The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role

Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 3 1, No. 3 September 1993

The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role

CHRISTOPHER HILL* London School of Economics

Introduction

In 1982 Bull and Kahler surveyed different aspects of the European Communi- ty’s role in the world for the twentieth anniversary of the Journal of Common Market Studies.l Even if not died in the wool realists, they both evinced considerable scepticism about the external achievements claimed for the Com- munity during the 1970s, based as they had been on a ‘civilian’ diplomacy but not on military force. Bull, with typical directness but also foresight, argued that the Europeans would need to develop a military capability through the Western European Union if they were ever to be taken seriously on the great issues of international relations.Even then, this would only be a form of ‘concert’ or alliance. Supranationalism would not work in foreign policy. Kahler, for his part, had little time for the grandiloquent claims made for the LomC Conventions concluded by the Community with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (the ACPs) as a model for a new North-South future. In his view the

*This is a revised version of a paper given at the 30th anniversary conference of the Journal ofcommon Murkef Studies, held in Edinburgh 20-2 November 1992 with the generous support of the Ford Foundation. In writing this article I have benefited from the comments of many colleagues, but in particular from those of David Allen, Renaud Dehousse, Philipp Borinski and Michael Smith. ’ Wolfgang Hager also wrote a piece on the external dimension, but this dealt with the specific question of protectionism.

@Basil Blackwell Ltd 1993,108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 11F. UK and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02 142, USA

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Community’s development policy was rather a fading remnant of colonialism largely engineered by France for its own national purposes.

Looked at from the perspective of 1993, Bull and Kahler seem coolly prescient. Recent dramas over the Gulf, the Uruguay Round and Yugoslavia seem to show that the Community is not an effective international actor, in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events. The realist view that the state is the basis of power and interest in the international system, and that the uneven distribution of military strength is a still a formidable factor in determining outcomes, has correspondingly damaged the Community’s image as a powerful and progressive force in the reshaping of the international system. This article goes a certain way towards reinforcing such a view (in that it cautions against expecting too much of the European Community as an international actor), but it does not do so in terms of a debate between realism and idealism, between the idea of the Community as a loose amalgam of independent nation-states and the concept of a civilian power whose example might transform international relations. The aim here, in working to a brief of conceptualizing Europe’s international role, is to look at the functions which the Community (EC) might be fulfilling in the international system, but also at the perceptions which are held of its role by third parties. The central argument is that the Community’s capabilities have been talked up, to the point where a significant capability-e~pectations gap exists, and that this is already presenting the EC with difficult choices and experiences that are the more painful for not being fully comprehended. The article ends by trying to sketch a more realistic picture of what the Community does in the world than that presented either by its more enthusiastic supporters or by the dernandeurs beyond its borders.

Starting Points

Since it is often necessary to go back a little in order to advance further, I want here to clear some of the methodological ground necessary for such a discussion. In the first instance, it is important to stress that although the intention is to show how we might think accurately about Europe’s international capability - that is, to ‘conceptualize’ it - this does not mean that the more ambitious undertaking of providing a theory which might explain and predict Europe’s behaviour is being undertaken. The attentive reader will uncover even more theoretical assumptions in the analysis than those which are explicitly spelled out, but the whole enterprise is essentially pre-theoretical in the sense that it fashions certain general ideas and arguments which might be useful in the construction of a wider theory, without attempting the systematic linking together characteristic of theory proper. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1993

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In any case, it is possible to argue that the experience of ‘European foreign policy’ over the last 20 years or so has been so unique that the search for one theory to explain its evolution is doomed to fail and that we must fall back on history. This is not to say, of course, that various different kinds of social science theories, depending on the level of analysis chosen, are not highly relevant to an understanding of the phenomenon in question. One might, for example, use theories of bureaucratic behaviour to look at the Commission and national foreign ministries, and theories of dependency to look at European relations with the Third World. Neither would focus sharply or parsimoniously enough on the central issue of what European foreign policy is and how its evolution may be understood,2 but each would contribute one layer of insight into a complicated and multifaceted problem.

Perhaps the problem is essentially normative, and simpler than we imagine. One observer’s response to a question about Europe’s international role was to say that Europe’s task was to compete with Japan and the United state^.^ There would be no shortage of people keen to join issue with this interpretation, and a primarily political discussion would ensue. But one of the starting points here is that too much of the discussion thus far has been normative, and that i t has obscured the analysis of what actually has been happening. Rather more conceptual unpicking is required than has so far been the order of the day.

A further starting point is that to try to identify a distinctive ‘role’ for Europe in the world is something of a mare’s nest, not least because this too requires a normative debate, but this time masquerading under the spurious objectivity of an analytical taxonomy. The idea of a role as the basis for any foreign policy has severe limitations (Hill, 1979). It assumes that an actor can and should find for itself something approximating to apart played on a stage, namely a distinctive, high-profile and coherent identity. But if all were to seek this in international relations, then nationalism inexorably would follow, whereas, when the most powerful do so they are likely to be deluded into looking for ‘a place in the sun’, ‘the leadership of the free world’ and other apparent panaceas, instead of concentrating on the more tedious work of crafting the endless necessary compromises between national interests and the long-run requirements of a working international system.

So, ‘conceptualizing Europe’s international role’ is taken here to involve using concepts to understand Europe’s various activities in the world; it does not mean outlining a single ‘role’ which Europe does or might follow. But this in turn brings us to the last definitional problem - what is ‘Europe’? This dilemma bedevils all who think about the theory and practice of modem international

* In the interests of brevity this discussion does not distinguish between positivist theories and ‘verstehen’ approaches, set against each other in Hollis and Smith (1991). even if it leans towards the latter.

Susan Strange, in a seminar at the European University Institute. Fiesole, November 1992.

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relations, particularly in the post- 1989 period. Several recent works have reflected helpfully on the multiple identities of contemporary Europe -the EC as Europe or as a nucleus of Europe, Europe as a wider security community, Europe as a grouping of developed capitalist economies (OECD Europe), Europe as an exclusive cultural entity (Neumann and Welsh, 1991) and so on. The criteria can be geographical, political, institutional, economic, moral or any combination of the five (Wallace, 1990; Barb6 and Grasa, 1992). The focus here will be on the record in world affairs over the last 25 years of the EC and its Member States - a difficult enough task given the unique combination the concept represents of a semi-supranational entity working alongside sovereign states. If we try to take wider geo-political areas which are still in a state of flux, such as CSCE-Europe, or even the more limited idea of Europe from Brest to the Caspian, it becomes impossible to say anything durable or precise, not least because the whole question of who is going to be in and who outside the EC is highly uncertain.

The focus of the discussion in this article is therefore on the pattern of activity of the Twelve since the beginning of European Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1970, including their relations with various categories of outsiders. In doing this we shall base the analysis on two key concepts, neither of which fits easily into the traditional schools of thought about the Community. We have already seen, for example, how the realism/idealism debate is too cramping, despite the useful contributions of DuchCne (1972), De Vree (1987), Pijpers (1991), and other^,^ Equally, although the recent interest of Hoffman, Keohane and Andrew Moravc- sik (Keohane and Hoffman, 199 1) in the EC has helped to revive neo-functional and neo-institutional approaches to integration theory, this has yet to extend to the special area which is EC external relations, consisting of the interaction between the Commission’s diplomacy on behalf of the Community and EPC. Moreover the Harvard approach is highly materialist and rationalist in its stress on ‘interstate bargains’ (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 75), deals and side-payments between governments who at certain times discover their ‘converging preferences’. It does not promise to translate well into the foreign policy field, where past trauma, common values, institutional evolution and ideological earth- quakes are more likely to provide convincing explanations of the changing patterns of diplomacy.

The two indispensable concepts which do not derive neatly from any of the major schools of thought about integration are actorness and presence. ‘Actor- ness’ in the world is something which most non-theoretical observers automatically assume that the European Community possesses, but which on closer examination might be seriously doubted, on the grounds that the EC in foreign

Francois DuchCne invented the term ‘civilian power’ in 1972. For a more recent statement of a broadly idealist position, see Ludlow (1991). Hill (1990) provides an overview of the various approaches.


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policy is solely intergovernmental, and is therefore no more than the sum of what the Member States severally decide. The truth, as those writers who have addressed the problem have pointed out, is that the Community is a genuine international actor in some respects but not all, and that what is fascinating about the history of the last 20 years is to assess the various efforts which have been made to increase the scope of actorness, as well as the consequences in this respect of the more organic changes in the relations between the EC and the rest of the world (Sjostedt, 1977; Taylor, 1982). ‘Actorness’ provides us with a theoretical perspective which can incorporate both the internal dynamics of institutional development (in this case CFSP) and the changing nature of the international environment in which it has to operate. In other words, if the EC is less than a state, but more than a conventional intergovernmental organization (IGO), in what ways can it be termed a genuinely independent actor in international relations? This approach enables us to chart the EC’s changing role in the world without becoming distracted by the ‘is it or isn’t it a superpower’ red herring (Bull, of course, took the view in 1983 (p. 15 1 ) that “‘Europe” is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one’, but few would follow him so far). Following Sjostedt, an international actor can be said to be an entity which is ( 1 ) delimited from others, and from its environment; which is (2) uutonomous, in the sense of making its own laws and decisions (‘sovereignty’ could be used here were it not for the spectre of statehood which the term raises); and which (3) possesses certain structural prerequisites for action on the international level, such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties.

The second concept, taken from Allen and Smith, is that of western Europe’s ‘variable and multidimensional presence’ in international affairs, which accepts the reality of a cohesive European impact on international relations despite the messy way in which it is produced (Allen and Smith, 1990, p. 20). In other words, it gets us off the hook of analysing EPC in terms of sovereignty and supranationalism, which might lead us to suppose that there was in fact no European foreign policy when common sense and the experience of other states tell us precisely the opposite (Brewin, 1987, is illuminating on the theoretical aspects of this paradox). It is a consequentialist notion which emphasizes outside perceptions of the Community and the significant effects it has on both the psychological and the operational environments of third parties. The presence of the Community is certainly felt in most international organizations, in international economic diplomacy, throughout the European subsystem and its borderlands, in the Third World, and wherever mediated solutions to international conflicts are sought. The extent to which outsiders are puzzled as to whether they should negotiate with the Community or with separate Member



States demonstrates the political ‘ m i ~ i t y ’ ~ which characterizes the Twelve’s relations with the rest of the world, and therefore the presence of the Community alongside its parts.

External Demands

Before we can make a sensible assessment of the Community’s actual and potential capabilities, we need to look at the various functions which it performs, and might need to perform, in the international system. It would be a mistake to attribute collective will or personality to the international system, which is essentially a set of regularized processes that provides its constituent elements with some of the most powerful givens of their existence (Waltz, 1979). Nonetheless, analysts can make judgements about the importance of the Community in the international system, and the world’s other major actors certainly have views on what the EC should and should not contribute to the functioning of the whole.

‘Functions’ in this context is a difficult term to use; there is no implication intended either of clearly demarcated tasks, agreed by the rest of the international community, or of a mechanistic system where each unit repetitively performs tasks without which the whole would not survive. Politics is not so neat or so integrated. But we can assume that within the international states system some actors have an identifiable presence, to the extent that certain things would either not have occurred, or would have been done very differently, without their existence.

On this basis we can divide the analysis into two parts, looking at the four functions which the EC has performed up to the present in the international system, and the six which it might perform in the future.

EC Functions in the International System up to the Present

( 1 ) The stabilizing of western Europe. The EC has not, of course, been the only cause of the peace which has become institutionalized in the region since 1945 (the Cold War paradoxically also takes some credit, together with economic growth), but without the Community such key elements as Franco-German entente and the democratic transitions of Greece, Portugal and Spain would have been much less likely.

(2) Managing world trade. World trade is not very effectively ‘managed’ even through the GATT, but to the extent that it is, the EC is the single most important actor in the negotiating process which produces the various trade

‘Mixity’ is essentially a legal term arising out of the ‘mixed agreements’ signed simultaneously by the Community and its Member States in such areas as the environment and international commodity negotiations (Groux and Manin, 1985, pp. 58-69). 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1993

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regimes. At around 16 per cent (excluding intra-EC trade) it has the biggest share of any state or trading group in world trade, and its weight has become steadily more apparent over the 35 years since 1958, culminating in the dramatic external impact of the Single Market programme after 1985 (Redmond, 1992). Although the Twelve conduct the major part of their trade with each other, a trend which enlargement would accentuate, there is no chance of the Commu- nity ceasing to be, with the USA and Japan, one of the crucial players in world trade politics for the foreseeable future.

(3) Principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South. In the 1970s the EC constructed an unusual and imaginative development policy with the first two LomC Conventions, to the effect that not only did the EC and its Members become easily the most important source of aid in the developed world, but also the rich countries most likely to win trust and exert influence in the South, particularly in Africa, where American, Japanese and Soviet policies were either absent or ineffective. Since then it is arguable that this position has atrophied, partly because of the structural limits on co-operation between very poor and relatively rich states, and partly because of ideological shifts in the 1980s. Nonetheless, the EC remains the principal interlocuteur with the poor majority in the UN. With the inclusion of the LomC system, the Mediterranean preferences, and its agreements with ASEAN and the Contadora countries, the EC enjoys institutionalized relations with at least 90 of the world’s poorer countries, who in turn constitute around 80 per cent of the membership of the United nation^.^

(4 ) Providing a second western voice in international diplomacy. It may or may not be true that multipolarity provides more stability in the international system than bipolarity (Rosenau, 1969, Part 4A) in which case the development of a collective European diplomacy has served wider needs than its own, but EPC has certainly evolved because of a perceived need to provide an alternative view to that of the United States, both within the western world and on behalf of it. US leadership has served European interests well in many respects, but the gradual changes of historical context during the 1960s and 1970s have high- lighted the problems. Accordingly, and channelled largely through EPC, a second and increasingly distinctive western voice has emerged, particularly where there seem to be possibilities of mediating dangerous conflicts between third states. We have now reached the point where even the United States looked first to the EC to manage the reconstruction of eastern Europe after 1989, and

In 1987 41 per cent of the trade of the 12 Member States was with the wider world, and 59 per cent with each other. In I990 the figure was almost exactly the same (Eurostur, I989 and I991,26th and 28th edns, Luxembourg: OOPEC, Fig. 1.16). ’ By ‘institutionalized relations’ is meant regular meetings, formal agreements and an EC commitment to assist with future development.



to stabilize ex-Yugoslavia (Edwards, 1992; Jorgensen, 1993). That it has not been able to do so does not invalidate the point that the EC has achieved a salience in the international political system which was simply absent in the 1960s.

Conceivable Future Functions for the EC in the Current Flux

Given that the international system is in a condition of transition, without anyone having much idea of the end point, that the Soviet Union has disap- peared, and that the United States is in no position to exert worldwide leadership, it is not surprising that amore self-confident and maturing EC should seem capable of extending its global activity. There are six main ways in which it might do so. The EC is potentially:

( i ) A replacementfor the USSR in the global balance ofpower. If we assume, with traditional accounts of international relations, that there always exists either a balance of power or a tendency towards balancing preponderant power, then we are drawn to the conclusion that there is now a power vacuum in the international system. One of its two major forces, locked together in an antagonistic equilibrium, has suddenly been removed from the scene, with destabilizing consequences which are becoming ever more apparent. On the further assumption that, at least in the short term, the nature of international relations cannot be transformed into a post-power politics, we shall need to think of the EC as a candidate to fill the vacuum. There is certainly no alternative in terms of balancing American strength globally. It would be a mistake to think that this means ineluctable military rivalry. Fortunately grand strategy between similar social systems is more likely to revolve around economics and diplomacy than armed might. But there can be no doubt that even if the EC takes over only some of the roles left vacant by the Soviet Union, then competition and conflict with the USA will increase in proportion.

( i i ) Regional pacifier. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union’s iron fist from central and eastern Europe has created the possibility of serious disputes breaking out between and within the newly liberated states of the region. Since the United States is currently looking to reduce rather than to increase its commitments in Europe, while the EC is becoming ever more ambitious, it falls to the latter to act as mediator/coercive arbiter when the peace of the whole region seems under threat. This has clearly been the general expectation (so far unmet) in the case of Yugoslavia. In institutional terms, it means the Community acting as the motor for the CSCE and for the Council of Europe, taking its legitimacy from the broader constituency of states and citizens represented in these fora, but itself providing the dynamism and capacity to mobilize resources for action that purely parliamentary bodies are unlikely to achieve. The EC also



has the capacity to act as a magnet and a model for the countries of eastern Europe. If all persist in wanting to join the Community, then the latter will by definition dominate the international politics of Europe, although it will risk destabilization itself. If, on the other hand, it can achieve a structure in which most countries to the east remain outside but closely tied to the EC, then there is the chance of being able to promote similar forms of international co- operation among the non-member countries.

(iii) Global intervenor. Growing out of the previous two potential functions is the possibility of the EC intervening in crises on a global basis. If it becomes a hegemon in Europe, however benign, then the pressures and opportunities which already exist for action further afield are bound to multiply. If relations with the United States deteriorate, then Europe may end up competing with American interventions; if they stay sound, then the Europeans may have to face substituting for a less outwardly-oriented USA. What this means -and it should not be hidden in euphemisms - is that the EC would interfere, on occasions by military force but more often with economic and political instruments, in states or regions where instability seemed likely to threaten European interests and/or the peaceful evolution of the international community of states. At present it seems likely that this second criterion would be judged by the Security Council of the United Nations (where the Europeans have at least a quarter of the votes and two-fifths of the vetoes), but such a legitimization might well not be seen as necessary in the future.In minimalist form an intervention might resemble the limited humanitarian operation of the USA in Somalia in late 1992 and early 1993. In maximalist terms, it might mean the Europeans choosing to take major responsibility for a ‘Desert Storm’ style campaign, instead of just making up the American numbers.

( iv) Mediator of conflicts. The line between forceful intervention and the provision of services to enable third parties to resolve their conflicts is a fine one. But it is easier and more natural at present for the EC to act diplomatically than to exert coercion, even economically. Thus we saw considerable diplomatic effort and creativity in the early stages of the Yugoslavian imbroglio, continued thereafter in harness with the United Nations. Over a much longer period, EPC has made it a major priority to work at narrowing the gap between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and eventually it might well be judged to have had some success. If any state or group of states is to achieve much in the area of mediation, then the EC has more claims than most. Between them, its Member States can claim considerable experience in relations with most parts of the globe, they have come through the period of decolonization without incurring too much long-term odium, and thus far they possess the singular advantage of not being perceived as a superpower and potential hegemon. Individual European states carry historical baggage which makes


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them distrusted in states such as Iran and Iraq; collectively, they represent more of a new beginning, and their claim to neutrality carries more weight.

(v) Bridge between rich and poor. As we have seen, the ‘privileged’ relations between the EC and the poor majority in the international system have deteriorated in recent years, while still leaving the Europeans pre-eminent among developed states in their concern for the south. The Community now faces an important choice in this respect: whether to accept the impossibility of a special relationship with avery large number of countries at amuch lower level of wealth and power, thus allowing the Lome system to peter out, or whether to make renewed efforts (political and financial) to assist with the relief of poverty and to prevent North-South relations degenerating into mutual hostility or disregard. Nor is this is an academic choice. European decisions on central questions like agriculture, immigration, the budget and the environment, to say nothing of trade, will automatically have profound repercussions for the poor states who look to Brussels for help. It follows that unless the Community is now to be indifferent to the Third World, it should factor these considerations into its overall policy-making process. Concrete and short-term interests certainly must be protected, but internal and external policies are now umbili- cally connected, and the EC should at least be aware of the trade-offs at stake, not least on such a significant issue for the long-term future of its own external environment.

(vi) Joint supervisor of the world economy. The recent dominance of laissez- faire thinking notwithstanding, it is more and more evident that the notion of ‘a world economy’ with attendant management needs is taking hold in the minds of public and private decision-makers. Accordingly, it is increasingly important for governments to find mechanisms whereby such influence as they can exert over the vicissitudes of the market is efficiently co-ordinated. In practice, this means the most powerful economies of the western world joining together in the yearly G-7 summits, in the IMF ministerial meetings and in the Group of Ten meetings of central bankers. The EC states are already powerfully represented in this process, and the opportunity lies before them to increase their weight of influence. With even limited progress towards a single currency, the Europeans will be more likely to make international monetary decisions the preserve of themselves, Japan and the United States. On the trade front, the history of the Uruguay Round has shown how the GATT has become a forum for trials of strength between the EC (strengthened by the Single Market progamme) and the USA, while the G-7 will become a G-3, with Canada in the observers’ gallery, if the major European states can hold together and develop a common sense of identity. This would mean developing an actorness it does not currently possess in the IMF, World Bank, International Atomic Energy Agency et al., both in tenns of institutional recognition and the capacity to act coherently and



consistently. If this happens a further issue opens up, that of whether a ‘G-3 world’ (and such modish simplifications should always be suspect) would mean the EC working in harness with Japan and the US, or whether it would produce tripolar conflict and instability.

The Capability-Expectations Gap

The above tasks -which the Community will certainly be expected to perform by many influential insiders and outsiders - pose a serious challenge to the actual capabilities of the EC, in terms of its ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal. It is arguable, indeed, that the Community has been talked up - as a result of the Single Market and the Intergovernmental Conferences of 1991 - to a point where it is not capable of fulfilling the new expectations already (and often irrationally) held of it. This is true both of the number and the degree of the expectations.8 Demands, whether for money, preferences or political assistance are flowing in from the Maghreb, southern Africa, central America, Afghanistan and Cambodia, to say nothing of eastern Europe and the pressure to join the EC from at least a dozen neighbouring countries. The extent of the demands is often unmanageable: stability and democracy for eastern Europe, a ‘solution’ for the Yugoslav crisis, relief for Third World poverty, all loom dauntingly on the horizon. Even with a clear strategy, which the Community demonstrably lacks over at least eastern Europe and the enlargement question, it would be difficult to cope with this flood-tide.

Historical developments such as that of European unity, even leaving aside the obvious teleological problems, are always a slower business than impatient politicians and idealists would wish. The Community does not have the resources or the political structure to be able to respond to the demands which the Commission and certain Member States have virtually invited through their bullishness over the pace of internal change. The consequential gap which has opened up between capabilities and expectations is dangerous. As with Slov- enia and Croatia, and perhaps also the Baltic states, it can lead to excessive risk- taking by supplicant states and/or unrealistic policies on the part of the Twelve. Still, it is possible that this is essentially a transitional condition, brought on by growing pains, and that the general direction of the Community’s development will eventually resolve it. To examine this possibility, and to judge how near to comprehensive actorness the EC is, it is worth outlining the theoretical charac- teristics of a single, effective, foreign policy and then measuring the Commu- nity’s achievements against them. It is surprisingly difficult to find models of

’ For a rather more optimistic view of the ‘challenges’ facing the Community, see Rummel(l992, pp. 1 I - 33 and 297-319).



what a proper European foreign policy would mean, practically and constitu- tionally.

Even the European Parliament’s Draft Treaty of Union of 1984, which went as far as it dared, did not spell out systematically what a fully-fledged foreign policy system would look like in the Community context (Bieber et al., 1985). Moreover in practice EPC, and its link with Community external relations, have grown quietly and in piecemeal fashion. Where questions of fundamental change have arisen, especially with constitutional ramifications, they have been quickly slapped down or evaded. But if the Community system evolves further, and if demand for Community actions continues to rise, such empiricism will soon become untenable. A European foreign policy worthy of the name will require an executive capable of taking clear decisions on high policy matters, and of commanding the resources and instruments to back them up. They will need to enjoy democratic legitimacy and also to have a sophisticated bureauc- racy at their disposal. Table 1 attempts an outline of these basic powers and associated mechanisms.

It will be seen from the proliferation of ‘N’s and ‘?’s in Table 1 that very few of the pieces are yet in place for the EC to acquire the federal foreign policy (for that is what is at issue here), which would give it the external quality of a state (and ipsofacto superpower status). Indeed, when the requirements are so baldly set down the obstacles to be cleared before this point is reached seem almost insuperable. We can even query the Community’s ‘regulation of commerce’ capability by reference to the Member States’ ultimate control over initiating and implementing economic sanctions. Moreover there is still a great deal of differentiation, not to say ambiguity, in the current structure. For instance the Court of Justice has competence over the EC Treaty but not over the CFSP provisions.

And yet . . . there is the familiar sui generis argument, which stresses that the EC does not need and has not needed to acquire state-like qualities to exert an important influence on the world. Furthermore, for each criterion identified above, it is possible to argue that hidden just below the crude surface judgements are degrees of progress so significant that the point where a qualitative leap becomes possible may at last be at hand.

To say this it is necessary to take the long view, and to assume that despite the current setbacks over Maastricht, the CFSP provisions of the Treaty are likely to hold.9 They involve some important developments: the concession of the principle of majority voting; the bringing together of EPC and of the external relations of the Communities into the same process and under the same legal umbrella; the acceptance that defence should no longer be a no-go area for the Community. The merging of the EPC secretariat with that of the Council of qAt the time of writing, ratification of the Treaty is still hanging in the balance.



Table 1 : The Conditions of a Single Foreign Policy

If the EC were to acquire its own foreign policy it would need to possess the following:

Basic Constitutional Powers

War and peace (N)

Raising armed forces (N)

Regulation of commerce (sanctions) (Y?) External borders (immigration) (N?) Cession or acquisition of territory (N) (but for ‘enlargement’) (Y)

Treaty-making (N/Y-EC?)

subject to:

(g) Democratic accountability at the union level (N?)

(h) Judicial scrutiny (NN-EC)

(cf states)

( i i ) Mechanisms and Policies

(a) A single Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic service, with common missions abroad (N)

(b) A single intelligence service (N)

(c) (d) A single development policy

(e)

A single set of armed services

A single cultural policy (?)

(N) (?50%)

(?5%)

Note: (‘Y’ =broadly possesses these powers/mechanisms; ‘N’ =not yet near; figures in brackets suggest how far down the road the EC has gone in creating a common policy. The judgements - inevitably provocative - assume observation of the CFSP provisions of Maastricht, which leaves the three European Communities intact but changes the title of the‘EEC’ to ‘EC’.)

Ministers is now well in hand. In other words, in many of the categories identified in Table 1, significant change has occurred even if it has not yet produced transformations. lo

l o ‘If ratified, the new treaty will undoubtedly become a major landmark in the history of European integration, and will significantly affect Europe’s role in world politics’ (Pijpers, 1992, p. 1).



These things seem vulnerable to the fate of the Maastricht Treaty. A strong contrary argument, however, is that Maastricht’s problems have been largely to do with EMU and with a general perception of technocratic elitism. On this reading most of the CFSP dispositions will survive whatever the fate of the Treaty. The only vulnerable provision is that which enables progress in the area of defence co-0peration.l Even here, the technical nature of the arrangements for the WEU and its relations with the EC is such (as with the rest of the CFSP) that public opinion is not likely to notice the Community being brought nearer to the threshold of radical change by seemingly innocuous administrative incrementalism.

There is, thus, undoubted potential for a single European foreign policy and some of that potential is already being mobilized. But it is equally true that there is still a large capability-expectations gap, and for two reasons: firstly because a coherent system and full actorness are still far from realization; and secondly because this inconvenient fact has often been ignored, (in Brussels as much as in the ‘demandeur’ states), in the heady swirl of international transition. Not just in terms of substantive resources - money, arms, room for immigrants - but in terms of the ability to take decisions and hold to them -the EC is still far from being able to fulfil the hopes of those who want to see it in great power terms.

Defence Capability

This is most clearly seen in the area of defence, where there has been considerable movement in recent years. In fact, as Bull argued 10 years ago, defence is the key to the development of the Community’s place in the world. No doubt there is a circular relationship between the issue of a great new military power emerging on the continent and the general place of force in international relations, but if the Community does not develop the capacity to defend itself and to project military power beyond its borders there will remain a great many things (for good or ill) which it will not be able to do. Conversely if the Community does develop a military dimension, it will have taken an immensely serious step towards transforming itself as an international actor and in conse- quence also external attitudes towards it.

The defence issue is a different category of problem from that of actorness; the EC could conceivably reach the position of being able to act purposefully and as one while eschewing a military capability. But in that case it would have to face the dilemma of either trusting to other forms of security, and/or leaving in place the individual Member States’ armed forces and rights to use them -

I I As exposed during the Danish referendum campaign(s), when one major reason for voters fearing the Treaty was the perceived possibility of Danish young people having to fight foreign wars at other people’s behest. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1993


which course emasculates a collective foreign policy right from the beginning. In this respect, a genuinely European foreign policy cannot simply be an ‘add- on’ to the existing activities of the states, as some would like to believe. In the military sphere, as in the commercial, there is a zero-sum relationship between what the Member States do severally and what they do collectively. This is the classical federal problem. (Dehousse, 1991, chs 1 and 2, although the author is unsympathetic to such an orthodox view, likewise Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990). The cartoon which once showed 12 Prime Ministers voting on whether or not to press the nuclear button pithily summarized the impossibility of having a genuinely intergovernmental defence community (NATO was at bottom a hegemonic defence community, which is why France left its military command structure in 1966 and has not returned). The converse of our initial hypothesis, therefore, does not apply: the EC is unlikely to develop an effective military capacity without also achieving general actorness.

What then, is the position at present in relation to defence? How near are the Europeans to taking on that fabledresponsibility for themselves about which the Americans have talked for so long (and so ambivalently)? Leaving on one side the decision-making/federal issue, there are three aspects to the problem - mutual obligation, operational capacity and resources.

(i) Mutual obligation. It is strange in a way that the question of an alliance obligation has not been given much attention in the Community, given that diplomatic solidarity, security co-operation and citizenship have all been addressed. The small reason for this is Irish neutrality, while the large one is the desire not gratuitously to damage NATO. Yet it must be assumed that if one Member State were to be attacked the others could not stand aside (excepting dependencies like the Falklands) without undermining the very rationale of the Community. Given this and the extensive net of connections between them, the Twelve clearly constitute more than a ‘pluralistic security-community’ in Deutsch’s original sense of the absence of internecine warfare (Deutsch, 1957), but not an ‘amalgamated security community’, where one supreme decision- making centre has been established. It would therefore be logical to spell out the emus foederis for which unity ultimately exists. This need not conflict with other obligations, whether to NATO, the CSCE or the UN, and does not imply that guarantees will be issued to outsiders, ci la Britain and France in 1939. If, on the other hand, NATO does crumble away, the Community should in principle have no problem with at least substituting its commitment to a collective defence policy l 2 - which could hardly have been said even 10 years

I* That is, not ‘collective security’, which strictly speaking refers to arrangements made to control conflict beween members of a grouping. This already exists implicity in the EC, in the sense that the Preambles tothe Coal and Steel Treaty and to the Treaty of Rome both make clear the fundamental purpose of building peace in western Europe, i.e. between France and Germany.



ago, such has been the political sensitivity over European defence collaboration. (ii) Operational capacity. When, in 19834, the major western states made

their ill-fated attempt to interpose military forces between the warring parties in the Lebanon, it was under US leadership and no one supposed that EPC served any function other than that of distant diplomatic chorus. Developments in recent years in the Gulf and Yugoslavia, therefore, particularly in respect of the WEU and its relation to the EC, have been little short of remarkable, fashionable criticisms notwithstanding (for a robust defence of the EC, swimming against the tide, see Gow, 1992; also Jorgensen, 1993). The WEU’s very revival was linked to the desire to get around the block on Community defence discussions, and it has evolved into the position where it is now an inner hub of the EC’s foreign policy-making process. Since 1987 it has made possible sophisticated naval co-ordination in the Gulf, on tanker-protection and mine-sweeping tasks, as well as some strategy and policy co-ordination during the pre-war phase of the 1990-1 crisis (Grove, 1990; Van Eekelen, 1990; Salmon, 1992). WEU- COM, a military equivalent to EPC’s COREU telex network between foreign ministries, has been set up between members’ defence ministries (De Schoutheete, 1990, p. 120). In Yugoslavia the Twelve mandated WEU to organize the first EC monitoring operation,l3 albeit on a very limited scale and increasingly giving way to the UN (Edwards, 1992, p, 176). At the start of 1993 the WEU Headquarters moved to Brussels, anticipating the creation of a CFSP via the Maastricht Treaty. When one adds in the growing institutionalization of Franco-German military co-operation, and the likely spillover into foreign intelligence operations from EPC and from the Trevi process, we can see that there now exists a range of precedents - both practical and political - for the further elaboration of Community operations in the security and defence field.

(i i i) Resources. There are still, of course, enormous obstacles to the creation of a Europeandefence entity, and the lack of resources is among the first of them. The Europeans have become too used to the American subsidy to be able smoothly to make the transition to funding their own security. Nor is it simply a matter of shifting figures from one balance-sheet (NATO, national) to another. Where several parallel frameworks exist simultaneously it will prove impossible not to incur the costs of duplication. Recently, for example, despite the talk of ‘double-hatting’ (the same troops being available for NATO and WEU purposes, referred to in the ‘Declaration on the Western European Union’ attached to the Treaty of Maastricht, section D7) NATO has in principle decided to extend the geographical range for its operations beyond the North Atlantic

”The dispatch of monitors to help in the transition to majority rule in South Africa followed in October 1992, but this had nothing to do with the WEU (EC Bulletin, 10-1992, 1.5.12). The WEU also co-ordinated naval operations to enforce sanctions in the Adriatic from July 1992. see The Military Balance, 1992-93, p. 13). 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1993

EUROPE‘S INTERNATIONAL ROLE 32 1

region, thus making an expansion of responsibilities possible in the long run.14 Domestic pressures, on the other hand, are all in the direction of defence cuts and the squeezing of resources.

It is always more difficult to reduce costs than to add them on, while the turmoil in post-Cold War Europe, and the US desire to shift the burden, both in Europe and globally, will probably nullify any dramatic ‘peace dividend’. Moreover although the Maastricht Treaty talks of the possibility of shifting the operational as well as administrative costs of the CFSP onto the Community budget (Article J.1 I), its drafters certainly did not have a full-scale European defence policy in mind. Just to mention transferring defence expenditure to the Community level is to realize its continued unfeasibility, despite the theoretical economies of scale. It would decisively move the burden of taxation and economic policy-making from the national governments to Brussels. This would be an astounding development, but in practice such things will have to happen before a truly European defence becomes more thinkable. Until then, we have to accept that the Community is a sophisticated alliance, but no more.

The issue area of defence demonstrates a general truth about European foreign policy, namely that there is a dialectical relationship between the substantive and the constitutional. It is not possible to say that either the ‘push’ of institutional reform or the ‘pull’ of the pressing need for a particular common policy (here defence) is responsible for such progress as is made towards a common foreign policy. Change occurs in both ways, interactively, as policy needs and the internal dynamics of the Community create new possibilities, each for the other. Just as often, change occurs very slowly or not at all, while a negative spillover is not unknown in which intra-Community problems undermine external policy, or external embarrassments damage internal cohesion and morale. The current excess of expectations over capabilities threatens to cause problems on both fronts.

The EC-12 as an External Relations System

Given that the EC is still some way from being a full international actor, but that since 1970 it has steadily progressed towards a considerable presence in the world, how can we conceptualize its unique condition? The idea of the ‘capability-expectations’ gap is a useful starting point: it enables us to see that if the gap is to be closed and a dangerous tension relieved in European foreign policy, then either capabilities will have to be increased or expectations decreased. Capabilities, as we have seen, means cohesiveness, resources and operational capacity. If they are to be increased significantly beyond their

l 4 The decision was of the NATO Council Meeting on 4 June 1992, although it was hedged around with references to the need for unanimity in both NATO and the CSCE (The Milirary Balance, p. 29).



present point, then an important political and constitutional leap will probably be necessary (Hill, 1991). Lowering expectations means both lowering one’s own ambitions in foreign policy and commmunicating the fact to outsiders, so that the limits of European actorness and intentions are clearly visible. Only this will put an end to the apparently widespread view of the EC-as-panacea, a cross between Father Christmas and the Seventh Cavalry.

But, with intelligence and time the capability-expectations gap might be closed, and the concept rendered redundant. Furthermore it is a static concept which cannot do full justice to the complexities of the Community’s evolving impact on world politics. More useful is the notion of the E C - w as a system ofexternal relations. By this is meant both that the Europeans represent a subsystem of the international system as a whole, (perhaps the only functioning regional security arrangement, as envisaged in ch. VIII of the UN Charter) and that they are a system (i.e. not a single actor) which generates international relations - collectively, individually, economically, politically - rather than a clear-cut ‘European foreign policy’ as such. This system is essentially ‘decen- tralized’ in Paul Taylor’s term, (Taylor, 1982, p. 41) and consists of three strands (pace the CFSP), as illustrated in Table 2.

This conceptualization covers internal and external aspects, decision-making and the Community’s impact on the international system. It does not in itself tell us where the Community is going in the world, but it does give a more comprehensive analytical basis for prediction than do other approaches. For it is vital to do justice to the three parallel sets of activities, increasingly in- termeshed and easy to confuse in the hurly-burly of political debate, but still essentially distinct, which EC members conduct: their persistently vigorous national policies; their sophisticated co-ordination and common initiatives through EPC; and the highly structured political economy dimension of collective commercial and development policies. It cannot be emphasized sufficiently that there is no evidence to suggest an inexorable (let alone imminent) fusion of the three strands into a single European foreign policy along the lines of a nation- state. Statements to the contrary are usually exercises in wish-fulfilment.16

Indeed, the current complexity of the system exists because not only are there three kinds of decision-making involved, but there are also at least three issue areas cutting across them. This means that the debate about ‘European foreign policy’ has two separate axes: (1) the degree to which policy is conducted on a collective basis; (2) the various issue areas into which policy decomposes in practice. They are expressed diagramatically in Table 3, with examples.

15The term ‘EC-12’ is still necessary,paceMaastricht, to do justice to the life which still remains in national diplomacies. l6 Even Eberhard Rhein, who emphasizes the convergence of EPC with EC external relations accepts that current trends fall short of ‘a real European foreign policy . . . shaped by a single European Foreign Office in a federal system’ (Rhein, 1992, p. 46). 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1993


Table 2: Parallel Systems of International Relations

National Foreign European Political External Relations Policies Co-operation of the ECs

Bilateral relations with Joint declarations with USA, Joint declarations; USA et al. Canada, Japan; privileged co-operation agreements

dialogues

Membership of IGOs

Defence policy; arms production

Commercial competition

Domestic politics

Embassies

UN -convergence in voting; common statements

Membership of GATT; observer status in other IGOs

Security co-operation; WEU ‘Consistency’

Commission participation Common Commercial Policy

European Parliament European Parliament; bureaucratic politics

Co-operation in third External delegations countries

Colonial and post-colonial Co-operation on crime and Enlargement ties terrorism; links to the

Council of Europe et al. ____ ~

Note: The columns contain examples of various aspects of each of the three strands of the system. The rows provide comparisons within the same general issue-area.

Table 3: The Two Axes of European Foreign Policy Actions (with Examples)

Political Military Economic

National Greco-Turkish Force de Export relations frappe credits

Collective Arab-Israeli WEU/NATO GATT policy



A truly European presence in the world would involve collective policies in all major issue areas, thus bringing economics and politics together, as well as rationalizing the decision-making process. At present there are elements of collectivity throughout, but the degree and extent of states’ commitment to co- operate vary considerably. We only have to compare the G-7, where the Commission represents the smaller European states, with the G-5 of the UN Security Council, where the UK and France act independently, to observe the loose character of the system. At present bloc diplomacy is like trying to harness 12 half-broken colts to pull the same carriage.

However the situation is dynamic as well as complex, for there is considerable interplay between the three strands of activities. What individual states do or do not do in their national foreign policies (as with Germany’s aversion to sending troops abroad) sets the limits for collective action. Equally, the common commercial policy, the CAP and now the Single Market lock the Twelve into certain positions in international economic relations which increasingly rever- berate onto EPC - as the very desire for ‘consistency’ betokens. Indeed the Community is now making definite efforts to increase cohesion, first through consistency, and second through ‘linkage’ (Wallace, 1976; Kissinger, 1979, pp. 129-30). Although the practice is still kept at bay in the Euro-American dialogue, where anything more than the most delicate allusion to the fact that disagreement in one sector might damage relations in another is still regarded as bad taste, in relations with the Third World, with eastern Europe and with those states made the object of the EC’s main political weapon, economic sanctions, explicit linkages are now unashamedly being made. l 7

Not all of these linkages are negative or coercive. There now exist Commu- nity ties and cross-linkages with outside states on an extensive scale, with varying degrees of intensity. Some are simple exchange relationships; some involve EC incentives and assistance in order to build up long-term patterns of friendship and stability. It might well be sensible, therefore, to broaden the conceptualization from that of the EC alone to an image of concentric circles, whereby states like the USA and the EFTAns form the closest ring around the EC, followed by a belt including (say) Japan, the CSCE and ASEAN, and then another constituted by the ACPs. l 8

This concept would have the further advantage of making possible the relaxation of the strict division between members and non-members of the EC.

I’ For example, the Commission’s suspension on 2 October 1991 of aid programming, under the fourth Lomt Convention, to Haiti, after a military coup there (EC Bulletin, 10-1991, 1.3.28).

This would be similar to the ‘pyramid of privilege’ notion used by analysts of the EC‘s relations with the LDCs. It even bears some resemblance to the concept of concentric circles boosted by President Mitterrands New Year speech of 1990, with the notable difference that Mitterrand wanted a European confederation, with non-Europeans confined to the outer orbits (Agence Europe, 4 January 1991).

Q Basil Blackwell Ltd 1993


For it is clear that in some respects a variable already exists in foreign policy matters, with some states pressing on towards communautariza- tion and others at least as much concerned with national independence or special relationships. Ireland, and Denmark are still fully integrated into defence co-operation via the WEU; France and Germany have a close bilateral relationship only rivalled by that between the Benelux countries; Britain makes no bones about Washington’s privileged status in London; the Commonwealth and France’s African Community provide preoccupations which do not exist for the other Ten; Italy attempted to develop a central European policy through the Pentagonale/Hexagonale initiatives. In short, there exist foreign policy sub- systems (De Schoutheete, 1990) of which some stretch out beyond the Commu- nity’s membership.

Much of this variability is inevitable. But when it has the effect of undermining EC solidarity on serious issues such as Yugoslavia then the question naturally arises of whether collective action can be sustained over time without a further leap into federalist obligations and structures. The stress on ‘consistency’ since the Single Act can only go so far in creating solidarity. Indeed, the very notion still posits separate strands of activity, which is why it is eschewed in the Maastricht Treaty in favour of proclaiming a Common Foreign and Security Policy. But proclaiming the desirable end-product without providing the means for getting there is insufficient. At present the whole question of the balance of costs and benefits involved in a more fundamental shift of powers, is being evaded.

Ultimately larger political judgements will have to be made about whether something more is required. It may be that some great trauma, internal or external will shock the Twelve into fusing into a single entity, but it is difficult to see anything short of major war provoking a transition to statehood. Given this context, the capability-expectations gap and external confusions will remain embarrassing realities unless a clear decision is made to accept variable geometry and ‘multi-institutionalism’ (Rummel, 1992, p. 3 19) as functional in foreign policy. It may be that even the notion of subsidiarity would be applicable - although the essentially contested nature of that concept would become even more readily apparent in this highly political field. But variability, including openness to co-operation with non-Member States, is really the only option if (1) the present hotchpotch is deemed unacceptable, while (2) the political impetus does not exist for a jump into federalism.

In some ways the external ‘pull’ of the international system represents a powerful force acting on the Twelve to acquire the capacity to pursue the tasks

l9 The metaphors of variable geometry and the concentric circles are preferred to that of a ‘multi-speed Europe’, because the latter implies a single destination at which all will arrive in time. I do not share the teleology. Wallace. H. (1985) analyses all the relevant concepts with great clarity. 0 Basil Blackwell Ltd 1993


which loom before them. But external factors alone cannot ‘federate’ without an internal readiness to do so, and domestic factors in at least four Member- States prevent such a condition coming into being. What is more, although the demands of world politics are increasingly likely to place constitutional questions on the Community’s agenda, the decisions they provoke will have to be decisions about the Community’s fundamental character, and not just its external face. For instance, despite proliferating arrangements for multinational corps and rapid reaction forces, without political integration even limited military actions in Yugoslavia have proved beyond the EC (cf. NATO; Bonanni, 1993).

The status quo in European external policy is clearly unsatisfactory and even dangerous. There is now a large gap between what is expected and what can be achieved. Two measures as a minimum need to be taken to make both internal and external perceptions of EPC/CFSP more realistic and to bring capabilities and expectations back into line. Of these the first and most important is a clear pulling in of the horns, and a signalling that there are certain things that the EC simply cannot or will not do. The emphasis should swing towards long-term attempts to improve the general milieu of international relations, particularly in Europe’s own region, and away from precipitate attempts to replace American superpower in particular crises.

The second need is to recognize that ‘complex interdependence’ applies in foreign policy as well as international economic relations. Variable patterns of co-operation, both within the Community and with outside states, are both inevitable and desirable. The excitements of the last seven years have made the Community too self-regarding, and some assessments of its capacity over- ambitious. Sometimes the language of politicscan run ahead of the realities, and if the idea of a ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ is taken too literally, the members of the European Community may well come to regret killing off the dull but accurate title of ‘Political Co-operation’.

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Documents

The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role