The changing religious composition of Nigeria: causes and ...pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13485/1/The changing religious composition... · role of religion on education, contraception

The changing religious

composition of Nigeria: causes

and implications of

demographic divergence

MARCIN STONAWSKI

University of Oslo, Department of Sociology and Human Geography,P.O. Box Blindern, Oslo, Norway and Cracow Universityof Economics, Department of Demography, Rakowicka , -

Cracow, Poland

Email: [email protected]

MICHAELA POTANCOKOVÁ

Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital(IIASA, VID/OAW, WU), Vienna Institute of Demography,

Welthandelsplatz , Vienna, Austria


MATTHEW CANTELE

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), EcosystemsServices and Management, Schlossplatz , A- Laxenburg, Austria


and

VEGARD SKIRBEKKQ1

Columbia University, Columbia Aging Centre, W. th Street,NY , New York, USA


SXjra pp: -- Techset Composition Ltd, Salisbury, U.K. //

J. of Modern African Studies, , (), pp. – © Cambridge University Press doi:./SX

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mailto:[email protected]




A B S T R A C T

At nearly million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country bytwofold and fertility levels remain higher than most other sub-Saharan Africannations. Throughout the last several decades, the fertility gap betweenChristians and Muslims has widened with significant political implications fora nascent democracy. Where the DHS survey of revealed a non-significantdifference of · children, this figure had increased to · children by . Asthe total fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased significantly from · to ·children per woman between and , the TFR of Muslims increasedfrom · to · children per woman. The timing of this divergence coincideswith the formal institutionalization of Sharia law in . We examine therole of religion on education, contraception and family behaviour. Finally, wetouch upon the implications for population growth and the religious compos-ition of Nigeria in the coming decades.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

At nearly million inhabitants, Nigeria is the most populous countryin Africa by twofold and is on course to become one of the largest coun-tries in the world. It is also one of the most diverse, with a large numberof groups from different linguistic and ethnic backgrounds (Katzner; Lieberman and McClendon ). Nigeria is also the only statein the world with equal proportions of Christians (·% in ),located mainly in the South, and Muslims (·%) (PEW ) whoare living mainly in the Northern regions of the country (Figure ).The population balance between the two majority religions, however,is likely to shift in the future as a result of distinctly different trajectoriesof demographic change. While the Muslim North is currently in an earlyphase of demographic transition with very high fertility rates, fertilityrates of Christians and Muslims in the South are declining as the demo-graphic transition is further underway. These diverging trajectories indemographic behaviour may lead to the end of the current equilibriumbetween the two religions with significant implications for the future ofthe country. Within this study we examine possible explanations for di-vergent population trajectories along religious lines as well as the paththat these trajectories may potentially take into the future.As with several other Western African countries, ethno-regional and

religious divides largely overlap in Nigeria and are manifested in a pro-nounced north-south gap (Mancini ). Here, inequalities haveemerged along geographic and ethnic divisions as well as along socio-economic lines between nomadic herdsmen and farmers, exacerbatedby climate change (e.g. Fasona & Omojola ; Sayne ). While

M A R C I N S T O N A W S K I E T A L .

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ethnic divides were of great importance in the past, a religious dividenow appears to be becoming more pronounced as religious tensionscompound traditional ethnic and geopolitical rivalries, magnifyingunderlying insecurities and grievances.The past decade has seen increasing reports of sectarian violence in

Nigeria’s Middle Belt where ethnic and religious communities meet.And in an ominous sign of things to come, these attacks are increasinglyframed in terms of religious and cultural conflict. In – Sharialaws were introduced in states in northern Nigeria (Figure )leading to religious unrest and an escalation of hostilities that resultedin thousands of deaths in Kaduna state alone (Barker & Ricardo :; Ostien & Dekker ). This drastic shift is reflected in the PewResearch Center’s Social Hostilities Index which documented a surgefrom · to · on a -point scale between and – one ofthe highest scores in the world. As part of efforts to establish anIslamic caliphate, attacks on Christians and moderate Muslims by themilitant group Boko Haram, which translates literally to ‘WesternForbidden’, may be orchestrated with the goal of stoking religious ten-sions between the predominately Christian Igbo in the South andHausa-Fulani Muslims in the North, with the Yoruba in the West repre-senting a mix of Christianity and Islam.Within the context of an ethnically and religiously diverse country

such as Nigeria, a newfound emphasis on religious identity coupled

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Figure . Religious composition by state in Nigeria in . Shading on themap indicates presence of Sharia law in states; pie charts represent religious

composition.

T H E C H A N G I N G R E L I G I O U S C O M P O S I T I O N O F N I G E R I A

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with religion-specific fertility differentials could carry significant politicaland economic implications. Indeed, Mazrui () finds that religiousdivisions in sub-Saharan Africa are most likely to lead to conflict whenthey reinforce underlying ethnic differences, precisely the situation wenow observe in Nigeria. It is particularly important to note that the emer-gence of militant Islamic sects and possible spread of Sharia law to add-itional states is potentially a response to the growing north-south gap andperceived political dominance of the South (Isa ). Indeed, while itsimplementation has ignited hostilities particularly in the border statesmaking up the Middle Belt, Sharia law was being applied to Muslimsin most Northern states long before its formal institutionalization(Ostien & Dekker ).In our paper, first, we discuss factors contributing to the widening gap

in the fertility differential between Muslims and Christians. Besides thefactors such as contraceptive use and demand for family planning anddifferences in marital behaviour that fall within the proximate determi-nants framework (Bongaarts ), which is a framework highly rele-vant for understanding of fertility change in sub-Saharan Africancontext, we discuss differences in educational improvements amongwomen and changing fertility ideals. We show that religion per se isnot the main driver of stalling fertility among Muslims in Sharia statesas there is significant heterogeneity in the reproductive behaviour ofMuslims in Nigeria. We argue that fertility stalls and high populationgrowth are specific for Muslims in Sharia states. Therefore, it is notuseful to speak of Nigerian Muslims as a homogeneous group.The second part of the paper demonstrates the consequences of the

increased fertility gap on the religious landscape of Nigeria. While therelative similarity in size between Muslims and Christians populationsemerged only during the past years, Muslims have never been aclear majority in a united Nigeria (Mi ). This situation may soonchange as we identify an ongoing demographic bifurcation that couldsignificantly alter the religious composition of Africa’s most populousnation with substantial implications for future population outcomes.

T H E I N C R E A S I N G G A P I N R E L I G I O N - S P E C I F I C F E R T I L I T Y I N

N I G E R I A

Using Demographic Health Survey (DHS) surveys, in this study we iden-tify religion-based fertility differentials and project potential demo-graphic futures based on a number of scenarios. We find that the total


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fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased significantly from · [CI:·–·] to · children [·–·] per woman between and while the TFR of Muslims increased from · [·–·] to · chil-dren [·–·] (Figure ). However, fertility is not rising among allNigerian Muslims. Taking a closer look we find that fertility hasincreased from · to · children per woman between and among Muslims residing in currently Sharia law states (Table I).However, among those residing elsewhere fertility declined from ·to · children per woman. Although this is one child more than theaverage for a Christian woman, we show that fertility change unfoldsin a similar way among Christians and Muslims from non-Sharia states.

Interestingly enough, the timing of the divergence in fertility trendscoincides with the formal introduction of Sharia law over the courseof several years following the return to civil rule and subsequentreinstatement of constitutional law (Kendhammer ; for an overviewsee Oba ; Ostien and Dekker ). This leads to questions regard-ing how Sharia law or culture specific to those regions where Sharia lawhas been institutionalized fosters high fertility. As discussed in the nextsection, we hypothesize that the adoption of Sharia and societal normsrelated to its practice sustains high fertility culture and contributes to in-creasing fertility differentials. The widening gap in fertility by religioncan thus be understood as a result of persistent high fertility and prona-talist culture among Muslims in Sharia law states contrasted with a pro-gressing fertility transition among Christians and moderate Muslimsresiding in the Southern states.

I S L A M , S H A R I A A N D F A M I L Y B E H A V I O U R

The institutionalization of Sharia law in northern states beginning in and consequent subjugation of the English legal system repre-sented a return to Islamic primacy which has not been observed sincethe pre-colonial period (Ostien & Dekker ). However, the spreadof Sharia law and extended jurisdiction to cover criminal as well ascivil matters was the culmination of gradual and some would argue inev-itable decline of the system of common law that was imposed on Nigeriaduring colonialism (Oba ). Indeed, Sharia law was already beingcarried out among Nigerian Muslims in the realm of civil/personallaw prior to official institutionalization (Nmehielle ). The full im-plementation of Sharia law can thus be viewed as symptomatic of pre-existing societal preferences as well as emblematic of a nascent


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movement away from Western conceptions of law, education and thesecular state.While the institutionalization of Sharia law in the northern states oc-

curred relatively recently, Islam has long been an integral aspect ofthe religious and political landscape of northern Nigeria, culminatingin the Sokoto Caliphate of the early th century and near total replace-ment of customary law with Islamic law (Ostien & Dekker ). During

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Figure . Total Fertility Rate among Christians and Muslims in Nigeria in and . Thick black lines indicate % confidence intervals.

TA B L E ITotal fertility rates by religion by states in Nigeria in ,

and .

Year

Sharia law states Non-Sharia law states

NigeriaChristians Muslims Christians Muslims

* · · · ·() () () () ()

· · · · ·() () () () ()

· · · · ·() () () () ()

*Because of the small number of observations it was not possible to calculate TFR for Christiansin Sharia states in .


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this period southern Nigeria was awarded as a protectorate to the British,resulting in the introduction of English law in the South while a systemof indirect rule (through local proxies) led to a two-tier legal system inthe North which included native/customary law (with elements ofIslamic law) and English law. In contrast with the North, Sharia lawnever supplanted customary personal law in the southern states ofNigeria and southern Muslims have traditionally adhered to tribalcustoms in most legal matters (Ostien & Dekker ). Thus, althoughcustomary law in SouthMuslim communities often reflects the influenceof Islamic law, the norms and procedures regulating marital law haveremained uncodified and thus largely contingent on local customs. Inthe North, however, the legal ease and societal norms associated withmarriage and divorce have been identified as key contributors to highfertility by motivating women within polygynous marriages to maximizetheir number of children in order to prevent divorce and ensure theirshare of inheritance (Izugbara & Ezeh ).Although the Quran does not prohibit birth control in marriage and it

is permitted for a wide range of justifiable reasons (Omran ), op-position to modern contraception and family planning programmesemerged in some contexts where these are seen as an import from theWest and a deviation from ‘the right path’ (Roudi-Fahimi ). Forthese reasons it is not uncommon that family planning programmeswould be politicized in Muslim societies. In this context, strict adherenceto Sharia law could imply a lack of sexual health education and/or sus-picion toward modern forms of contraception, as well as the relativelylow educational levels among young girls. Mazrui () outlinesseveral ways in which Islamic fundamentalism can affect fertility suchas distrust of the West, association of contraception with prostitution,Quran-based fatalistic attitudes regarding procreation, attitudes towardpolygyny and large families, subversion of traditional birth spacing,and encouragement of a large age gap between husbands and wives.Within this analysis we will focus primarily on the interplay of Sharia,education, and family planning and its implications for differentialChristian-Muslim fertility levels.Sharia law and the implicit societal norms associated with its practice

can influence fertility levels through a number of indirect and directcausal avenues including lowered age of marriage as well as outright pro-hibitions on formal education. While there is variation among differ-ent schools of thought, puberty marks the age of marriage for younggirls under classical Sharia (Rehman ). In addition to the increasedprevalence of pregnancy and implications for educational attendance,


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child brides are frequently forbidden from attending school or lack thetime to continue their education (Warner ). A low marriage agethus results in higher fertility by increasing the probability of pregnancywhile impeding access to education that could result in lower fertilitypreferences (Westoff et al. ). Disparate age differences are also con-ducive to patriarchy, resulting in increased male control over contracep-tive practices and reproductive behaviour which evidence suggests leadsto higher realised fertility (Ezeh et al. ; Isiugo-Abanihe ;Bankole & Singh ).Societal norms, patriarchy, and a resistance towards Western

influence – which are sustained by Sharia law – seem to play a role inhigh fertility culture among Muslims in northern Nigeria. High fertilityof Muslims in the Sharia states is coupled with persistently high fertilityideals (Figure ). In only about % of Muslim women in Shariastates were in favour of relatively smaller families (with two to four chil-dren) while large family ideals remain the norm with % of womenconsidering at least seven children ideal, and an additional % statedthat they would accept any number of children God grants them.Fertility ideals did not change much among the Muslim women inSharia states between and . Although more women nowgive a numeric response to the question, a fairly stable share of thosewho wish to have many children (more than or ‘any number’) sug-gests that unlimited fertility and large family ideas are well embeddedin the states that adopted Sharia law.In contrast, fertility ideals have shifted towards smaller families among

Christians and to a lesser extent also among Muslims in non-Shariastates. Muslim women residing in non-Sharia states not only have alower TFR than those residing in Sharia states, but also differ in theirperception of the ideal number of children, with more citing four chil-dren as ideal and fewer preferring large families with at least seven chil-dren. The ideal family size distribution and trend towards preferencesfor smaller families among Muslim women residing in non-Shariastates mimics the pattern of Christian women, although their overall fer-tility ideals are slightly higher than those of Christian women. The appar-ent difference between fertility ideals of Muslim women in Sharia andnon-Sharia states calls for more thorough investigation of situationfactors of fertility and deeper understanding of the role of religiousleaders and locally embedded cultural practices that give rise to thesediverging preferences.The high fertility gap between Muslims and Christians can also be

linked to differences in mean age at marriage and in the practice of


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polygyny. Our findings confirm that mean age at first marriage remainsvery low, at about years for Muslim women in the Sharia states acrossall waves of DHS (–). Muslim women residing in non-Shariastates marry at about – years, while the mean age at first marriagehas increased from to years of age among Nigeria’s Christiansduring –. We also see a decline in polygyny amongChristians and Muslim women in non-Sharia states (down from %to % among – year olds during –) while the declinein polygynous marriages has halted in the Sharia states according tothe and DHS. Here the share of women aged – whoare in polygynous union settled at %. Polygyny is conducive tohigher fertility within the Nigerian context where co-wives are com-pelled to have as many children as possible in order to economically con-strain the husband’s ability to take a new wife and ensure their portion ofthe husband’s inheritance (Izugbara & Ezeh ).One of the underlying mechanisms behind the changes in reproduct-

ive and marital behaviour is education. As we show in the next section,education levels among Christian women significantly increased, whileeducation levels among Muslim women in the Sharia states remainlow. Rising education levels, higher contraceptive use and lowerdesired fertility may have contributed to declining fertility in thelargely Christian South. Concurrently and potentially in response tothis development, anti-Western attitudes and growing fundamentalismin the largely Muslim North may have resulted in low education levels,early marriage age and retention of pronatalist beliefs.

E D U C A T I O N

Educational attainment is conventionally cited in explanations of fertil-ity differences. Numerous studies cite increasing female educational

Figure . Ideal number of children by religion and residence (%) amongwomen aged –, in and .


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attainment as one of the key factors of fertility decline. Can improve-ments in educational levels explain variation in fertility levels and theopening gap between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria? As illustratedin Figure , we observe a widening gap in TFR by religion and also diver-ging trends over time, with Christian fertility declining and Muslim fer-tility rising. If trends in education were to explain the fertility gapbetween Muslims and Christians, we should observe (a) higher educa-tional levels of Christians compared with Muslims, and (b) educationalimprovement among Christians as opposed to stalling education or evenworsening educational characteristics of Muslim women.Nigeria has witnessed educational expansion since the s when

primary schooling was made mandatory. Greater enrolment atprimary levels translated into increased completion of secondary andhigher education but this seems to be limited to the majorityChristian and better developed South. As expected, we find huge differ-ences in educational attainment between Muslim and Christian womenin reproductive age (Figure ). In a mere % of Christian womenaged – had no formal education and a majority attained at leastlower secondary education (%). In contrast, two-thirds of Muslimwomen had no formal schooling in and , a modest improve-ment compared with % with no formal education in .

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Figure . Educational characteristics of women aged – by religion in and .


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Furthermore, the gap in completed mean years of schooling (MYS)between Christian and Muslim women increased from · to · yearsfrom to despite significant gains by non-Sharia stateMuslims (Table II). Consistent with the hypothesis of a negativeimpact of Sharia culture on female educational improvement, the datashow that this growing rift is driven entirely by stalled educationalgains among Sharia state Muslims, % of which lack any formaleducation.The gap in educational attainment is partly sustained by the persistent

perception of Western education as being anti-Islamic (Csapo ).Lincove () finds a significant effect of religion on school attend-ance and Kazeem et al. () show that children from Christian house-holds are five times more likely to attend school compared with thosefrom Muslim households. In particular, female education remains atvery low levels. Studies also suggest that many Muslim parents prefertheir daughters to attend traditional Islamic schools, because it guaran-tees preserving religious values and traditional female roles(Ogunjuyigbe & Fadeyi ). Indeed, Adiri et al. () find that aQuranic education is more common than other types of schoolamong Muslim women (·%).The expected inverse relationship between education and fertility

(Bongaarts ; Skirbekk ) holds and we find that that fertility

T A B L E I IMean years of schooling of women – by religion and region in

, and .

Mean years of schooling

Christians · · ·() () ()

non-Sharia state · · ·() () ()

Sharia state · · ·() () ()

Muslims · · ·() () ()

non-Sharia state · · ·() () ()

Sharia state · · ·() () ()

Nigeria · · ·() () ()


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is lower among the better educated in both religions (Figure ). AmongChristians, those with primary or less education had at least six childrenin , while those with at least secondary only have four children.Between and , fertility fell by roughly half a child for all edu-cational groups among Christians. Overall, fertility levels were morethan one child higher among Muslims compared with Christianswithin all educational groups. The educational gradient in fertility corre-sponds to the positive effect of in particular secondary and higher edu-cation on the use of modern contraceptives (Ejelmi et al. ).However, TFR rose substantially among Muslims in the period –

. We find the most pronounced increase among those with no edu-cation, a smaller increase for those with at least some primary education,and stalled fertility among women with at least completed lower second-ary education. This has taken place in spite of modest improvement inthe educational attainment of Muslim women (Figure ). As can beseen from Table III, the structural effect of increased educationdepressed the fertility of Muslims by −· children per woman.However, fertility increased by · children per woman once educationis controlled for, using a two-component decomposition of fertility

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Figure . Total fertility rate by education among Christians and Muslims inNigeria in and .


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change among Christians and Muslims (see Appendix A; Retherford &Thapa ). Decreasing age at entering first marriage can lead to a risein fertility, however, as we showed earlier the mean age at first marriagestays low at about years but did not decline either. Therefore, otherfactors, such as possible changes in contraceptive use and possibly theinstitutionalization of Sharia law, stand behind the increased Muslim fer-tility in Nigeria.

C O N T R A C E P T I O N

Most extant studies find that contraceptive use is more common amongChristian women than Muslim women in Nigeria (Adebowale et al.). Our analysis reveals that among currently married or co-habitingChristian and Muslim women in Nigeria, there is an increase in contra-ceptive practice (either using modern or traditional methods) in non-Sharia states. Despite this modest increase, only around % ofwomen of reproductive age use modern contraception (see Table IV)and contraceptive use in Nigeria is low even by regional standards(Bongaarts & Casterline ). The shares of women using contracep-tion are higher among women aged – compared with youngerwomen.Differences in contraceptive use are significant also between religious

groups. Among Christians, the proportion of currently married womennot using any method to prevent pregnancy has declined from % to% between and . The fraction of non-users has alsodeclined among Muslims in non-Sharia states from % to %. In con-trast, contraceptive use amongMuslim women in states where Sharia lawhas been introduced has remained negligible and a vast majority ofmarried women do not use any method of birth control. The proportionof non-users slightly declined towards among the younger women

TA B L E I I IDecomposition of TFR change into educational change and fertility

change.

Religion

TFR

TFR change Educational change Fertility change

Christians · · −· −· −·Muslims · · · −· ·


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TA B L E I VPercentage of sexually active married or cohabiting women using no contraceptive method, by religion and

age.

Year

All married women Christians Muslims in Sharia Muslims in non-Sharia

– – – – – – – – – – – –

() () () () ( () () () () () () ()

() () () () () () () () () () () ()

(,) () (,) () () (,) () () () () () (,)

MARCIN

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NAW

SKI

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AL.

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aged – years; however, this trend reversed between –,shortly after Sharia law was introduced. Ejelmi et al. () find that re-ligion remains an important predictor of modern contraceptive use innorth-eastern and north-western Nigeria even after controlling fornumber of individual and community level factors.Further examination of the DHS surveys reveals that women in Sharia

states perceive unmet need for family planning. The proportion of non-users who intend to use or are unsure about using some method of birthcontrol in the future has increased among all groups during –,including Muslim women in Sharia states. The proportion of non-userswho do not intend to use any method of birth control has dropped to% for Christians and % among Muslims in non-Sharia states in. However, the decline has halted among Muslim women inSharia states in recent years and about % of non-users do not wishto use any contraception in future, see Table V. According to

DHS, % of Christian women currently not using contraception and% of Muslim women in non-Sharia states reported they would liketo use contraception. The situation is very different among Muslimwomen in Sharia states, where only % of women below age

expressed a wish to use birth control, a little more than ·% among– year olds.The main reason given for not intending to use any birth control in

the future (by the non-users who do not intend to use any birthcontrol) has shifted from wanting as many children as possible, which wasthe most prominent reason given by the Muslim women from Shariastates, towards opposition to contraception in the period from to, see Table VI. This shift is visible for both Christians and

T A B L E VTrends in the intentions not to use contraception among the

married women not using any method to prevent pregnancy, byreligion.

Year Christian Muslim non-Sharia Muslim Sharia All married

% % % %() () () ()

% % % %() () () ()

% % % %() () (,) (,)


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Muslims in Sharia states. The growth in opposition to contraception,from % to % among Christians and % to % among Muslimsmay be related to, among other factors, more conservative religiousviews that stigmatise modern contraception. A smaller proportion ofthe respondents explicitly cited religious prohibition as the mainreason for not using birth control in the future. Religious prohibitionwas cited more frequently by Muslims (% in and % in )than by Christians where the share actually declined (from % in to % in ).Compared with , more Muslim non-users from Sharia states cited

husband’s opposition to birth control – up from about % to % in, while Christians saw a stagnation of around %. Due to thisshift towards presumably more direct pressure not to take contracep-tion, fewer cited disapproval of others as influential in their decision.This suggests that both the internalization of attitudes leading to disap-proval of birth control and social pressure against use may have inten-sified in Sharia law states. Moreover, this shift is consistent with asignificant body of literature documenting the pivotal role male fertilitypreferences play on fertility decisions in Nigerian society, particularlyamong the Hausa ethnic group predominant in northern Nigeria

T A B L E V IAttitudes towards contraception among non-users, women aged

– years.

Christians Muslims (Sharia) Total*

N = N = N = N = N = N =

Wants as many children aspossible

. . . . . .

Opposed to usingcontraception

. . . . . .

respondent opposed . . . . . .husband opposed . . . . . .others opposed . . . . . .Religious prohibition . . . . . .Attitudes and values-related . . . . . .Knowledge-related reasons . . . . . .Method-related reasons . . . . . .Barriers-related . . . . . .Other reasons** . . . . . .Does not know . . . . . .


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(Isiugo-Abanihe ; Bankole & Singh ; Duze & Mohammed; Izugbara et al. ).Another difference between all Christian and Muslim non-users in

Sharia states is illustrated in the reason for intention not to use contra-ception in the future. Here we observe that among Christians the ration-ale for not intending to use is more frequently related to barriers such aslack of knowledge or a lack of access to contraception (e.g. due to highprice, no access, or health concerns). The aforementioned reasons havebeen increasingly cited by Christian non-users, by about % comparedwith about % of Muslims non-users in (this percentage has notfluctuated). We assume that respondents citing barriers-related reasonsare not principally opposed to birth control. If so, a larger proportion ofChristian and a smaller proportion of Muslim women would intend touse some methods of preventing pregnancy if they were betterinformed, had financial means to buy contraceptives and had (better)access to facilities offering methods of family planning. Problematicaccess to family planning facilities and services may indeed be areason why Muslim women in Sharia states who perceive unmet needhave little choice, in particular if reproductive choices are being madein highly unpredictable context (see Johnson-Hanks et al. ;Johnson-Hanks ). DHS data on the family planning servicesnetwork in Nigeria do not allow for a more detailed analysis. However,we can conclude that the current opposition to modern contraceptiveuse is an important reason not to use birth control for Muslim womenin Sharia states and it is as much embedded in as it sustains high fertilityculture in the region.

P O P U L A T I O N P R O J E C T I O N S

Will Nigeria become a majority Muslim country?

We argue in the previous sections that the institutionalization of Sharialaw has led to persistent high fertility as a result of the protective role itplays in sustaining a high fertility culture. With a small share of theMuslim population residing in non-Sharia states, the fertility of Sharia-state Muslims drives the overall high fertility of Nigerian Muslims. Thelack of convergence in Muslim-Christian fertility differentials will notonly change the religious landscape of Nigeria, but can also affectoverall population growth. If the greater fertility of Muslims is sustained,this will lead to faster population growth over time, particularly as theproportion of Muslims grows. However, if fertility rates for both


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Muslims and Christians were to converge and decline, this would imply alower population growth in the coming decades. We study the possibleconsequences of different fertility trajectories on religious compositionin Nigeria using a demographic projection model that takes intoaccount differences in fertility, intergenerational transmissions of reli-gion and age-distribution of religious beliefs (Goujon et al. ;Hackett et al. a; Stonawski et al. ).Q2The projection of population by age, sex and religion in Nigeria is

based on the demographic method of multi-state population projec-tions that is widely accepted by technical demographers (Samir et al.; Hackett et al. a, b). In order to illustrate the long-termconsequences of fertility differentials by religion on the religious land-scape of the country, we introduce four scenarios in the period of years, from to . The scenarios only differ in terms of fertilityassumptions (see Figure ):

() in the first scenario – Fert(conv) – we assume slow convergence infertility between Muslims and Christians from initial levels observedin that would lead to the same level and age-pattern for thesegroups by (within years). At each step of this scenario,

Fig.

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Figure . Total fertility rate and fertility gap betweenMuslims and Christiansin Nigeria in – by scenario.


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TFR for the total population follows the UN medium assumptions(United Nations );

() in the second scenario – Fert(c) – the assumption is that fertil-ity by religion is constant during the whole projection period. Thiswe estimate using fertility age-patterns based on the DHS andadjust them to meet baseline fertility level from the UN (UnitedNations );

() similar to Fert(c) – Fert(c) – fertility is constant but onthe level estimated from the DHS that are adjusted to be inline with the UN level in –;

() the last scenario – Fert(o) – is designed to examine how religiouscomposition would change if there was no difference in fertilitybetween religious groups, and TFR of total population followedthe UN medium scenario assumptions (United Nations ).

Because of a lack of empirical evidence on religion-specific mortality, weassume no mortality difference between religious groups. The course ofchange inmortality in – follows the UNmedium assump-tions. Baseline inflow and outflow of migrants in Nigeria are calculatedusing estimates of international migration bilateral flows (Abel ).Religion of migrants was estimated using information from the PewResearch Center’s Faith on the Move project (Connor ). In all scen-arios we assume religious switching between Christians and Muslims.Evidence from the Global Attitudes Project of Pew Research Center sug-gests that around –% of males and –% females (both Muslimsand Christians) convert during their life. We model this explicitly inthe projections by introducing transition rates.The results from our projection model suggest that constant fertility

levels from the baseline could lead to a dramatic change in populationsize in Nigeria. During the coming years the population size is pro-jected to increase from million in to million if relative dif-ference in fertility by religion is kept constant as observed in (Fert(c)), and to million, if fertility differentials from is used(Fert(c)). Fertility following the UN medium trajectory (UnitedNations ) leads to million people by (Fert(conv) andFert(o)). As a result of strong population growth, Nigeria may havethe second largest Christian and fourth largest Muslim population by (Hackett et al. a).In addition to strong overall population growth, it is likely that

Nigeria’s population will undergo significant changes in religious


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composition (Figures and ). A shift away from the current sharesseems inevitable, placing the country on a clear path towards becominga majority Muslim country in the coming decades. Even if there were nodifferences in fertility between the two religious groups (Fert(o) scen-ario), the proportion of Christians would decrease from ·% in to ·% in , whereas Muslims would gain · percentagepoints and for the first time in the history of a united Nigeria reach a ma-jority of ·%. In this scenario the differences in population structure,migration, and religious switching between Muslims and Christians havea minor impact on religious composition (Fert(o)).Several other scenarios suggest a stronger increase in the size of the

Muslim population resulting in a growing majority share of the totalpopulation. If the relative difference in fertility is projected from the level, when the differential was small, the proportion ofChristians drops to % and Muslims rise to %. In a situation ofmore pronounced and slowly diminishing fertility gap (Fert(conv)),the share of Muslims increases to almost % of Nigeria’s populationand Christians drops to % in . Finally, the scenario with themost pronounced fertility gap at the level of the DHS and constantfertility – Fert (c) TFR: Muslims – ·, Christians – · – shows that

Fig.

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Figure . Proportion of Christians in Nigeria in – by scenario.


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the Muslim population can reach as much as % whereas Christianscan decline to as little as %. In , and DHS data wesee stable fertility differential between Christians and Muslims and thedata so far do not support the convergence scenario. This does notmean that convergence is not possible in the future but for thecoming years the share of the Muslim population will likely follow theFert(c).We assume in our scenarios, conservatively, that the fertility differen-

tials between Christians and Muslims could decrease or remain constantat the baseline level. However, it is also possible that in the future the fer-tility of Christians will decrease following the demographic transition tra-jectory and Muslim fertility stagnates at the current level (e.g. due to alack of modernisation and sustained high fertility culture). Such a diver-gence would lead to a far greater share of Muslims in the religious land-scape of Nigeria – reaching as high as –% by .

C O N C L U S I O N S A N D D I S C U S S I O N

Nigeria is most likely going to become a majority Muslim country in nomore than a couple of decades unless the differential between the

Fig.

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Figure . Proportion of Muslims in Nigeria in – by scenario.


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Muslim and Christian fertility quickly converges in the near future.However, this is not likely to happen given the high fertility ideals, lowprevalence of family planning, and slow educational improvements inSharia states. Quite to the contrary, legal implementation of Shariamay sustain the high fertility culture by preventing modernisation as aresult of opposition towards the Western influence and increaseddesires to preserve cultural differences in respect to the rest ofNigeria’s population.In this regard, the institutionalisation of Sharia law should be viewed

as a symptom of societal preferences that have long been presentthroughout northern Nigeria. It is likely however that the ongoing nor-malisation of Sharia law will lead to greater societal pressure to conformto underlying tenets, thus reinforcing many practices contributing tohigher fertility while forming a bulwark against Western influences con-ducive to lower fertility (on normalisation, see e.g. May & Finch ).In Nigeria we are therefore witnessing the confluence of distinctly pro-natalist traditions in sub-Saharan Africa (Bongaarts & Casterline )with a conservative religious ideology, a synthesis which will likely con-tinue to result in high ideal family size and sustained higher fertility.Fertility intentions and preferences can be powerful in terms of

shaping behaviour and they can also be important as a marker of howpotentially unrestricted pronatalism penetrates religious and culturalnorms following Sharia. Therefore, high fertility can be seen as an inte-gral part of the local traditions and institutionalisation of Sharia law maybe seen as a way to preserve local culture. High fertility ideals are a keyaspect of high fertility culture and as we showed earlier more than %of women in Sharia states prefer large families of and more childrenor ‘any number of children God gives them’. Only % think that four orfewer children is ideal – this contrasts sharply with declining fertilityideals throughout the rest of Nigeria. Marriage customs, polygyny andin particular high divorce rates that result from liberal divorce regula-tions under Sharia are among other possible factors responsible for sus-tained high fertility among the majority of Muslims in Nigeria. We couldnot empirically investigate these potential influences due to data limita-tions, however, existing research supports this interpretation (e.g.Izugbara & Ezeh ).Nigeria is an outstanding case due to the uniquely balanced popula-

tion share of the two main religions and the clear divergence in demo-graphic trends. The high relevance of religion within the Nigeriancontext further underscores the usefulness of considering religion indemographic studies. According to the Afrobarometer, both


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Muslims and Christians claim that religion is very important in their life(% of Muslims and % of Christians). Nigerian society is dividedacross religious, ethnic and regional lines with a long history of rivalrybetween the largely Muslim North and mostly Christian South.Moreover, religion is the most frequently cited reason of violentconflict in Nigeria besides land disputes, according to Afrobarometer( and ). Religious conflict has intensified since the time ofthe survey; Boko Haram began committing atrocities in and there-fore it is likely that religion has become an even more important driverof political instability.Our projections show that should this fertility gap remain constant, or

slowly decrease (in the convergence scenario), Nigerian Muslims willhave a clear % majority by , making it one of the largestMuslim states in the world. However, it is very likely that the gap in fer-tility can grow even further leading to a higher share of Muslims inNigerian society. This discrepancy can ultimately bring significantchange to democratic outcomes, redefine the political dynamicsbetween traditionally comparable religious groups, and potentially callinto question power-sharing agreements such as the rotating presidency.Indeed, within the context of an ethnically and religiously diversecountry such as Nigeria, a newfound emphasis on religious identitycoupled with religion-specific fertility differentials could very well be pre-cursors to future sectarian conflict and carry significant political andeconomic implications for the region and the world.

N O T E S

. Source: Own calculations based on DHS .. Nigerian States: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto,

Yobe and Zamfara. In the census, which is the earliest reliable data source we found, .% of Nigeria’s total

population was Muslim, .% Animist, and a mere .% Christian. In the – census, the pro-portion of Muslims rose to .% and in the census to .% while the share of Christians sur-passed Animists, most likely due to conversion to other religions (.% of Christians in ). Theshare of Muslims grew most quickly in the Northern regions, amounting to about % of the popu-lation in – and censuses (Mi : ).

. We base our analysis on Demographic and Health |Surveys , , and . DHS was excluded because of the data quality issues that include underreporting of recent births inthe order of about % and a sample bias towards more educated women (DHS report ). Thusthe results of the survey diverge from the trends obtained using the three other waves.

. TFR estimations were done using tfr STATA module (Schoumaker ).. Christians are comprising % of the population in the northern regions while about % of

Muslims reside in the southern states (DHS ).. Source: own estimates computed for -year period prior survey based on DHS and .. We consider states from north-central, north-east and north-west as northern, and south-east,

south-central and south-west as southern. This division differs from the Sharia, non-Sharia distinctionwe introduce later in the text because not all northern states have adopted Sharia.


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. Source: DHS , and . Own estimates computed for -year period prior survey.Number of observations is in brackets. Sharia was introduced as source of civic and criminal lawfrom . Thus, DHS indicates results in pre-Sharia law states.. We refer explicitly to formal education to differentiate from Quranic education that is deeply

rooted in northern Nigeria.. There is no significant change for low fertility ideals and the increase in the preference for –

and + children can be attributed to the decline in non-numeric responses (any number, God’swill). This indicates that preference for large families remains stable between the two surveys.. Source: DHS and ; Note that DHS cannot be used due to differently phrased

response options. In the category ‘God’s will’ was explicitly stated but in and it wasremoved and non-numeric response is recorded only if numeric is not given after probing. As a resultthe fraction of non-numeric responses dropped from more than % to about %.. Gross enrolment rate (GER) at primary increase from to % in – and GER at

secondary level rose from to % (UNESCO – UIS database). GER are not available by regionsbut differences in educational attainment point towards nearly universal primary school enrollmentin the majority Christian South.. Source: DHS and . Note: MYS stands for mean years of schooling. The indicator was

computed using duration of schooling in single years of the respondents. Secondary and higher edu-cation means that the person completed at least years of schooling (lower secondary completed).. Source: DHS , and .. Source: DHS and DHS .. Source: own calculations based on data from DHS and computed for -year period

prior survey.. Source: DHS , and .. Source: DHS , and .. Unfortunately, the question was not asked in DHS .. Source: DHS and .. Part of DHS questionnaire inspecting the presence and kind of family planning facilities in the

proximity of women’s place of residence was discontinued since DHS III () and therefore wecould not address this issue.. In our article we present results of population projections which present scenarios of possible

future changes of a population when certain assumptions are made about the future trajectories ofdemographic processes. In contrast to projections, demographers also build forecasts which aim topresent most probable future development of population using the most realistic assumptions ofdemographic processes (for more see Preston et al. ).. The method is an extension of cohort-component based population projections (Preston et al.

). Rather than projecting only age and sex, this method extrapolates additional dimensions suchas health status, marital status, education, political views – or in this case, religion (e.g. Philipov ;Rogers ; Stonawski et al. ).. In our projection we follow the UN World Population Prospects, rather than revi-

sion because the revision is closer to TFR observed in DHS (. for – comparedwith . in DHS). In contrast, the latest revision assumed fertility stalls in Nigeria at . perwoman in – and also pre-estimate for – is at . children per woman, well abovethe DHS level.. Note: Fertility gap = TFR(Muslims)–TFR(Christians).

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http://www.popline.org/node/376806

http://www.popline.org/node/376806

http://www.pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx

http://www.pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx

A P P E N D I X

A. Decomposition method for disentangling fertility change from educationalchange.

Two components: () educational change, () fertility change

ΔTFR ¼ TFR t þ hð Þ � TFR tð Þ

¼ 5Xa;e

ASFRa;e t þ hð Þ � wa;e t þ hð Þwa t þ hð Þ � 5

Xa;e

ASFRa;e tð Þ � wa;e tð Þwa tð Þ

¼ 5Xa;e

ASFRa;e t þ hð Þ þ ASFRa;e tð Þ2

� �wa;e t þ hð Þwa t þ hð Þ � wa;e tð Þ

wa tð Þ� ��

þ 5Xa;e

wa;e t þ hð Þwa t þ hð Þ þ wa;e tð Þ

wa tð Þ2

0BB@

1CCA ASFRa;e t þ hð Þ � ASFRa;e tð Þ� �

2664

3775

where: ASFRa,e (t + h) – age specific fertility rate at age a and educationalgroup e at time t + h, wa,e (t + h)- number of females at age a and educa-tion e at time t + h,Q3


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Documents

The changing religious composition of Nigeria: causes and ...pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13485/1/The changing religious composition... · role of religion on education, contraception