and safe houses. By late October, nearly every tribein the northern and western outskirts of Rarnadihad publically declared support for the Awakening,and tribes in the dangerous eastern outskirts of thecity were sending out feelers about doing the same.The stage was set for a major change in Ramadi.

The Battle of Sufla

AQIZ did not sit idly as it slowly lost its domi-nance of both the terrain and the populace. Attacksremained high through October 2006 (Ramadan)inside the city limits while SVBIED attacks againstand harassment of new COPs and IP stations locat-ed outside the city occurred regularly. These attacksoften inflicted casualties on the nascent securityforces. Casualties were not enough to slow theAwakening, however, and support continued toexpand for the movement.

AQIZ long counted on a secure support base onthe east outskirts of town in the Sufia and Julaybahareas. These rural tribal areas were some of themost dangerous in the Ramadi AO, and intelligenceindicated they harbored a large support network forthe insurgents operating inside the city. AQIZlearned that one of the major sheiks of the Sufiaarea was considering supporting the Awakening andthat he had erected checkpoints to keep out insur-gents. Facing a threat to its vital support areas out-side of town, AQIZ acted quickly to maintain its gripthere.

On 25 November, 30 to 40 gunmen in cars droveinto the Albu Soda tribal area and began murderingmembers of the tribe. AQIZ forces took the tribalmilitiamen attempting to defend their homes by sur-prise, killing many while looting and burning theirhomes. A group of civilians fled in boats across theEuphrates River and reached an Iraqi Army outpostwhere they breathlessly described what was hap-pening. The IA battalion relayed the information toour brigade TOC [Tactical Operations Centerl,where the operations staff reallocated ISR platformsand immediately called for Captain Patriquin to pro-vide an Iraqi account of the situation.

Within an hour, Patriquin had gained an under-standing of the situation through phone calls to thelocal sheiks. The brigade headquarters quicklymade a crucial decision—we would support the

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Albu Soda tribe in defending itself. The BCT com-manders and staff cancelled a planned battalion-sized combined operation in east Ramadi that wasjust hours from execution. The battalion command-er who was responsible for that area, LieutenantColonel Charles Ferry of 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry(Manchus), quickly diverted his force away from theplanned operations to assist the Soda tribe indefending its homes. The decision was immediateand the response rapid, underscoring the brigade'sflexibility in recognizing and adapting quickly totake advantage of opportunities, rather than follow-ing plans in lockstep.

U.S. Marine Corps aircraft arrived overhead toperform "show of force" sorties designed to intimi-date the insurgents and convince them that airattack was imminent. Next, a ground reaction forcefrom Task Force 1-9 Infantry began preparations tomove to the area and establish defenses for the AlbuSoda tribe. Because we were viewing the area usingaerial sensors, our vision of the fight was indistinct,and we were unable to separate insurgents from thefriendly tribesmen. We did not want to attack thefriendly tribe by mistake, so we undertook actionsto intimidate the insurgents by firing "terrain denial"missions. Explosions in empty nearby fields raisedthe possibility of suppressive artillery fire in theminds of the enemy. Complemented by the roar offighter jets, the startled AQIZ forces became con-vinced that massive firepower was bearing down onthem. They started to withdraw, separating them-selves from their victims.

As AQIZ gunmen began fleeing the area, theyloaded into several cars, three of which our sensorsidentified. Our UAV observed a body draggingbehind one of the cars, evidently an Albu Sodatribesman. The insurgents obviously meant to terror-ize and insult the tribe through this act of mutilation,but they also triggered a boomerang reaction byclearly identifying themselves. The Ready First TOCcoordinated F-18 attacks that overtook anddestroyed the fleeing vehicles in a blazing fury asM1A1 tanks maneuvered to engage. Armed PredatorUAVs and M1A1 tanks in ambush positions finishedoff others attempting to escape. In the end, the AlQaeda forces suffered far more casualties than theAlbu Soda tribe. By nightfall, several companies ofinfantry and some M1A1 tanks had reinforced tribal

defenders, further demonstrating Coalition commit-ment.

Once again, AQIZ's intimidation attempt spectac-ularly backfired: tribes joined the Awakening move-ment at a rate that proved difficult to keep up with,even expanding into the neighboring Fallujah andHit AOs. Within two months, every tribe in Sufiaand Julaybah had declared support for theAwakening, and four new combat outposts hadbeen constructed to secure the populations. An areapreviously deemed high threat and used as a stag-ing ground for AQIZ mortar attacks became almostcompletely secure. Tribal members inside Ramadibegan supporting the Awakening as well, and secu-rity rapidly improved. Once a tribal area joined theAwakening, enemy contact in those areas typicallydropped to near zero, as IP, IA, and U.S. forces pro-vided security. Bases once under daily mortar andsmall arms attacks became secure areas and transi-tioned to IP control, freeing U.S. forces to pursueAQIZ elsewhere.

Overall, by February 2007, contacts with insur-gents dropped almost 70 percent compared to thenumbers in June 2006, and they had dramaticallydecreased in complexity and effect. The combina-tion of tribal engagement and combat outposts hadproved toxic to AQIZ's efforts to dominate Ramadi.

Rebuilding

Clearing and holding are the bloody but rela-tively straightforward part of any counterinsurgencyeffort; building the infrastructure to sustain militarysuccess is the complicated part. In Ramadi, it wasessential to begin building at the beginning of aclearing operation, so there would not be a gapbetween establishing security and implementingprojects.

While civil affairs projects are obviously vital tothe success of a clear, hold, build campaign, build-ing human infrastructure, which includes installinggovernment officials and agency directors, is just asvital. One of the keys to success in Tal Afar was theestablishment of a credible local government with amayor respected by the populace. In Ramadi, therewas no local governance when we arrived. We pre-vailed upon the provincial council to appoint amayor—one acceptable to the tribes—to coordinate

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development for the city. This appointment wasimportant because it relieved the governor ofmunicipal level duties and allowed him to focus onissues elsewhere in the province. We then workedwith the mayor to ensure that schools, hospitals,sewers, power stations, and other infrastructure allreturned to pre-war normalcy as soon as possible.In fact, the western part of Ramadi was undergoingredevelopment even while combat operations ineast Ramadi continued during autumn. This rebuild-ing effort demonstrated that normal services couldfunction again and helped convince the people ofRamadi that local security improvements were per-manent.

We wanted to encourage people living in still-embattled neighborhoods that joining the Awaken-ing was both possible and in their best interest. Tothat end, we held the first "Ramadi ReconstructionConference" in January 2007 at Sheik Sittar's home.Sheik Sittar invited all of the local sheiks, any gov-ernment officials we could find, and local contrac-tors. Following a brief on all ongoing projects, weexplained the different ways Coalition forces couldbe of assistance in reconstruction. The participantsbroke down into geographically based smallgroups, led by our five maneuver task force com-manders and their local partners, to design andrefine plans for reconstruction. The commandersdiscussed local needs and, just as importantly, localreconstruction capabilities. Everyone was asked toreturn in March to brief plans. Accordingly, we wereable to begin reconstruction in cleared parts ofRamadi before the fighting was over elsewhere.Maintaining the initiative in this way was the singlemost important thing we did throughout the cam-paign.

Why We Succeeded

Clearly, a combination of factors, some of whichwe may not yet fully understand, contributed to thispivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemyoverplayed its hand and the people were tired of al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevatedyounger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positionsof influence. A growing concern that the U.S. wouldleave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless againstal-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these

younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willing-ness to adapt our plans based on the advice of thesheiks, our staunch and timely support for them intimes of danger and need, and our ability to deliveron our promises convinced them that they could dobusiness with us. Our forward presence kept themreassured. We operated aggressively across all linesof operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring everyweapon and asset at our disposal to bear against theenemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusionand targeting meetings and operated seamlesslywith special operations forces, aviation, close airsupport, and riverine units. We have now seen thismodel followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq,and it has proved effective. Indeed, the level ofsophistication has only improved since the ReadyFirst departed in February 2007. Although, perhapsgroundbreaking at the time, most of our tactics,techniques, and procedures are now familiar to anyunit operating in Iraq today.

The most enduring lessons of Ramadi are onesthat are most easily lost in technical and tactical dis-cussions, the least tangible ones. The most impor-tant lessons we learned were:

• Accept risk in order to achieve results.Once you gain the initiative, never give theenemy respite or refuge.

• Never stop looking for another way toattack the enemy.

• The tribes represent the people of Iraq,and the populace represents the "key terrain"of the conflict. The force that supports thepopulation by taking the moral high groundhas as sure an advantage in COIN as a maneu-ver commander who occupies dominant ter-rain in a conventional battle.

• No matter how imperfect the tribal sys-tem appeared to us, it was capable of provid-ing social order and control through culturallyappropriate means where governmental con-trol was weak.

Conclusion

The men assigned and attached to the Ready First

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paid a terrible price for securing Ramadi. In ninemonths, 85 of our soldiers, sailors, and Marineswere killed, and over 500 wounded in some of thetoughest fighting of the war. Only the remarkableresults they achieved, and the liberated citizens ofRamadi who can now walk the streets without fear,temper the grief caused by their sacrifice. It is grati-fying to see our model adapted and used elsewherein the war on terror. It proves once again thatAmerica's Army is truly a learning organization. Inthe end, probably the most important lesson welearned in Ramadi was that, as General Petraeussaid, "Hard is not hopeless."

NotesMilitary Review, March-April 2008, 41-52.:

Reprinted by permission.

1. Frederick W. Kagan, "The Gettysburg of This War,"National Review, 3 September 2007.2. Megan K. Stack and Louise Roug, "Fear of BigBattle Panics Iraqi City," Los Angeles Times, 11 June2006.3. For the purposes of this essay, the multiple insur-gent groups are broken into two main categories:former regime elements (FRE), consisting of formerBa'athists and other nationalists, and al-Qaeda in Iraq(AQIZ), consisting of Islamic fundamentalist insur-gent groups.4. The "How to Win in al-Anbar" presentationbecame famous quickly, even gaining mention onseveral news talk shows. It can be downloaded at<http://abcnews.go.com/images/us/how_to_win_in_anbar_v4 .pdf>.5. Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How LittleThings Can Make a Big Difference (Boston: Little,Brown, 2000).

About the AuthorsMajor Niel Smith, USA, is operations officer at the U.S. Army and

Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, a part of the U.S. Army's

Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served as

the operations officer for the 1st Brigade Combat Team during

Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Colonel Sean B. MacFarland, USA, has been promoted to

brigadier general since publication of this article and is now com-

mander of Joint Task Force North. From 2005 to 2006, he was

commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored

Division.

Ramadi: From the Caliphate to Capitalism

by Andrew LubinU.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2008

By the summer of 2006 the Bush administrationand many of the generals fighting the war inIraq considered the city of Ramadi a lost cause.

The terrorist organization al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) hadannounced that Ramadi was now the capital of theirnew caliphate, an Islamic state in which a single rulerexercises both civil and religious power; the Marinesstationed in the government center, in the middle ofthe city, were under fire day and night; the Armystayed in bases on the outskirts of the city. In August,the Marines' in-country intelligence chief, Colonel PeteDevlin, delivered a bleak-and highly classified-assess-ment of the city and surrounding al-Anbar Provincethat shocked the administration, Congress, and theAmerican public when it was leaked to theWashington Post's Thomas E. Ricks.

Devlin, Ricks wrote, had recently filed "an unusualsecret report concluding that the prospects for secur-ing that country's western al-Anbar Province are dimand that there is almost nothing the U.S. military cando to improve the political and social situation there."

Americans had grown to know Ramadi from storiesof improvised explosive devices (IEDs) rippingthrough unarmored humvees, or Marine patrols beingattacked only a few dozen yards outside outposts withnames like Snake Pit. In August 2006, the month thatColonel Devlin completed his report, 33 Marines andsoldiers were killed in action in and around Ramadi.The successes and euphoria enjoyed by the politiciansand the American people in the afterglow of the quickand successful March 2003 invasion had long sincebeen replaced by the growing killed in-action reportsfrom the daily fighting in Ramadi, Fallujah, and othercities in al-Anbar Province.

As the casualty count mounted, the situation grewworse, and in November the Post followed up withanother article, by Ricks and Dafna Linzer, which saidthe Devlin report had been updated to say:

"The U.S. military is no longer able to defeat a

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bloody insurgency in western Iraq or counter al-Qaeda's rising popularity there." The story went on toquote a senior U.S. intelligence official as saying that,as of mid-November, "the problems in troubled AnharProvince have not improved."

But unknown to few outside of al-Anbar, the situa-tion on the ground was already changing. Aithoughthe improvements would not become apparent untilApril-May 2007, by early September 2007, only 10months after the Post's despairing report, the RamadiCity Council sponsored a 5K race that attracted some120 competitors and live television coverage fromBaghdad. Currently, salaries have increased almost 40percent due to the recent construction boom; Ramadi'smayor, Latif Obaid, with a full year in office, has spon-sored three well-attended business development coun-cils; and in January 2008 the Marines approvedpatrolling without wearing flak jackets and Kevlar hel-mets.

This is a turnaround of historic proportions.

Soldier, Marine, Sbeikb

The peace and prosperity enjoyed in Ramaditoday was earned primarily by the leadership andinitiative shown in the 2006-2007 time period bythree men: Colonel Sean MacFarland of the Army's1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st ArmoredDivision, known as "The Ready First," LieutenantColonel William Jurney of the 1st Battalion, 6thMarines (1/6), and Sheikh Sattar Abdul Abu Rishaand his Sons of Anbar, the first organized group ofIraqis to turn on AQI.

In 2006, the Army was fighting to control the Shiaareas in Iraq, and the Marine Corps was givenresponsibility for al-Anhar Province. Major General(now Lieutenant General) Richard Zilmer arrived inJune to take command of the 1st MarineExpeditionary Force (MEF) (Fwd) and began todevelop the strategy to secure Ramadi.

"Ramadi was the missing key to Anbar Province,"Zilmer said in a January 2008 interview with

Proceedings, "but we needed to stabilize the securi-ty situation first."

But Ramadi needed more than security if it wereto again be thought of as viable city. There were nobasic services. Two years of constant TED blasts, 70-ton Ml Abrams tanks barreling through the streets,and Marine counterattacks had left the city devastat-ed. Raw sewage ran down the streets from shatteredpipes. There was little to no city-supplied electricalpower. Shops and other businesses had long ceasedto open, and the school system had collapsed. Thosecitizens who had not fled the city huddled in theirhomes as Marines and insurgents fought through thestreets day and night.

With General Zilmer responsible for all of a!-Anbar Province, responsibility for gaining control ofRamadi fell to Colonel MacFarland of the "ReadyFirst" as it assumed area responsibility in early June2006.

The situation was grim; the Army had control ofthe outskirts of the city through its "bookend" campsto the west and east (Camp Ramadi and CampCorregidor). A tank company operated in the south-ern part of Ramadi, and the 3d Battalion, 8th Marines(3/8) under Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Neary werebased at Camp Hurricane Point, in the far westernend of the city. Neary had established three tenuousoutposts within the city limits; one at theGovernment Center, another in the Iraqi veteransaffairs building known as OP VA, and the third, OPHawk, close to the Government Center.

"2006 needed to be the Year of the Iraqi police(IP)," Zilmer said. "We needed to build up their armyand police so that governance could follow." But forthis to occur, the local Iraqis had to be convincedthat the Americans would stay and fight—just as theAmericans needed to be convinced that the Iraqiswould stand and fight with them.

Enter Sheikh Sattar Abdul Abu Risha.

Sattar Delivers

Shortly after the "Ready First" arrived in June 2006,Lieutenant Colonel Tony Deane, commander of TaskForce 1-35 Armor, approached Sattar to recruit histribesmen to the police force.

To accomplish this, Colonel MacFarland's deputy,Lieutenant Colonel Jim Lechner, and his police imple-

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mentation officer, Marine Major Teddy Gates, decidedto change the location for IP recruiting. They wanteda more secure location close to Sattar's house, as thiswould enable them to build a police station north ofthe Euphrates River in an area where many potentialrecruits lived.

Having already had his father and three brotherskilled by AQI, Sattar liked the idea, and the Iraqiresponse was overwhelming at the next week'srecruiting drive. Sattar promised even more recruits forAugust, and with AQI's help, he delivered.

In August, the new Jazeera police station north ofthe river, manned mostly by Abu Ali Jassim tribe mem-bers, was attacked and the sheikh of the tribe killed.AQI then hid the sheikh's body so it was not found forseveral days, a gross violation of Islam's strict burialrules that call for interment within 24 hours.

The attack on the station killed several Iraqi policeand also caused a number of burn casualties.MacFarland offered the police evacuation to CampBlue Diamond, an American Army camp outside ofRamadi, while they repaired the station, but the Iraqisrefused to abandon their post. Instead, in a scene rem-iniscent of Iwo Jima, they put their flag back up, andbegan patrolling again that same day.

With the locals outraged by AQI's disregard ofIslamic funeral laws, the charismatic Sheikh Sattarstepped forward to continue the push toward workingwith the Americans. He began as the spokesman forwhat is now known as the Anbar Awakening move-ment, and soon became the leader. McFarland attend-ed the meeting when the sheikhs officially began theAwakening, and the next week he and they agreed toa list of principles and requirements.

McFarland later said, "I told them that I now knewwhat it was like to be in Independence Hall on 4 July1776 when the Declaration of Independence wassigned."

Keeping Pressure on AQI

Three weeks later, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6)relieved 3/8. Its mission: "Provide security and stabili-ty for Ramadi, working with and through the IraqiArmy (TA)."

The battalion moved into the camp on the westernend of Ramadi known as Hurricane Point and imme-diately began to plan its advance into the city. "We

were told to expand our permanent presence with theIraqi security forces" (1SF), said Lieutenant ColonelJurney, the CO, "and so we began conducting somepretty serious offensive ops within the first 30 days."

Initially Jurney and 1/6 were on their own in WestRamadi, although they had theoretical support from anIraqi Army battalion that in reality was not able tofight. Jurney saw the need to fight aggressively, and hepushed his companies out into the city quickly.

"I tried to give my battalion commanders a clearintent for their role in the Brigade's fight, provide themwith the resources they need to execute, and let themfight their fight as they see it," explained MacFarland.

Jurney quickly dispatched his companies into thecity. Alpha Company under Captain Stephen Sloantook over OP VA. Captain Jason Arthaud, BravoCompany, pushed out to the Government Center, andCharlie Company, Captain Jody White, ran OP Hawk.Captain Todd Mahar's Weapons Company escortedconvoys around the city, conducted mobile patrols,and provided the heavy quick reaction force presence.

Additionally, MacFarland provided Navy SEALS andSeabees, Army scouts, civil affairs, and PSYOPS teams,UAVs, engineers, artillery, and attack helicopters asneeded. He also stationed a tank platoon at HurricanePoint to support the Marines. Based on reports fromhis field commanders, the colonel adjusted his forcesto maintain maximum pressure on the enemy at alltimes.

"We pushed our Marines into the most heavily con-tested areas," said Jurney, the 1/6 battalion command-er, "where AQI ruled primarily by murder and intimi-dation."

Jurney ordered regular patrolling, enhancing secu-rity street by street. His Marines also supplied gener-ators, other equipment, medical assistance, and a vari-ety of services that elevated living conditions forRamadi's citizens.

Night Calls

Knocking unbidden on the doors of residents aftermidnight, a practice known as "night calls," resulted inintelligence about the workings of the neighborhoodthat had the collateral benefit of helping the Marinesdistinguish between friend and foe. Captain Sloan'stroops would depart OP VA through the twisted wires,trash, and lED craters to knock on doors at 0100 or

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later. If not fighting, Second Lieutenant MicahSteinpfad would drink chai with the head of thehousehold as he inquired about family, schooling,employment (or lack of), and other demographicquestions so Marines could build a database of localknowledge for each street.

Simultaneously, the company corpsman, Chris"Doc" Anderson, would be treating children whoneeded basic medical aid. Returning to base at about0400, the teams would often hear gunfire and TEDblasts from other sections of the city where Marinepatrols were engaged in nocturnal firefights.

Lieutenant Colonel Jurney took the concept of"clear-hold-build" and refined it: he believed all threeactivities needed to be conducted concurrently. Therewere kinetic and non-kinetic operations done simulta-neously, but in different parts of the city, and to differ-ent degrees.

Part of the non-kinetic operations was Voice ofRamadi, a radio broadcast to the citizens via hugeloudspeakers from the top of the Government Center,and other newly established strong points. The brain-child of Major Tiley Nunnick, the Information Officer,the goal was to communicate news and events to thelocal population.

"Your brave Iraqi police stopped a suicide bomberthis morning" the citizens were told, or "750 more ofyour loyal Sons of Anbar have signed up as Iraqipolice in order to protect their homes and families."

Voice of Ramadi broadcast at set times each day,like the prayers chanted from the mosques. :Led byMajors Nunnick and Daniel Zappa, Lieutenant ColonelJurney's executive officer, 1/6 formed a working groupthat developed these culturally effective messages. Inan unusual move, Jurney and Zappa installed theirlead interpreter as a special adviser, his knowledgeand familiarity with the local culture and religion play-ing a big part in the communications operation.

In addition, the district police chiefs, Mayor Latif,and Anbar's governor, Ma-moun Sami Rashid al

Alwani, all took part in bringing public service mes-sages and updates to the people. Their messages hadto do with security and improving critical services asredevelopment projects got underway.

Working Together

As the Marines struggled to win the battle in the

streets, Jurney and MacFarland fought to prevail on agovernmental and tribal level. Governor Ma-mounshuttled between his office at the Government Centerand the Ministry of the Interior in Baghdad pleadingfor funds to pay the police and other city workers. Hisknowledge of the local political scene proved invalu-able to the Marines of 1/6; one day he brought Jurneya list of 120 names of Sunnis volunteering to join thepolice force—all of whom withstood a security check.

Jurney and MacFarland also worked with SheikhSattar in planning each new outpost. They wouldbuild one in a day, then assign both Marines and Iraqitroops to operate from it. After the surrounding areawas secured, they would construct another one sever-al hundred yards away.

While the Marines of 3/8 had labored mightily totrain the Iraqi Army battalion prior to the arrival of 1/6,it finally achieved acceptable combat readiness whenJurney and McFarland started co-locating Marines andIraqi units. Previously, the IA rotated companies inand out of the fight for leave, but this was changed toplatoon rotations so that companies could permanent-ly partner with the Marines and own the same battle-space.

Captain Patriquin

MacFarland and his civil affairs officer, CaptainTravis Patriquin, met regularly with Sheikh Sattar, andthe relationship developed into an essential ingredientin successfully engaging the locals.

Patriquin was a former Special Forces officer whospoke passable Arabic. Smart and highly personable,he accompanied McFarland to his meetings withSattar. He became personally close to the sheikh andhis family, who soon "adopted" him, and gave him thehonorary tribal name Hisham Abu Resha (Patrick ofAbu Resha). When Patriquin learned of medical prob-lems or other local needs, he told MacFarland's staff,which quickly responded, further improving relations.

MacFarland, Pâtriquin, and Sheikh Sattar huddledregularly to discuss ways to persuade tribesmen to jointhe Iraqi security forces, to induce more tribes into theAwakening movement, to bring a functional govern-ment back to Ramadi, and to rebuild the city. "It wasa partnership built on mutual respect" said MacFarland"and neither of us (he or Patriquin) ever made a com-mitment that we did not honor"

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"Patriquin was one more very good reason for thesheikhs to trust us," McFarland explained.

The captain's death from an TED blast in December2006 was a huge blow to the sheikhs, who turned Outin force for his memorial service and often becameteary eyed when speaking of him afterward. Theynamed a police station in his honor.

But at this point Jurney's Marines were still goingdoor-to-door, providing the muscle that gave Sattar the"face" he needed when talking with the other sheiks.The fighting inside the city remained ferocious; on thisauthor's first night at Hurricane Point, in October 2006,four Marines at OP Hawk were killed when theirhumvee was IED'd, and a month later Doc Andersonand Captain Patriquin were lost. The Marine KIA[Killed in Action] and WIA (Wounded in Action] tollcontinued to mount.

Seizing the Security Station

The first major Marine offensive was seizing the17th Street Security Station, which they did in mid-October. Taking control of this three-story buildingsignaled both the locals and AQI that the Marines wereserious about reclaiming the city. Sloan's AlphaCompany Marines were moved from OP VA into thesecurity station, and it became the first joint Marine-Iraqi outpost in the city.

Meanwhile, AQI's campaign of terror had not abat-ed. Beheadings of adults and teens continued.Smokers had their fingers cut off.

Now, though, Marines, Iraqi Army troops, andpolice were patrolling together three times a day. Theywent Street by street, knocking on doors, meeting theresidents, opening two schools, fighting if necessary.The continuous on-the-ground presence of theMarines gave the locals the courage to stand up toAQI.

The break came when the Abu Alwani tribe"flipped," meaning they switched their loyalties andbegan working with the Marines. The tribe lived inWest Ramadi, where Jurney's Marines first beganpatrolling, and were convinced by Governor Mamoun,a fellow Aiwani tribesman, to build a police Station intheir section of the city.

The station was commanded by Lieutenant ColonelSalaam al-Dalaimi, a dynamic Iraqi officer who aggres-sively began clearing AQI out of the area. But AQI

went after him equally aggressively, murdering him inhis home using a vehicle-borne improvised explosivedevice (VBID). His deputy, however, quickly steppedup and followed Salaam's lead. The West Ramadipolice station became even more active in workingwith the Marines to rid their part of the city of AQI.Salaam became a police hero, a martyr, and his picturestill adorns every police building in the city today.

The Marine-Army-Tribal alliance was successful:The Abu Alwanis flipped because the governor andSattar convinced them to do so—and was himself con-vinced by MacFarland, Patriquin, and the courage ofJurney's Marines.

City Coming Back to Life

In January 2007, Governor Mamoun appointed amayor, Latif Obaid. Protected by Jurney's Marines,Mayor Latif vigorously and visibly promoted stability,and began appointing fellow businessmen to anincreasingly active city council. Working with civilaffairs Marine Major Scott Kish and Gunnery SergeantMatthew Knight, the mayor also pressed for the repairof sewage pipes, the resumption of trash collection,the removal of burned-out cars from the streets, andother basic services—and he did it by hiring the localsand paying them in cash. These were the first jobsavailable in Ramadi since 2004, and were muchsought-after.

The improved security situation enabled Latif andthe Americans to rebuild and improve other municipalservices; electricity reached more parts of the city formore hours each day, houses and neighborhoods hadclean water, and the oddly named Route Michigan, themain road through the city, had the concrete blast bar-riers removed as traffic volume increased to pre-warlevels.

While Jurney's Marines were extended for threemonths, MacFarland and the "Ready First" returned toGermany. Colonel John Charlton and the Army's 1stBrigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, replacedthem in February 2007. Charlton continuedMacFarland and Jurney's tactics. With Jurney's Marinescontinuing to clear street-by-street, Chariton's troopsassisted by manning the newly opened joint securitystations where Americans and Iraqis lived and workedside by side.

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As the violence of winter 2007 eased, and springand summer arrived, the combined concept of securi-ty = jobs = more security = more jobs took hold andthe locals joined the Iraqi police by the thousands tocontinue to drive out AQI. Gunny Knight's initialclean-up program grew as the locals, with Marine andArmy managerial assistance, rebuilt the streets, thebuildings, and reopened the hundreds of small busi-nesses and markets that are the hallmarks of a pros-perous city.

Even the September 13 assassination of SheikhSattar did not break the momentum towards stabilityand peace. Shortly after Sattar was photographed at alAsad air base with President George W. Bush, AQI sui-cide bombers attacked him at his home during theopening days of Ramadan, killing him and his guards.But his brother, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, promptlytook charge of the Anbar Awakening Movement.Unusual in the Middle East, where loyalty normallygoes to the man and not the institution, Sheikh Ahmedwas successful in maintaining Ramadi's charge towardreconstruction and governance.

As of 15 February 2008, with police intelligencebecoming more effective daily, Ramadi has not: had agun fired in anger in 262 days, and the few TED inci-dents that occur do so outside the city.

The city of Ramadi today is a work in progress in acountry undergoing a transition from a government-managed petroleum dictatorship to a free-marketdemocracy. Thanks to Jurney, MacFarland, and the lateSheikh Sattar, Ramadi's citizens, 99 percent of themSunni, finally understand that their survival dependson banding together against AQI and their historic Shiaenemies. These three men built the base that enabledCharlton and Latif to continue reconstruction efforts—all of which gave the citizens of Ramadi the courage,and the opportunity—to stand up for themselves.

NotesU.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2008, 54-61.

Reprinted by permission. Copyright © 2008 by U.S.Naval Institute (www.usni.org).

About the AuthorAndrew Lubin is a journalist and a member of the USMC Combat

Correspondents Association. Between 2006 and 2008, he has been

imbedded with Marine and Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Daily Diary of anal-Qaeda SectorLeader

by Abu-TariqDiary captured and transcribed by UnitedStates Forces-Iraq

In the Name of Allah the Most Merciful andMost Compassionate.Date:Third of Shawaal of 1428 Hijri (H)[Gregorian: 15 October 2007]

This is My Will:

Jam Abu-Tariq, emir [leader] of al-Layinand al-Mashahdah Sector. There werealmost 600 fighters in our sector before

the tribes changed course 360 degrees underthe influence of the so-called Islamic Army(Deserter of Jihad) and other believer groups.

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Many of our fighters quit and some of themjoined the deserters, and later on I will men-tion the names of fighters who stood by us(faithful fighters), but things started gettingworse ever since, and as a result of that thenumber of fighters dropped down to 20 orless which led us to move some of our vehi-cles to another location (al-Muthanna estab-lishment area) for security reasons where ourbrother [NAME REDACTED] is stationed at (Iwill also mention the type vehicles at theend.)

There are many details known by brothers[NAMES REDACTED] and [NAME REDACTED]regarding the spoils, buying and selling vehi-cles such as:

1-Lorry (6-wheeled) in Mosul sold later andwe received some of the money for it.

2-[NAME REDACTED] still owes us[$10,000] which is the remainder of themoney that is still with them after they soldtwo Lorries for us at the car dealerships in theal-Saqlawiyah area which we have notreceived yet. We gave him our business andreceived [$10,000] from him as a down-pay-ment hut he still owes us another [$10,000],and later we gave him [$28,000] to get theLorry back, but he did not return it yet. (Theactual owner of the dealership is [NAMEREDACTED].)

3-The value of another Lorry is [$25,000] isstill in the possession of a person in Tikritknown by brother [NAME REDACTEDI

4-We bought a pickup model 2000 from aperson called [NAME REDACTED] (his phonenumber is [NUMBER REDACTEDI) of whichhe did not pay its value yet, and the deal wasto trade in this vehicle with a truck or pay itsvalue in al-Shirqat at al-Nahar dealershipclose to the house of brother [NAMEREDACTED] (killed) and the price of the pick-up is [$7,500].

Date: 9-10 of Shawaal of 1428 H[Gregorian: 2 1-22 October 20071

A BKC [7.62mm machine gun], ammunitionand other light weapons are still in the pos-

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session of [NAME REDACTED] and his broth-er [NAME REDACTED] which belong to usand brother [NAME REDACTED] knows aboutthat, and the weapons that are in the posses-sion of [NAME REDACTED] are 2,000 C5Rockets plus an RPG-9 but he refuses to giveus any of it lately and we do not know whatis his intention is in that regard, therefore, wehave to keep trying with him to get ourweapons and ammunition back due to thepresent condition and especially since the al-Sahwah [Awakening] groups started opposingus.

Weapons and ammunition such as 30 con-tainers of bullets and four BKCs in the posses-sion of brother [NAME REDACTED] alsobelong to us.

Brothers, I want you to know that I willonly mention the names of fighters who werefaithful to our cause and stood by us whenwe needed them, and later I will mention thenames of the traitors so that they may he pun-ished when time comes.

Date: 12 of Shawaal of 1428 H[Gregorian: 24 October 20071

There are very few tribe members whostood by us and supported us, such as mem-bers of [NAME REDACTED] tribe that weresurrounded by al-Sahwah [Awakening] fight-ers and even though they did not quit plusmembers of [NAME REDACTEDI and [NAMEREDACTED] sub-tribe members. After theraid that we did against the houses and safeheavens of the deserters, which led to killingand injuring a lot of them, burning some oftheir vehicles, and spoiling some of theirvehicles and weapons, which affected theirmorale and resources tremendously, knowingthat the number of fighters who did the raidand not 150 fighters as they claimed after that.

Date: 16 of Shawaal of 1428 H[Gregorian: 28 Oct 2007]

My request to you is not to be negligentwith the deserters/traitors at all, because

those kinds of people look like the cancerthat grew up in the body of al-Jihad move-ment, therefore, we should have no mercy onthem even if they joined the Iraqi governmentsecurity forces and do not let them have anysense of relief despite the fact that some ofthem ran away from our strong hand tounknown locations with their families. Eventhough our Jihadi movement goals at theearly stages were to recruit as many as possi-ble of the government employees in order tohave access, sources and supporters amongthem in order to gain more information aboutthe government security forces and the infi-del's military and tactical movements in orderto ease our movements and missions againstthem despite the fact that I was against suchgoals for security reasons. Dear brothers, Iwould like you to know that even though theIslamic State of Iraq (151) achieved a lot ofprojects for the benefit of the people of Iraqsuch as bringing water, electricity and agricul-tural help to a lot of areas such as [NAMEREDACTED] we were mistreated, cheated,and betrayed by some of our brothers whoused to be part of the Jihadi Movement, there-fore we must not have mercy on those traitorsuntil they come back to the right side—The1ST side—or get eliminated completely inorder to achieve victory at the end. And Iwould like to mention here the name of oneof [the] families [sub-tribe] who betrayed usand lost our trust is the [NAME REDACTED]family who were very good, faithful Jihadifighters, but later on we found out that thesepeople were nothing but hypocrites, liars, andtraitors and were waiting for the rightmoment to switch sides with whoever paysthem most and at the end they fought againstus and they tried to prevent us from attackingthe al-Sahwah [Awakening] groups blockingour entrance to that area.

Information about the old battalion offighters in my sector:

1-Battalion of Laylat al-Qadr Martyrs [Laylatal-Qadr is the 27th Night of Ramadan]: Itsgroup emir called [NAME REDACTED](detained), and the number of fighters in this

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battalion were 200. AJ1 of them were verywell equipped with weapons and 37 vehicles,and they did a lot of good activities againstthe invaders and its followers, but in themeantime, there are few fighters left who areactually fighting, and some were killed andsome arrested, but the majority betrayed usand joined al-Sahwah [Awakening]. This bat-talion was one of the first battalions whosenumbers of fighters was tarnished after Abu-Haydar al-Ansari Battalion, and the number offighters is now only 10.

2-Battalion of Abu-Haydar al-Ansari: Theemir of this battalion [NAME REDACTED] wasthe first renegade in this group. He ran awayone month before the al-Sahwah [Awakening]movement started in our sector, and we stilldo not know where he is hiding. It is no won-der that most of the information we got fromhim was deception and lies. There were 300fighters in the battalion equipped with goodweapons and 17 vehicles, and since [the Emir]deserted us, the number of fighters droppeddown to 16 and then to two; one of whomwas arrested [NAME REDACTED], and thesecond one was injured [NAME REDACTED],and the rest joined the al-Sahwah[Awakening] groups.

3-Battalion of Hudhayfah Ibm al-Yaman:The Emir of this battalion is [NAME REDACT-ED], and the number of fighters are almost 60.They are very well equipped with weaponsand other supplies. All of them are true andgood believers, plus their activities against theinvaders and their followers were very good,but for the present time, their activities arefrozen due to their present conditions plustheir families' conditions.

4-Battalion of al-Ahwal: Most of its mem-bers are scoundrels, sectarians, non-believers,and the worst one of them was [NAMEREDACTED], and he was the first one todesert his battalion and ran away to Syria,then later on came back from Syria and joinedthe traitors, while the rest of the battalion wasgone except for [NAME REDACTED] arid hissons, and the military person who was incharge of the battalion, his name is [NAME

Air Defense:

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the sniper/now he is

REDACTED] (bad not good), and he still hasin his possession three BKCs and two sniperrifles, and he claims that one of those rifles

[NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED]

was given back to its original owner [NAMEREDACTED]. (I will try to take back the restof the weapons from him soon, and I willmention that later.)

[NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED]

5-Battalion of Muhammed Bin Muslimah: [NAME REDACTEDI

The leader of this battalion was the martyr[NAME REDACTEDI who was killed by thetraitors of the Islamic Army with help of theinvaders' helicopters, which also led to thedestruction of some of our vehicles and

[NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED]

injured[NAME REDACTEDI

weapons. Some of the fighters of this battal-ion deserted, and especially the ones whocame from [NAME REDACTEDI tribe like the

[NAME REDACTEDI/detained[NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED]/left us a week ago

traitor [NAME REDACTED], who became anofficer with the al-Sahwah [Awakening]group, plus others who ran away with theirweapons to Diyala and then disappeared, like[NAME REDACTEDI who has in his posses-sion a sniper rifle, and his brothers, except forone [NAME REDACTED] who was injuredwith [NAME REDACTEDI who possesses aBKC.

[NAME REDACTED] and his sons/ENAMEREDACTEDI

[NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTEDI[NAME REDACTEDI[NAME REDACTEDI[NAME REDACTEDI[NAME REDACTEDI[NAME REDACTEDI

Technical Department: [NAME REDACTEDI[NAME REDACTED]/there are so many

Members of this department are [NAMEREDACTEDI and his sons, who are still work-ing with us, plus [NAME REDACTED], whowas injured recently.

negative remarks against him[NAME REDACTEDI/We have not seen him

for more than 20 days so far.[NAME REDACTED]/We have not seen him

for more than 10 days so far.[NAME REDACTED] showed up with their

.

One person left in this department who isgroup emir [NAME REDACTED] and they are:

[NAME REDACTEDIstill working with us [NAME REDACTEDI,who is willing to work with us to the end,

[NAME REDACTED]/left three days ago[NAME REDACTED}/came back to work

and he has in his possession three operativebatteries (one inoperative), plus eight C5launchers and one 23mm gun.

Names of people who are still working

with us recently after his wounds healed up.And that is the number of fighters left in

my sector.Remarks: [NAME REDACTEDI and their

with al-Qaeda:[NAME REDACTEDI[NAME REDACTED] and his brothers[NAME REDACTED] and his brothers[NAME REDACTED][NAME REDACTEDI[NAME REDACTED]

fighters are good and faithful, and they lostone of their fighters (his name martyr [NAMEREDACTEDI) fighting against al-Sahwah[Awakening] fighters, and in addition to thattribe area is surrounded with al-Sahwah fight-ers who are preventing them from leaving

their area. So far and we have no further (http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_con-information about the situation over there. tent&task=view&id = 16935&Itemid = 128).

Notes About the AuthorAbu-Tariq was an emir (leader) of al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters in the

Reprinted from an unclassified translation al-Layin and al-Mashahdah sector at the time his diary was cap-

posted by Multi National Force-Iraq (now tured in the fall of 2007.

United States Force-Iraq) on 10 February 2008

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Part V: Stability,Progress, and theFuture

As U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker toldjournalist Thomas E. Ricks for a piecepublished in February 2009, "What the

world ultimately thinks about us and what wethink about ourselves is going to be determinedmuch more by what happens from now on thanwhat's happened up to now."1 As of this writ-ing, Iraq is a much more stable and secure coun-try than it was in 2004. However, sectarian ten-sions remain, and there is doubt about whetheror not Iraq can remain stable without the pres-ence of substantial U.S. forces The followingselections present an overview of the questionsand problems that Iraq will face in the future, aswell as the concerns many observers feel aboutthe consequences of the surge and al-AnbarAwakening. Timothy Williams's piece from TheNew York Times considers the sense of optimismthat pervaded much of western Iraq as Marineswithdrew from Camp Fallujah in the fall of 2008.Steve Simon's article presents a warning againsttoo much optimism, however, noting that theAwakening strategy may have been successfulfor the short term, but that it has strengthenedforces that could undermine the cohesion of theIraqi state in the long term. In response, CohnH. Kahi and William E. Odom argue that Simon'sassessment is too pessimistic and that theAwakening presents a foundation from whichmore can be done to strengthen the Iraqi state.

1. Quoted by Ricks in "The war in Iraq isn't over. Themain events may not even have happened yet,"Washington Post, 15 February 2009.

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