THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: ADMINISTRATIVE

AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS BY KENNETH HALL AND BYRON BLAKE

State Univer.ri4 of New York, Oswego

INTRODUCTION

Integration literature, especially among developing countries has concentrated on substantive provisions and to a lesser extent on the formal legal and institutional structure of the various rkgimes. Similarly, failure of integration rkgimes to attain their objectives is attributed to technical and economic problems and the absence of political will. The role of institutional and administrative structures in the attainment of objectives has received much less attention. Few of the analyses of institutional and administrative structures that do exist have included CARICOM.1 Yet an analysis of the role of institutional and administrative structures in CARICOM would seem important in view of the wide range of its objectives, the responsibility assigned to the institutions for developing and operationalizing the mechanisms to advance these objectives, the geography of the region and the limited administrative capability of several of the participating states. This article essentially describes the institutional and adminis-

trative arrangements in CARICOM in the context of the aims and objectives and the constraints under which the integration rkgime emerged. It is hoped that this will provide information for integrationists interested in the process in the Caribbean and stimulate comparative and more definitive analyses of the role of institutions in integration schemes.

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established in 1973 as a successor to the Caribbean Free Trade Association

1 Dusan Sidjanski, Current Problems of Economic Integration: The role o j In~titutions in regional inttgration among developing countries (New York, United Nations, I 974). For analyses of CARICOM’s legal and institutional structure read: Duke E. Pollard, ‘Institutional and Legal Aspects of the Caribbean Community’, in Caribbean Studits, Vol. 14, No. I , pp. 39-74, and Hans J. Geiser, P. Alleyene and C. Gajraj, L g a l Aspects of Caribbean Integration, Trinidad Institute of International Relations, I 97 j .

2 1 1

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(CARIFTA) among twelve English-speaking Caribbean territories.2 Its emergence was to overcome the limitations of the Free Trade area while widening the scope of cooperation to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of the Caribbean people for improved standards of living. More specifically its objectives are?

(a) the economic integration of the Member States to the establishment of a common market regime (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Common Market’), in accordance with the provisions of the Annex to this Treaty, with the following aims :

(i) the strengthening, coordination and regulation of the economic and trade relations among Member States in order to promote their accelerated, harmonious and balanced development ;

(ii) the sustained expansion and continuing integration of economic activities, the benefits of which shall be equitably shared taking into account the need to provide special opportunities for the Less Developed Countries.

(iii) the achievement of a greater measure of economic independence and effectiveness by its Member States in dealing with third countries, groups of states and entities of whatever description;

(b) the coordination of the foreign policies of Member States

(c) functional cooperation, including : and

(i) the efficient operation of certain common services and activities for the benefit of its people;

(ii) the promotion of greater understanding among its people and the advancement of their social, cultural and technological development ;

(iii) activities in the fields specified in the Schedule and referred to in Article 18 of this Treaty.

In its economic intentions CARICOM is similar to most of the economic integration regimes among developing countries. Like the Andean Group, the Central American Common Market (CACM), the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic

* The members of CARICOM are Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago.

3 Article 4, Treag establishing the Caribbean Conrmmig, Caribbean Community Secretariat, Georgetown, 1973.

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY 2'3

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) it contains provisions for trade liberalization (including the removal of import duties, quantitative restrictions, and now tariff barriers) ; protection of the domestic market for regional producers; the coordination of economic policies and development planning ; and the coordination of trade relations with third countries.4 There is also the specific provision to ensure that the benefits of integration are equitably distributed among the participating states.6 This similarity of economic objectives derives from a common fund of theory and experience. These demonstrate the limitations of the national options of small countries to foster internal economic development or effectively cope with the international environment ; the inadequacy of free trade to guarantee the sustained expansion of economic activities and ensure the preeminence of national (regional) interests. It also indicates that increasing maldistribution of benefits- most likely occurrence in an uncontrolled situation-would subject the scheme to continuous political and economic pressures.6 In the area of common services and functional cooperation CARICOM is similar to EAC, which provided for the operation of common services in areas such as transportation, research and education. In the cases of CARICOM and EAC cooperation in these areas pre- dated the community, and were formalized and added to in its arrangements.

At the social and cultural level CARICOM has similar objectives to ASEAN and ECOWAS. Their inclusion reflected the view that a social content was a necessary complement to economic integration. The prospect of CARICOM providing resources which could not be mobilized by any one state was also an important consideration.

In its foreign policy aspirations CARICOM is unique. The inclusion of this sensitive area of cooperation in CARICOM derives from the relative importance of CARICOM as a group and the individual members in the international arena. Furthermore, the political status of two-thirds of its membership proscribed their direct participation in the international system. There was

4 Ibid., chapters 111-VI of the Annex to the Treaty. For a comparative analysis of the distribution-mechanisms between CARICOM and

other integration movements see Byron Blake, Anti-polarisation and Distribrtion Mechanisms in C A R I C O M , Georgetown, 1976, pp. 8-22.

II For the role of those theories and experiences in the emergence of CARICOM, see William Demas. Wcst Indian Nationhood and Caribbean Integration. Barbados, ccc Publishing House, I 974; Essqson Caribbean Integration and Development, ISER, Kingston, 1976; Caribbean Community Secretariat, From C A R I F T A to Caribbean Commrnity, Georgetown, 1972, and The Caribbean Community, A Guiak, 1973.

214 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

also the fear that the history of exploitation of divisions among CARICOM states might otherwise be repeated, to their cost.

Procedurally it had to be separated and treated differently however for two reasons. First foreign policy was regarded as such an important element of sovereignty that it could not be subsumed in the general agreement. Initially the participation of at least one independent member state in this area was in doubt. Second, and perhaps more important, the foreign policy of the non-independent states was the responsibility of the United Kingdom. This implies either that UK Government would de fatto be a member of the scheme representing the non-independent states or that these states would have to receive specific dispensation, which might have been conditional on the submis- sion of reports to the UK Government before or after discussions on foreign policy issues. Since both of these possibilities were unacceptable to the independent states a mechanism had to be found to limit participation in this area while permitting it in the others.

The attainment of these objectives would in large measure be dependent on the machinery developed to implement them. The nature of the machinery itself was influenced by a number of constraints. Three categories of factors appear to have been crucial in determining the institutional and administrative arrangements ; legacies of previous attempts at regional integration ; the structure of national administration ; and the disparity between Member States.

The immediate precursor to the integration movement in the Caribbean was the establishment in I 95 8 of the ill-fated Federation of the West Indies, comprising all the Commonwealth territories except the Bahamas, Belize and Guyana. The federation collapsed after four years, following the withdrawal of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. This was followed by the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) which came into existence in 1968. In 1973 CARIFTA was transformed to CARICOM, with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramus by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, with the eight remaining Member States of Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Belize, Montserrat, Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and Grenada acceding in 1974. In 1968, the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) set up the East Caribbean Common Market (ECM) within CARIFTA.'

' The Caribbean Communi& a Guide, pp. 18-24.

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY 2 '5

The demise of the Federation left behind fears about creating any supranational institution at the political level. Furthermore, a reservoir of caution, deriving from anxieties about probable collapse resulted in a preoccupation with ensuring that any regional arrangement did not deprive Member Countries of the ability to operate effectively in its absence. There were, however, a number of common services, inter-uliu the University of the West Indies, the Regional Shipping Services and the Meteorological Services, the efficiency of which required the continuation of a regional coordinating machinery. Indeed, the first Heads of Government Conference in I 963 was called primarily to consider the fate of these services. The collapse of the Federation also left unsatisfied the desire of some states for political autonomy, exemplified by the present constitutional status of the non- independent States. Its failure to deal with economic matters suggested that economic integration might be a focal point in any future regional arrangement.

Reluctance to enter into any political arrangement and emphasis on economic integration made it inevitable that CARIFTA would be an economic institution concerned mainly with the liberalization of Trade. Because the CARIFTA Council dealt primarily with trade, issues of regional interest other than free trade had to be dealt with outside its framework.

Come uently those institutions which pre-dated CARIFTA

Council but also independently of each other. These included the Heads of Government Conference, the Regional Shipping Council and the West Indies Shipping Corporation, the Meteorological Council, the University of the West Indies and associated bodies, such as the Regional Research Centre. New areas of regional cooperation led to the establishment of new institutions, such as the Ministers of Health Conference, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Council of Legal Education and the Caribbean Examinations Council. There was, however, an attempt to link most of these institutions administratively by having the Secretariat for the Free Trade Association act as a servicing unit for them.

From the perspective of institutional growth, these developments influenced the CARICOM arrangements in two ways. The new scheme had to take cognisance of their existence. In all cases, the existing organizations were left and granted the status of an Institution or Associate Institution in the Community. The main criterion which determined whether an organization was desig-

continue 1 to function not only independently of the CARIFTA


nated an Institution or Associate Institution was whether the organization possessed its own charter or treaty. Organizations with such instruments were designated Associate Institutions. To this extent, the Community was largely a formalization of what already existed. By allowing these institutions to function independently, moreover, a precedent was established whereby the major areas of regional cooperation were given their own institutions and provision was made to establish new ones to deal with each new area of activity.

The constraints upon the emergence of CARICOM derived not merely from the legacy of past efforts at integration but were closely related to institutional structures in the Member States, in which areas of government activity were divided into various portfolios for administrative purposes. The tradition of portfolio independence made the creation of a new regional institution fraught with the danger of conflicts among competencies. These would undoubtedly have had an adverse effect on administrative receptivity, as regional integration should have little or no direct impact on the internal administrative structure of government. Political considerations in some countries reinforced this reluctance to adapt, as well as the general feeling that if the movement should collapse, there would thus be no adverse effect on the normal operations of government.

Another constraint was the disparity between the member states, resulting in the arbitrary division of the Community into two categories of member-More Developed Countries (MDC’s) and the Less Developed Countries. One consequence of this classification is the abandonment of formal reciprocity in favour of preferential treatment in the implementation of several of the community mechanisms which are institutionalized in the special regime for the LDC’s. Special institutions, such as the Eastern Caribbean Common Market, the Caribbean Investment Corporation, were established as preconditions of their participation in CARICOM. At another level, the LDC’s could not effectively participate in some activities, notably in the coordination of foreign policy.

INSTITUTIONAL A N D ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE A N D PROCESS

The reluctance of the member states to establish supra-national institutions, and the existence of several established inter- governmental organizations, resulted in the creation of a framework characterized by a multiplicity of inter-governmental organs

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY 217

and institutions. The Community is governed by a hierarchical series of ministerial organs and institutions.* At the top is the conference of Heads of Government, which is the supreme policy- making body. Its principal task is the formulation and de- termination of strategic policies on all aspects of co-operation. In this regard it is given specific competencies for financial matters, admission of new members, settlement of disputes among member states and conclusion of treaties. The second principal organ is the Common Market Council, which has responsibility for the economic aspects of integration.

A series of subordinate institutions or ministerial committees deal with the various areas of cooperation. These include finance, industry, agriculture, mines, education, health, labour, foreign policy and transportation. These committees are empowered to take decisions to achieve CARICOM’s objedtives in their respective fields. Each territory is represented in the committee by the minister responsible for that portfolio in the national cabinet. In addition to these committees there are several specialized bodies designated, ‘Associated Institutions’ : inter-aha the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the University of the West Indies (UWI), the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM), and the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC). These organizations have responsibility for specific areas of co-operation but have their independent charters and rules. There are a wide range of technical groups composed of national and regional officials. These groups are primarily advisory, and include the Regional Industrial Planners, the Working Party on Commodities, and the Committee of Central Banks and Monetary Authorities. The following chart summarizes the main structural and organization features of CARICOM.

The main administrative organ of the Community is the Caribbean Community Secretariat. It is headed by a Secretary- General, appointed by the Heads of Government on the recommendation of the Council. He is assisted by a deputy and five directors.9 The Secretariat is similar in structure, functions and powers to institutions found in other organizations for international integration. It services meetings of the organs and institutions, monitors the implementation of decisions, initiates and carry-out studies on issues related to the objectives of CARICOM. It also provides services to member governments in areas related to the aims of the Community. Unlike the Junta of

8Chapter X I of the Treu?y. 0 See appendix for a detailed structure of the Secretariat as reorganized in 1977.

218

- of Foeign Affairs

Ministers

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THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY 2 ’ 9

the Andean Group, however, it has no decision-making power, and its authority is strictly inter-governmental. The senior staff enjoy diplomatic status, and even though recruited from national governments are prohibited from seeking or receiving in- structions from ‘Any government whether Member States or otherwise . . .’lo The Secretariat was essentially the same as that under CARIFTA, which in turn was modelled after the EFTA Secretariat. The present structure is the result of a detailed analysis undertaken with the assistance of the United Nations to rationalize the structure to fit the functions of the community. Because of its admitted competence the Secretariat enjoys very high prestige in the region. The prestige has resulted in attracting staff from a variety of sources-government, university, other international organizations. The result is that it has become the principal initiator of proposals advancing integration.

In spite of the hierarchical structure of CARICOM the decision- making processes are decentralized. With the exception of the Heads of Government of the Common Market Council, power is distributed between independent ministerial committees of equal competence, who make decisions in their areas. The experience to date has indicated the pre-eminence of the Common Market Council in the day-to-day affairs of the community. This is related to its composition, the frequency of its meetings and the powers delegated to it by the Heads of Government. Most overnments

his deputy or one of his very senior colleagues. The Council meets three or four times a year in regular sessions, compared to other institutions which meet once a year or even more infrequently. The Conference has delegated to Council its financial powers. Thus Council approves the annual budget for the Secretariat and the work programme. It can therefore influence its overall activities, through controlling the size of the staff and the distribution of resources. Furthermore, economic integration continues to dominate the activities of the community. Council therefore not only enjoys pre-eminence in functions but prestige and real power.

Decisions are made within the committees on the principle of unanimity. To this extent CARICOM is a classic case of ‘government by committee’ in which each state has a veto. There is no provision (as in the case of the East African community) for a legislative body of representatives. Proposals originate either direct from member governments or from the Secretariat. In

are represented in the Council either by the Head of 8 overnment,

10Article 11 of the Treuty.

2 20 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES practice the Secretariat has been the principal initiator. It usually convenes the meetings, prepares a draft agenda for consideration by governments, drafts most of the papers with proposals and circulates the bulk of the documentation. To some extent this is the result of its right to initiate studies and make recommendations for the advancement of the Community. However, member governments seem to place more reliance on it to initiate proposals because of its technical competence, its considerable prestige and the limited technical capacity of some member governments. In addition, owing to the decentralised nature of the inter- governmental institutions and the absence of effective machinery at the national level, the Secretariat is the only institution in a position to coordinate the activities of the community as a whole.

Acceptance of proposals by the ministerial bodies is influenced by the process of formulation. At the preparatory level the Secretariat convenes meetings of technicians from member governments or specialized institutions. These officials are usually responsible for the formulation of proposals and the implementation of decisions at the national level, and represent their governments at the meetings of officials which normally precede those of ministers. The proposals are then submitted for consideration to the preparatory meeting of national officials. They are finally submitted for approval to the ministers with the endorsement of the officials. Only in rare cases when proposals have had the unanimous recommendation of officials are they modified or rejected.

The ministerial bodies are empowered to make decisions or recommendations. The former are binding on member states, while the latter are expected to be adopted though not legally binding. Decisions are not published, but conveyed to governments in confidential reports prepared by the Secretariat.

Implementation is left entirely to the national administrative structures. Decisions are binding on states rather than individuals, so that each state decides the method by which each decision is implemented and incorporated in its domestic legal system. The Secretariat’s role is limited to requesting information about implementation and submitting progress reports to the various ministerial bodies.

THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN CARICOM

The aims of CARICOM and the constraints surrounding its emergence impose an unusually critical responsibility for the

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY 22 I

success of the enterprise on its institutions. With few exceptions the CARICOM Treaty represents intentions more than actuality. It outlines goals but leaves the specific mechanisms, the timing and the method of implementation to be determined by the Institutions. The question, then, is whether the institutions possess the capacity to take those decisions. The answer relates principally to the structure and operating principles of the inter- governmental institutions, as CARICOM has no decision-making institution at this level comparable to the Commission in the European Community or the Board in the Andean Group. The wide powers granted to the intergovernmental organs are a poor substitute. Unlike the East African Community, CARICOM has no provision for a ministerial body resident at the Headquarters. Neither is the chairman of the Ministerial Committees, who is selected by rotation, given any authority between meetings ; nor is there an organ empowered to make decisions, as in ASEAN with its Standing Committee of resident ambassadors.

The built-in veto enjoyed by every member State is capable of frustrating any further development. Even when decisions are arrived at in certain critical areas, the process is time-consuming and is often characterized by compromises which detract from their effectiveness.

Furthermore, there is the possibility that some governments might be persuaded to abstain from the decision-making process or even agree to a proposal because it controls the implementation and could frustrate it at that level.

There is the further problem that some governments lack the capacity to implement decisions even when they are willing to do so. Specifically, there is a weakness in the coordination of regional policies at the national level : at present none of the governments have effective machinery for inter-departmental consultation and coordination. This has resulted in the absence of a coordinated, well-defined, national position on many issues. It is therefore not uncommon for a member government to approve one aspect of a regional project in one inter-governmental committee and oppose it in another.

Related to the problem of lack of coordination is the shortage of trained personnel with the necessary technical and managerial skills effectively to manage national policies. The addition of regional policies in such a situation can only exacerbate the problem. As in other regions, the establishment of regional institutions tends to attract some of the more competent and experienced technicians from national governments, or to com-

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Pete with them for the limited number of available trained personnel.

At the operational level, ‘government by committee’ places a serious burden on the already limited human and financial resources of member states. The decision-making processes, characterized by frequent meetings, result in constant absences by ministers and their senior advisers. Over the past two years there has been an average of about one hundred and thirty meetings annually, lasting from two to five days each. In the smaller territories the problem is aggravated where one minister has responsibility for several portfolios. As these are also senior ministers, backed up by officials with heavy external and domestic commitments, regional affairs cannot receive their full attention. This problem assumes added significance in view of the reliance upon those officials to implement decisions.

Frequent meetings and the necessity to travel also make the process rather expensive, because of the geographical dispersion of the territories and the high cost of air travel. One result is that some governments have been unable to send representatives to certain meetings. The financial burden must also be viewed within the context of the proliferation of institutions required for the administration and operation of new mechanisms.

The reluctance of member governments to confer decision- making power on any regional institution and particularly on the CARICOM Secretariat has necessitated the creation of separate institutions for each new area of productive activity. For example, the movement towards rationalization of agriculture has already resulted in the establishment of three new bodies, the Caribbean Food Corporation, the Corn and Soyabean Corporation, and the Caribbean Agricultural Research Development Institute, with the prospect of others coming into existence. At the same time some of the areas in the Treaty such as industrial programming and coordination of foreign policy have suffered by the shortage of technical personnel both at the regional and national level. Highlighting of these problems does not however suggest that the institutions have been totally ineffective.“ On the contrary,

l1 For favourable assessments of CARICOM’s performance see the following speeches by Alister McIntyre: ‘Recent Developments in CARICOM’, November 1971 ; ‘CARICOM Today’. January 1976; ‘Evolution of the Process of Integration in the Caribbean and the current situation and Perspectives of CARICOM’, June 1976. Georgetown Caribbean Community Secretariat. See also Byron Blake and Kenneth Hall, ‘Major Developments in CARICOM : I 97 j ’, Caribbean Yearbook o International Relations,

contrasting appraisals see articles in Caribbean Contact July and August I 977. especially those by Trevor Farrell, Havelock Brewster, Clive Thomas and Norman Giman.

edited by Leslie Manigat, Trinidad, Institute of Internationa { Relations, 1976. For

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY 223

the record of the past four years is one of substantial advancement in the arrangement for intra-regional trade, monetary and financial cooperation, rationalization of agriculture, coordination of external economic policies and arrangements for intra-regional transportation. There have also been significant developments in certain functional areas, particularly in health, education, sports, culture, harmonization of laws and tax administration.

The frequent meetings of ministers and officials have provided opportunities for the settlement of conflicts through both the formal and informal channels. They also facilitate the development of close links between the Secretariat officials and national officials on the one hand and among national officials themselves. This is of particular importance in view of the range.of activities which are undertaken and the absence of representative institutions linking the Caribbean peoples. These meetings have undoubtedly contributed to greater understanding between decision-makers, dispersed as they are over such a large geographical area with limited transportation and communication facilities and a long heritage of mutual ignorance. The participation of the officials and the relevant Ministers in the initiation, formulation and decision-making process assists the process of implementation, in that they are thus involved in all stages of the process. The decentralization of decision-making also permits development in some areas even when the supreme organ does not meet.

CONCLUSIONS

CARICOM’s institutional and administrative framework closely approximates to the criteria recommended by the UNCTAD conference on institutional structure and processes for integration movements among developing countries. Like EAC, ECOWAS and CACEU, CARICOM’s inter-governmental hierarchy is crowned by the Heads of Government, who have supreme policy- making power in all matters of co-operation. It is, however, unique in the number of ministerial committees empowered to

5 deliberate and take decisions on issues within their competence. Nearly every national portfolio has its committee at the regional level, where the minister and officials meet their counterparts from the eleven other member states. These bodies have power not merely to deal with short-term objectives but are expected to initiate and decide upon actions for the achievement of long-term goals. They may also create new institutions as circumstances warrant.


The structure allows maximum participation by national officials at all stages of the decision-making process and gives them exclusive responsibility for implementation. It also faci- litates the development of alliances between regional and national officials, and removes mutual suspicions which often impede the process of regional integration. This tendency is strengthened by the policy of the Secretariat to have a national balance in its staff composition. In addition, many of the Secretariat staff are senior officials of national governments, recruited on secondment. There is provision for participation by international experts and interest groups, who attend some ministerial committees as observers. For example the Common Market Council meets once per year with the Joint Consultative Group made up of business, consumer and trade union groups, to discuss issues of direct concern to them.

The establishment of the Secretariat from the inception of CARICOM reflects the recognition that a highly qualified group of technical personnel was critical to the success of the regional movement. The recent decision to create two divisions-the Division of Functional Cooperation and the Sectoral Policy and Planning Division-suggests that the inter-governmental organs are determined to strengthen that body to cope with the intensification of the process. It is true that no additional powers have been granted to the Secretariat, but the recent call for the establishment of a Commissioner system might be interpreted as a move towards providing an effective administrative and policy- making machinery. The establishment of inter-governmental corporations with effective authority to manage those enterprises point in the same direction. There has also been some flexibility in the agreements establishing regional projects, whereby they could operate without full membership. This permits some member states to delay participation until they are in a position to do so, as well as enabling those projects to continue even if one member state withdraws. The West Indies Shipping Corporation (WISCO) and the Caribbean Food Corporation (CFC) are examples of this trend.

These institutional and administrative features have made CARICOhf not merely acceptable to its members, but increas- ingly also a model for other developing countries, especially in Africa. In this connection it is significant that the Chairman of the Review Committee of the East African Community is William Denias, former Secretary-General of CARICOM and now President of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), who is widely recognized as the chief architect of CARICOM. There are

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY z z j

also signs of dose cooperation between CARICOM and African groups as ECOWAS, the Mano Union, the CACEU and ECA.

Des ite these features CARICOM’s institutional structure has

achievement to date. The imbalance in the distribution of power between the inter-governmental and Community institutions supports this view. Compared with the Andean group, where power is more evenly distributed between the Council and the Junta, CARICOM’s structure leaves much to be desired. Its structure and processes are totally dependent on the ‘political will’ of the twelve national states, represented in inter-governmental committees, for its effective operation. The existence of that ‘will’ at the inception of CARICOM is no guarantee that it can be maintained in future. The experience of other integration groups has demonstrated that in times of economic crises or where there are radically divergent political ideologies national interests tend to dominate regional concerns, and governments act unilaterally in accordance with their perceptions and ideological objectives. Under such circumstances CARICOM is likely to experience similar crises as those currently in the EAC and CACM.

The requirement of unanimity and the possession of a veto by each member state have the potential to immobilize the institutions. From this perspective the absence of a Community institution with adequate power and authority to articulate regional concerns and implement regional decisions is an urgent problem. This is particularly urgent in CARICOM’s case where several members have very limited capacities to formulate and implement regional programmes, and where few if any member states possess effective coordination machinery at the national level.

It must be recognized, however, that the existing structure and processes were created in the full awareness that they were not ideal but rather reflected what was politically possible in 1973. To some extent the institutional and administrative structure display the legacies of previous successes of regional cooperation. It would have been impossible to justify fusing several organizations simply on grounds of administrative tidiness. Furthermore, the creativity and innovation shown by the technocrats and political leaders in creating structures to meet Caribbean conditions and needs cannot be doubted. Whether that will be sufficient to bridge the gap between the aims of CARICOM and the structures and processes created to achieve them must necessarily await events.

been B escribed as weak, judged either by its responsibility or its

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Documents

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS