The challenge facing

Britain's new

Defence Secretary:

A Henry Jackson Society Strategic Briefing

By Peter John Cannon

November 2011

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Executive summary:◊ TheNewSecretaryofStateforDefence,PhilipHammond,hasarrivedattheMinistry

ofDefenceataparticularlychallengingtime.

◊ Lastyear’sSDSRhasbeenwidelycriticisedforthesignificantcutstoUKdefencecapabilitieswhichitentailed.AfterpublicdisagreementsabouttheeffectsoftheSDSR,relationsbetweentheGovernmentandthemilitaryhavebeenstrainedandmoralehasbeendamaged.

◊ ThenewDefenceSecretarywillhavetomakeimportantdecisionsaboutBritishforcesinLibyaand,especially,Afghanistan.Withtheeconomicoutlookuncertain,theMinistryofDefencemayalsofacepressureforfurthersavingsandcuts.

◊ ThenewDefenceSecretarymustresistanyfurthercuts,inanyform,andmustbewillingtofighttoprotectUKdefenceagainstanyrenewedpressurefromtheTreasuryorotherdepartments.

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The new Defence Secretary

The new Secretary of State for Defence, Philip

Hammond, has arrived at the Ministry of Defence at a

challenging time, with UK military capabilities having

been drastically reduced by the Strategic Defence and

Security Review and cuts still being made to the Armed

Forces while the operation in Libra draws to a close

and the campaign in Afghanistan continues.

Criticism of the Strategic Defence

and Security Review

Last year’s Strategic Defence and Security Review

(SDSR) has been subject to a number of increasingly

damning assessments, particularly in the wake of the

campaign in Libya.

The Henry Jackson Society’s report ‘The Tipping

Point: British National Strategy and the UK’s Future

World Role’ argued that the cuts in military capability

resulting from the SDSR meant that the UK had now

reached a point where it had to decide whether it

would continue to be a global power with a global

role, or was to become a middle-ranking European

power with only a regional role. 1 The Government

was “pursuing an incoherent and cost–driven policy of

deleting vital capabilities, eroding our global influence

and leaving our future open to chance,” while it

needed to “retain a full spectrum of forces, not a

bare–bones defence specialised for scenarios that may

not and probably will not be the ones that we actually

face”. 2

The UK is “less able to adapt and respond” and is

“throwing away capabilities which it will take years

to recover”. 3 The short-sightedness of the SDSR

1 ‘The Tipping Point: British National Strategy and the UK’s Future World Role’, Bernard Jenkin & George Grant, Henry Jackson Society, 14th July 2011, http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/The+Tipping+Point.pdf

2 ‘Defence cuts “were incoherent”’, Thomas Harding, Daily Telegraph, 15th July 2011

3 ‘The UK has now reached a tipping point on defence’, Bernard Jenkin, Conservative Home, 16th July 2011, http://conservativehome.blogs.com/platform/2011/07/bernard-jenkin-mp-the-uk-has-now-reached-a-tipping-point-on-defence.html

had already been demonstrated by the absence

of the option of an aircraft carrier in Libya and the

last-minute delay to the scrapping of the Nimrod R1

reconnaissance aircraft because it was needed there.

The failures of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and

SDSR were due to the absence of a national strategy

“based on a clear understanding of what the UK stands

for, what sort of power we want to be in the world, and

what we understand about the world around us.” 4

In July, Shortly after the publication of ‘The Tipping

Point’, the Defence Select Committee published

a damning report on the NSS and SDSR, which

concludes that “the need for savings” is “overriding

the strategic security of the UK”. 5 The report baldly

states: “The Prime Minister’s view that the UK currently

has a full spectrum defence capability is rejected

by the committee.” Contrary to the Government’s

arguments: “Given the Government’s declared priority

of deficit reduction we conclude that a period of

strategic shrinkage is inevitable... The Government

appears to believe that the UK can maintain its

influence while reducing spending. We do not agree.

If the UK’s influence in the world is to be maintained,

the Government must demonstrate in a clear and

convincing way that these reductions have been offset

by identifiable improvements.”

In a strong criticism of continuing defence cuts while

fighting two wars, the Committee says: “We can only

conclude that the Government has postponed the

sensible aspiration of bringing commitments and

resources into line, in that it has taken on the new

commitment of Libya while reducing the resources

available to the Ministry of Defence.” 6 The Committee

warns that the Armed Forces are heading below

‘critical mass’ and that the UK will suffer major

4 ‘The Tipping Point: British National Strategy and the UK’s Future World Role’

5 ‘The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy’, Defence Select Committee, House of Commons, 20th July 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/761.pdf

6 ‘Cuts have left our troops with mission impossible in Libya and Afghanistan’, Thomas Harding, Daily Telegraph, 2nd August 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8678317/Defence-cuts-have-left-our-troops-with-mission-impossible-in-Libya-and-Afghanistan.html

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‘capability gaps’. The reports note that the Armed

Forces depend on increased spending from 2015 to

meet even the reduced capabilities set out in the SDSR

as ‘Future Force 2020’, but there is no guarantee that

this will happen.

In September, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon,

General Sir Michael Rose, Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy

Blackham, Air Commodore Andrew Lambert and Allen

Sykes argued in a report published by the UK National

Defence Association that the UK was on “thin ice”

and was in danger of making “expensive and possibly

catastrophic mistakes”. 7 Considering the transatlantic

strains in NATO and the impact of defence cuts on

the UK’s standing in the United States, the authors

argue: “It is now quite clear that the vital twin pillars

of Britain’s security for the past 50 years, the special

relationship with the US and the continuation of an

effective Nato, can no longer be guaranteed unless

Britain increases its defence capabilities substantially

and soon.” The report warns in particular that the

UK’s ability to defend the Falkland Islands is in danger,

describing an invasion by Argentina as a “disaster

waiting to happen”. 8

Most recently, Professor Gwyn Prins argued in a

paper for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),

‘The British way of strategy making: Vital lessons for

our times’, compared British strategy unfavourably

with the 1930s and argued that a future military

defeat was likely. 9 Professor Prins warns: “The UK’s

standing in the world which our Armed Forces have

given us over the centuries will be broken because

we will be defeated and will be shown to have failed.” 10 Most radically, Prins argues that defence reviews

7 ‘Inconvenient Truths - threats justify prioritising defence’, UK National Defence Association, 27th September 2011, http://www.uknda.org/File/Inconvenient%20Truths%20Tue%2027%20Final%20%20%28F1.3%29.pdf

8 ‘Boost UK defence spending or lose the Falklands, warn military grandees’, Nick Hopkins, The Guardian, 27th September 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/27/boost-defence-spending-lose-falklands

9 ‘The British way of strategy making: Vital lessons for our times’, Royal United Services Institute, 27th October 2011, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/The_British_Way_of_Strategy_Making.pdf

10 ‘Defence cuts are worse than those which allowed Nazi Germany to rearm’, Andy Bloxham, Daily Telegraph, 26th October 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

should be carried out without the involvement of

Her Majesty’s Treasury, with financial considerations

only entering the process after an assessment of the

threats and decisions on strategy have been made. 11 Unfortunately, this proposal seems unlikely to be

adopted in the foreseeable future, after the heavy

involvement of the Treasury and its priority of deficit

reduction in the SDSR.

Strains in civil-military relations

It is not only the reductions to the UK’s armed forces

made in the SDSR which the new Defence Secretary

will have to deal with. Largely as a result of the

SDSR, relations between the Government and senior

military commanders have also become strained.

This summer, the Government became increasingly

irritated at the candour of remarks made by senior

military figures regarding the impact of the SDSR on

the armed forces.

At the beginning of June, Chief of the General Staff

General Sir Peter Wall told a RUSI conference: “we

face a budget that is reducing considerably over the

early years of the coming decade, after which we will

certainly require a real terms growth in the latter part

of the decade if we are to resource Future Force 2020.”

He therefore made clear that the current trajectory of

defence spending would have to be reversed, or else

the British Army would face ‘serious decline’. 12

uknews/defence/8848976/Defence-cuts-are-worse-than-those-which-allowed-Nazi-Germany-to-rearm.html

11 ‘UK urged to leave Treasury out of defence reviews’, James Blitz, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab0c9618-ffda-11e0-8441-00144feabdc0.html

12   ‘Army chief: Britain’s ability to fight wars at risk unless more cash is invested in defence’, Daily Mail, 2nd June 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1393087/

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The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope,

highlighted the consequences of the Government’s

decision to decommission the HMS Ark Royal and

Harrier jets when he told journalists: “If we had Ark

Royal and the Harriers, I feel relatively reassured that

we would have deployed that capability off Libya...

The pros would have been a much more reactive

force... It’s cheaper to fly an aircraft from an aircraft

carrier than from the shore.” 13 He then went on to

argue that the operation in Libya might be difficult to

sustain without sacrificing commitments or capabilities

elsewhere: “Beyond that, we might have to request

the Government to make some challenging decisions

about priorities... we will have to rebalance.” Soon

after this, Air Chief Marshal Sir Simon Bryant gave a

similar warning about the Royal Air Force, telling MPs

in a briefing that it “was running hot”. He warned:

“Should Operation Ellamy endure past defence

planning assumptions the future contingent capability

is likely to be eroded.” 14

The three service chiefs had all therefore highlighted

some of the consequences of the SDSR, particularly

in the light of new commitments in Libya. This drew

an angry public rebuke from the Prime Minister, who

told the Downing Street press conference: “There

are moments when I wake up and think ‘you do the

fighting, I’ll do the talking’.” 15

This warning did not prevent General Sir Peter Wall

from publicly questioning the certainty of the Prime

Minister’s 2015 deadline for the end of British combat

operations in Afghanistan, telling the BBC: “Whether

or not it turns out to be an absolute timeline or more

Afghanistan-war-We-need-cash-says-General-Sir-Peter-Wall.html

13 ‘Navy chief: Britain cannot keep up its role in Libya air war due to cuts’, James Kirkup, Daily Telegraph, 13th June 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8573849/Navy-chief-Britain-cannot-keep-up-its-role-in-Libya-air-war-due-to-cuts.html

14 ‘Future RAF missions under threat if Libyan intervention continues’, Thomas Harding, 20th June 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8588125/Future-RAF-missions-under-threat-if-Libyan-intervention-continues.html

15 ‘David Cameron tells defence chiefs to stop criticising Libya mission’, Andy Bloxham, Daily Telegraph, 21st June 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/8588973/David-Cameron-tells-defence-chiefs-to-stop-criticising-Libya-mission.html

conditions-based approach nearer the time, we shall

find out.” 16

Relations between the Government and the military

have therefore reached a low ebb. One defence

correspondent argued that disdain for the military top

brass went beyond the Prime Minister: “A bad habit

the Government did not learn from the Blair/Brown

era is the blaming and bad mouthing of the military -

now a mania with Tory MPs of almost all stripes. The

continual sniping at anything military, overtly and

tacitly encouraged by ministers and their cronies, does

nothing for morale and is not a little spiteful.”17

Unsurprisingly, none of this has had a positive impact

on morale in the British military. Air Chief Marshal Sir

Simon Bryant argued in his briefing to MPs: “Morale

remains fragile... The impact of SDSR continues to

undermine the sense of being valued. There is concern

over the perceived lack of strategic direction which is

restricting confidence in the senior leadership.” Morale

has taken a further hit with waves of compulsory

redundancies across the three armed services, which

are likely to go beyond those set out in the SDSR in the

effort to balance the Ministry of Defence’s budget. 18

The challenge facing Philip

Hammond

The new Defence Secretary has therefore arrived at

an extremely challenging time. As if to underline the

difficulties faced by the UK’s defences, it emerged last

week that there was not a single warship protecting

home waters around the British Isles, whereas usually

there would always be a Fleet Ready Escort (FRE),

because the available ships in Britain’s reduced fleet

16 ‘Head of British Army questions deadline for Afghan troop withdrawal’, James Kirkup, Daily Telegraph, 22nd June 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/8590812/Head-of-British-Army-questions-deadline-for-Afghan-troop-withdrawal.html

17 ‘Take this chance to blow away the defence myths’, Robert Fox, London Evening Standard, 17th October 2011, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23999174-take-this-chance-to-blow-away-the-defence-myths.do

18 ‘Defence cuts: more compulsory redundancies to come’, Nick Hopkins, The Guardian, 1st September 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/01/defence-cuts-compulsory-redundancies

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had to be deployed to Libya. 19 This was exactly the

kind of problem which the First Sea Lord warned of

several months ago. 20

While the NATO mission in Libya has now come to a

successful conclusion, the campaign in Afghanistan

continues. With the 2015 deadline having been given,

he will have to make decisions about the rate of the

withdrawal of UK forces, which as things stand may be

a slower rate than US forces. 21

He is also likely to face decisions over whether or

not there are to be further cuts to personnel and

capabilities beyond those set out in the SDSR, as has

already happened this year. 22

While Philip Hammond has been seen as a “safe

pair of hands” to look after the Ministry of Defence,

some have expressed fears that he could act as a

‘Treasury axeman’ due to his perceived closeness to

the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 23 It would be entirely

wrong to judge the new Defence Secretary as he is

just starting his role, yet such an approach would be

a disaster for the Armed Forces, given the cuts they

are already having to sustain. Yet, with the economic

outlook uncertain, and Government’s programme of

deficit reduction therefore under renewed pressure,

it is possible that the defence budget will come under

renewed pressure. The former Defence Secretary,

Liam Fox, fought to stop greater cuts to the defence

budget, most notably in his letter to the Prime Minister

shortly before the publication of the SDSR. 24 His

19 ‘Not a single warship was tasked solely with protecting the country’s shores during the last month due to defence cuts’, Daily Mail, 2nd November 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2056117/Not-single-warship-tasked-solely-protecting-countrys-shores-month-defence-cuts.html

20 ‘Guarding our nation’s waters is not a luxury, it is a necessity’, Stephen Glover, Daily Mail, 3rd November 2011,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2056834/STEPHEN-GLOVER-I-simply-fail-understand-Tory-led-Government-muster-single-warship-protect-nations-shores.html

21 ‘MoD to-do list’, Daniel Korski, Spectator Coffee House, 18th October 2011, http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/7322203/mod-todo-list.thtml

22 ‘Liam Fox’s successor Philip Hammond faces MoD challenge’, Caroline Wyatt, BBC News, 19th October 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15364934

23 ‘Tory right wing fears that Philip Hammond will be Treasury axeman’, Nicholas Watt, The Guardian, 16th October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/oct/16/tory-right-hammond-treasury-axeman

24 ‘The Dangers of Britain’s Defence Review’, Peter Cannon, Henry Jackson Society,

successor must also be prepared to fight his corner

for UK defence. Both the former Defence Secretary

and the Prime Minister have accepted that defence

spending will need to increase after 2015 in order for

Future Force 2020 to be deliverable. Further cuts to

the defence budget, in any form, must therefore be

resisted.

One area which could become controversial is the UK

nuclear deterrent, where a study for alternative systems

is currently being carried out, despite the ‘Initial Gate’ for

the replacement of Trident going ahead. 25 Speculation

intensified when it was revealed that Philip Hammond

had never voted in Parliament in favour of the renewal

of Trident. 26 However, Hammond quickly clarified that

he was “absolutely committed to the Trident programme

and always [has] been”, and was absent on a ministerial

visit at the time of the last vote on Trident. 27 Another

worry is that as the operation is drawn down, and as the

political appetite for military interventions involving large

numbers of ground troops has diminished, the British

Army will be seen as the easiest target for further cuts.

After the SDSR, Britain is already going to be left with its

smallest army for more than a century. To cut further

would be disastrous, stripping Britain of the option of

deploying troops in effective numbers at all, regardless of

14th October 2010, http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=1767

25 ‘A worrying development for Trident’, Peter Cannon, Henry Jackson Society, 25th May 2011, http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?pageid=49&id=2203

26 ‘Trident doubts over Hammond’, David Maddox, 18th October 2011, http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/trident_doubts_over_hammond_1_1917402

27 ‘Philip Hammond backs Trident renewal’, The Guardian, 21st October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/oct/21/philip-hammond-backs-trident-renewal

© 2011 The Henry Jackson Society, Project for Democratic Geopolitics. All rights reserved.http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org

the threats that emerge and what may happen in future -

which, of course, we cannot predict. 28

The new Defence Secretary therefore faces a

significant challenge: having arrived as the SDSR is

reducing UK military capabilities and with relations

between the Government and military having

deteriorated, he will have to oversee the process of

reform at the Ministry of Defence begun under his

predecessor, make decisions over British forces in

Libya and Afghanistan, deal with his department’s

28 ‘The future of the British Army: On the defensive’, The Economist, 22nd October 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21533406

long-standing budgetary problems and resist any

pressure for further cuts in defence spending or

capabilities. This will be one of the most important

roles in the British Government in the coming years.

Not only does the new Defence Secretary need to

prioritise defence of the realm: he will have to try to

persuade the Government as a whole to give greater

priority to defence if the UK is to avoid losing influence,

security and freedom of action.