THE CARTER CENTERTHE CARTER CENTER 6 OBSERVING THE 2001 ZAMBIA ELECTIONS NDI CARTER CENTER STAFF DELEGATES Ms. Nell Bolton, Project Assistant, Democracy Program, USA Mr. Thomas Eberhart,

OBSERVING THE 2001 ZAMBIA ELECTIONS

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OBSERVING THE2001 ZAMBIA ELECTIONS

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OBSERVING THE 2001 ZAMBIA ELECTIONSNDI

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Carter Center Election Observation Delegation and Staff ............................................................... 5

Terms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. 7

Foreword ......................................................................................................................................... 8

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................... 10

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................. 15

Background ....................................................................................................................................... 17The 1991 ElectionsThe 1996 Elections

Political Context for the 2001 Elections ........................................................................................... 19Third Term DebateFractured Opposition

Carter Center Pre-election Activities ............................................................................................... 21June 2001 Assessment MissionEstablishing a Field Presence in Zambia: September-October 2001LTO Observations and The Carter Center Dec. 13 Pre-election Report

ECZ independence and transparencyPolling dateVoter educationVoter registrationCampaigning: use of state resources, the Code of Conduct, and the Public Order ActMedia fairness and accessAccreditation of observersCandidate nomination process

Carter Center and Conflict Management Committees ..................................................................... 32

Carter Center Election Observation Mission .................................................................................... 34Delegation Briefings, Deployment, and Observation MethodologyLeadership MeetingsThe Dec. 27 Electoral Process

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Carter Center Observer Reports and the Dec. 30 Preliminary StatementTurnout and conductThe voting process: logistical and administrative problemsInconsistent poll closingCounting of ballotsTabulation of resultsAnnouncement of resultsPostelection transparency in verification of results

Carter Center Postelection Observation .......................................................................................... 45Observation of Provisional Results and Inauguration: Dec. 30-Jan. 2Observation of Verification and Petition Processes: Jan. 3-31Carter Center Jan. 31 Second Interim StatementCarter Center Final Statement

Overall conclusion and assessmentVerification of resultsPetitions

Follow-up Observation Activities ..................................................................................................... 52Political Environment and DevelopmentsVerification Exercise and Announcement of Final Election ResultsPetitionsBy-elections

Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................................. 55Recommendations

National consultative process for electoral reformLegislative framework and constitutional reform

Observers and party agentsCampaignVoter registrationVoter educationVoting processCounting, tabulation, and verification of resultsPetitions

The Electoral Commission of ZambiaCorruption in the electoral processPolitical party fundingPolitical party developmentMedia reformConflict management committees

Appendices ....................................................................................................................................... 60

The Carter Center at a Glance ......................................................................................................... 103

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CARTER CENTER ELECTION OBSERVATIONDELEGATION AND STAFF

ZAMBIA TRIPARTITE ELECTIONS, DEC. 27, 2001

DELEGATION LEADERS

The Honorable General Dr. Abdulsalami Abubakar, Former Head of State, NigeriaThe Honorable Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo, Former President, BeninThe Honorable Judge Joseph Sinde Warioba, Former Prime Minister, Tanzania

DELEGATION MEMBERS

Ms. Ashley Barr, Senior Program Associate, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USADr. Michael Bratton, Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University, USADr. Peter Burnell, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UKMr. Thomas Bvuma, Coordinator, Electoral Supervisory Commission, ZimbabweDr. David Carroll, Associate Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USAMs. Laurie Cooper, Senior Program Officer, International Foundation for Election Systems, USAHon. Raul Domingos, Chair, Democratic Inst. for Peace and Development, and Member of Parliament, MozambiqueMr. Matthew Hodes, Senior Associate Director, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center, USAMs. Florence Iheme, Economic Community of West African States, NigeriaMr. Philliat Matsheza, Executive Director, Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa, ZimbabweMr. Simeon Mawanza, Project Officer, Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa, ZimbabweMs. Tomsie Phillips, Dir. of Political Party Secretariat, Independent Electoral Commission, South AfricaDr. David Pottie, Senior Program Associate, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, CanadaMs. Anne Schneller, Academic Specialist, Office of Intl. Studies in Education, Michigan State University, USADr. Scott Taylor, Assistant Professor of African Studies, Georgetown University, USAMs. Shani Winterstein, Asst. Coordinator, Refugee Rights Project, Lawyers for Human Rights, South Africa

AIDES TO DELEGATION LEADERSMr. Saidu Umaru, Aide to General Abubakar, NigeriaMr. René Mongbé, Aide to President Soglo, BeninMr. Buzana Nyamusha, Aide to Judge Warioba, Tanzania

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CARTER CENTER STAFF DELEGATES

Ms. Nell Bolton, Project Assistant, Democracy Program, USAMr. Thomas Eberhart, (Financial Officer), Manager of Accounting Operations, USAMs. Tynesha Green, (Financial Officer), Program Assistant, Democracy Program, USAMs. Amy Hamelin, (Project Staff Manager), Coordinator, Peace Programs, USAMs. Brett Lacy, Project Assistant, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USAMs. Kay Torrance, (Press Director), Assistant Director of Public Information for Peace Programs, USAMr. Joshua Walker, (Logistics Assistant), Intern, Democracy Program, CanadaMs. Lisa Wiley, (Leadership Coordinator), Manager of Conference and Event Services, USA

LUSAKA FIELD OFFICE STAFF AND LONG-TERM OBSERVERS

Ms. Dawn Del Rio, Field Office Director, USAMr. Tony Karbo, Conflict Management Specialist, Sierra LeoneMr. Patrick Berg, Long-term Observer and Logistics Coordinator, GermanyMs. Georgina Chikoko, Long-term Observer, MalawiMr. John Chipeta, Long-term Observer, MalawiMr. Moses Pitso, Long-term Observer, South AfricaMr. Nhamo Sithole, Long-term Observer, Zimbabwe

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The Carter Center delegation included members from 12 different countries.

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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AVAP Anti-voter ApathyAZ Agenda for ZambiaCCJP Catholic Commission for Justice and PeaceCMC Conflict Management CommitteeDA District AdministratorECZ Electoral Commission of ZambiaEU European UnionFDD Forum for Democratic DevelopmentFODEP Foundation for Democratic ProcessHP Heritage PartyLAZ Law Association of ZambiaLTO Long-term ObserverMMD Movement for Multiparty DemocracyMP Member of ParliamentNDI National Democratic Institute for International AffairsNEC Nationoal Executive Committee (MMD)NGOCC Nongovernmental Organizations Coordinating CommitteeNLD National Leadership for DevelopmentNRC National Registration CardNVEC National Voter Education CommitteePF Patriotic FrontSADC-PF Southern Africa Development Community – Parliamentary ForumSDP Social Democratic PartySTO Short-term ObserverUNIP United National Independence PartyUPND United Party for National DevelopmentUSAID United States Agency of International DevelopmentVRC Voter Registration CardZADECO Zambia Democratic CongressZIS Zambia Information ServiceZNBC Zambia National Broadcasting CorporationZNWLG Zambia National Women’s Lobby GroupZRP Zambia Republican Party

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FOREWORD

More than a decade ago, I led an observerteam that monitored the October 1991transitional elections in Zambia. Thatevent marked an important milestone for democracyin Africa, as opposition leader Frederick Chilubadefeated long-time President Kenneth Kaunda, andboth accepted the final results. The internationalobservation delegation, organized jointly by TheCarter Center and the National Democratic Institute,praised the electoral process and congratulated Zambiansfor managing a democratic and peaceful transfer ofpower. Like many others, I hoped that Zambia’ssuccessful election would serve as a model for otherdemocratic transitions in Africa.

Unfortunately, optimism about the prospectsfor genuine democratization faded quickly. UnderPresident Chiluba’s ruling Movement for MultipartyDemocracy (MMD), Zambia in the 1990s cameunder sharp criticism for its failure to honor demo-cratic processes and institutions. Opposition partiesand civic groups were harassed, and serious prob-lems of corruption and economic mismanagementsurfaced at the highest levels of government.Although President Chiluba was re-elected for asecond term in October 1996, the legitimacy of theelection was undermined by constitutional amend-ments designed to prevent former President Kaunda,the main opposition candidate, from contesting. TheCarter Center and other international observerscriticized these and other anti-democratic maneuversand refused to observe the 1996 elections.

Because of Zambia’s democratic backslidingduring the 1990s, the 2001 elections assumed greatimportance as another potential turning point. Inthe run-up to the elections, Zambian politics wasdominated by the “third term debate” surroundingPresident Chiluba’s efforts to secure constitutional

amendments to allow a third term. The debaterevitalized Zambian civil society groups, whichmobilized to oppose a third term. It also causedsplits inside the ruling MMD and defections byhigh-profile MMD leaders who decided to leavethe party to pursue their own presidential ambi-tions. In the face of this opposition, PresidentChiluba declined to run and instead promotedLevy Mwanawasa as the MMD candidate.

As detailed in this report, The Carter Centerconducted an extensive six-month observationprogram to assess the 2001 electoral process. In theend, the Center concluded that the Government ofZambia and the Electoral Commission of Zambia(ECZ) failed both to administer a fair and transpar-ent election and to address electoral irregularitiesthat may have affected the outcome of what provedto be a very close race. According to provisionalfinal results, the MMD’s Levy Mwanawasa defeatedAnderson Mazoka of the opposition United Partyfor National Development by less than two per-centage points (28.7 percent for Mwanawasa vs.26.8 percent for Mazoka). Unfortunately, CarterCenter observers reported serious problems incritical aspects of the electoral process, in particularregarding a lack of transparency in the tabulation ofvotes and the verification of final results. Conse-quently, the legitimacy of the electoral process wasclouded.

In spite of these problems, the 2001 electionsproduced several positive outcomes. Most impor-tantly, Zambia’s political system moved fromsingle-party domination to strong multipartyrepresentation in the Parliament, with no singleparty controlling a majority. The new Parliamentshould be fertile ground for attempts to strengthenZambia’s democratic institutions and practices. In

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addition, the electoral process was peaceful, andvoter turnout was unusually strong, reflectingZambians’ desire for change.

Although the electoral foundation of PresidentMwanawasa’s government was flawed, the newadministration has taken clear steps to addresscorruption and is moving forward with plans toprosecute former President Chiluba. In addition,President Mwanawasa has stated publicly that hewill respect the final decisions of the SupremeCourt, which is reviewing electoral petitions thatchallenge Mwanawasa’s election.

These are welcome developments. However,to ensure progress over the long term, the newgovernment must confront a series of importantchallenges. First, the government and the ECZshould release comprehensive final election resultsso that they can be verified by all sides, and thecourts should complete their review of all out-standing electoral petitions. Second, the governmentshould make electoral reform a top priority and workwith civil society, political parties and other stake-holders to implement necessary changes. Andfinally, the new administration should work withZambians to strengthen democratic institutions,improve governance, and reinforce the rule of law.The Carter Center is willing to work with Zambiansand others in the international community tosupport efforts in these areas.

Rosalynn and I would like to thank the co-leadersof the Carter Center’s Zambia election observermission, former Nigeria Head of State GeneralAbdulsalami Abubakar, former Benin PresidentNicephore Soglo, and former Tanzania PrimeMinister Judge Joseph Warioba. Individually andcollectively, these leaders worked diligently toguide our delegation and ensure its professionalism.We also would like to thank David Carroll andDawn Del Rio for directing the project and all theCarter Center staff and observers for their valuablecontributions.

Finally, we want to acknowledge the generousfinancial support for this project provided by thegovernments of Denmark, Norway, and theNetherlands, and the United States through theU.S. Agency for International Development. Ourwork would not have been possible without theirsupport.

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Following Zambia’s independence from Britainin October 1964, Kenneth Kaunda of theUnited National Independence Party becamethe country’s first president. In 1972 a newconstitution banned opposition parties andtransformed Zambia into a one-party state. In theearly 1990s, the ban was lifted following anintense campaign for change and politicalliberalization, paving the way for multipartyelections in October 1991.

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter led aninternational observer mission organized jointly byThe Carter Center and the National DemocraticInstitute for International Affairs to monitor thehistoric 1991 elections. Despite significant prob-lems, the elections were widely considered free andfair. Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)leader Frederick Chiluba defeated incumbentPresident Kenneth Kaunda, and both leadersaccepted the results.

Zambia’s second multiparty elections were heldin November 1996. The Carter Center decided notto observe because of concerns about the fairnessof the electoral environment. President Chilubawas re-elected, but his government came underincreasing criticism for its failure to strengthendemocracy and for charges of corruption.

The 2001 pre-election period was dominated bythe “third term debate” surrounding attempts byPresident Chiluba to amend the constitution toallow a third term. A popular movement opposinga third term, which was spearheaded by a collectionof civic groups known as the Oasis Forum, gainedwidespread support. Chiluba and the MMD even-tually backed Levy Mwanawasa as the MMDcandidate.

In June 2001, a Carter Center delegationvisited Zambia to assess the electoral environment

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

and prospects for Carter Center involvement. Aftera second assessment mission in September 2001,the Center was invited by the government ofZambia to observe the 2001 elections. In October,the Center’s Dawn Del Rio opened a field office inLusaka and recruited five long-term observers fromSouthern Africa with extensive contacts andcontextual knowledge.

The long-term observers visited all nine Zambianprovinces to assess the electoral process and metwith a wide range of stakeholders. Among the mostimportant concerns identified by the long-termobservers were the misuse of state resources; a lackof ECZ independence and transparency; insufficientenforcement of the electoral Code of Conduct;unbalanced media reporting and access; low levelsof voter registration; barriers to registration foryouth; and the need for greater voter education.Other concerns included costly accreditation feesfor observers, high fees for copies of the voters list,and a controversial candidate nomination process.After sharing its findings with the ECZ, the Centerreleased a public statement on Dec. 13, 2001,which summarized the Center’s assessment andincluded short- and long-term recommendations.

The Center’s interest in problems related toelectoral disputes led to a separate but relatedinitiative whereby the Center assisted the ECZ intraining members of Conflict Management Committeesthat were established to manage electoral disputes.Ultimately, the Center concluded that while impart-ing management skills to Zambian stakeholders wasworthwhile, the Conflict Management Committeeswere not very effective.

The Center’s main observer delegation arrivedin Zambia on December 22 to monitor the voting,counting, and tabulation processes. The 33-persondelegation was co-led by former Nigeria Head of

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State General Abdulsalami Abubakar, formerBenin President Nicephore Soglo, and formerTanzania Prime Minister Judge Joseph Warioba.The observers received briefings on Dec. 23-24and were deployed to all nine provinces onChristmas Day.

While most of the observers were deployed,the delegation co-leaders held meetings in Lusakawith presidential candidates, ECZ election offi-cials, and leaders of other international anddomestic observer missions. In these meetings,the Center became concerned that thousands ofobservers from the Foundation for DemocraticProcess had not received accreditation cards fromthe ECZ. After the Center raised this issue withECZ Chairman Bobby Bwalya, the ECZ took stepsto ensure that the Foundation for DemocraticProcess and other observers would be allowedinto polling stations.

Early on election day, Dec. 27, observersreported several problems, including delayedpoll openings, exceptionally long queues, andslow processing of voters. Zambian and interna-tional observers feared that many persons wouldnot have a chance to vote. The ECZ recognizedthe problem and decided to extend voting toallow all persons in line by 1700 to vote. Unfor-tunately, the ECZ was not able to communicatethis effectively to local electoral officials, whichled to arbitrary decisions about closing timesaround the country.

Field reports from Carter Center observersindicated that there were a large number ofadministrative problems and irregularities duringthe voting process, but that for the most part theproblems were minor. Long queues and slowprocessing caused tremendous frustration amongvoters and disenfranchised potential voters whowere too exhausted to wait.

While the majority of Carter Center observersreported that there were no problems or only minorproblems during the counting and tabulation

processes, some reported serious irregularities,including cases of unauthorized persons presentduring the count, insufficient access for observersto verify results, an intimidating presence of officialsfrom the Office of the President, and general chaosat some locations. Center observers were also con-cerned about the slow pace of the ECZ’s reporting ofresults, as well as an extra internal ECZ verificationexercise that stakeholders could not monitor.

These concerns were summarized in the

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EZambian women play an important role in the country’spolitical life.

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Center’s preliminary statement issued at a pressconference on Dec. 30. The statement also calledfor the ECZ to ensure maximum transparency andto allow for timely access to official results so thatstakeholders could cross-check and verify results inthe days remaining before the declaration of thefinal presidential results.

Early results showed a close race between theMMD’s Levy Mwanawasa and Anderson Mazoka ofthe UPND. Most of the opposition parties chargedthat the election had been marred by large-scalefraud. Anderson Mazoka, who claimed victorybased on early reports, told observers that theelection was being stolen. He also said that if hewere not declared the winner there might be chaosin the streets.

According to the ECZ’s provisional figures, theMMD’s Levy Mwanawasa defeated Anderson Mazokaof the UPND by 28.7 percent to 26.7 percent. TheFDD’s Christian Tembo was third with 13 percent,and Tilyenji Kaunda of UNIP was fourth with justunder 10 percent. Godfrey Miyanda of the HPreceived almost 8 percent. These same five partiesreceived roughly similar percentages of the vote inthe parliamentary elections. Among them, theywon 147 of the 150 parliamentary seats.

Several opposition presidential candidates fileda petition with the High Court to delay the inaugu-ration until elections results could be reviewed andverified. On Jan. 2, the High Court ruled againstthe petition and Levy Mwanawasa was inaugurated.Given the very small margin of victory – especiallyin the presidential race where only 33,997 votesseparated the two top candidates – Zambian stake-holders and independent observers, including TheCarter Center, expressed serious concerns aboutproblems in the electoral process.

Throughout January, a small Carter Centerlong-term observer team continued to observe post-election processes, including verification processesin Lusaka and the constituencies and the filing of

electoral petitions. The Center’s long-term observersnoted a number of discrepancies between resultsfrom polling station records and ECZ-tabulatedresults but concluded that most of the discrepanciesreviewed were negligible and did not appear tohave favored any candidate or party.

In January, the Center organized a postelectionassessment mission and released a second interimstatement highlighting the Center’s continuingconcerns about unexplained anomalies, discrepan-cies, and inaccuracies in the presidential andparliamentary election results. The Center’s fieldoffice monitored the postelection environment andelectoral processes through February and earlyMarch, focusing in particular on the ECZ’s verifica-tion exercises and the Court’s handling of electionpetitions. Center Carter long-term observersreported that the verification process was uncoordi-nated and random and, therefore, almost impossibleto monitor.

On March 7, 2002, the Center issued its finalstatement of the Zambia 2001 elections, whichconcluded that the ECZ and government failed toadminister a fair and transparent election andaddress electoral irregularities that clearly couldhave affected the outcome of a close race; that theDec. 27 presidential, parliamentary and localgovernment election results were not credible andcould not be verified as accurately reflecting thewill of Zambian voters; and that consequently thelegitimacy of the entire electoral process wasquestionable. As of August 2002, eight monthsafter the inauguration of President Mwanawasa, theECZ still had not published the final electionresults.

Between April and August 2002, The CarterCenter continued to monitor and assess the post-election environment. During this period PresidentMwanawasa affirmed his commitment to the rule oflaw, zero tolerance for corruption, and constitu-tional reform. The president also pledged to respectthe Supreme Court’s decision on the opposition

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election petitions, even if it ruled in favor of thepetitioners challenging his presidency. In addition,the government moved aggressively against a num-ber of former officials of the Chiluba administration.In July, Parliament voted to remove former PresidentChiluba’s immunity against prosecution. Chiluba haschallenged the legality of the parliamentary vote andis seeking judicial review.

Zambia is at a critical point in its democraticdevelopment. It is clear that the Zambian peoplevoted for change in the December 2001 elections.Unfortunately, however, the Zambian politicallandscape is characterized by excessive partisanbickering. To move forward, the Center encouragesthe government and opposition parties to engage inmeaningful dialogue and to embrace broad civicparticipation in order to provide a foundation forimproved governance.

In a spirit of mutual respect, and recognizing thatit is Zambians who must decide what is best for their

country, the Center offers a number of recommen-dations for improving future elections. The Center’srecommendations include, among others:

■ Government, civil society, and politicalparties should engage in an electoral reform processbased on a nationwide consultative process, includ-ing a review of constitutional provisions impactingthe electoral process and all relevant legislation.

■ Constitutional amendments should beconsidered to set a specific date or window forelections.

■ It should be required that presidentialcandidates secure more than a simple majority.

The Center provides a number of specificrecommendations for changes in electoral legislationconcerning the following issues: the status of Zambiannonpartisan observers; legal guidelines for media timeand campaign advertisements; voter registration and

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Carter Center electiondelegation leader formerNigeria Head of State Gen.Abdulsalami Abubakargreets former ZambiaPresident Kenneth Kaunda.

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voter identification cards; distribution of the voterslist; voter education; ECZ public information aboutelectoral administration; access to ECZ informationand copies of polling station results for observers andparty agents; posting of election results at pollingstations and tabulation centers; publication of ECZprovisional results by polling station and constitu-ency in the media; guidelines for the verificationprocess; and the petitions process.

In addition, the Center suggests recommendationsregarding the following: ECZ budgetary indepen-dence, selection and tenure of ECZ commissioners,political party funding, party development andinternal democratization, political party capacity-building, independence of government-sponsoredmedia, and enforcement of the Code of Code andmechanisms to manage electoral disputes.

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The Carter Center wishes to acknowledge thegenerous support for the Zambia electionobservation project provided by thegovernments of Denmark, Norway, and theNetherlands, and by the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID). The CarterCenter worked closely with each of the donoragencies throughout the election project and isgrateful for their support, cooperation, andcommitment to strengthening democracy inZambia. In particular, we wish to extend thanksto Sanna Olsen, minister counselor of the RoyalDanish Embassy; Steinar Skjaeveland, counselorfor political and economic affairs of the RoyalNorwegian Embassy; Robert-Jan Siegert, secondsecretary of the Royal Dutch Embassy; and FrankHawes, democracy and governance adviser at theU.S. Agency for International Development.

The Carter Center also wishes to express itsappreciation to the government of Zambia and theElectoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) for invitingthe Center to observe and evaluate the electoralprocess in their country. The Center is especiallygrateful for the collaborative efforts of Zambian andinternational groups, especially the Zambian moni-toring efforts by the Foundation for DemocraticProcess and Coalition 2001 and the internationalobserver missions from the European Union (EU)and the SADC-Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF).During the period surrounding the elections, theCenter’s delegation leaders and senior staff consultedregularly with leaders from the other internationalmissions to ensure that our efforts were mutuallyreinforcing. The Center is particularly indebted toHon. Michael Meadowcroft of the EU, Hon.Speaker Ntlhoi Motsamai of Lesotho, and Hon. EliaKaiyamo of Namibia of the SADC-PF mission fortheir commitment to collaboration and professionalobservation efforts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks is owed to the Carter Center’selection observer delegates who donated their time,energy, and insights to support our mission andgave up their Christmas and New Year’s holidays tojoin the delegation. We are especially grateful forthe efforts of the co-leaders of the delegation,former Nigeria Head of State Gen. AbdulsalamiAbubakar, former Benin President NicephoreSoglo, and former Tanzania Prime Minister JudgeJoseph Warioba, each of whom worked long hoursrepresenting the Carter Center delegation. TheCarter Center staff extends special thanks to eachof the co-leaders for their professional engagementand personal commitment. The Center is alsograteful for the contributions of Dr. Scott Taylor,senior political adviser for the project, and AmyHamelin, who served as the Center’s project man-ager for the election observation mission.

Most of the credit for the overall success of theelection project goes to Dawn Del Rio, director ofthe Center’s field office in Lusaka, and her team oflong-term observers: John Chipeta, Malawi;Georgina Chikoko, Malawi; Moses Pitso, SouthAfrica; Patrick Berg, Germany; and Nhamo Sithole,Zimbabwe. John Chipeta played an especiallyimportant role in the postelection phase of theproject, working closely with Dawn Del Rio forseven months after the elections.

The Center’s conflict management trainingprogram benefited from the efforts of a numberof individuals. Tony Karbo, a conflict resolutionspecialist, worked closely with Dawn Del Rio andCarter Center Conflict Resolution staff in Atlanta,including Matthew Hodes and Jeffrey Mapendere,to manage the conflict management program. TheCenter is especially grateful for the efforts of theteam of technical advisers on conflict management:Tomsie Phillips, South Africa; Simeon Mawanza,Zimbabwe; Georgina Chikoko, Malawi; Neshnie

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Pillay, South Africa; Charles Manyong, Zimbabwe;and Bubelwa Kaiza, Tanzania. Thanks are also dueto Brenda Muntemba and Alex Ng’oma, whocontributed to the program.

Thanks are due also to numerous CarterCenter staff in Lusaka and Atlanta, includingChibila Beyani, Flossie Muunga, and ChebaChakulya, administrative assistants in Lusaka;Tynesha Green, office manager and financialofficer during the election mission and adminis-trative assistant in Atlanta; Lisa Wiley, directorof logistics during the election mission; KayTorrance, media relations director on the elec-tion mission; Chris Brown, director of financeand Olivia Owens, financial analyst; ThomasEberhart, financial officer during the electionmission; Nell Bolton, Brett Lacy, and JoshuaWalker, project assistants for the election missionand in Atlanta; Matthew Hodes, Ashley Barr, andAmy Hamelin, liaisons with delegation leadersduring the election mission; and David Pottie,

Carter Center staff and LTOs with former Benin President Nicephore Soglo.

special elections technician on the electionmission.

David Carroll was director of the electionobservation project and was closely supported byCharles Costello, director of the Democracy Program,and Ambassador Gordon Streeb, associate execu-tive director of the Carter Center’s Peace programs.Several other Carter Center senior staff playedimportant roles, especially Sara Tindall Ghazal ofthe Development department.

This report was drafted by John Chipeta, DawnDel Rio, and David Carroll. Final editing wasmanaged by David Carroll, with assistance fromMaury Mendenhall and Barnali Dasverma. NellBolton produced most of the appendices andprovided important assistance in pulling togethersupporting information for the report. SarahFedota of the Center’s Public Information officeand Casie Hughes managed final proofing, layout,and production.

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THE 1991 ELECTIONS

Zambia’s democratic transition has been aslow and uneven process. The nation gainedindependence from British colonial rule onOct. 24, 1964, when Northern Rhodesia becamethe Republic of Zambia. The country’s 1964constitution provided for a multiparty politicalsystem. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the UnitedNational Independence Party (UNIP) since 1960and prime minister since January 1964, becameZambia’s first president. The country moved awayfrom multipartyism in 1972, however, after a newconstitution was established which prohibited theexistence of political parties besides Kaunda’s rulingUNIP. Zambia remained a one-party state governedby President Kaunda for almost 20 years.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, an intensecampaign for change by a coalition of intellectuals,businessmen, and trade unionists under the Move-ment for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led to aconstitutional amendment in December 1990 thatallowed for multipartism. This change paved theway for Zambia’s first multiparty elections, whichwere held on Oct. 31, 1991.

Responding to invitations from PresidentKaunda and other Zambian political leaders, TheCarter Center and the National Democratic Insti-tute for International Affairs (NDI) formed theZambia Voting Observation Team (Z-Vote) in thesummer of 1991 to undertake a comprehensiveelection-monitoring effort. Z-Vote sought to pro-mote the integrity of the electoral process, buildpublic confidence, and support domestic electionobservation efforts. Beginning in August of 1991,the project sponsored three pre-election assessmentmissions, worked with Zambian monitoring bodies,and maintained an ongoing presence in Lusakathroughout the election period. For the October1991 election, Z-Vote organized a 40-member

international observer team led by former U.S.President Jimmy Carter and NDI’s President BrianAtwood.

The MMD, which was transformed into apolitical party following Zambia’s reversion to amultiparty democracy, won the October 1991elections. MMD leader Frederick Chiluba assumedthe presidency on Nov. 2, 1991. Despite significantshortcomings with the electoral system and adminis-tration, the elections were widely considered tohave been free and fair. Many analysts hailedZambia as a model for the successful transformationof autocratic African regimes into democracies.

THE 1996 ELECTIONSZambia’s second multiparty elections were held

on schedule five years later on Nov. 18, 1996.Although The Carter Center tracked the electionsand considered becoming involved, it decided notto observe the electoral process because of seriousconcerns about the fairness of the electoral environ-ment, in particular the controversial constitutionalamendments passed by the MMD governmentimmediately preceding the elections. The amend-ments effectively disqualified the leading UNIPopposition candidate, former President Kaunda,and precluded full competition. As a result, UNIPboycotted the 1996 elections. Other contentiousissues during the 1996 elections included questionsabout the integrity of the voters list, problems withthe voter identification cards, and harassment andpolitically motivated arrests of UNIP membersfollowing several bomb explosions allegedly perpe-trated by an underground dissident group. 1

Incumbent President Chiluba won a secondterm in office with 73 percent of the vote, defeatinghis closest rival, Dean Mung’omba of the ZambiaDemocratic Congress (ZADECO), who gained 13percent of the votes. National voter turnout of

BACKGROUND

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registered voters was 59 percent. Although partlysuccessful, the UNIP boycott meant that the partylost all of its representation in parliament. Mostobservers felt that the unfair constitutionalamendments that eliminated important oppositioncandidates, together with the failure of the elector-ate to effectively oppose the amendments, wereevidence that a system for democratic contestationof elections had not taken root in Zambia.

The MMD’s second term in office was markedby weak governing institutions, charges of corrup-tion, and political discontent. After a failed militarycoup in 1997, the MMD government arrested armyofficers and harassed opposition political leaders,including former President Kaunda and DeanMung’omba.

1 The group called itself the “Black Mamba.” Theruling MMD alleged that the “Black Mamba” bombingswere attempts by UNIP to create fear and instability, whileUNIP accused MMD of being responsible for the bombingsand using them as a pretext to harass and dismember UNIP.The bombings remain unresolved. Eight UNIP membersarrested for the bombings were later acquitted.

Women supportersof UPND candidate

Anderson Mazokagather at an election

campaign event.

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THIRD TERM DEBATE

The pre-electoral period for the 2001elections was dominated by the so-called“third term debate,” which emerged inresponse to attempts by President Chiluba and theruling MMD regime to amend the constitution toallow Chiluba to run for a third term (thusrepealing one of the provisions that was used toblock former President Kaunda from running inthe 1996 elections).

The popular movement to oppose Chiluba’sthird term was spearheaded by the Oasis Forum,a collection of civic groups that was created inFebruary 2001 by the umbrella bodies of Zambia’smainstream Christian churches, the Law Associa-tion of Zambia (LAZ), and the NongovernmentalOrganizations Coordinating Committee (NGOCC).1

The anti-third term movement gained widespreadpublic support and proved an effective counter-weight to the MMD government.

In spite of growing popular opposition to athird term, as well assome opposition insidehis own MMD, Chilubapersisted and was success-ful in steamrolling theApril 2001 MMD partyconvention into changingthe party constitution toallow for his candidacy.The decision caused serious splits in the ruling partyand led to the expulsion of 22 senior Members ofParliament (MPs) who opposed Chiluba’s bid.

Recognizing the strength of those opposed to athird term, Chiluba called off his candidacy in atelevised public address in early May and recom-mitted himself to leave the State House aftercompleting his second term. On Aug. 23, 2001, theMMD’s National Executive Committee announced

that Levy Mwanawasa was its presidential candidatefor the 2001 elections. Many observers sawChiluba’s hand in the decision, charging that hehandpicked Mwanawasa as his successor.Mwanawasa had earlier served as Chiluba’s first vicepresident in the early 1990s, before leaving theparty citing disillusionment with governmentcorruption. Some MMD members who had wantedthe party candidacy also were disgruntled withMwanawasa’s selection. One of them, MichaelSata, resigned and started his own party, thePatriotic Front (PF).

FRACTURED OPPOSITIONAlthough popular support for the MMD has

dwindled since the early 1990s, the ruling party hasbeen able to maintain its political and electoraldominance in part because of a fragmented opposi-tion. Political party structures are generally weak,and leading political figures have a history ofswitching parties and/or forming new ones. As a

result, political partiesare often created asplatforms for individualleaders and not on thebasis of political ideolo-gies or philosophies.With the decline of theMMD’s popularity in the1990s, opposition

parties and independents have been able to increasetheir representation in parliament through defec-tions and by-elections.

Of the 28 political parties registered in Zambiagoing into the 2001 elections, the strongest opposi-tion parties were: Anderson Mazoka’s United Partyfor National Development (UPND); the UNIP, ledby former President Kaunda’s son Tilyenji Kaunda;and two new parties formed by former members of

POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR THE 2001 ELECTIONS

The popular movement to oppose Chiluba’sthird term was spearheaded by the Oasis

Forum, a collection of civic groups.

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the MMD, the Forum for DemocraticDevelopment (FDD) and the Heritage Party(HP). The FDD, led by Christian Tembo,was built around the nucleus of the 22expelled MMD members. The HP is led byformer general and one-time vice presidentGodfrey Miyanda.

1The women’s lobby was also an importantplayer in the Oasis Forum.

MMD supporters display a poster of Levy Mwanawasa at anMMD rally.

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JUNE 2001 ASSESSMENT MISSION

As early as 2000, several Zambian citizensand NGOs had contacted The CarterCenter to encourage it to engage in the2001 electoral process. In light of these contacts,the Center’s role in the historic 1991 elections, andits longstanding interest in Zambia’s democratization,the Center had identified Zambia’s 2001 tripartiteelections (for president, parliament, and localgovernment) as a priority for possible electionobservation.

In June 2001 a CarterCenter delegation consist-ing of Democracy ProgramDirector Charles Costello,Conflict Resolution SeniorProgram Associate JefferyMapendere, and SeniorPolitical Adviser ScottTaylor, visited Zambia toassess the electoral environment and the potentialfor Carter Center involvement. The delegates metwith representatives of political parties, civil societyleaders, electoral authorities, key members of theinternational community, and others. Most expressedstrong interest in the Center’s involvement in moni-toring the elections. In response to queries aboutinternational observers, members of the ElectoralCommission of Zambia (ECZ) told the delegationthat “all are welcome,” but indicated that invita-tions should be requested from the government.

The delegation was concerned about severalkey electoral issues. One major issue was therelative independence of the ECZ, which many civilsociety groups and opposition parties regarded as atool of the ruling MMD. Of equal concern was thequality of the voters list, which many civic groups

and opposition parties criticized as flawed. Linkedto the voters list was the fact that many Zambiancitizens lacked the national identity cards requiredto register to vote. Other electoral issues includedthe continued existence of the Public Order Act –which makes it illegal to have impromptu publicassemblies and demonstrations – police partialityand brutality, inequitable access to the publicmedia for candidates, vote buying and corruption,the use of state resources by the ruling party, racism

and tribalism withinpolitical parties, andpolitical violence.

Notwithstandingthese concerns, thedelegation was impressedwith the vibrancy,outspokenness, andcandor of civil societygroups and the unprec-edented levels of public

discourse over such issues as official corruption, thethird term, and multiparty politics.

ESTABLISHING A FIELD PRESENCE INZAMBIA: SEPTEMBER – OCTOBER 2001

In September 2001, The Carter Center sentDawn Del Rio, an independent consultant, toZambia on a short assessment mission. The purposesof the visit were to meet with key stakeholders toevaluate the current electoral environment and apossible role for international observers and to meetwith members of the donor community to exploreprospects for financial support for a Carter Centerproject in Zambia. ECZ officials indicated theirinterest in having the Center involved. In addition,

Many civil society groups and oppositionparties regarded the ECZ as a tool of the

ruling MMD.

CARTER CENTER PRE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES

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several international donors, including the govern-ments of Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands,responded favorably to Carter Center proposals forfinancial support for work on the elections. Inaddition, the United States Agency for Interna-tional Development (USAID) indicated it would

provide support for the Center to do follow-upwork in the immediate postelection period.

While in Lusaka, Ms. Del Rio also delivered aCarter Center letter to the Foreign Affairs Ministryrequesting an invitation to organize an internationalobserver mission. Shortly thereafter, the govern-ment of Zambia issued an invitation for the Centerto observe the 2001 elections (see Appendix 1).

In October 2001, the Center opened an office

in Lusaka with a field office director, Ms. Del Rio,and five long-term observers (LTOs) hailing fromMalawi, South Africa, Germany, and Zimbabwe.The main goal of the Center’s election observationmission was to support efforts to strengthenZambia’s democratic process and institutions and to

reinforce free and fairelections. As invited guestsserving as election observersin Zambia, the CarterCenter mission fully re-spected Zambia’s nationalsovereignty, including allaspects of the electoralprocess.

After the LTOs arrivedin Lusaka, a four-personCarter Center team led bythe Democracy ProgramAssociate Director Dr.David Carroll visited thefield office to provideorientation and training.The team included Dr. ScottTaylor, the Center’s seniorpolitical adviser on Zambia;Dr. Makumi Mwagiru, aKenyan expert in conflictresolution; and JeffreyMapendere from theCenter’s Conflict ResolutionProgram. During the visit theLTOs received intensive

training in the methodology and techniques ofelection observation and conflict management.

LTO OBSERVATIONS AND THE CARTERCENTER DEC. 13 PRE-ELECTION REPORT

Between mid-October and mid-December,the LTOs visited all nine provinces and 47 of the72 district centers. They met with a wide range of

Carter Center long-term observer Georgina Chikoko describes the electoralprocess.

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stakeholders, including representatives of politicalparties, government officials, media, electionofficials, police, faith-based organizations, and civilsociety groups at both the provincial and districtlevels to assess electoral preparations. The LTOsreported a number ofproblems that couldimpact negatively on theconduct of the elections.Among the most impor-tant issues were misuse ofstate resources, a lack ofenforcement mechanismsfor the electoral Code ofConduct, unbalancedmedia reporting andaccess, and the need forgreater voter education.The LTOs also noted a lack of transparency andopenness on the part of the ECZ and inadequatelogistical arrangements during the voter registrationprocess and in preparation for the polls.

The Center conveyed these observations andfindings directly to the ECZ in an effort to provideadvice in a constructive and timely manner. TheCenter also shared its findings with other relevantstakeholders. The Center hoped that by reportingits concerns in advance of election day, the govern-ment of Zambia, the ECZ, political parties andothers would be able to address them and workcooperatively and transparently to make a positiveimpact on the electoral process.

In order to establish an important pre-electionbaseline, the Center also released a public reportsummarizing its assessment of the pre-electionperiod on Dec. 13, 2001 (see Appendix 2). Itnoted that stakeholders considered that manydecisions taken by the government and electionauthorities had handicapped the opposition, cre-ated barriers to civil society participation, anddisenfranchised voters.

Nonetheless, the Center’s report commended

the ECZ for several important steps it had recentlytaken, including establishing Conflict ManagementCommittees composed of key stakeholders in theelection, guiding passage of an electoral amendmentto provide for continuous registration, promoting

greater media coverageof political candidates,and steps to improvevoter education regard-ing documents needed tovote on Dec. 27.

The Carter Centerreport offered severalimportant recommenda-tions to improve theelectoral process,including some stepsthat could be under-

taken immediately regarding: voter education,media access, accreditation fees for observers, andfair and effective enforcement of the Public OrderAct and the Code of Conduct. Other recommenda-tions focused on later changes for future elections,including action to ensure the neutrality of the ECZand other government and public officials, toimprove the registration process, and to providemore information about the voter list to stakehold-ers. The major issues and recommendations raisedin the report are discussed in more detail below.

ECZ independence and transparency. Althoughboth the Zambian Constitution and the ElectoralAct of 1991 provide for an autonomous ElectoralCommission, the Center’s LTOs found that mostZambian stakeholders perceived the ECZ as lackingindependence. In part, this perception was due tothe ECZ’s lack of funding and the government’sdelay in disbursing election funds, which under-mined the ECZ’s ability to properly administer theelectoral process. Such tactics created an unevenplaying field for the candidates and their parties andfueled opposition mistrust of the ECZ.

The Carter Center’s report expressed seriousconcern about voter apathy, the low level ofvoter registration, perceptions of misuse of

state resources, and unequal access tobroadcast media in the electoral process.

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Stakeholders perceived actions by the govern-ment and the ECZ, and their failure to be moretransparent, as deliberate attempts to weaken theopposition, exclude civil society, and disenfranchisevoters. Examples included the prolonged uncer-tainty about the election date, the failure to publishan election calendar, the introduction of newadministrative rules for domestic observers, andexorbitant increases in fees for the voters list, all ofwhich undermined the democratic spirit of theelections and the promotion of a level playing field.

The Center’s LTOs also noted that the proceduresfor the selection, appointment, and removal of ECZcommissioners served to undermine the ECZ’sindependence. The Electoral Act gives power tothe president to appoint members without obliginghim to consult or seek nominations from politicalparties and other stakeholders. Consequently, thepresident is in position to influence the ECZ’sadministration of election activities.

The ECZ’s lack of independence was madeworse by its lack of transparency in managing theelectoral process. ECZ members claimed that theirability to be transparent was constrained by provi-sions of the Electoral Act which restricted theiractivities and obligations. Unfortunately, however,Zambian stakeholders and the Center’s LTOsconcluded that instead of using the administrativediscretion available to it to address critical shortfallsin the electoral process, the ECZ insisted its legalmandate was limited and avoided taking action inmany critical areas. The Center’s report noted thatthe ECZ did initiate some positive steps, such ascreating Conflict Management Committees andsupporting improved media coverage and votereducation, and that these actions illustrated thatthe ECZ did in fact have the discretion to beproactive.

Polling date. According to the Electoral Act,the ECZ is empowered to set the date of electionsthrough a statutory instrument. In practice, however,

the head of state has set the date of elections.Given President Chiluba’s position as president ofMMD, the incumbent party enjoyed a clear advan-tage over other political parties. Throughout theyear, there was uncertainty and speculation aboutthe election date, which President Chiluba did notannounce until late November.

Stakeholders told the Center’s LTOs thatthey believed President Chiluba had intentionallydelayed announcing the election date to disadvan-tage the opposition and other stakeholders bymaking it difficult to plan and allocate their limitedresources effectively.

An additional concern reported to CarterCenter LTOs was that the date selected for theelections, Dec. 27, fell in the middle of the rainyand holiday seasons. The weather conditions hadthe potential to have a negative impact on electionoperations due to the inaccessibility of some areasresulting from flooding and poor road conditions.The potential for rain also created difficult condi-tions for voters who faced long travel time topolling stations and/or queues outside pollingstations. Students, families, military and others whowere registered to vote but traveled home to visitfamily during the holiday season were also disen-franchised because provisions had not been madeto allow people to vote early or outside of theirdistricts. Additionally, most polling stations lackedprovisions to accommodate the disabled or peoplewith physical limitations who were not able totravel to the polling station.

Voter education. Although not mandated bythe Electoral Act, the ECZ took the initiative toprovide voter education with assistance from theZambia Information Service (ZIS) and the NationalVoter Education Committee (NVEC), a group ofNGOs providing civic education. While workingwith the NVEC was a good way to coordinate civiceducation efforts, some committee members toldCarter Center LTOs that adequate resources were

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not made available to support the needed coverage.In addition to the ECZ’s activities, many civil

society organizations and international donors puttremendous resources into implementing votereducation programs. Among the most importantZambian groups were the Foundation for Demo-cratic Process (FODEP), Coalition 2001, theNongovernmental Organization CoordinationCommittee (NGOCC), the Zambia NationalWomen’s Lobby Group (ZNWLG), as well as theCatholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP).

The Carter Center’s LTOs noted concerns aboutvoter apathy and low levels of voter registration asreported by the media and Zambian stakeholders.The LTO’s discussions with stakeholders in bothurban and rural areas suggested that improved votereducation might have motivated more eligiblecitizens to register to vote. Stakeholders said thatvoter education efforts were largely concentrated in

urban areas, leaving rural areas neglected. WhileCoalition 2001 and FODEP produced voter educa-tion materials in many languages, the ECZ’smaterials were only produced in English.

As the sole independent body responsible forconducting elections, the ECZ is looked to byZambians to provide voter education and informa-tion. While the ECZ rightly expected the politicalparties to help educate voters, citizens often believethat parties are more likely to distort informationin their own favor, and they expect the ECZ toprovide accurate information. In its Dec. 13 report,the Center urged the ECZ to take proactive stepsto improve voter education as a means to minimizedisenfranchisement.

Voter registration. Under Zambian law, aperson qualifies to register if he/she is a Zambiancitizen, a minimum of 18 years of age, has a national

Voter education was largely left to civil society and political parties, such as this UNIP votereducation session in Mkushi, Central province.

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registration card (NRC), and is of a soundmind and not in detention for a criminaloffence. In preparation for the 2001 tripar-tite elections, the ECZ abandoned thecontroversial 1996 voters list, which somestakeholders believed had been manipu-lated to favor the ruling MMD, and decidedto conduct a new registration exercise.Initially, registration was to last three weeksnationwide beginning on June 25, 2001.The registration period was extended twicedue to low participation and finally con-cluded on July 26, 2001. At the completionof the exercise, 2.6 million citizens out of aneligible 4.6 million had registered to vote.

Although The Carter Center was notyet involved at the time of the registration,reports from Zambian and internationalmonitoring organizations indicated seriousconcerns about the registration process andthe integrity of the voters list. Observersreported that the exercise began late inmany locations due to insufficient materialsand was managed haphazardly, which mayhave contributed to voter apathy. Inaddition, many Zambian stakeholders re-ported a series of obstacles that seemeddesigned to impede registration and restrictefforts to verify the accuracy of the voters list.

The process itself was complicated andburdensome, requiring persons to travel toa registration and/or district center threetimes to complete registration and obtaincards. This was especially difficult forZambians living in rural areas that did not haveeasy access to the registration centers. Moreover,no alternative means to register, such as mobilestations, were provided for the disabled, elderly,pregnant, and sick who may have had difficultygetting to a district or registration center. Finally,if a citizen’s application to register was refused, theperson had to complete an application to launch an

appeal and pay a fee at the magistrate’s court whenlodging the appeal. Such requirements impededaccess to the right to vote.

Carter Center LTOs and Zambian stakeholdersreported that the area of greatest concern in theexercise was the requirement for a citizen to acquirean NRC as the only legal form of identificationacceptable to apply for a voter registration card

Zambian citizens became increasingly active as the elections drewcloser.

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(VRC). According to census statistics, only 3.06million citizens over the age of 16 held an NRC.The fact that no provisions were put in place toaddress the issue of the NRC as a barrier to registra-tion disenfranchised the majority of youths who hadreached voting age, but did not qualify becausethey did not possess an NRC. Opposition partiesviewed the requirement as a deliberate effort byauthorities to disenfranchise young voters, whowere generally perceived to be pro-opposition. It isimportant to note that in areas where mobile teamswere dispatched to issue NRCs, voter registrationincreased up to 50 percent. Such successful approachesshould have been duplicated and financially supportedcountrywide.

In addition, the role of the district administrators(DAs) in issuing NRCs at the district level wasviewed with skepticism by the members of theopposition, who claimed that the DAs – who areMMD political appointees – behaved as partycadres rather than civil servants, deliberatelyfavoring MMD supporters in the issuance of NRCs.Likewise, opposition parties criticized the ECZ’slack of transparency in managing the arrival ofadditional VRCs after the completion of the regis-tration period, suspecting that the cards might beused to rig the elections. Eventually, the ECZclarified that the extra VRCs were to be used forcontinuous voter registration.

The ECZ blamed low registration on politicalparties for not showing greater interest in mobilizingthe electorate. The ECZ also stressed that it had notreceived adequate funding from the government toimplement a sustained nationwide voter educationcampaign. On the other hand, the ECZ did play anactive role in pressing for an amendment to theelection law in 2001 to provide for continuousvoter registration. Unfortunately, the governmentfailed to provide the necessary funding, and the lawfailed to address the NRC application process andother critical issues.

The Center’s LTOs noted that the provisional

voters list was not on public display nor easilyaccessible from local government officials, whichcreated a serious barrier for inspecting the roll. TheCenter’s observers also questioned the ECZ’simposition of a new fee of Z$55 million kwacha(approximately $20,000 USD) to purchase thevoters list, particularly when the roll had previouslybeen provided free of charge. The Center agreedwith opposition parties, Zambian civil societygroups, and others independent observers that thefee was exorbitant and unjustified and made itunnecessarily difficult for political parties and otherstakeholders to obtain copies and systematicallyinspect the voters list. Opposition parties suspectedthat the ECZ was deliberately trying to discouragepublic access to the voters list.

The ECZ said the fee was necessitated by thematerial costs of preparing and distributing the roll,but would not provide information to backup theseclaims. Unfortunately, the ECZ refused an offerfrom the European Union for technical assistance tohelp make the list available on CD-ROM, whichwould have made the cost of providing the informa-tion minimal.

Noting that it is a commonly accepted principleof electoral administration to ensure that the voterslist is easily available for review, the Center’s Dec.13 report urged the ECZ to be more transparentregarding costs of providing copies of the voters listand recommended that the ECZ find more cost-effective and timely means of distributing the roll tostakeholders.

Campaigning: use of state resources, the Codeof Conduct, and the Public Order Act. TheCenter’s LTOs reported that the precampaign andcampaign periods were marred by abuse of stateresources, bribery, unfair media practices, intimida-tion, and failure to enforce the Code of Conductand the Public Order Act, which collectivelycreated an environment that was not conducive todemocratic elections.

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The Code of Conduct exists as a statutoryinstrument created in 1996 to protect fundamentalrights and freedoms. Carter Center LTOs concludedthat, if properly implemented and enforced, theCode could help to maintain elements of a levelplaying field, even if it could not ensure completeequity in the electoral process. However, the Codehas several glaring weaknesses. For example, theCode states that no person shall use governmenttransport or facility for campaign purposes or tocarry voters to polling stations, but indicates thatthis provision shall notapply to the presidentand the vice president.These provisions contra-dict the basic purpose ofthe Code and contributedto the creation of anunlevel playing fieldduring the campaign.

Numerous examplesof breaches of the Codeand misuse of stateresources by governmentofficials and the ruling party were reported to theCenter’s LTOs during the pre-election period. Inaddition to the use of state resources by PresidentChiluba and the vice president in support of MMDcampaign activities, state resources financed eventsin support of Mwanawasa’s campaign. Carter CenterLTOs received numerous reports of DAs usinggovernment vehicles and government finances tofund special programs for the MMD. Oppositionparties and their supporters were angered by theseactions but felt that there were no mechanisms inplace to enforce the Code. In response to anopposition suit against such practices by the DAs,the High Court issued a ruling that DAs could nolonger participate in politics while in the civilservice. This was seen as a positive developmentthat helped to ensure a measure of neutrality on thepart of government employees. However, there

were indications that the MMD government and itsDAs ignored the ruling, further eroding hopes forthe introduction of positive measures to level theplaying field.

The Code also mandates that political contestantsrefrain from offering inducements or rewards to anyperson for membership in a political party, attend-ing political events, voting, and nominatingcandidates. However, there were widespreadreports of vote buying and financial inducementsthroughout the campaign period.

Another concernreported to the Center’sLTOs by oppositionparties and NGOs wasthat the Public OrderAct was used to disrupttheir ability to organizemeetings and engage inpublic political debate.While the Act wasamended in 1996 withrespect to public meet-ings to delete the word

“permit” and replace it with the word “notify,” thelaw still served in effect as a “permit process” due tothe discretion given to the police to decide if theyhave adequate manpower to maintain law andorder during a public meeting and whether or notto stop meetings from taking place. Oppositionparties indicated that in practice the police deter-mined who might conduct and organize publicmeetings at the district level. As with the Code ofConduct, the president and the vice president areexempt from informing the police of their intentionto address political meetings, but this exception wasoften extended to other MMD candidates andcadres.

The opposition cited other examples of violationsof the Act. For example, at one point all oppositionpublic meetings in Eastern province were stoppedbecause the president, who was at the time out of

The Center’s long-term observers reported thatthe pre-campaign and campaign periods weremarred by abuse of state resources, bribery,unfair media practices, intimidation, and

failure to enforce the Code of Conduct andthe Public Order Act.

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the country, was scheduled to travel to theprovince upon his return to Zambia. Further-more, in Solwezi in Northwestern province, armedsecurity officers threatened opposition presidentialcandidate General Godfrey Miyanda’s public rallywith dispersal. While the Public Order Act may bean appropriate instrument to maintain security,abuses by police officials in its implementationduring the campaign period contradicted theconstitutional freedoms of association, assemblyand expression.

The Center’s Dec. 13 report expressed concernabout the unlevel playing field created by theseproblems. In addition, the report recommended thefollowing: Government employees should honor theCode and remain neutral in their role as civilservants; the Code should be publicized more

widely with the publicencouraged to act asa watchdog; and thePublic Order Actshould be applied inan evenhandedfashion.

Media fairnessand access. Theconduct of the mediaand its electioncoverage during thepre-election andcampaign periods canmake a significantcontribution to alevel playing field forpolitical parties andcandidates. Wheremedia access is fairand equitable, theexchange of politicalviewpoints is facili-tated. By contrast, the

misuse of the media during elections, particularlypublicly owned media, might have a profoundnegative effect on the general public’s ability to beexposed to a range of political debate.

The Center’s LTOs noted that television andnewspaper coverage during the precampaign andnomination period gave an unfair advantage to theruling party because of the extensive coverage thatwas provided in the government-owned televisionand press. While the opposition television and radioprograms were labeled “political adverts,” the rulingparty used the news coverage as an opportunity tocampaign.

Of particular concern to the Center’s LTOswere incidents of government censorship andintimidation of independent broadcasters. Afterseveral reports of violent incidents by MMD cadres

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Carter Center long-term observer John Chipeta (right) meets with other Carter Centerdelegates.

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at an independent radio station in Kitwe (RadioIcengelo), a Carter Center LTO visited the stationto witness the damage caused by the cadres, whohad broken into the station and disrupted thebroadcast of an opposition presidential candidate.The closure of Radio Phoenix and the threatenedclosure of Radio Maria raised similar concernsabout the government’s heavy-handed tacticstoward independent media.

Television stations were not spared by thegovernment’s censorship and intimidation. TrinityBroadcasting and ZNBC had signed contracts tobroadcast presidential debates and failed to honortheir contracts as a result of government pressureand intimidation. The Center was alarmed byformer President Chiluba’s decision to declineMMD’s participation in any of the public debatessponsored by the various television stationsthroughout the campaign period. These and othermedia practices appeared to be in violation of theCode, which provides for fair and balanced mediareporting of election campaigns.1

The Carter Center’s Dec. 13 report concludedthat the government and ECZ gave inadequateattention to the need for fair and equitable mediaaccess in the pre-election and campaign period andthat the ECZ should have worked to ensure moreequitable treatment for all political contestantsthrough enforcement of the Code of Conduct. Thereport urged Zambian media to provide equitableaccess to all parties and urged all parties to partici-pate in debates to help inform the electorate.

Accreditation of observers. Election observationby nonpartisan domestic and international organiza-tions is a common practice in democraciesworldwide and serves to enhance transparencyand credibility in the electoral process. Neither theconstitution of Zambia nor the Electoral Actprovides for or prohibits nonpartisan Zambian orinternational election observers.

The ECZ’s decision to allow nonpartisan citizens

and organizations to observe the elections waswelcomed by the Center. However, the Center wasconcerned by ECZ measures that created barriersfor local nonpartisan observers close to polling day.Late in the process, the ECZ introduced an accredi-tation fee and a new requirement for sworn affida-vits for each individual observer, which placed anenormous logistical and financial burden upon thedomestic monitoring organizations immediatelypreceding polling day. As a result, it was virtuallyimpossible for some organizations to secure accredi-tation for all of their observers because theCommission was unable to effectively implementits own regulatory requirements and failed toissue accreditation cards to all of the observers intime for the election.

The Center’s LTOs also questioned the ECZ’sefforts to challenge the legal status of Coalition2001, an umbrella group of NGOs working tomonitor the elections. Coalition 2001 was publiclycritical of the ECZ and government, and the ECZ’smove to discredit the Coalition was viewed as apartisan response to those criticisms.

Echoing the views of FODEP and otherindependent observers, the Center’s Dec. 13report concluded that the ECZ’s administrativemeasures created excessive barriers for domesticobservers and urged the ECZ to revoke the newaccreditation fees and requirements. The ECZignored these recommendations and insisted thatthe measures were justified. If the internationaldonor community had not stepped in to providefinancial support to the affected organizations,ECZ’s new fees would have blocked many domesticorganizations from observing the election.

Shortly before the election, when many of theirobservers had already been deployed but had notreceived their accreditation cards from the ECZ,representatives of FODEP raised these issues withthe Center’s observer delegation. The CarterCenter delegation pressed the ECZ to work out asolution that would allow the observation activities

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by FODEP observers and others to go forward asplanned with or without their accreditation cards(see section on Leadership Meetings, p. 35).

Candidate nomination process. In order to runfor public office, nominated candidates must meetminimum legal qualifications. In Zambia, the ChiefJustice serves as the returning officer and is respon-sible for reviewing presidential nominations.Nominations for parliamentary candidates arereviewed by officials at the district, town, or citycouncil level within the Ministry of Local Govern-ment, who serve as returning officers for the ECZ.

The nomination process for the 2001 tripartiteelections was scheduled to begin seven days afterthe president announced the election date. TheECZ publicized the nomination schedule andconducted informational meetings for politicalparties regarding the process. In advance of thenomination process, the ECZ announced it wasgoing to double the cost of candidate nominationfees. Some opposition parties and members of thegeneral public criticized the fee increase as an unfairbarrier to political competition. Presidential nomi-nations took place from Nov. 27-30, and theparliamentary nominations followed on Dec. 1. All11 individuals who wanted to run for presidentsuccessfully lodged their nomination papers anddeposits.

The nominations of some presidential andparliamentary candidates were controversial. SomeMMD members charged that the party’s presidentialcandidate, Levy Mwanawasa, was handpicked byPresident Chiluba and that the selection process didnot follow the party’s internal policies. However,the party stated officially that the MMD NationalExecutive Committee (NEC) adopted its candi-date. In protest against the alleged selectionmethodology used by MMD, Michael Sata resignedfrom the party and formed his own Patriotic Front,only months before polling day.

Additionally, there were many reports in the

press that the executive leadership of other politicalparties, namely UPND and FDD, had imposedparliamentary candidates upon constituencieswithout adequate consultation with local partyrepresentatives through a national convention.

1 The matter was eventually taken to court and theZambian High Court ordered Trinity Broadcasting toproceed with its contractual obligations to televise thepresidential debates. ZNBC had a signed, paid contract to aira live debate including all presidential candidates the daybefore the vote, but cancelled the debate with two daysnotice. Instead, ZNBC aired an interview with outgoingPresident Chiluba.

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For the 2001 tripartite elections, the ECZintroduced new Conflict ManagementCommittees (CMCs) as a mechanism formanaging electoral disputes. The ECZ planned toestablish CMCs at the national, provincial, anddistrict levels in order to create structures thatcould manage and reduce electoral conflicts andfacilitate peaceful elections. In the absence ofproperly equippedenforcementmechanisms andmandates within theelectoral framework,the ECZ utilized itsown administrativecapacity to establishand manage the CMCsas an administrativetool for preventing andmanaging conflict.

The Carter Centerexpressed interest inassisting Zambians toaddress problemsrelated to potentialelectoral disputes andconflict. In light ofthese mutual interests, and with financial supportprovided by the government of Norway, the ECZand The Carter Center signed a memorandum ofunderstanding to collaborate in the training ofCMC members throughout the country in advanceof the Dec. 27 elections. Carter Center field officedirector Dawn Del Rio and independent consultantTony Karbo managed the Center’s contribution tothe ECZ’s CMC program as a distinct Carter Centeractivity connected to its broader involvement in

observing the Zambian electoral process. Several ofthe Center’s LTOs played key roles working withthe ECZ and the CMCs.

The program faced many logistical and adminis-trative challenges owing to the limited time availableto secure funding and organize the necessary trainingprograms in advance of the Dec. 27 election. Giventhe time constraints, it was acknowledged that the

training and thus the CMC structures themselveswould not be fully operational throughout thecountry. Nevertheless, the various partners andmany Zambian stakeholders believed that providingconflict management skills to hundreds of Zambiansin advance of Election Day was worthwhile. As theelectoral schedule unfolded, these challenges werecompounded by a growing skepticism of the politi-cal will and capacity of the ECZ to administer theCMC program effectively.

Party representatives and electoral officials provided pre-election briefings to delegates.

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After the elections, the Center conducted anassessment of the CMC program and the nature ofthe electoral disputes that were documented by theCMCs. The report found that the majority of thereported disputes were beyond the capacity ofCMCs to resolve and that the nature of unresolveddisputes related directly to problems in the electoralsystem and to issues of corruption, bribery, andelection results. The report concluded that theseproblems could only be addressed through reformsof regulatory and legal systems and proper enforce-ment mechanisms.

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DELEGATION BRIEFINGS, DEPLOYMENT,AND OBSERVATION METHODOLOGY

After the release of the Center’s Dec. 13pre-election assessment report, the fieldoffice and LTOs concentrated on logisticalpreparations and briefings for the Center’s maindelegation of short-term observers (STOs), whicharrived on Dec. 22 to observe the voting, counting,and tabulation processes.

The Center’s 33-person observer delegation wasco-led by former Nigeria Head of State GeneralAbdulsalami Abubakar, former Benin PresidentNicéphore Soglo, and former Tanzania PrimeMinister Judge Joseph Warioba. The combinedLTO-STO delegation included observers fromNigeria, Benin, Tanzania, South Africa, Malawi,Mozambique, Zimbabwe, the United States,Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

During two days of inten-sive meetings on Dec. 23-24,delegates were briefed byCarter Center staff and LTOson the Zambian politicalcontext, the electoral process,and election observationtechniques. In addition,delegates heard from a broadcross section of Zambiansociety, including 10 politicalparties, representatives of theECZ, seven civil societyorganizations, and leaders ofother international observergroups, including the Euro-pean Union (EU) and theSouthern Africa DevelopmentCommunity-ParliamentaryForum (SADC-PF). At the

close of briefings, delegates were divided into two-person teams for deployment to their observationareas and provided with supplies and supplementalbriefings focused on their respective deploymentzones (see Appendix 3).

Delegates were deployed to all nine provinceson Christmas Day, Dec. 25. On Dec. 26, theobserver teams held meetings in their deploymentzone with electoral authorities, political partiesand candidates, and domestic observers. Theyalso met with members of other internationalobserver groups present in the area in order toensure coordination of efforts.

The observation plan called for Carter Centerdelegates to observe the voting process in all nineprovinces, visiting polling stations throughout theday on Dec. 27. At each polling station, observerteams completed a polling station observation form,or checklist, to record their overall assessment of

Observers met with a range of domestic monitoring and civil society groupsduring deployment.

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the voting process at the station as well as informationabout specific aspects of the voting process. Simi-larly, at the close of the poll, observer teamsmonitored the closing and counting process in atleast one polling station and completed anotherchecklist to record their observations and assess-ments.

After the counting process was completed, inmost cases on Dec. 28, about half of the Center’sobservers traveled to constituency tabulationcenters, where results for all the polling stations inthe constituency were tabulated. At the tabulationcenters, observers completed tabulation centerchecklists. The other half of the observers plannedto return to Lusaka to begin debriefings.

Each of the observer teams contacted theCenter’s Lusaka office at least once per day whiledeployed to report on conditions in their area.These reports were compiled on an ongoing basisby the Lusaka office and relayed to the delegationleaders who stayed in Lusaka for additional meetings.

LEADERSHIP MEETINGSOn Dec. 24-26, while most of the Center’s

observers were deployed, the delegation leaders metwith presidential candidates, election officials of theECZ, civil society groups, and leaders of the otherinternational and domestic observer missions todiscuss the election environment. In addition todelegation co-leaders Gen. Abubakar, formerPresident Soglo, and former Prime MinisterWarioba, the leadership group included CarterCenter Project Director Dr. David Carroll, FieldOffice Director Dawn Del Rio, and Senior PoliticalAdviser Dr. Scott Taylor.

One issue of immediate concern that emergedin the delegation leaders’ meeting with the Founda-tion for Democratic Process (FODEP) was thatthousands of domestic observers from FODEP andother groups still had not received accreditationcards from the ECZ even though they were alreadydeployed. The problem resulted largely from theECZ’s last-minute imposition of additional require-ments. FODEP planned to deploy observers to most

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of the polling stations and to conduct an independentverification of the ECZ’s official polling station results.If the accreditation problem was not resolved, itwould greatly undermine the work of the domesticobserver groups and their ability to observe andassess the electoral process.

The Carter Center delegation leaders raised theproblem in their meeting with ECZ ChairmanBobby Bwalya on Dec. 26. Chairman Bwalyarecognized the implications and assured the Centerthat all party polling agents and domestic observerswould be able to monitor the voting, counting andtabulation processes across the country. To facili-tate this, Chairman Bwalya said that the ECZ wouldimmediately instruct electoral officials and presidingofficers to permit all 6,500 FODEP observers intopolling stations.1 The Center delegation suggestedthat it would be helpful for the ECZ to publicize thisdecision in the media, especially radio, so thatobservers and election officials in the field would beinformed. Unfortunately, Chairman Bwalya and theECZ indicated that they did not intend to do so.

Partly as means to helpdisseminate information aboutthese steps, the Center issued apress release welcoming theECZ’s decision to allow allobservers and party agents intothe polls (see Appendix 4).

The delegation leaders alsoheld private meetings withseveral of the major presiden-tial candidates, including LevyMwanawasa of the MMD,Anderson Mazoka of theUPND, and Godrey Miyandaof the HP. In addition, theyalso met leaders from the FDD,the UNIP, the SDP, as well aswith former President KennethKaunda.

THE DEC. 27 ELECTORAL PROCESSIn the Dec. 27 tripartite elections, Zambians

were going to the polls to select leaders and repre-sentatives at three different levels: national president,parliamentary, and local government. The com-plexities involved in conducting three electionssimultaneously in 5,509 polling stations in a countrywith difficult terrain and poor infrastructure posedsignificant logistical and administrative challengesfor the ECZ.

Voting was scheduled to take place from 0600to 1700. Once inside the station, voters faced acumbersome process that required them to com-plete a separate circuit for each of the three electoralraces. Upon entering the polling station, after theirIDs and names were checked against the voters list,voters were required to queue to obtain the firstballot (for the presidential race) and then to queuefor the voting booth to cast their ballot. Once theycompleted the first ballot, voters had to repeat thewhole process two more times for the second andthird ballots (for the parliamentary and local

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ECZ Chair Bobby Bwalya (L) greets delegation co-leaders General Abubakar(center) and President Soglo (R).

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government elections). This complicated processextended the time it took to complete the votingprocess.2

At the close of balloting, votes were to becounted at each polling station. Polling stationresults would be transported to returning officersat the 150 constituency tabulation centers to bereviewed and combined to create a constituencyresult. As part of this process, returning officerswould review any rejected ballots from pollingstations to confirm or reject the decisions of thepresiding officer.3 The constituency results werethen to be faxed or otherwise relayed to the ECZin Lusaka, where national election results would bereleased.

Several of the political parties deployed agentsat large numbers of polling stations.4 In addition,Zambian civil society groups, such as FODEP,Coalition 2001, NGOCC, AVAP, ZNWLG, andothers, played a critical monitoring role, workingcollaboratively to ensure that almost every pollingstation had nonpartisan monitors present.

The main international observer groups, including

CONTESTING PARTIES AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

POLITICAL PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

Agenda for Zambia (AZ) MBIKUSITA-LEWANIKA, Inonge

Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) TEMBO, Christian S.

Heritage Party (HP) MIYANDA, Godfrey K.

Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) MWANAWASA,

Documents

THE CARTER CENTERTHE CARTER CENTER 6 OBSERVING THE 2001 ZAMBIA ELECTIONS NDI CARTER CENTER STAFF DELEGATES Ms. Nell Bolton, Project Assistant, Democracy Program, USA Mr. Thomas Eberhart,