THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL I999

IB, Islands Business. Suva. Monthly.

Interview. 1998. Interviews by DavidChappell in Noumea. June.

KO, Kanaky Online. 1998. March.<http://altern.org/kanaky>.

LEC, Libre Expression Caledonienne.Noumea. UNCT monthly.

NC, Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes.Noumea. Daily.

PIR, Pacific Islands Report.<http://pidp.ewc.hawaii.edu>.

RAN, Radio Australia News.<http://www.uq.oz.au/jrn/coco>.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

According to Prime Minister BillSkate, natural and economic disastersmade 1998 a particularly tough yearfor Papua New Guinea. Following onthe heels of a protracted drought, thetsunami that struck the coast nearAitape in West Sepik Province in Julyexacted an enormous human toll. Theeconomy experienced some externalshocks in the form of declining com­modity prices, which, coupled withrising prices for imports, led toaggressive budgetary action towardthe end of the year. The prime minis­ter could take some comfort from thesignificant progress in the peaceprocess on war-ravaged Bougainville,and from his own political survival inthe face of constant criticism of hisethics and leadership style.

The prospects for as many as 1.2

million rural dwellers appeared grimat the beginning of the year as theworst drought in a century continuedto disrupt supplies of food and waterthroughout the country. However, by

early March more normal weatherpatterns had resumed, allowing theemergency relief operation spearhead­ed by Australia to begin windingdown. In July, Australian medical andmilitary personnel were back in PapuaNew Guinea as part of an interna­tional effort to deal with the after­math of the Aitape disaster. Shortlybefore seven o'clock on the evening ofFriday, 17 July, an undersea earth­quake measuring 7. I on the Richterscale generated a fifty-foot wave thatswept ashore less than a minute later,traveling up to a mile inland in someplaces. The tsunami devastated aneighteen-mile stretch of coastline,killing more than two thousand peo­ple and destroying the villages ofSissano, Teles, Arop, IIiI, Warapu,Malol, and Pera Nambis. Some of theinjured were flown out of the area ortreated at a hastily established fieldhospital, while nearly nine thousandsurvivors sought refuge in six tempo­rary "care centers." Although the dis­aster attracted immediate supportfrom overseas, rescue and reliefefforts were hampered by severe logis­tical and communication problems,which according to a United Nationsreport released in August "may havecost lives" (PIR, 18 Aug 1998).

Like all of his predecessors, PrimeMinister Skate discovered that man­aging the national economy andachieving "development," especiallyin the rural areas where more than 80percent of Papua New Guineansreside, were difficult tasks. Early inhis term in office, Skate faced declin­ing export receipts, especially for min­erals and oil, and the virtual collapseof timber exports resulting from theeconomic crisis in Asia. Meanwhile

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POLITICAL REVIEWS· MELANESIA

import costs were rising rapidly as thevalue of the kina declined, anddrought-related relief efforts put addi­tional strains on the budget. At thebeginning of 1998, economists wereforecasting declining foreign reserves,rising inflation, negative growth in thenon-mining sector, and a growingbudget deficit. Delegates to a nationaleconomic summit held in Februarywarned of a crisis as severe as that of1994-9s, which precipitated a mas­sive and controversial World Bank­led bail-out effort (PR, 14 Feb 1998,1,4)·

Like the Chan government beforeit, the Skate government soon clashedwith the World Bank over the termsof the ongoing support package. Thistime the bank demanded as a condi­tion for the release of A$90 millionthat Skate dismiss his chief economicadviser, Dr Pirouz Hamidian-Rad, aformer head of the bank's teamassigned to work with Papua NewGuinea. Hamidiah~Rad stated pub­licly that not all of the many econom­ic reforms demanded by the bankwere necessary, and that it was tryingto bully Papua New Guinea intoagreement. Meanwhile, the Skate gov­ernment secured staged commercialloans totaling us$I20 million from aBrussels-based bank to support thebudget and dwindling foreign reserves(PR, 21 Oct 1998, I), and embarkedon an aggressive reform program ofits own.

In July, Skate dismissed or reas­signed twelve heads of governmentagencies in the interest of increasedproductivity in the public service, andannounced the establishment of aPrivate Enterprise Ministry to identifywhich government services could be

439

privatized or corporatized. The 1999budget introduced in November cutmore than five thousand public ser­vice positions, relocated a further twothousand to the provinces, abolishedfifteen statutory authorities and com­mittees, and earmarked most govern­ment departments for restructuring.According to Treasury and PlanningMinister Iairo Lasaro, other measures,including tariff reform and a value­added tax, were designed to promotesmaller, labor-intensive businesses andmake the private sector "the engine ofgrowth." The budget also called for athreefold increase in funds allocatedfor rural and economic development(PR, 30 Nov 1998, I). Previous plansto downsize or radically restructurethe 6S,000-strong public service havetended to falter in the face of strongopposition, bureaucratic inertia, orchanges of leadership. Skate's reformeffort certainly provoked oppositionfrom the trade union movement,which le<:l a rally of about two thou­sand at Parliament to demand thatthe budget be scrapped (PIR, 24 Nov1998). However, by year's end Skateremained determined to implementthe reforms, and his political positionseemed relatively secure.

Skate proved himself adept at thepolitics of survival during 1998. Earlyin the year he was cleared of briberyallegations associated with videotapessecretly recorded by former adviserand Australian businessman MujoSefa and aired on Australian televi­sion. According to PoliceCommissioner Peter Aigilo the evi­dence on the videotapes themselveswas insufficient to make a caseagainst Skate and Police MinisterThomas Pelika, who also appeared on

44° THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1999

the tapes. Aigilio said Sefa had failedto produce "concrete evidence" of thealleged wrongdoing, which includedauthorizing bribes for journalists andpoliticians. Sefa claimed he had coop­erated with the inquiry-and prompt­ly released further secretly recordedvideos to the Australian media (PIR, 2

Feb 1998). Meanwhile, Skate accusedhis former Deputy Prime MinisterChris Haiveta, whom he had fired inlate 1997, of conspiring with Sefa todiscredit his government.

The dispute with Haiveta led Skateto dump Haiveta's Pangu Pati fromthe coalition and elevate People'sProgress Party leader Michael Nali tothe position of deputy prime minister.However, he appointed Pangu Patistalwart and former Prime MinisterSir Rabbie Namaliu to his new cabi­net, and in the next few months sig­nificantly increased his support inParliament. By August, Skate's shake­up of the top echelons of the public-. .serVICe was causmg some uneaseamong the coalition partners, whoclaimed they were being excludedfrom decision making. Members ofthe People's Democratic Movement,the Independend Alliance, the UnitedResource Party, and even Skate's ownPNG First party, were uncomfortablewith the influence wielded by eco­nomic adviser Hamidian-Rad andPublic Service Minister Ian Ling­Stuckey, who had rejoined the cabinetafter being fired in late 1997 alongwith other members of the PanguPatio They also claimed that they hadnot been consulted about Skate'splans to replace Michael Nali withtwo deputy prime ministers, Ling­Stuckey and People's DemocraticParty Leader lairo Lasaro.

In October, Skate dismissed Naliand all his Peoples Progress Party col­leagues from the coalition, accusingthem of causing "instability" in hisgovernment. Although Nali was out­spoken in his criticism of Skate,describing him as "the most inconsid­erate, egotistical, irrational and errat­ic" politician he had ever met, sevenof the twelve parliamentary membersof the People's Progress Party optedto stay with the government andjoined Skate's PNG First party (PR, 26Oct 1998, I). lairo Lesaro was dulyappointed deputy prime minister, andby the end of the year the prime min­ister could claim the support of 63members of the I09-seat Parliament.

Some cabinet and coalition changesduring the year were attributable todisagreements over policy. Nali, forexample, claimed he had been dumpedas deputy prime minister because hestrongly opposed the reappointmentas Defence Force commander ofBrigadier General Jerry Singirok,dismissed in 1997 for his role in theSandline mercenary crisis (Wesley­Smith 1998). However, much of themaneuvering reflected a familiar formof coalition politics involving thestrategic use of cabinet positions toconsolidate parliamentary supportand ward off threatening votes of noconfidence in the prime minister.Early in the year Skate tried to intro­duce radical constitutional changesthat would make it much moredifficult to remove a prime ministerduring the five years between generalelections. These efforts were unsuc­cessful, leaving Skate facing the possi­bility of a vote of no confidence afterhis eighteen-month period of immuni­ty from such votes expired in

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POLITICAL REVIEWS. MELANESIA

February 1999 (PR, 28 March 1998,6). To thwart opposition attempts tomount such a vote, in DecemberSkate adjourned Parliament for eightmonths, leaving critical legislativebusiness unfinished and putting theBougainville peace process in jeopardy.

This was a generally encouragingyear for residents of Bougainville aftera decade of war that had claimed thelives of an estimated twenty thousandpeople. The peace talks that com­menced on 19 January at LincolnUniversity, near Christchurch in NewZealand, involved more than twohundred delegates representing themajor parties to the conflict, as wellas high-level delegations from neigh­boring countries. The meeting wasattended by the prime ministers ofPapua New Guinea, New Zealand,and Solomon Islands; Papua NewGuinea's leader of the opposition; theforeign ministers of Australia andNew Zealand; as well as observersfrom Fiji, Vanuatu, and the UnitedNations. On 23 January, the protago­nists endorsed the Lincoln Agreementon Peace, Security and Developmenton Bougainville. Sir John Kaputin,chief negotiator, and Sam Akoitai,minister for Bougainville Affairs,signed on behalf of the Papua NewGuinea government. Joseph Kabui,vice president of the BougainvilleInterim Government, and SamKauona, commander of the Bougain­ville Revolutionary Army, signed onbehalf of the secessionist rebels, whilePremier Gerard Sinato added theendorsement of the officially sanc­tioned Bougainville TransitionalGovernment. Hilary Masiria signed inhis capacity as commander of the pro­government Resistance Force, and

44 1

three of Bougainville's representativesin the national Parliament, JohnMomis, Michael Laimo, and MichaelOgio, also pledged to support theagreement.

The Lincoln Agreement providedfor an ongoing process of reconcilia­tion between the warring parties. Itannounced a "permanent and irrevo­cable" ceasefire, to take effect on 30April 1998, and a phased withdrawalfrom the province of the Papua NewGuinea Defence Force. An interna­tional Peace Monitoring Group wouldbe deployed in Bougainville while acivilian police force was recruited andtrained. There would be a generalamnesty for crisis-related offenses,and all parties would cooperate in"restoration and development" activi­ties on Bougainville. Unlike earlierpeace agreements, the Lincoln Agree­ment did not attempt to tackle thekey divisive issues head on. There wasno agreement on Bougainville's futurepolitical status, although the partiesdid agree to discuss "the politicalissue," and establish a BougainvilleReconciliation Government, beforethe end of 1998.

Although the agreement was wide­ly hailed as a success, implementingsome of its terms proved difficult. Theceasefire agreement, hammered out inmore detail in Canberra in March,was duly signed on 30 April at theprovincial capital of Arawa in frontof a large crowd of Bougainvilleansand visiting dignitaries. The unarmedPeace Monitoring Group, consistingof forces from Australia, New Zea­land, Fiji, and Vanuatu, replaced asimilar Truce Monitoring Groupdeployed in Bougainville sinceNovember 1997. In April, the United

44 2 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1999

Nations Security Council issued astatement in support of the LincolnAgreement, and the UN secretary-gen­eral dispatched an observer mission toBougainville to help monitor the situ­ation. However, Kabui and otherBougainville leaders were concernedabout apparent delays in the with­drawal of Papua New Guinea troopsprovided for in the agreement.Although the government declaredArawa town a demilitarized zone inJune, troops did not actually leavethere until August following a cabinetdecision to rescind the constitutionalcall-out order issued in 1989. Eventhen, the soldiers remained in thenearby port town of Loloho, albeitunder the normal legal provisions ofthe constitution. Perhaps more omi­nous was the refusal of rebel leaderFrancis Ona to participate in thepeace process despite numerous invi­tations to do so. He continued toassert that full and unconditionalindependence was the only acceptableoption for Bougainville, condemnedKabui's and Kauona's involvement inthe peace process, and threatened tokill members of the Peace MonitoringGroup.

Not surprisingly, "the politicalissue" continued to be the most trou­blesome one to deal with. JosephKabui made it clear on several occa­sions during the year that he and hissupporters still regarded independenceas their ultimate goal, and that theysaw the proposed Bougainville Recon­ciliation Government simply as ameans to that end. Prime MinisterSkate made it equally clear that inde­pendence was never going to be anoption, although he did seem open tothe idea of a phased transfer of pow-

ers leading to a considerable degree ofautonomy for the province. Well intothe second half of the year, no consen­sus regarding the composition of theReconciliation Government hademerged, and no timetable for itsestablishment had been determined.The national government seized theinitiative in September, announcing anagreement with the parliamentaryopposition that would establish aninterim reconciliation government onI January 1999, to be replaced by afully elected government before theend of June. The agreement did notdetermine the composition of thegovernment, although it did stipulatethat the four Bougainville members ofParliament would be full members ofthe assembly (PIR, 29 Sept 1998).Arguing that they had not been con­sulted, and that they did not recog­nize the Papua New Guinea constitu­tion anyway, Kabui and other leadersin Bougainville opposed the initiative,taking particular exception to theautomatic involvement of the nationalmembers of Parliament in the newgovernment.

The debate about the BougainvilleReconciliation Government was rude­ly interrupted in early Decemberwhen opposition members boycottedParliament, preventing Skate fromgetting the two-thirds vote necessaryto amend the constitution and clearthe way for the new government. Theboycott was staged to protest theprime minister's plans to adjournParliament so as to avoid a vote of noconfidence, although Skate claimedthat the opposition had agreed to sup­port the passage of the amendment ifhe agreed to reconvene Parliament byJuly 1999 (PR, 14 Dec 1998, I).

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443

Meanwhile, leaders in Bougainvillevowed to establish a BougainvilleReconciliation Government in thenew year, outside the terms of theconstitution if necessary. This was asignificant setback for the peaceprocess, and also a setback for Skate,who had been able to claim progresson the Bougainville issue as one of hisgovernment's most notable achieve­ments.

TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH

References

PIR, Pacific Islands Report. Daily websiteservice. Honolulu.

PR, Pacific Report. Fortnightly newsletter.Canberra.

Wesley-Smith, Terence. 1998. Papua NewGuinea. The Contemporary Pacific 10 (2):

446-455.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

On 7 July 1998 Solomon Islands cele­brated twenty years of constitutionalindependence. The highlight of thecelebrations was the first MelanesianArts and Cultural Festival, whichbrought together in Honiara perform­ers from Papua New Guinea,Vanuatu, Fiji, and New Caledonia.There was even a delegation fromTaiwan. The festival also coincidedwith the nation's annual Trade andCultural Show. Furthermore, twoweeks prior to the independenceanniversary celebrations, Honiara hadhosted the Pacific History Associationconference, which attracted morethan a hundred budding and estab­lished Pacific Islands scholars fromthe Pacific Islands and beyond. It was

a busy time for Honiara.The events of June and July reflect­

ed a politically busy year for SolomonIslands. Generally, 1998 was a year ofpolitical optimism. The governmentpushed for reforms and seemed confi­dent that its program would steer thenation away from the political insta­bility and economic hardships thathave characterized the public land­scape in the last two decades. It wasobvious, however, that many of thereform proposals were not entirelynew. They reflected neoliberal andeconomic rationalist initiatives else­where, especially those propagated byinternational financial institutions andaid agencies.

To understand the political eventsof 1998, it is necessary to have someknowledge of the political and eco­nomic developments of previousyears. In particular, the factors thatinfluenced the outcome of the August1997 national elections are pertinent.

Solomon Islands since indepen­dence has been characterized by ahigh turnover of governments, whichresulted from, among other factors,undeveloped political party systems,individually biased voting patterns,and the frequency of motions of noconfidence against successive primeministers. Consequently, SolomonIslands has had eight governmentsand five prime ministers in the lasttwenty years, making it difficult toimplement policies. Governmentsoften did not survive the four-yearterm and spent much time and efforttrying to stay in power.

Furthermore, by the beginning ofthe 1990S the economy had fallenthrough the cracks, causing debts torise beyond the government's ability