THE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK - … · Sergi Kapanadze, Kakha Gogolashvili, the Director of the Georgian com-ponent of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network, and Rusudan Margishvili,

B U L L E T I N # 11 S E P T E M B E R 2013

BSPNTHE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK

www.bspn.gfsis.org

C O N T E N T S

BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK GEORGIAN EXPERTS MEETING

A seminar organized by the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network was held in Gori on 20 December 2012. Representatives of non-governmental sector of the Gori district and the teachers’ community, experts Tengiz Pkhaladze, Sergi Kapanadze, Kakha Gogolashvili, the Director of the Georgian com-ponent of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network, and Rusudan Margishvili, project coordinator, participated in the seminar.

The meeting was opened by Kakha Gogolashvili, who began with a general introduction to the goals and directions of the work of the Black Sea Peace-building Network project. It was followed by reports – Role of the European Union in Conflict Resolution - by Sergi Kapanadze, Chairman of Georgia’s Reforms Associates, Prospects of Relations with Russia in the New Environ-ment – by Tengiz Pkhaladze, the Director of the International Center for Geopolitical Studies. After presenting both reports, a discussion took place where many questions were put forward by the attendees and the experts tried to give answers. In the end, the participants expressed their desire to ar-range further meetings in Gori, during which the audience would be able to get introduced to interesting topics and also would be given the opportunity to put acute questions to experts themselves.

P. 8

P. 2Sergi Kapanadze. Role of the European Union in Peaceful Resolution of Conflict

P. 7Tengiz Pkhaladze. Prospects of Negotiations with Russia

P. 9Elene Khoshtaria. Strategy for Regulating Relations with Rus-sia: Possibilities and Dangers

P. 11Gia Nodia. Georgia-Russia R el-ations

P. 13Kakha Gogolashvili. EUs Role in the resolution of conflicts in South Caucasus and future of the Eastern Partnership

MEETINGS & EVENTS

OPINION PAPERS

P. 11 P. 15

P. 17Kornely Kakachia. Cross bor-der conflict dynamics and secu-rity Challenges in Georgia

P. 15Ivlian Haindrava. To the issue of (in) security in the South Cau-casus

www.bspn.gfsis.org

2B U L L E T I N # 11 S E P T E M B E R 2013

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

Sergi Kapanadze

Introduction

Integration of Georgia in the European Union is one of the most important priorities. It is reflected in all the strategic

documents of the country. It is always made to sound rhetorically in statements made by senior officials of the country. At pres-ent both political powers agree that there is no alter-native to the European in-tegration. This partnership and strategic relationship go beyond just bilateral relations, the process of Association Agreement, free trade, or visa liber-alization. To Georgia the European Union is the main international actor involved in the problem of conflict resolution as a medium. The war of 2008, particularly the ceasefire agreement signed under the mediation of the Eu-ropean Union on 12th Au-gust and the Monitoring Mission sent to Georgia in October 2008, dramati-cally increased the degree

of involvement of the European Union in the with the aim of peaceful settlement of the conflict. This involvement is incomparable to the one existing before 2008 in terms of its institutional architecture, political importance and strategic partnership between the European Union and Georgia.

Historical Involvement of European Union in the Con-flict Resolution Process

Until 2008 the European Union, as a sole actor, did not take part in peacekeeping processes. Alongside with Russia and the USA, Germany and France – member-states of the European Union – were involved in the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General working on the problem of Abkhazia. However, the institutions of the United Nations did not have any individual role. This involvement was similar to the one the EU has in Nagorno-Karabakh today – where the role of the European Union is limited to only France, as a member-state of the EU. In the peacekeeping process connected to Tskhinvali region the role of the EU was simply non-existent, as none of the states of the Euro-

pean Union took part in the peacekeeping process. From the side of the EU it was only European Commission that participated in the sittings of the Joint Control Commis-sion (JCC) (with the status of an observer) and in the meet-ings of Rehabilitation Program’s management committee (only because the program was financed by EU member states). In fact, until 2008 EU was not institutionally in-volved at all. Although EU special representatives (EUSR) for South Caucasus (first Heikki Talvitie, later Peter Sem-neby) showed their personal interest in conflicts, it was still not translated into the institutional interest of the European Union. Furthermore, the mandate of the EUSR for South Caucasus was quite vague and vast. It should also be men-tioned, that until 2008 the EU preferred to maintain the then existing peacekeeping formats with regard to the problems of conflict resolution rather than create new ones. In addi-tion, we were dealing with the so called ‘labor distribution’ among the international organizations. In particular, it was considered, that the UN was occupied with the conflict in Abkhazia (the problem was listed in the agenda of the Se-curity Council, the United Nations Observer Mission was deployed on the territory, the special representative of the UN Secretary General was regarded the main international actor in the conflict resolution process), while the problems of Tskhinvali region concerned the OSCE (the problem was listed in the agenda of the Permanent Council of the OSCE, the OSCE mission in Georgia also worked on the Rehabilitation Program of Tskhinvali region, five monitors of the OSCE mission were present in Tskhinvali proper). Consequently, it was the approach of the European Union not to interfere with the “overloaded” situation and not to attempt to play bigger role. Russia’s permanent pressure on the EU and the European countries to prevent dimin-ishing of the role of the Russian Federation as a mediator state, naturally, added to it.

A remarkable example is the EU-Georgia European Neigh-borhood Policy Action (AP) Plan, whose Priority Area 6 is to “Promote peaceful resolution of internal conflicts” . If we look over the actions listed under this priority area, we will notice that they are just “desires” and do not imply any institutional or actual involvement of the EU. For ex-ample, the first four actions concern respect of Georgia’s territorial integrity, making steps towards building confi-dence, increase of economic assistance and importance of demilitarization within the frames of existing peacekeep-ing processes. The following two actions express the EU’s positions with regard to peaceful regulation of the conflict. First, the European Union points out that negotiation mech-anism, such as JCC should be employed more efficiently in peacekeeping process. Following this the EU emphasizes, that the European Union should conduct active coopera-tion with other international actors – the UN and the OSCE in terms of conflict resolution. The final provision of the ‘Chapter of Conflicts’ of the Action Plan was inserted with the demand of Georgian side. In particular, it was written

Sergi Kapanadze – founder of Georgian Reforms Association,

A s s o c i a t e d Professor of of European Studies and International Negotiations of the Inter-national Rela-tions Depart-

ment at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (since 2004); doc-toral dissertation in the sphere of international relations (Tbilisi State University, 2012); Master of Inter-national Relations and European Studies (Central European Univer-sity, 2003); in 2011-2012 was Dep-uty Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia; before that occupied vari-ous high positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005; 2007-2011), Administration of the President of Georgia (2006), National Security Council (2004-2005) and at Foreign Intelligence Special Service of Geor-gia (2006-2007).


in the AP that the European Union should include the prob-lem of Georgia’s territorial integrity in her political dia-logue agenda with Russia. The provisions given in the AP clearly show that institutional involvement of the European Union in the problem of conflict resolution did not actually exist until 2008. It was only in the summer of 2008 that the EU became interested in the conflict, which was mainly caused by extreme tension in conflict zones and by the in-creased armament of the Russian side. As a result of the insistence of the Georgian side, Xavier Solana arrived in Georgia with the view to visiting Tbilisi and Sokhumi. The declared main purpose of his visit was to defuse the ten-sion existing at the time. Despite the visit of this level, the positions of Sokhumi and Moscow were so separated from those of Tbilisi and Europe that no progress was made in negotiations. In particular, two main problems – (1) resum-ing suspended participation of Sokhumi in then running negotiations and (2) internationalization of the peacekeep-ing format - remained unsolved. This involvement of the EU turned out to be too delayed and insufficient. Alongside these visits Tbilisi continued demanding from the countries of the European Union to recognize Russia as the side of the conflict and to make effective efforts with a view to internationalizing peacekeeping troops made up with Rus-sian dominance. Furthermore, any hint made by Georgia with regard to the fact that the Parliament was going to suspend the status of the peacekeeping mission of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) operating under the aegis of the UN was perceived in an extremely negative way by the European capitals and Brussels.

Eventually, institutional involvement of the European Union was carried out during the hot phase of the con-flict, when France, being the holder of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, got involved as a me-diator in the war of August 2008. First, Bernard Kouch-ner, the French Foreign Minister, then Nikola Sarkozy, the French President, arrived in Georgia several times in order to reach the ceasefire agreement. As a result of these visits an agreement was concluded according to which Russian Federation was obliged to withdraw its military forces to the pre-war positions, also to admit humanitarian cargo, to get involved in international negotiations concerning the return of security and stability in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region as well as to return the refugees to their homes.

The agreement of 12 August 2008 was followed by the fact that the European Union realized the necessity of its in-stitutional involvement and made effective steps forward. First of all, the EU introduced a position of a special repre-sentative on the ‘problems of crisis in Georgia’, which was entrusted to Pierre Morel, an experienced French diplomat, then it made a decision to deploy a monitoring mission equipped with the function of monitoring the fulfillment of the ceasefire agreement from 1 October. The EU also got involved in the Geneva international negotiations and in the mechanisms of incident prevention and response as a

co-president together with the UN and the OSCE.

Role of the European Union in Geneva Negotiations

The European Union plays a special part in Geneva inter-national negotiations. For the first time in the history of Georgia, the European Union is the mediator in Georgia-Russian conflict. Everything points to it – basic documents of Geneva negotiations, the format of negotiations itself and the specific role that the EU plays in these negotiations.

xxxThe basis for Geneva negotiations is the ceasefire agree-ment of 12 August. Its ‘Article 6’ reads that there should start “international discussions on security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and on return of the refugees”. On 8 September 2008 an agreement was reached at the meeting of the French and Russian Presidents in Moscow, according to which “international discussions, as foreseen in the plan signed by Medvedev and Sarkozy on 12 August 2008, would start in Geneva on 15 October 2008.”

On 25 September 2008 the EU adopted the mandate of ‘European Union Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia whose Article 3 reads that the representative’s main function is “to help prepare for the international talks to be held under point 6 of the settlement plan of 12 August 2008” and to represent the European Union in these talks.

The first round of Geneva negotiations was actually held on 15 October and the fact, that it was held and that ne-gotiations are still conducted is a tribute to the European Union. It is remarkable, that during the first round of Gene-va negotiations the co-presidents disseminated a document called ‘Guide to the Proposed Conduct of the Discussions Beginning 15 October 2008 in Geneva’, whose Article 1 emphasized, that negotiations were to start under the co-presidency of the special representative of the EU, the spe-cial representative of the UN and the special representative of the country that was the holder of the Presidency of the OSCE. Consequently, all the documents underlying the Geneva negotiations clearly show that it is the European Union that is the mediator in these negotiations.

The role of the European Union has to be emphasized in the negotiations themselves. The EU determines the agen-da of every meeting, which has acquired a rather steady pattern over the past rounds. Before each round all three co-presidents visit Tbilisi, Moscow, Sokhumi and Tskhin-vali, where they meet the participants of the talks and then draw up the agenda which is sent to the participants by the secretariats of Geneva negotiations (the secretariat is actu-ally formed by the staff of the EUSR. In addition, every round is opened and completed by the EUSR, and after the negotiations it is the EUSR that sums up the progress of the past round.

It is remarkable, that the mediating role of the EU is rec-ognized by everybody except for Russian Federation,


which permanently tries to show that its role in the Ge-neva negotiations is similar to the function of the media-tor. It is interesting, that in press-releases issued after the Geneva negotiations the Russian Foreign Ministry nearly always applies the formulation - “В ней приняли участие делегации Республики Абхазия, Грузии, Российской Федерации, США, Республики Южная Осетия, а также представители ЕС, ООН и ОБСЕ”. (“Delegations of the Republic of Abkhazia, Georgia, Russian Federation, the USA, Republic of South Ossetia and the representative of the EU, the UN and the OSCE took part in it”). In the rest of the statement, as a rule, Russian Foreign Ministry tries not to mention the role of the EU as the co-president and, especially, as the mediator. By contrast, in its statements made after Geneva rounds, Georgia’s Foreign Ministry al-ways mentions that the EU, the UN and the OSCE are co-presidents, while Russia and Georgia are the sides of the conflict. In order to support their argument, Russian Feder-ation often tries to assemble a logical construction, accord-ing to which the European Union, its Special Representa-tive and the the EU Monitoring Mission are the guarantors of order and security in Georgia on the Georgian side of the Georgia-Ossetia and Georgia-Abkhazia state borders, while Russia, its diplomatic body and military forces have the same function in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This log-ic has been mentioned several times in the first work group of Geneva talks, although it was traditionally perceived in a skeptical way both by the Georgian side and by the USA and the co-presidents. Consequently, Georgia should bear in mind, that the mediatory role of the European Union is not universally accepted and adopted by every actor and it is enough to weaken attention or weakening the role of the European Union, that Russia will definitely make an at-tempt to change its status and, at least, show itself as a me-diator, like the EU. It was this that caused concern of many experts in Tbilisi, who believed that the beginning of the bilateral dialogue between Russia and Georgia (Karasin-Abashidze format) contained a potential threat - in case of commencing discussions about the conflict, it was possible that the EU might lose its role of the mediator. Actually, it is easy to imagine, that at some stage Russia will pro-pose to Georgia to invite representatives of Tskhinvali and Sokhumi to the meeting in Russia’s presence. In the case of such a proposal diminishing of the roles of the European Union and the USA will become problematic.

It is remarkable, that the role of the European Union in working groups of Geneva alks is particularly essential. Positions of Georgia and the EU on all the issues put for-ward in the agenda of Geneva negotiations at this stage are identical. In particular, they both share the position, that international presence in Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia should be reinforced, they both consider that Russia should take the obligation of non-use of force against Georgia and both consider that the process of the return of the refugees to their homes should start. Certainly, there are some differ-

ences on the issues of tactics, although positions of Georgia and the EU on strategic issues are identical.

In parallel with Geneva talks the European Union plays the crucial role in Incident Prevention and Response Mecha-nisms (IPRMs) agreed on in Geneva in February 2009 and from then on is quite frequently held. The leading part in the IPRM is played by the monitoring mission of the EU. In the IPRMs on Tskhinvali and Abkhazia problems the leader of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) either chairs or co-chairs meetings and draws up an agenda. Apart from that, the UN and the OSCE also have a function of co-chairmanship during Ergneti and Gali IPRMs, although their roles are rather weak. In particular, the OSCE does not take part in the Gali IPRMs due to the fact, that in this case Tskhinvali and Moscow are blocking “excessive in-ternational involvement”. If we add traditional antagonist attitude of Sokhumi and Tskhinvali towards the EUMM to it, it becomes clear that the role of the European Union in the IPRMs is not fully acceptable for Moscow. Moscow would pleasurably consent to change the mandate of the EU Monitoring Mission and to let it leave Georgia, more-over, if the functions of the EU Monitoring Mission were distributed among the UN and the OSCE.

The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)

Deploying the EUMM is also associated with the ceasefire agreement of 12th August and the implementation plan. In the latter Russia took the obligation, according to which the operation phase of the mission should start on 1st Octo-ber. It was recorded in the agreement that Russian military forces should “be completely withdrawn from the zones located around the administrative borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the points they had been deployed before rivalries. This withdrawal should be implemented within 10 days from deploying international mechanisms in these zones. These mechanisms should comprise at least 200 EU monitors and it should be implemented not later than 1st October 2008”.

The Monitoring Mission mandate covers the whole terri-tory of Georgia and it is due to this record that it does not manage to enter Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia. The re-cord “the whole territory of Georgia” is unacceptable to Moscow, Tskhinvali and Sokhumi. This is why Russian border guards do not allow the EUMM to enter the occu-pied territories.

The mandate of the Monitoring Mission is multi-compo-nent and implies components of stabilization, normaliza-tion, confidence building and information dissemination. In the frame of this mandate the EUMM carries out monitor-ing of the section of the administrative border which is situ-ated on the unoccupied territory of Georgia. The EUMM has signed memorandums of mutual understanding with the Defense Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, which enables the mission to receive informa-


tion about any substantial relocation of military forces and police.

The EUMM’s another serious function is connected to dissemination of independent unbiased information about safety situation in the regions adjacent to the occupied ter-ritories and the processes occurring on the occupied terri-tories. Although the EUMM does not have physical access to the occupied territories, it is still able to provide Brussels with proper information on the basis of that received from various sources. It is remarkable, that there have been sev-eral occasions when the EUMM refuted accusations of the Russian side about Georgia’s intention of arming and using force against Tskhinvali or Sokhumi. It is also noteworthy, that a few days before the elections of 1st October 2012 the EUMM made a clear statement about enhancement of Russia’s military capacities in Tskhinvali region and the announcement of mobilization. It was the statement of the EUMM that led to the fact that this issue was put at a high political level by the European Union.

The monitoring mission is an operation which implies seri-ous guarantee of security to Georgia. Despite the fact, that this mission does not have a police or a peacekeeping func-tion, it conveys a serious political message to Russia. The Monitoring Mission represents all the states of the Euro-pean Union without exception and the number of the moni-tors is over 200. From this point of view, this mission is re-ally unique because, as a rule, participation of all the states of the EU in missions carried out in the frame of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is an exception.

According to the above mentioned, it is obvious that the ac-tivity of the EUMM is completely unacceptable to Moscow, Sokhumi and Tskhinvali. During the year 2012 Sokhumi and Tskhinvali made a direct attack on functions and lead-ers of the EUMM. At the beginning of the year representa-tives of Tskhinvali informed the EUMM that they would not like the mission to co-chair of Ergneti/Dvani IPRMs. Tskhinvali demanded by a letter that the presidency of the IPRMs should be rotational among the participants, which meant that the representatives of Tskhinvali and the EUMM would have equal rights just like the ones of Georgia and Russia. This letter was ignored by both the EUMM and the International Community. However, after a few months this demarche was followed by demarches of Russia in Brussels against the role of the EUMM and the culmina-tion was the attack on the mission from Sokhumi. In April 2012 General Anjey Tishkevich, leader of the EUMM, was declared persona non grata by Sokhumi and he was banned to take part in the Gali IPRMs. It is remarkable that the rea-son used for justification of this step is not convincing. The representatives of Sokhumi believe that General Tishkev-ich insulted the memory of the dead in Gali district instead of responding to Sokhumi’s demand to let the EUMM get involved in investigating the incidents that occurred in Gali during the year 2012. Despite this, it was clear that General

Tishkevich’s response to this demand would naturally im-ply the demand to let the EUMM enter the territory of Ab-khazia in the case of investigation. It is difficult to imagine what actions were expected from the EUMM by Sokhumi in the situation, when the mission was unable to conduct monitoring in Gali. Eventually, these demarches orches-trated by Moscow ended up so that IPRMs have not been held in Gali for almost a year and the EUMM is far weaker today than it was before 2012.

It is essential for Georgia that the EUMM stays in Georgia and becomes as strong as possible. Naturally, due to the fact that the mission is unable to fulfill its mandate completely (it is not allowed in the occupied territories), the subject of necessity of elaborating the mission’s ‘exit strategy’ comes up in Brussels from time to time. Every discussion of this kind is followed by great discontent in Tbilisi, as it is be-lieved in Georgia that weakening of the EUOM, reducing the number of its monitors and, eventually, discussing the exit from Georgia have a negative impact on the country’s security.

It is obvious, that there is no alternative to eficient func-tioning of the Monitoring Mission of the European Union for Georgia unless police and peacekeeping forces are de-ployed on the occupied territories or/and at the adminis-trative borderline. It is important that Georgia’s authorities should not be satisfied with just presence of the Observer Mission and continue making diplomatic efforts in order to implement international operations on the occupied or their adjacent territories. This goal will be difficult to reach at this stage, although, as a result of strong diplomatic efforts, it is possible to mobilize international attention around the insecurity vacuum that has generated in Georgia due to ab-sence of a strong international mission.

EU’s Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy

Institutional involvement mechanisms of the European Union have been mentioned above. Naturally, mechanisms are instruments for putting a certain policy into effect. The policy of the EU in connection with Georgia-Russia con-flict is known as the so called ‘non-recognition and engage-ment ’ policy. This policy was worked out in the European Union in 2009-2010 and is based on several basic concepts. First of all, the EU respects Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and its every activity is the consequence of the frame of these principles. At the same time, the Eu-ropean Union wants to deepen its relations with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region with the aim of resolving the conflict and providing humanitarian aid. It is remarkable, that the European Union emphasizes that it is important to have relations with civil societies through making progress in building confidence and by discussing human rights, the increase of economic activities and the accessibility to hu-manitarian aid with them. In addition, the European Union may also consider having relations with Russian military forces as well as with diplomats; however, it believes that


the contact with Russian army should be made in the frame of IPRMs, while Russian diplomats should be contacted within the frames of Geneva talks. To make it simple, the European Union welcomes the direct dialogue with Tskh-invali and Sokhumi.

Georgia expresses contradictory position towards this ap-proach, which was mainly expressed in skepticism towards the final goal of such involvement. The declared aim of the EU is to de-isolate Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region and to reduce their dependence on Russia. However, Georgia’s aim, which is perfectly reflected in its action plan and the strategy towards the occupied territories, was reconcilia-tion with the population of these regions. Consequently, Tbilisi believed that in order to reach the reconciliation it was essential for the EU to put more emphasis on the com-ponents of Georgia-Ossetia and Georgia-Abkhazia recon-ciliation and that the EU’s involvement in the occupied ter-ritories was not oriented only at the EU-Abkhazia and the EU-Ossetia relations and de-isolation. This pre-condition was perceived very painfully by the European Union and was regarded as an attempt of Georgia to pose restrictions on activities of the EU.

For example, Georgian authority considered that the Euro-pean Union should implement measures for building confi-dence in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region either from Tbilisi or via Tbilisi, while the involvement of Abkhazian and Os-setian communities should be equal to that of the Georgian community: if any of the states of the European Union took Abkhazian children somewhere within the frames of edu-cational programs, then Georgian children had to be taken with them too; if the EU financed an economic program in Tskhinvali, the same kind of economic program had to be implemented on this side of the administrative borderline too in order to encourage building confidence between Os-setians and Georgians.

Under the new authorities of Georgia fundamental ap-proaches have not changed. Moreover, the new State Min-ister made several statements claiming that he does not intend to revise the state strategy and action plan. It is an important message, because if the approach of the Geor-gian authority changes, it might maliciously be employed by Moscow and the occupational regimes of Sokhumi and Tskhinvali.

It must be mentioned, that within the frames of the “engage-ment policy” of the EU, the states of the European Union spend rather large sums of money on confidence building. For instance, in 2011-2012 the EU spent 1.5 million Euros on implementing water projects in Tskhinvali region and about the same amount is intended to be spent in 2013. The European Union has set up the so called Confidence Building and Early Response Mechanism – COBERM, whose administration is carried out by the UN DP Georgia and whose aim is to encourage measures for building con-fidence in Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia. In 2012-2013

it is considered to finance COBERM by around 5 million Euros.

Alongside the engagement policy, the EU is implementing non-recognition policy very actively, which is expressed in diplomatic efforts made towards various countries of the world aiming to ensure these countries not to recognize Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region as independent states de-spite the pressure of Russian Federation. In 2008-2012 the European Union carried out several important international demarches in this direction and made a real contribution in the policy of non-recognition of the occupied territories.

The European Union and the Problem of Recognition of the Occupation

Apart from the above mentioned directions, Georgia has one more direction resulting from EU’s involvement in the problem of conflict resolution. It is the problem of recog-nizing Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region as ‘occupied re-gions’ by the European Union, as an organization, and by the states of the European Union, as independent units.

At this stage the European Union, as a unit, has not recog-nized Georgian territories as occupied. The occupation was recognized by the European Parliament, which actually legalized the term ‘occupation’ and ‘occupied territories’ in connection with the Georgian regions in the resolution ‘On the Summit of the EU and Russia’, adopted on 14th December 2011, in the resolution ‘On Negotiations of As-sociation Agreement between the EU and Georgia’ adopted on 17th November 2011, in the resolution ‘On the upcom-ing EU- Russia Summit’, adopted on 9th June 2011, in the resolution ‘The EU’s Strategy towards the Black Sea’, ad-opted on 20th January 2011, and in the resolution ‘On the Situation in Georgia’, adopted on 3rd September 2008.

Despite this, Georgia’s aim is for the other institutions of the EU to recognize the occupation of Georgian regions. The first step in this direction was made by Joze Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, who, af-ter the meeting with President Saakashvili in Brussels on 17th November 2010, declared at the press-conference: “We will defend Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial in-tegrity and will never recognize independence of any part of Georgia”.

The European Union was the closest to the recognition of occupation on 23rd November 2010, when, at the meeting N1099 of the deputy ministers in Strasburg, at the Council of Europe, the EU delegation made a statement on behalf of the European Union. It was said in the statement, that the European Union appeals to the Secretary General of the CoE to intensify contacts with all sides in order to “gain access to the occupied territories”. This statement was im-mediately welcomed by the Georgian side in the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the same ter-minology has not been repeated in the following statements


made by the European Union.

It remains Georgia’s aim that the topic of occupation emerges in the association agreement. Georgian side de-mands Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region to be recorded in this agreement as the occupied territories. The result of these negotiations will become known in the autumn 2013, when all the contradictory issues have to be agreed, so that Georgia will be able to sign the association agreement.

Conclusion

We can conclude that at present the European Union is one of the most important partners of Georgia that plays an es-sential part in the process of conflict regulation. The EU’s involvement caused internationalization of the conflict regulation format which was unreachable over years. The conclusion ordered by the European Union in connection with the conflict of 2008 (the so called Tagliavini report) remains to be the most serious international investigation into the causes of the war of 2008. The EU’s involvement in Geneva international talks and sending the Monitoring Mission to Georgia, as well as presence of the position of a

“special representative on Georgia’s crisis” is a serious message implying that the European Union is ready to fulfill the mission of the mediator in the Georgia-Russia conflict. Georgia should encourage the enhancement of this role. Neither the mutual dialogue with Russia, nor Mos-cow’s efforts to expel the EU from Georgia should persuade Georgia to agree with weakening EU’s functions. In addi-tion, non-recognition and engagement policy of the EU is in accordance with Georgia’s point of view. It is important to make these points of view get closer and to make the reconciliation between Tbilisi and Sokhumi and Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, rather than just abstract de-isolation of these re-gions, the ultimate aim of involvement of the communities of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region for the EU.

PROSPECTS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Tengiz Pkhaladze

After the elections of 1 October 2012 the first attempt of setting up direct contacts between Georgia and Russia can be observed. The initiative of the Georgian government on conducting a dialogue was responded, although with a de-lay, by Moscow and the suggestion for the first meeting was accepted. This was conditioned by several factors:

1. After the change of the government as a result of parlia-mentary elections of 2012 Russia did not have any argu-ment to support its refusal of meeting. The excuse, accord-ing to which “Russia would not sit at the negotiating table with the government which, according to the Kremlin, started war in August 2008”, was completely refuted under

the new government in Georgia.

2. The status of an occupant which is increasingly getting established in international legal documents is putting Rus-sian Federation in an uncomfortable situation. At present it needs to create a construc-tive image in the eyes of the international commu-nity and to show itself as an adequate side capable of discussing complex problems at the negotiat-ing table.

3. Russia is making at-tempts to restore its own influence on the post -So-viet states through ‘soft power’ mechanisms, which means increasing Russia’s, as the country’s, attractiveness in the eyes of the populations of the neighboring countries.

4. Russia is interested in testing the ground for positions with the new government and find out how firm the vector of Euro-Atlantic integration of the country’s foreign policy is.

5. Russia needs a format of direct negotiations, as it is sure that without international mediation it will be relatively easier for it to implement its own goals with regard to Georgia.

The meeting between Zurab Abashidze, the personal rep-resentative of the Prime Minister, and Grigori Karasin, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was held in Geneva on 14 December 2012.

As a rule, at the first meeting introduction of the positions of the sides and determination of the format and subjects of further meetings are considered.

Three points which Russia is ready to discuss with Georgia were pointed out:

1. resuming direct flights;

2. restoring commercial and economic relations;

3. cultural and humanitarian issues.

Obviously, these three issues do not represent the main problem in Georgia-Russian relations. They were selected given the degree of readiness of the sides – whether to dis-cuss any problem. The formula ‘from simple to complex’ is often used in international negotiations and it means, first of all, discussing the issues in which positions of the sides coincide to a greater extent and, therefore, it is easier to reach the compromise. Such a practice is welcomed in the

Tengiz Pkhaladze - is the Chair-man of the International Centre for

Geopolitical Studies (ICGS) and a visit-ing professor at the Georgian Institute of Public Admin-istration (GIPA). From 1992 through 2005 Mr. Pkhaladze

held important positions in the Gov-ernment of Georgia. He was the President’s State Representative in Mtskheta- Mtianeti Region and the Consul of Georgia toAzerbaijan.


case of constructivism of participants of negotiations. It is then that focusing on seeking mutually advantageous deci-sion occurs rather than on gaining victory over the other side and getting the upper hand. At the same time, a posi-tive precedent of cooperation is created with reaching an agreement on the so called ‘simple issues’, which builds confidence among the participants and helps them to dis-cuss ‘complex issues’ later.

If either of the sides is not oriented towards the result, but towards protracting the negotiation process, the formula ‘from simple to complex’ will not work as the problems become more distressing/complex and the focus is shifted from principal issues to minor ones. In such circumstances negotiations will develop into rough haggling, in which any agreement is reached at the expense of serious com-promises to be made by the weaker side.

Which of these scenarios will be realized during the Abashidze-Karasin negotiations largely depends on smart-ness and flexibility of Georgian government.

If Russian Federation is actually oriented towards regulat-ing relations, then in all three suggested cases ‘the ball will be on their side’ and Georgia will have practically nothing to yield.

1. Restoring regular flights - in reality the flights are con-ducted. Although today they are chartered ones, but their frequency equals that of regular ones. In this case we are dealing with changing of the name and not with introduc-ing any special regulations or with signing any particular kind of agreement in the sphere of air contacts. Besides, it was regular flights that were banned both in 2006 and 2008. It is obvious, that accomplishing the flights depends not on the regulations in this sphere, but on the political will of the Kremlin. Thus, restoration of the flights is not the guarantee for not banning them in the future.

2. Commercial and economic relations – this case is also re-lated to the political will of the Russian authority, because it was the political decisions due to which sanctions were imposed against Georgia. Georgia’s market is still open to Russian production; therefore, restoration of trade relations depends on the political decision to be made unilaterally. It should also be taken into consideration, that Georgia showed its good will and, despite the existing sanctions, agreed to let Russia become a member of the World Trade Organization. After doing so, the status quo of the trade and economic relations is not the problem of only the format of bilateral relations and its resolution should occur through international mechanisms. By becoming a member of the World Trade Organization Russian Federation undertook certain obligations and this should be employed by Georgia considering its interests.

Apart from that, restoration of trade relations with Rus-sia should not imply shifting the focus to Russian market.

Georgia stands rather close to signing the agreement on Deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area with the Euro-pean Union; also there are preconditions for starting nego-tiations on free trade with the USA. Returning to Russian market should not affect the quality of products manufac-tured in Georgia. Besides, protection from falsification is a serious problem, which is a big issue on Russia’s market. Falsification could badly spoil the international image of Georgian products and complicate its realization in other countries.

Finally, it should be taken into account, that economic rela-tions depend on the Kremlin’s sympathy or antipathy to-wards Georgia and there does not exist any kind of agree-ment that will guarantee protection of Georgian business against political risks.

3. Cultural and humanitarian relations – this apparently apolitical subject might be the one bearing the biggest po-litical risk. The point is that this issue is the main support of the so called ‘humanitarian aspect’ of Russia’s foreign policy, more commonly, it is known as ‘soft power’ policy. Russia’s strategic documents of foreign policy point out dissimilarly that education, science, culture, protection of interests of the compatriots living abroad and media are the instruments of implementation of foreign political tasks. Moscow permanently applies these means to exert influ-ence on its neighboring countries. It was under the excuse of ‘caring for compatriots’ that Russia illegally introduced passport system, artificial alteration of the population structure (including the means of ethnic cleanse) on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and carried out occupation of these Georgian territories.

According to the above mentioned, it is of utmost impor-tance that the Georgian side outlines all the possible risks in advance and on the basis of these calculations it elabo-rates the strategy which will conduct negotiations accord-ing to the ‘agenda’ of the Georgian side and will not give Russian Federation the opportunity to manipulate with ne-gotiations.

* * *

On 29 January 2013 a meeting of experts of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network was held at the Georgian Founda-tion for Strategic and International Studies. The meeting was attended by experts of the BSPN, the team working on the project, and representatives of the civil society.

At the meeting reports were presented by Mamuka Areshid-ze and Helen Khoshtaria. The topic of Mamuka Areshidze’s report was Dissemination of Conventional and Unconven-tional Islam in Georgia and its Political Imlications. He


emphasized the threats and problems that accompany the dissemination of Islam in Georgia. Helen Khoshtaria had a report on Optional Strategies for Regulating Relations with Russia.

STRATEGY FOR REGULATING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS

Elene Khoshtaria

Regulation of relations with Russia is one of the major for-eign political priorities of the new government. After the elections the government took the most active and consis-tent actions to fulfill this task both in terms of rhetoric and specific steps.

The change of any government is a convenient moment for airing or working out new approaches to the problem solv-

ing. . Similar steps have been taken by practically every government of inde-pendent Georgia.

In general, regulation of relations is a healthy and natural instinct, moreover, when it has direct and very acute impact on Georgia’s security and future. Fur-thermore, we should iden-tify the fact, that regula-tion of relations with Rus-sia has been an unresolved problem over centuries and no one has managed to complete this task de-fending Georgia’s interests since 1783.

Resulting from the above mentioned, before making any effort it is crucial to analyze the essence, possible prospects and dangers of the problem to be resolved, on the basis of which an optimal strategy will be formed.

What is the present situation and what could be the strategy for regulating relations with Russia in this situation?

The main component and the problem of today’s situation is Russia’s attitude towards international relations in gen-eral, as well as towards the countries of the region. Gaining an exclusive sphere of influence in the region is perceived by Russia as its strength. This problem is revealed not only regarding Georgia, but other states of the regions as well. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine or Moldova – none of these countries has managed to regulate their relations with Rus-sia. Manipulating by economic and power problems, dia-sporas and conflicts, Russia tries to maintain its linchpin for influence over all these states. Moldova even became a neutral state; yet, it still faces the problems of conflicts, instability of Russian market and European integration. In addition, Russia’s attitude towards international law or taken obligations is another problem in relations with this country. The treaty of 1783, the recognition of Geor-gia’s independence in 1920, the role of the mediator in the conflict entrusted to Russia in 1993, joining the Common-wealth of Independent States in 1994 – all these cases dem-onstrate the fact, that ‘agreeing’ does not matter for Russia and trusting this country usually has tragic consequences.

These kinds of approaches of Russia have been revealed in the consistent policy formed over centuries.

Ambrosi Khelaia’s address to the Genoa conference in 1922:

“At the end of the 18th century Georgian nation, exhausted with fighting against outside enemies, voluntarily sought refuge with co-religionist Russia hoping that under its pro-tection Georgia would secure its political and national ex-istence, which is clearly mentioned in the political treaty signed by Georgian King Erekle II and Russian Empress Ekaterina II. However, regrettably, my homeland, left with nothing but deceived hopes, suffered from bitter tyranny and unbearable repression from Russia’s bureaucracy over 117 years.

This is why in 1917 the nation declared independence and immediately started restoration of its political and national-cultural life. Despite the fact that working on this task was obstructed by internal and outside enemies, the country showed such a talent and national creative energy that three years later the educated Europe recognized its state ability and granted Georgia a place among independent, sovereign political units. Naturally, it was unacceptable to Russia, its former master and oppressor of minor nations: it started its occupation army towards Georgia’s borders and on 25th February 1921, after an unequal fight, Georgia, having lost a lot of blood, was again put such a heavy and shameful yoke of slavery that it had never experienced over its cen-turies-old history.”

What is our strategy? What do we mean by regulating rela-tions with Russia? What is the ultimate result that is desir-able for Georgia and reachable in the established situation?

Helen Khoshtaria – Georgia’s Re-forms Associates (GRASS), Chair-

person of the Board.Previously served as a deputy State Minister at the Of-fice of the State Minister for Eu-ropean and Euro-Atlantic Integra-

tion, also worked at the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. She graduated from Moscow State Institute of In-ternational Relations as a specialist in International Security with Honor. She currently lectures at the Cauca-sus University and is involved in the Administration of the Free Univer-sity of Georgia.


The only result that meets Georgia’s interests and after whose reaching we will be able to speak to Russia about regulated relations, is a unified sovereign Georgia aban-doned by Russian occupation armies and the one that has the freedom of making choice in the foreign policy; in ad-dition, it enjoys neighborly political, economic and cultural relations with Russia. This is how Georgian government formulated our position before negotiations and determined red lines running through Georgia’s territorial integrity and the integration with the NATO and the European Union.

In addition, regulating relations with Georgia means the exact opposite to Russia. Moreover, this position has been clearly declared. Russia does not intend to revise recog-nition of our territories, to de-occupy Georgian territories and to admit Georgia’s integration in the NATO and the European Union, as all this is perceived by Russia as los-ing influence over Georgia. In this situation there emerges a question: What could make Russia change its centuries-old approach in the process of these bilateral negotiations? There are several opinions on this problem.

One is – we will rebuild confidence through negotiations and then try to regulate the problem. Past lessons and Rus-sia’s current policy provide evidence that the problem lies not in the lack of confidence, but in Russia’s interests to maintain the influence over Georgia, which was the main point of its consistent ages-old policy.

The second opinion suggests that we should convince Rus-sia’s authorities. Convincing requires certain argumen-tation. In case of presence of such an argumentation, it might be possible to stop to think about to what extent it is enough for the other side to change its position. Again, if we consider Russia’s main interests in relation to our coun-try, finding such an argument will be a tricky problem.

Consequently, the question – what might create a motiva-tion for Russia in order to change its position on the prob-lems which are crucial to us, remains unanswered to me.

As it becomes clear from the government’s statements, re-suming trade contacts is number one issue. It goes with-out saying, that resuming trade contacts and gaining a new market in Russia for our products would be utterly impor-tant. Furthermore, there emerges a problem which was pro-nounced by the Russian President himself in the context of regulating relations with Georgia. Interests of the Georgian side in resuming trade contacts outweigh those of Rus-sia. What might be Russia’s motivation for opening their market to Georgia: 1. to regain the linchpin of influence over Georgia, which is a well-tested method in relations not only with Georgia, but with other states of the region as well. Meanwhile, we have to stop to think, to what extent it is in our interests to enter the market while the relations have not been regulated yet and while Russia can make a decision of our leaving the market without remorse, which will cause suffer to our economy; 2. to drag us into the pro-

cess of negotiations in which it will try to reach its desired effect.

Weakening of ‘Geneva Format’

In the process of negotiations between any weak and strong sides, moreover, when the strong side easily violates agree-ments and game rules, presence of an unbiased arbitrator is in the interest of the weak side. It is due to presence of such an arbitrator that Geneva talks create discomfort to Russia.

Assigning Karasin, the Russian Deputy Minister of For-eign Affairs, to conduct dialogue with our special repre-sentative serves this very aim. Under the circumstances, when assigning the representative from the Georgian side occurred unilaterally, without determining the mandate bi-laterally, there is no guarantee that the Geneva format will not turn into Karasin-Abashidze dialogue. Moreover, it is logical, that the person, whose portfolio is “Geneva talks”, will make an attempt to transfer this portfolio to the format more convenient to him (without an arbitrator).

Removing the Status of the ‘Occupant’

Existence of the status of occupation is essential for the future resolution of the conflict both politically and legally. In political terms, this status increases pressure on Russia (on the international arena), while, in legal terms, it makes Russia responsible for the existing situation on the occu-pied territories. Indeed, Russia will definitely try to use the desire of regulating relations as well as an attempt to build confidence and breaking ice for removing or, at least, for weakening the occupant’s status.

It is important, that alongside with starting the dialogue, Georgia’s government has not weakened the rhetoric in respect with occupation. In addition, it will be very hard to try bilaterally to build confidence and warm relations in parallel with continuing an active policy of establish-ing the term ‘occupation’ in more states and/or organiza-tions. Under the circumstances, the statement made by our special representative while summarizing the meeting with Karasin, which referred to possible changes to the law on occupation, was quite vague. If we ignore the dangers re-lated to the changes to be made to this law, making such a statement after meeting with Karasin still points to the supposition, that the dynamics of these negotiations might drag Georgia into conceding its principled positions.

Continuing ‘Non-Recognition’ Policy

Russia spends a substantial amount of political and financial resources in order to get the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia recognized by various countries. The factors that could contain this policy are, on the one hand, Geor-gia’s establishing/intensifying relations with the countries that might potentially find themselves under Russia’s pres-sure and, on the other hand, non-recognition policy of our strategic partners that juxtapose their linchpins with Rus-


sia’s pressure. The desire of creating positive atmosphere for regulating relations could create threat to effective and active implementation of the non-recognition policy.

Taking all the above mentioned into consideration, I be-lieve that this way of regulating relations with Russia is an unrealistic task. Moreover, this process is accompanied by rather serious threats avoiding of which should be the priority of the government. The only means of neutralizing these threats is intensification of western integration which, apart from its value itself, would be an important message to Russia emphasizing that the drawn red lines are impos-sible to cross.

The only realistic and result-oriented process for Georgia’s development and security is integration in the NATO and the European Union. It is under this safety guarantee and irreversible democracy that will make it possible to consid-er regulation of relations with Russia. Becoming a member of a club of 28 powerful countries (in which assaulting one means assaulting all of them) will be the motivation which will force Russia to find a new way of relations with Geor-gia and to adapt to the reality that a small but a democratic and strong state is its neighbor, as it happened in the case of the Baltic states.

* * *

On 30 March 2013 a seminar was held in Kutaisi within the frames of the project of the BSPN on the topic: Re-gional Security in South Caucasus. Representatives of non-government sector of Kutaisi and journalists took part in the meeting. Presentations were delivered by Ghia Nodia (Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Develop-ment) on Georgia-Russia Relations and by Kakha Gogo-lashvili (Georgian Foundation for Strategic and interna-tional Studies) on Role of the European Union in Conflict Resolution.

GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Gia Nodia

The concept, that Georgia has ever had good relations with Russia, is mistaken and is just an illusion. Actually, these relations have never been positive. It is also very doubtful, that these relations will ever improve considerably. There-fore, our strategic aim is to transform relations with Russia so, that the degree of harm received from these relations is reduced.

The acuteness of these relations cannot be explained by the approaches of traditional realpolitik. In terms of this approach, it might be prof-itable for Georgia to be-come Russia’s satellite. The main problem is how the societies or political elites of these two coun-tries imagine their national interests. In this case the approach called ‘con-structivism’ in the theory of international relations is more productive. There exists no objective neces-sity for countries to imag-ine their national interests as they do. For example, it was not necessary that Russia depicted the West as its enemy and its ex-pansion – as a hazard after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, Russian society and its political elite made this choice, which, apparently, is rather solid. Georgia’s choice – to connect its development with Euro-pean and Euro-Atlantic integration - seems equally solid and steady.

However, if so, there is obvious contradiction between Russia’s and Georgia’s national projects. What is a natural choice for Georgia’s development (European and Euro-Atlantic integration) is understood by Russia as interven-tion of a strange power in the sphere of its influence, which implies threat.

Many think that the main reason for the confrontation in Georgia-Russia relations is Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, which, at this stage, have been formed as occupa-tion by Russia. In fact, today it is the main irritant and it is very difficult to improve as the sides will find it difficult to deny their positions. But could we claim that this is the main reason why Georgia-Russia relations deteriorated so much or, just vice versa, it is the bad relations between them that caused Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-Ossetia conflicts to develop in such an acute and irreconcilable way? In my

Ghia Nodia - a Georgian political analyst. Nodia graduated from the

Department of Phi-losophy and Psy-chology at Tbilisi State University (TSU) in 1976 and worked at the Insti-tute of Philosophy of the Georgian

Academy of Sciences from 1980 to 2001. He has lectured at the TSU, the Ilia State University and in the West. Since 1992, he has chaired the Tbilisi-based think-tank Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. He was Minister of Education and Science in 2008. He is currently a Director of the Interna-tional School of Caucasus Studies at the Ilia State University.


opinion, the latter approach is closer to reality, although I can understand that not everybody will agree on this. We could put a question regarding Georgia too: Is it for fear of Russia that we aspire towards the west? Or, on the contrary, did Russia oppose us and become dangerous to us because we chose the route of European development?

According to the above mentioned it is obvious, that, in order to improve these relations, one of these countries or both of them should deny main components of their own national project. Therefore, we should construct our judg-ment as follows: how we see our interests and what is im-portant and what are the priorities for Georgia and Russia.

Let us start from us, or – what does Georgia want?

We want dignified life, development, which actually means being part of Europe. Our ambition is: “Why should we deserve less than others (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania or Slova-kia)”. Western civilization is the most advanced part of the universe which offers the best packet of common proper-ties: political stability, economic development, democracy and personal freedom, inviolability of national sovereignty. And all these are the necessary preconditions for us to de-velop, to form as a nation and as a state. Of course, we would also like to return Abkhazia and South Ossetia and restoration of territorial integrity.

The main problem on the route to fulfilling these goals is that our ambitions do not coincide with our abilities. In par-ticular:

• At this stage the west is not disposed to make us part of its main organizations (NATO and European Union). The reasons for this are internal problems and geopolitical point of view of the west as well as the fact, that our so-cietal and political institutions are not really western yet.

• Resolution of frozen conflicts does not seem to be com-pleted in the foreseeable future.

What does Russia want?

It is important to Russia to have a special status, a place in the modern world: in fact it means that it must be the dominant power at least in the post-Soviet region. But here, too, there is an obvious disparity between ambitions and abilities: it does not possess enough resource to occupy the place of its imagination and, consequently, it will not be able to gain recognition or respect it desires to own. Russia mainly has economy linked to exploitation of mineral re-sources and a low level of social and political development. It is not growing as fast as China or other new markets either. Accordingly, it cannot be the model of development for its neighboring countries and, on the other hand, it will be unable to receive the kind of recognition from the west it requires.

For the west Russia is not the number one problem after the Cold War. It is one of its headaches, but not the main

one. The Cold War against Russia used to be the central issue of the international system, but now it is one of those connected with the Arabic world, Iran, North Korea, China (in perspective). From the point of view of the west, Russia seems as a big size state which permanently creates prob-lems in international issues, but, at the same time, is unable to look after itself properly.

Under the circumstances, Russia’s main problem is the conflict with the west, which actually exists in Russia’s imagination. Georgia turned out to be the center of this conflict with the west. The actual expression of the con-flict is a geopolitical fantasy: “The west invades our sphere, our neighborhood, wishing to besiege us.” Russia imagines Georgia as the agent of western (especially American) in-fluence, a Trojan Horse”.

It is another concern for Russia that the west, being a nor-mative and soft power, appears to have better and more moral pretension. The Kosovo conflict turned out to be the sharpest representation of this: according to Russia, recog-nition of Kosovo by the west proves that the west is hypo-crite and its talks about human rights and democracy only serve expansion of its spheres of influence. In this context, the war of August, according to Russia, was a lesson for the west.

Despite then rhetoric, they understand in Russia that Saa-kashvili was not the main problem for them. Georgia is un-reliable, whoever at its head. The strategic way out of this situation is Georgia’s disintegration (e.g. putting the prob-lems of Javakheti and Samegrelo forward), while the tactic one is to obstruct its development, keeping it in unstable conditions, to turn it into a country not interesting and at-tractive to the west. From this point of view, Abkhazia and South Ossetia factor is a linchpin for Russia, which can be employed any time for accomplishing its goals. However, after the war of 2008 it lost this linchpin in some ways.

As far as the position of the west is concerned, it found it-self in the middle of the confrontation between Georgia and Russia involuntarily and it does not want to admit it. Posi-tions of the west are divided, which became particularly obvious during the war of 2008. On the one hand, it wants to reduce its involvement in this confrontation but, on the other hand, it also needs to maintain its image: it cannot ad-mit that Georgia is under exclusive influence zone of Rus-sia and here the west can only act with Russia’s permission. The promise about Georgia’s getting the NATO member-ship received in Bucharest is an excellent example of how ambivalent the west’s approach towards Georgia is: on the one hand, there exists the promise, but, on the other hand, the precondition for its fulfillment - Georgia’s ‘readiness’ – is extremely vague and its interpretation completely de-pends on the political will. Therefore, there is very little prospect for the future.

The west is also reluctant to get involved in the problems it


is unable to settle. However, Georgia’s separatist conflicts are exactly of this kind. But the west is equally unable to eliminate itself from attempts of their resolution. In the fi-nal analysis, the west prefers to accept the present status quo discreetly. At the same time, it makes an attempt to separate Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-Ossetia conflicts from the subject of Georgia-Russia confrontation, as it is much easier to reach the internal western consensus on the former (for example: “Let us encourage efforts for building confidence between Georgians and Abkhazians”), while this does not work in the case of the problems connected with Russia.

Under the circumstances, Georgia’s realistic goal is to pro-vide its own political, social and economic development. But in order to achieve this, the main precondition is to deepen relations with the west. As for Russia, in relations with this country we should be guided by the principle of reducing harm. We should achieve a kind of modus Vi-vendi with Russia, so that the country’s destabilization and impediment of its development should be prevented. This is quite realistic, while a more ambitious prospect would be difficult to reach.

EUS ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION OF CON FLICTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS AND FUTURE

OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

Kakha Gogolashvili

Sceptics have never considered EU a serious political/se-curity actor. To their believe It’s declarations and actions were frequently bearing ambivalent features. Frankly, this was true with Iraq or even with Kosovo cases, where the consensus among all member states never been reached. There is no still consensus on the Turkish membership and relations with Russia has being matter of contradictory feelings for a long time.

Despite of the EU Security Strategy, 2003 staying: “We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region” EU was always care-ful about its engagement as a security actor in such areas of explicit Russian interest. EU has never tried to mediate conflicts in the South Caucasus, deploy monitors or help to strengthen the security sector of Georgia or any other state in the region. But it evidently had strong interests and, in exchange, was acting somehow implicitly, backing interna-tional (UN, OSCSE) efforts, financing economic develop-ment, confidence building and rehabilitation projects, etc. Russia has always been vigilant of EU’s hidden agenda in Eastern Europe, in South Caucasus, in particular, and used to successfully block EU’s attempt to step firmly here.

Russia managed to hinder EU’s energy security projects in the area without making big efforts. Looking to the wider regional context, first of all we can stress the fact that EU, being interested in developing ties with Eastern European states did not took courage to dedicate a special coopera-tion framework to them. It included them into the Euro-pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, 2003), designed for 16 countries of wider Euro-Mediterranean region , latter (2004) including Georgia and her neighbours as well. ENP was not clearly talking about any European perspective, or even free trade or “visa free” prospects for the involved states.

The last two-three years make us to witness the changing face of the EU. Number of efficient joint actions in Lib-ya and consolidated policy towards Syria crises are most vivid examples. Despite of the economic crisis EU continues to deepen and consolidate its foreign and security policy. But when such change occurred first?

I think the war (or crisis as EU official documents say) in Georgia was an im-portant watershed between old and new EU. Surpris-ingly, then President of the European Council (Nicolas Sarcozi) received mandate to act in the name of all 27 member states and started brokering the ceasefire agreement in three days after the conflict in Geor-gia broke. On 12th of August (after 4 days of the massive Russian incursion) President of the European Council con-cluded the negotiations of the ceasefire agreement between Moscow and Tbilisi and practically stopped the Russian attempts to encircle the capital of Georgia and change the legitimate government by force.

The agreement the EU has brokered, theoretically elimi-nated political consequences of Russian invasion to the undisputed Georgian territories and created foundations for the further regulation of the conflict. So called “six-points agreement” and its implementation plan introduced later attributed special role to EU. Especially, the latest document, which allowing the EU to place around 200 monitors in the whole territory of Georgia. Latter Russia violated the promise by unilateral recognition of independ-ence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, leaving considerable military contingent in these regions and putting restrictions to the functioning of international observers (including EU monitors) in the occupied territories. Despite of these prac-tical failure of the “European mission” EU remained very

Kakha Gogolashvili - is the Direc-tor of EU Studies at GFSIS. The

projects under his supervision focus on research, capac-ity building, and advocacy, Europe-an Integration and Peacebuilding. He conducted research

and taught economics and business administration in a number of lead-ing academic and scientific institu-tions. During his diplomatic career he served as the Deputy Head of Mission to the EU and the Director of Department for EU Relations at the MFA of Georgia.


active and dedicated to support Georgia’s independence and sovereignty. The first September Extraordinary Coun-cil and consequent actions – adoption of two joint actions in October 2008, respectively, establishing EU Monitoring Mission and appointing special representative for Georgia Crisis, creating and co-chairing the “Geneva talks”, organ-izing donor conference on October 22, committing im-portant pledges to save Georgian economy from the con-sequences of the war, etc. But this was not all EU made for Georgia. Probably the war and the cynical behaviour of Russia, trying to show that she was the “suzerain” in the Eastern Europe pushed EU to start making firm steps to-wards the East. The same Extraordinary Council concluded two important things as well: “…to step up its relations with Georgia, including visa facilitation measures and the possible establishment of a full and comprehensive free trade area as soon as the conditions are met”; and that it was “….more necessary than ever to support regional co-operation and step up its relations with its eastern neigh-bours, in particular through its neighbourhood policy, the development of the “Black Sea Synergy” initiative and an “Eastern Partnership” which the European Council wishes to adopt in March 2009”;

I think this was, practically EUs open response to Russia’s aggression in the Eastern Europe and since then EU has never hided it’s growing ambitions towards the region.

Initiation of the Eastern Partnership on May 2009, fol-lowed by negotiations on Association Agreements with all Eastern European states (save Byelorussia) marked start-ing of a new era for the whole Europe. EaP has become an important tool for deepening economic and political coop-eration, but also for providing soft security to the region. Apart from a solid cooperation agenda and instruments of multilateral and bilateral dimension, political rapproche-ment going through early consultations between Foreign Ministers and meetings of the Heads of States and Govern-ments, occurring once in two years converts Eastern Part-nership into ambitious regional integration project.

Eastern Partnership does not directly deals with the conflict resolution, indeed the new ambition and depth of engage-ment pushes EU structures to treat the issue more inten-sively. EEAS, a new EU superstructure, firmly placed be-tween the European Commission and the member states has being involved in the regulation of frozen conflicts in the region of Eastern Europe. Its involvement in Georgia, is not limited by controlling the execution of the EUMM1 or EUSR2 EUMM or EUSR mandates, it also carries out ac-tive work in international organizations, conducts bilateral consultations with third countries in order to promote (in opposite of Russia’s efforts) non-recognition of independ-ence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the breakaway territo-ries of Georgia occupied by Russia. EU through its respec-

1 EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia 2 EU Special Representative (for crisis in Georgia)

tive services conducts political dialogue with Russian Fed-eration, where the Georgian problem has being frequently discussed. In 2009 EU PSC adopted so called “Non-rec-ognition and Engagement policy” towards the breakaway regions of Georgia, by which it tries to stop economic and social isolation of the mentioned regions from international society, engage them in the trade, cooperation and open for the population of the mentioned territories possibility to travel to other than Russia countries. There is a belief in EU institutions that with such an approach the regions become less dependent on Russia, integrated with the rest of the world and, as a consequence, less ideological differences with the proper Georgia remain. Since then EU continu-ously pressed the Georgian government to soften the law “On Occupied Territories” in the part, which concerns the movement of third state nationals to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia. The new government responded the EU demand and made appropriate changes in the law, but, in general, Georgians do not consider correct such pressure from side of the EU when the question concerns the sover-eign rights of the state to execute at least formal control on its own borders.

Prospect of signing of the Association Agreement with Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova and Armenia (who are in the track3) charges EU with new responsibilities towards the stability in the region of Eastern Europe. The men-tioned responsibilities concern frozen conflicts first of all. While Eastern Partnership tries not to deal with conflicts, its future success cannot be achieved without treating and solving the problems coming from them. Russia’s geopolit-ical projects - Customs Union and Eurazes directly oppose EUs initiatives, first of all by creating alternative integra-tion trough trade relation models4. Russia employs the con-flicts in the FSU space to force the neighbours to establish “new contract” with her. From the opposite, EU can attract same countries to “her sphere of interests” by employing same conflicts, but with totally different approach. Rus-sia threatens the neighbours (identifying them mainly as FSU states – “bivshie”) with the perspective of worsening the “existing status quo’s”. EU (who calls same countries Eastern Neighbours or Eastern Partners) tries to “improve” the status of conflicts and turn them towards the resolution track.

For the moment, the main problem is the insufficient ef-fort and lack of dedication from side of the EU towards the issues of conflict resolution, causing the doubts and confidence in her success. The partner countries still do not believe in ability of the EU to help in resolving their prob-lems. After all success of Europeanization of the Eastern Partners depends on outcome of this geopolitical competi-tion playing with the peace and stability in the region.3 In November 2013 the Agreements with the them will be initialed4 Membership in the Customs Union for a former soviet union country practically excludes implementation of the DCFTA with the EU at the same time


* * *

On 17 June 2013 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies hosted another meeting of experts of the BSPN. Ivliane Khaindrava (Director of the Caucasus Regional Studies Program, Republican Institute) presented his report- On the Problem of Security in the South Cau-casia Region and Kornelie Kakachia’s (Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University) report discussed Cross Border Conflict Dynamics and Security Challenges in Georgia.

TO THE ISSUE OF (IN) SECURITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Ivlian Haindrava

I will focus on three states of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network; namely, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The combined territory of these South Caucasus states is 186.3 thousand sq. kilometres; the population – about 17 ml. This is almost the same as the combined territory of Serbia, Cro-atia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (196 thousand sq. km.) as well as the population of these three Balkan states taken to-gether (18 ml.). With the Black Sea and Europe to the west and the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the east, Russia – to the north and Turkey and Iran (and the Greater Middle East) to the south, we are certain that the South Caucasus’ location is extremely important and favourable for global communication, transportation and trade. If we imagine open intra-regional borders, agreement on custom’s issues, significantly reduced military spending, etc., and if we take into consideration various resources in which the area is rich, we will obtain the profile of a region that has serious potential to develop, flourish, stay stable and have its own say in regional if not global politics. But so far, this is noth-ing more than imagination – reality looks quite different.

Let us glance at the South Caucasus more intently in order to obtain an adequate vision of the area focusing on the security issues and challenges that are of paramount impor-tance. We all are somehow used to the cliché of “the South Caucasus Region.” Contrary to the situation with the three other states of the EaP – Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova – there are no attempts of artificially uniting them into any

“regional” format. So what is the present-day South Cau-casus?

The tree states – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – differ from each other sig-nificantly by many basic parameters:

- Political systems are different. According to the annual reports of Freedom House, Georgia belongs to the group of the countries with “unconsolidated democracy” (or “hy-brid regimes”), Arme-nia – to the “uncon-solidated autocracy” and Azerbaijan – to the “consolidated autoc-racy.”

- Economic systems have little in common: the greatest portion of the economy of Azer-baijan falls within oil and natural gas extrac-tion, Georgia’s economy is mainly service/tourism/transit oriented and Armenia tries to benefit to the max-imum from its limited options in various spheres.

- Demographic trends (the factor which could not be ig-nored when discussing security issues) are different as well: Armenia’s population is reducing due to steady emigration, Georgia’s population remains almost the same for the last decade and the population of Azer-baijan steadily grows due to a traditionally higher birth rate. Both Armenia’s and Georgia’s populations are ageing.

- Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis differ by re-ligion – Gregorian Christianity in actually mono-con-fessional Armenia, dominant Orthodox Christianity al-though in a mixed environment in Georgia and Shi’ah and Sunni cohabitation in Azerbaijan.

- Even the languages spoken in the three states belong to different basic linguistic groups.

After regaining independence the three states of the South Caucasus followed different vectors in their quest of na-tional security guarantees:

- Armenia established a strategic partnership with Rus-sia (including deepening military co-operation within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Or-

Ivlian Haindrava – Director of the Republican Institute; Member of the

board of the Geor-gian Politician Sci-ence Association. Author of consid-erable number of publications on na-tional and regional security, conflicts

and democracy related issues in Georgian and foreign electronic edi-tions; Participant and key panelist to big number of international confer-ences and seminars; Editor and co-author of the selection of papers (in German and Georgian): “Diaspora, Oil and Roses”. Was twice elected as a member of the Parliament of Geor-gia (1992-95 and 2004-08), Member of the State constitutional Commis-sion (1993-95); Took part in the Par-liamentary and Presidential election monitoring missions in Ukraine, Ar-menia, Azerbaijan. In 2002 he was invited as a visiting researcher to the National Endowment for Democracy (US, Washington D.C.).


ganisation) but simultaneously maintains good rela-tions with NATO and the EU (policy of “complementa-rism”). Georgia and Azerbaijan did not join the CSTO; the former declared Euro- and Euro-Atlantic integra-tion its top priority, obtained the status of the NATO-aspirant country and is focused on signing the DCFTA and Association Agreement with the EU in the shortest possible period of time. Azerbaijan shows restraint in the issues of Euro-integration as well as in its attitude towards Russia but succeeds so far in preventing a to-tal collapse of relations both with Russia and the West. Meanwhile Azerbaijan became a member of the Islam-ic Conference and the Non-alignment Movement.

- After the failure of Russian-Azerbaijan negotiations on the Gabala radar station, Azerbaijan is free from for-eign military presence on its territory. Armenia – to the contrary – legalised Russian military presence for 49 years (Russian #102 military base in Gyumri and Russian border-troops). Georgia was on the way to-wards getting rid of Russian military presence after the Istanbul (1999) Agreement went into force but as a re-sult of the August 2008 war, Russia restored its military presence on Georgian territory (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and even strengthened such; Georgia and the West deem such presence as occupation.

- Each of the states of the South Caucasus has complicat-ed relations with at least one of the immediate neigh-bours of the region: Armenia failed to establish dip-lomatic relations with Turkey, Georgia has broken off diplomatic relations with Russia after August 2008 and unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran are characterised with a permanent crisis that prevents mutual trust and a good-neighbourhood between them.

All of the three immediate neighbours of the South Cau-casus – Russia, Turkey and Iran – have their own interests there based not only on their ambitions of regional powers but on their security needs as well; each of them faces its own problems in the areas bordering or located close to the borders of the South Caucasus: North Caucasus in Rus-sia, Kurdish-populated territories in Turkey and Southern Azerbaijan in Iran. At the same time each of the above-mentioned regional powers has its own standpoint regard-ing conflicts in the South Caucasus: Russia, Turkey and Iran – on the conflict around Karabakh, Russia and Turkey – on the conflict in Abkhazia, Russia – in South Ossetia.

It is also noteworthy that some other states like Ukraine, Israel and Kazakhstan also have interests – not always con-current – towards the South Caucasus, whether political, economic or military. At the same time, the Eastern in-terest towards the South Caucasus may be regarded as a growing one.

Global actors, too, are not at all indifferent towards the

South Caucasus due to its resources and important loca-tion. It looks like European “soft power” was expected to compensate for the decrease of American activity in the South Caucasus after the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war and become the leading international actor there. The sometimes unclear European messages, however, either mislead the governments of the South Caucasus states or even enabled them to ignore these messages. The situation ought to be exactly vice versa – what the South Caucasus definitely needs is understandable and predictable dynam-ics in terms of relations with the European Union based on the principle “more for more.” The individual approach to each of the three states – the one that was more or less suc-cessively applied to the Balkan states – seems to be more productive than the “regional” approach based on the at-tempt to make three very different countries level.

To make a long story short, some analysts (including this author) argue that there is no South Caucasus region as such. Indeed, there actually are no factors of trilateral un-derstanding and closeness between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan except for geography and maybe the common Soviet heritage which negatively demonstrates itself in mentality and works precisely against consolidation. This is why some experts prefer to talk about two competing lines (or axes) across the area: Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran, on one hand, and Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku, on the other.

Formation of regional identity in the South Caucasus (if there is such a task on the political agenda) will inevita-bly fail if there is no common idea, common vision and common goal within the nations of the South Caucasus. So far, only Russia has “invented” the term which artifi-cially “unites” Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis; this is “Persons of Caucasian Nationality” – preposterous, insulting and bearer of a criminal connotation. This notion needs to be opposed by a positive, perspective idea that is attractive for all nations of the South Caucasus. Hardly any other option can be seen here but to support modern Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis in their aspirations to be called and dealt politically as “European Nations.” In this regard, the fact that the term “Caucasians” is applied by scientists to the ancestors of Europeans comes to the mind by itself.

One can also note that while the EU first proposed the ENP and several years later – EaP (and that dualism made the situation rather vague than distinct) and while NATO pro-duced something really obscure and counterproductive at its Bucharest Summit in April 2008 regarding Georgia’s (and Ukraine’s) membership in the Alliance, Russia feels free to push on the projects of not only an abstract Eurasian Union but a quite real Custom’s Union and CSTO. Still, there is a hope that a “combined” Western interest towards the South Caucasus will not fall beyond the critical level. The Vilnius Summit of EaP at the turn of the year seems to be crucial from this point of view. If Georgia (and proba-


bly Armenia as well) obtain there only unconvincing, semi-symbolic promises like Georgia got in Bucharest, that will be a failure not only for Georgia (and Armenia).

Coming back to the issue of security – what we see today in the South Caucasus is the “no war, no peace” situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan which may explode at any moment; we witness Russia’s aggressive antagonism towards Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations (certain “de-tente” in Georgian-Russian relations obviously has its lim-its or so-called “red lines” and nobody is brave enough to predict how the situation will develop after the Sochi Win-ter Olympic Games next year); we observe Abkhazia and South Ossetia being literally dragged over the Caucasus mountains and actually becoming part of Russia’s North Caucasus.

I will not elaborate here on the risks – various risks – for the fragile peace in the South Caucasus resulting from a possible air-strike on Iran; I will not also speculate on how the internal processes undergoing in Russia and Turkey may influence the situation in the South Caucasus. But one cannot avoid stressing that for two decades Tbilisi maintains balanced, good-neighbourly relations with both Yerevan and Baku: this was reality under Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, this is reality now – under Ivanishvili and I believe this course will continue regardless of the politi-cal nature of any future leader of Georgia. But politics is two-way street and it is sometimes not easy to preserve bal-ance or full-scale symmetry when each of two neighbours is fast to demonstrate its jealousy when Tbilisi makes any step towards deepening co-operation with the other. In this context it is worthy to recall how Yerevan was unhappy with the project of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and how nervously (to say it mildly) Baku reacted to the idea of the reconstruction of the railway through Abkhazia. Georgia is really open for co-operation not because of its good-nature and inherent liberalism but because, as mentioned above, its economy is service/transit/tourism oriented and it needs open borders and free movement of people and goods. As early as June 2005, Georgia unilaterally introduced a vi-sa-free regime for 30 Western countries including all EU-member states (several others joined the list later); Armenia followed Georgia at the beginning of this year. Georgia’s border and custom services operate effectively and are corruption-free with a similar direction of development of the border situation taking place on the Armenian side and which should be noticed and welcomed. Thus Georgia and Armenia have created what I would call an “EU-friendly zone” that is comfortable for tourists and businessmen. The border of Azerbaijan is a different story to say nothing about the deadlock at the Azerbaijan-Armenia border.

On the other hand Azerbaijan and Georgia may play a significant role in the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan over the next year – both of them officially expressed their readiness to provide NATO with their in-

frastructure. Thus the territories of Georgia and Azerbaijan may be considered as a “NATO-friendly” zone in the South Caucasus.

But these “EU-friendly” and “NATO-friendly” zones meet or, rather, overlap only in Georgia (although, understanda-bly, with the exception of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and do not constitute a common integer space. And it is known for sure what the key to the creation of such a kind of space based on the full-scale trilateral (and multilateral) co-oper-ation in the South Caucasus is – it is Karabakh. This is as simple as it is. And this is also as hard as it is to find a way out until Azerbaijan and Armenia deny the principle of the zero sum game and realise the benefits resulting from the vision of the region this text started with.

CROSS BORDER CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND S ECURITY CHALLENGES IN GEORGIA

Kornelie Kakachia

Territorial disputes continue to be the most common source of conflict between states and have increasingly become the most frequent reason for violent conflict within states. Monitoring borders rais-ing important questions of cross border cooperation for scholars and policy makers, which call for pro-found institutional changes and re-conceptualization of our basic understanding of the symbolic and func-tional role of borders, bor-derlands and boundaries.

Georgia has common land borders with four coun-tries: Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. There are no serious dis-agreements on demarca-tion with Armenia and Azerbaijan. But the most disputable border is that with Russia, which runs mainly through the high moun-tainous chain of Caucasus Mountains and which in condi-tions of tense political and military relations between these two countries creates even deeper problems, such as the problem of frozen conflicts.

The Upper Larsi border crossing, (traditionally known as the Georgian Military Highway) perched 1,700 meters high in the Caucasus Mountains between Georgia and the Rus-sian republic of North Ossetia, is the only direct land route left between Russia and Georgian-controlled territory. In

Kornely Kakachia – founder and Director of Georgian Institute of Pol-

itics (GIP). An As-sociate professor at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State Uni-versity, Kakachia has held visiting ap-pointments at John. F. Kennedy School

of government, Harvard University (2009-10) and the Harriman Insti-tute at Columbia University in New York.(2011) He earned his PhD in Political Science at Tbilisi State Uni-versity. He is a member of Interna-tional Studies Association (ISA) and the Programme on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS Eurasia).


2006 Russia closed the border amid growing tensions with Western-leaning Tbilisi that spiraled into war two years lat-er. The checkpoint has been essential for channeling Rus-sia’s exports to Armenia.

Moscow has until very recently strictly opposed the move and the dramatic change in its attitude deserves attention. But unexpectedly, the countries late last year reached a deal under Swiss and Armenian mediation to reopen the checkpoint. While Georgia does not expect any special economic or political benefit from reopening of this bor-der crossing point, with two other border crossing points in breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia uncontrolled, it considers Kazbegi-Zemo Larsi border checkpoint as the only legally operating land crossing point between the two countries.5

Now that it is open again it brings Georgia and Russia phys-ically closer, but not politically, Georgian government says the opening does not signify a warming of ties between the two countries. Differences of opinion already exist over how to handle any residents of breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia who wish to cross the border. Accord-ing to Russia such residents, most of whom carry Russian passports, can cross into Russia without visas as Moscow recognizes the two territories as “independent” states. This type of discussion is nonstarter for Tbilisi.

While the negotiations were being conducted some Geor-gian analysts hoped that Russia would lift its embargo on Georgian agricultural products if it was also prepared to open the checkpoint, but others stated that territory can-not be exchanged for the chance to sell wine and mineral water. The checkpoint is open, the Russian embargo is still in force. Nor have any special benefits been given to the Georgians living near the border.6

Moreover Georgia insist that the existence of two illegal checkpoints in breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Illegal trade turnover between Russia and Georgia’s sepa-ratist regions violates the bilateral agreements previously reached between the two countries. As result, the Georgian government considers such actions as a violation of trade rules that contradicts the key principles of the World Trade Organization.7 Russia which aspires to become a member of WTO has to reach an understanding with Georgia. It argues that Russia’s military presence in two breakaway regions disrupts its border customs arrangements. Like all WTO members, Georgia has an effective veto on new members.8

5 Civil Georgia. Georgia-Russia Border Crossing Point to Reopen on March 1. February 27. www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=220316 Lizaveta Zhahanina. Opening at border Larsi-Kazbegi: a good beg-inning. Investor.ge Issue 2,2010 www.investor.ge/issues/2010_2/03.htm7 Georgian Economic Trends. Quarterly review. N4, March 2006. P.10 www.geplac.ge/files/english_2006_4.pdf8 Jonathan Lynn. Russian WTO bid picks up momentum. Reuters. Sep-

The Georgian public remains divided over the border issue. Some fear that re-opening the border with a country that waged war against their homeland in August 2008 would create additional problems. As Tbilisi has no diplomatic re-lations with Moscow and Georgians who oppose the move wonder how their government would be able to solve prob-lems stemming from the regulation of transit and border crossing. Others believe that any issue in relation to Russia should be solved within a complex framework aimed at de-occupation of the two Georgian territories and the restora-tion of Georgia’s full sovereignty. 9

While analysts and general public discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the reopening of the Kazbegi-Zemo Larsi border checkpoint it seems that everybody agrees that it’s better than nothing. It should be also noted that as the reopening of Upper Larsi is not a sign of the warming of Russian-Georgian relations,10 it’s a step made towards the normalization of Georgian-Russian cross border relations. Political problems remain, but the positions of the sides in the humanitarian and economic fields have become softer.

As most of the South Caucasus conflicts have cross-bor-der and cross regional dimensions, cross-boundary coop-eration between countries should be an integral part of any strategy to reduce conflict. Cross-regional cooperation is also the most effective instrument to gradually reduce the effect of the conflict between Georgia and Russian Federa-tion. It should be seen as tool for conflict transformation and peace-building, as they promote confidence-building across ceasefire lines and increase engagement with sepa-ratist regions.

In short and medium terms it’s hardly possible to expect any major improvements in relationship between Tbilisi and Moscow, taking into note that Russia occupies 20% of Georgian territories which international society consid-ers to be integral parts of Georgia , but if sides will decide towards going forward, to kick off cross-border and cross-regional cooperation initiatives, which have so far been underused, it could pave a way towards normalization of relations at least on regional level.

The gradual softening of border Control and administrative boundaries in the Georgia’s separatist regions controlled by Russia and the step-by-step management of separatist conflicts are good steps to follow. Opening of Larsi-Ka-zbegi checkpoint could be considered as first step toward the right direction. Looks like it is a small window opened, through which some oxygen is coming in.

tember 21, 2010. www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68K3EB201009219 Giorgi Kvelashvili. Georgia Considers Opening its Border with Russia. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 212 November 17, 2009. 10 Ghia Nodia. What Does ‘Confederation’ Mean In The South Caucasus? RFE/ RL. September 17, 2010. www.rferl.org/content/What_Does_Con-federation_Mean_In_The_South_Caucasus/2160662.html

CONTACT

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Tbilisi, 0108 GEORGIATEL: (995 32) 2473555FAX: (995 32) 2985265

www.bspn.gfsis.org / [email protected]

BSPN Team

Project Director: Kakha GogolashviliProject Coordinator: Rusudan MargishviliAdvisory Council: Giorgi Volski,Naira Bepievi, Julia Kharashvili,Natela Sakhokia, Aleksander Rusetsky,Aleksander Kukhianidze

THE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK (BSPN) MISSION

The Black Sea Peacebuilding Network represents a first attempt to focus on robust civil society involvement in conflict resolution process in the Black Sea region. The project is implemented by the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) in partnership with the Crisis Management Institute (CMI) and supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. The project targets seven wider Black Sea region countries facing domestic conflicts and aims at empowering civil society to promote mediation and dialogue for effective conflict management. The project’s purpose is to strengthen civil society peacebuilding at vari-ous levels (community, local, regional, national or international) to influence the understanding or attitude of conflict parties with new ideas and approaches. Furthermore, the establishment of the Black Sea NGO Forum provides the basis for a series of region-wide, broad-based initiatives such as creation of regional civil society platforms for linking local NGOs and civil society groups that are already involved and those that would like to engage for multiplying the peacebuilding efforts across the region. Moreover, the national forums have greater incentives to facilitate regional cooperation in crisis management and ensure close ties between NGOs, governments and the EU. GFSIS, as a local partner of CMI is responsible to create a forum of NGOs in Geor-gia and to organize meetings for the interested organizations and groups. The project comprises of three key components:

- Meetings, presentations, discussions organized on a regular basis with the participation of Georgian civil society actors and the Experts’ Council, preparation of consecutive reports with the meeting findings and outcomes.

- The project web page created to post the project information, updates, experts’ opinions, and data.

- The BSPN bulletin produced to familiarize the wider society with the project’s work and to disseminate analytical papers about conflict resolution, peacebuidling, regional security, and stability, as well as about the EU’s contribution and its role in peacebuidling prepared by the project’s Georgian and foreign experts.

The project intends to increase the public’s interest in conflict prevention, conflict management, transforma-tion, and peaceful resolution, to contribute to wider public debates on these issues and to promote dialogue between all interested parties at the national and regional levels.

www.bspn.gfsis.org

mailto:margishvili%40gfsis.org?subject=BSPN

Documents

THE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK - … · Sergi Kapanadze, Kakha Gogolashvili, the Director of the Georgian com-ponent of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Network, and Rusudan Margishvili,