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The Asia-Pacific’s Emerging Missile Defense and Military Space Competition
Ian Easton
December 1, 2010
Funded by a grant from the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)
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Introduction Competition is emerging over securing access to and control of the air and space
mediums in the Asia-Pacific region. This competition is being driven in large part by the
rapid Chinese development of asymmetric military capabilities and strategies that
increasingly challenge the ability of regional missile defense and military space programs
to keep pace. This situation has serious implications for the strategic landscape of the
region and well beyond. Concerns that this paper hopes to highlight include the long
term threat to strategic stability that China’s military developments pose to the region,
and the accompanying potential for a major multi-faceted regional arms race driven by
strategies and weapons systems that are of an inherently escalatory and de-stabilizing
nature.
The historic military modernization campaign being undertaken by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese development, testing and deployment of
advanced anti-access, area-denial capabilities are eroding the confidence of other regional
actors that they will have unimpeded access to and control of the air and space mediums
in the event of a conflict. This is of crucial importance because the Asia-Pacific region is
an aerospace theater by its very nature, and thus access to and control of the air and space
dimensions of any future conflict will be critical to achieving political and military
success on the land and the sea. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review, in an oblique
reference to China, states: “Future adversaries will likely posses sophisticated capabilities
designed to contest or deny command of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains.”1
Recognizing that a shifting balance of relative power and capabilities is underway, the
1 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2010), p. 9, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf, accessed June 4, 2010.
2
U.S. and its allies and partners in the region are seeking to develop a variety of means to
counter China’s fast evolving capabilities. However, current trends suggest that the U.S.
and its allies will find it increasingly difficult to deter and defeat China in any future
crisis or conflict. This is due, in no small part, to China’s unprecedented buildup of
conventionally armed missiles.
A key component of the evolving regional air and space competition is the
proliferation of missile technology, most notably stemming from China’s on-going, large-
scale production of conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. This is leading
other regional actors to invest in missile defense, and in some limited instances, precise
long-range strike capabilities of their own to counter and deter the perceived Chinese
threat. In turn, China is developing its own increasingly effective air and missile defense
network in the face of what it perceives of as missile threats on its periphery, and in doing
so is challenging its potential rivals to develop ever better offensive and defensive means
of deterrence. China is particularly sensitive to the U.S. development of an integrated
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) given such a system’s suspected ability to
have long-term impacts upon China’s nuclear deterrent. China is also alarmed by U.S.
moves to develop a regional theater ballistic missile defense network as a part of the
BMDS, given the effects such a system could have upon China’s conventionally-armed
ballistic and cruise missile centric strategies. However, authoritative Chinese sources
suggest that due to the relative advantages missiles provide over missile defense systems
in terms of strategic, tactical and economic effects, it is likely the PLA will continue to
invest heavily in such systems, while also bolstering its own missile defense capabilities.2
2 Guan Shiyi, Zhu Kun and Song Fuzhi, “Some Issues of Guided Weapon Systems of Winged Missile” (Guanyu feihang daodan tixi de ji ge wenti), Tactical Missile Technology (zhanshu daodan jishu), May
3
Influential Chinese strategists argue that modern conventional aerospace capabilities
transcend the nuclear threshold in that they are powerful enough to deter and defeat
formidable enemies without having to resort to the threat of using nuclear weapons.3 The
advent of relatively inexpensive, mass-produced, precise conventional ballistic and cruise
missiles is indeed altering security equations as such weapons are indeed capable of
creating strategic effects that were previously only limited to nuclear weapons. However,
as will be discussed, their development could actually increase the threat of nuclear war
in the coming years.
Closely related to the subject of missile defense is the development and testing of
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and the deepening regional militarization of space. Outer
space has increasingly come to be seen as the ultimate strategic high-ground from which
to wage modern warfare and as a result is being rapidly militarized by a number of actors
in the Asia-Pacific region. Taking a sweeping view of the region, one sees China’s
rapidly expanding military space and ASAT programs continuing to push towards a
deepening militarization of space, and perhaps leading towards the weaponization of
space; the United States, highly reliant on militarized space, researching, developing and
testing a number of technologies which seek to ensure access to space in the event of a
conflict; India and Russia, both having declared an interest in developing ASAT weapons
and increasing their exploitation of military space; and Japan and Taiwan possessing the
2004, pgs. 1-10. Wu Kai, “2009 CASIC Builds Foundation For Development” (Hangtian kegong jituan gongsi 2009 zhulao fazhan genji), China Space News, January 5, 2010, http://www.china-spacenews.com/n435777/n435778/n435783/65278.html, accessed on May 18, 2010. Guan Shiyi, “New Developments in Flight Mechanics – Discussing and Detailing Research on Missile Attack and Defense” (Feixing lixue yanjiu de xin fazhan – feixingqi gongfang duikang yanjiu pingshu), China Science Electronic Journal: Technical Science, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2009, pp. 568-574. 3 Jiang Guocheng, “Building an Offensive and Defensive PLAAF: A Critical Review of Lt Gen Liu Yazhou’s The Centenary of the Air Force,” Air and Space Power Journal, Summer 2010, p. 87, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj10/sum10/2010-2%20Summer%20English%20ASPJ.pdf, accessed June 4, 2010.
4
technical and economic wherewithal to further evolve their budding military space
programs should the calculus of their respective strategic outlooks change in the future.
Thus the stage is set for what may prove to be one of the most important competitions of
this century: the race to exploit the ultimate strategic high ground that space represents.
In discussing this topic it may prove useful to note the important differences that
exist between the militarization of space and the weaponization of space because without
proper definition these terms can (and often do) lead to some confusion. There is indeed
some room for reasonable disagreement. Some have argued that near-earth space has
been militarized since the German V-2 ballistic missile flights of World War Two and the
U.S. and Soviet development of ICBMs in the early stages of the cold war. Conversely,
others point out that because ballistic missiles only transit the space medium the way
ancient cannonballs transited the air medium, one can no more argue that ballistic
missiles militarized space than one can argue that cannonballs represented the advent of
aerial warfare.4
In any event, space was much more certainly militarized in the 1960s when both
superpowers deployed satellite reconnaissance platforms into near-earth space. Since
that time the number and variety of satellites performing military-related missions has
drastically increased but, despite the early cold war development, testing and deployment
of ASATs by the U.S., and the later deployment of operational ASATs by the former
Soviet Union and contemporary China, space has not yet been weaponized because no
nation is known to have crossed the threshold of placing space-to-space or space-to-earth
4 Barry D. Watts, The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001), p. 98.
5
weapons in orbit for either a long-term or permanent basis.5 However, as will be
discussed in this study, given the regional trend in the Asia-Pacific towards developing
and fielding an increasing variety of ASAT weapons and missile defense systems with
the potential for future space-based elements, the line between the militarization and the
weaponization of space appears to becoming increasingly blurred.
This monograph addresses the evolving missile defense and military space
competition in the Asia-Pacific region being driven by China’s rapid development of
ballistic and cruise missiles and ASAT weapons capabilities; explores the various state-
level motivations and capabilities behind this multi-faceted competition; discusses the
facilities and satellites most likely to be targeted in any future conflict; and looks at what
the trends inherent in the situation portend for the strategic future of the competitors and
the region as a whole. Ultimately, it will be argued that China’s missile-centric strategies
and ASAT weapons buildup will have deleterious effects on regional stability in the
coming years, and may lead to a major, multi-dimensional arms race in the region.
REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE COMPETITION
The United States
The U.S. faces numerous emerging regional missile defense threats around the
globe, including those stemming from volatile states such as North Korea and Iran.
However, the U.S. views China’s ballistic and cruise missile build-up as its most
challenging long-term threat, and accordingly is seeking ways in which to assure an
5 Ibid.
6
adequate defense for its forward deployed troops in the West Pacific and its allies in the
region. According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, “One regional trend that
particularly concerns the Unites States is the growing imbalance of power across the
Taiwan Strait in China’s favor. China is developing advanced ballistic missile
capabilities that can threaten its neighbors and anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
capabilities that can attempt to target naval forces in the region.” Chinese ballistic
missiles “will be capable of reaching not just important Taiwan military and civilian
facilities but also U.S. and allied military installations in the region.”6 As such, the U.S.
is seeking to strengthen its missile defense partnerships in the region, most notably with
Japan and indirectly with Taiwan, while also developing and deploying a range of land,
sea and air-based missile defense systems supported by space-based early-warning and
missile tracking sensors.
At the high end of the spectrum, the U.S. is deploying a space-based BMD system
of systems in the form of the Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS) and its integrated
ground components. SBIRS is intended to consist of four SBIRS-High satellites in
geosynchronous orbit (GEO) and two in highly elliptical orbit (HEO). Although only
two SBIRS HEO satellites are currently deployed as the result of repeated delays, cost
overruns and a satellite failure, two more HEO satellites are on order along with four
SBIRS-High satellites, the first of which could be launched sometime in 2010.7 These
6 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2010), p. 7, http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf, accessed on June 4, 2010. 7 Edward P. Chatters IV and Bryan Eberhardt, “Missile Warning Systems.” In AU-18 Space Primer, Prepared by Air Command and Staff College Space Research Seminars, (Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, September 2009), p.228, http://space.au.af.mil/au-18-2009/au-18-2009.pdf, accessed June 10, 2010 . “SBIRS Team Completes Critical Design Reviews for Follow-On Production Program for HEO and GEO Payloads,” Los Angeles Air Force Base News, January 4, 2010,
7
satellites provide a revolutionary early warning system that is sensitive enough to detect
and target mobile missile launchers from their engines’ heat signatures and will have a
crucial role to play in missile defense.8 SBIRS satellites are currently augmenting the
Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites in GEO that they are designed to eventually
replace. DSP satellites have far out-performed expectations and greatly exceeded their
design lives, allowing them to stay on station while the much delayed SIBRS-High
satellites are completed.9 This combination of SBIRS HEO and DSP satellites has been
utilized in the creation of the theater event system (TES) in order to increase defense
against growing theater ballistic missile (TBM) threats, of which China represents the
largest in terms of size and sophistication.
The TES is comprised of three networked elements: SBIRS, which in
combination with DSP satellites provide tactical and strategic missile warning functions;
the joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) for mobile in-theater processing; and the
classified tactical detection and reporting (TACDAR) system comprised of sensors which
ride on unidentified host satellites. The TES reports theater missile threats over two
types of satellite broadcast networks with the data incorporated into a number of different
battle-management systems including the Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) and the Air Defense Systems Integrator (ADSI).10 These elements work in
http://www.losangeles.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123184063, accessed on June 10, 2010. Amy Butler, “Classified Satellite Failure Led to Latest SBIRS Delay,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, October 15, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3732391&page=1, accessed June 10, 2010. 8 Jeremy Singer, “Downshifting in Space,” Airforce Magazine, April 2009, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/April%202009/0409space.aspx, accessed May 26, 2009. 9 Edward P. Chatters IV and Bryan Eberhardt, “Missile Warning Systems.” In AU-18 Space Primer, Prepared by Air Command and Staff College Space Research Seminars, (Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, September 2009), p.229, http://space.au.af.mil/au-18-2009/au-18-2009.pdf, accessed June 10, 2010. 10 Ibid, pp. 230-231.
8
concert with air and ground-based warning sensors and ground-based missile
interceptors.
Image: Theater Event System Source: Air University Space Primer
In the Asia-Pacific region, space-based BMD systems are augmented by long-
range ground-based warning sensors such as the Perimeter Acquisition Vehicle Entry
Phased Array Weapons System (PAVE PAWS) sensor site at Beale AFB, California,11
and the recently deployed, mobile Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar in Alaska.12 The U.S.
Navy is also deploying Aegis BMD cruisers and destroyers with advanced surveillance
sensors and missile interceptors.13 On Guam, the U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense
Command (AAMDC) is in the process of deploying a missile defense task force for the
Pacific region. This would include a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
11 Ibid, pp. 332. 12 “Sea-Based X-Band Radar,” Missile Defense Agency Factsheet, February, 2010, http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/sbx.pdf, accessed June 10, 2010. 13 “Aegis Ballistic Missile defense (Aegis BMD),” Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2010, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/AegisBallisticMissileDefense/index.html, accessed June 10, 2010,
9
battery and a PAC-3 battery for ballistic missile defense, along with a SLAMRAAM
battery for cruise missile defense.14
In terms of point defense, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) has been increasing its
deployment of BMD units to Japan. USFJ deployed a mobile X-band radar system to
Shariki Air Base (AB) in Aomori Prefecture in June 2006, and in September 2006
deployed a Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) battalion to Kadena AB on
Okinawa.15 In August 2006, the U.S. began forward deploying BMD capable, Aegis
destroyers armed with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in and around Japan.16
And in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) was established at
Misawa AB in Aomori Prefecture.17 The U.S. is also strengthening its joint cooperative
efforts, partnerships and BMD related weapons sales in the region. These will be
discussed at greater detail in the following sections on Japan and Taiwan.
The U.S. missile defense build-up in the Asia-Pacific region is being driven
primarily by the potential threat that China’s TBMs and cruise missiles present to U.S.
forces and interests in the region, most acutely illustrated by China’s development of an
ASBM system-of-systems. China’s ASBM program, which was officially confirmed to
be in the testing phase in the March of 2010, could jeopardize the U.S. ability to conduct
air operations in the west Pacific in the near to mid-future, thereby undermining U.S. 14 Luo Hui/Si Wei, “U.S. Deploys Three Missile Defense Systems on Guam to Defend Against Chinese Cruise Missile Attack” (Mei zai guan bushu 3 zhong fangkong daodan fang wo xunhang daodan gongji), Huanqiu, December 2, 2009, http://mil.huanqiu.com/Exclusive/2009-12/648403.html accessed April 19, 2010. David W. Eastburn, “Island Paradise at Forefront of Missile Defense,” Army.Mil News, November 16, 2009, http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/11/16/30499-island-paradise-at-the-forefront-of-missile-defense/, Accessed June 17, 2010. 15 Ministry of Defense (MOD), Japan’s BMD, (Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, February 2009), p. 17, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/bmd/bmd2009.pdf, accessed December 28, 2009. 16 The USS Shiloh was first deployed with mid-course interception capabilities to Yokosuka Naval Base in August 2006. 17 Ministry of Defense (MOD), Defense of Japan 2009, (Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2009), chapter 1, section 2, p. 190, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/28Part3_Chapter1_Sec2.pdf, accessed December 21, 2009.
10
defense commitments in the region.18 China’s long-range anti-ship cruise missile
(ASCM) and land attack cruise missile (LACM) programs could also have similar
effects.19 For this reason the U.S. is developing a number of potential solutions to this
unprecedented challenge that go beyond the current BMD architecture. Potential missile
defense capabilities under development include air-launched hit-to-kill (ALHK)
interceptors, directed energy systems, and land-based SM-3 interceptors.20
China
China faces a number of perceived missile threats on its periphery stemming
primarily from Taiwan, the U.S., India and Russia. From the Chinese perspective, the
threat of a conflict with Taiwan, and by extension with the U.S., remains primary. As
such, it represents a strong driving force for China’s missile defense efforts. Beijing is
acutely aware that Taiwan is planning to develop and deploy long-range missiles against
China, and that the U.S. has cruise missile submarines patrolling its coastline. China is
also aware that while conflict with India seems to be a remote possibility, the two
nation’s unresolved territorial disputes remain a point of tension, and that India is
developing and deploying increasingly long-range ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at
18 Wendell Minnick, “Chinese Anti-ship Missile Could Alter U.S. Power,” Defense News, April 5, 2010, p. 6. For an excellent overview see Mark Stokes China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: the anti-ship ballistic missile challenge to U.S. maritime operations in the Western Pacific and beyond,” The Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, September 14, 2009. 19 See Ian Easton, “The Assassin Under the Radar: China’s DH-10 Cruise Missile Program,” The Project 2049 Institute Futuregram, October 1, 2009. 20 However, it must be noted that these systems are as yet far from deployment-ready, and none offers an assured measure of improvement in terms of mitigating the relative disadvantages missile defense systems face when compared to offensive missile systems.
11
China. Russia remains a point of concern to China as well due to the two nations long
shared border and their sometimes conflicting interests in Central Asia.21
In response to these potential threats, China has been actively pursuing an
advanced, multilayered Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) since the early 1990s.
China has also recently begun the construction of an integrated ballistic missile defense
system as a part of its IADS efforts. The Chinese air defense network is comprised of
imported Russian systems, and increasingly sophisticated reverse engineered and
indigenous systems. China began importing Russian S-300PMU-1s in 1993, and two
years later obtained permission to begin the production of its own 150km ranged variant,
the Hongqi-10 (HQ-10). This was later evolved into the 200km ranged HQ-15,
reportedly manufactured with approximately 70 percent domestically produced parts.22
The premier air defense system currently known to be in the PLA arsenal is the
imported S-300PMU-2 “Favorit” (SA-20B), with 4-8 batteries currently deployed. It has
also been reported that China co-developed the next-generation S-400 “Triumf” (SA-21)
with Russia – an even more advanced version of the S-300PMU-2 with a 400km range
and increased capability to intercept ballistic and cruise missiles.23 Although China has
not yet purchased the S-400, technology obtained in its development could conceivably
21 For an excellent overview of China’s missile threat perceptions see KKTT, “A Preliminary Analysis of China’s Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Interceptor Technology Test” (Wo guo “luji zhongduan fandao lanzai jishu shiyan” chubu fenxi), KKTT blog, January 12, 2010, at http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/static/12126421120100129195498/, accessed January 17, 2010. 22 See “Hongqi-15 (HQ-15),” Missilethreat.com, undated, at http://www.missilethreat.com/missiledefensesystems/id.29/system_detail.asp, accessed June18, 2010. 23 For an excellent overview see Scott O’ Conner, “Chinese SAM Network,” IMINT and Analysis, January 30, 2008, http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/01/chinese-sam-network.html, accessed June 17, 2010. Carlo Kopp, “Advances in PLA Air Defense Capabilities Challenge Strategic Balance in Asia,” China Brief, October 23, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5232&tx_ttnews[backPid]=168&no_cache=1, accessed June 17, 2010. Carlo Kopp, “China’s Air Defense missile systems,” Defense Today, March/April 2008, http://www.ausairpower.net/DT-PLA-SAM-2008.pdf, accessed June 17, 2010.
12
allow China to upgrade its existing air defense systems to a comparable level. The
current air defense network in place provides China with an advanced and growing
defensive shield reaching well into the west Pacific against forth generation aircraft,
subsonic cruise missiles and rudimentary ballistic missile threats.24
In support of its air and missile defense architecture China has developed an
integrated radar system for air and missile defense composed of land, sea, and air based
radars. In an interview, PLAAF Colonel Liu Yongjian(刘永坚)envisions a future
integrated radar network that would add near space and space-based components with
radar, infrared and laser sensors to the current network.25 Likewise, PLAAF Commander
and Central Military Commission (CMC) member, General Xu Qiliang (许其亮), has
strongly advocated the development of an integrated air and space war fighting capability
to include seamless territorial air, missile and space defense components as well as long-
range precision strike capabilities.26 China’s space and missile industry conducted
successful tests in 2007 and 2010, demonstrating the ability to intercept satellites in low
earth orbit and TBMs during the midcourse of their flight. These tests underscore the
evolving nature of China’s integrated air and space defense posture.27
24 Ibid. 25 Liu Gang, “Domestic Third Generation Early Warning Radar Could Simultaneously Track 100 Air and Sea Targets” (Guochan di san dai yujing leida ke tongshi shence shu bai pi hai kong mubiao), AVIC News, April 26, 2010, http://www.avicnews.com/2010/0426/41479.html, accessed May 18, 2010. 26 “General Xu Qiliang: China’s Air Force will develop integrated air and space warfare capability” (Xu Qiliang shangjiang: Zhongguo kongjun jiang fazhan kongtian yiti zuozhan nengli), Sina News, November 5, 2009, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-11-05/1743572706.html, accessed May 19, 2010. 27 For an excellent and reasonable analysis of the January 2010 missile defense interceptor test by a well regarded independent Chinese military-technical analyst, see KKTT, “A Preliminary Analysis of China’s Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Interceptor Technology Test” (Wo guo “luji zhongduan fandao lanzai jishu shiyan” chubu fenxi), KKTT blog, January 12, 2010, at http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/static/12126421120100129195498/, accessed January 17, 2010. Also see Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for Future U.S. National Security (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1999), p. 115; and Ian Easton, “The Great Game in Space: China’s
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China is reported to have at least two and perhaps three over the horizon
backscatter (OTH-B) radars covering the East China and South China Seas. These long
range radars are widely suspected as being intended for aircraft carrier targeting as a part
of China’s ASBM program.28 However, they could also play an important role in missile
defense, monitoring sections of China’s airspace for missile launches. These OTH-B
radars, managed by the PLAAF, are thought to have a surveillance range that can extend
out to 1000-4000km. A shorter-range surface wave over the horizon (OTH-SW) system
with an estimated range of 300km is located on China’s coast near Shencheng.29
The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), is said to be
taking the lead in constructing China’s missile defense architecture. In 2009 CASIC’s
Second Academy, the Chinese industry leader in the development of air defense systems,
was believed to have conducted the largest recruiting campaign in China’s entire
aerospace community.30 CASIC saw impressive overall growth in budgeting, profits and
manpower in 2009, as well as the recruitment of highly talented senior leadership.31 It is
reasonable to expect that this growth reflects top-level attention being paid to China’s
Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy,” The Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, June 24, 2009. 28 Sean O’ Conner, “OTH Radar and the ASBM Threat,” IMINT and Analysis, November 11, 2008, http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/11/oth-radar-and-asbm-threat.html, accessed June 17, 2010. “Taiwan says Mainland OTH Radar Strengthens Anti-Carrier” (Tai cheng dalu chao shi ju leida zhuli fan hangmu), Ta Kungbao, April 5, 2010, http://www.takungpao.com/inc/photo/photo_cont.asp?nid=1238932&cid=992&c=%BD%CD%A7L%BD%D7%BCC&id=455694, accessed April 12, 2010. See also “Over-the-Horizon Backscatter Radar (OTH-B),” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/oth-b.htm, accessed June 17, 2010. 29 Sean O’ Conner, “OTH Radar and the ASBM Threat.” 30 See Ian Easton, “The Assassin Under the Radar: China’s DH-10 Cruise Missile Program,” October 1, 2009. 31 “CASIC 2009 Building a Strong Foundation for Development” (Hangtian kegong jituan gongsi 2009 nian zhulao fazhan genji), China Space News, January 5, 2010, at http://www.china-spacenews.com/n435777/n435778/n435783/65278.html, accessed June 18, 2010.
14
integrated air and space defense efforts - efforts which will undoubtedly be translated into
continued breakthroughs and advancements in the years ahead.
Image: China’s Long Range Radar and Space Facilities and Air Defenses Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)
India
India’s missile defense efforts are being driven by two primary threats, Pakistan
on its western border and China to the north. Complicating the situation is the close level
of defense cooperation that exists between the two. China cooperates closely with
Pakistan on military technology development, and has played a key role in helping
develop Pakistan’s missile program. China’s ongoing production and deployment of
ballistic and cruise missiles therefore represents a dual threat to India in the sense that
15
Chinese missiles could both be deployed against India directly and/or proliferated to
Pakistan. As a result, India is enhancing its aerospace power with significant investments
into Air Force, theater missile and missile defense modernization.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is developing a layered, hardened air defense C3
network called the integrated air command, control, communications system (IACCCS)
that draws from reconnaissance satellites, early-warning radars, UAVs and AWACS.
By 2016 the IAF plans to acquire 67 low-level air transportable radars (LLTR); 18 EL/M-
2082 long-range active phased-array surveillance radars; and 12 EL/M-2083 aerostat-
mounted active phased array radars (three of which have already been delivered). These
radars will be deployed with the IAF’s existing 32 mobile control and reporting centers
(MCRC); 12 air defense control centers (ADCC); and approximately 40 base air defense
zones (BADZ) on India’s western and north-eastern borders. These will progressively
replace current radars that were acquired during the 70s and 80s. The IAF also acquired
two long-range EL/M-2080 Green Pine long range tracking radars (LRTR) in 2001.
Three A-50E PHALCON (phased-array L-band conformal radar) AWACS, modified
Ilyushin IL-76, were delivered in May 2009, with two more expected sometime in
2010.32 When complete, this radar surveillance network will be linked to joint air traffic
control and reporting centers (JATCRC) that will be operational at 29 IAF air bases.33
The IAF is currently looking to upgrade 39 of its 80 strategic air fields along India’s
borders with China and Pakistan to improve network centricity and mobility.34
32 “India Gets First AWACS,” Defense Technology International, June 2009, p. 8. 33 Prasun K. Sengupta, “Double –Digit Growth: By 2016, IAF will be acquiring 67 new low-level air transportable radars (LLTR),” Force, February 12, 2009, p. 32. See also Rahul Bedi, “Country Briefing: India,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 21, 2009, p. 24. 34 Rahul Bedi, “Country Briefing: India,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 21, 2009, p. 26.
16
India’s IACCCS will support the nation’s air and missile defense architecture.
The IAF plans to acquire 2000 long-range (120km variant) Barak-2 SAMs beginning
2011. The IAF is already committed to procuring an initial batch for nine air defense
squadrons. The Indian Army plans to acquire up to 1500 medium-range (70km variant)
Barak-2 SAMs. Each launcher will have 12 missiles.35 IAF also expects 18 Spyder
SAM systems to be delivered by the end of 2012, and is seeking two more squadrons of
the long-operationally-troubled Akash SAM system.36
Starting in 2006, India has conducted a series of high-altitude interceptor tests and
intends to build a multi-tiered BMD system around its mobile, indigenously built
advanced air defense (AAD) or “Prithvi” interceptor missile system.37 Four of its initial
five BMD interceptor tests have been successful, with its test on March 14, 2010 having
been aborted due to technical problems.38 India plans to conduct a total of ten interceptor
tests, five endo-atmospheric (below 30km) and five exo-atmospheric (up to 80km), with
the AAD interceptor missile system beginning initial deployment by 2013.39 A next-
generation version of the system is under development for the interception of
intercontinental ballistic missiles. India is also developing a laser-based BMD systems
35 Prasun K. Sengupta, “Shield in the Air: Series production of MR-SAM expected to begin in 2011,” Force, February 12, 2009, pgs. 42-43. 36 Rahul Bedi, “Country Briefing: India,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 21, 2009, p. 26. 37 “Test-fire of India’s interceptor missile postponed,” NDTV, March 14, 2010, at http://www.ndtv.com/news/india/test-fire-of-indias-interceptor-missile-postponed-17691.php, accessed June 18, 2010. 38 “India successfully test-fires interceptor missile,” Indian Express, July 26, 2010, at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-successfully-testfires-interceptor-missile/651741/1, accessed September 17, 2010. See also “India’s interceptor missile test failed,” CCTV News, March 16, 2010, at http://english.cctv.com/program/worldwidewatch/20100316/100971.shtml, accessed June 18, 2010. “New Interceptor Missile Fails to take off,” The Times of India, March 15, 2010, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/New-interceptor-missile-fails-to-take-off/articleshow/5684974.cms, accessed June 18, 2010. 39 “India plans radars in space to boost missile defense system,” Thaindian News, March 9, 2010, at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/india-plans-radars-in-space-to-boost-missile-defence-system_100164598.html, accessed June 18, 2010.
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for the interception of ballistic missiles as well as lower-level air-breathing targets, and is
planning on deploying space-based radars to support the nation’s BMD architecture.40
Japan
Japan’s missile defense efforts are being driven by the growing threats that North
Korea and China represent. According to Japan’s white paper on defense, Defense of
Japan 2009, “in the event of an armed attack on Japan, such attacks are…likely to begin
with surprise air attacks using aircraft or missiles.41 North Korea is viewed as
representing an increasingly dangerous ballistic missile threat to Japan, and China’s long-
range ballistic and cruise missile developments are viewed with increasing concern. As
such, Japan has been taking a number of steps to improve its air defense posture that
include: upgrading its air defense radars, deploying a space-based intelligence network,
integrating itself in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) shield and centralizing its
air defense command headquarters.
Japan’s Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) maintains 28 ground-based, air defense
radar sites.42 Japan in recent years has begun the deployment of four FPS-5 next
generation missile defense radars, and seven improved FPS-3 radars. Japan’s first FPS-5
radar, deployed on Shimo-koshiki island in the Sasebo District, was officially unveiled on
40 Ibid. See also, Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Developing Laser-Based Anti-Missile Systems, Defense News, August 25, 2010, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4757079&c=ASI&s=TOP, accessed September 1, 2010. 41 Ministry of Defense (MOD), Defense of Japan 2009, (Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2009), chapter 1, section 3, p. 212, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/29Part3_Chapter1_Sec3.pdf, accessed December 21, 2009. 42 Ministry of Defense (MOD), Defense of Japan 2009, (Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2009), reference section, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/45Location.pdf, accessed December 21, 2009.
18
May 20, 2009. The FPS-5 radar costs an estimated 18 billion Yen per unit, and by fiscal
year (FY) 2011 will also be deployed at Ominato, Sado and Yozadake.43 An additional
FPS-5 radar will be deployed at Mineokayama, outside Tokyo, as a research facility.44
Seven FPS-3 radar sites at (from North to South) Tobetsu, Kano, Otakine, Wajima,
Kasadoriyama, Kyogamisaki and Seburi have been upgraded and are expected to be
operational in 2010.45 These radar sites and their associated air defense units are
organized into six air defense missile groups, which are grouped geographically with
their associated air wings and central aircraft control and warning wings into four air
defense forces, each of which will maintain one advanced FPS-5 missile defense radar
site.46 These four Air Defense Forces are unified at Japan’s Air Defense Command
Headquarters, which will complete its move from Fuchu Air Station to Yokota Air Base
in 2010.47
43 The Japanese government’s fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31. 44 Ministry of Defense (MOD), Japan’s BMD, (Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, February 2009), p. 15, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/bmd/bmd2009.pdf, accessed December 28, 2009. “Japan’s most advanced missile defense radar publicly unveiled” (Ri zui jianrui daodan jiance leida gongkai liangxiang), TaKungBao, May 21, 2009, http://www.takungpao.com/news/09/05/21/junshi03-1085706.htm, accessed December 21, 2009. 45 Ibid. 46 JASDF is organized into four regional air defense forces. The Northern Air Defense Force, headquartered in Misawa, is comprised of the 2nd Air Wing and the 3rd Air Defense Missile Group at Chitose; and the 3rd Air Wing, the 6th Air Defense Missile Group, the Airborne Early Warning Group and the Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing at Misawa. The Central Air Defense Force, headquartered in Iruma, is comprised of the 6th Air Wing at Komatsu; the Tactical Reconnaissance Group and the 7th Air Wing at Hyakuri; the 1st Air Defense Missile Group, the Air Defense Command Headquarters Flight Group and Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing at Iruma; the Airborne Early Warning Group at Hamamatsu; and the 4th Air Defense Missile Group at Gifu. The Western Air Defense Force, headquartered in Kasuga, is comprised of the 5th and 8th Air Wings at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki, respectively; and the 2nd Air Defense Missile Group, the Western Air Defense Force Headquarters Support Flight Squadron and Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing at Kasuga. The Southwestern Composite Air Division, headquartered in Naha, is comprised of the 83rd Air Wing, the 5th Air Defense Missile Group, and the Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing at Naha, Okinawa. 47 Leandra D. Hernandez, “Ceremony marks Japan’s Air Defense Command moves to Yokota,” Yokota Air Base News, February 20, 2008, http://www.yokota.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123088254, accessed January 4, 2010.
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Japan has been actively integrating itself into the U.S. BMD shield, co-developing
and deploying TBM and cruise missile defense systems. By the end of the FY 2008,
Japan had equipped two of its Aegis destroyers, the Kongo and the Chokai, with SM-3s
for upper tier ballistic missile interception. By the end of FY 2008 Japan had also
deployed PAC-3s to four fire units at Narashino, Takeyama, Kasumigaura and Iruma,
respectively, under the 1st Air Defense Missile Group. One PAC-3 fire unit (FU) was
also deployed at Gifu under the 4th Air Defense Missile Group, and another PAC-3 FU
was deployed at the Air Defense Missile Training Group and 2nd Technical School in
Hamamatsu.48 Looking ahead, Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) intends to link four
BMD-capable Aegis destroyers49 and 16 Patriot PAC-3 FUs to its new FPS-5 radar sites
and upgraded FPS-3 radar sites via a C3 network known as the Japan Aerospace Defense
Ground Environment (JADGE) by FY 2011.50 Eventually, Japan plans to have eight
Kongo-class Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles.51
In a move strengthening the U.S.-Japanese missile defense partnership, all
elements of Japan’s air defense network will be unified at Japan’s Air Defense Command
48 Ministry of Defense (MOD), Defense of Japan 2009, (Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2009), chapter 1, section 2, p. 185, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/28Part3_Chapter1_Sec2.pdf, accessed December 21, 2009. Japan’s PAC-3 Battalion 1 was first deployed to Iruma Air Base (AB) in March 2007, Battalion 3 was deployed to Hamamatsu AB in FY2008 (as a part of the Air Missile Defense Training Ground, 2nd Technical School), Battalion 4 will be deployed to Gifu AB FY2009, and Battalion 2 will be deployed to Kasuga AB in FY2010. In 1995, JASDF first decided to acquire 24 enhanced PAC-2 (or PAC-2 Plus) FUs, which are effective against TBMs and LACMs with slow re-entry speeds. The delivery of these PAC-2 Plus missiles began in 1998. Each of the PAC-2 Plus FUs (four per air defense missile group) has eight launch stations for a total of 768 missiles. Three more FUs (with 96 missiles) were purchased around 2000-01, for a total of 27 PAC-2 Plus FUs and 864 missiles. 49 Aside from the Aegis DDGs Kongo and the Chokai, the DDGs Myoko and the Kirishima will also be modified for SM-3 capability. 50 Ministry of Defense (MOD), Defense of Japan 2009, (Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2009), chapter 1, section 2, p. 185, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/28Part3_Chapter1_Sec2.pdf, accessed December 21, 2009. 51 Desmond Ball, “Whither the Japan-Australia Security Relationship?” Austral Policy Forum 6-32A Report, September 21, 2006, http://www.nautilus.org/~rmit/forum-reports/0632a-ball.html, accessed January 4, 2009.
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(ADC) Headquarters at Yokota AB beginning 2010 when Japan’s Air Self Defense
Force’s ADC completes its move from Fuchu Air Station. About 1,200 Japanese
personnel will transfer to the new ADC headquarters building which will be the supreme
command authority for Japanese air and ballistic missile defense. The JADGE C3
network and other advanced communications links will be used by the command when
the relocation is complete.52
This move strengthens early warning and bilateral command and control, and the
relocation will help facilitate joint cooperation between U.S. and Japanese forces as the
new bilateral air operations center will link up with the 613th Air and Space Operations
Center (AOC) at Hickham AFB in Hawaii which synchronizes all U.S. air, space and
cyberspace missions in the theatre.53 The JASDF ADC complex will also be physically
linked by a tunnel to a basement control hub under the headquarters of the USFJ. The
Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Command Center (BJOCC) under the USFJ
headquarters building can hold up to 150 people in wartime and every position on the
main floor has a Japanese counterpart working alongside U.S. personnel to foster bilateral
cooperation and augment bilateral operability.54
52 Rita Boland, “Partnership in the Pacific,” Signal, June 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5438/is_200806/ai_n27901531/?tag=content;col1, accessed December 14, 2009. 53 General Howie Chandler (USAF), “An Airman’s Perspective: Air, Space, and Cyberspace Strategy for the Pacific,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2008, p. 15, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Summer/chandler.pdf, accessed January 4, 2010. 54 Vince Little, “Control hub used to direct exercise,” Stars and Stripes, November 17, 2007, http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=50313, accessed December 14, 2009.
21
Image: JASDF Radar Sites Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan
Taiwan
Taiwan faces what is probably the most difficult TBM and cruise missile threat in
the world. Despite a recent warming in cross strait relations, Mainland China continues
to increase its coercive missile build-up vis-à-vis Taipei both quantitatively and
qualitatively.55 Underscoring this point, the head of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau
has stated that roughly 70 percent of China’s military drills in the year 2009 were
directed against Taiwan.56 A Senior Taiwan intelligence official has also stated that
China plans to increase the number of missiles deployed against Taiwan to at least
55 For an excellent overview see: Blumenthal, Mazza, Schmitt, Schriver and Stokes, “Deter, Defend, Repel, And Partner: A Defense Strategy For Taiwan,” Taiwan Policy Working Group, July 2009, at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090803-Deter-Defend-Repel.pdf, accessed June 19, 2010. See also Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond,” The Project 2049 Institute Occasional Paper, May 27, 2010, at http://project2049.net/documents/aerospace_trends_asia_pacific_region_stokes_easton.pdf. 56 See “70% of China’s Military Drills Last Year Aimed at Taiwan: Liberty Times,” Taiwan News, March 18, 2010, at http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1206110&lang=eng_news&cate_img=logo_taiwan&cate_rss=TAIWAN_eng, accessed June 19, 2010.
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1,800.57 As a result, Taiwan continues to build upon its existing missile defense
infrastructure, comprised of both U.S. missile defense systems obtained through Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) channels and indigenous missile defense systems developed with
U.S. assistance.
Taiwan currently fields three PAC-2 Modified Air Defense (MADS) batteries
with 200 missiles deployed around the capital Taipei, and has developed a number of
road-mobile Tien Kung-II (TK-II) air-defense missiles with a 300km engagement range.
These systems augment its static, silo-based Tien Kung-I (TK-I) air-defense missiles, and
13 batteries of aging Improved-Homing All-the-WAY Killer (I-HAWK) missiles.
Taiwan intends to begin replacing some I-HAWKs with TK-II systems beginning in
2010.58 To improve its missile defense posture, Taiwan is upgrading its PAC-2 batteries
to PAC-3 configuration, and purchasing new PAC-3 batteries. This could provide
Taiwan with as many as 444 PAC-3 missiles.59 These will augment Taiwan’s
approximately 500 TK-I and TK-II missiles, as well as its next generation TK-III system,
which is under development and scheduled to be deployed in 2012.60
Taiwan is also investing in early warning and upgrading its missile defense
sensors and command and control systems to undercut the coercive utility of China’s
theater and cruise missiles. Its initial step has been procuring a long range early warning
57 Russell Hsiao, “Taiwan’s Military Shores Up Indigenous Capabilities,” China Brief, September 10, 2010, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36808, accessed September 17, 2010. 58 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Taiwan Air Defense Status Assessment, (Washington D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, January 21, 2010), at http://www.defensestudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/dia-taiwan-air-power-assessment.pdf, accessed June 19, 2010. 59 Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s BMD Coming Online,” Defense News, March 22, 2010, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4547996, accessed June 19, 2010. 60 Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan Missile Base Identified Near China,” Defense News, February 22, 2010, at http://minnickarticles.blogspot.com/2010/02/taiwan-missile-base-identified-near.html, accessed June 19, 2010.
23
radar (EWR) able to detect both air-breathing and ballistic targets at extended ranges
through U.S. FMS channels. Building on existing PAVEPAWS technology, the radar
system is to be situated on a peak in the central mountain range and will be able to
provide early warning of ballistic missile lunches at distances of as far as 3,000
kilometers. The radar is also designed to monitor air targets over the Taiwan Strait and
beyond at ranges of less than 200 kilometers, depending on the target’s altitude and radar
cross section.61 The radar will augment existing and new radar systems deployed
throughout Taiwan and its off-shore islands.62 These systems will provide early warning
against threats to the new Anyu-4 air dense system, comprised of Regional Operations
Control Centers (ROCC). In the event of a threat, the ROCCs will select the appropriate
interceptor from a menu of air defense systems.63
However, there is a growing sense that despite official U.S. Department of
Defense and Taiwan Ministry of Defense reports citing the shifting military balance in
the Taiwan Strait in Beijing’s favor, Washington’s resolve to honor its defense
commitments to Taipei - as spelled out in the Taiwan Relations Act - is flagging. Instead
of continuing direct high-profile weapons system sales, it appears that the U.S. and
Taiwan may seek further cooperation on boosting the development of Taiwan’s own
indigenous defense production capabilities in the future.64 This trend, when coupled with
flat or decreasing defense budgets in Taiwan, could over time undermine Taiwan’s air
defense posture, lead to a greater military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait, and ultimately
61ShirleyA.Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, February 16, 2010, pp. 16-17, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf, accessed on June 19, 2010. 62 The Balance of Air Power in the Taiwan Strait, (Arlington, VA: U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, 2010), p.25. 63 Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s BMD Coming Online,” March 22, 2010. 64 Russell Hsiao, “Taiwan’s Military Shores Up Indigenous Capabilities,” September 10, 2010.
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compel Taipei to invest in greater numbers of offensive cruise and ballistic missiles to
deter Beijing.
Russia
Russia currently faces relatively few air threats in the Asia-Pacific region,
although it views with concern Chinese encroachments into its sparsely populated Far
East, and has an unresolved territorial dispute with Japan over the Kuril Islands. Russia
possesses a mobile and highly-survivable air defense capability in its Far Eastern military
region. Despite having the bulk of its most advanced air defense systems deployed
around the capital and strategically important cities and military facilities in the west and
northwest of the nation, Russia’s air defense assets in the Asia-Pacific region are capable
of providing for limited missile defense of key areas in the event of an attack.65
Eleven air defense batteries are believed active, providing coverage of sections of
Russia’s Far East. This force is comprised of nine S-300PS (SA-10B) batteries, one S-
300V (SA-12A) and one 9K37 battery, defending key naval facilities at Vladivostok and
Petropavlovsk and other important bases in the region. These are supported by forty-one
early-warning sites, which provide coverage for the Kamchatka Peninsula, the area
around Vladivostok and areas to the north and northeast of the Chinese border.66
65 These would include ICBM bases in Siberia and Russia’s Pacific Fleet headquarters in Vladivostok as well as important naval bases on the Kamchatka Peninsula. 66 For an excellent overview see Sean O’ Conner, “Russian Strategic Air Defense,” IMINT & Analysis, December 18, 2010, at http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/12/russian-strategic-air-defense.html, June 19, 2010.
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Russian President Medvedev has called for building a new space and missile defense
shield.67 This would be supported by a network of early-warning satellites and new, long
range radars which are to be deployed around the country.68
In 2006, Russia’s Defense Minister announced that Russia would construct an Air
and Missile Defense facility in the south of Russia. This could be the location for future
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) development. The testing of Russia’s A-135 ABM is
ongoing, with one launch test occurring in 2006 and two launch tests in 2007 at the Sary-
Shagan test range in Kazakhstan.69 However, a former Russian Air Force General has
stated that Russia is lagging 25-30 years behind the U.S. in terms of air defense, pointing
out that Russia has only currently been able to produce two S-400 (SA-21) batteries when
15 were planned. He also pointed out that Russia’s air defenses are roughly a fifth as
capable compared to Soviet times, and it would be difficult for Russia to intercept short
range missiles launched from Iran or North Korea.70 The average age of workers in
Russia’s defense industries is 60, and according to Russian military analysts this reflects
a decline in Russia’s industrial capacity and greatly impacts the production of complex
air defense systems.71
67 Tony Halpin, “Russia to build missile defense and renew nuclear deterrence,” The Times, September 27, 2008, at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4833037.ece, accessed June 19, 2010. 68 “Russia’s New Radar Station on Experimental Combat Duty to Strengthen Missile Defense” (E xinxing leidazhan touru shiyanxing zhandou zhiban jiaqiang fandao zhanli), Xinhua, January 8, 2007, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2007-01/08/content_5576769.htm, accessed June 19, 2010. 69 Sean O’ Conner, “Russian/Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” December 2009, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-ABM-Systems.html, accessed June 19, 2010. “Missile Race between West and East,” Russian Space Web, undated, at http://www.russianspaceweb.com/chronology_missiles.html, accessed June 19, 2010. See also “A-135,” Astronautix, http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/a135.htm, accessed June 19, 2010. 70 “Ex-Air Force Chief Calls Air Defense Weak,” The Moscow Times, May 13, 2010, at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ex-air-force-chief-calls-air-defenses-weak/405937.html, accessed June 19, 2010. 71 “Russia Parades New Missile Defense System,” Voice of America, May 9, 2009, at http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-09-voa18-68816137.html?refresh=1, accessed June 19, 2010.
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MILITARY SPACE COMPETITIONS
China
China represents a rising space power with an aggressive ASAT program that is
likely to continually challenge the notion of assured access to space in the Asia-Pacific
region. In fact, the notion that space is a contested domain, and no longer a sanctuary,
was first crystallized in the minds of many by China’s unexpected direct-assent, kinetic-
kill ASAT test on January 11, 2007. The historic amount of debris created by the test,
has over the past several years posed a hazard to satellites, space vehicles and astronauts
in low earth orbit and will continue to do so for the rest of this century. Moreover, this
test was followed with revelations that China had conducted two or three previous such
tests (albeit without the spectacular finale) and had tested a directed-energy, laser ASAT
weapon system on U.S. intelligence satellites the year prior. Subsequently, as part of its
manned Shenzhou-7 mission in 2008, China conducted a micro-satellite test with
implications for the development of a co-orbital ASAT weapon.72 And on January 11,
2010, three years to the date of its successful direct-ascent ASAT test, China tested a
mid-course interceptor which, while ostensibly for the purpose of missile defense,
represented an inherent leap forward in its ASAT capability. The test is widely suspected
of being the second successful test of China’s SC-19 direct-ascent ASAT system,
highlighting the complimentary nature of BMD and ASAT capabilities and the
difficulties encountered differentiating between the two.73 China’s development of
72 See Ian Easton, “The Great Game in Space: China’s Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy,” The Project 2049 Institute Occassional Paper, June 24, 2009. 73 Wendell Minnick, “China Missile Test Has Ominous Implications,” Defense News, January 19, 2010, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4460204, accessed September 23, 2010. See also: Jeffery Lewis,
27
integrated air and space warfare capabilities further blurs distinctions between missile
defense and anti-satellite operations.
While China’s development of ASAT capabilities truly runs the gamut from the
spectacular to the subtle, evolving directed-energy microwave, particle beam and laser
ASAT weapons capabilities are of particular concern both because China is a world
leader in optics and related technologies, and because such weapons systems could
eventually be directed against U.S. national security satellites in geo-synchronous orbits.
These capabilities could also be employed in a far more clandestine fashion than a
missile-bourn kinetic kill vehicle.74
Image: China’s BX-1 Co-Orbital Microsatellite Test Source: Chinese Internet
China is also developing other ASAT weapons that could also be potentially
difficult to detect and defend against such as co-orbital micro satellite weapons (also
“Chinese Missile Defense Test,” Arms Control Wonk, January 12, 2010, at http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2588/chinese-missile-defense-test, accessed September 23, 2010. 74 Ian Easton, “The Great Game in Space: China’s Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy,” June 24, 2009.
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known as parasite satellites); high-powered microwave and particle beam weapons; high-
performance radar and electronic jammers; and cyber attack and precision strike
capabilities which could be directed against satellite tracking and control stations. China
has also conducted cyber intrusions into power grids, and such capabilities could be
potentially applied in a conflict to attack power grids supporting space command and
control centers. In short, China’s ASAT weapons programs are of a broad nature and are
expanding in scope. China has also been developing and deploying a fleet of dual-use and
military satellites to augment its military build-up.75
The growth of China’s ASAT programs is due in no small part to the impressive
growth of the Chinese space program overall, a program that is of an inherently military
nature despite its many dual use civilian applications. China intends to launch 19
satellites in 2010 and 20 satellites per year for the following two years.76 In the 2008
China launched more satellites than the United States.77
Image: Chinese Mobile Satellite Operations Units Source: Chinese Internet 75 Ibid. 76 “China Plans to Launch More Than 20 Spacecraft Each Year For the Next Two Years” (Zhongguo weilai liangnian jihua mei nian fashe yu 20 ge hangtianqi), CANNEWS, April 26, 2010, at http://www.cannews.com.cn/2010/0426/41658.html, accessed May 18, 2010. 77 See Rob Chambers, China’s Space Program: A New Tool For PRC “Soft Power” in International Relations? (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, March 2009), p. 17.
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The United States
On the other side of the Pacific, the U.S. militarization of space was highlighted on
February 20, 2008 when the U.S. employed a modified SM-3 mid-course interceptor
missile to successfully shoot down a malfunctioning intelligence satellite that was
threatening to crash into earth with a payload of highly-toxic unspent fuel. This intercept
proved that the U.S. BMD shield was capable of conducting direct-ascent ASAT
missions, and ignited speculation that a U.S.-China arms race in space had begun. The
U.S. has been investing in a number of military space capabilities that could potentially
be applied to a future ASAT mission or program, although U.S. policymakers have to
date exhibited reluctance towards fully developing ASAT capabilities and have not
moved towards weaponizing space as a part of the BMDS.78
The U.S. does, however, lead the world in leveraging the outer space domain for its
military utility, and relies on access to space in conducting military operations far more
extensively than any other country. According to the commander of the U.S. Space
Command, General C. Robert Kehler, “Today, space capabilities are embedded in a host
of systems serving forces and commanders at every level. Space is no longer just the
high ground; it is an integral part of joint operations. Operational plans and advanced
weapons rely on space as never before…”79 And yet, as the commander of the U.S.
Space and Missile Systems Center, Lt. General John T. Sheridan, points out: “We have
seen foreign development and employment of an array of capabilities specifically
designed to deny US’ use of space…space is now a contested environment.”80
78 See “Recent U.S. and Chinese Antisatellite Activities,” Air & Space Power Journal, September 2009, at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/mackey.html, accessed May 16, 2010. 79 General C. Robert Kehler, “Introduction,” High Frontier, Volume 6, No. 3, May 2010, p. 2. 80 Lt. General John T. Sheridan, “Operationally Responsive Space and the National Security Space
30
From the American perspective, China is rapidly becoming a space-age superpower
and this is altering the status quo in outer space, which has been viewed as a realm of
unchallenged U.S. dominance and defined by international cooperation since the end of
the cold war. The U.S. is uniquely vulnerable to China’s ASAT weapons as it operates
nearly half of the 270-plus military satellites in orbit as well as hundreds of civil,
commercial and dual-use satellites that can be used for military operations.81
During the recent Iraq war, 68% of U.S. munitions were satellite guided, a massive
increase from the merely 10% of satellite guided munitions used in the 1991 Iraq War.82
One senior Air Force officer said that thanks to satellite technology the U.S. no longer
fights in the fog of war, but in a “huge cloud of electrons.” However, because four-fifths
of America’s military data is transmitted through unhardened commercial satellites, and a
single Global Hawk unmanned surveillance drone flying over the middle east or the West
Pacific can consume several times more bandwidth than was used in the whole of the
1991 war against Iraq, Air Force officers commonly describe space as being America’s
“Achilles Heel.”83 Referring to China’s January 11, 2007 direct-assent ASAT test,
General Hamel of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center said “if they take
our asymmetric advantage in space, we go from an information age war machine to an
industrial age war machine…shifting the balance, the edge will go to the adversary.”84
Many specialists also argue that aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital
space, the U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world economy, is also rapidly
Architecture,” High Frontier, Volume 6, No. 3, May 2010, p. 3. 81 See “Military Uses of Space,” Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, December 2006, No. 273. 82 Ibid. 83 See The Economist, January 19, 2007, pp. 18-19. 84 Richard Hughes and Jon Lowe, “We Need a Civil Reserve Space Fleet,” The Wright Stuff, April 17, 2008.
31
becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a
“space faring” nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided
by the orbital space medium. War games conducted as part of U.S. national security
protocols, such as the Army-After-Next, Navy Global and Air Force Global Engagement
series, Space Game 2 and the Schriever Games, as well as the privately conducted
“DEADSATS” war games, conducted from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, confirm
this view. According to space experts who were intimately involved with the war games,
the exercises exposed “a critical national Achilles heel that politicians, economists and
corporate CEOs have largely ignored…losses in space can quickly affect the economic,
social, and national security fabric not only of the united States, but of the entire world.”
These experts further speculate that “large military powers,” such as the United States,
could “be held hostage by the unknowns inherent in a new kind of war.”85 These
concerns are directly linked with China’s ASAT weapons and their potential applicability
in any future U.S.-Sino conflict. A more recent war game, “Pacific Vision,” conducted
by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) underscored the vulnerability of the unprotected
commercial communication satellite channels on which the Air Force relies, as well as its
cyber and radar vulnerabilities to Chinese attack.86
While many of America’s national security satellites are in GEO or highly-
elliptical orbits and will not remain vulnerable to Chinese ASAT weapons like the one
that destroyed FY-1C in the near-term, the reported Chinese interest in jamming
vulnerable GPS signals has caused the U.S. to set-up backup ground stations in case the
85 Michael J. Coumatos et al., Space Wars: The First Six Hours of World War Three (New York: Forge, 2007), p. 8 86 Richard Halloran, “PACAF’s ‘Vision’ Thing,” Airforce-Magazine.com, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchives/Pages/2009/January%202009/0109vision.aspx, accessed May 26, 2009.
32
main GPS control center outside Colorado Springs is disabled by cyber attacks.87 The
National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA) has added at least 11 more shared
monitor stations to strengthen the GPS land-based infrastructure as well.88 The U.S. is
also planning to deploy a new generation of GPS-III satellites with higher-power signals
to make jamming more difficult, and is developing laser communication systems, which
can carry far more data and are much less prone to interference than radio waves.89 The
U.S. military is also expected to improve its surveillance and intelligence of space threats
while further hardening its low-orbiting electro-optical/synthetic aperture radar
(EO/SAR) satellites with “passive defenses,” such as lens shutters to shield from laser
blinding such as those which occurred in August/September 2006. Other passive
defenses may include satellite redundancy (having back-up satellites), as well as turn-off
systems to avoid Chinese tracking and targeting. However, even optimistic war planners
expect that there would be serious losses to Chinese ASATs in a conflict.
It is also no coincidence that a little over four months after China’s successful direct-
assent ASAT test, the U.S. Air Force established an Operationally Responsive Space
(ORS) office at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The mission of this office is to
focus on assuring space power via the launching of smaller satellites on smaller boosters
which could quickly reconstitute lost satellite capabilities and augment existing platforms
in times of national emergency.90 Two Satellites have been launched to date as a part of
to ORS effort, the TacSat-2 and TacSat-3. The TacSat-2 featured a low-power imagery
87 See The Economist, January 19, 2007, p. 28. 88 Ibid. 89 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, “Global Positioning System,” Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?ID=119 accessed April 23, 2008. 90 Sheila Rupp, “Operational Responsive Space,” AF.mil, May 22, 2007, http://kirtland.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123054292, accessed May 26, 2009.
33
sensor and SIGINT payload, and the TacSat-3 features a hyper spectral imaging sensor to
penetrate camouflaged targets such as vehicles, buildings and landmines.91 Two other
satellites, the TacSat-4 and the ORS-1 are scheduled to be launched in late 2010 from
Alaska and Virginia, respectively. The TacSat-4 is a Navy-led communications satellite,
and the ORS-1 will carry a modified camera used on the U-2 reconnaissance plane.92
The Air Force is also said to be investing heavily in a stealthy, supersonic unmanned
aerial vehicle UAV which would combine high speed, high stealth, high altitude and high
persistence to fill any satellite gaps caused by development delays or ASAT attacks.93
India
India has a modest but growing military space program, and has advocated the
development of its own ASAT weapons program in the wake of China’s 2007 ASAT test.
The director of India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
General V.K. Saraswat has stated: “India is putting together building blocks of
technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites.”94 Air Chief Marshal P.V.
Naik, speaking in a clear reference to China stated, “Our satellites are vulnerable to
ASAT weapon systems because our neighborhood possesses one.”95 However, India is
not expected to test a direct-ascent, ASAT system in the near future, recognizing the 91 See Jeremy Singer, “Downshifting in Space,” Airforce-Magazine.com, April 2009, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/April%202009/0409space.aspx, accessed May 26, 2009. See also “Team helps put tactical satellite in orbit,” AF.mil, May 22, 2009, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123150722, accessed May 26, 2009. 92 Stephen Clark, “Air Force deems TacSat craft ready for operational mission,” Spaceflight Now, June 12, 2010, at http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1006/12tacsat/index.html, accessed September 17, 2010. 93 Vago Muradian, “A Stealthy, supersonic (and secret) UAV,” September 1, 2004, http://militaryphotos.net/forums/archive/index.php/t-21934.html, accessed May 26, 2009. 94 Sagar Kulkarni Thiruvananthapuram, “India readying weapon to destroy enemy satellites: Saraswat,” Indian Express, Jan. 3, 2010, at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-readying-weapon-to-destroy-enemy-satel/562776/, accessed June 19, 2010. 95 Victoria Samson, “India’s missile defense/anti-satellite nexus,” The Space Review, May 10, 2010, at http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1621/1, accessed June 19, 2010.
34
international approbation that could result, and instead plans to further develop its BMD
interceptor system, based on Agni-III technology, so that it could leapfrog technology in
order to rapidly field an ASAT weapon if needed.96 India has tested exo-atmospheric
ballistic missile interceptors that could be evolved into kinetic-kill ASAT weapons, and
India is also investing in laser weapons which could be applied to an ASAT mission as
well.97 India operates one dedicated military EO imaging satellite, the CARTOSAT 2A,
and three other dual purpose EO satellites.98 India also launched its first SAR imaging
platform, RISAT-2, on April 20, 2009 to monitor its borders with China, Bangladesh and
Pakistan.99 The IAF has long been trying to establish an Aerospace Command similar to
NORAD at Thiruvananthapuram, without success to date.100
96 Ibid. 97 James Carafano, “U.S.-India Strategic Partnership on Laser –Based Missile Defense,” Family Security Matters, January 29, 2009, at http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.2393/pub_detail.asp, accessed June 19, 2010. See also A.S. Joshi, et al., “Development of high powered laser and relevant technology in India,” Fusion Engineering and Design, February 1999, pp. 67-70. 98 “India in multi-satellite launch,” BBC News, April 28, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7370391.stm, accessed January 24, 2010. See also Madhumathi D.S., “ISRO arm may get more satellite launch contracts,” The Hindu Business Line, January 23, 2008, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2008/01/23/stories/2008012350332800.htm, accessed January 24, 2010. 99 Rahul Bedi, “India launches border-control imaging satellite,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 29, 2009, p. 15. 100 Radhakrishna Rao, “Establishing an Indian Space Command,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, August 27, 2009, http://ipcs.org/article/defence/establishing-an-indian-space-command-2958.html, accessed January 24, 2010. See also “Aerospace command soon, says IAF chief,” The Hindu, January 29, 2007, http://www.thehindu.com/2007/01/29/stories/2007012914880100.htm, accessed January 24, 2010.
35
Russia
Russian officials have recently announced that Russia is developing ASAT
weapons, and has increased its military space budget.101 Russia has a robust space
program and rich history of ASAT weapons development to build upon. The former
Soviet Union developed particularly notable co-orbital satellite killer, laser and directed
energy ASAT weapons.102 And while much of the Soviet military space architecture
degraded sharply in the 1990s, the Sary Shagan facility in Kazakhstan remains in use.
Russia’s missile defense and cyber warfare capabilities have also grown impressively in
recent years, providing Russia with key capabilities that could be harnessed to support
any future ASAT missions.103 Russia is constructing ballistic missile defense architecture
and systems that could play a leading role in any future ASAT program.
Japan
Japan began a space-based satellite reconnaissance program in response to North
Korea’s test firing of a short-ranged ballistic missile over Japanese territory in 1998.
Currently Japan operates three EO reconnaissance satellites and one SAR reconnaissance
satellite; and plans to launch two next-generation SAR satellites in 2011 and 2012,
respectively, as well as two next-generation EO satellites in 2011 and 2014,
101 “Russia developing anti-satellite weapons, official says” New York Times, March 5, 2009, at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/europe/05iht-05satellite.20621954.html, accessed June 27, 2010. 102 For an excellent overview see Desmond Ball, “Assessing China’s ASAT Program,” Nautilus Institute, June 14, 2007, at http://nautilus.rmit.edu.au/forum-reports/0714s-ball/, accessed June 27, 2010. 103 “Missile Race between West and East,” Russian Space Web, undated, at http://www.russianspaceweb.com/chronology_missiles.html, accessed June 19, 2010. See also “A-135,” Astronautix, http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/a135.htm, accessed June 19, 2010; and Michael Jansinski, “Russia: Strategic Early Warning, Command and Control, and Missile Defense Overview,” NTI, March 2001, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/abmc3/c3abmovr.htm, accessed June 27, 2010.
36
respectively.104 Japan is also seeking to develop a number of other space-based C4ISR
capabilities such as a dedicated military communications satellite, an infrared early
warning satellite, a SIGINT-collection satellite, and an independent navigation and
positioning satellite network.105
Taiwan
Taiwan has co-developed and operated two dual-use imagery satellites, the now-
retired Formosat-1 and the Formosat-2. Taiwan also purchases commercial satellite
imagery from a number of sources to augment its space-based reconnaissance program.
However, Taiwan currently faces a gap in domestic satellite imagery coverage because its
next-generation imagery satellite, Formosat-5, has suffered repeated delays, and will not
be launched until the end of 2013 or the first part of 2014.106 Revelations that Mainland
China exploited a commercial Singaporean communications satellite the Taiwanese
military was using during exercises have prompted Taiwan to consider building its own
communications satellite to guarantee secure communications. However, for budgetary
and technical reasons, it appears unlikely that such a satellite would be developed in the
near to mid-future.107 Taiwan is currently seeking to establish the technical foundation to
104 Secretariat of Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Basic Plan for Space Policy, (Secretariat of Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, June 2009), p. 7, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/keikaku/pamph_en.pdf, accessed January 2, 2010. 105 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Outlines Military Space Strategy Guidelines,” Defense News, February 23, 2009, p. 29. 106 Peter B. de Selding, “SpaceX Falcon to Launch Taiwan’s Formosat-5 Craft,” Space News, June 15, 2010, at http://www.spacenews.com/contracts/taiwan-orders-spacex-falcon-launch-for-formosat-5.html, accessed June 24, 2010. 107 Lin Xiuhui, “Turning to Develop Remote Sensing Satellites, Taiwan Leaps to Asia’s Number One” (Zhuanxiang fazhan yaoce weixing Taiwan yuewei yazhou diyiming), New Taiwan, October 13, 2005, at http://www.newtaiwan.com.tw/bulletinview.jsp?bulletinid=22863, accessed June 24, 2010.
37
conduct its own satellites launches. As part of this program, Taiwan began launching
sounding rockets in 1998, with seven launches having been conducted to date.108
Target Satellites
U.S. Satellites
China is well aware that the dramatic conventional war fighting advantage that the
U.S. possesses is due in large part to its space assets. As such, China has been acquiring
the ability to degrade or destroy U.S. satellites in the event of a conflict. While China
would have to weigh a number of factors in considering any attack on U.S. satellites and
consider the risks incurred and the benefits expected, the inherent U.S. vulnerability in
space, combined with the disproportionate degree to which the U.S. would rely on its
space capabilities in the event of a regional conflict, lowers the ASAT first strike
threshold to a considerable degree.109 Chinese strategic planners have described U.S.
satellites as “irresistible” targets.110 It is therefore reasonable to expect that a number of
critical U.S. satellites would be targeted in the event of a crisis or conflict.
In a crisis situation prior to the onset of hostilities, it is probable that reversible
effects attacks would be employed, including the blinding, dazzling or jamming of EO,
SAR and ELINT satellites in LEO, and the jamming of communications and SIGINT
satellites in GEO. It seems unlikely that early-warning sensors would be targeted due to
the severe escalatory effects that could have. It also seems unlikely that GPS satellites
108 “Sounding Rocket 7 Completes Science Experiment,” National Space Organization (NSPO), May 5, 2010, at http://www.nspo.org.tw/2008e/news/news_content.php?id=000311, accessed June 24, 2010. 109 Forrest E. Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment, (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA: 2010), pp. ix-x. 110 Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Future in Space: Implications for U.S. Security,” Space.com, September 20, 2005, at: http://www.space.com/adastra/china_implications_0505.html, accessed June 24, 2010.
38
would be targeted for interference or jamming for a number of reasons. From a Chinese
perspective, attacks upon GPS satellites could be counter productive because the PLA
also exploits GPS data for its own use. Attacks on GPS satellites would also risk
electronic fratricide because China’s own Beidou navigation satellites occupy similar
orbits. However, it is highly likely that such considerations would be ignored in the
event that a crisis erupted into conflict.
In a conflict scenario, China could be expected to engage in the full-spectrum of
ASAT attacks, including the kinetic destruction of satellites and physical attacks on their
ground-based support infrastructure, irregardless of space debris or escalation concerns.
Primary targets would include:
1) KH-12 “Advanced KENNENAN/Improved Crystal” EO satellites in
LEO. They are very large (10-15 tons), limited in number (3-4) and
have the ability to take high resolution images in the visible and
infrared spectrums.111
2) “Lacrosse/Onyx” SAR satellites in LEO. They are large (8 tons),
limited in number (3-4) and have the ability to take high resolution
radar images in the dark, through cloud cover, and (to a limited degree)
under the Earth’s surface.112
3) “White Cloud/PARCAE” Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) in
LEO. They are limited in number (4-5 pairs), operate in co-orbital
111 See Bill Sweetman, “Spatial Awareness: Satellite Imaging Systems Span the Globe,” Jane’s International Defence Review, May 2007, pp. 46-48. 112 Ibid.
39
constellations and provide ELINT useful for monitoring and targeting
warships and (potentially) air defense systems.113
4) TacSats are small, operational satellites in LEO with various SIGINT,
EO and SAR imagery sensors. They are currently limited in number
(2-3), although they could greatly increase in the future as part of the
responsive space effort.
5) Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites in HEO and GEO, are
large, limited in number (2 currently in HEO, and 4 planned for GEO),
and critical for a number of early warning, missile tracking and ISR
missions.114 It is one of the U.S. Air Force Space Command’s most
critical space systems.115
6) Military communications satellites such as the Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS), Milstar and the next-generation Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System satellites, are all limited in
number and vital to national security.116
Satellites in LEO could be targeted by China’s SC-19, road-mobile, kinetic-kill
vehicles. They could also be targeted with high-powered directed energy weapons, co- 113 See Major A. Andronov, “The U.S. Navy’s ‘White Cloud’ Spaceborne ELINT System,” http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/surveill/noss_andronov.htm, accessed on May 26, 2009. 114 “Space Based Infrared System – High (SBIRS High),” Lockheed Martin, 2010, at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/SpaceBasedInfraredSystemHigh/index.html, accessed June 25, 2010. 115 See the Air Force fact sheet “Space Based Infrared System,” Los Angeles Air Force Base, at http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5330, accessed June 25, 2010. 116 See their respective Air Force fact sheets: “Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS),” Los Angeles Air Force Base, http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5333, accessed June 25, 2010; “Milstar,” Los Angeles Air Force Base, at http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5328, accessed June 25, 2010; “Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System,” Los Angeles Air Force Base, at http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5319, accessed June 25, 2010.
40
orbital weapons, cyber attacks and radiofrequency devices. Satellites in GEO could be
targeted with a similar set of weapons, but due to their great distances from the Earth’s
surface, are probably most vulnerable to co-orbital attacks of various descriptions, the
most desirable of which from the attackers perspective would be space mines, or micro-
satellites that orbit near their targets ready to explode on command.117
Attacks would be supported by China’s land-based space surveillance radars, and
fleet of six Yuanwang (远望) space tracking ships. They could also be augmented with
physical attacks upon ground-based receiving and tracking stations, most likely in the
form of long-range submarine launched cruise missiles. Targets would include the
satellite tracking stations in the Pacific Ocean on Guam, Kwajalein and Hawaii and the
tracking station in the Indian Ocean on Diego Garcia.118 Cyber attacks could also be
launched on these facilities as well as key space C2 facilities such as major U.S. Space
Command facilities Peterson Air Force Base (AFB), Schriever AFB, and Vandenberg
AFB. These attacks could be launched directly or against critical infrastructure
supporting these bases. The cumulative result being that the U.S. could find itself
blinded or severely impaired in the opening moments of conflict.
117 Richard L. Garwin, “Space Weapons: Not yet,” Discussion Paper for Pugwash Meeting No. 283, May 14, 2003, at http://www.fas.org/rlg/030522-space.pdf, accessed June 25, 2010. 118 See the U.S. Space Command Fact Sheet: “Space Surveillance,” at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usspc-fs/space.htm, accessed June 25, 2010; “U.S. Space Organizations,” AU Space Primer, July 24, 2003, p. 2-7, at http://space.au.af.mil/primer/us_space_organizations.pdf, accessed June 25, 2010; and see also the information page on Altair “Space Operations,” Reagan Test Site, at http://www.smdc.army.mil/KWAJ/SpaceOps.html, accessed June 25, 2010.
41
Image: U.S. Space Surveillance Network Source: Air University Space Primer
Allied and Regional Satellites
Growing military space architecture in the Asia-Pacific region could lead to the
targeting of allied and friendly regional satellites by China in future conflict scenarios.
India and Russia are developing ASAT capabilities of their own as a means of deterring
potential Chinese attacks upon their satellites. Japan and Taiwan are also developing the
technical foundation upon which future ASAT capabilities could be eventually
developed. Japan’s successful testing of SM-3 interceptor 100 miles over the Pacific
Ocean is a demonstration of its latent ASAT capability.119 One key factor that might
limit the operational deployment of any future ASAT capabilities by Taiwan, Japan and
India is their limited satellite tracking networks. While the regional acquisition of
119 Amy Butler, “SM-3 Scores Hit In Japanese Test,” Aviation Week, October 29, 2009, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/SM3102909.xml&headline=SM-3%20Scores%20Hit%20In%20Japanese%20Test, accessed June 25, 2010.
Space Surveillance Network
Worldwide network of 29 optical and radar (Mechanical, Phased Array) sensors
Thule
Clear
CavalierBeale
Socorro EglinCape Cod
Maui
AscensionDiego Garcia
Fylingdales
Kwajalein (4)
Millstone/Haystack/Hax
AFSSS
MSSS (5)
TOS
Shemya
MSX/SBV
Dedicated sensors
Contributing sensors
Collateral sensors
Globus II
42
increasingly capable missile defense support sensors such as long-range early warning
radars will provide a basic means of tracking satellites as well as missiles, these will
likely be insufficient for ASAT operations. As such, the limited number of critical
military and/or dual-use satellites deployed by China’s neighbors, and their relative
inability to respond to ASAT attacks in kind, will leave countries such as Taiwan, Japan
and India acutely vulnerable to ASAT attacks for the foreseeable future. Russia, despite
its more robust satellite and satellite support architecture, and its implicit ability to
respond in kind to Chinese ASAT attacks, must also be considered quite vulnerable to
Chinese ASAT attacks because of its over reliance upon space assets to monitor its vast
Far East.
Chinese Satellites
China’s military space program has made impressive strides over the past decade,
and China is fielding a number of satellites that would make for tempting targets in future
conflict scenarios. As the country most capable of employing such strikes, the U.S.
would almost certainly be primarily interested in disabling or destroying Chinese
satellites supporting their ASBM system of system, theater missiles strikes and military
communications. These would include China’s Yaogan/Jianbing EO/SAR satellites,
China’s Haiyang ocean monitoring satellites, the Tianlian-1 relay satellite and the
Fenghuo 1 No. 2 (Chinasat 22A) and the Shentong-1 (Chinasat 20) military
communications satellites.120 Attacks could also be made on satellite receiving stations
120 For an excellent overview of China’s satellite programs see Andrew S. Erickson, “Eyes in the Sky,” Proceedings, April 2010, pp. 36-41. See also “DongFangHong 3 Communications Satellite,” SinoDefense, June 7, 2010, at http://www.sinodefence.com/space/spacecraft/dongfanghong3.asp, accessed June 25, 2010.
43
on Hainan Island and near Beijing, as well as the Xian Satellite Monitoring and Control
Center.
Image: Kwajalein Tracking Radar Source: Air University Space Primer
Implications
The U.S. relies upon space to a far higher degree than China, and as a result has
the most to lose from China’s ASAT weapons programs. However, countries such as
India, Russia, Japan and Taiwan also could also be greatly affected, and all have reacted
to China’s advanced missile and ASAT developments with alarm.
China’s development of asymmetric capabilities including TBMs, ASBMs, long
range cruise missiles and ASATs is the primary driver behind the regional missile
defense and military space competition. China and the United States are the primary
players in this competition, with India, Japan, Taiwan and Russia representing secondary
players. While China’s space program continues to mature, catching up to the U.S. in
some regards while even surpassing it in others, it is all but certain that competition will
intensify and the possibility of conflict will greatly increase. This stems from three basic
problems. The first is a continued lack of transparency and dialogue stemming from a
44
fundamental unwillingness on the part of the Chinese to address their counter space
program (let alone establish enduring, stable military-to-military relations that would
facilitate such a conversation). The Chinese view the mere discussion of ASATs as off
limits, as to them the mere act of entering into dialogue represents a concession in and of
itself.121
This relates to the second problem: a Chinese view that conflict in space is
inevitable and as such ASAT operations should be seamlessly incorporated into their war
planning. Since any future war will involve outer space, and since the space domain
could provide China with the edge it needs for victory, the perception is that it makes
very little to sense talk about it. The third problem stems from the fact that the Chinese
do not view space the way the U.S. and others do. Nor do they view it the way the former
Soviet Union did during the cold war. They claim sovereignty over all the air and space
over their territory extending into infinity, and do not recognize the strategic stabilizing
value that comes from having space-based reconnaissance and surveillance satellites, and
to the contrary view such assets as being hostile in nature. Given the lack of transparency
and dialogue it will be hard to convince the Chinese otherwise, and thus the future of any
treaty or legal framework (however appealing in theory) seems dim at best.122
The technology and capabilities for space warfare exist today, and while no
weapons are currently deployed in orbital space, China’s actions may be leading its
neighbors and the United States down the slippery slope towards space weaponization.
Several activities the PRC is engaging in could lead to an environment in which the
deployment and use of weapons in space could be seen as the natural and logical next
121 Ian Easton, Presentation on ASAT Weapons, “2010 Cooperation and Conflict in the Global Commons” conference, Virginia Beach, 30 June 2010. 122 Ibid.
45
step.123 China’s space program has been from its very inception, and remains today, a
fundamentally military endeavor.124 The Chinese space program still lacks the
bureaucratic structures necessary to make it a civilian organization like NASA in both
focus and culture. In fact, despite impressive achievements in the manned, civil and
scientific space arenas, China’s space program is still highly militarized, with the PLA
developing and operating its satellites as well as its launch sites and operations center
infrastructure.125
Image: Chinese YuanWang-3 Satellite Tracking Ship Source: People’s Daily
As a result, the U.S. is developing precise global strike weapons to serve as a
deterrent and/or retaliatory capability in the face of the emerging ASAT threat. One
example of this can be seen in the recent testing of a hypersonic cruise missile northwest
of Hawaii. Should such a capability reach maturity, it could be forward deployed to the
123 Ibid., pp. 105-106. 124 Kevin Pollpeter, Building for the Future: China’s Progress in Space Technology During the Tenth 5-Year Plan And The U.S. Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), p. 3. 125 Ibid., p. 45.
46
region in a number of different variants. For example, a land-based variant could be
deployed on Okinawa, an air-based variant on Guam, and sea-based variants aboard U.S.
Navy submarines, and surface ships. However, the ability to target mobile-launchers in
real time may prove to be far from assured due to China’s own missile defense and
ASAT weapons programs. In terms of developing an ASAT deterrent, the U.S. is
looking at retaliating against a Chinese ASAT attack with “prompt global strike”
weapons such as modified, non-nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles; stealth
bombers armed with “bunker buster” bombs; and high-speed, long-range cruise missiles
that could target Chinese ASAT missile sites very rapidly from modified Ohio-class
nuclear submarines.126 In one influential strategic assessment, strikes against China’s
ASAT systems were described as “essential.”127
The Pacific island of Guam is playing a key role in the U.S. strategic
recalibration, as it is undergoing a massive construction effort to support a wide range of
Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps missions. In terms of counter ASAT missions, these
include housing and support facilities for Global Hawk UAVs, B-2 stealth bombers, fast-
attack submarines, cruise missile submarines and an aircraft carrier, all of which would
play a role in responding to any Chinese ASAT attack. In particular, the Navy’s two
Pacific-based cruise missile submarines, Ohio and Michigan, can be armed with up to
154 cruise missiles to target Chinese ASAT missile sites. New generations of supersonic
and hypersonic cruise missiles and UAVs are also future payload possibilities. These
modified boomers can stay on patrol off the Chinese coast for up to 400 days, surfacing
126 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “Superiority Complex: Why America’s growing nuclear supremacy may make war with China more likely,” The Atlantic (July/August 2007), pp. 88-90. 127 Jan van Tol, et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-Of-Departure Operational Concept, (Center For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments: Washington D.C., 2010), p. 66.
47
in Guam in the middle of a deployment for 21 days to change crews, do maintenance and
load fresh supplies. The Ohio and the Michigan deployed for operations in the Pacific in
2007 and 2008, respectively, and represent the U.S. military’s strongest counter ASAT
deterrent at the current time.128
Other countries in the region are also developing long-range, precision strike
capability to offset China’s capabilities. Taiwan is reported to have deployed up to 240
cruise missiles and has long been researching rocket technology which could lead to a
future ballistic missile capability. Taiwan’s defense ministry also is believed to be
planning the deployment of 150 medium range missiles that could target Beijing.129 India
is indigenously developing long-range cruise missiles, while also co-developing high-
performance cruise missiles with Russia. In addition to indigenous cruise missiles, such
as the subsonic air- and ground-launched Nirbhay under development, the Indian military
is expected to purchase 1000 BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles by the end of the
decade.130 India’s plans to test a ballistic missile capable of striking any target in China
as part of a program that has seen the production of what are said to be some of the most
accurate ballistic missiles in the world.131
128 Richard Halloran, “Guam, All Over Again,” Airforce-Magazine.com, January 2008, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/January%202008/0108Guam.aspx, accessed May 26, 2009. 129 Taiwan to test missile that could reach Beijing: report, Space Daily, June 2, 2010, at http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Taiwan_to_test_missile_that_could_reach_Beijing_report_999.html, accesses June 16. See also “Deploying 150 Ballistic Missiles Against the Mainland? Taiwan’s ‘Ministry of Defense’ denies it” (Bushu 150mei dui dalu daodan? Taiwan ‘Guofangbu’ fouren), Huanqiu, June 2, 2010, at http://mil.huanqiu.com/Taiwan/2010-06/839140.html, accessed June 18, 2010. 130 “Indian Army will Buy 1000 Cruise Missiles within Ten Years” (Yinjun 10niannei jiangmai qianmei xunhangdaodan), Huanqiu, February 4, 2010, at http://www.takungpao.com/news/10/02/04/junshi08-1211493.htm, accessed June 18, 2010. See also Douglas Barrie and Neelam Mathews, “Su-30MKI To Get Indian Nirhbay Cruise Missile,” Aviation Week, May 10, 2010, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/awst/2010/05/10/AW_05_10_2010_p28-224612.xml, accessed June 18, 2010. 131 “India Says It Will Test Long-Range Missile,” Defense News, February 10, 2010, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4493025&c=ASI&s=TOP, accessed February 15, 2010.
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Should these current trends continue one could expect to see the nascent arms
race now brewing in the region expand considerably over the coming years, with the
potential for shifting strategic balances and negative impacts on overall stability. Clearly
any possible U.S. military contingency in the Taiwan Straits would require secure
satellites as the U.S. becomes ever more reliant upon its space systems. Moreover,
reconnaissance satellites are thought to limit the risk inherent in the build-up of forces
that both the PRC and the U.S. could be expected to deploy to the region in the event of a
crisis. However, if the U.S. was blinded as the result of a preemptive Chinese ASAT
attacks, the conflict could quickly escalate to a dangerous level. While China’s
asymmetric strategies revolve around surprise attacks with conventionally armed missiles
at the outset of a conflict, such attacks could lead to nuclear exchanges in a frightening
number of scenarios for one simple reason: when national leaders are blinded and
panicked – which is exactly what is intended and the most likely result if China’s ASAT
and cyber attacks in the opening seconds and minutes of war were successful – they tend
to miscalculate, overreact and generally do things they would never consider rational in
other circumstances. Therefore, China’s asymmetric strategies are inherently escalatory
in nature, as they depend upon a massive surprise attack to blind and confuse their enemy
at the outset of conflict; and their weapon systems of choice – TBMs, long-range cruise
missiles, ASATs and ASBMs are all inherently destabilizing in that they are offensively
orientated, difficult to defend against to the point of inviting offensive reprisal attacks of
an even greater magnitude, and, in some cases, are difficult to distinguish from a nuclear
first strike given their similar ballistic trajectories.
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According to two experts on the subject, “if there is a great- power war in the
twenty-first century, our crystal ball says that it will be between the United States and
China over Taiwan, with a very serious potential for a horrible escalatory process.”132
This underscores the gravity of the topic as well as the negative impact the Chinese shift
towards fielding ASAT and other asymmetric weapons and strategies could have.
Image: Laser Links Source: AsiaEye Blog
Conclusion
The Asia-Pacific region is witnessing increasing competition over the air and
space domains as evidenced by regional missile defense and military space build-ups.
China’s rapid development, testing and deployment of advanced missile and ASAT
weapons capabilities is the primary driver behind the competition. This competition is
likely to intensify over time given regional actors’ sense of vulnerability and the key
strategic importance of the air and space domains. This could lead to a proliferation of
long-range precision strike and ASAT capabilities, and could have highly detrimental
132 Richard Bush and Michael E. O’Hanlon, A War Like No Other: The Truth about China’s Challenge to America (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), p. 114.
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effect on regional stability. Various options exist for the mitigation of such outcomes,
however, a number of factors suggest such options will be fraught with difficulty.
Given the increasing nature of the threat U.S. and allied satellites face, there has
been a natural tendency in many corners to react with calls for an ASAT treaty or test
ban. Indeed notional frameworks that have been proposed are highly appealing because
they promise to greatly benefit the U.S., guaranteeing the continued access to space while
also showing U.S. leadership and demonstrating moral authority. However, a number of
unpalatable realities should be recognized and considered prior to the onset of any
negotiations.
The first is that China is keenly aware of the U.S. dependence upon the space
domain, and Beijing recognizes its own relative lack of dependence. Chinese strategists
also fully aware that space assets are inherently vulnerable to ASAT attacks, and that
even the destruction of a relatively small number of critical nodes in outer space could
potentially paralyze the entire system, allowing for an otherwise impossible asymmetric
victory over a technological superior foe. These factors are joined with the stark lack of
transparency that exists in non-democratic countries such as China, the inability to
discriminate between peaceful and malicious intentions in space, the inherent and
unavoidable dual-use of space technology, the frequent inability to verify treaty
commitments are kept and the historic proclivity of non-democratic governments to break
treaty commitments and avoid post-discovery punishment.
Therefore it is in the U.S. best interest to approach proposed ASAT treaties and
test bans with a healthy measure of caution and skepticism. In the interim, it would be
advisable to leave all options on the table, including the increased development of active
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and passive satellite defenses, the continued development of various means of deterrence
such as prompt global strike weapons and ASAT capabilities, and the exploration of
creative solutions. One such solution, worth further exploration is Albert Wohlstetter’s
space keep-out zone proposal, which would allow for the destruction of intrusive objects
approaching recognized critical satellite-inhabited zones.133 Such a proposal would go a
long way towards undercutting the utility of parasite satellites or space mines in MEO
and GEO. The increasing congestion and competition surrounding these orbital slots,
makes the idea all the more interesting. The major drawback of such a proposal would be
that it would represent the weaponization of outer space in the form of a space-to-space
weapon. However, because ASAT threats are proliferating in number and character
much more will have to be done. And, as is widely agreed upon, a powerful boost in
space surveillance will be critical. The launch of the first Space Based Surveillance
Satellite (SBSS) on September 25, 2010,134 is a step in the right direction and a clear
indication that the U.S. Space Command is committed to providing this crucial
capability.
Looking ahead, it will be of critical importance to seek various means by which to
mitigate the potential future arms races brewing in the Asia-Pacific. It will also be
critical to curtail the threat of ASAT attacks, especially kinetic attacks that could leave
entire orbital domains too hazardous for future satellite operations and manned missions
133 Albert Wohlstetter and Brian G. Chow, “Arms Control That Could Work,” opinion, Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1985, p.28; and Self-Defense Zones in Space, study for Integrated Long-Term Defense Strategy in partial fulfillment of MDA903-84-C-0325, Marina del Rey, CA: Pan Heuristics, July 1986, available from www.albertwohlstetter.com. 134 “U.S.A.F. – It’s Space for SBSS (Launch),” Satnews Daily, September 26, 2010, at http://www.satnews.com/cgi-bin/story.cgi?number=1527065563, accessed October 3, 2010. “Boeing Team Ships First SBSS Spacecraft To Launch Site,” Space Daily, June 2, 2010, at http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Boeing_Team_Ships_First_SBSS_Spacecraft_To_Launch_Site_999.html, accessed June 25, 2010.
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for decades and possibly centuries. Much hinges upon China’s willingness to increase
engagement and transparency with regional stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific as it
continues to modernize its military and space capabilities. The U.S. policy has been
noticeably cautious and restrained on the development of long-range strike capabilities,
BMD capabilities that could lead to the undermining of China’s nuclear deterrent, and
ASAT weapons capabilities. In recent years the trend has been towards increasing self-
restraint, seeking to assure China and others that the U.S. has no aggressive or
destabilizing intentions in the air and space domains and is willing to engage in further
engagement and work towards a greater level of transparency and international
cooperation.
A window of opportunity may exist for China to reverse the effects its
destabilizing weapons developments and strategies have had and assuage the fears it has
created in the region. Should Beijing decide to take concrete steps to do so vis-à-vis a
combination of sustained engagement, meaningful increases in transparency,135 and work
towards an INF-like agreement with its neighbors and the U.S., substantial benefits could
be expected for the region in terms of long-term strategic stability. However, should the
current trends continue unchecked, it is likely that the U.S. and its allies and partners in
the region will at some point in the near to mid-term future find it in their overwhelming
national security interests to shift away from the primarily defensive, reactive strategies
and capabilities currently in place, and towards offensive, proactive strategies and
capabilities with which to deter China. Once that happens, the competition currently
emerging in the air and space mediums of the Asia-Pacific region could transform into
135 As opposed to primarily symbolic steps such as the continued release of China’s National Defense White Papers.
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something far more worrisome: an unstable multi-faceted regional arms race that could
have non-linear and unpredictable long-term effects. It is therefore of the utmost
importance that this issue be afforded further attention and study in the years ahead.
Index
Image: China’s ASAT Options Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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Image: Overveiw of China’s Space Launch Capabilities Source: Rob Chambers, Naval Postgraduate School
Image: Dedicated Military Spacecraft Launched 2009 Source: Space Security 2010
Image: Types of Earth Orbits Source: Space Security 2010