The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society

8/7/2019 The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society

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Critique, Fall 1996

The Coming of a Post-Islamist SocietyAsef Rayt

O l ive r Ro y's con tent ion about the "fa i lure of polit ical Islam" does notmean the end of Is lamist act iv ism and discourse. Indeed, more than at any othert i me , th e global political language is filled with discussions about Islam andIs lamic act iv ism. Pol i t ics in M us lim socie ties is still predo min ant ly re l ig ious ;and the Is lamic mov eme nts con st i tute the major oppo si t ions to govern me nts . Animagined Is lamic threat to the W est exp lains Western interest in the subject . Abelief tha t Islam offers a possible solut ion to social , pol i t ical and economic i l lsis what at t rac ts the M u s l i m s .

Surprisingly, while Islamic discourse permeates politics in most Muslimsocieties, in Iran , the first modern Islam ic state, people seem preo ccupied withsecular concerns; Islamic language in po litics seems to be w aning . In fact, Iranis mo ving toward a new "post-Is lam ist" phase. W hat are the features of th is"pos t - Is lamism?" What are the causes beh ind this t rans i t ion? It probably is tooearly to prov ide defini t ive answers . However , the phenomenon is verysignificant, and the observations expressed here are meant to stimulate furtherdiscuss ion. Before descr ibing th e post-Is lamist phase, though, it is necessary tounders tand what Is lamism has been in Iran.The Islamist Phase

The Is lamist phase began with th e revolut ion of February 1979. Theestabl ishment of the first Islamic state in modern times set the stage for agradual Is lamizat ion of socie ty. ' The process was enforced largely from above,

1 . Pak is tan , w hi c h was crea ted out of Bri t i sh India in 1947, claims to be the f irst

Asef Baya t is an associate professor of sociology at the Am erican University in C airo.This essay is based on a lecture delivered at the English Public Lecture Series at theAmerican University in Cairo, May 1996. Th e author w ishes to thank the editors andreviewers of C r i t i qu e fo r their helpful comments and suggestions.


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44 * Baytoften w ith violence. The chief character is t ic of Iranian Is lamism was thecreation of an Is lamic government based on a novel /modern not ion of Valayat-ifaqih, the guardianship of the canon law j u r i s t , who is to rule the communi ty ofthe believers in the absence of the Shia Tw elf th Imam . According to I ran 's1979 Consti tut ion, al l of laws of the land must accord with Is lamic pr inciples .O f course, there does exist a par l iament , but the laws enacted by electeddeput ies can be modified or over-ruled by a Council of Guardians, a 12-memberbody of canon law jur is ts appointed by the Faq ih. This council vetoes anylegislat ion deemed to be in conf l ict wi th Is lamic values . The es tabl ishment ofthe Islamic gove rnm ent also me ant a change in symb ols and slogans. Iran 's flagand national anthe m , for exam ple, we re m odified to become Islamic. Theinternat ional izat ion of the Islamic order , or pan-Islam ism, accounted for anothe raspect of the New I ran.

Islamism should be seen in terms of a systematic at tempt from above toIslamicize society and the econom y. In the ear ly 1980s, a cultura l rev olutionwas launched to t ransform the education system, from unive r s i ti e s down to pre-school nurser ies . The idea was to set up a re l ig ious cur r iculum, employIslamically-committed instructors , and add Is lamic ext ra-cur r icula act iv i t ies .The aim was to produce and reproduce Islamic citizens.

C ompulsory hejab (ve i l ing ) for wom en in the ear ly 1980s was the mostdrast ic measure that gave a rel ig ious ident i ty to post-revolutionary Iranianwom en. Hejab has been part icular ly s ignif ican t as i t is a highly v is ible Is lamicsymbol . Along wi th the forced ve i l ing of women and survei l lance of men,many l iberal laws that had come into existence under the deposed shah wererevok ed. These included family laws, as wel l as employment and educat ionpolicies favor ing w o m e n . D ay care centers and family plann ing programs werecondemned as imp erial is t conspiracies; p olyga m y was tolerated, and menlawfu l ly received custody of child ren and the autom atic r ight to divo rce. Theimposit ion of a quota system effectively barred women from s tudying cer taincollege courses and restr icted their numbers in others . These changes wereaccompanied by a pervasive Islamization of leisureof dr inking habi ts , dress ,music , movies, te levis io n programs, v ideos , hol iday s and sate l l i te dishes .

From the very first days of the Revolut ion, there was a ques t for an"Islamic economy"one which was to be based on "Is lamic justice" (qist-iIslami), an economy that would be neither capital is t nor socialist. Itscornerstone was a redef ini t ion of property r ights , or mashru'a capital.Assuming the prosperi ty of the mustaz'afin, the depr ived, was i t s object ive .Dozens of seminars were organized to discuss the issue of Is lamic economics.Although no definite answer was agreed upon, those policies that were

modern Islamic state, but i t s govern me nt a lw ay s have been controlled by secular polit icale l i tes , not an Islamic c l e r g y .


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The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society * 45undisputed and practical were implem ented. Banking interest was removed intheory , th e labor laws changed, Islamic prayers were enforced in to the workplaces, "u nlsla m ic" businessmen were purge d, jai led or had their capitalconfiscated, and foreign investment was discouraged. These measures causedbusiness insecurity and a sharp drop in investment and product ive act iv i t ies .The need to respond to these trends caused a deb ate betwee n the "specialists"(takhassosgeraian) and maktabis. The former, representing President AbolhsanBani Sadr, emphasized expert knowledge in dealing with economic and technicalissues. The maktabis stressed th e importance of Islamic/ideologicalcom m i tm en t . For a long t ime during the early 1980s, th e maktabis view wasq u i t e predominant, Islam was considered a complete social, economic, politicaland moral system that had answers to all human problems. It was up to the"true" Musl ims, through resi l iency and commi tment , to discover them . Sucha monopol izat ion of t ruth meant that there was no room for the coexistence ofcompet ing v i e w s or systems. Islamism was exclus iv i s t and intolerant ofplura l i sm.

The Islamist phase prevailed throughout the 1980s. The war with I raq ,where Is lamic symbo ls were ut i l ized ful ly (the war of haqq against batil; Islamagainst unbe l ie f ) , cont r ibuted to the prevalence of this phase. Although a largesegment of the populat ion opposed Islamism from th e outset, th e state andsociety nevertheless had its own support base. The support came largely fromamong the urban poor , th e t radi t ion al urban pet ty-bourgeoisie , some rural yo uth ,and a segment of the mode rn m iddle classes. M any urban you th were integratedth rough the war effort . Revo lut ionary Ins t i tu t ions (nahadha-ye inqilabi) such asth e pasdaran, baseej, and the Jihad-i Sazandegi. The state further hoped that th eIslamization of schools wou ld reproduc e th is critical mass of suppo rters. Thissupport base w as inspired by the personality of Ayatol lah Khomeini whi le hewas al ive . How ever , w ith the end of the war (1988) and the death of Khomeini(1989), a new phase began to unfo ld . It was inaugura ted by a comprehensiveprogram of post-war reconstruct ion, wh ich marked the beginning of wha t mightbe term post - Is lamism.What is Post-Islamism?By "post-Is lamism" I mean a condi t ion where , fol lowing a phase ofexper imenta t ion , th e appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legi t imacy ofIslamism get exh austed , even among its once-ardent suppo rters. As such , post-Islamism is not ant i -Is lamic, but rather reflects a tendency to resecularizerel igion. Predominant ly , it is marked by a call to l imi t th e political role ofrel igion. In contemp orary Iran , post-Islamism is expressed in the idea of fusionbetween Islam (as a personalized faith) and individua l f reedom and choice; andpost-Islamism is associated with th e values of democracy and aspects ofm ode rnity. I t is expressed in the idea that Islam does not have answers to all


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46 * Baytsocieties' social, political, and economic problems. Post-Islamism implies anunder s tanding that not only is Islam compatible with modernity, but its verysurvival as a religion depends upon achieving this compat ib i l i t y . Yet, there alsois a strong quest for an independent modernity.

Post-Islamism is summed up in the phrase "we don't mind destroyingmosques in order to build f r eeways ." 2 Post-Islamism expresses, even amongcommitted Muslims, just such a state of mind, one of rationalization. It ismanifested in acknowledging secular exigencies, in a freedom from rigidity, inbreak ing down the monopoly of religious truth, in the sacred giving way to theprofane. O f course, Ayatollah Khomeini had expressed similar sentiments whenhe "absolutized" the Islamic state. However, his destruction of mosques hadbeen jus t i f ied for the sake of a more grand sacred, not for a secular, cause.

In contemporary Iran, a number of interesting social phenomena representpost-Islamist trend. Three of the most significant include the redevelopment ofTehran municipality and its socio-spatial rationale; th e Alternative ThoughtMovemen t ; and Islamic feminism. These trends are discussed below.1. Teheran Municipality

Since 1989, Gholamhosain Karbaschi has been redesigning the city ofTehran.3 The capital has assumed a new character, which does not have muchto do with th e image of an Islamic city. I ts spatial conf igura t ion and symbolism,f reeways, huge commercial billboards, and shopping malls remind a v is i to r moreof Madrid or even Los Angeles than of Karbala or Qom. There are no signs ofthose hur r i ed ly -wr i t t en revolutionary slogans and intense-looking posters which,dur ing the early 1980s, covered almost every empty wall in the city. They haveal l given space to commercial advertisements as well as a handful of official ly-sanctioned slogans adorned impressively by colorful designs and portraits.

Splendid cul tura l centers have been set up, both in the affluent north andpoor south of Tehran, catering to the arts, music and modern technology. Thereis a tremendous popularity among th e youth for Western and Iranian classicalmus ic . Over 75 percent of these concert goers are young men and w o m e n .4Although forced v e i l i n g and gender segregation still are enforced by the state,th e municipality's500 newly constructed parks bring together in public space,not only various social classes, but specially, men and women, and adolescentboys and girls. There are other spatial arrangements that facilitate thismingl ing , including mountain climbing and north Tehran skiing, not to mention

2. Stated by an Iranian diplomat abroad, 1995.3. For Karbaschi's role as mayor see Eric Hooglund, "Managing Metropolis ,"

Middle East Insight, v. 11, n. 5 (July - August 1995), pp. 72-73.4. For an interesting report on Tehran ' s new cultural centers (Farhang-saraa) seeGoft-o-Goo, n. 9 (Fall 1995).


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48 * Baytaccording to Soroush, it makes l i fe tolerable by enab l ing humans to cope wi thth e harsh realities of life and because it can provide th e mechanisms of self-cont rol against individual abuse of others , jus t as democracy facilitates externalcontrol.The A lternat ive Thought M ovem ent has generated widespread supportamong youth, the educated, and both religious-minded and secular Iranians,especially the modern middle classes, many of whom had been marginalizedpoli t ical ly. Perhaps more importantly, Soroush has gained a significantfollowing among theology stu den ts, more than that enjoyed by any senior c l e rgy .These young ulama are concerned about rel igion as an ins ti tutio n and the irfuture; they feel th e basis of thei r prerogat ives and legi t imacy is being erodedamid a growing anti-clericalism in the society.

The ideas propounded by these degarandishan (a l ternat ive think ers) , as theyare called in Iran, are being spread through lectures, symposiums, internationalconferences, books, articles, and specifical ly, th e month ly Kiyan. Of course,similar ideas can be found among Islamic modernists such as MuhammadA r k o u n , Hasan Hanafi or even th e secular Nasr Abo u Zeid in Egypt . However ,original i ty is not the issue here, but rather that these ideas have gainedpopulari ty under a self-conscious Islamic state.3. An "Islamic Feminism"?

A thi rd t rend in I ran 's post-Is lamism is a k ind of Is lamic feminist m o v e m e n tthat has emerged with in th e f ramework of the Alterna t ive Thought Mov ement .7The activists , familiar with both th e western feminist debates and Qur ' an i cteachings, are struggling with in the Islamic discourse to revoke those anti-women l aws and practices that are said to have rel igious jus t i f icat ions . Rely ingon the slogan, "equ ality of Men and W omen in Is lam," w hic h has been acceptedby clerical leaders, this movement has made considerable inroads to its effort toempower women in the domain of em ploym ent , educat ion and family l aw. Thestereotypes of Iranian women in the West as oppressed in the solitude ofdomesticity and hidden under the long black chador is no more than a crudeover-simplificat ion of wha t has been developing in I ran. Despi te heav ypressure, Iranian women are act ive in social, scientif ic, and cul tura l fields,perhaps more now than at any t ime in thei r his tory. For example, half of theposit ions in the government sector and over 40 percent of education jobs arefilled by wom en. Of course, women still are required to observe hejab.However, fo r some women, veiling has facilitated their mobility within male-

7. My analysis of the m o v e m e n t is largely based upon var ious i ssues of one of itsleading j o u r n a l s , Zanan. So far I have seen 29 issues. I have a lso re l ied on v a r i o u sissues of Zan-e Rouz, another w om an's m agazin e . Some issues of Nime-ye Digar, afeminist j o u r n a l pub l i shed in the US has also been usefu l


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The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society * 49domina ted fields. Thus, many lower class women w ho previously remained athome now are mobil ized and p lay ing a social role in neighborhood and re l ig iousins t i tut ions . Ne ve rthele ss, those modern m iddle class wom en w ho resent forcedvei l ing have not remained passive , and, consequently, many urban women wearthei r head scarves very loosely. Officials invar iably have complained aboutbad-hejabi, the laxity of young girls in observing veiling in public, to refer towomen's resistance against th e impos i t ion of hejab.

In add it ion, the opportun ity for equal educat ion w ith men has made a come-back fol lowing official restr ict ive quotas that favored me n. Polygamy seriouslyhas been curtai led, men's unilateral r ight to divorce has been restricted, andre l ig iously-sanct ioned mut'a marriage (according to w hich a formal contract issigned for a specified period of t ime ranging from a few hours to a few years)has been dem onized . C hild custody , which in Islamic laws favors the father(after the ch ild reached a cer tain age), also is bein g deb ated. The struggle forw om en to become judges is now on the agenda.8 Women act iv i t ies areorganized in at least 60 civic associations that communicate their ideas throughsuch publ ica t ions as Zanan, Farzaneh and Zan-e Rouz, organize rallies,participate in international women meetings, lobby polit icians and clericalleaders , and campaign in the M ajl is (par l iam ent) . I ranian women see themselvesat the forefront of the struggle for the em pow erm ent of w om en in the M u s l i mw or ld .The Causes

W hy did this new phase of post-Islamism emerge? It resul ted pr imari lyfrom the shortco min gs and contra dictions of Islam ist experience in Iran. Someleaders feared that these shortcomings m ight underm ine Is lam as the legi t im izingS D U I - L U of th e I s l am ic r epub l i c . To beg in w i th , the post-revolut ion pol i t icals t ructure excluded many groups from part icipat ion. A lthough th e faqih,supreme jur is t , ruled alongside a democrat ically e lected par l iame nt , restr ict ionson forming pol i t ical par t ies , and the Council of Guardians ' d isqual i f ica t ion ofcandidates for electoral office marginalized variou s po lit ic al tendencies. Ev ensome of the ardent supporters of the system became demoralized by thegovernment ' s excesses in polit ical control and fac tiona l inf ight ing. Many formerallies (such as Mahd i Bazargan, Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, Bani Sadr, the Mujahed in ,Ayatol lah Kazem Shar ia tmadar i , A yato l lah Hosain M ontazer i , and others)became opponents.Islamic economy did not de l ive r as much as it was expected. Althoughincome d is t r ibu t ion improved compared to the si tuat ion before the revolut ion (in1991, the top 20 percent of the population received about 50 percent of total

8. See for instance, Ibr ahi m Y azdi , "Reviva l i s t Is lamic Movement : Cha l lenges andCrises," Kiyan, n. 30 (Khordad 1375 [1996]), p. 12, (in Persian).


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50 * Baytincome, wh ile the bottom 40 percent received 13.4 percent; in 1977, the top 20percent received 57.3 percent of the total income and the lowest 40 percentreceived 11.28 percent).9 Nevertheless, national income in general dropped tohalf of that in the late 1970s. Economic blockades, the war with Iraq and amajor decline in international oil prices are impo rtant factors in this decline, buteconomic mismanagement and lack of economic security also were significantfactors.

With the end of revolutionary exceptional ism and the beginning ofnormalization after th e Iran-Iraq War, the mundane realit ies of wages, food,housing, and cars pushed ideology, altruism and the sacred to the sidelines. Thesocial problems of political apathy, youth, marginali ty, and population growthrate surfaced. Some leaders believed that there was a serious danger of peopleequating these social ills wi th Islam. C onse que ntly, they feared that peoplemight turn away from Islam as a whole. The issue of you th , the children of theRevolut ion, was undoubtedly th e paramount concern. The Islamization ofschools had failed to reproduce an Islamic yo uth . Recent official studiesrevealed that bad-hejabi (laxity on observing vei l ) , among school and universi tygirls is increasing progressively. "We are encountering a serious culturalonslaught. What is to be done?" an official wondered.10 The official concernsabout youth are highl ighted in surveys: over 83 percent of young people spendtheir leisure time before TV sets, but only 5 percent of them watch religiousprograms; of 58 percent who read books, less than 6 percent are inter ested inreligious l i t e ra ture ."Iranian youth sense that the future does not look very bright fo r many ofthem; they do not feel that their education brings them the expected rewards.The sluggish economy turns thei r expectation into outrage . Moral restrictions,in additio n, suppresses the expression of their youthful desires. This is indeeda familiar scenario also in Egypt, where, in the absence of other crediblealternatives, this morally-outraged groups turn to Islamic politics. In Iran,however, th e question is: which ideological inclinations wil l these youngsterspursue if they already have experienced Islamism? In th is new post-Islamistphase, you ng people are in an ideological void, in a situation whereby they haveexperienced many ideologies but have not gained much. They thus are addedto the army of already demoralized new middle classes and public sector

9. See A ll A k ha r K a r ha s i a n . "The Process of Income Distr ibut ion in I r an , " Iran-eFarda, n. 17 (Ordibehesht 1374 [1995]), p. 44, (in Pers ian).10 . The con t r ib u t ion o f Muha mm ad Had i Task hi r i , o f the O rgan iza tion o f I s lamic

Cul tu re and C o m m u n ica t io n in the Second Internat ional Seminar on Hejab, 28 A b an1376, reported in Zanan, n. 26 (Mehr /Aban 1376), pp. 8-9.

11. A survey of Supreme Counci l of Yo uth, c i ted by Golzar i in the 2nd I n t e r n a t io n a lSeminar on Hejab, ibid., reported in Zanan, ibid., p. 9.


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The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society * 51employees. Some yo uth tend to internalize their cond itions, orie ntin g ton ih i l i s m . Many turn to forms of violence. Soccer matches, for example, havebecome big security headaches for the government because there have beennumerous episodes of mass violence and riots in the afte rmath of games, th elargest being th e Tabriz riots of 1994. The more ambitious youth fantasizeabout migra t ing to the West . It is against this general background that post-Is lamism has emerged as a way ou t , as a world v iew to integrate such alienatedand margina l ized segmen ts . Beyond al tern at ive thou ght , secular authent i c i tyinth e form of art, music and modern science is being offered by someenlightened leaders.

The other factor behind post-Islamism has to do with the paradoxes of theIs lamic state. First, the very Islamization of the state has led to a g row ingsecularization of fiqh, or jurisprudence. The absolute valayat-e faqih givespower to the faqih to change any law, precept or injunct ion that he feels is inthe interest of the state. Even th e C ons t i tu t ion and re l ig ious wajibat,obl igat ions , are not excluded. Because valayat, government in Islam, hasprecedence over all other obl igat ion s. Gove rnment is, according to Ayatol lahK h o me i n i , awjab vajibat ( the highest obl igat ion). Not only does this meansacrifice of religious sanctity in the interest of mundane exigencies, but alsoencroachment on the cle rgy ' s prerogative for an autonomous interpre tat ion ofshari'a.

O n the other hand, the u lama 's fatavas, or verdicts, on publ ic affairs, aresubject to approval by the valli-e faqih; and their access to haq-i imam,donat ions from the fa i th fu l , is condi t ional on the permission of the supremefaqih. F i n a l l y , th e fusion of state and rel ig ion has tarnished the spir i tual andsocial legi tim acy of the clergy , and many Iranian M us lim s tend to equate thefailures of the state with that of the ulama.

For the first t ime in its modern history, the sh i ' i ulama in Iran are losingthe i r independence and power and this development, i ronical ly, has been hap-pening unde r an Islam ic state. The ir prerogative s on fiqh are being undermined,and their f inancial independence and legitimacy before people are beingcur ta i l ed . This dependency of the ulama on the state worries many ulama in theyounger generation about their future and that of the ins t i tu t ion of clergy. Theyfeel that they may be better off if they leave dirty polit ics to politicians.

It should be borne in mind that the Is lamic Revolut ion in Iran did notemerge out of a strong Islamic movement. There was no strong Islamicmovement in Iran in the late 1970s. Islamization of society in Iran grew notfrom below as in Egypt, but largely was inaugurated from above by an Islamicgovernment after the Is lamic Re vo lut ion . This par t ly explains w hy largesegments of the popu lat ion resis ted the ins t i tu t ional izat ion of Islamic principlessuch as veiling, control of leisure and behavior in the post-revolution period.Post- Is lamism should be viewed in the l ight of these contradictions and fai lures ,


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52 * Baytwhich some religious leaders see as undermining Islam per se. In a sense, post-Islamism seeks to save Islam as faith by undoing Islamism as politics.The Future

Is there a future for post-Islamism? There is no guarantee that post-Islamism wil l prevail . Indeed, it has aroused criticism and opposition, largelyfrom power-holders and the more conservative elements with in both the stateand society. Soroush and his associates hav e been attacked by the pres iden t,some leading ayatollahs, and the foreign minister. The mo nthly Kiyan and someof Soroush's lectures have been attacked for advocating the separation ofreligion from the state. The wee kly Payam-e Daneshjou and vigilante groupsof hizbollah hav e assaulted th e mayor and Tehran municipal i ty for the spread ofmusic, moral laxity in the publ ic parks and for "Western-style urbanizat ion."In th e same way, colorful female outfit, bike-riding, women athletes, skiing, andwomen's public presence have been th e subjects of major outcries in HaftehName-ye Sobh, Jomhuri-ye Islami, Fahang-i A farineshu and other conservativepublications. For example, Farhang-e Afarinesh has summed the "problems"that it claims th e women's movement is causing:

. . . the growing presence of women in public places, freedom of fashion andcolorful outf i ts , legi t imizing in teract ion between me n, asser t iveness [of wom en]in pub lic , expressing independent opinions in the househo ld , ac t iv i ty in the maledomain , th e r igh t to h a v e jobs despite the opposition of fami ly or hu s b an d , andeducat ion as the first pr io r i ty unde r any c i rcumstance these are some of ideasthat are being fed to the society.The situation in Iran might remain in a state of flux and uncertainty.

Contradictory trends can continue to coexist for a long time. The 1980s iswitness to the resiliency of the Islamic state to contain such co nfl ict in gtendencies. However, the indications so far are that, despite these lapses, th epost-Islamist trend seems wel l under way. If it is allowed to grow, it is l ike lyto bring significant political changes in the country with vital implications forpolitical Islam in the M uslim world. More imm ediate ly, it is bound to pose achallenge to democrats about th e future of democracy in Iran.

12. See for example, Hafteh Name-ye Sobh, 12 Dey 1374; Jomhuri-ye Islami, 10Bahman 1374; Farhang-e Afarinesh, 26 Dey 1374.

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The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society