The Axe Files - Ep. 141: Dan Shapiro · So, my father was on a moshav, in a chicken coop. He was in the school teaching. He was in the Angel bakery down the street. Anywhere men had

Ep. 141 – Dan Shapiro 1

The Axe Files - Ep. 141: Dan Shapiro Released April 24, 2017 [00:00:07] UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: And now from the University of Chicago Institute of Politics and CNN, "The Axe Files" with your host David Axelrod. DAVID AXELROD, "THE AXE FILES" HOST: I met Dan Shapiro when Barack Obama decided to run for president back in 2007. And he came on as a foreign policy advisor on Middle East issues. I served with him in the White House when he was on the National Security Council. I slipped off late in the day sometimes to play basketball with him on the White House basketball court, where he showed me all his old JCC basketball moves. But more than anything, I came to respect him as the U.S. ambassador to Israel for six years of the Obama Administration during very, very eventful and challenging times. And we sat down to talk about it the other day when he visited the Institute of Politics. Dan Shapiro, my old friend it's good to see you. DAN SHAPIRO, FMR. U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL: It's good to be here David. AXELROD: Someone gave me a quote of yours that said, "The job of U.S. Ambassador of Israel was a job I have been preparing for my entire life, even though I did not know it". You are like a kid from Champaign Urbana, Illinois. So, tell me about how you unknowingly were preparing for this all your life. SHAPIRO: Well, when I was four years old, my parents were academics at the University of Illinois, took a sabbatical. And -- AXELROD: What were they teaching? SHAPIRO: My father is an English professor. Shakespeare is really his area of expertise. Later he started the Jewish studies program at the University of Illinois. So, he broadened out to do American-Jewish literature. AXELROD: So if you're going to get involved in the quest for Middle East peace and Shakespeare, maybe perfect. SHAPIRO: He has a lot of lessons that are relevant. AXERLOD: Yes. SHAPIRO: My mother's a writer and was teaching in writing in the English department as well. So they had a sabbatical and decided to spend a semester in Israel. AXELROD: Were they deeply steeped in Jewish culture and faith? SHAPIRO: No. They were the children of immigrants. And who had really integrated and assimilated significantly. And they were just at the beginning of what became a lifelong or at most of their adult lifelong exploration of Jewish life. And so, they're really just at the beginning of that process with the young children, which was what sparked it. But they decided they really had to learn more. And then, give more to their teacher. Our family Jewish life became very, very rich. But at that time, it was really only at its infancy. So they


decided to spend the semester in Israel out of curiosity to learn. Again, they felt some connection. But not enough something I would describe as deep. So, we went there. It was August 1973. AXELROD: Yes. Yes. A fairly fortuitous -- SHAPIRO: Right. AXELROD: -- time to arrive. SHAPIRO: Right. So, we spent the first few weeks adjusting to this life in a new country. I was going to -- with my brother to a local gon (ph) or nursery school learning Hebrew, my sister going to elementary school. And it was a great adventure until of course, Yom Kippur, that fall, when the siren started to sound. And the soldier started to mobilize through the streets of Jerusalem where we were living. And -- AXELROD: You're six years old? SHAPIRO: Four years old. AXELROD: Four years old. So, how did you -- do you remember at all? SHAPIRO: I remember the way one remembers things from four years old with certain images that are very prominent. I don't think I can describe the whole narrative of the three weeks of the war. But I remember going to the bomb shelters. I remember blacking out the apartment. I remember the confusion that my parents were dealing with of just trying to understand what was going on. Their Hebrew was not that good. The news was sporadic. And it was just hard to know. And they tried to assess it from their neighbors. And of course all of their Israeli neighbors, our Israeli neighbors were dealing with -- AXELROD: Mobilizing primarily. SHAPIRO: Yes. And dealing with the trauma of having their sons, and brothers, and fathers going up to the front. AXELROD: Yes. Yes. SHAPIRO: So, it was a confusing time. Now, they of course immediately got pressure from their parents. Bring the grandchildren home, you know. What are you doing there? Get out of Israel. And it made it -- Well, it turned out to be a very significant decision for our family. They decided to stay and help, volunteer anywhere they could, where people had gone to fight. So, my father was on a moshav, in a chicken coop. He was in the school teaching. He was in the Angel bakery down the street. Anywhere men had gone to fight, he volunteered. My mother was mostly, you know, helping take care of the three young children. [00:05:03] But they really felt that sense of -- That was what began that sense of identification. So this was more than just a semester abroad, just turned into something much more meaningful. Of course the war ended and we stayed for the rest of the semester. And -- AXELROD: So just one more on -- you say you remember confusion. Do you remember fear? I don't know if four-year-olds remember that.


SHAPIRO: I remember my older sister being very scared. She was about seven. And I remember my parents being worried. I think I was too young to really understand it well enough, to really be afraid. I can remember playing tag in the bomb shelters with the other kids in the apartment building. I just, you know, don't quite remember feeling that sense of crippling fear myself. Although I'm sure there must have been moments. AXELROD: So you come back to the states after that experience. SHAPIRO: Right. AXELROD: And then how did your own path go from there? SHAPIRO: Right. Well, it meant that we as a family forged a bond with Israel that really stayed with us throughout my childhood. And so, kind of around the dinner table, the conversation would very frequently alight on whatever the events of the Middle East were. We were thrilled and followed intensely the peace negotiations with Egypt. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the ultimate Camp David Accords, then it was the war in Lebanon, which was a very traumatic one. Later was the First Intifada. But generally speaking, these were kind of very central parts of family discussion and very prominent in my own mind. I, determined that I wanted to spend more time in Israel later on as I was nearing the end of high school. So, I started to study Hebrew seriously in high school, first at a summer camp and then in high school and the college classes. And it definitely drew me to find my own relationship, defined my own relationship with Israel. So, on that trip I took after high school, between high school and college. I specifically looked for a program where I'd be able to live with an Israeli family. And found one that didn't speak any English. And really immersed myself to the usual study and travel, elements that are on that kind of experience. But most especially, to try to really immerse myself in Israeli society, to get my Hebrew up to fluency. And really sort of understand what Israelis lived with, and how they felt, and how they thought every day. AXELROD: I hear from Israeli friends that, you know, they've seen you out in about speaking at services or on television or on the radio and commenting on your fluency in Hebrew. And that -- and what an advantage that was to you as the American Ambassador. Did you find that? SHAPIRO: I did. And I found it to be more impactful than I expected. Yu know, I thought when I went, the fact that I spoke Hebrew. And worked hard to sort of get it up to a level I could use for public speaking and media. The people would appreciate it. "Oh, that's nice. The ambassador speaks some Hebrew". It was much deeper than that, much more profound for a couple of reasons. Number one, I think it speaks to Israeli's sense of isolation. You know, there's only one place in the world you could have gone and spent the time invested in the cultural knowledge to master that language. And that's Hebrew. And so, it said to people, "Wow this is someone who gets us". And therefore, they were willing to listen. Listen to policy, descriptions that they might not agree with. But that they could hear in very concrete terms was coming from someone who sort of spoke their language, but also got where they're coming from. And the second reason was impactful, because a lot of Israelis don't speak that good English. It may seem like an obvious statement. But, you know, we tend to gravitate towards Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. And people who've studied in the states. And so, there's a I think a misperception including on my own part, that most Israeli's speak English and you can get by just fine. The truth is a lot do not. And so, if you want to situate to any country connect to people without a filter. And help them really understand what you're trying to say. Then of course listen to them without the filter as well. Doing it in


their own language makes an enormous difference. AXELROD: Was faith -- How much was the faith dimension part of that? SHAPIRO: It was very important. I grew up in a reformed Jewish household. Nowadays I consider myself conservative. But all those years of religious studies of summer camps, Jewish summer camps, definitely imbued in me a feeling that I as a Jew had a special connection with this country far away and where I had only visited once through all my childhood. But that, I felt connected to that history. [00:10:00] And that story of return. That story of people that had been exiled from their homeland and through centuries of wondering much of a tragic, had finally found their way back home and rebuilt that state. That spoke to me very, very personally. Absolutely. AXELROD: And you made it a focus as you were saying of your studies? SHAPIRO: Right. So, I quickly have to have it, when I started college, it was originally at Wash U and St. Louis although I later transferred to Brandeis. I decided to understand Israel. I really also need to understand not just Hebrew, I also needed to learn Arabic. So I started to study Arabic. I started to get deeper into studies of Middle East history of Jewish and Islamic relations through the centuries. I took many courses in Islam. And it really became more of a focus on Middle East history that was really animating me. Although I followed the politics very closely and the first Intifada which erupted -- AXELROD: Uprising by the Palestinians? SHAPIRO: Right, which broke out in December of 1987 when I was a freshman in college. I have to say I followed it intensely, day-to-day. And it was very painful and traumatic to watch the scenes playing out. Israeli soldiers running after Palestinian, mostly then kids start throwing stones. The later Intifada's were much more violent. It was probably the first issue on which I really formed my own opinion, independent of my parents. Not that their opinions were all that different, but that I had really done my own homework and really researched and really thought deeply about the issues. And it had led me as somebody who was then and remains today, you know, deeply committed to Israel and deeply moved by its story and founding and deeply committed to its security, and the need to have it in Israel, because of everything that's happened to the Jewish people through the years. To also feel that there needed to be an accommodation and some kind of arrangement where both Israelis and Palestinians could live in their own states. So I was a pretty early adopter if you would, of the two-state solution idea of 1988. Let's say, it wasn't that common or that popular an idea, at least among in the Jewish community. But at least among people who consider themselves, you know, supporters of Israel. But that really hit me very early, early on, that there was no other solution to a conflict. It was interesting when I had been in Israel in 80 -- early '87 on this gap year program. There just hadn't been all that much discussion in the curriculum that we were studying about the Palestinian issue. Those first 20 years, let's say of the occupation after '19 -- after the Six-Day War were relatively quiet years. And it was only when the Intifada erupted that a lot of people had to kind of go back and really look at that situation. So, is this really a sustainable model for the long-term? AXELROD: Sustainable, for reasons of maintaining a Jewish democratic state. And also sustainable and


I speak now as a Jew, sustainable in terms of the values of Judaism and the values of Israeli society. SHAPIRO: Right. Both of those were obviously put under pressure by -- AXELROD: And continuatively. SHAPIRO: And continuatively by the sustained control of a large population that doesn't want to be under Israel's control. Now, as the story develops, so maybe we'll get into a little bit later, you know, there are many, many reasons for Israelis to be cautious. AXELROD: Yes. SHAPIRO: For Israelis to be risk-averse, to Israelis to feel. And with justification that frequently the other side or the other party has not lived up to anything like the values we would expect of them. There's been violence, there's been terror, there's been delegitimization. And that continues also to this day. AXELROD: Yes. Thousands of rockets raining down on you. SHAPIRO: Absolutely. Absolutely and I experienced that in the last few years as an ambassador. But that core understanding of, there's only one outcome here in which Israelis can live in their Jewish democratic state with peace and security and Palestinians can meet their legitimate aspirations for independence in the two state solution. That hit me in 1988. And I haven't changed my mind about it since then. AXELROD: We're going to get to that in a little bit. I just want to -- you then decided to take the training that you had and go into government. And you spent a bunch of time on Capitol Hill? SHAPIRO: Right. So I thought I was going to get a PhD in history. I finished my degree at Brandeis, started a PhD program in the Center for Middle Eastern studies at Harvard. And in the first summer between the two years of the master's portion of that program, I decided doing an internship with the State Department. And it changed my direction completely. [00:15:01] I went to the -- AXELROD: Whatever happened to the State Department? Well, that's different. We'll get to get to that. AXELROD? We'll get to it. I went to the United Arab Emirates, our embassy in Abu Dhabi and our consulate in Dubai. It was a year after the first Gulf War. So there were a lot of very interesting Gulf security issues, Iran bullying the UAE and other Gulf states. AXELROD: Now, are you fluent in Arabic by then? SHAPIRO: Well, I'm fluent. But it was pretty, usually it was pretty strong. It was usable. And I did use it in a small, well it was a small embassy then. I'm sure it's much larger today. As a graduate intern, everyone else was on vacation. They said to me, you are the political officer for the summer. So you're going to the foreign ministry. And you're doing the diplomacy. And they asked me to write some -- I thought fairly serious cables about the security situation. AXELROD: It's amazing -- I mean, you know, I run this Institute of Politics. You've been good enough to speak there in recent days. And these young people go off to internships. And have really meaningful experiences. They're given real responsibilities and it's life-changing. SHAPIRO: Indeed, it was for me. So, I came home from that summer to having changed my mind


completely about my direction. I'm no longer seeking a PhD in history. Instead, I finished out a Masters degree that was more U.S. foreign policy and Middle East politics. And then went to Washington. And I worked for much of the next decade or two on Capitol Hill. I was Lee Hamilton's Middle East advisor on the house of Foreign Affairs Committee. AXELROD: Kind of giant analyst of congressional history. SHAPIRO: Also an incredible boss. And even other senior staff on his team to learn from, how to do foreign-policy the right way in a bipartisan way? How to really put U.S. interests first above domestic politics. Lee Hamilton was an incredible mentor in that regard, not just for me, for hundreds and hundreds of others. Later for Senator Dianne Feinstein of California. Later for Senator Bill Nelson of Florida. And I had a range of responsibilities. But I was always keeping foreign-policy. And usually, Middle East policy at the center and all three of them who also followed that dictum of a bipartisan foreign policy, maintain a close focus on the Middle East. So, it kept me closely involved. AXELROD: And you spent a couple of years in the Clinton Administration as well? SHAPIRO: I did. I worked for Sandy Berger when he was a National Security Advisor, as a congressional liaison. And that was actually really important. AXELROD: At a fateful time, right, because one of the things that they were trying to accomplish at that time was to forge the kind of agreement that you're still seeking today. SHAPIRO: Right, right so yes. So, the Camp David summit, failed Camp David summit of July 2000 took place during that period, so I was involved in trying to help shape the congressional understanding of what was being attempted and then of course what the fallout and the aftermath was. It was also a very important experience just to learn how the executive branch functions. The legislative branch and executive branch really are almost two different planets. And particularly -- AXELROD: So we're seeing that right now. SHAPIRO: Yes. And if you have worked at one but not the other, you are not nearly as effective until you see how it looks on the other side of the fence. AXELROD: I want to ask you about that. We got to take a short break. And we'll be right back with former Ambassador Dan Shapiro. (COMMERCIAL BREAK) AXELROD: This issue of experience seems really important right now, because you have a president who has never served a day in government or the military. It's the first time in American history that that's happened. And a White House staff almost none of whom have had experience in government either in the legislative branch or in the executive branch. How much of the turmoil that we have seen in the first couple of months of this administration is as a result of just lack of experience? SHAPIRO: I think it's a huge problem at the moment. As you say, there are -- most of the people in decision-making roles are newcomers to government. And government's complicated. It's its own animal. It has -- AXELROD: It's like healthcare. It's complicated.


SHAPIRO: Yes. It has its own rhythm, figuring out how to get the information you need. Figuring out how to work as a team to integrate that information and make policy recommendations. Ultimately the decision is only made by the decision-makers. But that is not something that if you've never done it before, you just kind of walk in and know how that organization works. [00:20:04] And so, what -- first is you've got big gaps in staffing, you know, between the Secretary of State and the working levels of the State Department. There's about four or five levels undersecretaries, deputies, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, almost none of them. – And those are really the workhorses of the policymaking processes are in place right now. And there is almost complete cut-off from what one hears between the working levels and seventh floor or sector, Tillerson says. AXELROD: Yes. I mean I wanted to ask you as someone who had you -- I think you are the longest-serving ambassador, is that right, in Israel? SHAPIRO: Well, I was the third longest to do that job. But I was the longest-serving ambassador in the Obama Administration at the end of that term. AXELROD: So, you're very familiar with the State Department. What is going on with the State Department? The president proposed almost a third cut in the State Department budget. And it feels like Jared Kushner, the president's son-in-law is a more integral part of foreign policymaking than the Secretary of State. I mean maybe that's unfair. But that's the way it appears on the outside. SHAPIRO: Well, I think it's accurate at least again by all appearances. Numerous issues have been assigned to Jared Kushner, Middle East peace. And there's a lawyer, Jason Greenblatt, -- in the White House is actually doing it day-to-day U.S.-Canada relations, U.S.-China relations, I noticed he was in Iraq over the last a couple of days, whereas Secretary Tillerson has been absent from almost all of the president's meetings with foreign leaders. He -- AXELROD: Have you ever seen that before? SHAPIRO: No. That's very unusual. He has also just been very, very low -- extremely low profile, which one usually expects the secretary of state to be the main foreign-policy spokesperson for the United States. And that's important to educate allies and adversaries, and our own public and congress about priorities. And day-to-day, he and his team and his embassies need to be the ones to implement policy. And they sort of -- they need to be seen as connected, and credible, and to be able to speak on behalf of the president. And when they are as distant, and low-profile, and quiet as they have been, it really raises that question. And so, it, you know, I worry about our ambassadors' and embassies around the world going into the host governments. And the host governments looking at them and saying, these are very nice people. But they really do not have any idea about what the policy is. And not every relationship can depend on a phone call to Jared Kushner. There are other people in our government who need to be able to speak credibly and competently on behalf of the government. AXELROD: You think these -- you think foreign governments are learning how to game the system? SHAPIRO: They have too. They have no choice. And I don't begrudge that, you know, any foreign government has to find out what channel is most effective to advance its interests with the United States. I think it serves us better, or when we present a unified and cohesive team, representing the different institutions in our government, the State Department, the Pentagon, the NSC, other agencies as well. And right now, I just don't see any kind of cohesiveness or any kind of ability for those other departments to speak credibly.


AXELROD: Yes. Well, you know, you see it even within the White House itself. I mean there's, you know. And you were on the National Security Council before you became an ambassador of the Obama Administration. I want to talk to you about that experience and your experience with President Obama and the -- and the Middle East process. But, you know, there's always tension between White Houses and agencies even state and the Pentagon. But what's unusual here is you've got Steve Bannon sitting at the elbow of the president whose espoused one worldview and set up policies that are very much populist, anti-institutional, anti-global institutions, anti-China. And then, you have Kushner. You have Gary Cohn and his Chief Economic Advisor, even the secretary of treasury advocating a different set of policies. So, if you're the Chinese, for example. You're trying to scope all this out and say, "Well how we deal with this guy?" And he's a dealmaker. "How do we make a deal and who do we make a deal with? It's kind of interesting, because a lot of the stories leading into the summit with the Chinese is that Jared Kushner was a guy who structured that. SHAPIRO: You know, it's not unprecedented by any means to have rivalries or factions within the White House. I think President Obama's White House was far less driven in that regard than some others although, you know, there are disagreements. [00:25:03] And that's actually driven. AXELROD: Naturally. SHAPIRO: And a president has to be the -- in the end, the referee and to listen to the different views. And then, make a decision. I think what's alarming in this kind of situation is that we have a president who really has very limited background in most of these issues and has not demonstrated through his life, much less through his short political career an interest in going very deep into them. And so, he's really often it seems subject to the last person he talks to. And some of the people he talks to uncertainly, but some of the names you mentioned in that category or to me, advocating some very extreme and even dangerous positions. And so we hear that come out in this kind of casting aspersions on our alliance with NATO. I mean, NATO has been the absolute rock of the transatlantic, I would say even global security for decades. And yet, here we are out of the gate, calling into question whether we will meet our obligations to our NATO allies. Similarly, at different times to Asian allies. And then, it kind of whacked, it goes back and forth, you know, after calling into a question whether we were really going to stand by certain commitments to Asian allies. Then he had a very warm visit with the Prime Minister of Japan. AXELROD: And then also, you know, he or others may be saying one thing. Well, you know, General Mattis is overseas saying another thing. It's got to be confusing to the world. SHAPIRO: Yes. So that unpredictability, that inconsistency, that being pulled back and forth between different factions without maybe a real ideological core that you can come back to is extremely confusing and dangerous. I mean it's confusing to allies who are worried and who are anxious about whether the United States is going to stand by traditional commitments. And by the way, even if it's not directed at them, if I can guess what certain Israeli leaders are feeling, it's not that there is a question about whether the United States will stand up to or stand up to it for its commitments to Israel security. It's that, what kind of ally is the United States, if even our NATO partners aren't sure? And what's the United States standing globally, if adversaries think that they have -- traditional adversaries think they suddenly have an in with key White House staff and key allies are feeling uncertain. So I think it is


dangerous and I think it's very worrying. I don't -- look, I don't have much that I can say positive about this administration across a range of issues, domestic and foreign. I will say, maybe we'll get to it in more detail. AXELROD: We're going to. Yes. SHAPIRO: That on the issue of Israel and the Palestinians, in terms of -- AXELROD: They've surprised you. SHAPIRO: They've surprised me to the good. AXELROD: Right. SHAPIRO: They surprised me by running a policy so far that is more responsible and more in keeping with traditional norms of U.S. foreign policy. That is strong support for Israel security. A strong push to try to help Israel negotiate peace with its neighbors, including the Palestinians, but including other Arab states and a clear view that continue the construction of Israeli settlements is one of the factors that makes that harder. And so, all of those are consistent with the policy we had in the Obama Administration, but the policies of several previous ministrations as well. AXELROD: Yes. It's interesting. I want to get to that. I just want to talk a little more about your journey. And how -- I came to know you in 2007 when you showed up as an advisor to Senator Obama when he was running for president. What drew you to him? SHAPIRO: I guess the first answer is that my sister, who is a law professor here in Chicago had told me about him when he was running for Senate in 2004. I'd actually been asked to help another candidate in that primary whose name I won't mention just because a friend was advising. And she said to me, "Why are you helping, you know, that candidate? You should be helping this guy. He's the real deal. He's really smart. I know him from, you know, in a law firm and you know, the Chicago circles" And I said, "What's his name?" And she said, "Barack Obama". And I said, "Oh, Carolyn you're so naive. You don't know anything about politics". With a name like that, he's not going to get elected to Dogcatcher. AXELROD: You wouldn't be alone in having made that assumption. I heard that a lot when we started out. SHAPIRO: Yes. I know he tells that joke on himself, even from his first conversations with political consultants. Anyway, it shows what Washington experts know. When he was elected to the Senate, I got to know him. And he was on the Foreign Relations Committee where I was working with Senator Nelson. And I was also very fortunate and I suppose that he hired Pete Brouse and Mark Lippert into his Senate office. [00:30:00] And these were people, good friends who I had worked with for many years. AXELROD: Pete Brouse had been the chief of staff for Senator Tom Daschle when he was Majority Leader. SHAPIRO: Right. And Mark Lippert and I, worked with me with Senator Feinstein and later for the


Senate -- AXELROD: Another national security guy ended up as a ambassador to South Korea. SHAPIRO: Indeed. And so, I just started hanging around the Obama office. Had Chicago and Illinois connections, had friends in the office and it turned out that Mark, who is a truly brilliant foreign policy analyst, didn't have a lot of background in the Middle East. They've done work on many other issues. And he would just sort of turn to me kind of as informal sounding board and advisor for Middle East matters as they come before the committee. So I helped plan Senator Obama's trip to Israel in 2006. It was the first time he had ever gone and he went. I didn't go with him, but I helped put together an itinerary to help make sure he would kind of touch bases with all the different parts of the Israeli political scene and Israeli society. And that went pretty well. And when he was preparing to announce to run for president in the beginning of 2007, I was actually about to leave the Senate and go to do some private sector work. And Mark kind of knocked on my door and he said, you know, we're putting together a team outside foreign policy advisers for the campaign. I said, yes, OK. And he said, and you're going to be the Middle East advisor. And I said, I am? He said, yes, and you have a speech here, you have to write for an APAC forum that president going to speak at in February in Chicago. So that pulled me in to the work. I, you know, candidly, didn't know his chances were so great. I sort of thought this might be a few months little hobby assignment until he lost in the prime. AXELROD: You didn't ask? I would have told you. SHAPIRO: Right. I was a -- maybe not a full believer on day one. But those first three or four months being able to spend time with him, being able to work on speeches and other materials for the campaign, that's when I really drink the Kool-Aid not only about him and what outstanding leader I thought he could be and president across on many issues. But on issues, I knew best. Somebody who really approach them from a very similar perspective. Strong commitment to the traditional alliance between United States and Israel, strong belief that needs to be one of the core anchors of our Middle East policy, but also a belief that one had to work on negotiating peace between Israelis and the Palestinians to make good on that alliance, to help sort of our interest, but also Israel's future as a Jewish and Democratic state. And of course, in the broader Middle East trying to reduce our own presence and footprint and the costs we were incurring because of the war in Iraq, and work with partners in the region to help them take on more than burden with us as a convener and as an ally, but not necessarily do a shouldering all the burden themselves. AXELROD: Dan, you traveled with him to synagogues and to gatherings within the community as I did. And, you know, as I do that he met with -- he -- as you say, he reflected your thinking and the thinking of a lot of American Jews about my own, included about what -- about both the importance of our alliance for a variety of reasons that transcend even strategic interests. And the need to ultimately resolve this, you know, terrible impasse and to relieve Israel of the burden of being a permanent sort of occupying force. But it was less well received from him than you. Why did Barack Obama meet with such resistance among segments of the Jewish community? He got 78 percent of Jewish vote in 2008, so we -- I'm just talking about vocal segments of the community. SHAPIRO: Yes, right. So the first thing to say is, one shouldn't overstate the --


AXELROD: Right. SHAPIRO: -- at least in percentage terms. AXELROD: Right. SHAPIRO: How people in the Jewish community feel about him or felt about him during all those years. Look, there was a narrative that kind of grew up around him. AXELROD: How much of it was because he was name Barack Obama and he was an African-American. SHAPIRO: Look, it was the newness and the differentness and the unusual biography that he came with him, I think obviously that played into it. First of all, he was new on the national stage outside of the Jewish community around Chicago. And as you know, most of its leaders have then and still now think of him as a -- (CROSSTALK) AXELROD: Yes, you have very close relationship. SHAPIRO: -- strong relationship. But outside of that community who was not well known. That's unusual for a politician getting to the level, the national level he did. And so, many other people were just sort of hearing whatever they heard from whatever rumor and it was also -- (CROSSTALK) [0:35:08] AXELROD: And that for subject to caricature. SHAPIRO: -- and it was also the time I think when the phenomenon of internet rumors was really sort of reaching kind of a new plateau. And people could basically drop any story about him on to the net and it would race around. And as Mark Twain said, the lie gets halfway around the world for the truth gets its boots on, so. AXELROD: Yes, and that was before the internet. SHAPIRO: That was before the internet, but it's certainly being made more true since then. And so, there were, you know, with various episodes. You know, he had relationships which he was proud of and deservedly so with the Palestinian, Americans as well here in Chicago. And so sometimes those were twisted to say, oh, so he's not so unfriendly. There was a story about Reverend Wright and, you know, Wright stated views which the president never endorsed in any way. AXELROD: His past (inaudible). SHAPIRO: Yes. But that became a factor in it. You know, in the end, the approach I took and others on the campaign took that over those next two years was look, is there's facts, there's rumors, there's supposition, there's even innuendo, much of it fueled by people with a clear political agenda which is to hurt him or more broadly to kind of drive a partisan wedge into the Jewish community to try to suggest that one party, Republican Party is more friendly to Israel. The Democratic Party is less. And so much of it had that very impure motive behind it. But then there are lots of people out of genuine concern, out of care about Israel and its security and not knowing what would happen with an unknown


president with a different background than they're used to and without the national profile and with some other associations that raise questions for them. It meant that we had a lot of work to do to convince people who ultimately did vote for him that, you know, he was fine. That there's nothing you had to worry -- AXELROD: Yes, I am, personally offended, you know, just because I knew him so well. And he'd been my friend for 25 years and I knew who his other friends and mentors were. Many of whom were Jews and -- but as you say, there was an organized effort to try and drive a wedge. I went with him to a synagogue in Florida and you may have been there as well. But he gave such a moving speech and genuine about his feeling about the role that the Jewish community played in the Civil Rights Movement. That was his first entree into that relationship. And then, you know, why Israel was such an inspiration to him then as now, you know, and -- but also very directly raising the concerns that you've raised here. SHAPIRO: Sure. And there -- this was always my experience. We'll get to the -- maybe other policy differences that came up later in the presidency. But it was always my experience that when you got him in front of people either a group of leaders in a small room or even a larger audience. And he was able to speak in his own voice and communicate his own feelings and his own motivations. It wasn't that everybody agreed with absolutely every word that came out of his mouth, but that he so easily cleared the bar of -- this is a friend. This is a person who is afraid to Jewish community who shares so many of our communities' traditions and values and who really has Israel's well-being very much a prominent in his mind and in his policies. And he was always able to convince people that I felt in his own voice, a better than we, the staff could. AXELROD: We got take another short break. We'll be right back with Dan Shapiro. Let's go to the administration. I know one of the first major initiatives or addresses he gave was at Cairo University. I was there. You may have been there. SHAPIRO: I was. AXELROD: And it was a very moving outreach to the Islamic world and -- but a decision was made not to go to Israel on the same trip. Was that a mistake? SHAPIRO: I don't think it was a mistake. I know there's been a lot of -- a lot written about that and a lot of people involved in decision even on -- NRR team have said they wish we had continued on Israel. I don't think that was the time to go to Israel. You know, that trip had a very specific purpose which was to open a conversation with Muslim societies who had really, during the Bush years, come to see United States that's very unfriendly lie. [0:40:03] And it was critical that that audience be able to absorb the messages he was trying to deliver to them. There were many. I should add that among them were -- that there should be no question raised about Israel's legitimacy. AXELROD: Right. SHAPIRO: Anybody who thinks they can have a good relationship with the United States without accepting that we will maintain our close bonds with Israel and expect others to move in that direction as well, should think other one. AXELROD: But also some tough language about the settlement.


SHAPIRO: And some tough language about settlements and about the need for Israel to take certain decisions as well. So I think those are important messages for those audiences to deliver. I think had we continued on from Cairo to a trip to Israel. It would have -- perhaps suits some of the concerns that Israelis were feeling watching that scene unfold in Cairo. But it also would have meant -- the trip would have taken on a completely different meeting. You would have had to not only do Israel. You would also had to do the Palestinians. You would probably also had to do Jordan. And suddenly it becomes a peace process trip. And, you know, to try to keep the focus on that initial outreach and not have it turn into a trip about the negotiations than George Mitchell, our envoy was trying to get launched. I think would have really moneyed the focus. AXELROD: You had a very close bird's eye view of the relationship between Obama and Bibi Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and it isn't exactly news to say that it wasn't a warm relationship. Why wasn't -- why was there never an ability to get to become more closely aligned on things? SHAPIRO: Just one more point on the previous question, if you mind David. I -- my feeling that it wasn't a mistake to go to Cairo was also shaped by the fact that we always thought we would be able to get the president very much earlier. We thought we could get him there within the next 6 to 12 months as part of a peace process that was getting launched, and of course -- AXELROD: It never happened. SHAPIRO: -- it never happened. And so, that -- AXELROD: So what about Bibi and Obama? SHAPIRO: Look, you know, the president have spoken about this in ways that I think are still true. They -- he and Prime Minister Netanyahu come from sort of different political traditions, if you will. Prime Minister Netanyahu clearly out of the -- sort of the right of center camp in Israel, the president from the center left camp in the United States. So it's not surprising that they have some differences of outlook. But, you know, we've had those differences in pairings between Israeli and American leaders before. There was also the case that they -- I want to say before I get to the differences that they actually did enormous amount of positive work together and that despite those differences. They really put the focus on the common interests of strengthening the alliance, of strengthening Israel's ability to defend itself. And we could talked about -- AXELROD: We should stipulate that for sure. SHAPIRO: -- yes. AXELROD: But let's be honest. I mean, some of those things that happened between them were very unusual. SHAPIRO: Yes. Yes. So, I mean, I have to say I think the Prime Minister took a view fairly early on and it was inaccurate in my view and I would tell him that in later periods that there was almost a desire to harm him politically by some of the things that were being asked of Israel by asking for settlement freezes or other limitations on settlement construction, may be too much focus or too much sympathy for certain


Palestinian demands or perspectives. And, you know, he has always had a approached, I think the politics to first put -- and you always have to do this in the Israeli political systems, kind of put his own political stability first. It is true that an Israeli Prime Minister, unlike an American president can wake up Prime Minister and by evening have his government fall. But it's made him very, very cautious. And then when asked to do hard things as the president did, as he asked others to do hard things, including the Palestinians, he would sometimes recoil from that. AXELROD: Yes. No, I think -- and I think my interpretation from the Obama standpoint was he felt a sense of urgency about advancing this two state solution and he felt like Netanyahu had a historic opportunity to do it. As Nixon went to China, and to not do it was to miss a historic opportunity. And I think the president shall (ph), you know, his frustration with that. SHAPIRO: He did. [0:45:00] He was frustrated. I mean, he also did believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu had certain qualities and capabilities and political standing, considering where he came from in the political system in Israel to actually take some very hard decisions. And, of course, there's precedent for that in Israel. Menachem Begin giving Sinai back to Egypt and Israel. AXELROD: Sharon. SHAPIRO: Sharon. AXELROD: Yes. SHAPIRO: Withdrawing from Gaza. So, it wasn't as if this was a model that one couldn't find another -- AXELROD: Well, you seem very -- as you point a very focused on maintaining his coalition, not creating political. SHAPIRO: Yes. AXELROD: He wasn't really eager to spend his political capital on this particular project. SHAPIRO: Yes. I think he has taken tough decisions at times, but overall his first focus is one out of the finest cautions (ph). AXELROD: What's his status today? SHAPIRO: Well, today, he leads a very right-wing government, probably, the most right-wing in Israel's history. Probably not the coalition he wanted, frankly, coming out of the last election. And he has made several attempts during this government to try to broaden it. And they try to bring in Bougie Herzog, that leader of the Zionist Union. The center left party and the opposition to try to have a more balanced government. But, you know, he continues to -- Herzog got some legal troubles. (CROSSTALK) SHAPIRO: Or investigated by the police on a number of different -- AXELROD: That are serious. I mean, he faces potential indictment.


SHAPIRO: Yes. There will -- it could be a recommendation for indictment from the police later this year, the attorney general -- (CROSSTALK) AXELROD: There's unprecedented for that and Israel as well. SHAPIRO: -- there is. There is. But he remains, I think considered by many Israelis to be a -- someone who's been very credible on Israel's security, core security needs. At a time when there is a lot of doubt about who the leaders of the Palestinians will be or whether the current leaders have it within them to make hard decisions then -- (CROSSTALK) AXELROD: That's the other issues. But the Palestinians have been disappointed. SHAPIRO: That have been very disappointing. And it's a -- and therefore it's a good foil, you know, for an Israeli leader turning down what seems to be a very forthright and forward-leaning Palestinian leadership. They'd pay more of the price for that. For Netanyahu, he hasn't had that generally because President Abbas has been disappointing in many ways. So, I think he is still seen by many Israelis as somebody they trust with their overall security, since they have doubts about the prospects of two states under this pairing with these Palestinians leaders. They don't -- he doesn't pay that high price -- AXELROD: Really why he got reelected. He wasn't all that popular, but on this particular issue, he had credibility, you know. And he also -- as you remember, you were right in the middle of that. He played it very hard -- what appeared to be kind of -- what we would call the race card here going into that election. And he renounced -- he said under my leadership, there'll never be a two-state solution. SHAPIRO: Right. He was basically trailing in the polls going into the final weekend of the last election. And the only way he could recover those votes was to pull them from other parties on the right. That is to say he had to kind of play to the furthest right elements of Israeli politics. Bring them back into Likud fold and also suggests to them that they might be end up with that Prime Minister from the left. And so, Naftali Bennett is a right-wing rival and coalition partner, lost probably three or four seats in that final weekend because the Prime Minister was saying things about -- AXELROD: What was your reaction to that? SHAPIRO: Well, I thought the Prime Minister made some -- made an ugly statement on Election Day about -- (CROSSTALK) SHAPIRO: -- calling, you know, question to legitimacy in Arab citizens of Israel voting. He later apologized for it. But it showed how he was willing to play, you know, just put any card to get those voters to come back home and support him. By the way, now he, you know, I'd say, now he's been Prime Minister 8.5 years this time, plus an earlier term in the 90s. You know, there is a kind of a natural process in democracies where, at some point, a leader who has been there for a long time is sort of pushed out. It happened to Toucher (ph), it happened


to Blair (ph). You know, there are those who think the next election quite apart from legal troubles, quite apart from policy issues will be one. AXELROD: So you need an opponent? SHAPIRO: You need opponent. And there is Yair Lapid who is rising in the polls, but, you know, has challenges. And -- but it may be that there will be that feeling among Israelis that, you know, we just need to change. On the other hand, a lot of people thought for them for the last election as well. AXELROD: You were right in the middle of it when -- two big issues. One is the Iran agreement, which obviously was deeply opposed by Netanyahu and probably majority of Israelis and then the decision at the end of the administration to not to veto, the resolutions, the U.N condemning the settlements in Israeli policy. [00:50:08] Both of which were roundly denounced by the Israelis, now talk about that in those decisions. And then, I want to talk about where we are today. SHAPIRO: Sure. The Iran deal was -- you're correct, widely viewed in Israel not only by permission that Netanyahu was a bad deal. What was a little bit vexing for those of us who had worked on that issue with Israelis for years going back to the beginning of the Obama administration was that it really did derive from a common strategical of preventing and running nuclear weapon. There was no question in either government that that was a completely unacceptable outcome. That regime given its ideology and its threats and the way it conducts itself regionally could never be allowed to get that technology. And so, we had worked for years in very, very close cooperation to build the intelligence picture of the nuclear program in Iran to build out a sanctions regime and then enforce it. And that's really what put the economic pressure on Iran that ultimately brought them to the table in a serious way finally. But, we always sort of knew that we would probably if the negotiations have got serious. Draw the line differently between the good agreement and bad agreement. And indeed, that sort of what happened as we reach the decision points of early 2015. You know, then, the question is how do you deal with that disagreement? And it's a big one. That's important. And I don't fault Israelis for feeling that sense of vulnerability. You know, those differences of perspective are legitimate given that where a global power, given where we sit physically, geographically, given our military capabilities and Israel which is closer to the threat and more domestically threat. AXELROD: What was the alternative though? Realistically, there were months away from a weapon. SHAPIRO: This is the problem. And this was the argument we made consistently. Is that had we not reached an agreement that it met our conditions of systematically blocking off every pathway? Iran has the nuclear weapon and that what's this agreement did. We would have been faced with trying to maintain the sanctions against Iran. At the time when most of the rest of the world was -- AXELROD: It was so miraculously to get the sanctions in the first place. But it was always predicated on getting an agreement. SHAPIRO: Absolutely. Absolutely. Those who got -- those sanctions were already fraying. There were many countries not only Russia and China, but others who were looking for ways to wiggle out of those obligations. And if we were seen as the party that sort of walked away from negotiating -- AXELROD: They would have collapse.


SHAPIRO: They would collapse. And so, then, Iran would have had the return to the international economic system and no restrictions on its nuclear programs. AXELROD: Did Netanyahu favor military solution? SHAPIRO: I think he always felt there was no other solution. AXELROD: And is that a solution? I mean, can you destroy the Iranian nuclear threat or could you have militarily? SHAPIRO: Well, that was something else President Obama did during those years was he built and put in place a military option which did not exist before and which yes contain the capability to really destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. And he was prepared I believe to this day. He was prepared to use that if there were no other way to prevent Iran from breaking out. I know Wendy Sherman was here recently in and she made an important point which was while you can bomb facilities, you can't bomb away knowledge. AXELROD: Right. SHAPIRO: So, the downside of the military option is that it would have destroyed some of those facilities. But it wouldn't have takeaway the knowledge. You probably would have lost us the international consensus around trying to keep Iran from breaking out. And Iran would have gained a great deal to international sympathy. And then, within 2 to 3 years they could have rebuilt those facilities and made a dash into a breakout for bomb. So, this agreement which buys us at least 10 to 15 years with systematic monitoring of all the different pathways that Iran could take to make sure they don't break out. But, as much more time, it doesn't solve this problem and person never claimed, they did solve this problem for all time. But, it buy us much more time and gives us much more intelligence with much greater international support, then we would have ended up with after military strike. AXELROD: On the resolution at the U.N., this was hotly debated both here and in Israel. And the argument against it was you've given the U.N. now the authority to pursue incitement. You know, arguments of incitement and that, you know, against Israel that -- and given international bodies more authority than they should have or you want them to have over Israel. [00:55:03] And I know you must have -- you must still get barraged with questions about that -- SHAPIRO: Yes. AXELROD: -- in Israel. On the other hand, there was no movement on this question of settlements and there was aggressive movement toward settlement. SHAPIRO: Yes. You know, I -- this was really one sort of the last chapter of my mastership in and all Israelis not only those of the Prime Minister's camp are unhappy about it. And so, it sort of colored my final weeks there and that's not important but, you know, I probably couldn't live without it from that point of view. I do -- I can defend it. It was actually not my preference. I mean, I think how do we been able to shape a resolution to be more like a report. The court had issued in the summer that I think applied the responsibility to all the different parties a bit more evenly that I think could have been a maybe more constructive product. But that's not how the Security Council works.


We were not really in a position to just draft what we wanted and get it past. We were going to have to deal with something the Palestinians were able to get one of their allies on the council to present. And so, that's what happens. And all through the fall, we were talking about three openly with the Israelis. And I said to them, you know, if -- I don't know how we would respond to a resolution like that. We did veto one in 2011. And -- but, this one maybe only drafted more cleverly. Maybe they'll put in some balance language about terrorism and incitement. Actually, they did include that in the end. Maybe, almost be hard to -- for us to find the hook on which to hang the veto. But, at least, if you know that's coming. This should be a period of relative quiet on the issue of settlements because you don't want the decision-makers to have that weighing heavily on their mind when the time comes. AXELROD: They went in the other direction. SHAPIRO: They went in the other direction. First, there was a new settlement announced right when President Obama traveled to Israel for former President Perez's funeral. In about two weeks after we had signed the $38 billion memorandum of understanding for military assistance kind of an odd way to sort of say thank you for those steps. And then, after our election, there was a kind of hooping and hollering -- AXELROD: Since then, they had green light from camp. SHAPIRO: -- yes. There was a belief which turns out not to been the case. AXELROD: Right. SHAPIRO: That the Trump administration was going to take the rains off completely. Build anywhere you want. Annex anything and two states -- AXELROD: And part of it, let's say he appointed an ambassador David Friedman who is an attorney from Jersey -- New Jersey who had been a financial supporter of the settlement movement and an outspoken and had said some things about American-Jews who opposed that that were deeply, deeply offense. SHAPIRO: Right, right. And so, there were Israelis, particularly on the right who said great. This is a sea change, now, we can legalize illegal settlements and there was Knesset legislation advancing to adjust that. Now, we can start annexing. The two states solution is dead. Thank you President Trump. And I said to them, you know, he's not president yet. If you actually think that's going to be the policy of the new administration, well, I would disagree with it. But wait, till January to adjust your policies accordingly. President Obama still president. So, by the time that resolution came up and it was, you know, kind of in the crazy period right before the holidays, as things were moving (ph) in and this legislation to legalize, illegal building had advanced. You know, the president had a tough decision. I mean, had he vetoed it. He could have said look, the U.N. is inherently unfriendly body and it is. And that's why we've always protected Israel from unfair criticism there. On other hand, he had to say, number one this resolution is drafted more -- in a more balanced way. But, number 2, if I veto it, am I somehow giving my assent to this race to legalize and annex in and build that I believe is fundamentally dangerous for Israel's future as a Jewish Democratic State. So, you know, it was a tough call. It's judgment call. In the end, he made the call to abstain. AXELROD: Let's go to -- I want to ask you about Trump because, as you point out and you did earlier that it has worked out as some of the right in Israel anticipated at least in the early going here. He has


been discouraging of the settlements and I presumably you see other signs that he is pursuing a more conventional course consistent with what past administrations have done. SHAPIRO: Right. So, that's the funny thing happened between Election Day and inauguration day, at least does it looks from to some Israelis who were expecting something very different. In that, they must have started talking to a lot of other people, including Arab Diplomats took a while but eventually the Palestinians as well. And they -- I think started to understand the connections between these issues. If you decide that you are going to say, we don't have any problem with building settlements or you decides to say, you know, on the first day we're going to move our embassy to Jerusalem, which I actually think is not an impossible thing to do. [01:00:07] AXELROD: Yes, I know you've written on that. SHAPIRO: Well, get back to that. At the same time to try to convince Arab States who want to participate or you want to participate in a regional process that will show Israelis, there's a prospect of being integrated and normalized into the region and put some positive pressure on the Palestinians to come to the table in a useful way. Those two things don't really go together. And so, they seem to figure that out even before inauguration. They certainly in the run up to the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in which the president several times, the White House said, we have concerns about continuing settlement construction. They didn't say everything. Nothing can happen or all settlements have to go immediately, but they did say continuing construction is problematic for this goal we are trying to achieve. AXELROD: President even mentioned that and it's sitting in the Oval Office would be the -- SHAPIRO: He turned to the Prime Minister and he said you are going to hold back on settlements a little bit, aren't you? AXELROD: I know as he didn't get a response. SHAPIRO: He didn't get much response. Subsequent to that his envoy, Jason Greenblatt, another lawyer from the Trump organization went out there, and I have to say he has made an impressive debut. He, first of all did not only meet with Netanyahu and Abbas, he met everybody, Israelis of all political stripes, Palestinians have many political stripes, refugees, students, settlers, soldiers, business people, I thought that was the right thing to do. And both of those societies, there are other actors besides the leaders who will help determine the success or failure of the diplomatic efforts and it was a useful for him to hear that. But number two, they entered into a weeks long negotiation with Israelis that reminded me a lot of several episodes in the Obama administration, which was how much less settlement construction will go on during a period you're trying to get the Palestinians back to the table and trying to get Arab States to participate in a regional process. In the end, they have reached an agreement by all accounts. AXELROD: Well, and in fact, the Prime Minister announced that he was going to move forward on a whole new settlement. SHAPIRO: And under the pressures of his cabinet, he says that he's going to go ahead and build a new settlement for those from a settlement that was evacuated under court order and they will allow building with in the built-up areas of existing settlements. The Trump administration has not endorsed that. I think they are continuing to push for less and something they can take to Arab States and say look, this -- you're not going to be embarrassed, if you come to a regional process.


You're not going to be embarrassed by some splashy announcement of settlement construction the same week you show up. You know, there's a -- sometimes a belief and some articulate this that because there is an actual alignment of interests between Israel and many of the Sunni Arab States against other regional threats like Iran and like ISIS. And that's real. And they are talking often quietly but often less quietly with Egypt and Jordan about how to protect each other against those threats. AXELROD: But that doesn't mean they can look the other way. SHAPIRO: There's a belief, right? That they -- yes, the Palestine issue no longer matters. It's true. If you go and talk to Arab leaders, they don't necessarily put the Palestine issue at the top or top five of their priority list. But it is different from saying they could be seen us throwing them under the bus. That misunderstands the role the Palestine issue and Arab politics. And I have to say to the new administration's credit, they seem to have understood that and they are trying to find a way. AXELROD: But it also sounds like they may meet with the same frustrations that past administration. SHAPIRO: It's entirely possible, you know. AXELROD: Tom Friedman sat here a few weeks ago and he said the two state solution is dead. That -- and he said it with regret. He wasn't saying with any particular joy but he said he just can't see -- he thinks that time has run out on that. Why is that wrong? SHAPIRO: Well, I don't know if it's wrong. I hope it's wrong. I don't know if it's dead. You know, there is some tipping point where because of the way attitudes have evolved on both sides and with both sides, still say in majorities with declining majority. We want two states, but it's the other side that won't make the necessary compromise. As those attitudes harden and of course as the map changes with additional settlement construction it will get -- it will reach a point of impossibility. The thing about tipping point is you often don't know you past them, until you are well past them. So, I do not know if it's a little ahead of us. I hope that still true or if it's still behind us, in which case Tom is right. I do think that that we as Israel's closest ally and we, as a country that benefits from the kind of security and economic and societal partnership we built with that country have an interest in ensuring that it remains strong and secure in Jewish and democratic because that's the Israel that we have been able to build that partnership with. And if you take two state solutions off the table, some of those things are going to start to change. So, I'm not ready to throw it out and say it's dead. I do think at the same time that we continue to work for it and I'm glad the administration is. There's probably a policy planning exercise that people outside of government and think thank and others should be thinking about this. [1:05:03] It's not a happy question, but what does the U.S.-Israel relationship look like if we don't have a two state solution. Once we sort of know it's not going to happen. What are our options? How will we maintain our interests or security partnership, certain moral commitments as well? At a time when many Americans, much of the rest the world and not a small number of Israelis will say, you know, Israel is not quite the same Jewish and Democratic society that it was originally intended to be when it's founding. AXELROD: One the last question about President Trump. In his remarks with -- in his side-by-side with Prime Minister Netanyahu when they were at the White House, he kind of casually said, you know, one state, two state whatever they decide, it's fine with me. How did you interpret that? SHAPIRO: I didn't buy it. I didn't buy it that it was a change of policy. And indeed the next day, several administration officials made clear the policy is still two states and I was very glad about that. I think it was a favor for Prime Minister Netanyahu who was under great pressure from his cabinet who are


dominated by ministers who actually opposed the two state solution not to use that language. Now, he has endorsed the two state solution with various caveats, demilitarized Palestinian State that recognizes the Jewish State. Since a speech he gave in Bar-Ilan Univesity in 2009. AXELROD: With the interregnum of the days before the election last year when he said he didn't. SHAPIRO: That is correct. That is correct, and then he sort of walk that back after he came in. AXELROD: So you're saying that everybody saying stuff that they do not necessarily believe? SHAPIRO: But -- well, it's how I read that a statement by the president. It was that he was doing a favor to Prime Minister Netanyahu, to help him in getting in and out of that press conference without crossing lines that members of his cabinet had had set for him. Now, you're asking what are the prospects. I mean, I do think -- one of the reasons I think it's not dead yet, you know, is because a lot of these depends on leadership. And even when it looks impossible when the right leaders or the right combination of leaders emerge, things that look impossible are suddenly possible again. I don't think the dynamic of Netanyahu and Abass is going to produce that breakthrough. I don't think any Israeli coalition that looks like the current one could do it. It may well require a new Palestinian leadership and that's a huge question will more follows Abass. But I do think, that's one of things that I hold onto as hope that the two states usually is not dead, is that the right leaders properly motivated, and who invest in each other as partners and show that they trust each other. And make it a little bit easier to make hard decisions instead of the dynamic we basically had between Netanyahu and Abass where they mistrust each other and are always scoring points and positioning for the blame game that would still give me some hope that it's possible. AXELROD: Well, you are a man of faith apparently (ph). So good to be with you, Dan Shapiro and I value the time we spent together in the White House. I really honor your service in a very, very difficult time and a very challenging posting. And I wish you the best in the future. SHAPIRO: Thank you David. It was definitely an honor to serve with you and serve the president and he put me in the place where I hopefully made a good contribution. AXELROD: Absolutely Dan. UNIDENTIFED FEMALE: Thank you for listening to "The Axe Files", part of the CNN podcast network. For more episodes of "The Axe Files", visit cnn.com/podcast and subscribe on iTunes Stitcher or your favorite app. And for more programming from the University of Chicago Institute of Politics, visit politics.uchicago.edu.

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The Axe Files - Ep. 141: Dan Shapiro · So, my father was on a moshav, in a chicken coop. He was in the school teaching. He was in the Angel bakery down the street. Anywhere men had