THE CHEONAN SINKING INCIDENT: ITS IMPACT TO THE INTER

THE CHEONAN SINKING INCIDENT:

ITS IMPACT TO THE INTER-KOREAN RELATION

(2010-2011)

By

DWI CAHYANI

ID No. 016201000026

A Thesis presented to the

School of International Relations, Communication and Law

President University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

Bachelor Degree in International Relations

Major in Defense Studies

2014

I

Teuku Rezasyah, Ph. D.

THESIS ADVISER

RECOMMENDATION LETTER

This thesis entitled “The Cheonan Sinking Incident: Its Impact to

the Inter-Korean Relations (2010-2011)” prepared and submitted by

Dwi Cahyani in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

of Bachelor in the School of International Relations, Communication

and Law has been reviewed and found to have satisfied the

requirements for a thesis fit to be examined. I therefore recommend

this thesis for Oral Defense.

Cikarang, Indonesia, _____________

Recommended and acknowledged by,

II

Dwi Cahyani

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this thesis, entitled “The Cheonan Sinking Incident:

Its Impact to the Inter-Korean Relations (2010-2011)” is, to the

best of my knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has

not been submitted, either in whole or in part, to another university to

obtain a degree.

Cikarang, Indonesia, _____________

III

PANEL OF EXAMINER

APPROVAL SHEET

The Panel of Examiners declares that the thesis entitled “The

Cheonan Sinking Incident: Its Impact to the Inter-Korean

Relations (2010-2011)” that was submitted by Dwi Cahyani

majoring in Security and Defense Studies from the School of

International Relations, Communication and Law was assessed and

approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on _____________.

Name and signature of Chair – Panel of Examiners

Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D.

Hendra Manurung, SIP., MA.

IV

ABSTRACT

Title: The Cheonan Sinking Incident: Its Impact to the Inter-Korean

Relations (2010-2011)

Keywords: Korean Peninsula, the Cheonan, bilateral diplomacy, conflict relations

This research is to analyze the impact of the Cheonan sinking incident and its

contribution to the development of inter-Korean relations. This research is

substantial in delivering information about the Cheonan sinking incident,

perspectives from the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People‟s Republic of

Korea, and international concern towards the incident. The timeframe of this

research is starting from the beginning of 2010 until early 2011. This research is a

descriptive and explanatory research with qualitative approach and conducts

library research by analyzing reports and documents from government of the ROK

and DORK as the primary sources. Generally, it was found by the ROK

investigation team that the sinking was caused by a torpedo attack made in DPRK

fired by a DPRK‟s submarine. On the other hand, the inspection group of the

National Defence Commission (NDC) of the DPRK stated that the case was the

most hideous conspiratorial case in the history of the nation faked up by the US

and ROK. Finally, the Cheonan sinking incident was impacting intensely to the

aftermath inter-Korean relations.

V

ABSTRAK

Judul: Insiden Tenggelamnya Cheonan: Dampak Tenggelamnya Cheonan

terhadap Hubungan Antar-Korea (2010-2011)

Kata Kunci: semenanjung Korea, Cheonan, hubungan bilateral, hubungan

konflik

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis dampak tenggelammnya Cheonan dan

kontribusi insiden ini terhadap hubungan bilateral antara Republik Demokrasi

Rakyat Korea dan Republik Korea. Penielitian ini berisikan informasi tentan

peristiwa tenggelamnya kapal Cheonan, pandangan serta aksi pemerintah Korea

Utara dan Korea Selatan terhadap kejadian ini, serta tanggapan dari masyarakat

internasional terhadap tenggelamnya Cheonan. Tenggang waktu yang digunakan

dalam penelitian ini ialah awal tahun 2010 sebelum Cheonan tenggelam sampai

dengan awal tahun 2011. Penilitian ini merupakan penelitian deskiptif dan

eksplanatori dengan pendekatan kualitatif, dan mengadakan studi kepustakaan

dengan menganalisis laporan dan dokumen dari pemerintah Republik Demokrasi

Rakyat Korea dan Republik Korea sebagai sumber utama data. Telah

disampaikan oleh tim investigasi Republik Korea bahwa penyebab tenggelamnya

Cheonan ialah ledakan dari luar yang berasal dari serangan torpedo yang dibuat

oleh Republik Demokrasi Rakyat Korea. Disisi lain, kelompok investigasi

Republik Demokrasi Rakyat Korea mnyatakan bahya kejadian ini merupakan

kejadian yang diskenariokan oleh Amerika dan pemerintahan presiden Lee

Myung-bak. Pada akhirnya, insiden tenggelamnya Cheonan berdampak buruk

pada hubungan antar-Korea.

VI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank Allah swt. for allowing me to finish this research.

This research is made under the sincere guidance of Teuku Rezasyah, Ph. D. and

Nabilla Sabban, MA. I would like to thank them for their exemplary guidance,

monitoring, and constant encouragement throughout the course of this research. I

would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to the Dean of School of

International Relations, Communication and Law, Prof. Anak Agung Banyu

Perwita who gave the golden opportunity to do this research.

In this opportunity, I would like to express my profound gratitude and

deep regards to my parents, Madiyono and Retty Ismail, who have fully supported

and provided all the things I need during this research writing process. Thanks

also go to my siblings, Amalia Mardiana Ramadhani and Muhammad Riski Adit

Triyono who have always been my motivation to finish this research in time.

Thanks to my friends Yolanda Ratnasari, Nadhika Sabrina Kartini,

Adhysta Prahaswari, Atika Trina Sari, Dinar Syarita Bhakti, and Nurul Mar‟atus

Solihah for helping me collecting the data and accompanying me finishing this

research. Not to forget, Faculty of Business and International Relations of

President University for all the preparation, suggestion, assistance, and solutions.

The blessing, help and guidance given by all of them time to time shall

carry me a long way in the journey of life on which I am about to embark.

Without their help, I would not be able to finish this research.

Researcher

February 2014

VII

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THESIS ADVISER RECOMMENDATION LETTER…………….…..……I

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY…………………………….……..….II

PANEL OF EXAMINER APPROVAL SHEET…………………..….…….III

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………….....….…….IV

ABSTRAK..………………………………………………….……….……...V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT…………………….………………....…….……VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………..…....VII

LIST OF TABLES………………………………...…………..…..….….....XI

LIST OF FIGURES……………………….…...………...……...….………XII

LIST OF ACRONYMS…………………………………...…………...….XIII

I. INTRODUCTION………………………..…………………..…..….…1

I.1 Background of the Study.……………………………….……..….…1

I.2 Problem Identification……….………………..………….……….…4

I.3 Statement of the Problem.…………………..………………..…..…..5

I.4 Research Objectives….……………..………………………...….….5

I.5 Significance of the Study…………………….…..….............………6

I.6 Theoretical Framework……………………………..………….…….6

1.6.1 Diplomacy….…………………………………………..……....6

VIII

1.6.1.1 Bilateral Diplomacy.……………………………….…...….7

1.6.1.1 Multilateral Diplomacy.…………………….…….………..7

1.6.2 Conflict Relations.………………………..………….……...….8

I.7 Scope and Limitation of the Study.…………..…………....…..…….9

1.7.1 Limitation ….….….....…………….. …………………..……...9

1.7.2 Scope ….………..….………………………………..…..…….10

I.8 Definition of Terms…….…………....….………………………..…10

1.8.1 Korean Peninsula…….…….….……....…………….…….…..10

1.8.2 Republic of Korea (ROK)…… ….……….…..………........…..10

1.8.3 Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea...……....…………....11

1.8.4 The Cheonan…….………………………….………...….…….11

I.9 Research Outline…………….……..…………………..……..……13

1.9.1 Introduction.…………………..….……….……………….…..14

1.9.2 Literature Review….………..…….…………...….……….….14

1.9.3 Research Methodology….……….….…………………….…..14

1.9.4 Inter-Korean Relations….………….………………...……….14

1.9.5 The Cheonan Sinking...….….…………………….….…….... 14

1.9.6 Conclusion…...………………….……………..…….……….15

II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………......…16

II.1 Background of Literature Review…….………..…………….……..16

II.2 Journals Review…..……………....……………..….……….……..16

II.3 Working Papers of Previous Research…….…………..…….....…..28

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY………….…………………….……...33

III.1 Research Method..………………….…………….....……………..33

III.2 Data Collection……..…………….……………..…...……………..34

IX

III.3 Research Time and Place….……………………..……..……...…..37

IV. THE CHEONAN SINKING INCIDENT ………………..….......….....38

IV.1 The Cheonan Sinking …….………………….…………………….38

IV.2 The Cheonan Sinking Investigation Result ….………………..…..41

4.2.1 JIG Investigation Result…………….…….……….…….…....41

4.2.2 NCD of the DPRK Open Announcement……….……….……47

V. INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS AFTER THE CHEONAN SINKING

INCIDENT………………………………………………………………… 54

V.1 May 24 Measures….………….…………..…………….…….…….55

V.2 The 38th

working level military talks …….…………………….…..57

V.3 Yeonpyeong Island artillery shelling …..………….…………...….58

V.4 The 39th

working level military talks ……..…..….…......................59

VI. CONCLUSION………………………..………………….……....…….62

LIST OF REFERENCES………………………...…..……...………………67

APPENDICES

X

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Research Timeframe 37

Table 2. Detection method and characteristics of torpedos 45

XI

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The recovered remains of the ROKS Cheonan warship 38

Figure 2. 3D laser scan image of the fractured bow and stern 43

Figure 3. Schematic of torpedo and recovered rear section of torpedo 44

Figure 4. Korean Writing in Torpedo body 44

Figure 5. Korean Writing in Torpedo body 2 44

Figure 6. CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by DPRK 45

XII

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ROK Republic of Korea

DPRK Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea

JIG Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group

NDC National Defence Commission

US The United States

ROKS Republic of Korea Ship

UN The United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

HIIK Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research

SOF Special Operation Forces

UK The United Kingdom

KCNA Korean Commission of North Korea

NLL Northern Limit Line

UNC United Nations Command

MAC Military Armistice Commission

MBC Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation

NPT Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon Treaty

KPA Korean People‟s Army

1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.1 Background of the Study

The Korean Peninsula is still divided by wounds of the Cold War

and is one of the most heavily militarized areas of the world1. Despite its

size, this area represents a significant threat to regional and global peace

and stability2. Since the Division of Korea in 1945 and Korean War in

1950-1953, relations between the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea

(DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have been strained. The two

Korean states subsequently not only pursued divergent development

strategies but also pushed those strategies to extremes, in which ROK not

only adopted a capitalist system but also went on to pioneer an outward-

oriented development strategy, emphasizing international trade as a

catalyst, while DPRK, in contrast, not only chose central planning but also

intentionally time-phased its plans to frustrate linkages with those of other

fraternally allied socialist states and in doing so created the world‟s most

autarkic economy, is notable in the degree to which markets were

repressed3.

Over the last 60 years the ROK and DPRK have lived in the era of

confrontation4. In particular, the Korean Peninsula was facing a critical

1 Felician, S. (2011, August 24). North and South Korea: A Frozen Coflict on the Vege of

Unfreezing? pp. 1-2

2 Ibid

3 Noland, M. (2007, July-September). The Future of North Korea is South Korea (Or hope springs

eternal). World Economics , p. 27 4 Ministery of Unification. (2013, July). Retrieved October 11, 2013, from Special Office for Inter-

Korean Dialogue: http://dialogue.unikorea.go.kr

2

turning point with the sinking of the Republic of Korea naval ship the

Cheonan off the coast of the Korean peninsula on 26 March 2010, with the

loss of 46 lives5.

Later on, the ROK government formed a Joint Civilian-Military

Investigation Group involved Korean and foreign expert in investigating

the sinking of the 1200-ton corvette of the ROK Navy. According to

results obtained, the sinking was caused by a torpedo attack made in

DPRK fired by a DPRK‟s submarine6.

The sinking of the Cheonan constitutes a military provocation

against the Republic of Korea by Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea,

as stated by ROK President Lee Myung Bak on May 24, 20107. The

North‟s military provocation violated the United Nations and contravened

the existing agreement reached for the sake of peace and stability on the

Korean Peninsula8. The government of ROK took stern measures in

holding the North accountable such as by forbidding DPRK ship to make

passage through any of the shipping lanes in the waters under the South

control and suspending trade and exchange between the two countries. The

government of ROK urged DPRK authorities to apologize immediately

and punish those who are responsible and involved in the incident9.

On the other hand, the inspection group of the National Defence

Commission (NDC) of the DPRK stated that the case was the most

hideous conspiratorial case in the history of the nation faked up by the US

5 Lee, M.-B. (2010, May 24). National Committee on North Korea. Retrieved October 7, 2013,

from National Committee on North Korea: http://www.crf.org

6 JIG. (2010). Investigation Result on the sinking of ROKS "Cheonan". Seoul: Ministery of

Defense of the Republic of Korea 7 Lee, M.-B. (2010, May 24). National Committee on North Korea. Retrieved October 7, 2013,

from National Committee on North Korea: http://www.crf.org 8 Ibid

9 Ibid

3

and ROK. According to the DPRK foreign ministry spokesman, the result

of the investigation into the case announced by the U.S. and the ROK

authorities are a sheer fabrication. If they are true, there will be no reason

for them to refuse to receive the inspection group of the National Defence

Commission of the DPRK as already proposed by it to have those "results"

confirmed objectively10

.

To begin with the “team for investigation” was formed in such a

way that it could not make a scientific and objective investigation, and it is

clear from the fact that the ROK military supervised the investigation.

Moreover, the US, which is in the hostile relationship with the DPRK, was

included in “international joint investigation team” alongside with Britain,

Australia and Canada11

. The course in which the results of the

investigation changed several times and they were fabricated to gradually

focus on the story about "a torpedo attack of the North" goes to prove that

the investigation was unscientific and nonobjective12

.

The Republic of Korea interpreted this incident as a military

provocation by DPRK in which the state continued insisting that ROK

Government fabricated the sinking of the Cheonan such as the incident of

the bombing in midair of Korean Air Flight 85813

. In contrast, the

Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea believed that the incident was

conducted according to the script already worked out by ROK and US, just

as the US did Iraq on February 2003 with sheer lies regarding to

information about the existence of weapons of mass destruction14

. If the

10

National Committee on North Korea. (2010, June 4). Retrieved October 7, 2013, from KCNA:

http://www.kcna.co.jp

11 Ibid

12 Ibid

13 Lee, M.-B. (2010, May 24). National Committee on North Korea. Retrieved October 7, 2013,


14 National Committee on North Korea. (2010, June 4). Retrieved October 7, 2013, from KCNA:


4

UNSC is again taken in by U.S. lies and tables the "results of the

investigation" into the "Cheonan" warship and discusses them, then this

will mean that the UNSC is misused for encroaching upon the dignity of

the Korean people and the sovereignty of the DPRK15

.

The purpose of the study is to analyze the impact of the sinking of

ROK Naval ship Cheonan off the coast of the Korean Peninsula in military

aspect of inter-Korean relations. The study will begin with an overview of

the recent tensions in the Korean Peninsula and the incident of Cheonan

sinking. It will present various official documents and statements from the

Republic of Korea and the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea, and

public opinion from Korean citizens. The study will then use two

theoretical frameworks to analyze the influence of the Cheonan sinking on

military aspect of inter-Korean relations, in which bilateral diplomacy and

conflict relations will elaborate the development of inter-Korean relations.

Finally, using the findings from the perspectives of two countries and

diplomatic relations conducted by them, the study will provide some

recommendation on how the two states and international society may

better respond such incident and maintain the stability and security of the

Korean Peninsula.

I.2 Problem Identification

The central problem of this study is peak tension between ROK

and DPRK after the Cheonan sinking on March 26, 2010 off coast of the

Korean Peninsula. Despite the result of the investigation by JIG of ROK

that the sinking of Cheonan was due to torpedo explosion by the DPRK,

the government of DPRK firmly stated that the incident had nothing to do

with it16

. Instead of apologizing and taking responsibility as ROK urged,

DPRK provided some evidences that the incident was fabricated by the

15

Ibid 16

National Committee on North Korea. (2010, May 28). Retrieved October 7, 2013, from KCNA:


5

ROK government. ROK government and some other states have given

strict sanction towards the DPRK and it led to a more severe humanitarian

issue in the peninsula due to the suspension of international aids to the

country.

The issues related to the conflict in Korean peninsula constitute an

act of defiance which threatens not only the peace and security of the

Korean Peninsula but also international peace and security17

. It has

become an international issue in which the two states and international

society need to play a constructive role to avert and solve the conflict in

the Korean peninsula. Revealing the fact behind the Cheonan sinking and

analyzing military aspects of inter-Korean relations after the incident is a

very interesting topic to be discussed involving the two states‟

perspectives on the incident.

I.3 Statement of the Problem

Topic: Inter-Korean Relations

Questions:

What was the fact behind the Cheonan sinking incident?

How was the Cheonan sinking incident impacting to the military aspect of

inter-Korean relations?

I.4 Research Objectives

- To elaborate the perspectives on the Cheonan sinking incident

- To analyze the influence of the incident to military aspect of inter-Korean

relations

17

Kim, S.-H. (2012, December 12). Ministery of Unification. Retrieved October 7, 2013, from

Ministery of Unification: http://www.unikorea.go.kr

6

I.5 Significance of the Study

The issues in Korean Peninsula are very important in many ways.

To the DPRK, the interdependency of aids from other countries cannot be

omitted since the government has failed to fulfill its obligation to serve the

people. There are about six million DPRK people who are so close to

death because of famine and more than 150,000 people have been detained

without trial for political reasons18

. To the ROK, the sinking of a ROK‟s

naval vessel, bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, and cyber sabotage

against a ROK‟s major bank, have caused damage and threatened the

security of the state. The nuclear weapon possessed by DPRK also

threatens regional even world security.

This study hopes to provide a fresh perspective on the issues in the

sinking of Cheonan off coast of the Korean Peninsula to facilitate more

strategies deal with the problem. A secure and prosperous Korean

Peninsula that respect world peace and international law will benefit not

only its own citizens, but also the global society as well.

I.6 Theoretical Framework

1.6.1 Diplomacy

Diplomacy is an essentially political activity and, well resourced

and skillful, a major ingredient of power. Its chief purpose is to enable

states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resource

to force, propaganda, or law19

. Diplomacy is an important mean for a

state in pursuing the state‟s foreign policy. It is used to be carried out

by officials and private persons under official instructions.

18

Saragih, B. (2012, May). The Jakarta Post. Retrieved July 2013, from The Jakarta Post:

http://www.thejakartapost.com

19 Berridge, G.R. (2005). Diplomacy Theory and Practice Third Edition, pg. 1

7

The main function of diplomacy is negotiation, in which it consists

of discussions between official representatives to achieve the formal

agreement, either of shared concern or dispute settlement toward an

issue between them. Beside negotiation, other functions of diplomacy

are information gathering, lobbying, clarifying intentions, supporting

commercial and financial activities, assisting nationals abroad, and

promoting popular sympathy for the state‟s foreign policy- at home as

well as abroad20

. In order to embrace these other functions, diplomacy

is pursued through direct communications, bilateral diplomacy,

multilateral diplomacy, summitry, and mediation.

1.6.1.1 Bilateral Diplomacy

Bilateral diplomacy will mean the conduct of relations on a state-

to-state basis via formally accredited resident missions, which is the

conventional method in conducting bilateral diplomacy21

. Harold

Nicholson introduced the term „French system diplomacy‟ considering

the important influence of France in conducting relations between

civilized states. 22

Resident mission, secret diplomacy, and

professionalization are key features in French system diplomacy.

Particular diplomacy required extensive knowledge and technical

expertise with controlled entry, proper training, clear ranks, and

regular payment23

.

1.6.1.2 Multilateral Diplomacy

Multilateral diplomacy is where communication is conducted

principally by means of verbal, face-to-face exchange attended by

three or more states. It is vary hugely in subject, scope, level of

20

Berridge, G.R. (2005). Diplomacy Theory and Practice Third Edition, pg. 91 21

Berridge, G.R. (2005). Diplomacy Theory and Practice Third Edition pg. 108 22

Nicholson, 1954 in Berridge, 2005 23

Callieres, in Berridge, 2005

8

attendance, longevity, and extent of bureaucratization rather than

predominantly written style of bilateral diplomacy. 24

According to

Berridge, in certain circumstances multilateral diplomacy provides the

best chance for a successful negotiation. As mentioned by Sir Maurice

Hankey, in a conference, the particular issue discussed is subject-

focused and concentrates minds, involving parties whose agreement

and perspectives are necessary. The conference has its goals, and there

must be a target or deadline to achieve the goals25

I.6.2 Conflict Relations

The word „conflict‟ comes from the Latin word „confligere‟ which

means „bumping into each other‟ or „beating up of

something/someone‟. These refer to the direct action of a state or a

structure26

. Lots of definition of conflict, depending on the scope and

theories applied. According to the Heidelberg Institute for International

Conflict Research (HIIK), conflict refers to the clashing of interest

(positional differences) over national values of some duration and

magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, group

of states, organization) that are determined to pursue their interest and

win their cases27

.

Conflict can be defined by these following characteristics:

Conflict requires at least two parties or two analytically distinct

units or entities

Conflict arises from „positional scarcity‟ or „resource scarcity‟

24

Berridge, G.R. (2005). Diplomacy Theory and Practice Third Edition pg. 151 25

Hankey, pp. 35-7, in Berridge, 2005 26

Bonacker, T. and Schmidt, L.: Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien der Konfliktforschung.

Studienmaterial der Friedenswissenschaftlichen Weiterbildungsstudiengänge IF Master of Peace

Studies. Hagen 2005 27

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research: Conflict Barometer 2006. Retrieved

from: http://www.hiik.de/konfliktbarometer/index.html.de (Accessed September 9 2013

9

Conflicting behaviors are those designed to destroy, injure, thwart,

or otherwise control another party" (...) "and a conflict relationship

is one in which the parties can gain (relatively) only at each other's

expense

Conflict requires interaction among parties in which actions and

counteractions are mutually opposed"

Conflict relations always involve attempts to gain control of scarce

resources and positions or to influence behavior in certain

directions, (...) the attempt to acquire or use power or the actual use

of power28

Conflict is normal, ubiquitous, and unavoidable, as an inherent

feature of human existence. It is almost impossible to conceive a

conflict-free situation29

.

I.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

1.7.1 Limitation

The majority of the material available on this subject is the official

documents and statements from government of the Republic of Korea

and the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea regarding to the

sinking of Cheonan. The conflict between both Korean countries was

escalated again after the DPRK‟s second nuclear test in 2009 and was

in peak after the sinking of the Korean naval vessel on March 26,

2010. This study will present the various results of the investigation

28 Mack, R. W. and Snyder, R. C.: The Analysis of Conflict – Toward an overview and Synthesis.

In: Smith, C. G. (ed.): Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences. Notre Dame

1971, pp. 8-9

29 Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V. and William Zartman, Introduction: The Nature of Conflict and

Conflict Resolution, The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution

10

held by both ROK and DPRK government, the country reports to the

UN, and the UN and international responses regarding to the incident.

1.7.2 Scope

The key focus of this study is the analysis on the impact of the

Cheonan sinking to military aspect of inter-Korean relations. A

number of issues will be covered in detail by this study such as a

strategic interest of parties involved in the incident according to the

theoretical framework used. This study will not analyze in detail how

other states‟ involvements in this incident have influenced the

development of the conflict.

I.8 Definition of Terms

There are several basic keywords that will be used frequently, namely:

1.8.1 Korean Peninsula

The Korean peninsula is a peninsula in East Asia, extends

southwards for about 1,100 km from continental Asia into the

Pacific Ocean. After the Korean War 1953, northern division of

the peninsula was governed by the DPRK, while the southern

was governed by the ROK.

In this research, the term „Korean peninsula‟ is also used to

name both countries the DPRK and ROK.

1.8.2 Republic of Korea (ROK)

Republic of Korea (Daehan Minguk) is a country in East Asia

constitutes the southern part of the Korean Peninsula30

. ROK

maintains diplomatic relations with more than 188 countries in

the world. However, its relations with the DPRK are most

tense. ROK and the DPRK continue to claim sovereignty over

the peninsula and surrounded island. The Korean Peninsula

30

CIA. (2013). The World Factbook. Directorate of intelligence

11

was facing a critical turning point after the incident of the

Cheonan sinking, as stated by President Lee Myung-bak31

.

ROK formed an investigation team in addressing the incident,

namely, Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG). JIG

assessed that the sinking was caused by a torpedo attack, and

concluded that the torpedo was fired by DPRK submarine32

.

1.8.3 Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (Choson Minjujuui

Inmin Kongwhaguk) is a country in East Asia, in the northern

part of the Korean Peninsula33

. The state emphasizes the

ideology of Juche, self reliance and independence in foreign

affairs, but it has no diplomatic or economic isolation34

. In

relations to the Cheonan sinking, DPRK stated that it had

nothing to do with the incident, as issued by the National

Defence Commission on their Issues Statement 20 May, 2010.

The DPRK warned ROK not to make reckless remarks

concerning the sinking of warship “Cheonan”35

.

1.8.4 The Cheonan

Republic of Korea Ship Cheonan (Patrol Combat Corvette-772

1987) is a Pohang-class corvette, served as part of the ROK

Navy up till March 2010. Its primary mission was coastal

patrol, utilizing her 9.5ft draught to good effect in close inshore

patrol work near the DPRK coast36

. On the night of March 26,

31

Lee, M.-B. (2010, May 24). National Committee on North Korea. Retrieved October 7, 2013,


32

JIG. (2010). Investigation Result on the sinking of ROKS "Cheonan". Seoul: Ministery of

Defense of the Republic of Korea 33

CIA. (2013). The World Factbook. Directorate of intelligence 34

NCNK. (2011). DDPRK DIplomatic Relations. Washington: The National COmmittee on North

Korea 35

NDC. (2010). National Defence Commisssion Issue Statement. Pyongyang: DPRK NCD 36

ROKS Cheonan PCC772. (2013, September 5). Retrieved January 20, 2014, from Military

Factory: http://www.militaryfactory.com

12

2010, the Cheonan sank in the Yellow Ocean at a closest point

of ROK territory to the DPRK. According to JIG assessment, a

strong underwater explosion generated by torpedo caused the

Cheonan to split apart and sink37

.

37


Defense of the Republic of Korea

13

I.9 Research Outline

Research Question: The Cheonan Sinking Incident's Impact to Military Aspect of Inter-Korean Relations

Introduction to the Cheonan Sinking Case

Overview of the case

Republic of Korea

The Cheonan sinking was caused by a

torpedo

ROK condemned DPRK for incident

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DPRK has nothing to do with the

incident

The Cheonan sinking was

fabricated by ROK

CH I

CH II

Qualitative approach is used to analyze the collected data

using the diplomacy and conflict theory CH III

The Cheonan Sinking Incident

ROK government perspective (JIG Result)

DPRK government perspective (NDC Report)

CH IV

Inter Korean Relations after the Cheonan

Sinking Incident

May 24 Measures

Working Level Military Talks

Yeonpyeong Island Artillery Shelling

International concern

CH V

Conclusion: Impacts of the

Cheonan sinking to military

aspect of inter-Korean relations CH VI

14

1.9.1 Chapter I INTRODUCTION

The first chapter of this research is aimed to explain the problem

discussed and the purpose of this research. This chapter consists

of the background of the problem, problem identification, and

statement of problems, significance of the study, theoretical

framework, scope and limitation, and definition of specific

terms which are used frequently in this research.

1.9.2 Chapter II LITERATURE REVIEW

The second chapter of this research is aimed to present varieties

of perspectives on the issue of the Cheonan sinking from books,

journals, and previous research on the same area of interest.

1.9.3 Chapter III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The third chapter of this research is intended to introduce the

reader about the methodology used in conducting the research.

The researcher mentioned and elaborated how the research was

conducted by using a qualitative approach.

1.9.4 Chapter IV THE CHEONAN SINKING INCIDENT

The fourth chapter of this research tells the reader about the

Cheonan sinking incident (what, why, when, where, who, and

how), and analysis of the collected data and perspectives from

ROK and DPRK.

1.9.5 Chapter V INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS AFTER THE

CHEONAN SINKING INCIDENT

The fifth chapter of this research explains the development of

military relations between the ROK and DPRK after the

Cheonan sinking incident.

15

1.9.6 Chapter VI CONCLUSION

The sixth chapter of this research consists of the conclusion and

recommendation of the research. And policy and sanction that

might be useful in supporting the stability and security of the

Korean peninsula will be suggested.

16

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

II.1 Background to Literature Review

The incident of the Cheonan sinking is one of the most

phenomenal events happened in the brink of the Korean Peninsula. It was

a turning point in ROK-DPRK relations, encompassed the lives of Korean

military personnel and the warship crews. The conflict in the Korean

Peninsula is not a new topic of interstate, regional, even international

concerns. Moreover, the policies pursued in the area of conflict are worth

to be elaborated. This phenomenon has attracted scholars and researcher to

sink and interpreted the issue. The researcher presented several analyses

regarding to the Cheonan sinking incident to be utilized as a comparison

and supported data of the research. These consist of four titles journals

and three titles of working papers from previous researches which have

the same area of interest in the case of the Cheonan sinking.

II.2 Journals Review

2.2.1 Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. (2010). The Implication of the Cheonan

Sinking: A Security Studies Perspective

This journal mentioned the events happened prior and after the

incident of the Cheonan sinking. On March 26, 2010, an ROK Navy ship

Cheonan was split in half caused by a bubble effect from a wake homing

torpedo. The Cheonan was not only sailing in the Republic of Korea

17

territory, but also in the territory recognized by the Democratic People‟s

of Republic of Korea as being ROK Sovereignty38

.

The sinking of the Cheonan was an act of provocation by the

DPRK, as most of provocations by DPRK “have four things in common:

o The plans are invited when the country is being the attention of the

region and even the world stage.

o The incidents are relatively small, easily operated and quickly resolved.

o The tactics and techniques are unpredictable

o DPRK denies responsibility”39

Bechtol mentioned that since 1999, DPRK often involves acts of

provocations like a naval battle that sank a DPRK Ship and one of their

naval ships sank a ROK patrol crash in 2002. The DPRK also conducted

a nuclear test in 2006, and in January 2009, the Pyongyang‟s state-run

television broadcasted a demand for ROK to stop its military posture on

the Korean Peninsula. There was some leadership moves place Kim

Jong-il‟s most trusted people began in January 200940

. General Kim

Kyok-sik was assigned as the new commander of the fourth corps of the

DPRK Army; he was formerly chief of the general staff41

. Another

important shuffling was made when General O Kuk-ryol was assigned a

senior position on the National Defence Commission (NDC)42

.

38

Bechtol, B. E. (2010). The Implication of the Cheonan Sinking: A Security Studies Perspective.

International Journal of Korean Unification Studies , 1-40 39

Bechtol, B. E. (2010). The Cheonan Incident and North Korea's NLL Strategy. International

Journal of Korean Unification Study 40

Ser, M.-j., & Kim, M.-s. (2009, January 19). Seoul Goes on Alert After Sharp Attack by

Pyongyang. Retrieved October 15, 2013, from JoongAng Ilbo:

http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?

41 JoongAhn Ilbo. (2009, March 16). A Provocation by General Kim Kyok-sik Plotting Comeback

in Pyongyang? Retrieved October 15, 2013, from JoongAhn Ilbo:

http://nk.joins.com/news/view.asp?aid=3335047&cont=news_polit

42 AFP. (2009, February 20). N. Korea‟s Kim Picks Hawk for Top Military Post. Retrieved

October 15, 2013, from Asia News:

http://asia.news.yahoo.com/090220/afp/090220064136asiapacificnews.html

18

Thereafter, the operation department was taken out of Korean Workers

Party control and placed under the Reconnaissance Bureau control. It

seemed like General O Kuk- ryol was involved in the sinking of

Cheonan and the Reconnaissance Bureau conducted the attack. After the

key players were in their position, two key events that occurred prior to

the attack on the Cheonan were a naval skirmish occurred on November

10, 2009, violated the NLL near Daechong Island and large scale

artillery live fire exercise conducted by DPRK at the end January 201043

.

The Cheonan, which was on a routine mission on the NLL, sank

before 9: 45 pm on the night March 26, 201044

. According to that

statement from the captain of the ship, it split in half of five minutes

after the explosion occurred. On March 30, 2010 ROK concluded that

the sinking of Cheonan was due to an external explosion, and revealed

that another ROK ship the corvette Sochko – fired an object which was

thought as the DPRK ship right after the explosion. It was revealed that

DPRK submarine had left it‟s based on the west coast; however the

Cheonan could not detect any submarines near it. On April 9, 2010, an

unidentified government official released to the press that a torpedo

launched by an SOF craft (subordinate to the Reconnaissance Bureau)45

.

It was also known that DPRK submarines came into ROK waters

between March 23 and 27, 2010.

On May 2010 the ROK Defense Ministry confirmed that the

suspect has most likely the Reconnaissance Bureau and 130 ton Yeoneo-

class submarine was most likely launching the torpedo investigator team

43

Bechtol, B. E. (2010). The Cheonan Incident and North Korea's NLL Strategy. International

Journal of Korean Unification Study 44

Yonhap. (2010, March 26). S. Korean Ship Sinking in Yellow Sea. Retrieved October 15, 2013,

from Yonhap News:

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/03/27/13/0301000000AEN20100327000100315

45 Pak, P.-c., & Na, K.-c. (2010, April 10). Sinking of ROK‟s Cheonan Attributed to General

Reconnaissance Bureau of North. Retrieved October 15, 2013, from Segye Ilbo:

http://www.segye.com/Articles/Main.asp

19

also revealed that the traces of explosive residue were identical to what

was contained in DPRK torpedo46

. In mid-April, the investigator team

reported that the sinking of Cheonan was caused by “bubble jet” effect

(external explosion causing a water shock wave)47

.

The JIG (Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group) stated that

“A strong underwater explosion generated by the donation of homing

torpedo below and to the left of the gas turbine room caused Republic of

Korea Ship (ROKS) “Cheonan” to split apart and sink”. JIG found

evidence written in Hangul “1 번” (No. 1) matched with DPRK‟s

provided for export purposes. They also confirmed that 2-3 days prior to

the attack, one Sango-class submarine and one Yeoneo-class submarine

had departed. As predicted, the DPRK Government denied any

involvement and responsibility in the attack. President Lee Myung-bak

announced the ROK punitive actions towards the DPRK such as

suspension of the trade between both states, prohibition for a DPRK ship

to make passage through any shipping lanes under South‟s control, and a

ban for all ROK citizens on travel to the DPRK.

At the end of May 2010, NCD again denied the result of JIG

Investigation; deny that DPRK had 130 ton Yeoneo-class submarines,

even though the satellite imagery in Google Earth had revealed that

Yueneo of DPRK was on its port48

. The Cheonan Sinking is referred to

the UNSC: Result and Disappointments. ROK referred the sinking of

Cheonan case to UNSC in June, 2010, and as a good sign, UNSC

extended the sanction to DPRK (sanction given in 2009 because of

46

Kim, S.-h. (2010, May 26). Reconnaissance Bureau is Heart of N.K. Terrorism. Retrieved

October 15, 2013, from Korea Herald:

http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100526000675

47 JIG of ROK. (2010). Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS "Cheonan". Seoul: Ministry

of Defense of the Republic of Korea 48


International Journal of Korean Unification Studies , 1-40

20

nuclear and ballistic missile test by DPRK)49

. There was no objective

forum UNSC when ROK submitted the JIG result. However, knowing

Beijing‟s close relationship to Pyongyang, UNSC did not give

appropriate action to be taken because China would not accept a

condemnation due to the effort in defusing tensions for the time being.

The thing is that the UNSC condemned the attack which led to the

sinking of the Cheonan50

.

In this journal, Bechtol demonstrated the important events after the

UNSC released statement regarding the sinking of the Cheonan. Seoul

invited China and Russia to evaluate the JIG result, but China refused it.

DPRK ships had been ordered to leave ROK water as the sanction given

by the ROK government. The marketing catalog about DPRK torpedo

was revealed completed with an equality assurance guarantee. Evidence

that revealed to the sinking of Cheonan is the existence of DPRK Poster

in Pyongyang: ship smashed in two by a sailor‟s fist, “Ready to crush

any attack with a single blow!”51

.

49

Breltbart. (2010, June 2). Mandate of U.N. Panel on N. Korea Sanctions extended for 1 Yr+.

Retrieved October 15, 2013, from Breltbart:

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9G6GRD01&show_article=1

50 Kirk, D. (2010, July 12). Why North Korea Cheonan Sinking Gets Wrist Slap from U.N.

Retrieved October 15, 20113, from Christian Science Monitor:

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0712/Why-North-Korea-Cheonan-sinking-

gets-wrist-slap-from-UN

51 Han, S. J., Young, J., & Scarlatoiu, G. (2010, July 2010). Posters Show Smashed Ship. Retrieved

October 15, 2013, from Radio Free Asia: http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/poster-

07152010143832.html?searchterm=None, the figure of the poster is attached in the appendix

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/poster-07152010143832.html?searchterm=None

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/poster-07152010143832.html?searchterm=None

21

US announced their new sanction for DPRK at the end of July,

targeting weapons proliferation and activities that brought profits to the

DPRK elite. Russia‟s state-run television network stated that the

Cheonan was sunk by DPRK torpedo, without publicly revealing the

result of their investigation. Despite the evidences provided by JIG

investigation, among the few naysayers, there was Professor Singing Lee

of the University School of Advanced International Studies claiming that

there was no sufficient evidence. The (No. 1) could be produced by ROK

as well, while the JIG consists of USA, ROK UK, Australia, and Sweden

would conspire to fabricate the evidence and justify its claim52

.

The writer emphasized that ROK and the US began making

important moves in countering possible attack from DPRK just like

when both countries conducted joint naval drills in June, and combined

exercise in July, and a large anti-submarine exercise near the west coast

of the Korean Peninsula in August. On June ROK was the host nation

for a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), while in October 2010; ROK

hosted a multinational stimulating the interdiction of WMD‟s53

.

ROK actions were deliberate and transparent in doing the

investigation instead of conducting a retaliatory strike against DPRK.

The punctuated actions were aiming political, economic and military of

Pyongyang, impacting coffers of the elite, disallowing passage of DPRK

ships to ROK waters, while increasing exercise focused on anti-

submarines warfare and anti-provocation activities.

American roles were important in responding the events like to

participate in JIG investigation and Naval exercise, also increasing

sanctions aiming at illicit North activities. It‟s disappointing that US has

not put DPRK on the list of nations supporting terrorism. The DPRK is

likely to continue its provocation. In fact, DPRK attacked NLL area on

52

Lee, S.-h. (2010). Comments on the Section "Adsorbed Material Analysis" of the Cheonan

Report made by the South Korean Civil and Military Joint Investigation (CIV-MIL JIG). Virginia 53


International Journal of Korean Unification Studies , 1-40

22

November 23, 2010. Resisting DPRK threats is the only practical policy

in maintaining stability of the Korean Peninsula.

2.2.2 Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun (2011). Cheonan and

Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to DPRK‟s

Provocations

This Journal explored about the response from Northeast Asian

countries to the sinking of the Cheonan on 26 March 2010. It was shown

as a periodic incident within the inter-Korean relations, followed by

Yeonpyeong Island artillery shelling on 23 November 2010, and had

evoked different response from regional society. After the Korean War

ended in 1953, DPRK continued practicing their hostile military

strategy. The incidents in 2010 were being a turning point in the scale of

Pyongyang military provocation, since 1960s54

. The relations among

regional actors were influenced by these events, such as Sino-US

interaction, where US showed the commitments in Northeast Asia

stability, and aspiration of China in expanding its regional political and

security influence.

As noted by Snyder and Byun, an action taken by Lee Myung-bak

administration in forming an investigation group (the Joint Civilian-

Military Investigation Group), despite putting the blame to the DPRK,

drew praise from international society. According to the investigation

result, an „external explosion‟ from torpedo launched by DPRK turned

as the most likely cause of the sinking55

. The DPRK was denying its

involvement and accusing President Lee administration fabricating the

evidence56

. An investigation team from Russia also concluded that the

54

Michishita, N. (2009). North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1965-2008 55

JIG of ROK. (2010). Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS "Cheonan". Seoul: Ministry

of Defense of the Republic of Korea 56

NDC. (2010). Cheonan Incident Fabricated by the US and Lee Myung Bak Group of Traitors

was most Hideous Conspiratorial Farce in the Nation's History. Pyongyang: National Defence

Commission

23

evidence could not prove that DPRK torpedo was the cause of the

Cheonan sinking57

. China and US initiated a mediation (inter-Korean

dialogue) in mid-December 2010 after the Yeonpyeong artillery attack.

The talks broke down on 9 February 2011, showing the differences of

opinion of responsibility of the sinking of the Cheonan58

.

Snyder and Byun assumed that China was frustrated by ROK

efforts in brining the Cheonan incident into an international stage of the

UNSC. Beijing called for „calm and restrain‟ in responding the incident.

Sino-ROK relations had been damaged by China‟s handling of Cheonan

incident by blocking international censure towards Yeonpyeong Island

artillery shelling. China did not inform ROK in advance that the DPRK

president would attend the Shanghai Expo on 30 April59

. He concluded

that China‟s decision not to join international condemnation of

Pyongyang could be perceived as a setback in diplomatic relations with

the ROK.

China response towards the incidents was considered an attempt to

hold the DPRK responsible, while China considered US-ROK joint

exercise as a provocation in escalating tension on Korean Peninsula

according to Snyder and Byun. Chinese military leaders have tended

defending DPRK‟s position, according to US officials, moreover

China‟s refusal to condemn the DPRK with Security Council, and critic

towards US-ROK joint military expressed the wider gap between China

relations with the US and ROK after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong

Island incidents60

.

57

Ahn, M.-s. (2010). Sinking of ROKS Cheonan. 1-5 58

Korean Central News Agency. (2011, February 12). S. Korea Denounced for Sticking to Their

Policy of Confrontation. Retrieved January 11, 2014, from KCNA: http://www.kcna.co.jp

59 Na, J.-j. (2010, May 2). President Lee's China Trip Half Success. Korea Times

60 Snyder, S., & Byun, S.-w. (2011). Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to

North Korea's Provocation. The Rusi Journal , 74-81

24

It seemed like the United States was fully supporting President

Lee‟s approach in the forming of JIG. Following the investigation team

result, US emphasized its security commitment to the ROK by

establishing the joint communiqué of the US-ROK Security Consultative

Meeting on 8 October 201061

. Both countries also held joint naval

exercises in the end of November in the Yellow Sea. US hosted a

trilateral foreign ministers meeting with Japanese and ROK‟s

representatives soon after the Yeonpyeong Island attack to send a

message to Beijing that provocation by DPRK had driven US allies to

area where China should not be involved62

.

China putted more concern on US-ROK drills on July in the East

Sea because China preferred to maintain rather than challenge the status

quo. The tension in Korean Peninsula was a test for both China and US

whether to cooperate or compete in supporting the Asia‟s regional

security and stability; however, the approach both counties acted had

shown a gap between the relations of China and US63

.

This journal remarked that the Cheonan incident had led Japan to

the reinforcement of cooperation among Japan, the US, and the ROK in

addressing the DPRK threat, involving strengthened logistical and

intelligence co-operation64

. Russia did not play major role in stability of

Asia in recent years. However, it demonstrated its support to Pyongyang.

Russia sent an investigation team, debating the DPRK‟s liability for the

sinking of the Cheonan, being the first nation to deny the DPRK‟s

61

Defense Ministry. (2010, October 8). Joint Communiqué, „The 42nd US-ROK Security

Consultative Meeting. Retrieved January 11, 2014, from Defense Ministry official website:

http://www.defense.gov/news/d20101008usrok.pdf

62 The United State Government. (2010, December 6). Trilateral Statement: Japan, Republic of

Korea, and the United States. Retrieved January 11, 2013, from US Government official website:

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152431.htm

63 Snyder, S., & Byun, S.-w. (2011). Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to

North Korea's Provocation. The Rusi Journal , 74-81 64

Daily Yomiuri. (2010). Maintain Vigilance Against North Korea

25

responsibility. In the Yeonpyeong artillery shelling case, Russia did not

try to protect DPRK from international critics, unlike China who refused

to condemn DPRK. Moscow had suggested that the Korean Peninsula

issue should be pursued through the resumption of Six Party Talks65

.

We can learn several things from the impact of the Cheonan

sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling. First, the countries involved

need to strengthen regional co-operations mechanism like what US-

Japan-ROK established and consult one another. Second, the incidents

highlighted China contradictive approached in dealing with the issue

while shielding DPRK as the cause of the problem. Third, the DPRK‟s

political transition was visible from balancing its domestic interests with

foreign policy priorities. The last but not the least, regional approach to

the conflict management and conflict resolution of inter-Korean tensions

are needed in addressing the issues through negotiation rather than

military measures66

.

2.2.3 Hilary Keenan (2010). Shock Wave and Bubble: The Untruth

about the Cheonan

According to Keenan, what matters is what happened and what

come out in the months of the investigation. Keenan seemed not agree

with the fact that the ROK Ministry of Defense was involved in the

investigation team. The major investigators were Korean, and he thought

that the investigation team was lacking of foreign experts. As China and

Russia were not involved in the investigation team, both states had

desires for „stability‟ in the Korean Peninsula. China wanted to play a

role as an ally and major source of aid to the DPRK, while being the

ROK‟s biggest trading partner67

. However, the Russian team was

65

RIA Novosti. (2010). Russia, China to try to Prevent Conflict on Korean Peninsula. Lavrov 66

Snyder, S., & Byun, S.-w. (2011). Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to

North Korea's Provocation. The Rusi Journal , 74-81 67

Keenan, H. (2010). Shock Wave and Bubble: The Untruth about the Cheonan. Global Media

Journal

26

ambivalent about the cause of the sinking (bubble-jet torpedo) could

have split the vessel into two. Russia, but refused to make publishing

their investigation result.

The writer used the analysis of two Korean-American university

physicists about the bubble effect that would have caused „spherical

deformation‟ rather than „an angular shape‟. Another fact mentioned in

the journal was that the writer predicted if the torpedo was German-

made. He emphasized that the torpedo parts found by fisherman‟s nets

was a different model from the one that sank the Cheonan. He also

questioned about how the words „No. 1‟ written in Hangul in a part of

the torpedo by ink or paint could have survived the extreme heat of the

explosion. Some argued that this part of the torpedo was shielded by

something so that the words remained68

.

2.2.4 Victor Cha; Ellen Kim (2010). US-Korea Relations: The

Sinking of the Cheonan

This journal reported about indirect result of the Cheonan sinking

towards US-ROK relations which were the delay in transfer of wartime

operational control (OPCON) and the ratification of the KORUS FTA.

Not only this, the journal also showed a desired of a stronger and deeper

partnership in the face of DPRK threats between US and ROK.

Cha elaborated the solidarity and strength of US-ROK alliance.

Right after the incident, President Barack Obama sent military support to

help the rescue operation. Both states brought the incident to the United

Nations Security Council and condemn the DPRK for their provocative

actions. US-ROK also had shown their intention in conducting a joint

US-ROK anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise69

.

68

Kirk, D. (2010). The Sinking of Cheonan. Global Media Journal , 99-104 69

Cha, V., & Kim, E. (2010). US-Korea Relations: The Sinking of the Cheonan. A Quarterely E-

Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations

27

This journal underscored that the Cheonan sinking incident was

causing a step back to the re-birth of Six Party Talks. Quiet efforts to re-

establish the dialogue were ended in the shut down conversation as the

result of the incident. ROK has made it clear that it would not return to

the talks unless the UNSC issued a formal condemnation of provocative

action by the DPRK.

The writer accentuated that there was a delay in the wartime

operational control (OPCON) transfer, which was dated in April 2012

into December 2015. The security environment in the Korean Peninsula

was not supporting the transfer, which is why it was delayed. As

mentioned by the writer, the OPCON was seen as the return of „military

sovereignty‟ from the US to ROK70

.

In correlation with the delay of OPCON transfer, there was also a

push ratification of the KORUS free trade agreement (FTA) as stated by

President Obama in Toronto until after the G-20 Summit in Seoul on

November, 2010. He said that there was „adjustment‟ work between the

two states. However, Trade Minister Kim Jong-Hoon made it clear that

the ROK would not renegotiate the original agreement. The success of

the KORUS FTA could be a test of the depth relations between the US

and ROK. Finally, the KORUS FTA was renewed successfully on

December 3, 201071

.

70

Ibid 71 United States Trade Representative. (2012, March). U.S. - Korea Free Trade Agreement.

Retrieved January 22, 2014, from Office og the United States Trade Representative:

http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements

28

II.3 Working Papers of Previous Researches

2.3.1 Min-sung Ahn (2010). Sinking of ROKS Cheonan

DPRK decided to focus on its military on the Peninsula, despite

denying reports that the Cheonan was sunk by its torpedo. It could be

seen as responding to the ROK‟s statement that the DPRK is the

perpetrator; however the military leadership turnover in the DPRK was

questioned as a suspicious movement. The JIG report had so many faults

according to various experts in naval warfare and technology72

.

The writer of the working paper was representing Russia in the

Model of United Nation. Russia had a very unique stance as despite

traditionally having good relationships with DPRK, they had chosen to

remain neutral. However, Russia was still refusing the investigation

result by the ROK government. It had its own expert‟s investigation of

the incident. The conclusion was that a torpedo was not the cause of the

Cheonan sinking. Because the investigation result was against ROK and

the US statement, the government of Russia decided not to publish the

result of the investigation.

2.3.2 Jong-sung You (2010). The Cheonan Dilemma, Inter-Korean

Relations, and the Six Party Talks: A Korean Perspective

You Jong-sung to express that the Cheonan sinking incident was an

embarrassment to the Lee Myung-bak government who failed to dater

the incident of the incident in the first place. The ROK military released

blunders of statements such as their inability to inform the precise

location and time of the incident. There was also delayed and ineffective

rescue and recovery of the Cheonan. Lee Myung-bak government saw a

political opportunity by declaring DPRK as the perpetrator of the

sinking, reporting plausible evidence for blaming the torpedo attack by

72

Ahn, M.-s. (2010). Sinking of ROKS Cheonan. 1-5

29

the DPRK. They also brought up this issue to the UN Security Council.

Despite the varieties of perspective on the real culprit of the incident, the

frozen inter-Korean relations could only be address by two possible

approaches: „get to the bottom of it‟ or „put it behind us and move on‟73

.

„Get the bottom of it‟ might be achieved through talks between the

US-led UN Command and the DPRK military. However, the talks had

been stopped because DPRK had violated the armistice agreement. Joint

investigation should be conducted by ROK and DPRK. But, it seemed

like both states did not want to share information and findings one

another, just like DPRK rejected JIG investigation result and conducted

its own inspection on the Cheonan sinking. Lots of questions also

occurred about the JIG investigation result.

According to You, the more ROK stick to demand DPRK apology

and responsibility, the weak credibility of the investigation would be.

You emphasized that it might take years, even decades to get enough

information about the cause of the incident.

„Put it behind us and move on, ‟ was a more realistic approach

considering the difficulty of the previous approach. Leave the Cheonan

sinking incident and move on the resuming of Six Party Talks. This

research suggested the ROK to have bold political leadership in

responding criticism of being weak towards DPRK. Providing

humanitarian aid without condition could be a starting point to bring

back the talks.

The writer hoped that the Cheonan incident would be an

opportunity to accomplish the long-anticipated denuclearization of

73

You, J.-s. (2010). The Cheonan DIlemma. Inter-Korean Relatins, and the Six Party Talks: A

Korean Perspective. San Diego

30

DPRK and establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula

and Northeast Asia74

.

2.3.3 Haksoon Paik (2010). An Analysis of the North Korean

Perspective on Post-Cheonan Regional Security

The Cheonan sinking incident resulted in an immediate tension

between ROK and DPRK. This working paper introduced the activities

done by the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea after the sinking of

Cheonan. Haksoon Paik noted that the first statement after the incident

was released on April 17, when a commentator of the DPRK military

denied the state‟s involvement in the incident. The groundless statement

by ROK was a political effort to win the June 2 local elections75

. After

JIG reported the investigation result, the NDC spokesman stated that the

DPRK would respond to ROK reckless actions by launching „righteous

war‟ and send „inspection team‟ to deny the evidence reported by ROK,

as he remarked. A statement from the DPRK foreign ministry also noted

that ROK investigation result was a self-manufactured supported by the

US76

.

The writer listed some statements by DPRK officials in responding

the complaint as if on May 26, DPRK warned that it would take military

measures like destroying the military propaganda speakers, followed by

issue of military guarantee withdraw, cutting off military

communications, suspending of passage into DPRK territory, and

banning of ROK government officials‟ entry to the country. Paik also

noted the declassified materials used in the EC 121 Incident in 1969

were a plan by the United States against DPRK. Those materials were

also used against the DPRK and China in1954. He concluded that there

74

You, J.-s. (2010). The Cheonan DIlemma. Inter-Korean Relatins, and the Six Party Talks: A

Korean Perspective. San Diego 75

Paik, H. (2010). An Analysis of the North Korean Perspective on Post-Cheonan Regional

Security 76

Ibid

31

was also the possibility to do those conspiratorial actions again by the

US and ROK in the Cheonan sinking. As issued by the US Department

of Defense on April 6, 2010, that it would not use or threaten to use

nuclear weapon against non-nuclear weapon states, means that it was

possible to use nuclear weapons against states which were not in

compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including the

DPRK.

Paik pointed out the ROK‟s request to delay the OPCON transfer,

which was scheduled to be held in 2012, in 2015 by fabricating the

Cheonan incident. The DPRK had been ROK‟s concessions in opening

the ROK‟s market to US, maintaining military assistance by US forces

in the ROK, becoming a full member of US-led missile defense

system77

. Besides, he asserted that NDC spokesman issued a statement

that the investigation result of the Cheonan sinking was the first military

provocation, while US-ROK joint naval exercise in East Sea was the

second military provocation toward the DPRK, and the state would

respond with a nuclear deterrent.

As stressed by the writer, there were preparatory talks between US

and DPRK for the resolution of the incident conducted before general-

level talks on July-August. DPRK suggested 20-30 members

investigation team from DPRK to do on the spot investigation in the

ROK. However, the talks failed to accommodate the opinion due to

DPRK convict on the US-ROK joint naval exercise. This exercise was

seen as a blunt provocation for the US military hegemony in Northeast

Asia78

. The writer added that DPRK fired about one hundred shell in the

West Sea on the last day of the joint naval exercise.

77


Security 78


Security

32

Paik concluded that the above DPRK responses could help

identifying the characteristic of DPRK‟s thinking and actions: touching

the inter-Korean relations only, accusing US as the mastermind,

continuing to strengthen the nuclear deterrence, and interpreting the

Cheonan sinking incident as a way to broaden US and China influence in

East Asia.

The seven analyses have explained about the perspectives on the

sinking of Cheonan. Some of them were arguing that the Cheonan

sinking was caused by an act of provocation by the DPRK who launched

a torpedo on the night of 26 March, 2010, causing the death of dozens of

ROK‟s military personnel. The rest of the literatures debated about the

falsity of all evidences provided by ROK, and assumed that the incident

was a sheer fabrication done by ROK and US. However, those

researches only presented each perspective separately, while there was

interconnection among those data that might be answering the question

of what is fact behind the Cheonan sinking. Therefore, in this research

the researcher will explore the events happen prior, during, and after the

incidents to answer the research question of this research which is

impacts of the incident to inter-Korean relations.

33

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

There is a need to compare the perspectives from the ROK and

DPRK to answer the research question dealing with the fact behind the

Cheonan sinking. The previous chapter has presented several

commentaries regarding the Cheonan sinking case, as well as the responses

from the UNSC and other countries. This chapter will describe the

research methodology and procedures that the researcher used to complete

the research. The followings are the methodologies that are used to answer

the research question of whether the sinking of ROK naval ship Cheonan

off the coast of the Korean Peninsula is an act of provocation or

conspiracy.

III.1 Research Method

The Research methodology used in this research is a qualitative

approach in which quantitative approach would not suitable to answer the

research question. Qualitative research relies on transforming information

from observation, reports and recording into data in the form of written

words or visual images, not a number. The researcher preferred to use a

qualitative approach rather than quantitative approach because of the

characteristic features of qualitative research, as defined by Zoltan

Dornyei, are very suitable for this examination:

3.1.1 Emergent research design

The study id kept open, means that researcher can respond in a

flexible way to a new details that may occur during the research

process

34

3.1.2 The nature of qualitative data with a wide range of data

The researcher used graphics and images from the investigation

result to support the statement

3.1.3 Insider meaning is concerned with subjective opinion

The explicit goal of this research is to explore varying

perspectives of the South Korean investigation team, North

Korean investigation team, public and international stages of the

case of the sinking of Cheonan

3.1.4 Interpretative analysis is fundamental interpretative

The outcome of the research is ultimately the product of the

researcher‟s subjective interpretation by providing data79

III. 3 Data Collection

The actuality and completeness of data influence the quality of a

research. The nature of a research is to provide answers to what, who,

when, where, why, and how the issue is happening. In this research, the

qualitative approach was used to obtain and analyze the primary and

secondary data related to the case of the Cheonan sinking, by conducting

literature research.

3.3.1 Research Instruments

Varieties of instruments were used to support the writing of this

research, as listed below:

3.3.1.1 Official government and institutions' documents

79

Dornyei, Z. (2007). Research Methods in Applied Linguistics

35

Republic of Korea investigation team involving 25 experts

from South Korea and 24 foreign experts from the United

States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Sweden, released an

interim report and final report that could be accessed through

the official document website. National Defence Commission

of Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea also announced their

investigation result on the truth behind the Cheonan incident

and published on KCNA website. These official documents

were used as the primary data of the research.

3.3.1.2 Books, journals, and previous research

The researcher also collected the data from books,

international journals, and articles related to the case as

secondary data. Several books on conspiracy were used to

provide the ground theory of this research. In the second

chapter of this thesis, the researcher utilized several journals

and working papers from previous research in structuring the

literature review.

3.3.1.3 Media publication

Media publication played important role in the writing

process of this research, contributed varies opinion on the

sinking of Cheonan case.

3.3.1.4 Internet

As one of the main tools that most people use in getting

information, government of Republic of Korea and Democratic

People‟s Republic of Korea has been more open in this

globalization era. Both states have their own official website

provided with previous and recent issues related to the states

36

which can be accessed by the world. The internet was used as

one of the main resources in this research.

3.3.2 Data Analysis

“We can progress from initial description, through the

process of breaking data down into bits, and seeing how

these bits interconnect, to a new account based on our

reconceptualization of the data. We break down the data in

order to classify it, and the concepts we create or employ in

classifying the data, and the connections we make between

these concepts, provide the basis of a fresh description.”80

After conducting literature research, this research will answer the

research question by utilizing the theory of conspiracy and four

characteristics of North Korean provocation. It will present the

contradiction of statements from stakeholders and sanctions pursued to

address the incident.

3.3.3 Data Interpretation

The aim of analysis is not only to describe our data, but also to

interpret, to explain, to understand, even to predict. Through analysis, we

can obtain a fresh view of our data. Finally, the researcher will express

her opinion with her own interpretation of the discussed issue and

recommend changes that may support the stability and security of

Korean Peninsula.

80

Dey, I. (2005). Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientist

37

III. 4 Research Time/Place

Time: Started on September 2013

Place: President University, Jababeka Cikarang Bekasi, Indonesia

Universitas Indonesia Library, Jakarta, Indonesia

Universitas Mercu Buana Library, Jakarta, Indonesia

Table 1. Research Timeframe

Name of Activity September October November December January February

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

Research

Writing of Thesis

Submission of Final Draft

Defense

Revision

38

CHAPTER IV

THE CHEONAN SINKING INCIDENT

IV.1 The Cheonan Sinking

The Republic of Korea Ship Cheonan, also known as 772, was

born in 1987. It is a Pohang-class corvette, served as part of the ROK

Navy up till March 2010. Its primary mission was coastal patrol, utilizing

her 9.5ft draught to good effect in close inshore patrol work near the

DPRK coast81

. It weighed 1,200 tons, was 86m × 10m × 25m, with speed

up to 32 knots.

Figure 1. The recovered remains of the ROKS Cheonan warship

Source: JIG. (2010). Investigation Result on the sinking of ROKS "Cheonan". Seoul:

Ministery of Defense of the Republic of Korea.

81

ROKS Cheonan PCC772. (2013, September 5). Retrieved January 20, 2014, from Military

Factory: http://www.militaryfactory.com

39

The Cheonan was sailing on its patrol duty in the night of March

26, 2010. However, the apparent explosion at 21:22 one mile from

Baekryeong Island caused the ROKS Cheonan to break apart and sink82

.

The stern of the ship sank in a few minutes, while the bow sank three

hours later. There were 104 crews on the night of the incident, ad 46 of

them were missing or dead83

. According to the captain of the ship, the

Cheonan split in half five minutes after the explosion occurred84

. One of

the other officers, Lieutenant Park Yeon-su, stated that he did not think

that the ship was wrecked on a rock, and neither by an explosion inside.

He was almost sure that there was a possibility that the ship was attacked.

However, he did not have any proof at the moment85

.

By March 31, 2010 it was revealed that DPRK submarine had left

it‟s based on the west coast 50 km away from the Baeknyeong Island. The

ROK and the U.S. intelligence agencies detected disappearing and

reappearing of DPRK submarines on the day of the incident86

. According

to the source of ROK government, the submarine occasionally disappears

and come back, but it is difficult to relate it to the Cheonan sinking87

.

However the Cheonan could not detect any submarines near it as stated by

the ROK Ministry of Defense. He stated that the Cheonan was sunk in

waters due to an unexplained explosion. He also said that the ROK

convert Sochko fired an unspecific object toward the north, which was

thought as the DPRK ship right after the explosion.

82

Ahn, M.-s. (2010). Siking of ROKS Cheonan. Model United Nation at UCLA 83

Han, D.-s. (2010). Briefing The Cheonan Situation 84

Lee, T.-h. (2010, March 28). More Questions Raised than Answered Over Sunken SHip.

Retrieved October 15, 2013, from Korea Times:

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/03/

85 Oh, K.-w. (2010, March 28). Testimonies from Survivors. Retrieved October 15, 2013, from

Korea Herald: http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2010/03/29/201003290

86 Chosun Ilbo. (2010, March 31). N. Korean Submarine 'Left Base Before the Cheonan Sinking'.

Retrieved October 15, 2013, from Chosun Ilbo:

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/03/31/20100331010

87 Ibid

40

More and more statements subjected the Democratic People‟s

Republic of Korea in the incident of the Cheonan sinking even though

there had not been any official result supported by evidence. The incident

occurred less than three months after the naval skirmishes in the water

near de facto sea border as the continuation of the Pyongyang

unpleasantness of the Northern Limit Line fixed by United Nation

Command in 1953.

Government of the Republic of Korea formed an investigation

team named a Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) involving

Korean and foreign expert in investigating the sinking of the 1200-ton

corvette of the ROK Navy. The JIG conducted an investigation with 25

experts from 10 Korean expert agencies, 22 military experts, 3 experts

recommended by the National Assembly, and 24 foreign experts

constituting 4 support teams from the United States, Australia, the United

Kingdom, and the Kingdom of Sweden. There are four teams composed in

JIG: Scientific Investigation Team, Explosive Analysis Team, Ship

Structure Team, and Intelligence Analysis Team88

.

According to the investigation result by JIG on May 20, 2010, they

conclude that the ROKS “Cheonan” was sunk as the result of an external

underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in the DPRK. The

overwhelming evidence points to the conclusion that DPRK submarine

fired the torpedo, causing the sinking of the Cheonan and the loss of 46

lives89

.

Following this, the first-ever news conference by Kim Jung IL on

May 28, 2010, rebutted the evidences by the ROK. National Defence

Commission of DPRK then disputed the result of investigation by JIG.

DPRK concluded that the incident was a sheer fabrication and

88


Defense of the Republic of Korea 89

Ibid

41

conspiratorial farce done by The U.S. imperialist and Lee Myung-bak

administration. DPRK revealed the truth behind the case in the last

through the investigation result of NDC90

.

IV.2 The Cheonan Sinking Investigation Results

4.2.1 JIG Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROKS “Cheonan”

In a five page interim report released on Thursday May 20, 2010,

Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Team made an assessment that a

strong underwater explosion generated by the distortion of a homing

Torpedo below and to the left of gas turbine room cause Republic of

Korea Ship (ROKS) “Cheonan” to split apart and sink91

.

They conclude that:

ROKS Cheonan was torn apart and sunk due to a shock wave and

bubble effect of the underwater torpedo explosion

The explosion occurred approximately 3m left of the center of the

gas turbine room, at a depth of about 6-9m

The weapon system used is confirmed to be a high explosive

torpedo with a net explosive weight of about 250kg, manufactured

by the DPRK

The DPRK military is in possession of a fleet of about 70

submarines; consist of 20 Romeo class submarines (1,800 tons), 40

Sango class submarines (300 tons) and 10 midget

submarines including the Yeono class (130 tons)

90



Commission 91



42

It also possesses torpedoes of various capabilities, including

straight running, acoustic and wake homing torpedoes with a net

explosive weight of about 200 to 300kg, which can deliver the

same level of damage that was delivered to the ROKS

"Cheonan"

JIG confirmed that few small submarines and a mother ship left

and came back to DPRK naval base in the West Sea 2-3 days prior

and after the attack

It was confirmed that all submarines from neighboring countries

were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the

incident

The torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a

dredging ship on May 15th

, perfectly matched the schematics of the

CHT-02D torpedo by the DPRK for export purposes. The

markings in Hangul, which reads "1번 (or No. 1 in English)", was

founded in the end of the propulsion section. Russian and

Chinese torpedoes are marked in their respective languages92

“Joint Investigation Report on the Attack against ROK Ship Cheonan”

It was then published on September 2010 by the Ministry of

National Defense of ROK, which contains the findings of the investigation

team to address the DPRK denial over the incident. The report consisted

of the situation development, investigation activities of the four teams, the

overall shape and structures of ROC Cheonan, analysis of the possible

causes (non-explosion, internal explosion, and external explosion), and

detailed analysis result by the team.

92



43

“A precise measurement and analysis of the damaged hull showed

that a shock wave and bubble effects caused significant upward

bending of the (Center Vertical Keel) compared to its original

state.93

”

Figure 2. 3D laser scan image of the fractured bow and stern


Ministery of Defense of the Republic of Korea

According to the report, the survivors heard a nearly simultaneous

explosion once or twice and they saw a splashed of water on the port face.

Besides, statements made by the coastal sentries on Baekryong Island,

testified that they saw a 100-meter high pillar of white flash for 2-3

seconds. There were no traces of fragmentation or burn injury was found

from the wounded survivors94

. An analysis by Korea Institute of

Geosciences and mineral Resources (KIGAM) showed that a seismic

wave of magnitude 1.5 was detected at 4 stations. Two acoustic waves

were detected from 11 stations with 1.1 second intervals95

.

Analysis result by US team showed that the possible explosion

type is TNT equivalent of 200-300kg. The second analysis by a Korean

team resulted with the TNT equivalent of 250-360kg charge size. Finally,

on May 15, the JIG recovered some torpedo parts like propellers, a

propulsion motor, and steering section. These are shown in the pictures

below96

.

93

Ibid 94

JIG. (2010). Joint Investigation Report on the attack against ROK Ship Cheonan. Seoul:

Ministry of Defence of Republic of Korea 95

Ibid 96

Ibid

44

Figure 3. Schematic of torpedo and recovered rear section of torpedo



Figure 4 Figure 5



The Korean marking “(No. 1 in English)” inside the rear section of

the propulsion system (Figure 4) is similar to the marking of DPRK test

torpedo obtained in 2003 (Figure 5).

It was confirmed that DPRK submarines left and returned to their

base 2-3 days prior and after the incident. Not only this, the propellers and

other parts of the recovered torpedo were identified to be the CHT-02D

torpedo produced by the DPRK for export purposes97

.

97


Ministry of Defence of Republic of Korea

45

Figure 1. CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by the DPRK



Main activities held by the JIG started from the recovery of the

ship parts, both of the stern and bow, until the recovery of the torpedo

propulsion motor, and also the press conference on the investigation

result98

. The activities were started on March 31, and ended on 20 May,

2010. According to the analysis by the JIG, external explosion from

torpedo was being the most possible cause of the Cheonan sinking as

defined by the detection method below.

Table 2. Detection method and characteristics of torpedoes



The investigation teams made an assessment that the explosive was

happening in the center of the ship where it exploded below the gas

98


Ministry of Defence of Republic of Korea

46

turbine room 3m to the port side from the center, where the shockwave

and bubble effect generated by the explosion crashed the ship into two.

There was a high possibility of torpedo attack in which an acoustic guided

torpedo was assessed to be the weapon used99

.

According to the presented data by Joint Civilian-Military

Investigation Team, the Republic of Korea concluded that the cause of the

Cheonan sinking incident was an external explosion of a torpedo,

identified to be the CHT-02D. Several parts of the torpedo found a few

weeks after the incident shown that the torpedo was produced by the

Democratic People‟s of Republic of Korea. Marketing catalog of the

torpedo that was used by the DPRK for export purposes was revealed. It

was also confirmed that some DPRK submarines were departing the base

and returning home 2-3 days prior and after the incident.

DPRK stated that the incident has nothing to do with the country,

continued the denial by revealing the National Defence Commission

investigation result about the truth behind the Cheonan. The DPRK also

reported that United States imperialist and President Lee‟s administration

were fabricating the incident100

. However, there were the military

leadership turnover in Pyongyang before the Cheonan sinking incident,

and the existence of a poster in Pyongyang that showed a soldier crashed a

ship using his fist101

. In 2009, several Kim Jong-il most trusted people

were moved to important positions like the commander of the fourth corps

of the DPRK Army and a senior position on the National Defence

Commission. Besides, the Operational Department, which had conducted

99


Ministry of Defence of Republic of Korea 100



Commission 101

Radio Free Asia. (2010, July 15). Posters Show Smashed Ship. Retrieved October 15, 2013,

from Radio Free Asia: http://www.rfe.org/english/news/korea/poster-

07152010143832.html?searchteam=None

47

lots of underground missions was moved into the control of the

Reconnaissance Bureau. This bureau was the one that controlled the

movement of Special Operation Forces (SOF) to clandestine infiltrations

into ROK102

.

On April 9, 2010, it was stated that the torpedo was launched not

by a DPRK navy, but it was launched by an SOF craft103. This statement

was quite contradictive with a statement made by representatives of ROK

defense ministry that there was no suspicious movement by DPRK prior

and after the incident. The researcher does believe that it takes time to find

and identify evidences related to the incident. However, inconsistent

statements released by ROK representatives would just lead people‟s

perception into hesitancy about the findings.

In responding the poster, photographed in late June by a Chinese

businessman who visited Pyongyang, DPRK who denied the responsibility

over the incident was circulating this propaganda aiming the morale of the

people, despite when the poster was made (might be from the earlier naval

clash between ROK and DPRK in 2002).

4.2.2 National Defense Commission of the DPRK open

announcement on the truth behind the Cheonan incident

While the United States and the Lee Myung Bak administration

was linking DPRK as the launcher of a torpedo causing the sinking of

the Cheonan on 26 March 2010, DPRK was dismissing the accusation

102

JoongAhn Ilbo. (2009, March 16). A Provocation by General Kim Kyok-sik Plotting Comeback in Pyongyang? Retrieved October 15, 2013, from JoongAhn Ilbo: http://nk.joins.com/news/view.asp?aid=3335047&cont=news_polit 103 Segye Ilbo. (2010, April 10). Sinking of ROK's Cheonan Attributed to General




48

by releasing an investigation result of National Defence Commission.

DPRK disclosed what a sheer fabrication and conspiratorial farce that

the US and Lee‟s administration created104

.

Aluminum alloy fragments proved that the torpedo was not

from the DPRK

JIG presented that the torpedo fragments found in the waters off

Paengyong Islet was material evidence that the torpedo was from

North Korea and that North attacked the ship. The DPRK did not

deny that it owned torpedoes with such a gigantic striking power.

However, those made of steel alloy material manufactured by

DPRK workers, not aluminum alloy made by other countries105

.

Propelling body was fabricated

All of a sudden, a civilian fishing boat netted the propelling body

which dozens of naval vessels equipped with sophisticated

detecting devices failed to find out in 50 days. This propelling

body was different to the one published by the investigation team

(it was pasted with silver paper) on May 20. They also made public

that the explosive ingredient (HMX, RDX, and TNT) was detected

from the hull of the Cheonan. No explosive ingredient detected

from the propelling body106

.

The falsity of the torpedo design

JIG displayed the CHT-02D torpedo design and mentioned that the

propelling body was made by the DPRK, and insisted that

„Guaranteed by the DPRK‟ was written in the literature of the

torpedo. The thing is that the words written in Japanese with

rectangular shape motor, while the shape of torpedo motor of the

propelling body presented by them was of a streamlined shape. It

104

National Defence Commission Inspection Group. (2011). NDC Inspection Group Reveals

thruth behind Yohnpyong Shelling. Pyongyang: NDC 105

Ibid 106

Ibid

49

has been disclosed that they had replaced the torpedo design in

secrecy by a new one, and the propelling body was produced by

the US and ROK107

.

The Writing style “No. 1,” vivid manifestation of ignorance

A writing “No. 1,” was found on the propelling body written by

using a pen. DPRK does not use a pen when writing on equipment,

but carve them. In this case, they use Korean word Ho, not Pon

(number), in which it is not a conventional writing style in DPRK.

Moreover, it is nonsensical that the “No. 1,” remained vivid due to

the hot temperature caused by the explosion. “No. 1,” was written

by something like a felt-tip pen, while it is known that boiling

points of the ingredients are 138.5˚C for xylene, 110.6˚C toluene,

and 78.4˚C alcohol. The temperature of the explosion might have

been as high as 325˚C-1000˚C. As informed by a maritime expert

that conducted a personal experiment on the spot, the propelling

body had never been in the sea water after “No. 1” was written on

it108

.

The false statement of a column of water

According to the crews and soldiers on the duty near the vessel

right after the incident, there was no one who witnesses the column

of water. Then, out of the blue, a watchman on Paengyong Islet

said that he had witnessed a column of water. But, the location he

was standing on duty was quite different with the scene of the

incident, and he witnessed nothing but a „white light flash‟. A

soldier who survived the incident also said that he did not notice

anything particular like a column of water when he looked

around109

.

107



Ibid 109

Ibid

50

Invention of „course of channel infiltration‟

The military authorities asserted that there was no mysterious

movement of DPRK before and after the incident. After they

published the investigation result, they claimed that some DPRK

Navy vessel were confirmed to have left a certain base in the West

Sea of Korea 2-3 days prior to the incident and returned 2-3 days

after the incident. In fact, nothing was detected by the ROK Navy

during the incident. They admitted that they had failed to monitor

any movement due to the poor quality of the image because of bad

weather110

.

Aluminum adsorbent scientifically rejected

The investigation reported that there was a large quantity of white

powder found in propelling body, and it was the same component

found in several places on the hull. They claimed that aluminum

used in making the torpedo turns into non-crystalline aluminum

oxide. It was detected on the energy spectroscope, not in X-ray

diffraction analysis. Physicists from some countries (including US

and Canada) refused the above statement and said that it is

impossible of aluminum turns into non-crystalline aluminum oxide

100 percent after the explosion and cooling. It is close to 0 percent.

The physicists proposed an open experiment to the US and ROK,

but they could not respond to the proposal. And soon, they clarify

that it was not oxidized crystalline aluminum, but non-crystalline

aluminum, to deny the scientific data111

.

Port screw and fluorescent lamps were in a good condition

JIG explored that there was a non-contact underwater explosion in

the port of the vessel. However, the port screw remained in a good

110



Ibid

51

shape, only the vessel into two pieces while leaving the fluorescent

lamps very close to the port as they are. They explained nothing,

but claimed that the lamps were made to stand any shock112

.

The evidence proving the vessel‟s standing

The location of the incident was in the waters between Paengnyong

Islet and Taechong Islet which abound in rocks. If it was damaged

by torpedo attack, the vessel would not be torn apart and got rusty.

The security guard would have been broken and there should be

lots of fragment on the vessel as well. However, the security guard

was in perfect shape, there was no lot of fragments, there was no

one among the crew who got his eardrum ruptured and joints hurt,

and finally no dead fish could be seen on the surface water.

Survivors asserted that they felt the vessel hit something before

smelling burning oil. According to the above information, there is

no evidence supporting that the incident was caused by torpedo

from the DPRK113

.

Video file went missing

An animation file showing a non-contact underwater explosion

conducted by ROK in 2004 showed that with an explosive power

equivalent to that of 185kg of TNT (Paeksango torpedo) split the

hull into two pieces in less than one second after its explosion. It

was even impossible to find any trace of the hull in thirty second

after the explosion. The CHT-02D torpedo‟s power is 250kg of

TNT, means that the Cheonan should be sunk in less than 30

seconds. A TOD video file showing the explosions of the vessel

and the split of the hull were going missing. The remaining video

showed where the vessel had sunk114

.

112

Ibid 113



Ibid

52

Unreasonable measurement of corrosion period

The investigation team of Puppet group stated that the corrosion

period might be similar to the state of 1-2 months corrosion

measured by naked eyes. The thing is that corrosion period is not

something that can be measured by naked eyes115

.

The warship sinking simulation invites derision

In the first simulation, the CHT-02D torpedo with 250kg of TNT

was not enough to sink the Cheonan. In the next simulation, they

used 350-500kg of TNT to represent a simulation of real damage

caused by explosion to the engine room and hull of the warship. It

indicated that the simulation was carried out for the purpose of

frame-up as stated by the investigation team that they needed to

work hard for about two months in modifying and rectifying a

model of simulation116

.

The release of „final report‟ to reduce false indictment

The interim report published by the US and ROK on May 20 was

hesitated by public inside and outside Korea, therefore they

published the final report on September 13 to remove the

suspicions that have been raised. The Russian group of

investigation also affirmed that there was no ground to judge that

the sinking of Cheonan was caused by torpedo attack from the

DPRK. The media of Russia, China, the US, and other countries

remarked the final report on the Cheonan as the worst false

document117

.

Based on the open announcement of National Defence

Commission of Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea, the Cheonan

115

Ibid 116



Ibid

53

sinking incident was a sheer fabrication planned and conducted by Lee

Myung-bak administrative and the United States. Plenty of evidence was

presented to prove the innocence of the DPRK from the incident that

caused the loss of 46 lives. Firstly, at the end of May, NDC representative

announced that DPRK had no Yeono-class submarine that had been

suspected by ROK government as the launch of the torpedo. NDC pointed

out that the torpedo discussed in the investigation by JIG was not from

DPRK and the propelling body of the torpedo was fabricated. There were

inconsistent statements from representatives of ROK, as the researcher has

mentioned before, in relations to the time and place of the incident, and

statement that there was no mysterious movement by DPRK before and

after the incident. The JIG also failed to present complete evidence like

video monitoring and TOD video file that showed the explosions of the

vessel. The investigation team even used bad weather as an excuse of its

failure to identify any movement surrounding the Cheonan. Finally, the

release of „final report‟ seemed to aim the reduction of false indictment by

the society inside and outside the ROK.

The Cheonan sinking was considered as an act conducted by the

Lee Myung-bak administration to win the local election on June 2, 2010,

as stated by NDC in its open announcement. Lee‟s firm stand on the

Cheonan would significantly enhance his sagging popularity and the

party‟s position118

. It was inevitable to link The United States with the

incident due to the US desire in having more and more influence in

Northeast Asia.

118

Kirk, D. (2010). Who sank the Cheonan? Many South Koreans in denial; Conspiracy theoriest

have a field day. Retrieved October 15, 2013, from World Tribune:

http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/ea_skorea0495_06_04.asp

54

CHAPTER V

INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS AFTER THE

CHEONAN SINKING INCIDENT

According to the Republic of Korea‟s government investigation

team, the Cheonan was sunk by a Democratic People‟s Republic of

Korea‟s torpedo attack. On the other hand, DPRK denied its involvement

and demanded to re-do the investigation by their own „inspection team‟119

.

Instead of apologizing and taking responsibility as ROK urged, DPRK

provided some evidences that the incident was fabricated by the ROK

government. ROK government and some other states have given strict

sanction towards the DPRK and it led to a more severe humanitarian issue

in the peninsula due to the suspension of international aids to the country.

The incident contributed significantly to the increased tensions on

the Korean peninsula in 2010120

. Seoul was demanding for Pyongyang

responsibility by imposing measurements regarding to the vessel passage,

trade, and assistance programs between the two states. Pyongyang refused

to take responsibility, while proposing inter-Korean dialogue on some

aspects including military aspect.

119


Security 120

Smallwood, S. (2012). Continued Isolation of North Korea. Retrieved January 18, 2014, from

http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-cheonan-incident-and-the-continued-international-isolation-of-

north-korea/32075

http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-cheonan-incident-and-the-continued-international-isolation-of-north-korea/32075


55

V. 1 May 24 Measures

The Civilian-Military Joint Investigation Team released the result

of investigation on the Cheonan sinking incident on May 20th

2010, and

declared that the incident was caused by an external underwater explosion

caused by a DPRK made torpedo. In a statement released by Lee

Myungbak to the nation, he urged DPRK to apologize and punish those

who were responsible for the attack121

. On the same day, the Ministers of

Unification, of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and of National Defence held a

joint press conference, releasing the May 24 Measures. It consisted of

sanctions given by ROK to DPRK, suspending all interactions between the

two Koreas122

. It composed prohibition of DPRK vessel passage to ROK

maritime territory, suspension of trade, prohibition to visit DPRK,

prohibition to invest in DPRK business, and suspension of several

assistance programs.

For DPRK, ROK is the second largest economic partner; with inter

Korean trade accounting for nearly 30 percent of the DPRK total trade.

DPRK had suffered an annual loss of over 400 million dollars due to the

May 24 measures123

. The volume of trade of DPRK had declined 10.4

percent from before the measures were imposed. Humanitarian assistance

provided for DPRK decreased as well as 51. 1 percent to 19 billion won

from 40 billion won the year before124

.

Unfortunately, DPRK responded the measures in a harsh way.

According to the statement by the spokesman for the Committee for the

Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF) a day after, they formally

121

Special Office for Inter-Korean Dialogue Ministry of Unification. (2013). South-North

Dialogue in Korea No. 75 (January 2010 – February 2013). Seoul 122

Ibid 123

May 24th

Measures : /first Two Years, May 24, 2012

World.kbs.co.kr/English/event/nkoreanuclear.htm?, retrieved April 2014 124


Dialogue in Korea No. 75 (January 2010 – February 2013). Seoul

56

declared that they would start taking decisive actions by completely

closing inter-Korean relations, renouncing the nonaggression agreement

between ROK and DPRK, as well as leaving all kind of bilateral relations

between the two states125

. Not only that, some statements released by KPA

General Staff Department stated that military guarantees would be

withdrawn. The spokesperson stated that inter-Korean agreements were

also canceled to prevent further clashes during the high tension in the

peninsula126

.

A day before ROK and US held joint military exercises (July 25-28

2010), NDC spokesman stated that DPRK would begin a holy war of

retaliation based on their nuclear deterrent capability127

. The statement was

released due to US refusal to have dialogue with the state128

.

ROK was continuing its plan on holding naval exercise in the

waters near Baengryeong and Yeonpyeong islands. In responding the

issue, The KPA Frontline West District Command, on August 3, 2010,

warned that it would perform powerful physical strikes against the

exercises in the ROK‟s territory according to the NLL in which DPRK did

not recognize. DPRK was completing the threats seizing a vessel of ROK,

the Daeseung, along with its four Korean and Chinese crewmen on August

8, and fired artilleries into the waters near the exercises was held on

August 9129

. DPRK fired 110 artillery rounds the disputed area. ROK

urged DPRK to stop the artillery shelling and stop worsening the tension

by sending a telephone message by the head of South Korean delegation to

the inter-Korean general-level military talks on August 10. The situation

got better after the ROK Red Cross informed that it would provide food

125



Ibid 127

Ibid 128

Ibid 129

Ibid

57

assistance for victims in Sinuiju. Finally, on September 7, DPRK released

the crew and returned the ship to the ROK130

.

V.2 The 38th

working level military talks (Sep. 30, 2010)

DPRK urged to hold working level military talks on September 24

through a telephone message on September 15. Some consultations were

made and the 38th working level military talk was held in the Peace House

on the southern sector of Panmunjeom, September 30131

.

ROK Delegation:

Head of Delegation: Moon Sang-kyun (Director, North Korea Policy

Division, MND4, Colonel)

Delegates: Chung So-un (Director, Inter-Korean Dialogue Division I,

MOU)

Kim Young-chul (Director, Naval Operation Division, JCS, Colonel)

DPRK Delegation:

Head of Delegation: Ri Son-kwon (Senior Colonel, KPA)

Delegates: Jon Chang-je (Colonel, KPA)

Hong Sok-il (Colonel, KPA)

ROK delegations pointed out that according to the investigation

result by JIG; it was revealed that DPRK was responsible for the sinking

of the Cheonan. They strongly urged the DPRK to confess its involvement

and apologize, as well as punish those who were responsible for the

sinking. ROK also urged DPRK to establish actions to prevent such

incident happen again. Delegates of ROK demanded DPRK immediate

ceasing of its military threats and provocations against ROK waters

130

Ibid 131


Dialogue in Korea No. 75 (January 2010 – February 2013).

58

territory in the West Sea132

. On the other hand, DPRK revealed ROK

provocation by spreading leaflets in its territory in the name of

conservative nongovernmental organizations. DPRK delegates stated that

the smear campaign was brutally violating international laws and bilateral

agreements between the two states. They urged ROK to punish the

perpetrator and involving organizations. And DPRK also claimed that

ROK violated DPRK‟s maritime patrol line in the West Sea by mobilizing

its boats. ROK responded that their ships were carting out routine

activities in their own waters. Again, the issues discussed were due to the

unclear definition of borders between the two countries. DPRK asserted

that the future of inter-Korean relations would depend on how ROK

manage the spread of anti-DPRK leaflets and how they address the

maritime violations happened in the disputed territory133

.

During the talks, ROK delegations strongly urged DPRK to take

responsibility of the Cheonan sinking incident. However, DPRK delegates

refused it and insisted that ROK should accept its proposal to do the

investigation by their own team in the ROK. The talks ended without any

agreement134

.

V. 3 November 23, 2010, the Yeonpyeong Island artillery shelling

Just two days before the next Red Cross Talks were held, another

clash between ROK-DPRK happened on the Yeonpyeong Island,

November 23135

. DPRK fired dozens of shells against Yeonpyeong Island,

blaming ROK for starting the exchange. ROK was having military

exercise and acknowledged that they fired test shots in the area, but denied

that any had falle in the DPRK‟s territory. On the other hand, DPRK

132

Ibid 133



Ibid 135

Ibid

59

denied any role. Over 200 residents of the island fled to the mainland town

by ferry.136

It caused the deaths of four innocent ROK citizens including

two civilians and two marines. There were 19 casualties from ROK

side137

.

The shelling came as a response of ROK naval drilling in the

territory that sits just two miles from the Northern Limit Line, disputed sea

border between ROK and DPRK138

. In December 18, DPRK blamed the

United States for the Yeonpyeong Island shelling. The foreign ministry

spokesperson also emphasized its need to sign a peace treaty. Not only

that, DPRK continued conducting a live fire artillery exercise off the coast

of Yeonpyeong Island in December 20139

.

V.4 The 39th

working level military talks (Feb. 8~9, 2011)

The ROK government‟s position was revealed in the form of a

comment by the Unification Ministry spokesperson on January 10, pointed

out that DPRK continued to propose dialogues just to receive economic

assistance while refusing the responsibility of the Cheonan sinking and

Yeonpyeong Island shelling incidents140

. That comment showed that

DPRK‟s proposal on unilateral meeting was disguising peace propaganda

to gain sympathy of international society.

On January 20, DPRK proposed to hold high level military talks as

well as a preliminary preparatory meeting. The preliminary preparatory

136

‘Crisis ‘Status’ in South KKorea After North Shells Island, November 23, 2010 . Retrieved on

April 2014 www.nytimes.com 137



Crisis ‘Status’ in South KKorea After North Shells Island, November 23, 2010 . Retrieved on

April 2014 www.nytimes.com 139



Ibid

60

meeting was then held on February 8 to 9 at the Peace House in the

southern sector of Panmunjeom.

ROK Delegation:

Head of Delegation: Moon Sang-kyun (Director, North Korea Policy

Division, MND4, Colonel)

Delegates: Chung So-un (Director, Inter-Korean Dialogue Division I,

MOU)

Kim Do-kyun (North Korea Policy Division, MND, Colonel)

DPRK Delegation:

Head of Delegation: Ri Son-kwon (Senior Colonel, KPA)

Delegates: Jon Chang-je (Colonel, KPA)

Jo Chol-ho (Colonel, KPA)

In this preparatory meeting, bots states proposed the agenda to be

discussed I the high level military talks. ROK proposed “the sinking of the

Cheonan ans the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island” to be the agenda, while

DPRK proposed “the Cheonan incident, the artillery exchange around

Yeonpyeong Island and the suspension of military actions” to be the

agenda141

. DPRK delegations argued that ROK‟s initiative to discuss only

those two issues was aimed to refuse the high-level military talks. In

response to DPRK‟s statement, ROK delegates replied if they were ready

to discuss all issues of mutual interest proposed by DPRK. ROK suggested

either defense minister or chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the head

of delegation. The North, however, preferred that the delegations be

headed by a vice ministerial level official, either vice minister of People‟s

141


Dialogue in Korea No. 75 (January 2010 – February 2013). Seoul

61

Armed Forces or vice chief of the General Staff Department for the

North142

.

ROK again stated that it was waiting for the satisfactory result

regarding the Cheonan sinking and and Yeonpyeong Island shelling.

However, DPRK claimed that it has nothing to do with the Cheonan

sinking incident, and argued that the incident was nothing more than a

smear campaign manipulated by US. Yeonpyeong Island shelling

happened due to ROK provocation in the area143

. ROK delegates then

criticized DPRK statement that denied its responsibility of the artillery

shelling as an act of provocation. The talks ended with no resolution when

DPRK delegates claimed that ROK showed no change in position and left

the conference144

. The two Koreas were not able to deal with their

differences on several arguments and issues just like the level of head of

delegation as well as the agenda discussed in the high-level talks.

Sooner, on February 27, a statement released by North Korea‟s

KPA Representative in Panmunjeom stated that DPRK had embarked on

an all-out attack to bring down the U.S. military occupation of ROK and

the anti-nationalistic regime that was a group of traitors (Lee Myungbak

administration). They would respond with a war that would turn Seoul into

a sea of fire.

142

Ibid 143



Ibid

62

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Korean Peninsula is still divided by wounds of the Cold War

and is one of the most heavily militarized areas of the world145

. Since the

Division of Korea in 1945 and Korean War in 1950-1953, relations

between the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the

Republic of Korea (ROK) have been strained. The conflict was started

because the northern region followed the USSR and became communist,

while the southern region who opposed communist government adopted a

capitalist government. The ROK was established in August 15, 1948,

while the DPRK was established thereafter. After the two states were

established, they worked together in reunifying Korea. However, this

caused conflicts because each of them wanted to unify the area under their

own adopted system. Korean War (1950-1953) broke down as the result of

the tension on the Korean Peninsula146

.

The conflict in the Korean Peninsula remains there even after

decades have passed. One of the most influencing conflicts in the last five

years was the Cheonan sinking incident. A ROK corvette Cheonan was

torn apart and sunk in the West Sea on March 26, 2010. The incident

caused the loss of 46 lives of the crew on the corvette. The Cheonan

sinking was causing a setback in the inter-Korean relations and efforts to

establish a more stable and secure peninsula.

A lot of debates discussed about the cause of the Cheonan sinking,

and many speculations on who is the perpetrator of the incident.

145

Felician, S. (2011, August 24). North and South Korea: A Frozen Coflict on the Vege of

Unfreezing? pp. 1-2

146 Briney, A. (2011, January 2). http:/geography.about.com

63

According to the investigation result by JIG on May 20, 2010, they

conclude that the ROKS “Cheonan” was sunk as the result of an external

underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in the DPRK. Following

this, the first-ever news conference by Kim Jungil on May 28, 2010,

rebutted the evidences by the ROK. National Defence Commission of

DPRK then disputed the result of investigation by JIG. DPRK concluded

that the incident was a sheer fabrication and conspiratorial farce done by

The U.S. imperialist and Lee Myung-bak administration. DPRK revealed

the truth behind the case in the last through the investigation result of

NDC147

.

In responding both perspectives, lots of academic people found it

was interesting to analyze the fact behind the Cheonan sinking. There are

two main perspectives on the discussion. The first one is „the incident was

an act of provocation by DPRK‟ just like how the state continued its

military provocation in the Korean Peninsula. The second one is „the

incident was a conspiratorial act done by the US and Lee Myung-bak

administration‟ aiming the local election on June 2, 2010, and a mere

existence of US military presence in Northeast Asia.

According to the presented data by Joint Civilian-Military

Investigation Team, the Republic of Korea concluded that the cause of the

Cheonan sinking incident was an external explosion of a torpedo,

identified to be the CHT-02D produced by the DPRK. Several parts of the

torpedo found a few weeks after the incident. It was also confirmed that

some DPRK submarines were departing the base and returning home 2-3

days prior and after the incident. Moreover, there were the military

leadership turnover in Pyongyang before the Cheonan sinking incident,

147



Commission

64

and the existence of a poster in Pyongyang that showed a soldier crashed a

ship using his fist148

.

Based on the open announcement of National Defence

Commission of Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea, the Cheonan

sinking incident was a sheer fabrication planned and conducted by Lee

Myung-bak administrative and the United States. Plenty of evidence was

presented to prove the innocence of the DPRK. Firstly, at the end of May,

NDC representative announced that DPRK had no Yeono-class submarine

that had been suspected by ROK government as the launcher of the

torpedo. NDC pointed out that the torpedo discussed in the investigation

by JIG was not from DPRK and the propelling body of the torpedo was

fabricated. There were inconsistent statements from representatives of

ROK, as the researcher has mentioned before, in relations to the time and

place of the incident, and statement that there was no mysterious

movement by DPRK before and after the incident. The JIG also failed to

present complete evidence like video monitoring and Tod video file that

showed the explosions of the vessel. The investigation team even used bad

weather as an excuse of its failure to identify any movement surrounding

the Cheonan. Finally, the release of „final report‟ seemed to aim the

reduction of false indictment by the society inside and outside the ROK.

Despite both perspectives supported by abundant of evidences, this

Cheonan sinking incident had brought the inter-Korean relations into a

more hostile situation. As mentioned in the fifth chapter, several bilateral

talks were ended with no resolution due to each state‟s stance on the

incident. Measurements imposed by ROK were just causing another

tension when DPRK responded the US-ROK joint naval drill and exercise

148

Radio Free Asia. (2010, July 15). Posters Show Smashed Ship. Retrieved October 15, 2013,

from Radio Free Asia: http://www.rfe.org/english/news/korea/poster-


65

by threatening with its nuclear deterrent. The DPRK fired about one

hundred shell in the West Sea on the last day of the joint naval exercise.

One of the biggest issues impacted by the Cheonan sinking

incident was the failure on resuming the Six Party Talks. The DPRK had

made clear that it would not return to the Six Party Talks unless UN

sanctions on DPRK were removed. DPRK pointed out „the spirit of mutual

respect and equality‟ as the foundation of the Six Party Talks (mentioned

in the September 19th

Joint Statement for denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula). However, the talks were violating DPRK sovereignty and

aiming to disarm and change the regime of the DPRK. That is why there

is still a long way to return to the Six Party Talks unless the truth behind

the Cheonan sinking incident was revealed. Meanwhile, the ROK had

made clear that it would not resume the talks unless UN gave appropriate

sanctions responding the Cheonan sinking incident and only if DDPRK

apologized for the sinking rather than denying its responsibility149

.

According to a UN report (June 12, 2010), majority states had agreed to

impose sanction against DPRK. However, when the states were asked to

submit the reports on their implementation of the sanction resolutions, 111

out of 192 members did not submit it150

. Moreover, China also refused to

join the international condemnation over the DPRK.

It is going to take various measures and years, even decades to

improve and prove the credibility of investigation results of both states.

The urgent matter is the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue and the Six

Party Talks. Engaging both states in the dialogue will be the best approach

to address the conflict resolution and normalization of issues in the Korean

Peninsula. The research finds that the Cheonan incident might be a

149

Paik, H. (2010). An Analysis of the North Korean Perspective on Pos-Cheonan Regional

Security 150

Global Policy. (2012). Sanction Against North Korea http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-

council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/north-korea.html

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/north-korea.html

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/north-korea.html

66

significant opportunity to totally break the possible peace talks or be a

great opportunity to accomplish the long-anticipated peace regime in

Northeast Asia.

67

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north-korea/32075



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APPENDICIES

THU, 20 MAY, 2010

The Joint Civilian-Military

Investigation Group

Opening Statement

The Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group (JIG) conducted its

investigation with 25 experts from 10 top Korean expert agencies, 22 military

experts, 3 experts recommended by the National Assembly, and 24 foreign

experts constituting 4 support teams from the United States, Australia, the

United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Sweden. The JIG is composed of four

teams—Scientific Investigation Team, Explosive Analysis Team, Ship Structure

Management Team, and Intelligence Analysis Team.

In our statement today, we will provide the results attained by Korean and

foreign experts through an investigation and validation process undertaken with

a scientific and objective approach.

The results obtained through an investigation and analysis of the

deformation of the hull recovered from the seabed and evidence collected from

the site of the incident are as follows:

The JIG assesses that a strong underwater explosion generated by the

detonation of a homing torpedo below and to the left of the gas turbine room

Republic of Korea Ship (ROKS) "Cheonan" to split apart and sink.

The basis of our assessment that the sinking was caused by a torpedo

attack is as follows:

o Precise measurement and analysis of the damaged part of the hull indicates

that

A shockwave and bubble effect caused significant upward bending of the

VK (Center Vertical Keel), compared to its original state, and shell plate

was steeply bent, with some parts of the ship fragmented.

On the main deck, fracture occurred around the large openings used for

maintenance of equipment in the gas turbine room and significant upward

deformation is resent on the port side. Also, the bulkhead of the gas

turbine room was significantly damaged and deformed.

The bottoms of the stern and bow sections at the failure point were bent

upward. This also proves that an underwater explosion took place.

o Through a thorough investigation of the inside and outside of the ship, we

have found evidence of extreme pressure on the fin stabilizer, a mechanism

to reduce significant rolling of the ship; water pressure and bubble effects on

the bottom of the hull; and wires cut with no traces of heat. All these point to

a strong shockwave and bubble effect causing the splitting and the sinking of

the ship.

o We have analyzed statements by survivors from the incident and a sentry on

Baekryong-do.

The survivors made a statement that they heard a near-simultaneous

explosion once or twice, and that water splashed on the face of a port-

side lookout who fell from the impact; furthermore.

A sentry on the shore of Baekryong-do stated that he witnessed an

approximately 100-meter-high "pillar of white flash" for 2~3 seconds.

The aforementioned phenomenon is consistent with damage resulting from

a shockwave and bubble effect.

o Regarding the medical examination on the deceased service members,

No trace of fragmentation or burn injury was found, but fractures and

lacerations were observed. All of these are consistent with damage

resulting from a shockwave and bubble effect.

o The seismic and infrasound wave analysis result conducted by the Korea

Institute of Geosciences and Mineral Resources (KIGAM) is as follows:

Seismic wave intensity of 1.5 degrees was detected by 4 stations.

2 infrasound waves with a 1.1-second interval were detected by 11

stations.

The seismic and infrasound waves originated from an identical site of

explosion.

This phenomenon corresponds to a shock wave and bubble effect

generated by an underwater explosion.

o Numerous simulations of an underwater explosion show that a detonation with

a net explosive weight of 200~300kg occurred at a depth of about 6~9m,

approximately 3m left of the center of the gas turbine room.

o Based on the analysis of tidal currents off Baekryong-do, the JIG determined

that the currents would not prohibit a torpedo attack.

o As for conclusive evidence that can corroborate the use of a torpedo, we

have collected propulsion parts, including propulsion motor with propellers

and a steering section from the site of the sinking. The evidence matched in

size and shape with the specifications on the drawing presented in

introductory materials provided to foreign countries by North Korea for

export purposes. The marking in Hangul, which reads "1번(or No. 1 in

English)", found inside the end of the propulsion section, is consistent with

the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo. The above

evidence allowed the JIG to confirm that the recovered parts were made in

North Korea.

o Also, the aforementioned result confirmed that other possible causes for

sinking are raised, including grounding, fatigue failure, mines, collision and

internal explosion, played no part in the incident.

In conclusion,

- The following sums up the opinions of Korean and foreign experts on the

conclusive evidence collected from the incident site; hull deformation;

statements of relevant personnel; medical examination of the deceased

service members; analysis on seismic and infrasound waves; simulation of

underwater explosion; and analysis on currents off Baekryong-do and

collected torpedo parts.

- ROKS "Cheonan" was split apart and sunk due to a shockwave and bubble

effect produced by an underwater torpedo explosion.

- The explosion occurred approximately 3m left of the center of the gas turbine

room, at a depth of about 6~9m.

- The weapon system used is confirmed to be a high explosive torpedo with a

net explosive weight of about 250kg, manufactured by North Korea.

In addition, the findings of the Multinational Combined Intelligence Task

Force, comprised of 5 states including the US, Australia, Canada and the UK and

operating since May 4th, are as follows:

- The North Korean military is in possession of a fleet of about 70 submarines,

comprised of approximately 20 Romeo class submarines (1,800 tons), 40

Sango class submarines (300 tons) and 10 midget submarines including the

Yeono class (130 tons). It also possesses torpedoes of various capabilities

including straight running, acoustic and wake homing torpedoes with a net

explosive weight of about 200 to 300kg, which can deliver the same level of

damage that was delivered to the ROKS "Cheonan."

- Given the aforementioned findings combined with the operational environment

in the vicinity of the site of the incident, we assess that a small submarine is

an underwater weapon system that operates in these operational environment

conditions. We confirmed that a few small submarines and a mother ship

supporting them left a North Korean naval base in the West Sea 2-3 days

prior to the attack and returned to port 2-3 days after the attack.

- Furthermore, we confirmed that all submarines from neighboring countries

were either in or near their respective home bases at the time of the incident.

- The torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a dredging ship

on

May 15th, which include the 5x5 bladed contra-rotating propellers, propulsion

motor and a steering section, perfectly match the schematics of the CHT-02D

torpedo included in introductory brochures provided to foreign countries by

North Korea for export purposes. The markings in Hangul, which reads

"1번(or No. 1 in English)", found inside the end of the propulsion section, is

consistent with the marking of a previously obtained North Korean torpedo.

Russian and Chinese torpedoes are marked in their respective languages.

The CHT-02D torpedo manufactured by North Korea utilizes acoustic/wake

homing and passive acoustic tracking methods. It is a heavyweight torpedo

with a diameter of 21 inches, a weight of 1.7 tons and a net explosive weight

of up to 250kg.

- Based on all such relevant facts and classified analysis, we have reached the

clear conclusion that ROKS "Cheonan" was sunk as the result of an external

underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in North Korea. The

evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired

by a North Korean submarine. There is no other plausible explanation.

Cheonan Incident Fabricated by the US and Lee Myung Bak Group

of Traitors Was Most Hideous Conspiratorial Farce

in the Nation’s History

(1) Open announcement of the inspection group of the National Defence

Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

on the truth behind the Cheonan incident

Seven months have passed since the Cheonan of the south Korean Navy sank in the

West Sea of Korea.

No sooner had the incident occurred than the US imperialists and the Lee Myung

Bak group of traitors deliberately linked it with the DPRK as if they had waited for it

to happen, kicking up an unprecedented anti-DPRK confrontation racket.

From the outset the DPRK dismissed the groundless story about its involvement in

the Cheonan incident as a sheer fabrication and conspiratorial farce, and declared at

home and abroad its will to probe the truth behind the case to the last.

The proposal for field investigation made by the inspection group of the NDC of the

DPRK was prompted by this will.

Having grown afraid that the inside story of the case may be disclosed, the US

imperialists and the Lee group of traitors hastily announced the “results of the

investigation” conducted by a “civilian-army joint investigation team,” desperately

opposing the field survey by the NDC inspection group.

As the “investigation results” were criticized for being full of suspicions, they

recently made public a “final report,” another fabrication, only to be censured and

ridiculed by all people.

They have gone so far as to stage joint naval exercises in the form of

“demonstration of armed forces” one after another in the waters close to the DPRK

while getting frantic with a racket for applying sanctions against it on the international

1

arena.

It was the original plan of the DPRK side to make public the truth about the incident

in the most scientific and legitimate manner after the completion of the field survey by

the NDC inspection group.

The US imperialists and the group of traitors, however, not only objected the field

survey but went the lengths of turning down even the proposal made by the DPRK out

of magnanimity to jointly survey and estimate all material evidence which they

claimed they had lifted from the waters where the ship sank after bringing them to

Panmunjom.

Under this situation the DPRK side decided to disclose before the world on the

basis of information gathered so far what a sheer fabrication and conspiratorial farce

they orchestrated. The following is the first installment of the statement:

1. Aluminum alloy fragments prove themselves that the torpedo was not from the

north

The US imperialists and the “investigation team” of the Lee group of traitors

claimed that the fragments of torpedo allegedly lifted from the waters off Paengnyong

Islet where the Cheonan sank were those of aluminum alloy.

They made public that the aluminum alloy was material evidence proving that the

“torpedo was from the north” and that the “north attacked the ship.”

The army and people of the DPRK have silently watched how the US imperialists

and the group of traitors would explain the issue of these torpedo fragments as they

pretended to be well informed of the DPRK. The army and people of the DPRK have

exercised patience with an intention to verify them on the spot and make public what

they had in mind.

As it has become impossible to verify them on the spot, they now do disclose the

truth about the incident.

The Navy of the Korean People’s Army has torpedoes as the naval forces of other

countries do, and we do not hide the fact that it possesses torpedoes with such a

tremendous striking power that the world can hardly imagine.

2

They are Juche-based torpedoes made of steel alloy material manufactured by the

workers of the DPRK, not aluminum alloy like those made in other countries.

It was our original intention to hand steel alloy sample of a torpedo of the Navy of

the KPA to the US imperialists and the group of traitors so that they could compare it

with aluminum alloy. It was aimed at inducing them to admit that the “attack on the

Cheonan by the north’s torpedo” was a sheer fabrication and conspiratorial farce.

The DPRK is still willing to directly hand the steel alloy sample of Juche-based

torpedo to the US imperialists and the group of traitors.

The US imperialists and the group of traitors have so far claimed that the aluminum

alloy fragments were “those of the north’s torpedo,” and this is as good as denying the

“story” themselves.

Here we would like to lay bare more glaringly the hypocrisy and the inside story

about the anti-DPRK conspiratorial scenarios including several “investigation reports”

which the US and the south Korean puppets announced as regards the Cheonan

incident.

2. Propelling body is a sheer fabrication

The propelling body is one of the decisive evidence produced by the US and the Lee

Myung Bak group of traitors to prove the story that the “north was involved” in the

Cheonan incident.

The origin of this propelling body is full of doubts.

It is nonsensical for them to claim that a civilian fishing boat appeared all of a

sudden and netted the propelling body which dozens of naval vessels equipped with

sophisticated detecting devices had failed to find out in at least 50 days. The

propelling body which was shown on TV was different from what the “investigation

team” made public later.

The propelling body, which was lifted by the fishing boat at that time, was reported

to have been pasted with silver paper, but there was no such thing on the 1.5 metre-

long propelling body presented by the puppet group’s “investigation team” on May 20.

This is not the only thing that aroused suspicion.

3

At the outset the “investigation team” said that HMX, RDX and TNT explosive

ingredients were detected from the hull of the Cheonan.

But there rose an opinion that no minute explosive ingredient was detected from the

propelling body which they claimed had been used for sinking the vessel. It does not

stand to reason that no gunpowder ingredient was detected from the torpedo which is

to be exploded by gunpowder, i.e., from the propelling body of the torpedo which they

claimed had been used for breaking the 1,400-ton-class Cheonan into two.

Driven to a tight corner, the US and the south Korean puppets excused themselves,

saying that they could not detect the explosive ingredient as it was dissolved in

seawater because the propelling body remained in the salty seawater for long. But this

excuse can cut no ice as they had already made public that gunpowder ingredient was

detected from the vessel’s hull which remained on the bottom of the same waters for

the same length of time.

3. Torpedo design, mockery of world

A greater irony is that it was disclosed that the torpedo design shown by the group

of traitors in a bid to convince the public that the torpedo propelling body was “from

the north” was full of suspicions.

When making public the “joint investigation results,” the puppet group shamelessly

displayed at the venue of the news conference CHT-02D torpedo design it claimed had

been drawn by the north so as to make plausible its assertion that the propelling body

of the torpedo which had attacked the vessel was “made by the north.” It insisted it

was certain that the propelling body was made by the north as “Guaranteed by the

DPRK” was written on the literature of the torpedo design.

However, the words written on the design were confirmed to be Japanese in fact,

and it was brought to light that the torpedo motor on the design was a rectangular one,

and the motor of the propelling body produced at the venue of the news conference

was of a streamlined shape.

When their clumsy plot proved to be false, they could not but admit that they had

given the explanation with the help of a different torpedo design so as to confirm the

4

story of the “propelling body from the north.”

The falsity of the design is proved by the following facts: The puppet group claimed

in its “report on the results of the joint investigation” that it was a “design contained in

north Korea’s torpedo literature distributed for export,” and it was “provided with the

image of the CHT-02D torpedo by the information analyzing section.” The part just

under it referred to the “process of printing the north’s words in computer by printer,”

hinting that it was a computer file. This fact alone proves that whether the design is a

printed matter or an image or a computer file remains uncertain.

It had already been disclosed that the puppet group replaced the torpedo design by a

new one in secrecy several times in a bid to convince the public at any cost that the

propelling body was “from the north.”

This goes to prove that the propelling body produced by the US and the south

Korean puppet group as strong evidence of a “torpedo attack by the north” was

nothing but a sheer fabrication making a mockery of the world.

4. Writing style of “No. 1,” vivid manifestation of ignorance

The US and the south Korean puppets cited the writing style of “No. 1” written on

the propelling body as decisive evidence.

The munitions industry of the DPRK do not use pen when writing any necessary

figures on any parts or equipment but carve them, and in this case they use Korean

word Ho, not Pon (number). In a word, “No. 1” is not a conventional writing style

used in the DPRK.

Moreover, had the vessel been sunk by a torpedo attack, not only the head of the

torpedo, which caused explosion, but its propelling body would have been seriously

destroyed due to the high temperature and pressure which occurred during the

explosion. Therefore, it is nonsensical that “No. 1” remains vivid as if it had just been

written on the propelling body.

When one has a look at the back part of the propelling body and the rudder of the

torpedo presented by the puppet “investigation team,” one can judge that their surfaces

are heavily corroded.

5

A torpedo is painted to prevent it from being corroded before its use. The paint is

burnt up due to high heat during its explosion and its remains are corroded in the

seawater.

Then there arises a question as to at what temperature the paint on the torpedo is

burnt.

It is a view of the relevant scientists that generally the boiling point of the paint of

silicon and ceramic varieties that can stand the highest temperature is 760 and the℃

boiling point of ordinary oil paint is 350 -500 .℃ ℃

Supposing that 250kg of explosives were used to attack the vessel as claimed by the

puppet “investigation team,” the temperature of the back part of the propelling body of

the torpedo should be at least 325 and at most over 1,000 right after its explosion℃ ℃

in view of the amount of energy to be generated at that moment.

When taking into consideration the fact that the outer rudder at the edge of the back

part of the torpedo remained corroded, its inside might have been heated above the

said temperature, and the temperature inside the back part of the propelling body on

which “No. 1” was written might have been as high as 325 -1,000 .℃ ℃

But “No. 1” was written by something like felt-tip pen, not by paint.

The ink usually used for felt-tip pen worldwide is made up of xylene, toluene and

alcohol. The boiling points of ingredients are known to be 138.5 for xylene,℃

110.6 toluene and 78.4 alcohol. So, the ink used on the back part of the℃ ℃

propelling body might have been burnt up at the temperature of 300 .℃

If the outer paint is burnt up, the characters “No. 1” written with felt-tip pen should

be burnt up, and if the characters are left, the outer paint should also remain. This is a

science.

However, the outer paint that stands high temperature was burnt up, but the inner

ink that burns up even in low temperature remains intact. With no rhetoric can the

puppet group justify this inconsistency.

It is quite natural that many people said it was hardly understandable in the light of

common sense why there were no similar characters on the other parts of the

6

propelling body of the torpedo if this was written by the north on it for the purpose of

assembling the torpedo.

The characters “No. 1” only betrayed the lack of scientific knowledge and

ignorance of plot-breeders, far from proving that the torpedo was made by the north.

A maritime expert conducted a personal experiment on the spot, and scientifically

proved the fact that the surface of the part on which the characters were written was

clearer than other parts as it was grinded by abrasive paper for writing new characters

and the propelling body had never been in the seawater after “No. 1” was written on it.

University professors of the US and Canada made a precision analysis of the ink

used for writing characters “No. 1” and officially confirmed that it is identical with

what is used in south Korea, driving the tricksters into an inescapable tight corner.

Everywhere in south Korea one can still hear such boos and jeers as that “buses

bearing blue ‘No. 1’ and running streets are the ones from the north for intruding into

the south,” “players in uniform with blue ‘No. 1’ on the playgrounds are players from

the north” and “a nephew who has the same writing style as that used for writing

characters ‘No. 1’ is also a spy from the north.” This clearly proves how ridiculous the

evidence proving “No. 1” is.

5. “Story about a column of water,” false statement made under coercion

Right after the occurrence of the vessel incident, experts expressed their respective

assertions and views on the cause of the incident, saying that “it was stranded,” “it was

destroyed for its natural age,” “it was sunk by a mine explosion,” “it was sunk by the

explosion of its ammunition chamber,” etc.

But the US and the south Korean puppets floated the “story about a column of

water” in a bid to brush aside the above-said assertions and convince the public at any

cost that the “vessel was sunk by the north’s torpedo attack.”

If the vessel was sunk by a torpedo attack, there would be naturally rising of a

column of water. Therefore, the “story about a column of water” drew attention of the

public keen to clarify the cause of the incident.

But the results of analysis of the testimonies made by the crew of the vessel and the

7

soldiers who were on duty in the waters near the vessel right after the incident proved

that there was no one who witnessed the column of water. Then, all of a sudden, it was

reported that a watchman on Paengnyong Islet said he had witnessed a column of

water. He was reported to have said that at a sound of bang he had looked at the waters

270 degree of declination about 4 km away from his position, and then saw a white

light flashed and disappeared.

But when the location where he claimed he had seen the column of water was

compared with the position he was standing on duty, it is evident that it was a place

quite different from the scene of the incident; worse still, what he had witnessed was

nothing but a “white light flash.”

No one out of the 58 survivors of the incident said he had witnessed a column of

water, light flash and flame that would happen at the time when a vessel is attacked by

a torpedo. The results of the examination of the dead by X-ray and other means

showed that there was no trace of wounds caused by splinters or burns, except bone

fracture, lacerated wound, etc.

This fact generally suggested that there was a small possibility that they died due to

external hurt and suffocation but they drowned in the waters.

To support the “story of a column of water,” the puppet “investigation team”

emphasized that there were drops of water on the face of a port watcher and there was

much seawater on the vessel, but this only has become a target of ridicule.

A soldier who survived the incident has this to say: “At that time I was on duty of

watching the starboard of the vessel. I did not notice anything particular like a column

of water when I looked around.” This statement flatly refuted the “story of a column of

water” spread by the puppet group.

This fact proves that the above-said “story of a column of water” deliberately

fabricated by the upper echelon of the puppet military to convince the public that the

vessel was sunk by the “north’s torpedo attack.”

6. “Course of channel style infiltration,” assertion of the blind

The US and the south Korean puppet group invented the story about “the course of

8

channel style infiltration” by the north’s submarine into the said waters in a bid to

prove that the Cheonan was sunk by a torpedo attack of the DPRK.

Right after the occurrence of the incident the US and the south Korean puppet

military authorities asserted that there was no mysterious movement of the Korean

People’s Army before and after the incident.

Later they published what they called “investigation results,” in which they claimed

some mini-submarines and certain supporting vessel of the KPA Navy were confirmed

to have left a certain base in the West Sea of Korea 2-3 days before the incident and

returned 2-3 days later.

What matters is that there is neither a single mini-sub in that base touted by the

puppet group nor any shadow of something similar to it.

The puppet group insisted that a submarine sailed towards the international waters

in the west after loading torpedo at the said base and veered to the south before sailing

to the east to infiltrate in channel style close to the waters off Paengnyong Islet.

There should be a limit to cooking up a lie.

When the public demanded correct materials proving the story, the puppet group

categorically objected to it at the outset, claiming that it could not confirm it for fear of

the exposure of the level of army intelligence gathering with regard to the information

of the movement of the DPRK’s submarine. But unable to turn down the public

demand any longer, it uttered it could not show the image as its quality was poor

because of bad weather.

In other words, the puppet group admitted itself that it failed to monitor any

movement due to poor quality of image.

The puppet group had boasted that it discerns submarines on the basis of the

observation data obtained by the south Korea-US joint intelligence gathering

machinery and the credibility of the round-the-clock observation of the related area by

the US cutting-edge intelligence satellite is very high as it is based on the precision

image data with the resolution of less than one metre. It is sheer abstraction for the

puppet group to talk about “the course of channel style infiltration,” while asserting

9

that it could not produce correct observation results because of “poor image quality” 1

or 2 days before and after the outbreak of the incident.

The observation was not affected by weather for some days before and after the

occurrence of the incident. Its assertion about impossible observation only goes to

prove that its story about the infiltration of the DPRK submarine was no more than a

farce of its own making to bury it in a “black box.”

7. Aluminum adsorbent scientifically rejected

The US and the south Korean puppet group presented even the analysis of adsorbent

which they said was found on the hull and torpedo parts as scientific evidence proving

the vessel’s sinking by torpedo explosion. They asserted that as the large quantity of

white powder found on torpedo propelling body was of the same component with

those found on several places of the hull, it could be concluded that the vessel was

sunk by a torpedo attack.

A precision analysis conducted by prestigious physicists of several countries,

including the DPRK, categorically dismissed this assertion.

The puppet “investigation team” claimed that aluminum used for making a torpedo

turns into non-crystalline aluminum oxide when it explodes and cools and that the

non-crystalline aluminum oxide is detected as aluminum in energy spectroscope and

not as aluminum in X-ray diffraction analysis.

Physicists of several countries including the US and Canada refuted the above-said

claim, saying that it is impossible that aluminum turns into non-crystalline aluminum

oxide 100 percent after undergoing explosion and cooling, and explained that the

probability of all aluminum turning into oxide is close to 0 percent and the probability

of all oxidized aluminum turning into non-crystalline is also close to 0 percent. They

gave particular explanation proving that the adsorbent found on the hull and torpedo

propelling body asserted by the puppet “investigation team” are hardly produced in

high temperature like at the time of explosion, unlike non-crystalline aluminum oxide,

a product of explosion, as they are formed in normal and low temperatures. To

scientifically prove this, those physicists analyzed and verified the adsorbent by

10

various means such as X-ray diffraction, energy spectroscopy, infrared ray

spectroscopy, laser spectroscopy and even with the help of an electronic microscope.

They even conducted direct experiment on it and proposed open experiment to the

puppet “investigation team.”

Physicists of the DPRK shared the view with those physicists.

The puppet group, which could not respond to the proposal, let loose such poor

excuses that only oxidized, non-crystalline aluminum, not oxidized crystalline

aluminum, was detected in the initial examination because it was present in a

minimum amount, only to deny the scientific data and assertion made by themselves.

The mock explosion of the hull and torpedo and the analysis of resultant adsorbent,

which the puppet group had so far claimed to be the most scientific one among the

investigation results, only proved that they tried to justify the investigation results in a

far-fetched manner, unaware of even the scientific truth that aluminum does not turn

into non-crystalline oxide 100 percent through explosion.

8. Port screw and fluorescent lamps in good shape

The puppet group staged such a farce as inviting people from all walks of life to

look round the vessel in the puppet Navy’s 2nd Fleet base in a bid to link the incident

with the DPRK. But this added to its worry.

Those who looked round the lifted vessel cast more doubts about the case than

understanding the explanation given by the puppet group. This is because there took

place non-contact underwater explosion in the port of the vessel but the port screw

remained in good shape and the starboard screw was seriously deformed and

fluorescent lamps in the part of the hull broken into two pieces were as they had been.

The witnesses ridiculed that they have never seen a torpedo with such a super-

precision striking power capable of breaking only a vessel into two pieces while

leaving fluorescent lamps very close to the part where explosion took place as they

are, asserting that these fluorescent lamps should be licensed as “magic fluorescent

lamps” and “bullet-proof fluorescent lamps” which stood a torpedo explosion.

As a matter of fact, the deformation of the screw provides core testimony to the fact

11

that the Cheonan was sunk without external factors. What is most important is to clear

the basic doubts but the puppet group gave no explanation to this matter.

When arguments gained in scope and strength, the puppet Ministry of Defence

ambiguously spoke about the results of the analysis of the screw deformation and let

loose a spate of sophism that there is no reason to assert that glass fluorescent lamps

should be broken when the hull was broken into two, claiming that fluorescent lamps

of the naval vessels were made to stand any shock.

The above-said port screw and fluorescent lamps provided decisive evidence

refuting the US and the puppet group’s assertion that the vessel was sunken by a

“torpedo attack of the north.”

9. Evidence proving the vessel’s stranding

The biggest controversy this time was whether the warship was sunk by a torpedo

attack or due to stranding.

The puppet group opened to the media the bow and stern of the vessel to which they

had been barred from getting access, to convince them that the vessel was sunk by a

torpedo attack.

As regards this issue, experts asserted that all the information about the Cheonan

incident clearly proved that it had been stranded, adding that the “joint investigation

team” committed a serious mistake when analyzing the cause of the incident.

First of all, the waters where the bow of the warship was found is the waters

between Paengnyong Islet and Taechong Islet which abound in rocks.

The torn part outside the port security guard of the stern, the bending of the left side

of the security guard and the serious scratching on the framework of the hull and the

security guard can be usually found when the hull is hit by a rock or sand ground.

If they were damage done by a torpedo attack, the vessel would have neither been

partly torn off nor got rusty.

The experts who asserted that the vessel had been stranded contend that if the vessel

had been sunken by the pressure of non-contact underwater explosion which would

cause contraction and swelling, the security guard would have been broken or blown

12

up. They termed this a reasonable suspicion as regards the fact that the security guard

was in perfect shape although the right propeller of the stern became bent.

The puppet group labeled such reasonable suspicion as a “strange story” and

“enemy-benefiting act” to cope with the reasonable assertion through a poor colour

theory. However, it could not hide the truth.

Had the torpedo exploded near the Cheonan as claimed by the “investigation team,”

a lot of fragments must have been embedded in the vessel body. But there was no

fragment on the vessel, there was no one among the vessel’s crew who got his

eardrum ruptured and joints hurt, and no dead fish could be seen on the surface of

water. The results of the analysis of the TOD image made public by the puppet

Ministry of Defence and the coordinates presented by the “investigation team,” and

the coordinates of automate tactical command system of the puppet Navy, showed that

the Cheonan continued to sail northwest even after the time it had sunk, time

confirmed by the “investigation team.” That the vessel continued to sail against the

current even after it had been broken into two by a torpedo attack denies the story that

the vessel was sunk by a torpedo attack. Survivors testified to the fact that they had

felt the vessel hit something with the sounds of “bang” and “boom” before rising and

smelt burning oil. This fact went to prove the vessel’s stranding.

It is by no means accidental that experts at home and abroad assert that a

comprehensive analysis of the propelling power unit of the torpedo which was claimed

to have been lifted from the waters where the vessel sank, the deformation of the hull,

the content of the testimonies made by those related to the case, the conditions of the

wounded and the autopsy of the dead, an analysis of seismic wave and air sound wave,

the simulated underwater explosion, analysis of the tide near Paengnyong Islet,

analysis of explosive ingredients, retrieved parts of torpedo, etc. can prove that there

was no short-distance non-contact underwater explosion, that the propelling body had

nothing to do with the destruction of the Cheonan, and that there is no evidence

proving that the torpedo was from “the north.”

10. Video file disappeared before being made public

13

The “investigation results” announced by the puppet group said that torpedo CHT-

02D with explosive power of 250kg of TNT went off three metres portside from the

gas turbine room of the vessel and in waters 6-9 metres deep, giving off “shock waves

and non-contact underwater explosion effect” which resulted finally in breaking the

vessel into two.

The “shock waves” which caused the most serious direct damage to the vessel gave

shock to the hull with the speed of 8,000 metres per second.

Had the torpedo produced such powerful shock waves approximately three metres

off the hull as announced by the puppet group, 1.1 second would have been enough to

completely cut off the vessel.

An animation file showing a mock “non-contact underwater explosion” of a heavy

torpedo conducted by the puppet Institute for Defence Studies in 2004 proved that

Paeksango torpedo with an explosive power equivalent to that of 185 kg of TNT

completely split the hull into two pieces in less than one second after its explosion. In

more than 10 seconds after the explosion a water column scores of metres high

disappeared and the bow was observed scores of metres away from the stern. Thirty

seconds after the explosion it was hardly possible to find any trace of the hull on the

water surface.

This suffices to prove that the Cheonan must have completely sunk or its bow

separated from its stern after about 30 seconds if it had been hit by CHT-02D torpedo

with an explosive power of 250kg of TNT, much stronger than that of Paeksango

torpedo.

The puppet Ministry of Defence which had refused to disclose the navigation diary

and sonar details was compelled to make public a TOD video file showing the waters

where the vessel had sunk; only the scenes showing the explosion of the vessel and the

split of the hull were missing.

Then where has the video file showing the hull at the moment of split which can

serve as decisive evidence proving the cause of the vessel’s sinking gone?

Right after the incident the puppet Ministry of Defence presented to the public the

14

scenes showing the Cheonan in its normal operation before the explosion, its bow and

stern that were split after explosion and the sinking of the bow. It insisted that the

TOD record of the most crucial moment showing the split of the bow and stern was

not available. However, it could not but disclose additional video file two times in face

of the public criticism. This only aroused greater suspicion.

This TOD video file dealt with what happened between 32 seconds and 40 seconds

after the alleged explosion of the vessel.

This video file lasting 8 seconds showed the funnel of the vessel as a black spot and

its starboard side tilted toward Paengnyong Islet with the bow and stern not

completely split.

The scientific experiment made by the puppet group and common sense suggest that

had the vessel been sunk by a torpedo, anything should not have been shown above

the surface of the water 32 seconds after the explosion.

Much upset by this, the puppet Ministry of Defence made poor excuses, saying that

“scenes are blurred as the TOD focus was set at the low triple magnification” and that

“it is hard to discern the split vessel’s body though it was broken into two pieces

because resolution was low.”

At the very outset it concealed this file, talking about military secret, and corrected

its assertions three times. But the results proved that the vessel was not sunk by a

torpedo attack. Clear is why this video file had been missing.

11. Unreasonable measurement of corrosion period

The falsity of the “investigation results” presented by the US and the south Korean

puppet group can be seen through their measurement of the corrosion period of the

propelling body of the torpedo.

At the time when the puppet group announced the “mid-term investigation results,”

they said that they could not measure the correct corrosion period as great deflection

between the quality and corrosion layer of the metal of the propelling body was

observed in the course of measuring them, adding that members of the “investigation

team” estimated with naked eyes that it was similar to the state of 1-2 months’

15

corrosion.

What matters is why the corrosion period of metal could not but be measured only

with naked eyes.

There is a need to investigate the experiment results announced by a marine expert

of south Korea.

He put heated aluminum, stainless steel and iron pieces in the waters with salinity

and tide similar to those in the waters where the vessel had been sunken, before taking

them out in order to scientifically clarify the state of corrosion of the vessel.

The results showed that they were not as heavily rusted as the propelling body and,

particularly, white adsorbent was found in some parts of aluminum piece but some

heated parts appeared to be dark. This stood in sharp contrast to the adsorbent found

on the propeller of the propelling body which had been made public by the puppet

“investigation team.”

The same can be said of the iron piece. It was rusted dark but when it was placed in

the air after the dark rust was rubbed off, it turned yellow. This can be compared to the

shaft of the propelling body which was rusted red; in other words, the propelling body

was rusted more heavily.

Some parts of the stainless steel piece was observed to be dark, but no corrosion

was found.

The expert noted that the propelling body presented by the “joint investigation

team” to prove a torpedo attack by the north gathered a preposterously great amount of

rust, adding that it must have been under water for at least 4-5 years and then put in

the air for a considerably long time.

The results of investigation made by a Russian team said that one could judge from

the scientific analysis and comparison between the rust formed on the vessel’s hull and

the rust formed on the propelling body with “No. l” that the propelling body was under

seawater for more than six months, adding that one can draw conclusion that they have

nothing in common.

Contained in the appendix to the “final report” made public by the puppet

16

“investigation team” were data of EDS proving that the adsorbent collected from the

torpedo was not aluminum oxide caused by explosion but aluminum hydroxide, rust

caused by corrosion.

Foreign experts said that the data of energy dust ores, which was formed when

adsorbent was treated in the heat of 200°C, was contained in the “final report” even

though they were not presented at the time of publication of the mid-term

investigation, noting in unison that as the results of experiment of adsorbent are

identical with those of heat treatment of aluminum hydroxide, it is contrary to the

conclusion of the “final report” that adsorbent was produced by explosion.

They even expressed their understanding that it can be interpreted that some

scholars of conscience left such data in the “final report” full of deception and falsity.

In the final analysis, the puppet group revealed by themselves the unscientific and

slack way the investigation was made through such simple estimation as “examination

with naked eyes,” not scientific and technological examination, and fully showed that

the “story of the north’s involvement” in the Cheonan incident was a sheer fabrication.

12. Simulated warship sinking invites derision

The puppet group reportedly staged a simulated warship sinking allegedly to prove

the warship sinking by torpedo explosion with an aim to link the Cheonan incident

with the DPRK.

The simulation overturned the investigation results the puppet group has so far

announced.

From the outset it declared that the explosive power of the torpedo was equivalent

to that of 250kg of TNT of the DPRK’s heavy torpedo CHT-02D and, on this basis,

presented investigation results.

The specification of the “No. 1 torpedo” made public by it defined the amount of

powder as 250kg. What matters is that explosive power of such amount of powder is

not enough to sink the Cheonan.

In general, high-efficiency powder stronger than TNT is used in torpedo.

Torpedo experts consider that torpedo explosive power is 1.4-2 times stronger than

17

ordinary TNT. This indicates that the explosive power of the “No. 1 torpedo” is as

much as that of 350-500kg of TNT.

The puppet group belatedly admitted the fact that the powder of the torpedo was not

simply made up of TNT. And in order to correct its mistake it increased the explosive

power of the torpedo to that of 360kg of TNT and staged another simulated

underwater explosion. That was necessary to represent a likeliness of real damage

caused by explosion to the engine room and hull floor of the vessel.

The results of the simulation negated what happened at the time of the sinking of

the vessel.

Negation of the explosion as powerful as that of 140-260kg of TNT which was

registered by the then seismic and air sound waves precisely means that of the generation

of shock and heat, height of the column of water, wounds suffered by the crew,

possibility of existence of characters “No. l,” the hull and inner powder chamber and all

other places of the sunken vessel that remained undamaged by explosion-caused shock

waves as well as all other points of contention based on explosive power produced by the

puppets.

As regards the simulation, a member of the “investigation team” confessed that

“they could not but work hard for about two months to modify and rectify a model.”

This indicates that the simulation was carried out for the purpose of frame-up.

After all, the puppets’ desperate efforts to fabricate the story about the Cheonan

sinking by the DPRK’s torpedo attack backfired on it.

13. “Final report” reduced to false indictment

When the “interim report” published by the US and the south Korean puppet group

on May 20 was snubbed and rebuffed by the public inside and outside Korea, they

presented the “final report” on September 13 after the lapse of more than one hundred

days, talking about the removal of all suspicions which have been raised so far.

The “final report,” however, touched off stronger suspicion, only to prove that the

group of traitors made an empty talk when it promised to clear off the suspicion.

The puppet group just confined itself to such work as recording the course and

18

contents of investigation and the analysis data including the investigation activities

carried out according to schedule unlike at the time of issuing the primary presentation

which preponderantly analyzed the cause of the sinking of the Cheonan, and even

deleted the part that they could not explain though there arose strong suspicion.

The puppet group again presented the torpedo propelling body, which it claimed

had been lifted from the waters where the Cheonan sank, as material evidence proving

the “story about the attack on the Cheonan by the north’s torpedo,” a story that

sparked off the strongest suspicion. But it failed to present the direct evidence proving

that the propelling body is “from the north” and, as for characters “No. l,” “design of

torpedo,” etc. it only repeated previous assertions.

The south Korean media, deploring who would believe the unsubstantial “final

report” full of “indirect evidence,” said that it is quite natural that more than 70

percent of the south Korean people “suspect that the authorities have deliberately

distorted the truth to seek the political purpose or evade responsibility” and the

remaining people disbelieve or are doubtful about it as the investigation conducted for

many days after inviting so many experts only increased and reproduced the doubtful

points as to the cause of the sinking of the vessel, far from presenting perfect evidence.

In fact, people from south Korean political, public, scientific and other circles are

holding emergency seminars, expressing their will to probe the truth about the incident

to the last.

It is by no means fortuitous that the Russian investigation group, the only group which

investigated the case on the spot, said as regards the sinking of the vessel that “it could

find no ground to judge that it was caused by the torpedo attack by the north,” the

Swedish investigation group which participated in the joint investigation officially held

back its opinion that “it was the deed of the mini-submarine of the north” and different

countries of the world are demanding the reinvestigation of the incident, expressing

doubts at the “investigation results.”

The media of Russia, Germany, China, the US and other countries dismissed the

“final report on the Cheonan” announced by the south Korean authorities as the worst

19

false document.

Much upset by the shower of criticism and denunciation, the tricksters let loose a

spate of groundless outbursts, advising those who were strongly suspicious of the case

to “look at a cartoon recording the points of suspicion and contention to get

understanding.”

Talking about the “limitation of detectability” in the present times in which

detection is made down to the level of nanogram is little short of self-admission that

falsity can never prevail over truth. And the substitution of a scientific and

technological solution with a cartoon only proves the level of baseness of the artifice

employed by the tricksters.

The Lee Myung Bak group of traitors fabricated the Cheonan incident while

sacrificing a great many soldiers to escalate the confrontation racket. It only glaringly

disclosed its heinous nature as the group of traitors unprecedented in the nation’s

history, the vicious confrontation-minded elements and the despicable sycophantic

traitors serving the US.

The US egged its stooges on to fabricate the conspiratorial case against the DPRK,

self-proving before the world that it is a matchless “producer” in this field and has

committed another fraud to serve its strategic interests in the Far Eastern region, the

Northeast Asian region.

There are a lot of information proving the falsity of the investigation results about

the Cheonan incident announced by the US and the group of traitors.

We will issue the second and third installments of the statement to prove the truth

behind the conspiratorial farce and charade in the face of the frantic racket kicked up

by the US and the group of traitors to escalate confrontation with the DPRK while

making fuss about the Cheonan incident.

The US and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors will never be able to escape the

sledge-hammer blow of the times and history for their hideous frame-up

unprecedented in the history of the Korean nation.

20

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22199/south_korean_president_lees_national_address_may_2010.html

Published May 24, 2010

Speaker: Lee Myung-Bak

South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak gave this address on May 24, 2010.

South Korean President Lee's National Address, May 2010

Fellow Koreans,

I am standing here today, keenly aware that the Korean Peninsula is facing a critical

turning point.

My fellow citizens,

The Cheonan was sunk by a surprise North Korean torpedo attack. Again, the

perpetrator was North Korea. Their attack came at a time when the people of the

Republic of Korea were enjoying their well-earned rest after a hard day's work. Once

again, North Korea violently shattered our peace.

The sinking of the Cheonan constitutes a military provocation against the Republic of

Korea by North Korea.

Since the end of the Korean War, the North has perpetrated incessant armed

provocations against us, including the bombing attack against the presidential

delegation at the Aung San Martyr's Mausoleum in Myanmar and the bombing in midair

of Korean Air Flight 858. The North Koreans, however, have never officially admitted

the crimes they committed. This time is no different. They continue to insist that my

Government fabricated the sinking of the Cheonan.

I am not surprised by such North Korean behavior and this was the reason why I

emphasized, from the very beginning, the importance of conducting a thorough and

objective scientific investigation into the incident. I also asked the nation to exercise

patience and self-restraint. It was important for us not to come to any hasty conclusion

until the results of the investigation came out.

Finally, on May 20th, the international joint investigation group released their

conclusive findings, backed by definitive evidences. With the release of the final report,

no responsible country in the international community will be able to deny the fact that

the Cheonan was sunk by North Korea.

Fellow citizens,

We have always tolerated North Korea's brutality, time and again. We did so because

we have always had a genuine longing for peace on the Korean Peninsula. But now

things are different. North Korea will pay a price corresponding to its provocative acts. I

will continue to take stern measures to hold the North accountable.

From this moment, no North Korean ship will be allowed to make passage through any

of the shipping lanes in the waters under our control, which has been allowed by the

Inter-Korean Agreement on Maritime Transportation. The sea routes meant for inter-

Korean exchanges and cooperation must never again be used for armed provocations.

Trade and exchanges between the Republic of Korea and North Korea will also be

suspended. We still remember the killing of an innocent South Korean tourist by a

North Korean armed guard at the Mt. Kumgang resort. More recently, North Korea

unilaterally confiscated South Korean assets at this same resort. Worse yet, the North

sank the Cheonan taking the precious lives of our young sailors. Under these

circumstances, any inter-Korean trade or other cooperative activity is meaningless.

However, we will continue to provide assistance for infants and children. Matters

pertaining to the Kaesong Industrial Complex will be duly considered, taking its unique

characteristics into consideration.

From now on, the Republic of Korea will not tolerate any provocative act by the North

and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence. If our territorial waters, airspace

or territory are violated, we will immediately exercise our right of self-defense.

The North's military provocation against the Cheonan on March 26 violated the Charter

of the United Nations and contravened the existing agreements reached for the sake of

peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, including the Korean War Armistice

Agreement and the Basic Agreement between South and North Korea.

In close consultations with the nations concerned, the Government will refer this matter

to the UN Security Council, so that the international community can join us in holding

the North accountable. Many countries around the world have expressed their full

support for our position.

I solemnly urge the North Korean authorities to do the following. Apologize

immediately to the Republic of Korea and the international community. Immediately

punish those who are responsible for and those who were involved in the incident.

These are basic measures that the North has to take before anything else. If the North

continues to make excuses and wild assertions as it has always done in the past, they

will not find any place to stand in the world.

My fellow Koreans and our compatriots in North Korea,

The overriding goal of the Republic of Korea is not military confrontation. Our goal has

always been the attainment of real peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Our

goal is to bring about prosperity for all Koreans. Our vision is to realize the peaceful

reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. The Republic

of Korea is no longer what it once was-an impoverished nation, suffering from the scars

of war. Rising above the ruins of war, the Republic of Korea has achieved an impressive

miracle of progress guided by the constitutional foundations of liberal democracy and a

free market economy. The Republic of Korea is continuing its confident march toward

the center stage of the world.

All countries across the globe are competing with one another to ensure the prosperity

of their own citizens. At the same time, all nations are working together for the sake of

co-prosperity and peace in the global community. The entire world is changing.

Changes are taking place faster than ever.

But, what is the situation in North Korea? Nothing has changed over the last sixty years.

It is a country still holding onto an empty ambition of forcefully reuniting the Korean

Peninsula under the banner of communism. It is a country that still believes in making

threats and committing terrorist activities. North Korea's goal is to instigate division and

conflict.

For what reason and for whom is it doing what it does?

As compatriots, I am truly ashamed.

It is now time for the North Korean regime to change.

Today, no country can maintain peace and make economic development on its own. It is

imperative to conduct exchanges and cooperate with the world and to join the path that

everyone else is taking. It is time to look at reality and make that courageous decision. It

is time for the North Korean regime to start thinking about what is truly good for the

regime itself and its people.

The Korean Peninsula must not be left standing as the danger zone in Northeast Asia.

The two Koreas must take the initiative and resolve this problem. The Peninsula must

become a new cradle of world peace.

Fellow Koreans,

Permeating this War Memorial of Korea are the spirits of the soldiers of the Republic of

Korea and United Nations who shed blood on this land. Also dedicated here was the

monument memorializing the 46 fallen warriors of the corvette Cheonan.

Through the Cheonan tragedy, we learned a painful lesson once again. We had been

forgetting the reality that the nation faces the most belligerent regime in the world.

We have to admit that our Armed Forces made mistakes as well. On the occasion of this

incident, the Government will solidify the national security readiness. The discipline of

the Armed Forces will be reestablished, military reform efforts will be expedited and

combat capabilities will be reinforced drastically. The ROK-US joint combat readiness

will be further strengthened on the basis of strong ROK-US alliance.

Public awareness of the importance of national security will be strengthened as well.

We must never waver in the face of threats, provocations and divisive schemes by the

North. We must become one when it comes to national security.

Fellow citizens,

Regardless of how rough the storm may be, we will continue to walk steadily on the

path toward a prosperous nation, a compassionate society and a strong country.

The great people of the Republic of Korea will build an even greater country.

Fellow Koreans,

Let us all join forces and march forward together.

Thank you very much.

Provided by the National Committee on North Korea (www.ncnk.org)

Documents

THE CHEONAN SINKING INCIDENT: ITS IMPACT TO THE INTER