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Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266

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the chinA-indiA doklAm crisis , its regionAl implicAtions And the structurAl fActor

S. Kalyanaraman1 and Erik H. Ribeiro2

• The Doklam crisis marks the lowest point for China-India relations in the post-Cold War

era.

• Recurrent border crises in recent years reflect a broader Sino-Indian conflict of interest in

the Asian regional order.

• The most relevant development after Doklam is the deepening of India-Japan strategic

partnership, while the U.S. and BRICS have had a more pervasive but subtle influence in the Si-

no-Indian cooperation and conflict dynamics.

1 Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi, India. E-mail: [email protected]

2 PhD candidate in International Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). Research Assistant at the Bra-zilian Centre for Strategy & International Relations (NERINT). Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi, India. E-mail: [email protected]

Presentation

China-India relations are essential for understanding the future of Asian international politics and the centrality of the Indo-Pacific region in the 21st Century. These bilateral relations have been marked by both rivalry and cooperation, mixing multiple-level economic and security dynamics. After more than two decades of rapprochement since 1988, China and India could not mitigate their competition for regional influence in Asia. Recurring bilateral disputes over the border issue and China’s special friendship with Pakistan have reflected an increasingly complex regional rivalry, as both countries enhance their economic, political and military power.

The Doklam crisis signals the lowest point of the post-Cold War bilateral relations between China and India. The three month standoff near the Bhutan-China-India border led India to defend a third party

in the dispute, which hampered Beijing’s intentions to consolidate its claims in the area. Moreover, Chinese and Indian views of regional integration and connectivity have diverged, reducing the space for economic cooperation and interdependence. Thus, in the long term, there is a possibility of increasing bilateral and regional disputes between China and India, especially in the background of stronger India-U.S. defense partnership and closer Indo-Japanese relations.

On the other hand, both countries have also joined efforts for the reform of the global order, which leaves them an extensive agenda for cooperation as well. The BRICS 2017 Xiamen Summit served as a mechanism to defuse the Doklam crisis, since both countries did not want to jeopardize BRICS’ agenda with a bilateral contention. While China is the most important BRICS member and


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the main driver of the group’s objectives, India has actively contributed to the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and is a major shareholder in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Therefore, until now, both countries have considered the structural political transition as an essential feature of their rise as major powers. This is why they have pragmatically focused on multilateral cooperation to mitigate bilateral economic and security divergences.

Background of the Doklam Crisis

Between June and August 2017, China and India were engaged in a military standoff in the disputed region of Doklam plateau, which is claimed by Bhutan and China. This area is located near the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction, facing Sikkim which was integrated as an Indian state in 1975. The crisis began when Chinese soldiers were found building a paved road towards the disputed area. India has a treaty of friendship with Bhutan, Article 2 of which reads: “Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other3”. According to the Indian government, it decided to send troops to the disputed area and halt the road construction because the Bhutanese government had asked for help in the spirit of the agreement. The standoff was a great diplomatic challenge for both countries, since India was not protecting what it considers to be its own territory, but that of a third party. The Chinese media raised the rhetoric, With the Global Times publishing an editorial stating that China could reconsider the recognition of Sikkim as Indian Territory. Another opinion from an outside contributor stated that China should “teach

India a second lesson”, referring to the 1962 war (Global Times 2017, Gong 2017). This call for war was either a reflection of China’s discontent with the Indian intrusion or intended to put pressure on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to take action against what they considered as India’s reckless behavior.

In any case, the situation required careful handling and a set of meetings between Chinese and Indian top officials. After three months, both sides agreed to a mutual withdrawal plan, although its terms were not clear. The Indian government stated that both sides agreed to withdraw sequentially from Doklam, while China ambiguously declared that the situation was handled well but leaving space for the resumption of its activities in the area.

More importantly, China-India relations have been deteriorating in the last few years, with recurring crises in the Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh border sectors. The deeper causes for the increasing frequency of disputes are to be found in the bilateral conflict of interest over several issues in the Himalayan ranges, the Sino-Indian competition for influence in Asia, and the partnership between China and Pakistan.

The period of 1988 to 2005 saw a Sino-Indian rapprochement, beginning with the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China and culminating with the signing of a China-India strategic partnership. This forward movement led to regular dialogues on the border dispute and, more importantly, to a reasonable level of economic interdependence in the long term, which made China the biggest trade partner of India in 2011. Both countries also agreed on the need to reform international organizations, such


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as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. Their partnership at the global level was also boosted by the creation of the BRICS group, which in addition includes Brazil, Russia and South Africa.

As for the border dispute, there was a notion that both sides were satisfied with the status quo and could eventually agree to a ‘swap’ between Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, respectively under the control of China and India. In fact, the two countries signed an agreement in 2005 on the political parameters and guiding principles for a boundary settlement. This agreement was thought to be a culmination of the process that began in 1993 with the first bilateral agreement for confidence building measures along the border was signed. In 2003, India had formally recognized Tibet as part of China, while the Chinese recognized Sikkim as an Indian state. Another positive development was the opening of the Nathu La pass (Sikkim) for trade in July 2006.

However, by the end of 2006, Chinese officials began to denominate Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Southern Tibet’, indicating their resolve to retake the area of Tawang in particular, which is an ancient holy Buddhist monastery and the place where the seventh Dalai Lama was born centuries ago. In this sense, one aspect of the long-present dispute is the status of Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s permanent residency in India. The Chinese always interpreted the harboring of the Tibetan Buddhist leader in Dharamsala as a trump card in Indian hands. He also made several visits to Tawang, which were seen as acts of provocation by China.

There are several additional aspects of ‘Himalayan

relations’ that impact the China-India bilateral dynamics. Whenever there is unrest in Tibet, as happened in 2008 in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, the perception of China is that India is to be blamed for not preventing the political activities of the Tibetan community in its own territory which only further internationalizes the issue of the region’s sovereignty status. Moreover, India still maintains – although in a low profile – the Special Frontier Forces, a paramilitary force composed of ethnic Tibetans under command of the Indian external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Other points of conflict relating to the border issue are: the eroding Indian sphere of influence over the Himalayan states (Bhutan and Nepal); China’s massive build-up of infrastructure in the Tibetan Autonomous Region during the last fifteen years; and the sharing of the waters of the Himalayan Rivers Sutlej and Ganges-Brahmaputra.

Since 2013, there has been an increasing number of border standoffs and trespassing of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), particularly by the Chinese side. Weeks before the visit of the Chinese premier Li Keqiang to India in 2013, there was a standoff in Ladakh, in the western sector of the LAC, provoked by a Chinese incursion. Again in 2014, Chinese troops were spotted building a road into Indian controlled territory in the same sector, only days before President Xi Jinping’s first visit to India. What makes the mutual distrust even more evident is the fact that the countries signed another agreement for border defense cooperation in October 2013, but this has not led to an improvement in their relations or to a decrease in the number of border related incidents.

Overall, the Chinese approach to border disputes has


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become increasingly assertive during Xi Jinping’s term (2012-), highlights being the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea and the construction of artificial islands to consolidate claims over the South China Sea archipelagos. Moreover, China has frequently intercepted, escorted or even harassed foreign civilian and military assets transiting through these waters.

When analyzed in conjunction, these Chinese moves can be interpreted as a pattern which has been called ‘salami slicing’, characterized by progressive grabbing and occupation of disputed territory until met with resistance from the other side. The Chinese strategy for the defense of its borders has been based on concessions whenever China is clearly the stronger country and the other party kowtows and acknowledges Chinese superiority. However, China has been more inclined to the use of force and coercion in situations where its claims are not sufficiently strong; or the other country is protected by a Great Power (Taiwan, Philippines); or the other party is a major country (India, Japan, Soviet Union).

In the case of Doklam, China was possibly testing Indian resolve to protect Bhutan. This is similar to the Chinese approach to the South China Sea dispute, where it has been testing the reaction of the United States by building facilities in the claimed territories or threatening Filipino and Vietnamese vessels in disputed waters. Although China signed an agreement with Bhutan for the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in 1998, in fact it has been pushing the construction of roads in these areas and forcing the Bhutanese government to concede its claims. China’s interest is to show not only to

Bhutan, but also Nepal, that India is not a reliable ally and that their best interests would be served if both Himalayan landlocked countries established closer relations with China.

India, in its turn, also took a bold step in the Doklam crisis, which was in part a contingency to protect its ally, but also reflects a posture of active territorial defense. Until the beginning of the 2000’s, India neglected infrastructure building in border areas and stationed a limited number of troops in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh sectors. The Chinese inauguration of the Qinghai-Tibet railway forced the Indian government and elites out of inertia and triggered important developments.

India has responded in two ways to the increasing pressure in the Himalayan borders: building infrastructure and reinforcing its military deployment in border areas. The Indian government started a project for the construction of 73 “Indo-China border roads”, but they were not completed by the initial deadline of 2012, and only 27 roads have been built until 2017. The next deadline now is December 2022 (IANS 2017a). Also, advanced landing grounds have been built to compensate for the lack of land connectivity.

More importantly, there is a renewed effort to strengthen India’s territorial defense against China in the Northeast region. In 2009, the raising of two new mountain divisions was authorized and in 2013 these became subsumed within the first Mountain Strike Corps, which will be fully operational in the next five years. The Indian Army is also raising the first regiment of BrahMos cruise missiles in the Northeast. Regarding the Indian Air Force, new squadrons of Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters have been


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posted in the same region.

Even though there may be a perception of increasing border conflict that could lead to war, the reality of bilateral border relations is much more complex. In fact, both countries have always neglected the defense of the Himalayan borders, leaving the task of routine patrols to scouts, militias and police forces. For now, the simultaneous military and infrastructure efforts of both sides can be seen more in the context of a deterrent effort than an offensive move to change the status quo. However, there are external factors that contribute to the increasing distrust between China and India, which may have an adverse impact upon border relations. The Increasing Sino-Indian Conflict of Interest in Asia

John Garver (2002) presents three defining aspects of China-India relations, which are: the status of Tibet, the China-Pakistan partnership and competition for regional influence. In the last decade, all of the three issues have gradually worsened. The first one has been discussed in the previous section, while the other two are essential to understand the broader contours of China-India relations. In the last few years, the China-Pakistan partnership has deepened in economic and military terms, reflecting a long-term trend of close relations between these two countries that directly affects India’s security concerns. Regarding the Asian context, India has refused to participate in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for economic connectivity, instead launching its own regional projects and moving closer to Japan.

Both dynamics indicate further conflict of interest

in regional affairs and reduced salience for economic interdependence. Although scholars had envisioned a few years ago that China-India economic cooperation is likely to mitigate their security dilemma, Holslag (2009, 2010) has already argued that, so far, its effects have not reduced competition in the security sphere.

China and Pakistan have sustained more than fifty years of special relations - termed as an All-Weather Friendship - and there are increasing Chinese geopolitical interests in the stability of Pakistan, which is a declared adversary of India. Although India does not oppose Pakistan’s economic growth – and even looks for a greater degree of bilateral interdependence – China has been exporting arms and nuclear technology to Pakistan, while launching an economic corridor to connect its hinterland with the Indian Ocean through the Gwadar port.

The triangular dynamics can be observed from the phenomenon of catching up in the development of nuclear weapons and the processes of military modernization. Also, there is a sub-conventional dimension in the issues of insurgency and terrorism that adds to the triangular relations. India conducted the Pokhran-II nuclear tests in 1998, justifying the need for an overt nuclear capability due to the Chinese nuclear arsenal and its support for Pakistan’s nuclear program, with the latter being clearly aimed at India4. Two weeks later, Pakistan conducted its own tests and also became an overt nuclear power, consolidating the triangular dynamics in the nuclear dimension.

In the last few decades, India developed the Agni family of ballistic missiles, which is now reaching a range of more than 5.000 km after four tests


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of the Agni-V. In response to India’s increasing missile arsenal, Pakistan introduced the Ghauri and Shaheen families. India also developed its first nuclear powered submarine, the INS Arihant, which was commissioned in 2016. A few months later, Pakistan tested the submarine-launched version of the Babur-III cruise missile. Moreover, both countries have been developing research programs for multiple warheads, which may increase the lethality and retaliatory capability of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. In the conventional sphere, according to the SIPRI database, Pakistan has been the biggest client of China’s arms sales in the 2012-2016 period, accounting for 35% of its exports, including frigates, submarines and fourth-generation fighters (Fleurant et al 2017).

China has also ignored Pakistan’s close relations with militant and terrorist groups which have bases in its own soil, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). These groups were responsible for major terrorist attacks in India in 2001 and 2008, which increased the possibility of a conventional war in the subcontinent, and even unintended nuclear escalation as a consequence. Also, Pakistan has historically supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, where it seeks influence as a way of gaining strategic depth against Indian political and military pressures. In the last few years, China has pragmatically participated in the peace process in Afghanistan, but it has not given incentives or pressured Pakistan to drop its support for insurgent groups. On the contrary, it keeps stalling resolutions against key leaders of these groups in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is a matter of contention with India.

There is also a competition for influence in the

neighborhood, with China and India having diverging visions of a regional order. China is increasingly pursuing regional hegemony throughout Asia, but India still strives for a sphere of influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. John Garver had already identified this Sino-Indian tension in the 20th Century, which he called a “protracted contest” between two rivals. In his view, due to the major power gap that was being formed after the end of Cold War, India cannot compete with China globally or in Asia. Thus, it would have to choose between seeking regional hegemony in South Asia and accommodating a hegemonic China in its own backyard (Garver 2001: 29).

Even though the first decade of the 21st century witnessed some progress, there is renewed security competition between China and India in the Indian Ocean Region. Contrary to Garver’s perception, India has not only sought hegemony in the subcontinent, but has a long term strategy to create a sphere of influence in the whole IOR. In the past, the Indian government has intervened in conflicts in Bangladesh (1971), Maldives (1988) and Sri Lanka (1987-1990). Recently, it has been assisting insular countries like Maldives and Mauritius by selling patrol ships and installing surveillance radars and sonars. While their purposes are mainly located in non-traditional security spheres, India is gradually expanding its network to control key points of the IOR (Brewster 2014).

Since 2001, India already has a full-fledged tri-service command in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, which are located close to the Malacca Strait. To test India’s surveillance capabilities and its own ability to operate in distant waters, the Chinese Navy has frequently sailed its submarines


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to the Indian Ocean and also sends regular anti-piracy patrols to the Gulf of Aden (Sen 2017).

In 2017, China also opened its first permanent overseas naval base in Djibouti, taking a leap forward in its intentions of projecting power to the IOR. China has also built or modernized ports in countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, which could be eventually used to support its operations in the region. However, the idea of a Chinese naval encirclement is exaggerated in the current situation, since it would be much more difficult for China to sustain operations in a distant and hostile environment, and those ports would be easy fixed targets for the Indian Navy.

The simultaneous rise of China and India is leading to different projects of regional economic integration that have few points of convergence. China has invested a lot of economic and diplomatic efforts in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is composed of six main infrastructure corridors that connect the Chinese mainland to Eurasia and the Indian Ocean. Three of them run through Central Asia, Mongolia and Russia. However, the projects with most impact for Asian geopolitics are the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor and another corridor from southern China to the Indochinese peninsula. There is also a proposal for a Maritime Silk Route, which will further develop port infrastructure in Southeast Asia and the IOR (Lopes and Pautasso 2016, Ghiasy and Zhou 2017). Together, these plans will further enhance China’s economic clout in countries and regions that are adjacent to India or perceived by the Indian side as its traditional sphere of influence.

The Chinese have repeatedly stated that India is an important part of the BRI, although it is not clear what role would be reserved for it. In May 2017, China made a four point initiative for the improvement of China-India relations, which was aimed at convincing India to participate in the Belt and Road Forum, held later in the same month, which featured global political leaders from key interested countries. The Chinese proposal included aligning the BRI with India’s Act East policy, signing a treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation, moving towards a bilateral free trade agreement and solving the border issue at the earliest possible (PTI 2017).

India’s reasons for not participating in the BRI are multiple, but are derived from two main causes: the sovereignty dispute with Pakistan over the Gilgit-Baltistan region, through which the CPEC project runs; and the fear that China will further enhance the economic and trade gap in relation to India. In this sense, the Indian government has already voiced its concern regarding the violation of its sovereignty by the CPEC project.

Also, India now reluctantly sustains a trade deficit of more than US$ 45 billion with China, which is its biggest partner. A symptom of this issue was seen during the Doklam standoff, when the Indian government decided to impose anti-dumping duties on a range of Chinese products (ET online 2017). Although there are many economic and trade opportunities in the bilateral agenda, little progress has been made so far to open both markets to each other (Bajpai et al 2016). Thus, India is increasingly wary about the possible negative effects of improving bilateral economic ties, while the Chinese are seeking a degree of interdependence


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that mostly fosters their economic growth.

India has not only refused to effectively participate in the BRI, but also does not allow China to participate as a full member in its main economic and security initiatives in the Indian Ocean Region, such as the Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Indian diplomacy is investing a lot of energy in these forums, which have been boosted as an alternative to the failed South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

India is also deepening its economic partnership with Japan, agreeing in May 2017 to launch a rival regional project to the BRI, called the Asia Africa Growth Corridor. The proposal emerged in the Modi-Abe talks in November 2016, but was formally presented only during the African Development Bank meeting held in Ahmedabad (India) (Puri and Nishimura 2017).

The India-Japan partnership can increasingly be seen as a move for both internal and external balancing from the Indian side. Japan is already increasing its investments in Indian infrastructure, with the flagship project of its first bullet train, which will link Gujarat to Mumbai. Also, Japan is planning to invest in India’s northeast region, including the disputed state of Arunachal Pradesh. Earlier this year, India and Japan agreed to deepen their defence partnership and start a dialogue for the development of dual use technologies and expansion of military training in Anti-Submarine Warfare, for example. Also, Japan has expressed its willingness to export amphibious aircraft with discounted price to India.

Further, Japan was the only country to express support for the Indian side during the Doklam standoff. The Japanese ambassador to India stated that India had to step in the area because it has bilateral agreements with Bhutan; furthermore, no side should resort to “unilateral attempts to change the status quo”, in a clear reference to the Chinese road construction in Doklam (Roy 2017). Thus, the Japanese are signaling an increase in their diplomatic support for India, especially in disputes related to China.

Also, Japan has initiated a military modernization process in part because the US defense commitments are not a reliable or sufficient deterrent against China in the long term (Chanlett-Avery et al 2017). For instance, the increasing convergence of interests in the Indo-Pacific lies between India and Japan, which are the first to sense the real effects of China’s rise. While an India-U.S. alliance seems improbable for now, Delhi-based analysts like Raja Mohan (2017) have recently argued for an Indo-Japanese alliance-like relationship. The motive is exactly the uncertainty regarding Washington’s long term interests and policies, which might turn into a “retrenchment or a deliberate decision [...] to cede more space to Beijing in Asia”. However, the U.S. remains as the most relevant structural factor that impacts China-India relations in the long term.

The Structural Factor: the United States, BRICS and China-India relations

Despite the bilateral and regional factors influencing the relations between China and India, the United States policy for the Indo-Pacific and the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South


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Africa) are structural variables that impact bilateral dynamics of cooperation and conflict. In this sense, both China and India still prioritize structural issues over bilateral or even regional contentions, because the former enhance their prestige and facilitate their economic and political rise, which are essential conditions for Chinese and Indian long-term strategies. In other words, for now, both countries are more concerned with broader global trends and realignments, rather than focusing on local issues that might lead to further conflict in the future.

The overall state of China-India relations began to deteriorate after the 2005 US-India nuclear agreement, which signaled the beginning of a strategic partnership between both countries and the recognition of India’s Great Power status by the sole global superpower. As Raja Mohan (2003) has argued, India “crossed the Rubicon” when it decided to conduct the 1998 Pokhran II nuclear test, which put the country in the highest echelon of the International System. From that moment on, India has sought recognition of its status as a Great Power, not only in the United Nations Security Council, but also in trade and financial institutions, for example (Paul and Shankar 2014). In this sense, although China perceives India as a partner for reform of the world order, it is also wary of India growing as a Great Power rival.

A deeper partnership with the United States is entertained by both the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata parties, especially as a bargaining tool and as means of strengthening its balancing movement against China. India has always been reluctant to align itself with any major power in order to maintain its strategic autonomy. On the other hand,

this doesn’t mean India will maintain equidistance between the US and China. During the Cold War, for example, India signed a treaty with the Soviet Union for deterrence purposes against a Chinese intervention during its 1971 war against Pakistan.

The limits of India-U.S. partnership, however, have been evident. The Indian elites understand that the US cannot fully commit to a strategy of containing China, and there would be no incentive for India to only pursue policies aligned with the US. Moreover, it is possible that the United States could seek accommodation with China in a bipolar world. Not only India, but Japan is also wary of the special economic relationship between U.S. and China, which could turn into a broader political engagement (Brzezinski 2009). This idea has been entertained by both American and Chinese elites in the form of the G2, which would be a bilateral condominium to set the agenda for a new world order. In China, the G2 debate has revolved around the concept of “New Type of Great Power Relations”, put forward by Xi Jinping (Zheng and Breslin 2016).

Despite these constraints, New Delhi sees a clear opportunity to strengthen its military power and global status with the help of the United States. During the Vajpayee and Clinton/Bush governments, especially after the beginning of the Global War on Terror, both countries began a strategic dialogue to both overcome previous contentions regarding India’s nuclear weapons program and advance their defense and strategic partnership. During the U.S. President Obama’s governments (2009-2016), he expressed support for India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and for participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Also during his second term, India became one of


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the U.S.’ top ten arms importers and the world’s largest buyer of military equipment (Blanchfield et al 2017).

In the bilateral sphere, there are domestic impediments to the US transfer of military or dual use technology to India, which is one of New Delhi’s main interests in the partnership. However, there is a growing willingness on the part of the US to deepen defense, industrial and technological cooperation as is evident from the declaration of India as a major defense partner. Recent years have seen important platforms being exported to India and the involvement of Indian companies in the production processes of these platforms. Components for the C-130 Hercules are being manufactured by Tata in India. The U.S. also exported a few sensitive technologies embedded in the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter and the P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, both manufactured by Boeing. Recently, Lockheed Martin has offered to transfer the assembly line of the F-16 fighter aircraft to Tata (India), if the Indian Air Force decides to purchase at least a hundred units (Rapoza 2017).

In consonance with the closer defense partnership is the movement by Narendra Modi’s government to develop a defense industrial complex under the “Make in India” program, opening the sector to domestic private companies and inviting bids from joint ventures. Thus, there is an increasing private industrial lobby interested in deepening India-U.S. defense partnership.

India and the U.S. have strengthened their defense partnership through regular military exercises, the highlight being the Malabar naval

exercise, which became permanently trilateral with the inclusion of Japan in 2015 and could eventually host other countries (Australia and Singapore) as well (Sinha 2016). In 2016, India and the U.S. further institutionalized their naval cooperation through the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which officialized the sharing of military logistics and naval facilities between both countries (Khurana 2016). The Americans have actively encouraged India and Japan to move closer to each other, holding several official trilateral meetings since 2011. These are clearly consequences of China’s rise and bid for regional hegemony in Asia, with the United States facilitating a rapprochement between its traditional allies - especially Australia and Japan - and the new Indian partner.

At the same time, the BRICS represents an ad hoc group for the reform of the international institutions and creation of new global order. In this sense, India is an active participant in the newly created BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) and, even more importantly, of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an initiative led by China. India was the one to put forward the proposal for the creation of the NDB in 2012, which was formally approved a year later and officially signed in 2014 (Baumann 2017). Currently, K. V. Kamath, an Indian executive, holds the presidency of the NDB. In the AIIB, India has the second largest voting share (8.3%), only behind China (28,7%), which invests half of the bank’s capital (Weiss 2017).

These new banks will probably not replace the existing financial institutions, but rather work in cooperation with those and provide another funding alternative for developing countries. In this sense,


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China and India have shared a strong pragmatic policy of not letting their bilateral disputes affect their global interests in decentralizing global governance from the traditional powers towards the BRICS countries, which are the strongest emerging powers in the International System.

Not surprisingly, this pragmatic approach had a positive effect in defusing the Doklam crisis. According to at least two Indian sources, negotiations on the Doklam crisis began only in July - a few weeks after the standoff began - during the G20 Hamburg summit (IANS 2017b, Samanta 2017). On that occasion, Narendra Modi approached Xi Jinping during the informal BRICS meeting on the sidelines of the event, beginning a series of high-level talks between India’s National Security Advisor and China’s State Councilor, with their respective teams.

Although there was disagreement on many points regarding the China-India-Bhutan border dispute and their individual claims, China wanted the BRICS Xiamen summit to be a success and would not allow the Doklam incident to jeopardize Prime Minister Modi’s participation in the event. Also, the Chinese have been aware that another war with India at this moment would have serious consequences for China’s rise. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China’s strategy has shifted from Deng Xiaoping’s “Keeping a Low Profile” to “Striving for Achievement”, which indicates more willingness to use coercive diplomacy and attract more political support by showing strength in the international arena (Yan 2014).

However, China does not want a coalition of regional powers to be formed against it, but rather

maintain dynamics of cooperation and conflict working in its favor. Thus, the challenge is to find a balance for this equation and prevent, for example, the quadrilateral Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. from becoming a balancing coalition. It is worth mentioning that these countries met in a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue for the first time in 2007, but did not follow through with regular meetings. But these countries reconvened the quadrilateral in November 2017, with the aim of fostering a rules-based order in Asia, discussing the Korean Peninsula crisis and increasing shared maritime security (Panda 2017). While the U.S. promised to rebalance, or ‘pivot’, towards Asia-Pacific in 2012, the actual balance is being made by the Asian regional powers, which are actively resisting a more assertive and unilateral Chinese posture in the Himalayas and the Pacific Ocean.

Final Remarks

The overall results of the Doklam crisis between China and India are negative and have to be analyzed in the context of deteriorating regional economic and security dynamics between both countries. After almost two decades of rapprochement since 1988, China and India are increasingly at loggerheads over the Pakistan and Tibet issues and have competing regional integration projects. The recent economic and security dynamics suggest a further deepening of India’s partnership with Japan and the United States as a means of internal and external balancing against China’s rise.

Despite these difficulties, there are many factors contributing for a lowest common denominator from which China and India can increase cooperation


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and avoid escalation of bilateral tensions. The challenge is not to transform the Sino-Indian rivalry into a full-fledged partnership, but rather understand the limits of their cooperation and work for the improvement of these relations.

So far, the major point of convergence has been the reform of the global order, but even here the two countries have different views. China envisions a superior role for itself in Asia and beyond, since it has more available instruments of hard and soft power. India’s rise has been more gradual and with less external impact, but that doesn’t mean it will accept to be a junior partner of either China or the United States.

In regional terms, there are other points of convergence to be further explored, especially regarding the changing situations in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Both states have experienced long civil wars with heavy foreign interference and are relevant crossroads for the stability and integration of the Asian continent. In both cases, the direct or indirect engagement of the United States has also been a determinant for a positive outcome. Another point that directly relates to the situation in Afghanistan is the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to include India and Pakistan as full members5. It remains to be seen whether China and India will be able to overcome their differences and, more importantly, induce a positive change in Pakistan’s long term strategy of supporting militant and terrorist groups in South Asia.

The key for greater bilateral stability also lies in the strengthening of India’s economic and military power, which will make it less dependent on

external sources as means for balancing China. Much of India’s insecurity regarding China’s assertive posture comes from its own perceived failure in overcoming domestic weaknesses and deterring the Chinese from crossing its perceived red lines. China’s coercive diplomacy in Asia can only be met with a similar strategy of pushing one’s own interests and demonstrating strength, while engaging in active diplomacy and showing willingness to cooperate beyond bilateral contentions.

In this sense, the Doklam crisis is not inherently negative, but can signal a new phase in Sino-Indian relations, where their coexistence is marked by Great Power politics. Japan, for example, has not abandoned its economic agenda with China, including trilateral free trade talks with South Korea. Acknowledging this reality of simultaneous cooperation and conflict between major powers with complex regional and global interests will help both countries to set a positive agenda, instead of frustrating prospects of cooperation whenever a bilateral crisis occurs.


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Notes3 Government of India; Government of Bhutan. India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty. New Delhi, 2nd March 2007. Available at: https://idsa.in/resources/documents/Ind-BhutanFriendshiptreaty.2007

4 After Pokhran II, then Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee sent a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton, stating that India would remain a responsible country and justifying the test as a deterrent measure against China. The letter was later leaked and published by the New York Times.

5 For an analysis of this issue, see Ribeiro and Vieira (2016).

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Received on November 22, 2017.Approved on November 24, 2017.

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