understanding ofunder standing.Nevertheless, therearetensionsandinternal conflicts, and Derrida'sdeconstructive practiceshighlight these.Before turning ex plicitly to questions thatDerrida might have raised, Iwantto mention something thatGadamerandDerridahavein common, butwhichis alsoasourceoftheir greatestdivergence.They bothshareanextraor dinarysensitivity tothenuancesof language.Typically, whatever topictheyconsider,theybeginbyreflecting on multiplelinguistic ex pressions.Think, for example, ofthe way in whichGadamerintro ducesthe concept of play(Spiel) in Truthand Method byspeaking of children's play, the play of waves, the play of gears, the play of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, andthe play ofwords.Hedoes thisinordertoshowhow play is"theclueto ontologicalexplanation." Language itself"has somethingspeculative about it"; an"eventof speech" is speculative inthesense"thatfinite possibilities oftheword areorientedtowardthesenseintendedastowardtheinfinite."33But thenthinkofthe very different way in whichDerrida appeals to play inhisfamous article,"Structure,Sign and Play," wherehetellsus: Play isthe disruption of presence. The presence ofanelementis always a signifying andsubstitutereferenceinscribedin a system ofdifferences andthe movementofachain. Play is always a play ofabsenceand pres ence, butifitistobe thoughtradically,play mustbeconceivedofbe forethealternativeof presence andabsence. Being mustbeconceived as presence orabsenceonthebasisofthe possibility of play andnotthe other way around.34 33 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 469. 34 JacquesDerrida,"Structure,Sign, and Play intheDiscourseoftheHu man Sciences," in Writing and Difference, trans.AlanBass (Chicago: Univer sity of ChicagoPress,1978), 292.See my discussionofDerrida's concept of play in"Serious Play: TheEthical-PoliticalHorizonof Derrida," inTheNew Constellation, 171-98. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions588RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN WedetecthereadifferencebetweenGadamerandDerridathatruns deep. WhenGadamerreflectsontheusesoftheword "play" inorder toelaboratehis concept of play, itistheto-and-fromovementof play, the primacy,continuity andthecommunal aspect of play thatheem phasizes. ButDerridafocuseson play asunstable disruption anddis continuity. He begins hisarticle byspeaking ofan"event"inthehis tory of"structure"thathenames "rupture." And throughout, Derrida is mostconcernedwith play as decentering, as diff?rance. Gadamer's "conversation,""dialogue,""understanding," and"fusionofhorizons" are shapedby a metaphorics of overcomingbarriers,achievingagree ment,commonality, andreconciliation.ButDerrida constantly speaks of rupture, of abysses, of "possibleimpossibles" and "impossi ble possibles."Derrida, inhisdeconstructive practices, seemstode light in locatingdiscontinuities,breaks,obstacles,"contradictorylog ics"andunstableundecidables.35Solet'sseehowhe might have questioned Gadamer.RememberthatinhisAdorno lecture, Derrida notedthatthe misunderstandings betweenGadamerandhimself"al ways occuraround interpretation andthe verypossibility ofmisun derstanding?they turnaroundthe conceptof misunderstanding "36 Itis striking how infrequently Gadamer speaks aboutmisunderstand ing and misinterpretation. HetendstobedismissiveofSchleierma cher'sclaimthathermeneuticsis"theartof avoiding misunderstand ings" andthat "misunderstanding follows automatically and understanding mustbedesiredand sought at everypoint."37 Gadamer privilegesunderstanding and prefers to speak aboutthe"failuresof understanding," thefailuretodowhatneedstobedonetoachieveun derstanding. ButDerrida might well object thatthereisan implicit hi erarchicalvalorizationherethatmusttobe challenged. After all, de spite Gadamer'sclaimthat understanding constitutesour being-in the-world, if wetake seriously his rigorousrequirements forwhat constitutes "genuine"understanding and conversation, thenit appears tobea very rare phenomenon, ifitever really occurs.Misunderstand ing isnot just afailureto understand, burratherisintrinsictounder 35 ForDerrida'sreflectionsonthe practicalimplications forhis "prefer ence"of discontinuity over continuity for diff?rance over reconciliation, see hisinterview "Terror,Religion, andtheNew Politics," in DebatesinConti nental Philosophy. 36 Derrida,"Fichus," 178. 37 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 185. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED589 standing.Why? Because understanding doesn't happen without prej udices.Some prejudices are enabling andarethe"conditionsof understanding," butthereare alwaysprejudices thatcanblockordis tort understanding.38 But integral toGadamer's critique ofthe Enlight enment "prejudiceagainstprejudice" andhis critique ofCartesian claimsabout bracketing all prejudicesby anactof self-reflection, is theclaimthatweareneverina position, onceandfor all, toisolate those prejudices thatresultin misunderstanding. TheDerridean way of making this point isnottoreverse Gadamer's hierarchy, notto say withSchleiermacherthat "misunderstanding follows automatically and understanding mustbedesiredand sought at everypoint," but rathertoaffirmthat understanding and misunderstanding are equipri mordial.Thereisno understanding without misunderstanding andno misunderstanding without understanding.Furthermore, because therecanbenofixeddecision procedure for distinguishing whether weare understanding or misunderstanding, itisinthis respect unde cidable. This instabilityhighlights anothertensioninhermeneutics (Derrida wouldcallitan aporia). Oneofthemostinsistentthemesin Gadamer'shermeneuticsisthe critique ofthe subject-object dichot omy, whetheritis interpretedontologically or epistemologically. This is whyplay asthecluefor ontologicalexplanation isso important for Gadamer, and why heinsists upon the primacy of play overtheindi vidual players. WhenGadamer applies this concept of play tothe hermeneutical conversation, he emphasizes thatthereisato-and-fro movementbetweenthe partners inthe dialogue; betweenthe person whoseekstounderstandandthetextthatshe attempts tounderstand. FollowingHeidegger, Gadamerisrelentlessinhis critique of subjec tivity, somuchsothathe rejects Schleiermacher'sclaimthatherme neuticsinvolves "divining" theintentional meaning oftheauthorofa text.39Hermeneuticsisnotconcernedwiththe "psychological" states ofthecreatorsoftexts.Thetextitselfhas meaning,although the meaning ofthetextcomesalive only whenitisunderstood by thein terpreter. The interpreter mustnot only learntheartof asking the rightquestions, shemustlearnhowtolistentothe way thatthetext answers her;understandingrequiressubmitting oneselftothe 38 Ibid., 277. 39 Ibid., 184. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions590RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN authority oftradition.Butwhatis paradoxical, indeed aporetic, is thatthemoreGadamer critiquessubjectivity, themoreheaffirmssub jectivity. ThinkofthedemandsthatGadamer places ontheinter preter-partner(subject?) whoseekstounderstandatext.Shemust learntheartof asking the rightquestions; shemustriskher preju dices; shemustlistentowhatthetext says; shemust open herselfto theclaimoftruthofthetext. Furthermore, shemustbetheventrilo quist forthetext because, asGadamertells us, "thetext speaksonly through theother partner, the interpreter"; andshehasthe responsi bility of changing thewrittenmarks"backinto meaning."40 Gadamer may notwanttocallthisa "subject," butliketheCartesian ego, thisis a subject that doubts,imagines,thinks,hears, and speaks forherself andforthetext.In short, themoreGadamerdeniesthattheinter preter isa subject, themoreheaffirmsthatshehasallthecharacteris ticsofthe"classical" philosophicsubject. Buttherearefurther problems.Despite Gadamer's suggestion thatthe partners inthehermeneuticalconversationstandina recipro calrelationtoeach other, theaboveremarks bring outthe asymmetry betweenthetextandthe interpreter-partner. Thereareahostofdiffi culties concerning thewrittenandthe spoken word.Gadamer says thatthewrittentext "speaks"onlythrough theother partner, thein terpreter, buthealsoinsiststhat"itis perfectlylegitimate to speak of ahermeneuticalconversation"betweenthetextandthe interpreter.41 Buthowdo I, as interpreter, knowthatI am speaking"correctly" for thetext? Presumably ifI misspeak,if, for example, Iam imposing false prejudices, thetextwillanswerme.Butthereis somethingvery strange herebecauseitisI?the interpreter-partner?who answers "No"forthetext.Sowefindourselves facing another aporia: Imust atonceaffirmthatthetext speaks andthatitdoesn't speak(Ispeak for it). Thedifficultiesare compoundedbecause,although Gadamer says "thatallthe meaning ofwhatishandeddowntousfindsitscon cretion (thatis, is understood) initsrelationtothe understandingI," healso says: 40 Ibid., 387. 41 Ibid, 388. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED591 Theintimate unity of understanding and interpretation isconfirmed by thefactthatthe interpretation thatrevealsthe implications ofthetext's meaning and brings itinto languageseems, when compared withthe giventext, tobeanew creation, but yet doesnotmaintain anyproper existence apart fromthe understandingprocess. ... [T]heinterpretive concepts are superseded inthe fullnessofunderstanding because they aremeantto disappear.42 Soit appears thatthereisno understanding or interpretation without the "understanding I" and yet thisIis superseded(disappears) inthe happening of understanding. Inthe concluding sentenceof"Textand Interpretation," Gadamerdeclares:"The interpreter who gives hisrea sons disappears?and thetext speaks."43 Gadamerseemstothinkwecandissolvethis aporia oncewerec ognize thatthehermeneuticalconversationbetweenthetextandthe interpreter-partner "islikearealconversationinthatthecommon subject matter [Sache] is whatbindsthetwo partners, thetextandthe interpreter, toeachother."44"Toconductaconversationmeanstoal lowoneselftobeconducted by the subject matter [Sache] towhich the partners inthe dialogue are oriented."45Thetextisnota cipher; it constrainsus.Unlessweare responsive toits subject matter (Sache), unlessweshare it, thenthereisnoconversationandnounderstand ing. But suppose we probe thisideaofacommonSache.Howdo I, as interpreter, knowthatthere really isacommon subject matterthan bindsmetothetext? Perhaps I am deludingmyselfbyprojecting false prejudicesupon thetext.Butifthisis whatI havedonethenthetext willcheck me; it will say, "No!" But, even according to Gadamer, this isnot quite accurate.Thetextdoesnot literallysay noto me; itisI as interpreter who says noonbehalfofthetext.This begins tolooklike a verystrange conversation.Unlikea"real"conversationwithan other person whohasthe capacity to sayyes or no, thisisaone-sided conversationwheretheburdenof answering forthetext always falls onme (theinterpreter-partner). Derrida might even highlight this apo ria bynoting thatthisisaconversationor dialogue that begins tolook moreandmorelikea soliloquy oraninternal monologue whereI play 42 Ibid.,473;emphasis added. 43 Gadamer, "Textand Interpretation," 51. 44 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 388. 45Ibid., 367. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions592RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN differentroles: interpreter and spokesperson forthetextthatI amin terpreting.46 The aporiae locatedabovearealsorelevanttothe way in which Gadamercharacterizesthefusionofhorizons.The very ideaofafu sionofhorizonsseemsto suggest thereareatleasttwohorizonsthat needtobefused?thehorizonofthe personseeking tounderstand andthehorizonofthe text, theworkofartorthehistoricaltradition thatweseektounderstand.ButGadamertellsusthatthisisnot quite accuratewhenheassertsthattherearenodistincthorizons.What thenamI talking aboutwhenI speak ofthefusionofhorizons?Once again, wedetectan asymmetry andnota reciprocal relation.When Gadamerdiscussesthe "historicity of understanding" hetellsusthatI project a"historicalhorizon."Itis I, the interpreter, whodoes this; it isIwho project. SohowdoI knowthatthe horizonthatI project isin factthehorizonofthetext?Can'tI bemistaken? According toGada mer, I certainly canbemistaken.Otherwisetherewouldbenodia logue withthetextfromwhichIlearnabout my mistaken interpreta tions.HowdoIfindoutifI ammistakenwhenitisI who speak for thetext?Gadamertellsus:"Inthe process of understanding, areal fusing ofhorizonsoccurs?whichmeansthatasthehistoricalhorizon is projected, itis simultaneouslysuperseded."47 It begins tolookasif thetextitself drops outofthisfusion. Why? Because I, theinter preter, fromwithin my ownlimited horizon,project thehorizonfor thetextthatI am seeking to understand, andthis projected horizonis "simultaneouslysuperseded." Thefusionhereisnotbetween my ho rizonandthehorizonofthe text, butbetween my horizonandtheho rizonthatI project onbehalfofthetext. 46 The difficulty herecanbe generalized. Gadamer's understanding of hermeneutics requires that we acknowledge twofundamental principles. Textsexerciseconstraints. They bindand guide us.Theconstraintsoftexts are compatible withthe openness of understanding and interpretation inthe sensethatatextis alwayspotentially open tonewanddifferent interpreta tions.Unlessthetextexercisedsomeconstraintit wouldnotevenmake senseto speak of understanding or interpreting thetext.ButGadamerdoes not reallyexplain howthetextitselfconstrainsthe interpreter whenitisthe interpreter whomust speak forthetext.Oncethisis acknowledged thenthe possibility arisesthatthe interpretermaymisspeak forthetext.Itis notthen thetextthat constrains, butthetextasunderstoodand interpreted thatcon strains.The aporiahere,according to Derrida, isthatGadameraffirmsthat thetextdoesanddoesnotconstrain us. 47 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 307-8. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED593 Butthisisnotthe onlydifficulty withthefusionofhorizons.One ofthemainfunctionsofthefusionofhorizonsistoshowhowwecan understandwhatisotherandalienwithout reifying thisothernessor denying theothernessoftheother. According to Gadamer, itis only inand through theencounterwiththeotherthatI can enlargemy hori zonandcometoa greaterself-understanding. But Derrida, inaLevi nasian spirit,mightquestion whetherthis really does justice totheal terity oftheother. Despite Gadamer'sinsistencethatthetextandthe interpreter are partners, wehaveseenthatitis really the interpreter thatis privileged insofarasshe speaks forherselfand speaks forthe textsheis seeking tounderstand.48Gadamer does, of course, claim thatall understanding is limited; wecanneverexhaustthe meaning of thetext.Buttheothernessoftheother may stillbeviolated. Phrasing the point inadifferent way, Derrida mightsuggest thatGadameris guilty ofthat tendency thatliesso deep inthetraditionof Western phi losophy:reducing theothertothesamebecause understanding neces sary involves my horizonandthehorizonthatI project onbehalfof theother.Sonowwehaveanew aporia. Gadameratonceaffirmsbut denies (undermines) theothernessoftheother.Derridatells us, there are always "tracesofan alterity whichrefusetobe totally domesti cated."49At least, withanother person, shecan respond: "Youhave not really understood me,you are projecting your own concepts and categories ontome."Butwitha text, it requires the interpreter-part nerto respond forit. Derrida might also object thatthereis somethingethically and politicallymisleading aboutthe primacy thatGadamer gives todia 48 To speakonly ofthe interpreter andthetextisto oversimplify thesit uation.Weare alwaysbeingshapedby other interpretations?even conflict inginterpretations. ThisisconstitutiveofGadamer's concept of wirkungs gechichtliches Bewusstsein (historically effected consciousness), a consciousnessthatis doubly relatedtotraditionbecauseitis"affected" by history;open totheeffectsof history andalso brought into being?"effected" byhistory.Ibid., 298-304. 49 SeeDerrida'sinterviewwithRichard Kearney, "Deconstructionand the Other," in DebatesinContinental Philosophy: ConversationswithCon temporaryThinkers, 148-9.Derridaadds:"Moreoverthe rapport ofself identity isitself always a rapport ofviolencewiththe other, sothattheno tionsof property,appropriation, and self-presence, socentralto logocentric metaphysics, are essentiallydependent onan oppositional relationwithoth erness.Inthis sense,identitypresupposesalterity."Derrida, "Deconstruc tionandthe Other," 149. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions594RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN logue andconversation.Wedonothaveto deny thatsometimesthere are dialogues andconversationsthatareorientedtoacommon subject matter (Sache) that guides theto-and-fromovementofthedia logue.(Deconstructivepractices donot primarilydeny;theybring forth complexitiesbyrevealing innertensionsand contradictorylog ics.) Gadamerstressesthe demanding conditionsfora "genuine" dia logue; butheseemstothink dialogue andconversationare always possible. Derrida might even appeal tohissometime adversary, Hab ermas, in questioning this.Weshouldbealerttothe manyways that dialogue andconversationare impossible, whenin Habermas's phrase thereis"distortedcommunication."Putinanother way, thematerial conditions, theverbal ability, thelevelofeducation (theeconomic, social,political, andcultural conditions)required for persons toen gage ina genuinedialogue donot always exist. Theyrarely existeven inthebestofcircumstances.Too frequently thecallfor dialogue isa powerplay, ascreenfor doing violencetotheothernessoftheother.50 Thislast pointbrings up oneofthemost important differences betweenGadamerandDerrida.Gadamerhas always beenconcerned withthe ethical-political horizonofhermeneutics. Understanding, in terpretation, and application arethreemomentsofa singlehappen ing.Application isconstitutiveof understanding. To clarify whathe meansGadamerdrawson Aristotle's Ethics,particularly BookVIof theNicomacheanEthicswhereAristotle distinguishesphronesis fromtechneand episteme. [I]f werelateAristotle's description oftheethical phenomenon andes pecially thevirtueof moral knowledge[phronesis] toour investigation, wefindthathis analysis infactoffersakindof model of the problemof hermeneutics.Wetoodeterminedthat application isneitherasubse quent nor merely anoccasional part ofthe phenomenon ofunderstand ing, butco-determinesit asa wholefromthe beginning. Heretoo appli cationdidnotconsistin relating some pregiven universaltothe particular situation.The interpreterdealing witha traditionary text 50 Thismotifhasbeen especially dominantin Derrida's writingsduring thelastdecadesoflife whereheexaminesthe complexpolitical issuescon cerningasylum,immigration,homelessness, andthetreatmentofthosewho are "sans-papiers." See JacquesDerrida,OfHospitality, trans.Rachel Bowlby(Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress,2000); and JacquesDerrida, "On Cosmopolitanism," trans.Mark Dooley, inOn Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, ed.Mark Dooley andMichael Hughes(London:Routledge, 2001), 1-24.Cf. J?rgenHabermas, The Theoryof Communicative Action, trans.Thomas McCarthy(Boston: Beacon Press,1985), vol.2. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED595 triesto apply ittohimself.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthetextis given forhimas somethinguniversal, thathefirstunderstandsit perse, and thenafterwardsusesitfor particularapplications.Rather, theinter preter seeksnomorethantounderstandthis universal, the text?i.e., to understandwhatit says, whatconstitutesthetext's meaning and signifi cance.Inordertounderstand that, hemustnot try to disregard himself andhis particular hermen?utica!situation.Hemustrelatethetextto thissituationif hewantstounderstandatall.51 The type of reasoning characteristicof phronesis withitsmediation (play) betweentheuniversalandthe particular isthe type ofreason ing thathermeneutical understandingrequires. Phronesisis impor tantforGadamerbecauseitenableshimto distinguish hermeneutical understanding fromthe objectifying methodsofmodernscience.But Gadameralsowantsusto moveintheotherdirection?torecoverthe importance of phronesis for practicalphilosophytoday(and toshow howhermeneuticsistheheirtothetraditionof practicalphilosophy). Hetellsus:"When Aristotle, inthesixthbookoftheNicomachean Ethics,distinguishes themannerof 'practicalknowledge'[phronesis]. .. fromtheoreticalandtechnical knowledge he expresses, in myopin ion, oneofthe greatest truths by whichtheGreeksthrow lightupon 'scientific' mystification ofmodern society of specialization."52 Or again hewrites: In my own eyes, the great meritofAristotlewasthathe anticipated the impasse ofourscientificculture by his description ofthestructureof practical reasonasdistinctfromtheoretical knowledge andtechnical skill.... [T]heproblem ofour society isthatthe longing ofthe citizenry fororientationandnormative patterns investsthe expert withan exag geratedauthority. Modern societyexpects himto provide asubstitute for past moraland political orientations. Consequently, the concept of 'praxis' whichwas developed inthelasttwocenturiesisanawfuldefor mationofwhat practicereally is.Inallthedebatesofthelast century practice wasunderstoodas application ofsciencetotechnicaltasks.... It degradespractical reasontotechnicalcontrol.53 51 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 324. 52 Hans-GeorgGadamer, "TheProblemofHistorical Consciousness," trans.JeffL. Close, in Interpretive SocialScience:ASecond Look, ed.Paul RabinowandWilliamSullivan (Berkeley:University ofCalifornia Press, 1981), 107. 53 Hans-GeorgGadamer, "HermeneuticsandSocial Science," Cultural Hermeneutics2 (1975), 312.Fora moredetaileddiscussionofGadamer's understanding of phronesis andthe way in whichitdiffersfromtechneand episteme, see my BeyondObjectivism andRelativism (Philadelphia: Univer sity of PennsylvaniaPress,1983). This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions596RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Derridawould agree withGadamer'sremarksaboutthe degrading of practical reasontotechnicalcontrol.His writings aboutthe mentality andeffectsofwhathecalls"technoscience" support Gadamer's claims.Butunlike Gadamer, Derridadoesnot appeal to phronesis.(I amalmostinclinedto say thatheistonedeaftothe significance of phronesis andoftheAristoteliantraditionof practicalreason). He stressesthe aporiae?thecontradictorylogics thatweconfrontwhen everwemake practical decisions.Thisbecomes especially dominant in his writingsduring thelast decadesofhislife.In hisdiscussionsof cosmopolitanism,hospitality, and forgiveness, heseekstoshowhow weareconfrontedwith incompatibleimperatives. Wemust negotiate betweenthese injunctions in makingresponsible decisions.Butif we are really confrontedwith contradictorylogics, thenit wouldseem thatthis paralyzes decisionandaction.Thisisan objection thathas frequently beenraised against Derrida.ButDerrida emphatically claims that, onthe contrary, this facing up tothe contradictorylogics oftheunconditionalandtheconditionalis precisely whatenablesre sponsible decisionandaction.Whenavariationofthis objection was pressedagainst Derrida'sclaimthatthe onlything to forgive istheun forgivable, he responded: The aporia isthe experience of responsibility. Itis onlybygoing through asetof contradictoryinjunctions,impossiblechoices, thatwe makeachoice.IfI knowwhatI haveto do, ifI knowinadvancewhat hastobe done, thenthereis no responsibility. Forthe responsible deci sion envisaged or taken, wehaveto gothroughpain and aporia, asitua tionin whichI donotknowwhattodo.I havetodothisand this, and they donot gotogether. I havetofacetwo incompatibleinjunctions, andthatis whatI havetodo everyday in everysituation,ethical,politi cal, ornot. ... An aporia isan experience,enduring an experience, in which nothing?such as forgiveness?presents itselfassuch.Thatis becauseabsolute forgiveness never presents itselfassuchandisirre ducibletoconditional forgiveness.54 But one mayask, andif myimagined conversationbetweenGadamer andDerridahadtaken place, Gadamer might wellhaveasked:"What 54 JacquesDerrida,"Forgiveness: ARoundtableDiscussionwith Jacques Derrida," in QuestioningGod, ed.John Caputo, Mark Dooley, andMichael Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress,2001), 62.For my discus sionand critique ofDerrida'sreflectionson forgiveness, see myarticle, "Der rida:The Aporia of Forgiveness?" inConstellations 13, no.3 (September 2006): 394-406. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED597 isthis experience ofthe aporia? HowdoI decideifI havetoface'in compatibleinjunctions'?" Derridawrites: [I]f wewantto embody anunconditional forgiveness in history andsoci ety, wehaveto gothrough theseconditions.Wehaveto negotiate be tweentheunconditionalandtheconditional. They cannotbedissoci ated,although weknow they are absolutelyheterogeneous and incommensurable.Itis becausetheseincommensurable poles areindis sociablethatwehavetotake responsibility, adifficult responsibility, to negotiate thebest response in an impossible situation.55 EvenifGadamer accepted Derrida'sclaimsabout "incompatible in junctions" and "contradictorylogics" he might stillask:"What pre cisely do you mean by'negotiation'? Isthisa reasoningprocess? Whatareitscharacteristics?"GadamerandDerridaboth reject the ideathatsuch negotiation canbeunderstoodas calculation, asa means-endtechnical rationality. NeitherGadamernorDerridathinks that responsible decisionsfollowfromuniversalrules.Gadamer might say Derrida's negotiation looks suspiciously like phronesis. (And evenif Gadamerwouldnot saythis, Iwould say itinhis name). To put theissueina slightly different way, Derridadoesnotthinkthat negotiating betweentheunconditionalandtheconditionalisacom pletelyarbitraryprocess. Itisadeliberative process whereI weigh andevaluatealternativesinordertodecide responsibly whattodoin this particular situation.Nowevenaftersuch deliberation, thereis stilla gap between my deliberationand my decision.Butthisisal ways trueof phronesis asaformof practicalthinking. Theconsider ationstowhichI appeal in deliberating donotdictateor completely determinethedecision.Insofaraswe negotiate between incompati ble imperatives inordertodecidewhattodointhis particular situa tionweare engaged inadeliberative activity thatisneithertechnenor episteme. Thereare always risksinvolvedin making sucha practical decision; but uncertainty isintrinsicto phronesis. Howthen might weunderstandthetensionthatstillexistsbe tweenGadamerandDerrida?Iseeitasa productive tension.Onthe on hand, Gadamer helps ustoseethatthekindof negotiation that Derridatakestobesofundamentalfor responsible decisionsandac tionsisaformof phronesis. Butontheother hand, Derrida brings out complexities andrisksof phronesis-, hewarns againstreducing itto 55 Ibid.,58;emphasis added. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions598RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN technicalcalculationor simplyfollowing auniversalrule.Inhislan guage, thereis always a gap?anabyss?which wehavetofacein makingresponsibledecisions, whether they areethicalor political de cisions. I have attempted toshowhowsuchaconversationbetweenGa damerandDerrida might have begun. I stress this, becauseI havenot pursued howGadamerandDerrida might have responded tothe type of objections thateachraisesabouttheother.Andthereare topics thatIhavenoteven explicitlyraised, suchastheirdifferentunder standings oftruth.ButIwanttoconclude by abrieflookattheirdif ferent readings ofthePhaedrus?thePlatonic dialogue thatissofun damentalforbothofthemandfortheir respectiveconceptions of hermeneuticsanddeconstruction. MuchofwhatGadamerhasto say about conversation,dialogue, understanding,interpretation, andtextcanbereadasa commentary onPlato'sreflectionsabout writing and speech?especially asitisdis cussedinthefamous passage fromthePhaedrus (274c-279c). One mightinitially thinkthatGadamer simplyaccepts thestandardtradi tional reading wherePlato presumably introducesthe myth Theuthin orderto argue forthe superiority ofthe spoken wordoverthewritten word.After all, Gadamerseemstofavor livingdialogue andconversa tion.Heconceivesofthehermeneuticaltaskasoneof making writ tentexts speak. Not onlyinterpreters, buttextsthemselves pose and answer questions;they are partners inthehermeneuticalconversa tion. Consequently, Gadamerseemstobe guilty ofthe phonocentrism thatDerridatakestobeattheheartofthe logocentrism oftheWest ern metaphysical tradition.Butacareful reading ofGadamershows thatthisisnot quite accurate?anditisn'tthe way in whichheinter prets thePhaedrus.Thefirstandforemosttaskofhermeneuticsis the understanding ofwritten texts, notoralutterances. "[WJriting is centraltothehermeneutical phenomenon insofarasitsdetachment bothfromthewriterorauthorandfroma specifically addressedre cipient orreader gives italifeofitsown."56WhenPlatocriticizes writing(in the Theuth myth), Gadamernotes: [T]his is obviously anironic exaggeration withwhichtoconcealhis own writing andhisownart.In fact,writing and speech areinthesame plight. Justasin speech thereisanartof appearances anda 56 Ibid, 392. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED599 corresponding artoftrue thought?sophistry anddialectic?soin writ ing therearetwo arts, one servingsophistic, theotherdialectic.There is,then, anartof writing thatcomestotheaidof thought, anditistothis thattheartof understanding?which affordsthesame help to whatis written?isallied.57 Boththewrittenwordandthe spoken wordhavetheirdistinctive weaknessesand strengths."Writing isnomereaccidentormere sup plement that qualitativelychangesnothing inthecourseoforaltradi tion. ... [0]nly a writtentraditioncandetachitselffromthemerecon tinuanceofthe vestiges of pastlife, remnantsfromwhichonehuman being can by inference piece outanother'sexistence."58Withthewrit ten word,then, itisthereaderthatisthearbiterofitsclaimtotruth. ThelessontobelearnedfromPlatoisthatthereisasubtle complex relationbetweenthe spoken andthewrittenword. They donotstand ina simplebinaryopposition.Writing isakindofalienated speech andthehermeneuticaltaskistotransformwritten signs backinto speech and meaning. Thewrittenwordisnota secondary ora degen erateformof speech. Writtentextsarethevehiclesfor meaning and truth; itisthetaskofhermeneutical understanding torenewthis meaning andtruth.Itisthewrittentextthatovercomesthe ephem eralcharacterofthe spoken word. [T]hemeaning of something writtenis fundamentally identifiableand repeatable. Whatisidenticalinthe repetition is only whatwas actually deposited inthewrittenrecord.Thisindicatesthat "repetition" cannot bemeanthereinastrictsense.Itdoesnotmean referring backtothe original sourcewhere something issaidorwritten.The understanding of something writtenisnota repetition of somethingpast buttheshar ing ofa presentmeaning.59 Derrida'sfamous essay, "Plato's Pharmacy," isatourdeforce?a hundred-page close reading anddeconstructionofthePhaedrus.We canevenusethedistinctiveGadamerian concepts to analyze what Derridais doing.Derrida, like Gadamer, isnotconcernedwithrecon structing Plato'sintentionsor probing the psychological statesof Plato'smind.Hefocusesonwhatthewritten text,Phaedrus,says. AndinafineGadamerianmannerhefocuses closely onthe language ofthePhaedrustodrawoutwhatitrevealsandconceals.We might 57 Ibid, 393. 58 Ibid, 391. 59 Ibid, 392. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions600RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN even say thathisdiscussion exemplifies themovementoftheherme neuticalcircleinsofarasthereisaconstant playing backandforthbe tweenthe part andthewhole. Contrary to many traditional interpre tationsofthePhaedrusthat complain aboutits apparent disjointedness, Derridashowshow carefully itisconstructedand howunifieditis.The question oftherelationofthe spoken andthe writtenwordisnot simply the subject oftheTheuth myth; itis appar entat everystage ofthe dialogue, fromthemomentthatSocratesdis coversthatthe speech Phaedruswantsto try outonhimis actually a recitationofa writtentextthathehashiddenunderhiscloak.Derr idais engaged ina dialogical encounterwiththewritten text, aclassic thatstill speaks tous.He questions thetextand responds tothe way in whichthetext questions him. Bybringing forthfreshandunex pectedmeaning(s) ofthe text, Derridashowshownew meanings emerge fromtheto-and-fro play of interpretation betweentheinter preter-partner andthe text-partner.Historically effectedconscious ness (wirkungsgeschichtlichesBewusstsein) isatworkinDerrida's playfulreading ofthetext. And yet, Derrida's reading ofthePhaedrusis strikingly different from Gadamer's, and radicallychallenges Gadamer's understanding of therelationofthe spoken wordandthewrittenword.Derridadoes precisely whatGadameris alwaysrecommending thatthe interpreter must do?pay closeattentiontothe language ofthewrittentext. Spe cifically, Derrida'sclose reading followsthethreadofthe multiple conflictingmeanings of pharmakon as poison,remedy, andcure.Fre quently, translationfroma foreignlanguagerequiresusing different wordsto convey a word's meaning ina given context.Thetranslator hasto figure outwhatisthe appropriate wordtouse. (Think, forex ample, ofhowtranslators struggle to convey the precisemeaning of Hegel'sAufhebung). ThistruismabouttranslationisnotDerrida's point. Hemakesa muchmoreradical pointbyshowing thatthecon flicting andeven contradictorymeanings of pharmakon havetheir ownuncontrollablesemantic logic. InaGadamerian spirit, heshows Plato's language hasa logic and spirit ofitsownthathaslittletodo withPlato'sintentions.SotheissueisnotwhatPlatointendedeach timeheusedtheword pharmakon, orevenwhetherhewas fully awareofitsuncontrollableandundecidable multiplemeanings. Con ceding thatPlato might wellhaveseensomeofthelinkswithinthe word pharmakon, Derridacomments:"Then again inother cases, This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED601 Platocannotseethe links, canleavethemintheshadoworbreak them up. And yet theselinks go on working ofthemselves.In spite of him?Thanksto him?In histext?Outsidehistext?Butthen where? Betweenhistextandthe language? Forwhatreader?Atwhatmo ment?"60Gadamerhimselfhasaffirmedthat language has something speculative aboutit"inthatthefinite possibilities ofthewordareori entedtowardthesenseintendedastowardtheinfinite."61 Buthowarethe multiplecontradictory anduncontrollablese manticlinksof pharmakon relatedtotheissueof speech and writing? Before answering this question I wanttoreiterate something thatI saidatthe beginning ofthis paper. AsI interpret theconstellationof hermeneuticsand deconstruction, I donotseeitasan Either/Or, but ratherasaBoth/And.I donotseethatDerridais reallydenying Gada mer'scharacterizationof understanding andallthatitentails.RatherI seehimas complicating our understanding of understanding?of bringing outits instabilities,difficulties,risks,conflicts,uncertainties, andundecidables.I haveindicatedthatGadamernotesthe strengths andweaknessofthe spoken andthe written, buthenevertheless pre supposes thatwehavea relatively clear understanding ofthediffer encesbetween speech and writing. Andthisis whatDerrida'sdecon structionis calling into question. ForDerridathe speech/writing opposition is closely relatedtoa wholeseriesof oppositions thathave beeninherentintheWestern logocentricmetaphysical tradition:in side/outside;good/evil;soul/body;memory/forgetfulness?all of whichhavetobedeconstructed.Butletusreturntothe speech/writ ingopposition inthePhaedrus. WhenTheuthoffersthe gift of writing to KingThamus, hecate goricallyrejects the gift and gives ahostofreasonstoshowthatwrit ing is not really a remedy orcure (pharmakon) butis actually a poison (pharmakon) thatwill encourageforgetfulness andfillmenwiththe falseconceitofwisdom (doxosophia).Writing is thoroughly con demned; itisan illegitimatebastard, a dangerouspoison. Butatacru cialand culminatingpoint inthePhaedruswehavethis revealing ex change betweenSocratesand Phaedrus, whichDerrida quotes.62 60 JacquesDerrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in Dissemination, trans.Bar baraJohnson (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress,1981), 96. 61 Gadamer, Truthand Method, 469. 62 SeeDerrida's quotation anddiscussionofthis exchange between PhaedrusandSocratesin"Plato's Pharmacy," 148-55. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions602RICHARDJ.BERNSTEIN Socrates:Butnowtell me, isthereanothersortofdiscoursethatis brothertothewritten speech, butof unquestionedlegitimacy? Canwe seehowit originates, andhowmuchbetterandmoreeffectiveitisthan theother? Phaedrus:Whatsortofdiscoursehave you in mind, andwhatisitsori gin? Socrates:Thesortthat goestogether with knowledge andis writtenin thesoulofthe learner, thatcandefend itself, andknowstowhomit should speak andto whomitshould saynothing. Phaedrus:Do you meanthediscourseofamanwho reallyknows, whichis living andanimate?Woulditbefairtocallthewrittendis course only akindof ghost ofit? Socrates: Precisely. AndDerridacomments: While presentingwriting asafalse brother?traitor,infidel, andsimu lacrum?Socratesisforthefirsttimeledtoenvisionabrotherofthis brother, the legitimate one, asanothersortof writing: not merely asa knowing,living, animate discourse, butasan inscription oftruthinthe soul.Itis nodoubt usually assumedthatwhatweare dealing withhere isa "metaphor." ... Butitisnot any lessremarkableherethattheso called living discourseshould suddenly bedescribed by a "metaphor" borrowedfromtheorderofthe verything oneis trying toexcludefrom it, theorderofthesimulacrum.63 Derrida'sdeconstructive moves suggest amuchmoreradicalcom plexity of speech and writing. Heisnot onlychallenging this binary opposition thatdominatessomuchofthe logocentric and phonocen trictraditions.Hewantstoshow that, insteadofan opposition be tween speech and writing,speech(thereallygood kindof speech) presupposes atits very corea type of writing?theinscription en graved inthesoul.Themorethatonetriestoexclude writing from livingspeech andto expose itsderivativecharacter?that writing is 63 "Plato's Pharmacy," 149.Derridaclaimsthatthis metaphoricappeal to writing inorderto clarify the "living discourse"isnot just anaccidental slip, butratherreveals a deeppattern thatdominatesWestern philosophy. "According toa pattern thatwilldominateallofWestern philosophy,good writing(natural,living,knowledgeable,intelligible,internal,speaking) is op posed tobad writing(a moribund,ignorant,external, muteartificeforthe senses). Andthe good onecanbe designatedonlythrough the metaphor of thebadone. Metaphoricity isthe logic ofcontaminationandthecontamina tionof logic," ibid. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsTHECONVERSATIONTHATNEVERHAPPENED603 "traitor,infidel, and simulacrum," themoreoneaffirmsthat"another sortof writing" is"an inscription oftruthinthesoul.64Gadamerde claresthat writing isalienated speech, butitis just astrueto say that speech isalienated writing. I have barely scratchedthesurfaceofDerrida's playful andbril liantdeconstructionofthe Phaedrus, butI hope I havesaid enough to begin torevealhowmuchheshareswithGadamerand yet howradi cally hediffersfromGadamer.Butwhois reallyright? Who presents abetter interpretation ofthePhaedrus?Whoismore illuminating abouttherelationof speech and writing,understanding andmisunder standing,interpretation and misinterpretation? Ithinkthesearemis guidedquestions. Thereisno Either/Or, butratheraBoth/And.To parody Derrida:"Gadamer/Derrida:Hermeneutics/Deconstruction. Extremesmeet." Togethertheypresent uswitha "juxtaposed rather than integrated clusterof changing elementsthatresistreductiontoa common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle." NewSchool for SocialResearch 64 Ibid. This content downloaded from 131.91.169.193 on Sun, 24 May 2015 15:09:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions