The Budget Deficit in Transition: A Cautionary Note Author(s): Vito

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The Budget Deficit in Transition: A Cautionary Note

Author(s): Vito TanziSource: Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 1993), pp. 697-707Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals on behalf of the International Monetary FundStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3867454

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IMFStaffPapersVol. 40, No. 3 (September1993)? 1993InternationalMonetaryFund

ShorterPaperThe Budget Deficit in Transition

A CautionaryNoteVITO TANZI*

Thispaper discusses majorfiscal issues faced by the previously centrallyplanned economies in their transition to marketeconomies. It focuses onthe extent to which the budget deficit should guide policy and the in-teractions betweenfiscal policy and other aspects of the macroeconomy.[JEL H2, H3, H5, H6, P2, P3]

URINGCENTRAL LANNING,t was not really meaningful to speak of/fiscal policy andpublic finance since these concepts imply the exis-tence of private finance and thus a significant private sector.1 In that era,all was public in a way. However, many "fiscal" functions, as defined inmarket economies, were carried out not by government but by state

enterprises. These enterprises often provided to their workers housing,hospital care, vocational training, kindergarten facilities, shops, pen-sions, various forms of welfare assistance, employment, and so forth.They were also responsible for much "public" investment. Because thestate enterprises were required to hire workers even when they did notneed them, official unemployment was nonexistent. As a consequence,no programs existed to protect unemployed workers. In economies intransition, state enterprises are still carrying out many of these fiscal

*Vito Tanzi is Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department. He holds a doctoratefromHarvardUniversity.Veryusefulcommentswerereceived romS.J.Anjaria,GerardBelanger,GuillermoCalvo,CarloCottarelli,ManuelGuitian,GeorgeIden,JohnOdling-Smee, ndseveralcolleagueswithin heFiscalAffairsDepart-ment. The author is solely responsible for the views expressed.'Recall that, in market economies, public sector activity is largely justified by(private) market failure. See Stiglitz (1989) and Musgrave (1959).697


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functionsand are stillhoardingworkers.For the transformationo mar-ket economies to be completed,most legitimatesocial functionsmustbe shiftedfrom the state enterprises o the government.As this shifttakes place, spendingby the enterpriseswill fall and spendingby thegovernmentwill rise.2In spiteof occasionaldivergentviews,mosteconomistsagreethat, inmarketeconomies,the fiscal deficitis a usefulguidefor assessing iscalpolicy.A largedeficit ndicates hat(unlessa strongcase to the contrarycanbe made)fiscalpolicyshould become more restrictive.The conceptof fiscaldeficitimpliesthat governmentactivitiescan be sharplydelin-eatedfrom those of theprivate ector.3Thus,expenditures ndrevenuesareeitherpublicorprivate.The measureof the fiscaldeficitrequires hatthe differencebetweenwhatthepublicsectorspendsand what t collectscan be accurately alculated.With full employment, f the publicsectorspendsmore, the privatesector mustspendless, unlessthe economyisableto attract oreignsaving.Thus,theexistenceof a fiscaldeficit mpliessome (unwanted)crowdingout of the privatesector unless Ricardianequivalenceor a Keynesianmultipliercan be assumedto operate.

I. BudgetDeficit Limitsand PerverseIncentivesThere are severalreasons orcautionwhenusingthisconceptto guidepolicyactionduring hetransition.Someof these reasonsareconceptual.Othersdeal withmeasurementproblems.Still othersoriginate romthepossibility hatstrict imitson aninadequatemeasureof thefiscal deficitmaycreateperversencentives,whichmayslowdown hetransformation.

TransferringSocial Expenditure ResponsibilityStateenterprisesn economies n transition ontinue o dominateeco-nomicactivityandprovidesocialservicesto workersand their families.Some of these services are provided n place of higher money wages.Othersareprovided n placeof higherbudgetary xpenditure.In otherwords, these enterprisescontinue to performsome functions that in

marketeconomiesare financedthrough he governmentbudget.The transition o a marketeconomyrequires hatthe budgetassumethe responsibilityor those social functionsthat the countrywishesto2 This does not imply that the government needs to assume all the functions nowcarried out by the enterprises.3It also implies that the fiscal activities of the government can be separatedfrom the monetary activities. For example, the fiscal activities of central banksmust be assessed as part of fiscal policy.

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BUDGET DEFICIT IN TRANSITION

finance publicly.4This transfer to the budget should occur regardless ofwhether the state enterprises are privatized or not. The faster it occurs,the easier it will be for the enterprises to be privatized or to becomeeconomically viable while remaining state owned.The transfer of these functions to the budget will increase budgetaryexpenditure and, unless revenue is raised correspondingly, will also in-crease the budget deficit.5Thus, the transfer should also reduce the creditneeds of the state enterprises. For most of these countries, however, thereis little solid knowledge about the potential impact on the budget of atotal or partial transfer of these functions.6 In Russia, "the governmentappears not to have quantified the dimensions of this problem or planneda solution" (Wallich (1992, p. 7)). The more important are these func-tions and the faster and the larger is their transfer to the budget, thegreater will be the growth of budgetary expenditure. Thus, ex ante limitson the size of the budget deficit should explicitly allow for the budgetarycost of transferringsome of these functions from the state enterprises tothe budget.7The possibility must be recognized that a limit on the budgetdeficit that ignores this transfermight be met by the government delayingthe transferof these social functions from the enterprises to the budget.This delay would slow down the process of transformation but would notreduce credit expansion if the banking system continues to react to theneeds of the enterprises.If a decision were made to subsidize some loss-making state enter-prises, it would be better economic policy if they were subsidized throughthe budget rather than through soft and cheap loans from the bankingsystem.8 However, subsidies financed through the budget increase thebudget deficit, and cheap loans do not.It would be unrealistic to assume that subsidies to enterprises, whether

4The functionsnot taken over by the budget shouldno longerbe the re-sponsibilityof the publicsectorand the stateenterprises.By adjustingmoneywages,workers ouldbegivengreaterdiscretion ver heuseof thetotalcompen-sationtheyreceivewhile the stateenterprises ouldstophaving o provide ocialservices.5Throughouthe paper,the term"budgetdeficit" s usedfor thatpartof thefiscaldeficitthatis actuallyaccounted orby the budget.Thisis the measureofdeficitnormally eportednnewspapers nd ngovernmenteports.Thetheoret-ical conceptof the fiscaldeficitis muchmore comprehensive nd muchmoredifficult o measure see variouspapers nBlejerandCheasty 1993)).It extendsto the whole publicsectorand includesquasi-fiscaldeficits.6 There s no available stimateof themagnitude f thesesocialfunctions.TheWorldBankis attempting o quantify hemfor Russia.The assumptions thatthey are quiteimportant.7Theselimitsmaybe self-imposed rnegotiatedwith nternationalnstitutionsor othercreditors.8Thecurrent ituationnRussia,wherethecentralbankcontinues o subsidizethe stateenterprisesn particular ectorsthroughsubsidized reditand, in theprocess,createsinflationarypressures,showsthe importanceof this issue.

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through hebudgetorthroughcheapand softloans,couldbe completelyandpermanentlyabolished n the short run. Some of these enterprises(especially hose in the defenseindustry)willbe ableto restructure ndbecome economicallyviable only if they receive financialsupportforsome time. It would also be unrealistic o assumethat those who makeor influenceeconomicpolicywould look at cheapcreditgiven directlythroughthe bankingsystemin the same way as they look at subsidiesfinanced hrough he budget.9Thus,the argumenthat hasoccasionallybeen made-that the provisionof subsidies hrough he banking ystemor the budget is only an accounting ssue and would disappear f onemeasured he fiscal deficit in a comprehensive ndeconomically oundway10-ignoresthe importantpoint that economicpolicyis not alwaysguidedbythe mosteconomically orrectconceptsandthat, in anycase,the measurement f the all-embracingiscal deficit is next to impossibleunder the circumstancesprevailing n these countries.Thus, the mea-sured(budget)deficit is likely to continueexertingmore influenceonpolicymakers ndpublicopinion,both withinand outsidethe countries,thanthe truebut unknown fiscal)deficit. For thisreason,policymakershave an incentive o show a smallerbudgetdeficit even when this actionmayconflict with otherimportant conomic and socialobjectives,suchas the speed of transition o a marketeconomy.If thegovernment aised axes on stateenterprises'profitsat the sametime that the bankingsystem extended cheap or soft loans to theseenterprises,the budget deficit would fall withoutreducingmonetaryexpansion.This implies that focusingon the budget deficit may leadobserversand policymakers o miss the underlyingcause of monetaryexpansionand couldlead to the apparently nomalous ituation experi-encedby Polandand, especially,Yugoslavia)of highinflationwith thebudgetin surplus.

Budget Deficit and InflationThe relationshipbetweeninflation,the budgetdeficit,andthe publicdebt is also relevantto this discussion.To the extent that there is a9For one thing, it is difficultto calculatethe subsidyelement of subsidizedcredit.See, for example,the paperby MichaelWattleworth,"CreditSubsidiesinBudgetaryLending:Computation,Effects,andFiscalImplications,"nBlejerand Chu(1988).Also, subsidies,giventhrough hebudget,wouldmostlikelybeassociatedwithmorecareful,or atleastmorepoliticallydebated,decisionsaboutwhichenterprises hould be subsidized.1O his measurewouldcount the socialexpenditurebystateenterprisesn thesamewayas budgetary xpenditures. t wouldalso count the subsidiesgiven bythebanking ystemaspublic pending.See, forexample,BeggandPortes 1992).

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domesticpublicdebt,anincrease nthenominal nterestratepaidon thepublicdebt will be reflected in governmentexpenditureand in the sizeof the budgetdeficit even if the rateof the increasematchesexactlytheincrease n inflation-in otherwords,even if the realinterestratedoesnot change. Given a significantpublicdebt and a potentiallyhigh butunknownuturerate of inflation, t is difficult o predict heeffecton thedeficit f thegovernmentpaysa givenreal nterestrate on itsdebt. Givena real rate of interest,the rise in the deficitwill be a directfunctionofthe size of the debt andthe level of the nominal nterestrate,which,inturn,willdependon the inflationrate. The potentialeffect of a changein the rate of inflation on the conventionallymeasuredbudgetdeficitcould be very large.11In the situationdescribedabove,a governmenthat hasan interest nshowinga smallerbudgetdeficitmightbe temptedto repressnominalinterestrates,thuscreatingdifficulties or the developmentof the finan-cial sector andforthe allocationof financialresources.Under inflation-aryconditions,conceptssuchas the operationalor the primarydeficit,whichattempt oeliminate heimpactof inflationonthedeficit,mayhaveto be used. But they will only correctthe budgetdeficit rather thanmeasure the truefiscal deficit.Furthermore, hese conceptshave theirown limitations.

Budget Deficit and the Unemployment RateIf stateenterprises ayoff redundantworkersnorder o improve heirefficiencyand, as a consequence,the government'spending or unem-

ployment compensationincreases, the change will cause the budgetdeficitto rise. The rise will dependon the level of unemployment om-pensationperworkerand on the numberof unemployedworkers.Foragiven level of unemployment ompensationper worker,the largertheadjustmentn the work orcebythe stateenterprises,andthusthegreaterthe numberof unemployedworkers,the largerwill be the potentialimpactof thisadjustmenton the budgetdeficit.Shouldthe governmentbe excessivelyconcernedabout the size of its budget deficit, it mayencouragethe state enterprises o continuehoardingworkers.The potential mpactof this factor on the budgetdeficitsof countriesin transition an be appreciatedbythe fact thatfalls in outputthathave,at times, been as large as, or largerthan, 30 percent of GDP have

1 Therelationship etween he fiscaldeficit,publicdebt,andtheinflationratewas discussedn Tanzi,Blejer,andTeijeiro 1987).For references o the impactof this factoron the fiscaldeficit of LatinAmericancountries,see Tanzi(1992).

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generally not resulted in corresponding increases in unemployment.12Ifthese countries had behaved like market economies, they would haveexperienced unemployment rates not seen since the Great Depression ofthe 1930s.13As long as the state enterprises continue to hoard workers,they will not be able to restructure and become efficient and competitive.It will also be more difficult to privatize them.14However, when theenterprises fully adjust their employment to their greatly reduced pro-duction needs, and the governments take responsibility for financing thecost of unemployment, budgetary expenditures will go up. This increasemust be taken into account in setting ex ante limits on the deficit, but itmay be very difficult to forecast.

Budget Deficit and the Exchange RateIf a country devalues its official exchange rate, its interest payments onforeign debt measured in domestic currency will rise, thus increasing

public spending, and government expenditure on imports measured indomestic currencywill also rise. Both of these factors would tend to raisethe budget deficit. 5On the other hand, the devaluation will also increasethe domestic value of exports by the public sector and the revenue fromsome taxes. However, if the proceeds from the public sector exports areoutside the budget, even if the exporters are public institutions, theimprovement will not be reflected directly in the budgetary accountsunless the exporters contribute significantly to tax revenue.'6 In otherwords, the budget deficit will rise, and the rise will depend on the size

12 The situation s changing.Forexample,the unemploymentate in Hungaryhas risen fromless than 1 percent n the first half of 1990to morethan 11per-cent in September1992. In Bulgaria, t has risenfrom 1.6 percentin 1990 to14percent n 1992; nPoland, rom6.3percent n 1990 o 13.5percent nOctober1992;and in Romania,fromzero in 1990to 10percent n 1992. Forthe fall inoutputupto 1991,see IMF(1992a,p. 46).For heestimated all in1992,see IMF(1992b,p. 19).13Ratesof 25 percentor higherwere recorded.4In fact, privatizationmayin somecasesraisethe size of the fiscaldeficit ifthe social expenditures hat the governmenthas to take over from the stateenterpriseexceed the revenuefrom the sale of the enterprise.15If thegovernmentsunable o paytheintereston theforeigndebt,therewillbeadifferencebetweenaccruedandcashmeasures f thebudgetdeficit.Domes-tic arrearsto and from the government also create differences between cash andaccrued measures of the budget deficit.16The difficulties of the central governments of many of these countries, incontrolling the accounts and the actions of the whole public sector, indicate thatthe budget may not be the beneficiary of devaluation.

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BUDGETDEFICIT NTRANSITION

of the devaluation.17Rigid ex ante limits on the measured size of the fiscaldeficit (that is, limits on the budget deficit) might encourage the author-ities to delay the needed exchange rate adjustment especially when theexternal debt is large and the government's imports are significant.

Shifting Expenditures out of the BudgetAnother perverse incentive that may arise from the attempt to showa smaller budget deficit or to stay below a too rigidlimit is that of pushing

expenditures out of the budget and into other parts of the public sector,whether extrabudgetary accounts or lower levels of government. Indeed,extrabudgetary accounts have proliferated in many economies in transi-tion, though information on them has been elusive. Also, sizable expen-ditures have been shifted onto local government. In this context, it maybe worthwhile to cite from a study on fiscal decentralization in Russia byChristine Wallich (1992, p. 3):

In the fiscalprogramor 1992,most of the majorcutsweremade in centralgovernmentexpenditures-centrallyfinancedenterprise nvestment,pro-ducer andconsumer ubsidies,and defense.Thesecuts werefollowedby adecision o delegateanimportantpartof socialexpenditures early n 1992),and investmentoutlays(lateron) to the subnational evel. On the tax side,the budget envisagesa marked ncrease n taxes, primarilyon petroleumproductsandforeign rade.Thus,virtually lladditional evenuewillaccrueto thefederalgovernment,whilemost of the additional ocialexpenditureswill emergeat the subnational evel (italics n original).

Wallich's conclusion is also worth citing:The basic strategyhas been to "pushthe deficit downward"by shiftingunfunded xpenditure esponsibilities own n thehopethatthe subnationallevel will do the cost cutting (pp. 3-4).These are just a few examples of the possibilities that call for cautionin the use of the budget deficit in guiding economic policy during thetransition. They do not exhaust the possibilities.18 They all point to the

7Thisdiscussionpointsto the importanceof bringing he foreigntradeareawithin he tax net. Forexample, t is importantorimports o be subjected o thevalue-added ax.18 Forexample,a solutionto the bad debtproblemof the commercialbanksand the arrears among enterprises might be delayed by the fact that the solutionwould raise the budgetdeficit.Begg andPortes(1992)haveargued hat if thedeficitwereproperlymeasured, hese policieswould not change ts size. How-ever, the assumption of the bad debt of the banks by the government, by replacingbad assetswith good assets, would allow them to give more loans that mightincrease the liquidity of the economy.

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need to ensure that perverse incentives are not created by reliance onnarrowconcepts of the deficit. These incentives will exist when the deficitcovers only a part of the public sector and when the limits imposed onit are too rigid. In this case, there will be an incentive to "park"the deficitwhere it cannot be measured or to postpone structuraladjustments thatmay tend to increase the size of the measured deficit.19

II. Need to SeparateFiscalfromMonetaryPolicyA total and sharpseparation between fiscal andmonetary policy is nextto impossible in any economy. There are always overlapping areas. For

example, when central banks change the discount rate or engage in openmarket operations, these actions have an impact on the budget deficit.In general, these two policies are less clearly separated in developingcountries than in industrial countries. In Latin America, for example, thecentral banks have, in several cases, engaged in activities that have causedthem to experience large quasi-fiscal deficits.20In Chile, for example, aquasi-fiscal deficit arose during the 1980s as a result of the central bankassuming the bad debts of the commercial banks. This assumption wasclearly a fiscal operation that could have been carried out by the budgetif budgetary conditions at the time had been more sound. In other cases,the central banks assumed the foreign debt of enterprises.In general, the less developed the institutions of a country, the moredifficult it is to separate monetary and fiscal policies and the more difficultit is to measure the true size of the fiscal deficit. More often than not itis the weakness of the fiscal institutions (for example, the inability to raiseneeded revenue) that forces the monetary institutions to assume a fiscalrole. However, making the budget deficit look better than it is also playsa role.

Normally, economic policy is improved when monetary and fiscalpolicies are pursued according to their own specific roles. In this case, ifan enterprise needs to be subsidized, the subsidy should be given throughthe budget. If this results in a budget deficit, the deficit should be financedby the country's treasury through the sale of bonds carrying marketinterest rates.21

19Therewill also be an incentiveto reducethe cash deficitby postponingpayments, husincreasingarrears.20See the recentpaperby Fry (1993).21Whenthe financialmarket s not welldeveloped,or when the credibility fthe governments not good, this sourceof financings not available.However,if the deficit s to be financed hrough nflationaryinance, t maystillbe betterif this finance is directlyallocatedto the budgetand the budgetfinances thevariousactivities ncluding ubsidies o stateenterprises.

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The budgetdeficitis a highlywatchedeconomicbarometer.A largerdeficitalwayssendswarning ignals,both domesticallyandinternation-ally. Therefore,countrieshave an incentiveto limit its size either bygenuinefiscaladjustmentor by pursuing econd-bestpolicies,the resultof whichmaybe even moredamaginghan f thebudgetdeficithad beenallowedto rise. In otherwords,the bias is almostalways or showingabudgetdeficit hatappears maller han t wouldbeifthe true iscaldeficitwere correctlymeasured.At times, this reduction s achievedthroughpoliciesthat do not reduce the realor underlyingiscal deficit but onlythe measuredbudgetdeficit. In otherwords,gimmicksare used to lowerthe budgetdeficitartificially.22Duringthe transition, o the extentpossible,it is importanto containthe inflationratewithoutresorting o directpricecontrols.23 o achievethis objective,the most importantmacroeconomic nstrument or bothmarketeconomiesandeconomiesin transitions creditexpansion,notthe budgetdeficit.Oncetotalcreditexpansion s determined, he coun-tries should be encouraged o continueimproving he efficiencyof theeconomyas well as the fiscal accounts.They shouldbe encouraged oreduceparticular ategoriesof publicexpenditure, o make others moreproductive,and to raise governmentrevenue in an efficient way tocontain the publicsector fiscaldeficit.Theyshould also be encouragedto speed up the variousadjustmentsmentionedabove,evenwhen theseadjustmentsmayresult nincreasesn(measured)budgetdeficits.Impor-tant amongthese adjustmentss the transfer o the governmentof theessentialsocial functionsshoulderedby the state enterprises.Another important point to recognize is that which makes theeconomies in transitiondifferent from normalmarketeconomies: forgiventotalcredit,an increaseof the (measured)budgetdeficit does notnecessarilycrowdout what, in marketeconomies,is the privatesector.Much of the credit expansion goes to the state enterprisesand thegovernment,and only a small residualgoes to the emergingprivatesector. A largereallocationof credit betweenthe budgetandthe stateenterprises an takeplacewithoutnecessarily ffecting heprivate ector.Thisreallocation ouldbefullyconsistentwiththeobjectivesof the trans-formation.If state enterprises a) shedredundantworkers,(b) transferto the governmenthe responsibilityoressential ocialfunctions,(c) nolongerfinancenonessentialsocial functions(suchas vacation or work-

22 Thisis not onlya problemof economies n transition. n fact, it hasbeen afrequentproblem n adjustmentprograms.See Tanzi(1989).23However,because of the changes n relativepricesduring he transition, tmaynot bewise to aimforaninflationratethat stoo lowsincethiswouldrequirea fall in pricesin some sectors.

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ers), and (d) compensate he workers or a fractionof these reductionsthroughsome adjustment n the level of nominalwages, then the netresultof these changescouldverywell be a largerbudgetdeficit withamore efficienteconomy. This change could also be achievedwithoutadditionalcredit expansion if the additional credit to the budget tofinance ts newresponsibilitieswerecompensatedby lower creditto thestate enterprises o reflecttheir reducedsocialresponsibilities.

III. ConcludingRemarksThe paperhas shownthat in situationswhere the role of the govern-menthas not yetbeen determined,where the budgetmust assumesomeresponsibilitiesnow carriedby state enterprises,and where "propertyrights"within he publicsector areill-defined, he budgetdeficit,whichis calculatedby lookingat the behaviorof budgetaryevenueandexpen-diture,has less informational aluethangenerallyassumed.This deficit

mayoften widelydifferfromthe true fiscal deficitfor the whole publicsectorandmayeven movein a differentdirection.The true fiscal deficitwouldincludethe fiscal activitiesof the stateenterprisesandthe centralbank.Underparticular ircumstances,ontaining he budgetdeficitwillnotnecessarilymake more resourcesavailable o theprivatesector andmayeven slow down the structural eformsnecessary o make the transitionsuccessful.The above conclusion houldnot, however,be understood omeanthatfiscalpolicy s irrelevant. fthere s amessage hatfollows romthe discussion, t is (a) that the most comprehensiveand economicallysoundmeasureof thefiscal (not budget)deficit should be used to guidepolicyand(b) that the transferof functions romstateenterpriseso thegovernmentwill needto be taken nto account nsetting imits o the sizeof the deficit. If this is not possible, then the budgetdeficit shouldbedeemphasized. n anycase, structural eformsandtotalcreditexpansionmust receivethe full attentionthey deserve.

REFERENCESBegg,David,andRichardPortes,"EnterpriseDebt andEconomicTransforma-tion: FinancialRestructuring f the State Sectorin Central and EasternEurope,"CEPRWorkingPaperNo. 695 (London:Centre for EconomicPolicyResearch,1992).

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Blejer,Mario,and AdrienneCheasty,eds., How to Measure he FiscalDeficit:AnalyticalandMethodologicalssues(Washington:nternationalMonetaryFund,1993).Blejer,Mario,andKe-youngChu,eds., Measurementf FiscalImpact:Method-ologicalIssues, IMF OccasionalPaperNo. 59 (Washington:nternationalMonetaryFund,1988).Fry,Maxwell,"The Fiscal Abuse of CentralBanks,"IMFWorkingPaperNo.93/58 (Washington:nternationalMonetaryFund,1993).InternationalMonetaryFund(1992a),WorldEconomicOutlook(Washington:InternationalMonetaryFund,October1992).

(1992b),WorldEconomicOutlook,InterimAssessment(Washington:InternationalMonetaryFund,December1992).Musgrave,Richard,The Theoryof PublicFinance(New York:McGraw-Hill,1959).Stiglitz,Joseph,TheEconomicRoleof theState Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1989).Tanzi, Vito, "FiscalPolicyand EconomicReconstructionn LatinAmerica,"WorldDevelopment,Vol. 20 (May 1992), pp. 641-57.

, "FiscalPolicy,Growth,and the Designof StabilizationPrograms,"nFiscalPolicy,Stabilization, ndGrowth, d. byMarioBlejerandKe-youngChu(Washington:nternationalMonetaryFund,1989).Tanzi, Vito, MarioBlejer, and MarioO. Teijeiro,"Inflationand the Measureof Fiscal Deficits," Staff Papers, InternationalMonetaryFund, Vol. 34(December 1987), pp. 711-38.Wallich,ChristineI., Fiscal Decentralization:ntergovernmentalelations nRussia(Washington:WorldBank, 1992).

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Documents

The Budget Deficit in Transition: A Cautionary Note Author(s): Vito