The causes of conflict in Africa: Consultation document

DFID Department forInternationalDevelopment

The causes of conflict in Africa

Consultation document

The causes of conflict in Africa

Promoting poverty reduction, peace and stability in the world are key objectives of British Government policy. In July 2000the Government announced that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Developmentand the Ministry of Defence, in association with the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury, would work more closely togetherto improve the effectiveness of Britain’s contribution to peace keeping, conflict prevention and conflict management inSub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the world.

This draft paper examines the causes and consequences of conflict in Africa. Its aim is to stimulate discussion andcontribute to Britain’s longer term policy on tackling Conflict in Africa.

The British Government would welcome any comments you may have on this paper by 30 April 2001.

Please direct comments to:“Resolving Conflict in Africa”,Africa Policy and Economics Department,Department for International Development,94 Victoria StreetLondonSW1E 5JLUNITED KINGDOME-mail: [email protected]

Cabinet Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention in Africa

The causes of conflict in Africa – consultation document – March 2001 3

Summary 6

Part I

The background to Conflict in Africa 7Emerging independence 7The Cold War 7The New World Order 8

The current context of conflict 8Conventional warfare – Wars of attrition 8Factional warfare 8Genocide and ethnic based conflict 9The “New Warfare” – Regional conflict 9

The impact of conflict 10The human tragedy 10The economic impact 11The costs of war 12

Part II

The causes of conflict 13Root causes 13Secondary causes 14Tertiary causes 14

Part III

Responses to conflict 16Africa 16Regional 16International 17International and bilateral actions 17

Part IV

A comprehensive framework for conflict prevention in Africa 20The role of the UK 21

Appendices 23

4 The causes of conflict in Africa – consultation document – March 2001

Contents

DFID Department for International DevelopmentDRC Democratic Republic of CongoECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEU European UnionFrelimo Governing Political Party, MozambiqueG8 Group of Eight leading industrial nationsHIPC Highly Indebted Poor CountriesIMF International Monetary FundInterahamwe Hutu armed militia (Rwanda) MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of AngolaOAU Organisation of African UnityOECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and DevelopmentRUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)SADC Southern African Development CommunityUNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Glossary


Conflict in Africa● Has dramatically increased in level and scale

throughout the 1990s. In January 2000 over halfof African countries were affected.

● Is caused by inequality, economic decline, statecollapse and history.

● Has changed in nature; wars are now predominantlyregional.

● Has increasingly affected non-combatants over thepast decade as a result of increasing factional fightingand violent action against the civilian population.

● Has caused as many deaths each year as are caused byepidemic diseases, and has uprooted millions of people.

● Is constraining economic growth on the continent asa whole. Its economic impact crosses state borders.

● Has resulted in a marked reduction in food productionand serious losses of infrastructure.

● Must be tackled because of the human suffering andalso because of the impact on global security and theenvironment.

● Requires a stronger and more focused internationaleffort encompassing conflict prevention, reduction,resolution and peace building, in order to respondeffectively and break the conflict cycle.

Summary


The Background to Conflict in Africa

Emerging Independence

1. The birth of the OAU in 1963 heralded the beginningof the end of Africa’s colonial era.At its inceptionOAU had 32 independent member States.There arenow 53. From the beginning, the OAU recognisedthe imperfections of national boundaries. It madethe choice that, if Africa was to remain stable, theboundaries that existed at independence should remaininviolate.This principle was enshrined in a 1964resolution and has remained OAU policy since then.

2. As a founding principle, the OAU signalled itsintention to “to eradicate all forms of colonialism fromAfrica”. Many African countries fought hard to gaintheir independence. In the former Portuguese colonies,the struggle was both lengthy and bitter.The overthrowof the Salazar regime in the mid 1970s created a powervacuum. In Angola, the collapse of weak transitionalarrangements left three liberation movements inarmed competition. In Mozambique, Frelimo had onlypartially consolidated its authority in the North of thecountry when it found itself in power. Both countriesbecame victims of a cold war proxy confrontationand a South African campaign fought by the formerapartheid regime, which sought to destabilise the“front line” states.

3. However, most countries in Africa went througha relatively smooth transition to independence.Adherence to OAU principles guaranteed a high levelof national stability within the continent.The majorityof newly independent countries defined the role of thestate in development terms, seeking to harness nationalresources towards ensuring economic growth.The structures and institutions of the state, however,remained relatively undeveloped through the 1960s, thefocus being on building those institutions that allowedfor the exploitation and management of resources.There emerged an African leadership system, basedon centralisation of power and patronage networks thatallowed little popular involvement in government atnational or local level.

4. The Horn of Africa was an exception.The Somalisnever accepted their externally imposed borders and

for decades unsuccessfully pursued the vision of agreater Somalia.The UN’s acquiescence when Ethiopiaended the federation with Eritrea compounded theproblems of the region.The continuing problems ofSudan also arise from failure to establish a politicalstructure that adequately reflects the real differencesof the South.The inability to resolve these issues hassustained conflict at different levels of intensity overthe past thirty-five years.

The Cold War

5. The Cold War led to the emergence of East-Westspheres of influence in Africa.A system of client statesemerged, in which the leaders were maintained inpower in return for their allegiance to one of thesuperpowers. In countries such as Somalia, Zaire andSierra Leone a corrupt leadership was sustained whilethe institutional basis of the state continued to atrophy.The Horn of Africa and Southern Africa were ofparticular strategic interest to the great powers.Armsflows and military expenditure increased dramaticallyin these two regions during the Cold War.The majorpowers and their allies were actively engaged inmilitary training and a number of foreign forcesincluding the Cubans and the Chinese had asubstantial presence on the continent.

6. Cold war interests directly fuelled two major conflicts.In 1975, South Africa intervened in Angola to preventthe MPLA coming to power.The MPLA were seenas a communist surrogate, a perception that wasreinforced by the arrival of 12,000 Cuban troops tosupport the MPLA.The perceived communist threatto Southern Africa intensified the conflict and reducedWestern pressure on apartheid South Africa. In 1977,Somalia had built up sufficient military strength toattack Ethiopia in the Ogaden region. Ethiopian forces,with considerable Cuban assistance, repulsed theoffensive. Soviet Bloc support to Ethiopia sustainedand prolonged conflict throughout the region duringthe 1980s.

7. During this era the scale of conflict was no greater thanwas being experienced in Asia.Aid flows remained highbecause the major powers were motivated to ensurethe continuing support of client states. But there wasa cost.Where conflict did erupt, strong centralisedgovernments enforced their authority through large

Part I


standing armies.These same armies were to become athreat to stability in Africa once external support waswithdrawn.At the end of the Cold War, there was littleeffective demobilisation in Africa and the remnantsof large African armies still remain in the continent,contributing to new areas of conflict or sustainingfactional irregular armed groups which threaten bothdomestic stability and security.

8. During the Cold War state-to-state arms transfersinvolved primarily heavy, high maintenance equipment– tanks, transport aircraft and jet fighters.The scale wascolossal. In 1988 alone, at the end of the Cold War, theyamounted to more than $4 billion. By 1995, they haddropped to $270 million. However, state to state flowswere replaced by a major growth in commercial armsdealing and illegal arms trafficking in low maintenancelight weaponry, primarily items such as the AK 47 rifleand rocket propelled grenade launchers. (See alsoparagraphs 45 and 64.)

The New World Order

9. In 1990, the Secretary General of the OAU presenteda report to his Council of Ministers on the changestaking place in the world and their implications forAfrica. In this he stated that “the strongest likelihooddoes exist for the emergence of a new geopoliticalbalance of forces as well as a new internationaleconomic order that could further debilitate andmarginalise Africa.”1 These fears were well founded.Conflict became more widespread through the 1990s.Poor economic management weakened highlycentralised states.The inability to provide basic levelsof policing and social services helped to lead to theweakening of state authority. Internal conflict increaseddramatically throughout the 1990s. In extreme cases,fragmentation encouraged the formation andproliferation of splinter groups, which in turn dividedinto warring factions.The very nature of conflictchanged.The civilian population increasingly becamethe target of conflict in factional wars and subjected toparticularly high levels of violence and abuse.Thisresulted in massive displacement as well as social andeconomic distress.

10.Terrible levels of ethnic violence and genocide, aswitnessed in Rwanda and Burundi, re-emerged in thelast decade of the century.The political exploitation of

ethnic discrimination in Africa has its roots in colonialhistory. In general, it is more often used as a means tosustain conflict and is rarely a primary cause.Yet, theincreasing marginalisation of the poor has providedfertile ground for those promoting ethnic conflict asa means of sustaining their own control over power.Ethnic violence is now becoming part of the cultureof conflict in Africa.

11.As a number of ailing, autocratic leaders in Africa lostcontrol and external support, several states collapsed.Failed states such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone andZaire became centres of regional insecurity.Africancountries increasingly intervened militarily inneighbouring states and justified their actions on thegrounds of necessary self protection. Conflict becameincreasingly regional in nature as collapsed statesthreatened the security of their neighbours.

12.By 2000, over half the countries in Africa and 20% ofthe population were affected by conflict.There wereeleven major conflicts with more than a thousand warrelated deaths a year.The extent of conflict was greaterthan in any other region in the world2.

The Current Context of Conflict13.Four distinct types of conflict are now evident.

Conventional warfare – wars of attrition

14.The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was theonly conventionally fought war in Africa during thelast decade. It was fought with regular troops alonga defined series of fronts.Targets and objectives wereprimarily military and strategic.The war madeextensive use of expensive technology such as heavyartillery and jet fighters.The increasing cost of suchwarfare has tended to make these conflicts self-limitingin Africa.

Factional warfare

15.Factional wars are fluid by nature.There is rarelya defined front line and fighting is frequentlyopportunistic rather than strategic.Warfare is low techand small arms are the main weapons. Such wars arenot costly and can easily be sustained without externalsupport. Frequently these conflicts move rapidly fromthe original cause to revolve around the exploitation ofcommercial, mineral and natural resources.

Part I: The background to conflict in Africa


1Report of the Secretary General on the fundamental changes taking place in the world and their implications for Africa: Proposals for an African response.(Fifty second ordinary session of the Council of Ministers).

2See Appendix 1 for a chronology of conflicts in Africa.

Factions will seek to involve, exploit and control asignificant proportion of the civilian population inorder to sustain the conflict. Countries currentlyaffected by factional warfare are Somalia, Liberia(internally), Uganda (internally) Namibia andpotentially Cote D’Ivoire.

Genocide and ethnic based conflict.

16.The last decade has seen the re-emergence of genocidaland ethnically based conflict. Centrally directed andinvolving the virulent use of propaganda, these conflictsspread like wildfire and leave a huge death toll, massivedisplacement, fear and confusion. Ethnic and genocidalfighting tends to be extremely low tech using knives,machetes and occasionally small arms.A distinguishingcharacteristic is the speed with which genocidal attackstake place and the high degree of central organisationand planning involved.

17.Burundi remains the country at most immediate riskof genocide.The potential also exists in the DRC inthe Kivu region.A number of other countries, mostnotably Nigeria, are experiencing outbreaks of ethnicand religious violence. Cote D’Ivoire is also at risk.

The "new warfare" – regional conflict

18.All three elements of warfare have coalesced into whatcan be described as Africa’s "new warfare" – regionalconflict. In this type of conflict, conventional stateforces are frequently engaged in the protection of keyinstallations, or may find themselves engaged in capital-intensive, attritional warfare with other states. Extensiveuse is also made of factional forces that act as proxiesand as a forward line of protection for conventionalforces.These proxy forces are encouraged to be self-sustaining through the exploitation of natural resources.Ethnic conflict has increasingly been sanctionedor exploited to gain support for the continuationof the conflict.

19.The trend towards regional conflict continues.Previously contained internal conflicts spark offregional intervention.The war in the DRC involvesthe armed forces of eight countries while the DRC hassought to take the war back into Rwanda, Burundi andUganda. In the last year, the war in Sierra Leone hasdeveloped a similar regional dimension, as has theprolonged conflict in Angola.The Sudan conflict hasretained its strong regional dimension. FourteenAfrican countries are currently engaged in these fourregional conflicts.



Conflict in Sub Saharan Africa

Senegal

Guinea

Sierra Leone

LiberiaCote

d’Ivorie

South Africa

ZimbabweNamibia

Angola

SudanEritrea

EthiopiaSomalia

Kenya

RwandaBurundi

Uganda

Nigeria

Ghana

DRC

Lesotho

Sub Saharan Countries byType of conflict

Internal (4)Inter State (2)Regional (11)At Risk (2)

Mozambique

The following map identifies the main conflict areas inAfrica and the countries involved. (to be inserted)

The Impact of ConflictThe Human tragedy

20.During the last two decades, sub-Saharan Africa hasbeen the most conflict-affected region in the world.Ten of the 24 most war-affected countries between1980 and 1994 were African, and four of these (Liberia,Angola, Mozambique and Somalia) were ranked withinthe five most severely affected countries in the world.Conflict has been responsible for more death anddisplacement than famine or flood.The scale andnature of warfare have directly affected the lives ofmany millions of Africans.The main elements of thistragedy are the millions of uprooted people who havelost their homes and livelihood, the increasing numbersof direct civilian casualties and increased levels ofviolence, abuse and mutilation suffered by non-combatants.

● Displacement

21.Africa has the highest level of internal displacementin the world and some of the largest refugee flows,the majority from countries in conflict. In 2000,almost eleven million people in Africa were internallydisplaced3.This is an increase of two million during thepast year and is the second consecutive increase in twoyears, after five years in which the numbers remainedrelatively stable. Sudan,Angola, the DRC and CongoBrazzaville account for the majority of this increase. In1999, thirteen African countries each had 100,000 ormore displaced persons, compared to eight suchcountries at the start of the decade. Internally displacedpersons now outnumber refugees by a ratio of three toone.Taking refugees and internally displaced peopletogether, 14 million people in Africa are uprooted.

● Civilian casualties

22.War in Africa causes increasing suffering for civilians.They suffer death and injuries and the indirectconsequences of famine and epidemic disease thathave followed in the wake of war. Since 1960 overeight million people have died either directly orindirectly as a result of war in Africa, of whom fiveand a half million were civilians. (Appendix 1 lists theconflicts with the highest deaths).The Global Burden

of Disease Study4 established that in 1990, 6% of alldeaths in the world were caused by physical violence.In sub Saharan Africa the figure was 13% with one insix males dying from violent causes.Almost 1 in 20 ofall deaths in Africa are clearly attributable to war.Epidemiological projections suggest that by 2020,injuries caused by war will have become the eighthmost important factor (after tuberculosis) incurringa disease burden on society.

23. In Africa, the number of civilian casualties hascontinued to increase year by year, unlike in otherparts of the world as is demonstrated in this graph.Recent events suggest that this trend is continuing.

● Violence

24.The most disturbing aspect of conflict in Africa is theincreasing use of extreme violence, especially over thelast ten years.Violence is now deliberately targetedat civilians rather than armed groups, and at entiregroups rather than individuals.5 In the conflicts inLiberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Mozambique,Northern Uganda, Sudan and Angola, violencehas taken appalling forms. Mutilation, torture ofwomen and children, violent rituals and the forcibleinvolvement of relatives, children and spouses in killingand rape are used as a means of waging war primarilyby militia groups and by some state proxies. In someinstances, such violence is part of ritual that binds

400

300

200

100

0

Thousands

Sub-SaharanAfrica

Middle East &North Africa

SouthAsia

Countries intransition

Latin America& Caribbean

1945 50 60 70 80 90 95

East Asia& Pacific

Conflict Deaths



3State of the World’s refugees, UNHCR, Geneva, 2000.4Murray CJL, Lopez AD.Alternative projections of mortality and disability by cause 1990-2020: global burden of disease study. Lancet 1997.5Warfare, endemic violence and state collapse in Africa, Chris Allen, Review of African Political Economy vol. 26,1999.

militia groups together . Extreme violence can be usedas a means of humiliation or revenge. More frequently,it is used as a means of intimidation, as is the case withthe RUF in Sierra Leone. Here, mutilation was brutallyapplied as part of a strategy to stop people from votingor from gathering the harvest or to spread controlover territory by sheer terror and fear, thus avoidingthe need to fight.There is a danger that extremeviolence of this kind will erode the social fabricof African societies and further hasten state collapse.

● Child soldiers

25.Children have become one of the main targets ofviolence and in turn are being used to perpetuate it.Children are deliberately indoctrinated into a cultureof violence and used as a specific instrument of war.Militia groups and irregular armed forces such as theLord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the Interahamwein Rwanda / DRC, the RUF in Sierra Leone, UNITAIn Angola, and formerly Renamo in Mozambique, havemade a practice of forcibly recruiting children andinitiating them through acts of violence against theirown community.The intention is to create a fightingforce that is separate, reckless towards others and hasa tactical advantage over adult conventional forces.There are now approximately 350,000 child soldiersworldwide, of whom some 200,000 are in Africa.

The economic impact of conflict in Africa

26.Africa’s development is threatened by conflict.Armedconflict has become one of the most important causesof poverty in Africa, leading to displacement of people,and the destruction of communities’ livelihoods.6

The effects of war cut across all levels of the economydown to the level of the household.War has a directand immediate economic impact through the physicaldisruption it creates, denying access to land, keyresources or markets. Some of the effects of conflictare less tangible. Insecurity is the least conduciveclimate for domestic savings and internal or externalinvestment. Nor is the impact of war limited to thearea of conflict.War damages regional infrastructure,markets and investment confidence across a widerregion.The regional spread of conflict jeopardises stableand successful countries.

27.The World Bank estimates that conflict in Africa iscausing a loss of 2% annual economic growth across

the continent. Conflict in Africa has also created asubstantial loss of opportunity. Lost either through theinability of states to invest in their own populations orthrough high military spending which has squeezedout effective investment in the economy.The continentas a whole is seen as a high risk by potential externalinvestors because of armed conflicts.

● National impact on production and livelihoods

28. In the majority of African economies the most directimpact of war is on production and householdlivelihoods.War can deny people access to their land atcritical growing or planting periods, increase the costsof agricultural inputs, disrupt markets and restrict salesof produce.The use of landmines for example, incountries like Angola has severely limited access to landfor the long term.Agricultural production and familylivelihoods have suffered dramatically as a result.Astudy undertaken by the International Food PolicyResearch Institute7 determined that African countrieshad suffered production losses of up to 45% (inAngola).Average production losses through conflictwere 12%.War also seriously affected growth in theagricultural sector by 3% per annum.War has thereforebeen responsible for increasing the gap in foodproduction for large parts of Africa and in somecountries created a substantial requirement forimported food and food aid. (See Appendix 2for Key Indicators for Africa).

● Loss of infrastructure

29.War has seriously damaged Africa’s infrastructure.Roads, rail, ports, airports, electricity, water supply,sewers and telecommunications have all been affected.During war there has been a dearth of investmentin and maintenance of infrastructure. Over the pasttwenty years Africa has lost over fifty per cent ofits transport infrastructure, many of the losses due toconflict.This loss has both an immediate and a long-term impact on African economies. In immediateterms, it increases impoverishment. For example,South Sudan has almost no viable road network asa result of years of civil war.This severely harms thelivelihood of the population, who are dependent ontrading cattle for cereals as their means of survival.Countries such as Angola and DRC are now totallydependent on air transport because of the collapseof infrastructure and insecurity. Countries affected by



6Luckham 1999 See Appendix 4 on the Effects of War.7Breaking the link between conflict and hunger, Messer, Cohen, D’Costa (IFPRI 1998).

war also suffer from weak, fragmented and highlyunstable markets.This in turn contributes to anothercharacteristic of war-affected economies: hyperinflationand a volatile currency.

The costs of war

● Refugees and internal displacement

30. Internal displacement and refugee flows have aserious effect on the economy and the environment.The denial of access to the land by military factionshas led displaced people to congregate in cities andsurrounding areas. Uprooted populations lose access toany means of production and put enormous pressureon government services. Refugees and the internallydisplaced put pressure on fuel and water resources.The World Bank estimates that in Africa the totaldirect costs of refugees to their hosts is in the regionof $530 million per year.

● Effects on services

31.Recent wars have led to the destruction of the basicsocial infrastructure. Schools and health centres areincreasingly the targets of military activity. During thefifteen-year war in Mozambique, over 40% of healthcentres and schools were destroyed.The situation issimilar in most conflict-affected countries. Socialprovision is also squeezed by increased militaryexpenditure.A long-term consequence is reducedaccess to education and health care.The resulting largenumbers of young uneducated men helps create thecircumstances that sustain conflict.8

● Governance and investment

32.Changes in the quality of governance resulting fromconflict further contribute to the economic lossesof war. It is common for armed crime to increasesubstantially during a period of conflict. Business thenconcentrates on reducing its exposure to risk bysupporting those activities that require no long teminvestment and by making strategic alliances witharmed groups either for protection or gain.This isfollowed by a downward spiral in both domesticsavings and inward investment.The economy becomesdependent on the exploitation of easily extractablenatural resources. Government revenue suffers and thestate becomes criminalised. Commercial and stateinterests can become combined in sustaining conflict,as dual economies develop in which military business

partnerships jointly trade, exploit resources and payfor the conflict.

● Debt burden

33.Conflict also contributes to unsustainable debt. Forexample, approximately US$1.4 billion of external debtarrears to the International Financial Institutions plusmore than US$9 billion to the Paris Club owed by theDRC is estimated to arise indirectly from militaryexpenditure.There are currently 13 Highly IndebtedPoor Countries that are affected by conflict.The WorldBank has identified 10 countries (9 in sub-SaharanAfrica: Burundi; Central African Republic; Congo;DRC; Ethiopia; Liberia; Sierra Leone; Somalia andSudan) that are either not progressing towardsqualifying for debt relief under the HIPCframework or where conflict has delayed progress.

● Regional economic impact

34.The effects of conflict are rarely confined to onecountry.The increasing trend towards regional conflictshas led to sharp increases in military expenditure forneighbouring countries and a corresponding reductionin social expenditure.The World Bank estimates thatcountries bordering conflict zones increase their ownmilitary expenditure by $114 million on average.Thisexcludes non-government security expenditure, privatesecurity outlays by firms and individuals, and off-budget military expenditures.The interrelated natureof African economies also means that the costs of warwithin a region generally result in economic costs forneighbouring countries.These include productionlosses through loss of opportunities for migration,trade losses, increased costs of policing and the costsof supporting refugees.

● International impact

35.Conflict also has a major effect on the environmentthrough uncontrolled exploitation of naturalresources. Organised crime also benefits fromconflict in Africa, through arms deals, moneylaundering and drug smuggling. Europe in particularhas to cope with the consequences of the increasingflows of asylum seekers and economic migrantsfrom Africa.The failure to find effective solutions toconflict in Africa also damages the reputation of theUnited Nations.Africa now takes up sixty per centof the Security Council’s time and considerableinternational resources have been devoted to



8Collier: On the Economic Causes of War,World Bank, 2000.

The Causes of Conflict36.An effective response to African conflict requires

agreement on and understanding of its causes. Pastresponses to conflict have often failed to understandthe context within which conflict has operated orto address causes. It is possible to distinguish betweenthe root causes of conflict , the secondary causes thatenable and sustain conflict and the tertiary causes orthe drivers that hinder resolution.

Root Causes

● Inequality

37. Inequality between groups is probably the foremostcause of conflict in Africa. It is inequality betweengroups – rather than individuals – that increases theprospects of violent conflict. It exists on three mutuallyreinforcing levels: economic, social and political. Incountries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda,political power and its benefits were monopolisedby one group. Unequal access to power perpetuateda similar lack of access to resources and revenue.Where group inequality occurs there is also differentialaccess to education (as has notably been the case inBurundi).This plays a key role in sustaininginequalities.Where a society is divided into twopre-dominant groups, growing inequality betweenthem often leads to conflict.

● State collapse

38.The collapse of state institutions has caused internaland regional conflict. Collapse is rarely sudden, butarises out of a long degenerative process that ischaracterised by predatory government operatingthrough coercion, corruption and personality politicsto secure political power and control of resources.The state finds itself unable any longer to providebasic services or security to its people and loses itslegitimacy.The collapse of infrastructure completes thebreak up of the state.The combination of breakdownof institutions and physical infrastructure coupled withthe use of ethnic violence creates the conditions inwhich violence becomes self-sustaining and factionalwarfare develops, as has happened in Liberia and SierraLeone. One faction may predominate over time, but

this does not necessarily result in resolution of conflict.Rather it leads to the creation of “shell states”, wherethe leadership wishes to maintain the fiction ofstatehood.When this happens, state building will bea complex task and the process of democratisation caneasily become a vehicle for consolidating personal rule.

● Economic decline and economic shock

39.Continuous economic decline plays a major part instate collapse and conflict. Economic shock is a moredirect and potent cause.This can take various formsranging from natural catastrophe to sudden large shiftsin terms of trade.The Ethiopian famine of 1974 wasthe main factor in the overthrow of Haile Selasse’sgovernment and the violence that ensued. Faminecan cause mass displacement increasing pressureon scarce resources. Other economic shocks havesimilar effects.The sudden shift in the terms of trade inNigeria in 1992/3 halved Nigeria’s income, introducedhyperinflation and led to violence and the overthrowof the government.

● History

40.Many conflicts occur where there is a tradition ofresolving problems by violent means. Political violenceis entrenched and the instruments of the state suchas the army, the police and the judiciary sustain theprocess. Other historical processes may provokeviolence. History in places such as the DRC, Rwandaand Burundi created a state model based on theartificial creation and abuse of ethnicity to maintainpower.A past pattern of conflict is one of the bestpredictors of future conflict. Deeply entrenchedhistorical patterns of violence are amongst the mostdifficult to resolve as they require major societal andpolitical change.

● Natural resource wealth

41.Africa accommodates two types of resourcebased conflict: wars of resource scarcity and wars ofabundance9.The most common conflicts of scarcityrelate to the control of grazing and water rights fornomadic people.

Part II


9Le Billon - The political economy of resource wars in “Angola’s war economy” ed. Cilliers and Dietrich, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa, 2000.

42.Countries whose economies are dependent on naturalresources such as oil and minerals, face a very high riskof conflict. In these wars of abundance, groups competefor control of these resources, which become the“prize” for controlling the state and can lead tocoups, as in Sierra Leone and the DRC. Unfairexploitation of resource rich regions can lead tosecession.Abundant resources can also attract externalintervention.The role of the private sector is critical inwars of abundance, as belligerents rely on its capacityto exploit and commercialise the resources. Frequently,the military have become involved in developing theirown commercial companies. Such wars become self-financing, self-sustaining, and therefore less opento mediation.

Secondary Causes

● Unemployment, lack of education

and population pressure

43.Countries with high levels of unemployment amongyoung men and where male educational levels are lowface a far higher risk of conflict.Throughout Africa,factional conflict has drawn on a pool of marginalisedor socially excluded young men. Increasing insecurityof land tenure in Rwanda and the high levels of ruralunemployment provided a ready group of participantsin the genocide there.The conflict in Liberia wasfought by socially marginalised young men.

● The abuse of ethnicity

44. Political leaders and belligerents in Africa have madeincreasing use of ethnic hatred. Such abuse prolongsconflict, creates long term divisions that reduce theeffectiveness of peacebuilding efforts.The war inthe DRC provides a ready example of the abuse ofethnicity. Elements of the DRC government haveopenly provoked ethnic tensions in the Kivus withthe intention of destabilising areas under Rwandaninfluence. Equally elements of the Ugandan armedforces have exploited ethnic differences in orderto benefit commercially from the conflict. In bothinstances community divisions have been deepenedand there have been a greater number of fatalitiesand injury than are experienced in moreconventional fighting.

● Availability of arms

45.The ready availability of small arms in Africa is a majorfactor in sustaining and fuelling conflict. Considerable

supplies of small arms are in circulation from previouswars. For example, between 1972 and 1990, Ethiopiaand Somalia imported $8 billion worth of small armsand light weapons. In 1992, the Angolan governmentdistributed an estimated 700,000 rifles to thepopulation for their defence against UNITA. Cachesof arms exist throughout the continent and Africa hasactive trading networks that move arms betweencountries. However imports of arms, primarily fromformer Soviet Bloc countries, continue to grow andto sustain conflict.The increasing capacity withinAfrica to manufacture ammunition has removed yetanother constraint on the use of small arms.The readyavailability and relatively low cost10 of small arms hasbeen coupled with the emergence of a network ofboth local and international dealers who trade armsfor minerals or other resources.This has been a majorfactor in prolonging African conflicts, which havebecome self-sustaining conflicts and consequentlyless amenable to external mediation or intervention.

Tertiary Causes

● Regional and interlocking conflicts

46.A large swathe of Africa from Sudan to Angola, passingthrough the Great Lakes and the DRC, is caughtup in a series of multiple and interlocking conflicts.The duration of conflict therefore increases withthe complexity of regional intervention, and theinterrelationship of one conflict with another.

● The conflict cycle

47.Parts of Africa have settled into a conflict cycle inwhich states or factions move from low-level crisisor open war into long-term and protracted conflictand then back to low level crisis. Often the greatestrisks occur when a fragile peace is not properlyconsolidated.This was demonstrated in Sierra Leonelast year. In some cases, states or factions have enteredinto a framework that provides for “consensual”conflict, where belligerents have more to gain fromsustaining low-level conflict than from its resolution.

● Lack of guarantors

48. Internal conflicts are mostly resolved when theparties involved have arrived at a stalemate, frequentlya political and military balance.When either partyto a conflict feels that it has a perceived advantage ordisadvantage, it continues to fight, spurred on by the

Part II: The causes of conflict


10Throughout Africa the usual market price for the ubiquitous AK 47 assault rifle remains steady at US $25.

prospect of victory or a desire to negotiate from a moreadvantageous position.A “hurting stalemate” whereall belligerents have lost, provides opportunity forresolution of conflict. In many cases, the opportunitiesfor resolution are lost because of the lack of credibleexternal guarantors to the peace process.Thisis particularly important when dealing withdemobilisation and disarmament, where the stakesare high for the belligerent groups in terms of thepotential loss of power and personal security.

● Inadequate and inappropriate mediation

49.External mediation is frequently offered in timesof conflict, yet the past decade has seen few obvioussuccesses.While the option for peaceful resolutionof conflict must always be available, poor mediationprocesses can make the situation worse and prolongconflict by giving combatants time to rearm andreorganise as has happened in the DRC and Angola.Peace processes that are based on inadequate analysisand rushed timescales can push the parties to conflictinto untenable positions and threaten their power baseor chances of survival. Greater emphasis on securingand maintaining a cessation of hostilities as the firstpriority is critical. Peace processes need to be ableto draw on a wider spectrum of arrangements fortransitional government to provide the conditions inwhich a stable peace, which addresses the fundamentalcauses of conflict, can be established.

● Misplaced humanitarian assistance

50.There are increasing dangers that much neededhumanitarian assistance can cause wars to be intensifiedor prolonged.Where wars are fought through factionalor proxy forces there is little recognition or respectfor international humanitarian standards. Such forcesseek to control humanitarian assistance as a means ofconferring greater political legitimacy on themselvesand control over the population. Relief supplies mayalso provide the focus for increasing tension andfighting between groups that receive supplies and theirneighbours, as was the case in South Sudan. Somaliain 1995 and Zaire in 1996 demonstrated the problemsthat occur when humanitarian assistance becomes thekey element in a resource-starved environment andtherefore subject to predatory behaviour. Humanitarianagencies increasingly recognise that they face a majordilemma in meeting the needs of victims withoutproviding the means to resume fighting.

Part II: The causes of conflict


Africa Responses to Conflict

● Inclusive Government

51.Conflict prevention will not be effective unless it isbased on Africa’s own experience and capacity torespond to crisis.Africa provides examples of someof the world’s longest lasting conflicts. It also providesexamples of enduring recoveries from conflict. A keyelement in Africa’s success stories is a commitment to inclusivegovernment and institutions as a means of managing ethnicor regional inequalities.

● Restoring the legitimacy of the state

52.Mozambique’s successful emergence from conflicthas been in no small part due to its success inrelegitimising the state in the eyes of its population.This was done through a strong commitment to re-establishing and delivering basic services, therebydemonstrating the value of national government.The restoration of education and health care were thetwo essential services. In both cases, effective servicedelivery is dependent on a system that requires thestate to manage and co-ordinate resources and takeresponsibility for their sustained delivery. Currentlyin Somalia there is increasing local pressure to moveback to statehood.This is driven by the recognitionthat basic services cannot be sustained or managedat local level.

● Dealing with the climate of impunity and

the need for reconciliation

53.The increasingly violent nature of factional conflictand the deliberate use of ethnicity to promote conflictcreate deep divisions in society.The reintegration ofcombatants into society has become more difficultover the last decade because of the violence theyhave inflicted on the community. South Africahas paved the way in addressing the issues of postconflict reconciliation. Other countries in Africa haverecognised that reconciliation must be tempered witha clear commitment to ending the climate of impunityfor the unacceptable use of violence. Effective conflictresolution in Africa depends on processes of reconciliationand justice, which should operate at both national andlocal level to reintegrate people into their communities.

● Economic diversification and growth

54.Botswana is one of the few countries in Africa to havemanaged its mineral wealth in a manner that does notfuel instability. In part this has been achieved by clearand well-defined state control over diamond incomeand the exploitation of resources.This has beencoupled with a commitment to diversify the economy.There are lessons for other countries such as SierraLeone and Angola in how to better manage mineralresources and develop strategies for economicdiversification and reinvestment in services,two key elements in conflict prevention.

● Regional economic integration and

mutual security

55.Many African countries see economic integrationand the development of robust regional structures as ameans of encouraging mutual security and respondingto some of the economic pressures that fuel conflict, forexample by facilitating the free movement of labour.

Regional ResponsesThe OAU

56.Since its foundation, the OAU has been concernedwith threats to development caused by internal andcross border conflicts. It sees its role as working withinthe UN framework to take primary responsibility foridentifying the causes of conflict and providing earlywarning of conflict in Africa. It also has responsibilityfor mobilising support and assistance for post conflictreconstruction. In 1993 the OAU established aMechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management andResolution whose operational activities are supportedby an OAU Peace Fund.The OAU has furtherstrengthened its early warning capacity by establishinga Conflict Management Centre. Political andbureaucratic difficulties have meant that the OAUmechanisms for conflict management have remainedrelatively weak and under-resourced. Most of themember states wish to confine the role of the OAUto early warning, preventive diplomacy and monitoringpeace processes.They would not wish it to engage inregional peacekeeping or establishing mutual securityarrangements between states.

Part III


Regional structures

57.The Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) and the Inter-GovernmentalAuthority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa,are the main regional organisations engaged inconflict prevention and resolution.11 All three areinvolved in preventing the proliferation of smallarms and light weapons and are also involved inmediation and conflict resolution activities.There isconsiderable international and African interest in therole that these regional organisations play in regionalpeacekeeping and peacemaking either throughmandated operations under Chapter VIII of theUN Charter or in their own right.

Mutual security

58.The concern of regional organisations with peaceenforcement has dominated their security agenda atthe expense of more effective mechanisms for mutualsecurity within the region.The recent spillover ofconflict from Liberia and Sierra Leone into Guineademonstrates the limits to intervention and the need tocontain the spread of regional conflict through mutualsecurity and collective defence.There is a need forsimple but reliable structures for security co-operationthat can stabilise relations, prevent the spillover ofconflicts, secure emerging common values and,perhaps, lay the foundation for new security regimes12.In the absence of effective crisis response structures,regional peace keeping initiatives will continue tobe ad hoc, poorly implemented and driven by theinterests of the strongest in the region.

International ResponsesThe United Nations

59.An effective and credible United Nations is criticalto addressing conflict in Africa.A series of failedpeacekeeping operations over the past decade hasseriously damaged UN credibility in the continent.This has contributed to a developing climate ofimpunity, reluctance by the international communityto take part in peacekeeping operations and a poor

response to peacebuilding activities. Kofi Annanrecognised the need for action in his special reportto the Security Council in 199813. More recently theBrahimi report made recommendations to improvethe UN’s capacity in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.Implementation of Brahimi’s recommendations willstrengthen UN conflict resolution capacity in Africa.

The World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund

60.The Bank and IMF are critical actors in post conflictreconstruction and the Bank has recently establisheda post conflict reconstruction fund that enables it torespond more rapidly to the immediate needs forsupport once peace has been established.The Bankand the IMF have concluded that the key issues forpost conflict financing are: timeliness and speedof engagement; the amount of financial resourcesavailable for post conflict reconstruction work; thelevel of concessionality attached to resources; and howresources are delivered.The involvement of the Bankand the IMF is critical to post conflict reconstruction.They can help to release other funding and maintaindonor and investor confidence.

International and Bilateral actions61.Concern over conflict in Africa has moved up the

international agenda.A number of initiatives have beenlaunched in the past few years and conflict in Africa isnow on the G8 agenda.The Miyazaki meeting offoreign ministers in July 2000 launched initiatives onsmall arms, illicit trade in diamonds, international civilpolice, the impact of development policies on armedconflicts and the impact of armed conflict on children.The World Bank, IMF and OECD are beginning torecognise that conflict is one of the major obstacles todevelopment .The European Union is working todevelop its capacity to address conflict.The RapidReaction Facility is designed to enhance the EU’scapacity to intervene fast and effectively in crisis pointsoutside the EU.

Part III: Responses to conflict


11The OAU also recognises the Arab Maghreb Union (known by its French acronym UMA) in the North and the Economic Community of Central AfricanStates (ECCAS) in the Central African sub region.The East African Community is also in the process of establishing a military cooperation and mutualsecurity structure.

12The OAU and African subregional organisations - A closer look at the ‘peace pyramid’ Mark Malan, Institute for Security Studies Occasional PaperNo. 36, January 1999.

13“The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa” - report of the Secretary General of the UN to theSecurity Council,April 1998, which outlined a framework of action whose main elements were: more effective peace making through a more unifiedapproach to mediation and the development of more effective sanctions and arms controls, enhanced peace-keeping capacity and responsiveness, improvedco-ordination and standards of humanitarian action and timely and high quality post conflict peace-building.

● African peacekeeping and peace enforcement

capacity

62.Enhancing African peacekeeping capacity attractswidespread international interest.The US, Franceand the UK and the Nordic countries are currentlythe main providers of support and training. Howevera common approach has not been developed.TheBrahimi report provides the basis for a much-neededcommon strategy for improving the effectiveness ofpeacekeeping. It emphasises that effective UNpeacekeeping in Africa requires larger forces, withmore effective command and control structures andenhanced levels of interoperability. It also stresses theimportance of training troops to understand andoperate with more robust “rules of engagement” andthat effective peacekeeping and peace enforcementrequires good military skills.

63. Improved peacekeeping capacity in Africa is essentialif we are to learn the lesson of failure – as in the caseof Rwanda – or weak performance – as in the case ofSierra Leone – because of painfully slow and partialdeployments.The poor performance of some Africanpeacekeeping forces has been the result of “systemsfailures” where troops have not been paid, ammunitionhas not been available, or where troop behaviourdemonstrated a lack of accountability. More effectiveAfrican peacekeeping will therefore need to be linkedto effective security sector reform.

● Small arms and light weapons

64.There are a number of small arms initiatives underwayin Africa.These include the ECOWAS moratorium onlight weapons, the East African Action programme onillicit arms trafficking and the SADC arms protocol.Most progress has been made in SADC, whereimplementation structures are well advanced andbased on regional police cooperation with Interpol.Other regions are making slower progress withimplementation structures, although some haveprogressed in establishing regulatory frameworks.Control of small arms in Africa is especially difficultdue to the porous nature of most borders, weak andunder resourced enforcement capacity, high levels ofsurplus stocks and well established illegal supply chains.Recent conflicts have exacerbated the problem, asstate actors have distributed weapons to local militias,defence forces and irregular armed forces. (Recentexamples are to be found in Sudan, DRC and Angola.)

Tackling the problem will require comprehensiveaction that not only addresses the issue of illegaltransfers, but also ensures large scale destructionof surplus weapons.

● Exploitation of resources to fuel conflict

65. International attention has recently been focusedon the role that diamonds play in fuelling conflict.The UK has strongly supported efforts to introducebetter controls over rough diamonds.The object is todisrupt the illegal trade in diamonds and to reducethe possibilities for their use as payment for the illegalpurchase of weapons.The work of three expert UNpanels in the last year14 demonstrated that diamonds areonly one element in a far wider exploitation of mineraland natural resources.Trade in coltan (cobalt tantalite),cobalt, gold, timber and oil may play a more importantrole in fuelling conflict. But, there has been someprogress in trying to ensure that the wealth derivedfrom mineral resources is used for development.Theconstruction of the oil pipeline in Chad by the WorldBank has set a precedent by establishing internationalregulation of Chad’s oil income so that it may notbe used for military expenditure.The critical roleoil revenues play in war economies such as Sudanand Angola underlines the value in establishinginternational standards of accounting and transparencyfor multinational companies.

● Local mediation and peace-building activities

66.The role of civil society in mediation and peace-building has been a major element of internationalsupport to conflict prevention and resolution. It isparticularly important when responding to conflictarising from disputes over the sharing of scarceresources. For example, civil society in Kenya hashelped to resolve conflict between pastoralist groups.Civil society has a broader role to play in Africanconflict. Peace and security depends on major changesin attitude within society.This is particular the casewhere society has become polarised. For example, thechurch leadership in Rwanda have come to recognisetheir own engagement in the genocide.The churchremains a potent political force in Burundi, whereother elements of civil society can also perpetuate thedivisions within society. Far too often peace processesare seen as the prerogative of combatant forces. Inmany of Africa’s wars, lasting peace will depend on“demilitarising the mind” and developing a social



14The UN expert panels examined the relationship between illegal exploitation of natural resources and conflict in Sierra Leone,Angola and the DRC.

climate that seeks to sustain peace. Demobilisation andthe reintegration of combatants are critically dependenton societies’ ability to accept combatants back into thecommunity. DFID funded activities in Northern

Uganda demonstrated the importance that support tocommunity reintegration and mediation processescould play in providing the basis for reintegratingviolent factional forces into the community.



A comprehensive framework for conflictprevention in AfricaCommitment and support to addressing conflict

in Africa

67. International concern over the adverse effects ofconflict in Africa has been steadily increasing since themid 1990s. Initiatives to address the problem have hadlimited impact.There is no magic solution that canstop the cycle of conflict.As wars become moreentrenched, it becomes inevitable that they become lessamenable to external intervention.This only serves toemphasise the need for a long-term commitment to abroad and comprehensive framework that seeks tobuild on African successes, re-establish the authority ofthe United Nations and build on international andbilateral actions.

68.Concerted international action is required to halt thespread of conflict. Measures that will assist include:● Greater coherence between foreign policy, security

and development objectives● An early warning mechanism and a common

strategic framework to deal with failing and fragilestates, which would include a commitment to statebuilding where necessary.

● Ensuring that aid does not exacerbate conflictin line with OECD guidelines.

● International willingness to commit to post –conflict reconstruction and longer termpeacebuilding, specifically reconstruction ofaccountable military and police forces along witha functioning and independent judiciary.

Recognising the threat of regional conflict

69.Large parts of Africa are affected by a series of regionalinterlocking conflicts. Past action has been based onthe premise that intra – state conflict has been themain problem. It is now evident that conflict isincreasingly regional and fought through variousstate alliances, and frequently through proxy groupsof irregular armed forces.This suggests the need todevelop new approaches to international interventionand mediation:● Effective Peacekeeping will require new military,

political and humanitarian strategies for dealingwith the localised nature of conflict and specific

mechanisms for dealing more effectively withirregular armed forces.

● Recognising that most regional conflict is centredaround collapsed, failing or fragile states e.g. SierraLeone, DRC, Somalia, we must devise bettereffective mechanisms to develop effectivemodern states.

Dealing with small arms proliferation and control

of light weapons

70. to resort to violence and war in order to resolvedisputes or grievances.The factors motivating supplyand demand for light weapons by both State and non-State actors are complex, involving both considerablesurplus stocks, illicit transfers within Africa andcontinuing external supplies.The followingmeasures are key:● Support for the implementation of small arms

moratoriums with adequate structures andmechanisms.

● Support to European and international regulationof arms trafficking.

● Improved regulatory mechanisms in producerand exporting countries.

● Action against illegal transfer and transport of arms.● International support for the disposal and

destruction of weapons surplus to nationalsecurity needs.

International action on resource exploitation

71.The battle for control and exploitation of naturalresources is a critical element in all of the conflicts inAfrica.The exploitation of these resources will almostinevitably involve international business and investors.In many instances the international businesscommunity will find themselves protecting theirlegally acquired and legitimately managed investmentsin the area. However, conflict also encourages theproliferation of opportunistic businesses operatingfor quick returns and high profits in areas of risk.Responsible investment could make a majorcontribution to conflict resolution in thefollowing ways:● International investment standards for conflict

affected areas and agreed international standardsof financial transparency and accountability.

Part IV


● Integrated investment planning in conflict countries– i.e. aid – business partnership – to enhanceeconomic diversification.

● Measures for external monitoring and internationalmanagement of mineral resources in conflict areas.

● Improved international controls and mechanismsfor illegal exploitation of resources, includinginternational action on money laundering andsequestration of illegally acquired assets.

Effective and appropriate support to African

mediation structures.

72.Effective conflict prevention in Africa will requirethe evolution of more stable and equitable politicalstructures.This in itself poses a major challenge forthe OAU and the regional organisations. New politicaldispensations can rarely be effectively imposed fromoutside. In order to develop, they will require peaceprocesses that tackle the fundamental causes ofinstability; and transitional processes that ensure alasting ceasefire and that allow the creation of a publicclimate favourable to change and a broad constituencyfor peace.This will be assisted by● Support for the development of regional mediation

structures with credible African guarantors.● Recognition and support for civil society to rebuild

and reinforce a culture of peace within society.● Support for reconciliation processes and

mechanisms for reintegration of combatants.

More effective and appropriate peace support

interventions

73.The changing nature of peacekeeping demands inAfrica mean that larger scale and more rapidlydeployable forces will be required. Sharingresponsibility for action will require that Africanforces maintain or increase their current capacity toparticipate in peacekeeping operations, develop thecapacity to work effectively and jointly with otherforces and develop a greater command and controlcapacity. Effective African peacekeeping capacityis ultimately dependent on accountable and well-trained national forces.The international communitycan assist by:● A co-ordinated international response to building

Africa’s peacekeeping capacity through trainingprogrammes and exercises that share a commonframework.

● Support to the development of effective regionalpolitical and military crisis management structures.

● Recognising through programme design, the linksbetween effective African peacekeeping capacityand security sector reform.

● Recognising the need for joint responsibility forglobal and African peacekeeping and mechanismsto support force projection and deploymentincluding through European or internationalpartnership arrangements/facilities.

Effective humanitarian action

74.The chances of responding effectively to humanitarianneeds in Africa are being steadily eroded by restrictedaccess to those in need and an increasing disregard forhumanitarian principles. Humanitarian agencies needto understand the risks posed in conflict areas by beingthe main provider of resources – and establish waysof working by which these risks can be minimised.However, greater protection for humanitarian valueswill also be achieved through the establishment of theInternational Criminal Court and promotion of theconcept of individual responsibility for war. Moreeffective humanitarian action will be assisted by:● International promotion of humanitarian standards

with all combatant groups.● Specific action to protect children from abduction

and combat.● Developed humanitarian strategies for safeguarding

access to those in need.● Political action to complement humanitarian

action.● Judicial and police support to humanitarian actions.

The Role of the UK75.The Department for International Development, the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministryof Defence have a shared interest in reducing conflictin sub-Saharan Africa. By combining forces andadapting shared strategies they can have a greaterimpact.The Government’s conflict preventioninitiative is an important step in improving thecapacity of the UK government to work withothers to address Africa’s conflicts.

76.The UK’s conflict prevention strategy will be basedon our experience in mediation and our engagementin peacekeeping and peacekeeping training andsecurity sector reform programmes.The UnitedKingdom’s response and actions will draw onour role as a permanent member of the UNSecurity Council, our political and developmental

Part IV: A comprehensive framework for conflict prevention in Africa


representation within Africa and our role withinthe International Financial Institutions and UNhumanitarian and development system.

77.The Government expects its new arrangements forconflict prevention in Africa will provide the basis fora comprehensive plan of action linking immediateneeds to longer-term strategy.

78.The most pressing needs are for actions that willcontain the spread of regional conflict in the GreatLakes region and in West Africa in and around SierraLeone. UK conflict prevention work in Africa willfocus on the following areas:● Small arms and light weapons controls – The UK

will enhance its support for the control of theproliferation of small arms and light weapons inAfrica. It will support domestic and Europeanmeasures to better regulate the arms trade includingthe transport and shipment of weapons. It willsupport greater efforts to control the internationaltrade.The UK will assist national and regional armscontrol and destruction programmes in Africa.

● Inclusive development – The UK will continue toencourage responsible investment practices in areasof conflict and encourage responsible internationalinvestment.The UK will continue to work with theInternational Financial Institutions to encouragemore stable and diverse economic activity.

● Reduction in the exploitation of mineral and othernatural resources for the purposes of war – The UK

will work with others to examine and assist ways oflimiting the exploitation of such resources for thepurpose of conflict.We will also seek to identifyand promote the means by which such resourcesare safeguarded and managed in a way thatreduces conflict and ensures that they benefitthe population.

● Inclusive government – The UK will work withothers to support development efforts that reduceindividual and group inequality.We will promotecommitments to develop services that are inclusiveand responsive to all groups and sectors.The UKwill also work with others to support and helpdevelop strategies for reconciliation, reintegrationand justice in conflict affected countries.

● Security Sector reform – The UK will continueto identify countries where British involvement insecurity sector reform and increased accountabilityof the security forces to democratic authoritywill enhance peace and security and helpreduce conflict.

● Regional security bodies – The UK will supportactions and international coordination that willlead to enhanced common and mutual securityin Africa.

● African peacekeeping capacity – the UK will workwith the United Nations, the US, and within theEU to develop an agreed programme of actionto support and enhance Africa’s peacekeepingcapacity in line with the approaches suggestedin the Brahimi report.

Part IV: A comprehensive framework for conflict prevention in Africa


Year Country Name of Conflict Type of Conflict

1948–1994 South Africa Anti Apartheid Struggle Internal

1955–1972 Sudan First Civil war Internal

1960–1965 DRC (Zaire) Post Independence War Internal

1960–1964 Rwanda Ethnic Strife Internal / Ethnic

1961–1974 Angola Independence war Independence

1962–1974 Guinea Bissau Independence war Independence

1964–1975 Mozambique Independence war Independence

1965–1980 Zimbabwe Struggle for majority rule Independence

1966–1990 Namibia Liberation war Independence

1966–1969 Nigeria Biafra civil war Internal

1966–1996 Chad Civil War Internal

1966 Namibia Caprivi strip secession Internal / Regional

1970–1974 Burundi Ethnic strife Internal / Ethnic

1974–1991 Eritrea War for Independence Independence

1974–1978 Ethiopia Revolution Internal

1975–1991 Mozambique War with Renamo Internal

1976–1983 Ethiopia Ogaden War Internal

1977–1978 Ethiopia / Somalia Somali war Inter state

1978–1991 Ethiopia Civil War Internal

1978–1979 Uganda / Tanzania Amin invasion Interstate

1978 Ghana Rawlings Coup Internal

1979–1996 Central African Republic Coups and civil strife Internal

1980–1984 Uganda Obote overthrow / Civil war Internal

1982– Senegal Casamance Internal

1983– Sudan 2nd Civil war Internal

1984–1989 Somalia North West Secession Internal

1989–1997 Liberia Civil war Internal

1990–1994 Rwanda Civil War and Genocide Internal / Ethnic

1990– Sierra Leone War with RUF Internal / regional

1991– Somalia Civil war Internal / factional

1992– Angola 2nd War with UNITA Internal

1993– Burundi Civil war Internal /Ethnic

1997–2000 Congo (Brazzaville) Civil war Internal

1997 DRC Civil war Regional

1998– Ethiopia – Eritrea Border Conflict Interstate

Appendix 1:Chronology of conflict in Africa15


15Based on University of Michigan database, Federation of American scientists-Military analysis network and “The World Guide 2000”.

Appendix 2:Key Indicators for Africa


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1999

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819

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5.5

220

194

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20.5

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314

15.

138

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52.

21.

63.

21.

81.

51,

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110

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78.

64.

45.

154

810

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3

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2.6

138

5.2

240

190

2.7

1.2

1.5

2.4

2.8

1,39

932

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174

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204

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116

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11.

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23.

992

155

3411

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1.6

156

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200

196

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42.

71,

091

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5


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ibia

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2.7

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5.8

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er2

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2.3

190

199

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114

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525

018

74.

82.

1–

4.4

4.4

1,22

634

4317

.3

Sene

gal

4.7

113

5.1

510

155

2.3

2.6

3.7

2.8

1.6

3,86

158

5610

.8

Sier

ra L

eone

0.7

179

–8.1

130

203

–9.8

1.7

–3.

25.

91,

243

126

2216

.2

S Af

rica

133.

228

0.8

3,16

086

–0.9

3.2

7.9

3.2

1.8

24,7

1218

120.

4

Tanz

ania

894

5.6

240

190

3.1

1.3

–2.

21.

37,

603

7131

12.5

Togo

1.5

157

2.1

320

176

–0.3

1.1

4.5

2.9

21,

448

6829

8.6

Ugan

da6.

899

7.7

320

176

4.8

1.8

2.6

2.4

4.2

3,93

535

237

Zam

bia

3.2

131

2.6

320

176

0.4

2.3

2.2

3.3

1.1

6,86

518

136

11.4

Zim

babw

e6.

110

20

520

154

–1.8

3.1

–3.

83.

84,

716

6924

4.7

Appendix 2 (cont)

Appendix 3:


UNMOGIP1949 –

UNIKOM1991 –

UNOMIG1993 –

UNDOF1974 –

UNIFIL1978 –

UNTSO1948 –

MINURSO1991 –

UNFICYP1964 –

UNMIBH1995 –

UNMOP1996 –

ONGOING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Map No. 4000 Rev. 16 UNITED NATIONSAugust 2000

Department of Public InformationCartographic Section

MONUC1999 –

UNAMSIL1999 –

UNTAET1999 –

UNMIK1999 –

UNMEE2000 –

Heightened insecurity andexploitation of vulnerablegroups. Increased genderviolence. Emergence ofnew groups dependenton war for livelihoodsbut also potentially at risk;child soldiers, demobilisedcombatants, warwounded, etc.

New forms of inequalityassociated with privatisation of violence; rent seeking by thosecontrolling weapons,transport routes, fooddistribution, mineralsand natural resources,access to aid etc.

Rent -seeking by thosewith access to stateand military power,reinforcing macro-economic distortionsand underminingcapacities of the state

Asset transfers; directappropriation of assets,land, sources of livelihoodfrom vulnerable groups,displaced populations

Reverse entitlements/New forms of socialinequality

Local communitiesweakened; existingsafety nets and copingmechanisms insufficientor break-down. Proliferationof vulnerable groups(refugees, displaced,orphans, female andchild headed households,HIV victims etc.)

Existing institutions unableto cope with stresses anddislocations induced byconflict (eg refugee influx).Heighten competition forresources and conflictsbetween previously co-operating regions/ethnicgroups/communities

Diminished sense ofcitizenship based onshared rights andobligations. Shrinking of civil society

Destruction of socialcapital (institutions,values, networks) throughpopulation displacement,diminished trust etc.

Loss of civil and socialentitlements

Contraction in formalemployment; decline in realwages; forced asset sales;destruction of subsistencelivelihoods; food shortages;changes in gender divisionof labour; shortages,entitlement failures anddeclining consumption

Decline of formaleconomy relative toregional and local wareconomies; increaseduncertainty; hightransaction costs; failure ofprice mechanisms; marketsegmentation; foodproduction affected;major disparitiesbetween war affectedand other regions

Macroeconomic costs:stagnant or falling GNP,exports, imports, trade b of p and budgetimbalances; hyperinflation and exchangerate depreciation; dis-investment; capital flight; increased debt

Destruction and decayof physical capital,communicationinfrastructure; withdrawalof land and labour forcefrom production (eg dueto landmines, populationdisplacement)

Loss of market/livelihood entitlement

Insecurity: civilians at riskfrom violence, rape, crime,seizure of assets.

Diminished access topublic services includinghealth and education etc.hence higher disease,infant mortality, smallerschool enrolments etc.

State loss of monopolyof violence to armedopposition groups.Distribution of publicgoods and servicesskewed on geographical,social and gender basis

Growing macro insecurityof states and regimes.Decline in their capacities(to tax, provide publicgoods, ensure security)associated with a shrinkingrevenue base and reducedpublic spending

Collapse of instrumentsof public order: military,police etc.

Destruction and decayof public infrastructure

Loss of Public Entitlements

Households andcommunitiesSectoral and Regional

Indirect Impacts ofconflictMacro

Direct impacts ofconflicts on Assetsand Livelihoods

Appendix 4Inventory of the effects of conflict on Poverty


Source: Adapted from Luckham et al (1999)

03/01 2K Produced for DFID Information Departmentby Stairway Communications

Documents

The causes of conflict in Africa: Consultation document