The Austrian general election of 1986

154 The West German Federal Election

may be noted. The ticket-splitting by coalition supporters meant that the CDU won 169 of the constituency seats and the SPD only 79. The SPD gained thirteen constituencies, six of them in North-Rhine Westphalia, and lost three. There are now 77 women Bundestag members, more than ever before. A majority of the Greens’ deputies (24 out of 41) are women. And the distribution of list seats within theL?nder is now by the HareNiemeyer (highest average) method, not, as hitherto, by the d’Hondt (highest remainder) method. This has left the FDP and Greens each one seat better off and the SPD and the CDU each one seat worse off. A more significant consequence was the redistribution of seats from the larger to the smaller states. The Saar and Bremen gained two each, Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg one each; Bavaria lost two, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia three each.

Notes and References

1. Peter Pulzer, ‘Responsible Party Govern-

2.

3.

4.

ment and Stable Coalition: The Case of the German Federal Republic’, Political Studies, June 1978. R. E. M. Irving and W. E. Paterson, ‘The Machtwechsel of 1983: A Significant Land- mark in the Political and Constitutional History of West Germany’, Padiamentury Affairs, Autumn 1983. See Max Kaase, ‘The West German General Election of 6 March 1983’, Electoral Studies, August 1983, pp. 158-166. The main German opinion-polling institutes are Allensbach, EMNID, INFAS and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim. Over the medium and long term their findings coincide quite closely. Manfred Berger et al., ‘Wechsel im eigenen Lager’, Die Z&t, 30 January 1987, p. 5. EMNID, Der Spiegel, 19 January 1987, p. 60. Ibid., p. 64. Ibid., p. 61. SKF, supplied by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

The Austrian General Election of 1986

ALAN SCOTT

Nuffiield College, Oxford OX1 1 NF EngIund

The Austrian General Election (Nationulrats- wabl) of the 23 November 1986 was called pre- maturely after the collapse of the coalition between the Sc+list Party (Sozdistische Partei Osteweicbs-SPO) and the much smaller Freedom Party (Freibeitkhe Partei Osteweicbs -FPO). The election resulted once more in a hung parliament in which the SPO remained the largest party but with a reduction of its margin over the Conservative and Catholic People’s Party (Osteweichiscbe Volkspartei-OVP) from nine to three seats; both major parties lost votes to the FPO, and the Greens (die CriinenF see Table 1. After a protracted period of negotia- t.ion lasting until 14 January 1987, the SPO and OVP agreed a division of ministerial posts which enabled them to form a ‘Grand Coalition’ for the first time since 1966.

The author wishes to thank the following for discussing the Austrian election with him: Pro- fessor Ernst- Wangermann and Dr Reinhold Wagnleitner (Salzburg), Dr Wolfgang Miiller (Vienna), Professor Helmut See1 (Graz) and Pro fessor Peter Pulzer (Oxford).

The course and results of the election raise four questions; first, why after sixteen years of continued SPO government and a rather unsuccessful final legislative period, the Socialist Party managed to maintain, against an international trend, a relative majority of three seats; secondly, why the Conservative opposition actually lost support under these seemingly favourable circumstances? Thirdly, what is the significance of the success of the right-wing Freedom Party? Fourthly, does the entry of a Green Party into Parliament indicate the establishment of a new political force?

Background

The SPij formed a coalition with the FPO after the election of 1983 in which it lost the absolute parliamentary majority which it had held for twelve years. For the Socialists, a precondition for the coalition had been the continued dominance within the FPij of its ‘liberal wing’ under the leadership of Dr Norbert Steger, and the rejection of the overtly right-wing nationalism with which the FPO had long been associated. However, an

ALAN Scorr lS5

TABLE 1. Austrian general elections, 1983-86

Party

Socialist Party (SPO) People’s Party @VP) Freedom Party (FPij) Greens’ Communist Party (KPO) United Greens (VGO)2 Alternative List (ALO) Others

votes % of valid votes Seats 1986 1986 1983 1986 1983

2,092,024 43.1 47.6 80 90 2,003,663 41.3 43.2 77 81

472,205 9.7 5.0 18 12 234,028 4.8 - 8 -

35,104 0.7 0.7 0 0 - - 1.9 - 0 - - 1.4 - 0 - 0.3 0.1 - -

Electorate 5.5 m. Turnout 90.5%. 1. First stood in 1986 2. Did not stand in 1986

extended period of coalition under the rather colourless leadership of Steger had both alienated nationalistic and deeply anti-socialist elements within the FPij, and also lost potential support among voters wishing to register a protest against the two major parties.

Increasingly vehement criticism of Steger and of the coalition with the SPij culminated in the election of -his chief critic, Dr Jijrg Haider, as party leader at an extremely rancorous party con- ference in Innsbruck on 12-13 September 1986. On the 14 September, the Federal Chancellor, Dr Franz Vranit+cy, called an election on the grounds of the FPO’s swing to the right, and its ‘unsuitability’ as a coalition partner.

For the SPij, these developments within its junior partner presented an opportunity to end what had been a difficult legislative period without great loss of face. After a long period of socialist majority government under Dr Bruno Kreisky (Chancellor from 1970-83), the SPG government was facing increasing political and economic problems. Among these was the question of Kreisky’s successor. K&sky’s own initial choice (then Finance Minister, Dr Hannes Androsch) had disqualified himself through alleged involvements with financial improprieties which forced him to resign in 1980. With Kreisky’s resignation after the 1983 election, party leadership and the post of Chancellor were transferred to Dr Fred Sinowatz. When faced with the problems of coalition government, Sinowatz, who had previously been Minister for Education and Arts, appeared indecisive at several key.points.

The SPOlFPO coalition faced a number of political crises. Among these were a series of scandals with which SPtj ministers, for example the Minister of Building and Works, Karl

Sekanina, became embroiled. These provided reminders of the corruption with which the party, particularly in Vienna, had become associated. Similarly, the internationally known wine scandal, although not a government scandal in a narrow sense, tainted the reputation of the coalition.

Nevertheless, it was the FPO which precipi- tated the major political crisis of this government when, in 1984, the Freihei&cher Defence Minister, Dr Friedhelm Frischenschlager, per- sonally greeted a convicted war criminal, Walter Reder, on his return from Italy, where Reder had been imprisoned since the end of World War IL Despite hostile international reaction and pressure from within his own party, Sinowatz, faced with Steger’s threat to withdraw from the coalition, refused to sack Frischenschlager. The OVP’s motion of no-confidence in the govem- ment threatened to split the SPG, and the imps- sition of ‘Clubzwung’ (the equivalent of a three- linewhip) by the SPij leadership on a matter of conscience left the party in a state of low morale.

Underlying these political problems were a series of structural economic changes and difficulties threatening to weaken Austria’s highly successful and consensual policy of peak-level wage and policy negotiation known as the Sozial- purtnerschuft (social partnership).

Until recently Austria had remained largely immune from the worst effects of world recession. Latterly however, unemployment has been increasing (from around 2 per cent during the 1970s to 4.5 per cent in 1983 and a current rate of just over 5 per cent). At the same time the deficit had increased to 5.3 per cent of GNP.* Moreover, the nationalized industries, which comprise two-thirds of Austria’s largest concerns, had been returning massive losses. In particular VOEST (the nationalized steel organ-

156 The Austrian General Election of 1986

ization) had come under investigation for mis- management, overmanning, and the involve ment of its holding company, In&trading, in highly speculative oil investments. Both the deficit and the state of nationalized industries are seen as sideeffects of the social partnership, and of maintaining high levels of employment among relatively privileged workers in core industries.

The Election Campaign

One would expect the main political beneficiary of such a situation to be the Conservative opposition. Evidence to this effect seemed to be supplied by the result of the election of the c)VP supported candidate, Dr Kurt Waldheim, in the contro- versial presidential election of June 1986.2 For the first time in the Second Republic an SPO presidential candidate had been defeated. This low point of the Government’s popularity resulted in the resignation of the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister (Leopold Grau). But Wald- heim’s election occurred in special circumstances. ft was not the iiVP, but the FPij who could expect to gain most from any resurgence of nationalist feeling linked to Waldheim’s election. Nor could the element of protest against the coalition government be translated automatically into Conservative votes at a general election.

In reality, the (5VP’s room for manoeuvre was limited by its own adherence to social partnership arrangements and consensus politics. The &‘P’s main initial platform was the call for a ‘ wknde’ (tu~reorientation) based on the model of Kohl’s Wende in West Germany, and ulti- mately upon the shift to market economics and stricter monetary policies associated with, if not always achieved by, Reagan and Thatcher. In the context of Austria’s political system however, the slogan of a We&e rang rather hollow. The Conservatives were not prepared to see a radical shrinkage of the welfare state for the sake of free market economics. Nor did they seem willing to accept considerably higher levels of unemployment as the price for restructuring the nationalized industries.

Similarly problematic was the tiVP’s claim that it would do away with the ‘party card’ upon which the so-called ‘Profomptem’ is based: the system whereby civil service posts (e.g. mana- gerial posts in state-owned industries, some academic posts and headmasterships, etc.) are allocated on the basis of party membership and on a roughly equal proportion between the two major parties. Not only was the tjVP the joint initiator of this system during the per&d of the Grand Coalition between OVP and SPO (1945 - 66), but it is also one of the two main bene ticiaries of Proporz.

The ijVP was consequently squeezed from two sides. On the one side the SPij seemed to have aiready achieved the We&e, in its much weakened Austrian sense, which the Conserva- tives demanded. The selection of Vranitzky as Federal Chancellor and an earlier budget aimed at reducing the government debt are crucial here. In adopting Vranitzky as Chancellor, the SPij had already signalled a shift to the right, and a preparedness to tackle Austria’s financial and economic problems. The SPO’s campaign drew ever closer to that of the ilVP. Both Vranitzky and the Conservative leader, Dr AIois Mock, spoke of the need for a restructuring of nationalized industry to make it more competitive on the world market (one SPO slogan was ‘Austria must remain ahead’), a degree of m-privatization, and greater ‘L&rrzg* (achievem~~‘high per- formance). Substantive differences between the two major parties during the campaign were reduced to details of tax-reform, and the impression remained that the major issue was which party was better able to carry through an essentially shared programme.

This impression was reinforced by the prospect of a new Grand Coalition. At an early stage in the electoral campaign the polls indicated that neither party would gain an absc$ute majority, with the probabi~~~ of a slight OVP advantage. Given the FPO’s opposition to a coalition under its new leader, a coalition of the two main parties seemed from the beginning the most likely outcome. Leading politicians from both parties, including the Spa’s General Secretary, Heinrich Keller, made this quite explicit. The result was a rather lacklustre campaign in which the question became not which party would form the government+ but rather who would become Chancellor. This focus on the personalities of the leaders worked to the advantage of the SPij. Whilst Mock, who had been opposition leader since 1979, appeared tired and wooden, Vranitzky was a relatively unknown quantity who carried over a reputation for successful management from his days at the Liinderbaltk and appeared relaxed and self-assured on television. Potentially divisive issues became swamped in the convergence of the main parties.

This convergence was demonstrated with respect to issues which cropped up during the campaign only to disappear again. For example, the contentious question of bi-lingual education for the Slovenian minority in Carinthia,s and the purchase of 24 secondhand Saab fighter aircraft from the Swedish Air Force. In both cases the SPCj moved to narrow the gap between its position and that of its rivals.

The ijVP was also squeezed on a second front, namely from the FPO. Despite being in coalition,

ALAN SCOTT 157

the FPG successfully managed to present itself during the election campaign as the party of opposition. Haider’s power-base is Carinthia, and he is associated with the far right of his party whose stronghold is Carinthia. The routing of the liberal leadership, plus a number of provocative gestures, such as holding the final campaign rally in Braunau (Hitler’s birthplace), had already won over ex-Nazis and younger adherents of the extreme right. The electoral problem for the FM is that this section of the electorate provides a relatively small base of core voters. If the party is to extend beyond this base it must establish a wider appeal among present SPG and GVP voters.

The FPO’s previous electoral tactic of presenting itself as a modern liberal party and combining this with the occasional gesture to its older voters (of which the Reder affair provides the most dramatic example) was based upon the calcula- tion that a large proportion of its core voters were of a dying generation. Haider’s election as leader marked a break with this approach. By presenting himself as a ‘new type of politician’, and his party as one distinct from the ‘old parties’, as he referred to them, Haider attempted to appeal both to a new generation of voters for whom far-right politics are again attractive as well as to potential protest voters. In this he was aided by his youth (he is 36), and his highly abrasive style. The party’s populist attack on the major parties, their call for a ‘cleaner politics’, and their condemna- tion of Pro/~orz enabled them to tap feelings of discontent with consensus politics and with the two larger parties. The FPG nearly doubled its share of the vote (see Table 1). The behaviour and reputation of the party, and particularly the circumstances of Haider’s selection, caused the Liberal International, of which the FPO is a member, to send a delegation to observe the party’s campaign. At this point it seems likely that the FPO will be excluded from the Liberal International in the near future.

One further feature of the campaign must be mentioned: the emergence at national level, and for the purposes of standing at a parliamentary election, of a single Green party (a mixture of the Vereinigten Griinen herreich, and a number of AIternutive- and Biirgerfisten). The Green Movement in Austria has achieved two notable political successes: a referendum in 1978 stopping not only the coming on stream of Austria’s first nuclear power-plant at Zwenten- dorf,4 but also its entire atomic energy programme; and, secondly, at the beginning of 1985, the hindrance of plans to build a hydro- electrical station in one of Europe’s last remaining primeval river-forests east of Vienna at Hainburg. But despite electoral success at local level (particularly in Vorarlberg and Salzburg),

the Austrian Greens, unlike their West German counterparts, had not yet gained parliamentary representation. In the 1983 elec+on two green groups (the United Greens (VGO) and Altema- tive List (ALO)) had stood separately, and had failed to gain a parliamentary seat (see Table 1)’ Nevertheless, the relative success of a Green candidate, Freda Meissner-Blau, in the first round of the Presidential Elections in May 1986 (she gained 5.5 per cent of the popular vote, and up to 11.8 per cent in some provincial town&) suggested that the Greens might have realisti- cally expected up to twelve, or even fourteen, seats in parliament.

Ideologically, the Austrian Greens are more diverse than the West German Greens. Not merely the difficulty of agreeing a common platform for the election, which occurred at an early stage of their attempts at unification, but drawing-up a list of candidates led to considerable in-fighting among various sections. A split occurred between Meissner-Blau and her followers, and groups, largely centred in Vienna, to their left. Meissner-Blau refused to associate her name with some of those selected within the movement to stand, and pushed for the inclusion of her own candidates on positions high on the list, in effect ensuring their election. This led to a proliferation of Green lists in Vienna and Carinthia, and to Meissner-Blau’s faction, still the largest, standing under the name ‘Griine Alternative Lisle-Freda Meissner-Biau’.’

Thus, in effect, during or shortly before the election all those parties standing a realistic chance of entering Parliament, with the excep tion of the Conservatives, had moved to the right. In each case the campaign came to focus more on the party leaders than on the parties’ policies.

Analysis of the Results

The distribution of the votes indicates that the FPG won support from two main sources. From the SPO they won votes in traditional socialist strongholds (e.g. eastern Styria-see Table 2); areas of heavy, and particularly nationalized, industry. Here it seems reasonable to assume that skilled workers who under the social partnership had won for themselves a degree of privilege and job security, now, fearing job losses irrespective of the return of a Socialist or Conservative government, opted for a right wing protest party to express opposition to the shrinking, and possible privatization, of parts of the nationalized industries.

From the GVP, the FPij won seats in more rural areas of Austria (especially western Austria, and Carinthia-see Table 2). Here some sections of the rural population, who have traditionally

158 The Austriun GeneraI Election of 1986

TABLE 2. Regional party trends 1983-86 (% share and gains/losses)

SPO tiVP Fpii Greens 1986 1983 1986 1983 1986 1983 1986

East

Vienna

Lower Austria

Burgenland

S&burg

Tirol

Vorarlberg

Total

52.4 56.6 33.2 33.6 (-4.2) (-0.4)

42.4 45.9 47.3 48.1 (-3.5) (-0.8)

49.0 51.4 42.8 44.3 (- 2.4) (-1.5)

42.1 46.3 41.5 43.5 (-4.2) (-2.0)

44.1 49.5 41.0 42.3 (- 5.4) f- 1.3)

47.2 52.9 27.2 32.1 (- 5.7) (-4.9)

36.8 41.3 40.9 46.1 (-4.5) (- 5.2)

29.2 34.8 53.2 57.4 (-5.6) (-4.2)

25.5 27.3 53.1 60.3 (-1.8) (-7.2)

43.1 47.6 41.3 43.2 (-4.5) (- 1.9)

5.8 4.4 (+ 1.4)

6.1 3.0 (+3.1)

5.4 2.2 (+3.2)

11.0 6.0 (+ 5.0)

9.9 4.0 (+ 5.9)

20.9 10.7 (+ 10.2)

15.9 8.0 (+7.9)

11.3 4.4 (+6.9)

11.9 7.2 (+4.7)

9.7 5.0 (+4.7)

6.1

3.6

2.5

4.9

4.1

3.8

5.9

5.8

8.8

4.8

been a major source of Conservative support, may have come to feel that the OVP represents the interests of the larger farmers and of the Raiffeisengenossenschaft (a cross between bank, marketing board and farmer’s pressure group), and may have used their vote to register a protest against the!: ‘natural’ party.

The SPO retained their relative majority by default. The heavy desertion. of support went, in large part, directly to the FPO rather than, as was expected, to the OVP (see Table 3). At the same time the 6VP lost support to the FPO and to the Greenss

The Green Party too suffered at the hands of the FPij (see Table 3). Their difficulty is that they compete, though from a different political perspective, for a similar constituency to that of

the FPij, namely for those dissatisfied with the carving-up of political influence between the major parties and interest groups through the social partnership and the Propomystem. The success of Haider’s campaign, plus their own internal strife, combined to make them less effective on these fronp. Curiously, they won most support from ex-OVP voters (see Table 3) in sharp contrast with the West German case where the Greens gained almost entirely at the expense of the SPD. This reflects the character of the Green Movement in Austria which shows signs of developing into a ‘biirgerliche Pmtest- partei’ (party of middle-class protest), especially in rural areas and medium sized provincial cities such as Salzburg. It may also reflect the less industrialized character of Austrian society.

TABLE 3. Vote switching (on the basis of a comparison of recent local elections results with general election)

Total votes General election votes

(in thousands) SPO GVP FPii Greens

SPS 1970 46 107 54

:zJ 39 7 1837 10 126 149 62 16 Greens 25 22 26 72

Source: Zukitnft, 1 January 1987.

ALAN Scorr 159

Although not doing quite as well as expected, despite internal strife and a rather ineffective campaign, the Green vote, at 4.8 per cent held up reasonably well, and above all they managed to secure parliamentary seats for the first time.9 The smaller Green groups in Vienna and Carinthia gained a very low percentage of the popular vote (see Table 4). This suggests that the main Green party has established a stable core vote among the young (9 per cent of the under 30s voted Green, only 2 per cent of the over 50~‘~) and better educated, particularly in urban areas.

TABLE 4. Green vote in areas where more than one such group stood

Greens GAL’ KG2

Vienna 55571 6005 - Carinthia 13699 - 1059

1. Griine Alternative Liite 2. Carinthian Greens

The 1986 election will stimulate discussion of the possible points of continuity or discontinuity within the Austrian political system, and especially as to whether a long period of consensus politics is coming to a close.

The course and results of this election are not conclusive in this respect. On the one hand the success of the FPO and the entry of a fourth party into Parliament, indicate a weakening of the previously strong identification with one of the two main parties (Austria has Western Europe’s highest level of party membership) which has previously been noted in this journal.” Both the FPij and the Greens have demonstrated the potential for protest against two-party domina- tion, and perhaps also against the close associa- tion between these parties and the major interest groups within the framework of the social partnership.

Here there are nevertheless countervailing tendencies. A restructuring of the political parties does seem to be taking place, but not as a result of competition between the parties, but rather as a result of changes within them. Political change may be taking place within the framework of consensus by political parties adapt- ing themselves to the circumstances of Austria’s delayed recession without abandoning neo- corporafjst arrangements. The preparedness of the SPO to consider some of its long term arrangements with the unions, while at the same time working these out through the social partnership, and the willingness of the ijVP to participate actively in this process through

entering a coalition rather than go it alone through more confrontational means, suggest at least a desire on the part of the two main parties for adaptation rather than discontinuity. Whether or not this will be successful will depend upon negotiations between the social partners as to the course of economic restructuring. If the new coalition fails in this, the potential for third and fourth parties and the number of floating voters, especially among the middle class, will continue to grow.

The second major talking-point of this election, one which has gone beyond political science, is the possible reemergence of the far- right. The reassertion within the FPO of its right wing did not damage its electoral chances, quite the contrary. Nor can it be assumed that voters were unaware of the character of Haider’s party. However. at this stage it is not possible to say to what extent the FPij’s success is due to an upsurge of right-wing sympathy or to what extent it was the result of pure protest. Haider’s electoral platform was more populist than ultra- rightist; his campaign being less marked by a coherent right-wing programme than by the lack of any programme. Furthermore, the FPG bene- fited from the similarity between the two major parties. In voting for a party which demonstrated a strong criticism of Pro~orz, sections of the electorate expressed disapproval with current political arrangements.

At the same time, the success of the FPO demonstrates the potential of demagogic politics of a rightist nature, and the failure of the main parties to present adequately an attractive democratic alternative. It demonstrates too the degree to which public opinion in Austria is unaware of, or chooses to ignore, international reaction to political developments within the country. The attitude of the SPO leadership during the Reder- affair, and OVP’s readiness to exploit isolationist feelings throughout Waldheim’s campaign must carry much of the responsibility for this. Whether Haider converts protest potential into a solid block of right-wing anti-democratic fo!!owers,will depend in part on the ability of the SPO and OVP to make clear the implications of the FP@s political position. The electoral campaign demonstrated a signal lack of willingness on the part of Socialists and Conservatives to do just that.

Conclusion

Signs that the political difficulties which haunted the previous administration may be carried over into the new coalition appeared early with ex- chancellor Kreisky’s denunciation of the distribution of cabinet posts. He was particularly offended by Mock’s appointment as Foreign

160 The Austrian General Election of 1986

Minister since it was he who was most closely the country is divided in the first round of associated with Waldheim’s presidential counting (the Grundtnandat). The per- campaign. Kreisky’s criticism, and his resigna- centage of the vote required will vary accord- tion from his last remaining honorary post within the Sm, was also prompted by his view that in

ing to the size of the population within the in~vidu~ co~tituency group. Votes not

adopting policies of privatization and fiscal allocated in the first round of counting constraint, the party had abandoned the policy of (‘Reststimmen’) are distributed in the full employment which he engineered and still second round in which the country is views as the key both to Austria’s economic divided into two constituencies (Wahikreis- growth and to social peace. His comments verbiitzde). demonstrate the extent to which the present 6. Pulzer (1986), op. Cit. government represents a break with the 7. In line with the terminology of the electoral traditions with which Austrian social democracy authorities, I shall refer to this group simply has been synonymous in the post-war period. as ‘the Greens’ (die &&en).

Notes and References

8. E. Gehmacher, ‘Nicht Wende, doch Wamung’, Zukunft, 1, January 1987, pp. 8-12.

1. The Economist, 29 November 1986, pp. 59-60.

2. See P. Pulzer, ‘The Austrian Presidential Election of 1986’, Electora! Studies, 5:3, December 1986, pp. 3024.

3. See The Guardian, 18 November 1986, p. 7.

4. See A. Pelinka, ‘The Nuclear Power Referendum in Austria’, Electorui Studies, 2:3, December 1983, pp. 253-61.

5. Unlike West Germany, Austria has no 5 per cent barrier, Nevertheless, in order to gain a seat a party must have enough votes to elect at least one MP in one of the nine constituency groups (Wahlkfeise) into which

9. After both rounds of counting, the Greens were allocated nine seats. When postal votes were taken into account, one of these seats was transferred to the GVP. Since the Greens actually received proportionally more support from postal voters than from regular voters, this transfer suggests an inconsistency in Austria’s system of propor- tional representation.

10. See H. Fischer, ‘Nationairatswa~en 1986’, Zukunft, I, January 1987, pp. 5-7.

11. See Pelinka op. cit., and Pulzer, ‘The Austrian General Election of 1983’, Electoral &dies, 2:3, December 1983, pp. 275-80.

The Irish General Election of 1987

DAVID M. FARRELL

University Coiiege Dublin, Dublin 4, Ireland

On 17 February 1987 Kreland went to the polls a the lifetime of the Tw~ty-Four Dail (Parlia- year early. It was perhaps surprising that the Fine ment), of which he was Taoiseach (prime GaeVLabour coalition had survived so long, for in minister). In 1983 an anti-abortion referendum 1981-82 Ireland had experienced an un- was carried adding a new clause to the Constitu- precedented three elections in 18 months and the tion protecting ‘the right to life of the unborn’. third election results seemed to offer no assurance FitzGerald had sought in vain to have the of stability. However, Garret FitzGerald the wording of the amendment altered to take better leader of Fine Gael (FG) emerged as Prime account of the woman’s rights in the matter. In Minister, committed to fundamental, but far June 1986 he was unsuccessful in his bid to from extremist change. In 1981 he had made amend the constitution to allow for the intrc- known his intention to launch a ‘constitutional duction of limited divorce. crusade’ to change the laws and Constitution of The one noted achievement of the FitzGerald the Irish Republic so as to make it appear more administration was the Hillsborough agreement attractive to Northern Unionists. This crusade of November 1985 which granted some say in foundered on FitzGerald’s inability to influence the admiiistration of Northern Ireland to the the vote in two referendums which were held in Dublin government. The Unionists were

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The Austrian general election of 1986