THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM COALITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM

COALITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE

SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES

Francine Sanders Middle Tennessee State University

Scholarship attempting to explain the success of progressive reformism in the United States is divided into three approaches. “Great man” scholars regard it as the result of a genuine desire for good government; revisionists as an attempt by elites to eliminate immigrants from the power structure; and pragmatists as a means for urban political machines to increase their influence. The proposition made here is that it was the type of reform- electoral versus moral-that significantly determined the make-up and motivations of the supporting coalitions. The hypothesis is supported through a roll call analysis of House votes on the Seventeenth and Eight- eenth Amendments. While the electoral reform was backed by the groups who would reap the greatest tangible rewards, the coalition that formed around the moral reform reflected a regionally based ideological split.

T h e progressive movement in the United States, which lasted from approximately 1896- 1920, has traditionally been proffered as an example of both the potential success of an outsider movement, and the ability of the federal government to respond to the demands of the people. Studies of the period are significant not only for their historical value but because they can conceivably cast light on two key questions of American politics: To whom are our elected representatives responsive, and is it possible to circumvent the two-party system? The body of existing scholarship on progressive reforms, however, fails to provide answers to these questions due to con- flicting explanations of the roots of the movement and its subsequent successes. The basic motivations behind reform, the nature of the support-

Southeastern Political Review * Volume 24 * No. 3 * September 1996

470 Southeastern Political Review Vol. 24 No. 3

ing coalitions necessary for their ultimate success, and whether or not progressivism truly represented an “outside” (i.e. anti-party) movement remain sources of controversy and confusion.

There are two problematic tendencies in much of the literature which lead to this resulting lack of clarity. The first is a mistaken propensity to assume the synonimity of all reforms of the era-presuming them to share similar origins, goals and supporting coalitions. In reality, it seems reasonable to suppose that the reforms of this era could have varied from each other considerably. An attempt at meaningful and systematic categorization is needed in order to clarify the differences between these in fact disparate reforms.

Second, the literature is too often complicated by a lack of clear differ- entiation between the roots of reforms and their ultimate supporting coalitions. The former subject, involving questions such as who originally incorporated these issues into the public dialogue, and what their motivations for doing so were, is difficult to explicate objectively. But the question of which groups ultimately pushed these measures to fruition (e.g. at the ballot box, in statehouses and in the U.S. Congress) is a somewhat different issue-one which comes closer to answering the above questions and can be empirically ascertained.

The hypothesis underlying this study is that supporting coalitions will vary significantly as the category of reform legislation varies. Specifically, roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives in support of an electoral reform will have come from a quite different group than those who joined in support of a moral reform. By focusing on roll calls, this study presents data which can empirically support the contrasting make-up of the coalitions, instead of inferring the outcome from anecdotal evidence. Before detailing the design and outcome of this empirical inquiry, a literature review is presented in order to more clearly portray the lack of conclusive explanations and the need for a different approach to the subject.

TRENDS AND CONTROVERSIES IN THE LITERATURE

“Great Man” The original approach to explaining the progressive movement took the

form of a “great man” theory.’ This body of literature, which includes works of that era and contemporary scholarship, is characterized by an idealistic view of the movement and largely focuses on the reformers themselves, showing how their moral fortitude led them to set the American system back on the true course of democracy. In his treatise on reformer Brand Whitlock,

Progressive Reform Coalition in the United States 471

Tager declared that, “Whitlock and reformers like him brought Americans closer to a necessary re-examination of traditional values, and stimulated the construction of new systems to cope with the complexities engendered by the Industrial Revolution” (1968,162). John C. Burnham defended the reformers as the embodiments of “the idea of unselfish service” (Buenker, Burnham, and Crunden 1977, 18).

Croly defined the movement as one that would repair the breakdown of the traditional American citizen and help the industrial worker “conquer a higher standard of living without doing any unnecessary harm to his employers and with a positive benefit to general economic and social efficiency” (1914,205). The picture of progressivism which emerges from this literature is of an anti-partisan movement which, in response to the needs of the citizenry, was able to promote improved public policies.

Revisionism Perhaps induced by Beard’s (1928) An Economic Interpretation of the

Constitution, the revisionist account of the economic motives of the foun- ders of the American republic, subsequent interpretations of the era began to question the motives of the reformers. The traditional “great man” biographies began to be recast as a virtual social registry of old stock, wealthy elitists resentful of foreigners and fearful of their potentially socialistic influence.

It was not mere jealousy of power that was believed to have motivated this group, but elitism and xenophobia, spurred on by the large influx of immigrants into the upper echelons of party power. The reforms were seen as a means to displace the urban political machines in the power structure. Thus this strain of the literature (see in particular Hofstadter 1955; Kolko 1971; Mowry 1971; Prewitt and Stone 1973) is united in the assertion that while the final goal was reform, it was only in terms of changing the system enough so that the immigrant dominated party machines would be weakened.

As far as answering the question of which groups government is responsive to, the “great man” and revisionist approaches provide different answers. The first suggests responsiveness to the common man and the general welfare, with the reformers themselves simply acting as agents helping to bring about these changes. The second implies much more of a non-democratic model. Reforms were passed only because they were in the interests of societal elites.

But the two approaches do converge on three other points. First, they view all reforms as similar-i.e. they all represent either dedicated reform-

472 Southeastern Political Review VoL 24 No. 3

ers helping the oppressed (“great man”), or old stock elites forcing out newcomers (revisionism). Second, the focus is on who instigated the reforms, not on what sorts of coalitions ultimately supported them as policy. Finally, both branches of the literature portray the entire movement as something that occurred outside of the established two-party system in America. Although the majority of reformers came originally from the Republican party, the movement is not really portrayed as either an inter- or an intra-party struggle. It was a case in which some group’s preferences (the people themselves, or the elites) were transformed into policy not through party action but by outside pressures. Burnham and Chambers note that the increasing role of centralized government “required the displace- ment rather than the further development of the political party as an instrument of popular government” ( 1967,284). Several logical inconsis- tencies in this school of thought ultimately triggered the third strain of the literature, which incorporated a much more pragmatic approach to the history of progressive reforms.

Pragmatism The third strain of the literature challenges the idea that parties were

mere bystanders in the reform process and also begins to consider that the determination of the original identity and motivations of the reformers was less telling than the make-up of the coalitions which ultimately supported the policies. Pragmatism seriously questions the assertion that reforms in large part represented an attempt by outsiders to limit party power. For if the parties, and in particular the Democratic controlled urban machines, were as strong as contended, it is not clear why the reformers were simply able to circumvent them, and why the parties would not have responded to the progressive impetus through a modification of their own positions.

Furthermore, if the progressive program was based on public altruism (Herson and Bolland 1990) while the party machines appealed to personal gain it is not apparent why voters would have supported the former, especially since the established parties largely controlled social welfare during this period (Scott and Hrebenar 1979). The notion that voters suddenly became unselfish (even if this was the result of a certain degree of manipulation) is counter-intuitive. Finally, the revisionist argument lacks cogency to the pragmatists because even if one accepts the notion that the parties were willing to surrender to the progressive movement and that voters suddenly became altruistic, it does not address the fact that the party machines survived the reform movement largely intact (Mayhew 1986).


Thus pragmatism explores the possibility that the reforms (whatever their original source) were supported and carried to fruition by the groups they supposedly targeted-the urban based political machines. This approach indicates an application of Anthony Downs’ (1957) general theories of party behavior in that it suggests that reform policies were in many cases appropriated, if not originated, by the group that would most benefit from them. Although it was traditionalIy thought that this group was non-partisan elites, it may in fact have been urban Democrats. Both Buenker (1969) and McDonagh (1989) writing respectively on the success of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, advance the idea that support for these measures came largely from the urban political machines who pragmatically understood them to be in their own best interests.*

This approach suggests that rigid characterizations of progressivism as a victorious effort by agents outside of the established party structures to limit the power of parties (targeting urban Democrats in particular) may be inaccurate. If so, the answer to the question of whom government was responsive to changes once more. Policies were passed because powerful party organizations wanted them to pass.

Pragmatism includes only limited recognition that it may be erroneous to treat all progressive reforms as similar. Most notably, in her study of House passage of the women’s suffrage amendment, McDonagh (1989) finds the roll call vote pattern to resemble some other progressive reforms but not all, suggesting “multidimensionality” to the progressive agenda. Buenker (1969) maintains that progressive reforms differed in terms of their potential attractiveness to the urban political machines.

These three strains of the literature thus depict a somewhat disorganized picture of the progressive movement-it is still not clear who originated or, more importantly for policy implications, supported the reforms and what their motivations were. One explanation for the continuing confusion is the tendency of scholars to incorporate too wide a spectrum of groups, motivations and policies under the progressive ~mbrel la .~ The definitive answer may be that each of these interpretations has validity, but only in regard to certain types or categories of reform.

Additionally, this review of the literature reiterates the need to clearly differentiate between the original proponents of reform and those who made up the supporting coalitions. One clear inadequacy in both the “great man” and revisionist approaches is that they fail to address an important point: no matter who it was that promulgated the reforms, additional support was a requirement for passage. Both theories largely fail to answer the question of where this support came from, and why. While pragmatism does consider


the make-up of the supporting coalitions, the evidence is often more anecdotal than empirical.

PROPOSITIONS REGARDING ELECTORAL VERSUS MORAL REFORMS

Electoral reform refers to the sizeable number of proposed reform policies which attempted to change the rules of the game, with at least the stated purpose of eliminating impediments between the people and their government (Morone 1990). Examples at the national level include the popular election of U.S. senators, the direct primary and women’s ~uf f r age .~

While it would be going too far to say that all electoral reforms owe their success to the political machines, these were the kinds of policies on which urban Democrats were most likely to have constituted a majority, or at least a significant portion of, the supporting coalition. When such reforms passed it was because they were at least perceived to be potentially advantageous and empowering to urban Democrats. Or stated alternatively, if the urban machines had interpreted the outcome of these reforms as detrimental to their own power, it is unlikely that they would have passed.

But these “rules of the game” alterations were only part of the progressive legacy. There was also a body of morality based reforms which had more to do with personal rights and preferences. Issues such as prohibition and child labor fit this category. In contrast to the electoral reforms, the struggles for these morality based policies were a reflection of nation-wide ideological schisms based on regional, ethnic or class divisions. Coalitions supporting morality based reforms would have been quite different from those coalitions supporting electoral reforms, with successful passage re- flecting not strategic party preferences, but the influence of a movement independent of the parties.

The use of these categories will support the assertion that the type of reform in question is a key variable in determining which basic model of the reform era is the most useful explanation, The pragmatic approach should come closest to explicating the electoral reforms while in the case of moral reforms, the great man or revisionist approaches (with their emphases on the outsider, anti-partisan aspect of progressivism) will be most relevant.


RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Setting and Test Cases The U.S. House of Representatives was chosen as the test site because

it fits well with one of the questions raised above-what can the passage of reform policy tell us about the responsiveness of government? Since the House is meant to be the most responsive component of the federal system the question becomes key in this setting. Did the passage of the reform, as evidenced by the roll call vote, reflect a heeding of the constituency or the mindfulness of some other cue such as party organization preference? Two examples of legislation considered in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing each of the categories, were then chosen.

The Seventeenth Amendment represents a pure electoral reform-the movement to direct election of United States senators, thus ending the practice of their selection by the state legislature^.^ An additional reason for its inclusion is the fact that it (and other similar innovations designed to increase citizen participation) seems to have been largely misunderstood. At the time of its adoption, many believed that this reform would release the Senate from the grip of machine bosses who were sending party “yes-men” to Washington. Because of the indirect electoral system, these senators never had to answer to the voters for their behavior. While this view (increased voter input leading to a less corrupt Senate) is entirely plausible, one factor seems to have been largely ignored. Before this amendment passed, senators were chosen by state legislatures which were for the most part apportioned to the detriment of urban areas (Buenker 1969).

Thus it was not as likely as traditionally thought that pre-Seventeenth Amendment party bosses controlled the statehouse and thus their U.S. senators. However, constructing a reasonable argument as to why the Seventeenth Amendment could have benefitted the machines (as Buenker does) is not the same as empirically demonstrating that the amendment was in fact largely supported by, and perhaps owed its ultimate success to, the urban Democrats.

The Eighteenth Amendment, which established prohibition, seemed to be the most obvious choice of a progressive era moral reform. Timberlake notes, “If progressivism desired to curb the power of an industrial and financial plutocracy, prohibition aimed to remove the corrupting influence of one branch of that plutocracy-the liquor industry” (1970,2). The issue of temperance stirred up feelings of xenophobia, racism and religious intolerance and was especially championed by southerners. The Ku Klux


Klan was one of the strongest supporters of prohibition and this stemmed in part from their malice toward Catholics and immigrants, whom they supposed profited from the liquor trade in the northern cities. Additionally, many southerners favored prohibition because they feared liquor would fuel criminal behavior among blacks, or at least promote racial conflicts (Tim- berlake 1970). It is possible to construct afeasible alternativr scenario, such as Rumbarger’s ( I 989) suggestion that the roots of prohibition were economically motivated-based on capitalism’s need for sober m d efficient workers. But, again, the empirical data utilized here will help to clarify the controversy.

Some consideration should be given to the nature of these two supposedly representative pieces of legislation for each category. They are, after all, constitutional amendments which are not necessarily similar to normal bills. One notable feature of amendments is that they may involve the mobilization of the public to a greater degree than does ordinary legislation (Ackerman 199 1). In particular, the assumption that roll call votes on moral reforms reflect a greater responsiveness to public sentiment may be more valid for amendments than for other bills, and this could be a limitation of the categorization. However, since one of the key questions to be answered here is the potential responsiveness of government to public demand, amendments seem to be appropriate candidates for this roll call analysis.

Data Collection To reiterate, the expectation is that the supporting coalition for the direct

election of U.S. senators was characterized by a large number of members representing the urban Democratic machines. On prohibition, however, the majority of support would have come from members representing the south-that region most in favor of this reform. The evidence, including both roll call summaries and the transcribed floor debates on these issues, was obtained from the Congressional Record.

Members who voted against either amendment were divided into two groups-those who represented large urban districts (all members who fit this description were Democrats) and those who did not.6 Cities included in the former category were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, De- troit, New York City, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis. Only representatives from districts solidly within the city limits were included in the “urban party” category. In order for the hypothesis to be tested under the most rigorous conditions those from bordering districts were assumed to be outside party control.’


A presumption is made that members of the House from these cities represented the machine organizations, and the literature supports this. First, although having suffered substantial losses to the Republicans in the election of 1896, the Democrats by the period in question had regained their hold on many of the major northern urban areas (Clubb 1978). Second, there is evidence which indicates that the party bosses wielded a great deal of influence in the election of their U.S. representatives (Martin 1964).

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The Roll Call Record The Congressional Record’s (1912, 1917) accounts of these two pro-

gressive amendments display striking dissimilarities. This is most obviously reflected by an observation of the aggregate roll call votes on the final adoption of the measure, as reported in Table 1. In 1912, the Seventeenth Amendment passed with a recorded vote of 238 yeas, 39 nays, and 115 abstentions. The Eighteenth passed in 1917 with 282 yeas, 128 nays and 23 abstentions. Eighty-nine (21 percent) more House members were willing to vote against prohibition than against the direct election of senators.

The large number of abstentions in the roll call totals reflects the practice of paired voting in which pairs of congressmen agree beforehand not to even appear on the floor because their votes will cancel each other-one is pledged to vote for the measure, and the other against. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell from the record which member of the pair was on which side. However, the fact that far fewer congressmen “paired” on the Eight- eenth Amendment does suggest that it was an intense issue whose floor vote few wanted to miss.

Since the specific make-up of the coalition is what the hypothesis predicts, it was necessary to investigate and characterize the votes further. The vote analysis illustrated in Table 2 supports the hypothesis that electoral and moral reforms were advanced by dissimilar coalitions. Roll call voting on the direct election of senators indicates a strategic, party based impetus

Table I

Roll Call Vote Totals for the 17th and 18th Amendments

17th Amendment 18th Amendment In Favor 238 282 Opposed 39 128 Abstaining 115 23

478 Southeastern Political Review Vol.24 No.3

Table 2

Opposition Votes to the 17th and 18th Amendments

17th Amendment 18th Amendment Total number of votes in opposition 39 128 Percent from southern representatives 100 6 Percent from urban representatives 0 50

while the vote on prohibition reflects the regionally varied, citizen based demands noted above.

For the Seventeenth Amendment, all 39 opposing votes were from the south-not a single congressman who voted against the direct election of senators was from the party dominated districts thought to be targeted for reform by the measure. Obviously, others besides urban Democrats supported the measure, but there is clearly no reform versus party antagonism evidenced by this vote. What the results do suggest is a regional split within the Democratic party since the congressmen who voted against it were all southern Democrats. The nature of this opposing coalition also makes strategic sense, since southern Democrats were the only group who clearly had nothing to gain from the amendment. Because the south at the time still functioned as a virtual one-party state, Democrats could only lose power as the result of this reform since southern blacks, who traditionally supported the Republican party, would by federal law be guaranteed the right to vote in these new national electionsag

Roll call tallies for the Eighteenth Amendment are quite different. Of the 128 nays, 65 were cast by congressmen from the nine previously mentioned cities. All were Democrats and all came from machine dominated urban areas.9 While no urban Democrats opposed the move to direct election of U.S. senators, they comprised 50percent of the coalition opposed to prohibition. Furthermore, only eight of the 128 votes cast against prohibition were from southerners (more specifically, from members representing Texas or Louisiana). The northlsouth split in public opinion was accurately reflected in the roll call.

The Debates There were also qualitative differences between these two pieces of

legislation that further support the theory that all progressive reforms did


not spring from a single impetus. The record on the Seventeenth Amend- ment seems to support its characterization as a tool for increasing the power base of its putative target-the urban Democratic machines, and not as a triumph of progressive morality or elitism. In the case of prohibition, however, the record does indeed suggest a clash of ideology and culture- the traditional characterization of a progressive issue.

The House debates on senatorial election were relatively short, and the very slight amount of controversy was limited to discussions of rules and technical matters. This is likely an indication that non-southern Democrats, Republicans and progressive converts from both parties all thought that they would benefit by the amendment and simply wanted to pass it as quickly as possible.

The debates on prohibition, however, tell quite a different story. The record in this case shows a fiery and polemical dialogue among the congressmen. Representative Edwin Webb of North Carolina proclaimed that, “Never was the Roman war cry ‘Delenda est Carthago!’ more ceaseless and remorseless than that of the American Christian and temperance people that the saloon must be destroyed, and I hope today’s epochal vote will be the beginning of its destruction.” Representative Meeker of Missouri responded that, ”Prohibition is the dagger in the hand of religious fanaticism and commercial greed that, in the name of reform, is to be driven into the heart of American liberty” (Congressional Record 1917,5548). Thus this issue also reflected inter-Democratic party divisions, but here the evidence suggests that the split was based not on rational, electoral concerns but on a fierce ideological argument.

CONCLUSIONS The results of this analysis provide initial support for the hypothesis that

the type of reform significantly affects the supporting coalition. Not only did a dissimilar group of representatives advocate each measure, but the tone of the national level debate on each was quite distinct. The record of House roll call votes on the Seventeenth Amendment provides empirical evidence for the pragmatic view that progressive reforms were simply originated or co-opted by the party or party faction that would most benefit by them. The assertions of both the “great man” and revisionist approaches that progressive electoral reforms targeted and weakened the urban political machines appear mistaken in light of this group’s complete lack of opposition to the move toward direct senatorial elections.

Conversely, the Eighteenth Amendment’s record shows that this view should not be taken too far, and potentially supports both the revisionist


assertion that progressive reforms were based on an ideological based fear and hatred of foreigners and the lower classes, and possibly the “great man” emphasis on reformers as men who labored against the evils of American society. Additionally, it suggests that reform can be a non-partisan based governmental response to mass or elite based demand.

What is most significant here is the suggestion that previous approaches which attempted to analyze all progressive reforms within a single explana- tory framework are inadequate. Although “great man,” revisionism, and pragmatism differ in substance, they largely attempt to posit one basic type of coalition andor incentive as the root of all progressive era reforms. This analysis casts doubt on the wisdom of that assumption and illustrates the need for additional empirical analyses, by supporting the proposition that the nature of the reform may have determined the character and motivation of the supporting coalition.

NOTES An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1995 annual meeting

‘This tripartite division of the literature is my own. The approaches noted are chronological in the sense that “great man” appeared first, revisionism second and pragmatism third. As the review illustrates, however, none of these strains ever really disappeared, with fairly recent examples of each still in evidence.

2However, McDonagh (1992) also supports the premise that the roots of certain progressive reforms in the House of Representatives (those involving federal economic intervention, suffrage qualifications and prohibition) can be traced to demands from local constituencies.

3Filene (1970) was the most influential but also see Buenker, Burnham, and Crunden (1977) and Sundquist (1983) for similar viewpoints. The idea that even a single reform can be traced to a variety of interests is found in analyses of the temperance movement by Rumbarger (1989) and Timber- lake (1970). More recent works on this subject such as Morone’s (1990) and Finegold’s (1995) view this question of the roots of progressivism as so complicated as to be unanswerable. They focus instead on the imple- mentation and evaluation of reforms.

4 B ~ t as McDonagh (1989) notes, there were components of “social justice” associated with the women’s suffrage issue.

of the Western Political Science Association.


51t has been properly noted (Riker 1955) that the public played a meaningful role in the election of U.S. senators before this amendment by sometimes electing state legislators on the basis of which U.S. Senate candidate they supported. However, the Eighteenth Amendment did represent a significant change in the formal rules of election. Additionally, the purpose here is not to argue the evolutionary importance of this amendment, but simply to refute claims that it was largely opposed by the urban machines.

61n assessing the roll call vote outcomes of each amendment, a focus on the “nay” voters provides more conclusive evidence. A “yes” vote could signify a personal commitment to legislation, but it could also simply be a vote of acceptance of the inevitable. If a bill is going to pass anyway, representatives may consider it best to go on record as a member of the winning side.

7Republican machines were not unheard of but did not exist in these cities at this time. Additionally, the cities listed were not the only ones controlled by machines. However, with some of the smaller cities, it became problematic to determine which representatives should be considered to be machine controlled since so many districts spanned both city and suburb or rural area. The districts included here were taken from an atlas of congressional districts (Martis 1982) in which state maps with the properly numbered districts are provided for every Congress since 1789.

81n state elections, many disenfranchising devices such as whites-only primaries were still a common way to exclude blacks from meaningful participation.

9This finding casts doubt on Rumbarger’s (1989) conclusion that the successful passage of prohibition was largely attributable to northeastern members of Congress who believed the industrial captains’ claims that prohibition would provide a sober work force which would translate into continued industrial growth in that region. But perhaps the decision to oppose prohibition was economically strategic if it was true that the party machines benefitted from the legal liquor trade.

REFERENCES Ackerman, Bruce. 199 1. We the People: I-Foundations. Cambridge,

Beard, Charles A. 1928. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.

MA: The Belknap Press.

New York: MacMillan Co.


Buenker, John. 1969. “The Urban Political Machine and the Seventeenth Amendment.” Journal of American History 56:305-22.

Buenker, John D., John C. Bumham, and Robert M. Crunden. 1977. Progressivism. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Books.

Bumham, Walter Dean, and William Nisbet Chambers. 1967. The Ameri- can Parry Systems. New York: Oxford University Press.

Clubb, Jerome M. 1978. “Party Coalitions in the Early Tbentieth Century,” in Seymour Lipset, ed., Emerging Coalitions in American Politics. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.

Congressional Record. 1912. 62nd Cong., 2d sess. Vol. 48, pt. 7.

Congressional Record. 1917. 65th Cong., 26 sess. Vol. 56, pt. 1. Croly, Herbert. 19 14. The Promise of American Life. New York: DaCapo

Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York:

Filene, Peter. 1970. “An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement.”’

Finegold, Kenneth. 1995. Experts and Politicians. Princeton, NJ: Prince-

Herson, Lawrence J. R., and John M. Bolland. 1990. The Urban Web.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform. New York: Alfred A.

Kolko, Gabriel. 1971. “The Triumph of Conservatism,” in David M. Kennedy, ed., Progressivism: The Critical Issues. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Press.

Harper & Row.

American Quarterly 22:20-34.

ton University Press.

Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

Knopf.

Martin, Ralph G. 1964. The Bosses. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.

Martis, Kenneth C. 1982. Historical Atlas of US. Congressional Districts, 1789-1983. New York: The Free Press.

Mayhew, David R. 1986. Placing Parties in American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

McDonagh, Eileen L. 1989. “Issues and Constituencies in the Progressive Era: House Roll Call Voting on the Nineteenth Amendment, 1913- 1919.” Journal ofpolitics 51:119-36.


McDonagh, Eileen L. 1992. “Representative Democracy and State Build- ing in the Progressive Era.” American Political Science Review 56:938- 50.

Morone, James A. 1990. The Democratic Wish. New York: Basic Books.

Mowry, George E. 197 1. “The California Progressive and His Rationale,” in David M. Kennedy, ed., Progressivism: The Critical Issues. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Prewitt, Kenneth, and Alan Stone. 1973. The Ruling Elites. New York: Harper and Row.

Riker, William H. 1955. “The Senate and American Federalism.” Ameri- can Political Science Review 49:452-69.

Rumbarger, John J. 1989. Profits, Power; and Prohibition. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Scott, Ruth K., and Ronald J. Hrebenar. 1979. Parties in Crisis. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Tager, Jack. 1968. The Intellectual as Urban Reformer; Brand Whitlock and the Progressive Movement. Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University.

Timberlake, James H. 1970. Prohibition and the Progressive Movement Z900-Z920. New York: Atheneum.

Documents

THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM COALITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES