1

The Buddha, the Bazaar, and the Burmese Roadmap to Democracy

Xiaolin Guo

Institute for Security & Development Policy in Stockholm

This report reflects on some current issues following a trip to Myanmar in the spring of 2009. The

purpose of my visit was to see beyond the international headlines for a change. My route through the

country extended from the original landing port to inland historical sites and beyond what is historically

known as Burma proper. I was interested in how ordinary people live and what their general concerns

are. For the people of Myanmar, as for people elsewhere in the world, there is after all more to life

than just political ideals. A general indifference toward national politics stands in contrast to a strong

desire for economic development, and I was struck by the gap between what matters most to people

inside the country and what many on the outside like to see. My report thus deals with, in order of

their importance, key aspects of native experience in Myanmar.

Spiritual Being

Buddhism is the centre of life in Myanmar – spiritually and politically. The arrival of the religion in

Bagan around the eleventh century began the history of political rule evolving from the middle

reaches of the Irrawaddy. Bagan is a land of pagodas, numbering around 2,500, about half of what

existed in its heyday, according to a very proud local guide. The number of pagodas in ratio to local

population is roughly one to ten. These sacred buildings of red brick and sandstone with or without

gold leaf gilded roofs are today not just tourist attractions; the local residents go on pilgrimages in

droves during slack season and on holidays, and individuals come to pray whenever they feel like it.

Walking barefoot is required on these holy premises to show total devotion and unreserved respect.

The Bagan dynasty (1044-1287) perished after the Mongol invasion. The old palace and its walls are

today lying in ruins, in sharp contrast to some of the glittering pagodas in the surroundings.1 After a

half hour flight from Bagan to the northeast one arrives in Mandalay, the seat of Myanmar’s last

dynasty, Konbaung. The city takes its name from the topography, “flat land.” The palace was built in

the early years of the Mindon reign (1853-1878). The year 2009 came to mark the 150th anniversary

of the city. At the end of the U Bein Bridge lie the old quarters originally divided by professions.

Casting Buddha statues is among the oldest professions, and today a flourishing business. Clay,

marble, bronze, and sandalwood, the Buddha statues of various sizes and postures are made to

order; customers come from Thailand, Cambodia, China, and beyond. Techniques of production are

1 A replica palace was built nearby between 2005 and 2008.

2

traditional, but the means of transportation of Buddha statues has greatly improved. A royal

descendant is purportedly a master of logistics involved in delivering Buddha statues.

The history of Burma proper began with the arrival of Buddhism, and all the dynastic founders were

patrons of the religion by way of building pagodas and financing monastic teaching. After the

country’s independence, Buddhism was effectively promoted to the status of state religion; all national

leaders, civilian or military, have without exception patronized Buddhism.2 As part of national

reconciliation, the military government in the 1990s paid special attention to the religious

establishment by participating in Buddhist rituals, making donations, sponsoring monastic teaching,

and not the least, setting up a

special government organ to

supervise religious affairs.3

Between 1988 and 1995, the

expenditure by the military

leaders on building pagodas

alone was estimated at 82

million USD.4

Monastic

teaching centres have a status

equal to that of other

government schools, and enjoy

patronage from not only the

government but also the

populace.

Casting Buddha Statues near U Bein Bridge Mandalay

Mahagandayon in Mandalay is one of the largest Buddhist teaching centres in Myanmar. Housing

over 1,000 monks of different ages, the monastery site is like any university campus, except that the

buildings are well furbished and better maintained than those found on the Yangon University campus

today. The monastery is a major tourist attraction, and renowned for its elaborate rituals. The prestige

associated with the century-old monastery makes Mahagandayon particularly attractive to patrons.

2 David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001), p. 45. 3 He Shenda and Li Chenyang, 《 缅甸》(Myanmar), (Beijing: Zhongguo shenhui kexue wenxian chubanshe,

2005), p. 55. 4 Li Chenyang, “缅甸社会中的佛教和僧侣” (Buddhism and Clergymen in Myanmar Society), in 《缅甸“袈裟”革命：起因、趋势、影响与对策研讨会》 (Collected Papers from the Conference “Myanmar’s ‘Saffron Revolution’:

Origin, Trend, Impact and Policy Adjustment”), edited by Li Chenyang and Qu Jianwen (Kunming: Yunnan University Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p. 40.

3

The mid-day meal at the monastery offers a glimpse of the bond between clergymen and the lay

people.

In the morning, donors and volunteers converged on the campus to help with cooking and

other chores. Food was plenty: rice (cooked in gigantic containers with traditional methods),

fish and vegetable dishes, plus ice-cream and sponge cakes for dessert. Shortly before noon,

the Abbot made his appearance among the donors and volunteers congregating in the

courtyard outside the dining hall. It looked like just a casual chat from a short distance, the

laymen nonetheless stood in total deference putting the palms together and occasionally knelt

down in front of the holy man. At the toll of a bell, the student monks in their hundreds drifted

out of classrooms and dormitories to merge into a double-line queue, each person holding a

black alms bowl. In an orderly manner, they collected food handed out by their patrons in the

courtyard, and moved on into the dining hall to eat.5

The link between substance and religion is the premise of the patron-client relationship in Myanmar

society. Understandably, the belief to gain merit by giving money and offering food to those who

follow a spiritual path has created what is called “an ecological reinforcing niche for people to live by

begging.”6 Outside monasteries, receiving alms is a daily scene on the streets: monks (in maroon-

coloured robes) and nuns (in pink) stroll separately,

from one shop to another and from one house to

another, with alms bowls in hand. These monks and

nuns are effectively the non-residents of the local

households. While the circumstances

understandably vary, for a family in a city like

Mandalay it is not uncommon to receive four or five

regular monks, three or four times a week. Offerings

include rice and sometimes curry dishes. In addition,

people donate cash to monasteries on Buddhist

festivals; for a family of three or four people living at

a subsistence level, the amount of the annual cash

donation is estimated at 20,000-60,000 Kyats –

enough to cover basic to moderate family spending

on food for an entire month.7 No wonder that monks

took to the streets when the population at large felt

the pinch of inflation from the fuel price hike in 2007.

The event illustrated, in a manner of speaking, how the Mahagandayon Learning Centre Mandalay

5 The author’s own observation at Mahagandayon, March 30, 2009.

6 Gary Snyder, The Real Work: Interviews and Talks 1964-1979 (New York: A New Directions Book, 1980), pp. 104-105. 7 The current market exchange rate is 1,000 Kyats = 1USD.

4

going gets tough when the gruel becomes meagre and the monks plentiful. This aspect of life marks

an interesting aspect of Myanmar’s political economy.

Material Life

Next to pagodas, an important scene attracting tourists has to be the local bazaar. The layout of the

marketplace, the goods transacted, and the prices, together serve as an index of local consumption.

Myanmar is a country where the divide between urban and rural areas is not distinct. Local markets in

cities are not that different from those in the countryside, except that size varies considerably.

Whether it is the rural marketplace in Bagan, or the shopping centre in Mandalay, there is an ample

supply of goods: food and spices, household utensils and religious trinkets, fabrics and garments,

jewellery and gems, and much more. At the rural

bazaar (like the one in Bagan I visited), goods are

mostly locally produced and buyers are predominantly

local; the shopping center (two adjacent multi-storey

buildings) in Mandalay carries locally produced goods

as well as goods imported mainly from neighbouring

countries, predominantly China and India; customers

are more diverse compared to their rural counterparts.

Rural or urban, all markets serve the basic needs of a

subsistence living, and prices are generally

compatible with the local level of incomes.

Lacquerware production in Bagan

Bagan is predominantly an agricultural area, and the majority of the local residents make a living on

farming and handicrafts. One village scene aside from bamboo-structured houses, which strikes a

visitor, is the fairly large size of livestock (oxen, buffalos, and goats) kept by each household in the

yard. Crops that have as many as two or three yields a year are mostly the oil-bearing kind (peanut,

sesame, and so on), in addition to a variety of tropical fruits.8 In a household of five to six people, two

or three may be involved in making lacquer-ware to supplement the income from farming. Lacquer-

ware art is a Bagan specialty, using organic materials (bamboo, clay, colour and lacquer paint);

everything is done by hand. Enterprises in this profession are privately owned; each workshop

employs up to a dozen workers from nearby villages: women are involved in engraving and weaving

(bamboo threads), men handling baking and painting. An average worker earns 800-900 Kyats (just

8 Rice in the local consumption comes from north of Mandalay.

5

below one dollar) a day; a daily wage for skilled craftsmen is up to 2,000 Kyats. The survival of this

industry nowadays largely depends on tourism. During slow seasons, workers are generally laid off,

and must find other waged labour to make up the income loss. One person having more than one job

is common.

In cities like Yangon and Mandalay today, a civil servant’s income is estimated at 50,000-80,000

Kyats per month. A subsistence living costs 10,000-15,000 Kyats per week for a household of four.

The proportion of spending on food in the household is relatively high: 70 percent is a national

average and the figure is even higher in some parts of the country.9 The consumer price index,

however, does not quite correspond to the existing consumption of luxury commodities like

automobiles. A ten-year old used Japanese car with the steering wheel on the right-hand side sells for

up to $30,000 (or 30,000,000 Kyats). Given that automobiles and parts rank third in value in the

country’s Commodity Composition of Imports,10 it would suggest that such a commodity is in high

demand. The puzzle is, however, how can such expensive purchases be affordable for not just a few

but quite a few? Income disparities are apparent. A gap between household income and

expenditure,11 furthermore, indicates that a large amount of income is not accounted for in the

statistics. Moonlighting is an important part of the country’s economy, in both the public and private

sectors. Teaching in private schools generally pays well, up to 200,000 Kyats per month,

corresponding to a government minister’s monthly salary. Public school teachers with meagre

incomes make do by giving

private tutorials. That the well-

to-do people, allegedly, do not

deposit money in banks –

either for fear of inflation or

simply to hide personal wealth

– would explain the

phenomenon of outrageous

spending on luxury

commodities, and validate the

prevalence of informal practice

in economic activities.

Village scene in Nyaung-U

Informal practice is the characteristic of Myanmar economy, as a result of essentially lax regulations

and incompetent fiscal administration. These problems normally have a direct impact on government

9 U Myint, “Myanmar Economy: A Comparative View,” paper presented at the Burma Studies Conference, Singapore (July 13-15, 2006), pp. 11-14. 10 U Myint, “Myanmar: Commodity Composition of Imports, Fiscal Year 2007-08,” Working Paper (No. 8, January

2009). 11 U Myint, “Myanmar Economy: A Comparative View” (2006), pp. 12 and 16.

6

revenue while abetting corruption in the form of tax evasion, embezzlement, and misuse of public

funds, all detrimental to economic development and public services. Government revenue mainly

draws from foreign trade (of which natural gas, timber, gem, and agricultural products are the primary

commodities), income from state enterprises, sales and value-added tax, in addition to a wide range

of fees and fines. The per capita income in Myanmar is among the lowest in the Asia-Pacific region,

and so too is the country’s per capita GDP; similarly, government-supplied goods in Myanmar are

among the scarcest and government-provided services maintain only the lowest of standards. The

public services that have been gravely neglected, due to constraints on public spending, are in the

areas of health care, education, sanitation, clean water, and irrigation. Many roads, bridges, and

railways date back to colonial times, and are in desperate need of repair. Putting up with frequent

power cuts has become a way of life in cities, as well as in the countryside, where diesel powered

generators turn out to be daily necessities.

In the present decade, the military government has taken measures to generate revenue by

decentralizing trade and experimenting with a market economy. Agricultural produce has for decades

contributed the bulk of the country’s GDP. Rice in Myanmar is both subsistence and commodity, for

domestic consumption and export (in addition to pulses and other cash crops). For that reason, the

rice trade had remained a government monopoly until 2003 when a new rice policy was implemented

to stimulate rice sales and replenish government revenue.12 Rice harvests, good or bad, matter

greatly therefore, not just in terms of government revenue but also social stability. The prospect of the

post-Nargis rice farming is presently a cause for some concern. As it has been observed, in addition

to bad harvests, mounting debts sustained by the farmers and shortage of credits due to a lack of

government investment in agriculture will continue to have a negative impact on rice production in the

coming years.13 The seriousness of this challenge to the incumbent government and the one to

succeed it cannot be underestimated.

Under constant revenue constraints to meet expenditure demand in public sectors, the military

government has in recent years resorted to price hikes. The inflation in 2007 that sparked public

protests was blamed on a sudden manoeuvre by the military government to reduce long-standing

financial subsidy in certain consumption goods including fuel and food; the price adjustment doubled

fuel prices and triggered increases in daily spending, resulting in significant hardship in people’s life.14

The price adjustment, reportedly, coincided with salary increases for civil servants.

12 With this policy implementation, the traditional rice procurement was lifted.

13 See report by Amy Kazmin, “Crises Test Resilience of Burma’s Farmers,” Financial Times, May 29, 2009.

14 Zou Chunmeng, “缅甸 ‘袈裟革命’的经济因素分析” (Myanmar’s ‘Saffron Revolution’ and Its Economic Factors),

in Collected Papers from the Conference “Myanmar’s ‘Saffron Revolution’: Origin, Trend, Impact and Policy Adjustment” (2007), pp. 23-28.

7

The incumbent government is faced with mounting problems of an economic nature, and its inability

to deal with these problems is partly due to the overall political agenda set by the military leaders, and

partly due to fiscal operations that the uniformed personnel is too inexperienced to manage well.

Because national defence and security justify the existence of military rule to the regime, a main area

of the country’s spending is on a military build-up.15 Having the lowest percentage of gross domestic

investment in statistical terms among the Asian countries makes the economic structure of Myanmar

today, in effect, “pre-industrial.”16 To a large extent, successive post-Independence Myanmar

governments have taken the people’s spirit of self-reliance largely for granted. The people of

Myanmar are known to be generally at ease with themselves and self-content; they desire a better

life, but try not to upset themselves when not seeing much progress. This attitude toward life is

believed to be in tune with the virtues of Buddhism. For many, their living conditions today are not

necessarily worse than 20 years ago, but all want to see their country develop and modernize, like

their Asian neighbours.

Aspiration for Change

In 1988, the popular movement that ended Ne Win’s rule was essentially sparked by public

resentment toward the BSPP’s poor economic performance (a year after the country had been listed

among the UN’s Least Developed Nations).

Any alternative political force was regarded

at the time as offering hope for change; the

NLD captured the momentum and won

people’s hearts and minds. Outside the

country, however, the message was read

somewhat differently. Sanctions were

imposed to induce the regime to institute

political reform. Some of the unintended

consequences of sanctions have, however,

turned out to be troubling.

Bagan Panorama

15 As previously estimated, military expenditure comprised over 40 percent of the government budget, whereas

expenditure on education and health amounted to, separately, 19 percent and five percent. Hu Qiongyao, “缅甸爆发‘袈裟革命’的原因探析” (Analysis of the ‘Saffron Revolution’ in Myanmar), in Collected Papers from the

Conference “Myanmar’s ‘Saffron Revolution’: Origin, Trend, Impact and Policy Adjustment” (2007), p. 21. 16 U Myint, “A Note on GDP Growth and Investment: A Historical Perspective,” Working Paper (February 28,

2007).

8

As research has shown, in the garment industry targeted by U.S. sanctions, smaller firms have

suffered more than larger ones, and unemployment as a consequence of sanctions has impacted

primarily on poorer households.17 Of the estimated 80,000 workers who lost their jobs (in mostly

privately owned firms) as a result of sanctions targeting the garment industry, nearly 90 percent were

female, most of them not married. Some researchers in Myanmar relate that, a large percentage of

women currently making a living by providing sex-related services are former garment factory

employees.18 The collateral damage as such, to the people of Myanmar, hardly justifies the moral

intention of the sanctions to punish the villain. Some have drawn an analogy between the international

sanctions and levying punishment on a drunk and abusive man for negligence by way of starving his

six-year-old stepson living under the same roof, as if the little boy had not already suffered enough by

living with his stepfather who is, in the view of the onlookers, irresponsible and repressive.

Naturally, advocates and defenders of the sanction policy tend to reiterate the line that sanctions send

“a strong message.” It makes little sense to the people in Myanmar, even though the “strong

message” is sent supposedly for their benefit. Some view the sanction policy as no more than a

game, like two neighbours: one day Y stopped talking to Z; compelled to do something under the

circumstance, Z decided not to talk to Y. Aside from a demonstration of “doing something about it,”

the tit for tat served no other purpose. In the case of Myanmar, however, international sanctions are

increasingly seen as providing the military leaders with convenient excuses for not being able to do

anything about the country’s economy, if not totally neglecting it.

The military government is said to be good at managing crises (in its own way), but hopelessly inept

at organizing economic activities. It may not be that the leadership is totally unaware of the

seriousness of the country’s economic problems, only that a military mindset invariably prioritizes

national security and political stability. No matter what they do for a living, few ordinary citizens are

satisfied with the economic performance of the incumbent government. In that regard, the government

is a “step-parent” (invoking yet again, the same metaphor) who has authority over the children and

simultaneously a duty to look after them, except that he cannot do his job properly because

sometimes he does not care, and sometimes he is too drunk (or too carried away) to be bothered;

likewise, the children under his care have little respect for the step-parent, but they have to put up

17 Toshihiro Kudo, “The Impact of U.S. Sanctions on the Myanmar Garment Industry,”

http://networkmyanmar.org/images/kudo.pdf 18 See also Derek Tonkin, “Myanmar: The Quest for Effective Sanctions and the Law of Unintended

Consequences,” Burmese Perspectives, October 1, 2007, http://networkmyanmar.org/images/bp%20oct%201.pdf

9

with him and get by. For many in the international community, getting rid of the military government is

the end; but people in Myanmar are more concerned about what follows afterward.

The intellectuals of the country, the young, the middle-aged and the old with no particular political

affiliations are generally aware of the international headlines about their country and about the military

government; to some extent, they even agree with the foreign analyses of their woes. They do not

dispute democracy, nor do they think that the electoral process itself can solve the country’s

problems. The protracted civil war in their country is very much on the minds of many people.

Tightening controls on drug trafficking and making peace with the various insurgent forces, as initiated

by the government 20 years ago, are regarded as moves in a positive direction, and good for the

country.19

Lamenting the fact that the

country’s economy has been neglected for

decades, people cannot help but compare

Myanmar to a sick man. Depending on

one’s preference, they say, there is a cure

by either blocking nutrition intake to starve

the bacteria, or increasing nutrition intake

so that the body can gain strength to fight

the infection. The latter is considered the

right treatment for Myanmar. This

preference means that however bad the

situation may be, hardly any one wants to

see their country in ruins. Mandalay Palace Moat

The general elections announced by the military government – expected to take place in 2010 – will

complete the fifth step on the “Roadmap to Democracy.” As the date (though not yet announced) is

drawing near, the general public is showing little enthusiasm. Realistically speaking, the chances for

radical change ensuing the elections look remote, given that political stability requires a certain

degree of continuity in the political transition. Then again, boycotting the elections does not seem to

offer a sensible solution either. On the contrary, some see the process as a necessary step for the

country to move forward. For many in the international community, a democratic process is the end

game, but the people of Myanmar are more interested in what is lying beyond the general elections.

The economic failure on the part of the military leaders shows the country in desperate need of

competent and skilled hands to make and execute economic plans. A reduction of the role of the

19 Warfare and drug trafficking had made much of the Shan State impenetrable for decades. The ceasefire

process began in 1989. For more on this topic, see Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma (Washington, D. C.: East-West Center, 2007), pp. 40-43.

10

military in government in the event of general elections would allow a bigger role for civil servants in

the management of economic activities and civil affairs.

Twenty years after the downfall of Ne Win, the people of Myanmar continue to place their hope in

change. They are not as much concerned with who comes to power in the next general elections as

with who may bring real economic progress to the country. Although much of the general public is still

sympathetic to the NLD, there is no denying that the image of this once formidable political opposition

has changed over time. The unrelenting support for international sanctions by the exile communities

is increasingly seen to have prolonged the hardship on people inside the country. There is a distinct

feeling of being let down by the military government who cares only about political stability at the

expense of economic development. The international campaigns for democracy in Myanmar, on the

other hand, have so far not exactly helped improve the living conditions for many inside the country.

Despite a general negative opinion toward international sanctions, the country does not seem to bear

an acute grudge against foreign governments that have resorted to, or supported, sanctions; instead,

people are looking forward to the return of foreign tourists and investments. Apathy towards the

general elections aside, the members of the educated elite yearning for change are hoping to see the

post-election government come up with a comprehensive plan for economic development, whereas

the private entrepreneurs are counting on some kind of relaxation and a benign environment for their

businesses to thrive. How much relaxation can be expected in due course very much depends on

how stable the post-election situation in the country will turn out to be.

International Predicaments

Myanmar would have been just another Third World country, where the plight of the majority may well

go unnoticed, had it not been for the charismatic Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who led the democratic

movement in 1988 and later won the Nobel Prize. The international limelight on her, however, has

done little to resolve the political stalemate, as the world has witnessed in the past two decades. She

may have been made irrelevant in the drafting of the new Constitution and her prospect of becoming

head of state may be remote (as many assume), but Aung San Suu Kyi is holding the key to a crucial

part of national reconciliation, and her position remains the focus of policymakers in Brussels and

Washington. Weeks before her house arrest term expired, speculations of reconciliation, if not wishful

thinking, led one to believing that the opposition leader might be persuaded to rethink her position for

the benefit of the country, once she came into touch again with society. That encouraging prospect of

11

political progress was shattered when John Yettaw from Missouri was fished out of the Inya Lake near

the house of Aung San Suu Kyi, at the crack of dawn on the 6th of May, 2009.

20

The timing, not to mention the incident itself, is quite peculiar, and for the time being one can only

speculate about what lies behind the printed stories and statements. In any case, the swift court

proceedings showed the military in control of the situation despite international pressure. The delay of

sentencing indicates the intricacy of the case, as the Myanmar authorities seek to show the public.21

Up to this point, the military government has kept its priorities straight following the Roadmap to

Democracy without hiccups, and some measures have been taken to prevent unwanted disruption, as

civil servants have been relocated to Naypyidaw and university students dispersed to campuses

outside Yangon. Maintaining control over the political process remains of the utmost importance to the

military leaders, a lesson learned from the 1990 elections.22 While the general elections in Myanmar

may well go ahead as scheduled, how the Western powers are going to respond to the result is as

good as anyone’s guess at the moment. Anticipating the outcome of the elections is as disconcerting

for the military government as it is for the international community. The uncertainty, to some extent,

speaks for the presently sluggish policy review in the EU and U.S.

The existing sanctions policy has been debated among academics and politicians. Increasingly, it has

been acknowledged that the policy has failed, in a sense that it has not brought down the military

government as intended in the first place; instead, it has inadvertently prolonged the suffering of the

people in Myanmar. Since US President Obama took office at the beginning of 2009, there has been

some talk of a policy adjustment vis-à-vis Myanmar (along with a foreign policy review in other areas),

but there has been so far no sign on either side of the Atlantic of lifting sanctions.23 Pro-sanction

politicians and Burma campaign advocates alike, seem to find it hard to let go of the idea that since

sanctions arguably worked in South Africa, why should they not do so in Myanmar?24

Notwithstanding, the military government under international sanctions and in isolation has managed

20 The accused trespasser allegedly had a vision that Aung San Suu Kyi was about to be assassinated, and felt

duty-bound to warn his heroine of the immanent danger. 21 The latest briefing by the Myanmar authorities on charges against John Yettaw questioned a number of points

with regard to his conduct and circumstances involved in his mysterious visit, each presented as “food for thought.” It was also made clear in the briefing that investigations were to continue. The New Light of Myanmar, June 26, 2009, http://networkmyanmar.org/images/266newsn.pdf 22 See an analysis by Derek Tonkin, “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Raises the Stakes,” Burmese Perspectives

(February 5, 2009), http://networkmyanmar.org/images/bp050209.pdf. 23 For the European part, the EU Council conclusions on Burma/Myanmar have recently extended the existing

EU position for another year, including the restrictive measures. The Council of the European Union, 2938th

General Affairs Council Meeting Luxembourg, 27 April 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/107388.pdf 24 For a critique of the South Africa parallel, see Derek Tonkin, “The Opposition in Overdrive,” Burmese

Perspectives, April 21, 2009, http://www.networkmyanmar.org/images/BPs/bp210409.pdf

12

to achieve ceasefire agreements with all but one remaining insurgent group,25 draw up a new

Constitution, and set the agenda for general elections, while expanding trade with neighbouring

countries. Continuation of the current punitive policy toward Myanmar is doubtful to have any

substantial impact on what the military government has been doing and what it is set to do.

Talk of “smart sanctions” has been going on for quite some time now as a way to restore the magic of

the sanction policy. Yet, very few seem to be able to get a grip on what constitutes smart sanctions,

and just how smart they should be in order to achieve the intended results, other than confirming that

the sanctions executed previously were not smart.26 A way out of the present diplomacy quandary

would require a new political vocabulary, moving away from the rhetoric of sanctions (whether “smart”

or not), so as to justify the goodwill of the international community to the people of Myanmar and the

country that has endured decades of civil war and poverty.

P.S.

On the border between Mandalay and the Shan State lies a bustling town by the name Maymyo,

formerly the Hill Station, or the summer resort of the colonial administrators. Many colonial style

houses are fairly well preserved, while quite a few have been converted into hotels serving similarly

those who have the means today. With the relocation of the administrative capital to Naypyidaw,

south of Mandalay, there has been speculation on the old colonial resort soon becoming a holiday

destination for government ministers and their subordinates. Already, the military has its plantations

and factories in and around the area, as well as its elite academies. The Myanmar National Defence

Service Academy is one of them, located on the side of the main road. Opposite the gate that bears

the name of the academy is a slogan, which reads: The Triumphant Elite of the Future. I read it aloud,

as we were driving past the gate. My local guide promptly added: “The future is uncertain.” This

seemingly casual remark reflects the mood of many people concerned about where their country is

going at the moment.

25 The military government recently announced that “17 out of 18 armed insurgent groups have returned to the

legal fold,” including recently hundreds of KNU members (more than 300 in February 2007, and another 160 in March 2009). The New Light of Myanmar, June 1, 2009, http://networkmyanmar.org/images/16newsn.pdf 26 What has emerged about the EU’s selection of sanction targets making use of the Myanmar Yellow Pages

Online, for one, hardly strikes one as being smart. See Derek Tonkin, “EU Sanctions Legislation Purloined Myanmar Yellow Pages,” http://networkmyanmar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13&Itemid=87