THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY- I—FRANK

Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 9 (1999) pp. 163-231Copyright © 1999 Cambridge University Press

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: IPRIMARY ENTITIES

RICHARD M. FRANK

The aim of the present study is to examine the most basic conceptsand terms of those fundamentals of AS'arite ontology and theologyabout which there was generally common agreement within theschool.1 The major features of their teaching concerning atomsand accidents and God and His attributes are well known and areoften, if not generally, regarded as relatively simple. One reasonfor their being so regarded is that in most studies, including myown, far too much has too often been taken for granted or treatedonly superficially. Many of the most fundamental concepts andthe associated terminology have not been thoroughly examined;and concommitantly a number of expressions employed in trans-lating and explaining the texts have not been properly scrutinizedwith regard to how accurately they represent the intention of theArabic. Though omitting all formal discussion of the As'arites'antecedents and their opponents, we shall give some seriousattention to the Arabic lexicography concerning a number ofwords in hopes of gaining a clearer view of how they were heardand so of their uses and nuances. This will also help bring to thefore certain important^ features of the AS'arite theology in itsbeing, like that of al-Gubba'i and his Mu'tazilite followers, aMuslim science originally thought out and elaborated in Arabicwith no commitment to and little or no direct influence of prior,non-Muslim traditions. Because the terminology is of centralimportance to our purpose here, we have given the Arabic morefrequently than might normally seem required.

1 Accordingly, the notions of ontologically distinct "states" (ahwal) as held by al-Baqillani and al-6uwayni will not be treated. Nor will we offer more than a very ele-mentary discussion of the concepts and terminology that have to do withrelationships of primary entities, e.g., those that involve matters such as an atom'sbeing black or a cognition's relationship to its object, and the like, for these are top-ics that embrace a number of complex issues about which there were disagreementson various levels.

164 RICHARD M. FRANK

Al-Baqillani says that some As'arites, among others, hold that"the most universal nouns are 'say", 'dat', 'nafs', and "ayn' andthat by 'universal nouns' (al-asma'u al-amma) they mean thosedescriptions which include all beings' (al-tasmiyatu al-mustami-latu 'aid sa'iri al-dawdt).2 To say that these are the most uni-versal of nouns might appear to take 'dot', 'nafs', and ''ayn' assynonymous with 'say" viewed simply from the standpoint ofordinary lexicography, as al-Mubarrad says that 'say" is "themost universal expression you can use" ia'ammu ma takallamtabihi).3 Within the context of kalam, however, one formally dis-tinguishes "those nouns which convey the assertion that theentities [referred to] have actuality in being {tufidu al-itbata li-al-dawat), 'say", for instance, which is the most universal ofpositive nouns" (a'ammu asma'i al-itbat).4

2 Al-Baqillani, K. al-Tamhld [hereafter Tarn], ed. R. McCarthy (Beyrouth, 1957),p. 234, 7f. ('description' is here singular since these terms are taken as synonymous).The reason that some, including al-Baqillani, do not hold these to be the most universalis that 'known' and several others may be used of both the existent and the non-existent,while these, according to common AS'arite doctrine, are used only of the actually exis-tent; cf. Abu Bakr ibn Furak, Mugarrad maqalat al-As'ari [hereafter Mug], ed.D. Gimaret (Beyrouth, 1987), pp. 252, 4ff. and 255, 4ff. To predicate 'say" of a non-exis-tent (i.e., a possible or imagined) being is to use the word in an extended sense (tawassu';ibid., p. 253, 12f. and al-Qusayri, Lata'if al-isarat, ed. I. Busyuni, 6 vols. (Cairo, 1968-1971), 4, p. 200, 13ff. (ad al-Qur'dn, 22.1). Note that, following the usage of the gram-marians, 'ism' is employed as a term for all nominal forms, including verbal adjectives,both active and passive, which are used as attributives and/or predicates. Our renderingof the word, therefore, varies according to what seems most appropriate in each context.'Say" and the other words under discussion here are taken up in a somewhat differentperspective in D. Gimaret, Les Noms divins en Islam (Paris, 1988), pp. 133ff.

3 Al-Mubarrad, K. al-Muqtadab, ed. M. A. 'Udayma, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1964-68), vol. 4,p. 280. [The indefinite noun] "is not particular to one individual of a class apart fromall the others, e.g., 'man', 'horse'..." (Mubarrad 4, p. 276); "the most indefinite of nounsis 'say" for it is non-specific with respect to all things (ankaru al-asmd'i qawlu al-qa'ilisay'un li-annahu mubhamun fi al-asya'i kulliha: ibid. 3, p. 186), Similarly Abu al-Qasim al-Zaggagi says (al-Gumal fi al-nahw, ed. A.T. al-Hamad [Beyrouth, 1984],p. 178) '"say" is the most indefinite of indefinites, then 'gawharun', then 'body', then'animal', then 'human being' (insdn), then 'man' (ragul);" cp. also Istiqaq asmd Allah,ed. A. H. Mubarak (Cairo, 1974), p. 466, ult. The occurrence of 'gawhar' has in this sen-tence - for us at least - a somewhat peripatetic ring, but that it be meant as an equiva-lent to Greek ouaio is quite implausible. The word is used in its normal Arabic sensewhere, for example al-Mubarrad says (3, p. 272) that [the names for] iron and silver andthe like, which are material substances (gawahir) cannot be employed as descriptives{la yun'atu bihd). Similarly Ibn Ginni says (al-Hasd'is, ed. M. A. al-Naggar, 3 vols.[Beyrouth, 1983], I, p. 119) that verbs are taken only from events not from substances(innama yastaqqu min al-hadati Id min al-gawhar), i.e., they are derived from verbalnouns, not from nouns that name material substances.

4 Mug, p. 252, lOf. (concerning the meanings of 'itbdf and the sense of 'positive'here, see below). So also 'mawgud', is termed a universal and a synonym of 'say"; cf.also ibid., p. 255, 6ff.

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 165

Discussing the semantics of 'mawgud' (existent/exists) al-As'arlsaid that it commonly means 'known', something a knower knows (mdwagadahu wdgidun), and that it is known by virtue of the knower's knowingit {mawgudun bi-wugudi al-wdgidi lahu) and by his knowing it so long as itis known to him. [...J But what is mawgud in an absolute sense {al-mawgudual-mutlaq), which is not correlated to a knower's knowing it, is whatever hasactuality and is, which is neither non-actual nor non-existent {al-tdbitu al-ka'inu alladl laysa bi-muntafin wa-la ma'dum).5

What he means by "absolute" is that 'mawgud' is not said withreference to or as implying any relationship, but only as assert-ing the actuality of the object/referent. The etymological expla-nation of the use of 'mawgud' in the sense of existent proposedhere may perhaps originate with al-As'ari's master, Abu 'All al-Gubba'i, whose study of the semantics of the Divine Names isjustly admired and was commonly followed even by his oppo-nents. The fact is, however, that the use most likely originatesnot from wagada, yagidu in the sense of to know, but in thesense of to find, as it would seem to be a caique on Syriac 'seklh'as a rendering of Greek 6v or undpxov.

Al-Ansari says:The existent (al-mawgud) is what has actuality and is {al-tdbitu al-kd'in),viz., a ddt and a nafs and an 'ayn. These are all expressions for a being {say').Every being is existent and every existent is a being; nothing is described by.'is a being' that is not described as being existent and nothing is described by'exists' that is not described by 'is a being' {ma Id yusafu bi-al-wugudi Idyusafu bi-kawnihi say'an).6

5 Mug, p. 27, 12ff. {Wagada, yagidu in the sense of to know commonly connotes toknow of one's own knowledge and is sometimes so distinguished from 'alima,ya'lamu and 'arafa,ya'rifu. It is clear from al-A5'ari's discussion here, however, thatthis distinction is not in play.) So also in Sirazi {La Profession de foi d'Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, ed. M. Bernand, Supplement aux Annales islamologiques, no. 11 [Cairo,1987], p. 67, lOf.) we read, "al-mawgiidu kuwa al-say'u a/-ka 'in ... fa-ma 'na qaw/indmawgudun wa-say'un wa-tabitun ma'nan wahid" and in Abu al-Ma'ali al^Guwayni,As-Samil ft Usul ad-Din, Some Additional Portions of the Text [hereafter Sam (81)],ed. R. M. Frank (Tehran, 1981), p. 48, 9f, "... anna al-tabita wa-al-say'a wa-al-mawguda 'ibardtun 'an mu'abbarin wahid." For a different use of the expression 'al-mawgudu al-mutlaq', see Abu al-Qasim al-Ansari, Sarh al-Irsad [hereafter S.Ir], MSPrinceton University Library, ELS no. 634, foi. 42r, llff, cited below.

6 Abu al-Qasim al-Ansari, al-Gunya ft usul al-din [hereafter Gn], MS III Ahmet no.1916, foi. 12r, 14ff. It is thusv that al-Guwayni cites al-Baqillani as denning to be a say'{al-say'iyya) by existence (Sam (81), p. 56, 20f). On the phrase 'al-tdbitu al-kd'in'here see n. 25 below.

166 RICHARD M. FRANKIn non-kalam usage 'daf commonly means (refers to or desig-nates) an individual being as such. Al-Sirafi thus in explainingwhy Slbawayh in the first line of his Book employs 'al-kalim' asthe name for words rather than (al-kalam' distinguishes severalkinds of nouns and says that 'al-kalim' is the name of theintended object itself (ismu dati al-say'), sc, words as such,while 'al-kalam' is a verbal noun (ismu al-ft'l) based on 'kalim'and that of the two classes, names of things/objects are primary(aqdamuhumd fi al-rutbati ismu al-ddt). In a later passage hesays:When you say 7 thought Zayd was leaving' you have no doubt concerningZayd, but have doubt only with regard to his leaving, whether it took placeor not; [...] and when you say 'Zayd is leaving' before introducing these verbs[e.g., 'I think', 'I know', and the like] you inform the hearer of his leaving,about which he didn't know, not about his person as such (datuhu), which heknew already.7

'Nafs' has many meanings in Arabic, most of which are of noconcern to us here.8 In its basic meaning it is taken by the lexi-cographers to name something associated with the ruh (lifebreath or pneuma) and so is employed also to mean the humanperson as a living being and also, thus, the (human) body (al-gasad).9 Thus al-Zaggag is cited in Lisan al-'arab as saying thatin the speech of the Arabs the word has two basic uses, the oneto mean the life breath and "the other in which it has the mean-ing of the whole entity/object and its basic reality as such(ma'na gumlati al-say'i wa-haqiqatihi), as in 'so-and-so killedhimself, destroyed himself, i.e., he brought destruction on hiswhole being and his very reality [i.e., as a living person]"(taqulu qatala nafsahu wa-ahlaka nafsahu ay awqa'a al-ihlakabi-datihi kullihi wa-haqiqatihi). Thus al-Ansari says (Gn, fol.36v, 21f.) "'nafs' refers to the actual reality of the being as such;

7 Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi, Sarh Kitab Sibawayh [hereafter SK], ed. R. 'Abd al-Tawwabet al, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1986-1990), vol. 1, p. 316, ad Slbawayh, al-Kitdb, 2 vols. (Bulaq,1316), vol. 1, p. 18, 1-5. In the sequel, where the citation is found, as here, in the mar-gins of the Bulaq edition of the Kitab reference is given simply asadloc.

8 For a list, cf. Gimaret, Noms, pp. 151ff.9 Lisan al-'arab, s.v. and al-Gawhari, Tag al-luga wa-sihah al-'arabiyya, 6 vols., ed.

T. A. 'Attar (Beyrouth, 1979), s.v., citing Ta'lab. So in the line of Ibn Abi Rabi'a{Diwan, # 204, 5): in kana saqamun fa-kana land I wa-lahd l-saldmu wa-sihhatu l-nafsi (If there is illness, let it be ours, while to her, well being and good health. Theplural, 'anfus' is treated as masculine because it is taken to refer to men: MagdlisTa'lab, ed. A. M. Hartin (Cairo, 1969), p. 252.

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES 167one says 'the cognition itself and the [instance of the accident]black itself (inna al-nafsa yunbi'u 'an haqiqati al-say'i yuqalunafsu al-'ilmi wa-nafsu al-sawdd).

So it is that 'dat', and 'nafs' and "ayn' are employed almostinterchangeably as emphatics: the very Self of the particularreferent: "The nafs of a thing is its 'ayn (nafsu al-say'i 'aynuhu)and is employed as an emphatic: 'ra'aytu fulanan nafsahu' and'ga'anl bi-nafsihV ('I saw so-and-so himself and 'he came to mein person')": (al-Gawhari, s.v.). Abu al-Hasan al-Tabari says, "ifsome one says 'so-and-so is king in Syria and Iraq' he means [hehas] dominion over Syria and Iraq, not that he is himself(datuhu) in them."10 Again, al-Sirafi says, you use"alimtu' when you mean the recognition of a particular object as such (datual-say') and you did not previously recognize it/him, as in 'I recognized Zayd';that is, you recognized him but did not recognize him earlier (SK, fol. 126r,6ff, ad Sibawayh 1, p. 18).11

In accord with this common usage, Ibn Furak says:To designate a body and assert the fact of a movement is not an assertion ofthe existence of the particular body as such {'aynu al-gism). The desire ofsome one who asks "did Zayd move?" and "did he leave Egypt?" is not toknow the individual, Zayd and that this individual actually exists in theworld {'aynu Zaydin wa-annahu mawgudu al-dati fi al-'alam); the desire ofthe one who asks the question concerns Zayd's departure and his movement(Mug, p. 218, 14ff.).

That is, he knows the particular being/person (dat, 'ayn) namedZayd and that he exists. The analysis here follows that of thegrammarians regarding predicational sentences, in which it isthe predicate (habar, hadit) only that confers information, since

10 Ta'wll al-ayat al-muskila, MS Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, Tal'at, mag. no. 490, fol.133v, 4ff.

11 Note that the '-hi' of datu al-say'i wa-lam takun 'arifan bihi refers to 'say" andnot to 'dat', which is simply an emphatic as in 'he himself. The phrase means theindividual as an individual. (With this contrast its use in the phrase 'mawgudu al-ddt' in the following citation (Mug, p. 218, 16)). It may be worth pointing out that inkalam works 'dat' is often treated as a masculine, e.g., Abu al-Ma'ali al-Guwaynl, al-Satnil fi usul al-din [hereafter Sam (69)], ed. A. S. al-Nas§ar (Cairo, 1969), p. 127, 9and 132, 11, but al-Sirafi in the passage translated above treats it more properly asfeminine (... Id datahu allati 'arafaha at the end of the passage cited). Regardingvariant readings, K = the portion of the text edited by H. Klopfer (Cairo, 1963), T =Tehran University Library, MS 350, and E = a paraphrase found in Escorial MS1610. NaSSar's edition is based on Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya MS kalam no. 1290,which is in fact a photocopy of MS Kopriilu no. 826 from part of which Klopfer pre-pared his edition.


the referent of the subject term (mubtada', ism) is assumed tobe known to the hearer.

With nouns that designate classes, 'dot' is often employed tomean the individual instance as such. Thus al-Mubarrad says(2, p. 296, 5) that, in contrast to the personal 'man', 'ma' isemployed "of non-human entities and of the attributes ofhuman beings" (li-dawati gayri al-adamiyyina wa-nu'uti al-adamiyyin). Ibn Furak speaking of "created atoms and bodies"says that their individual instances are numerically finite andlimited (dawatuha mutanahiyatun mahduda).12 So too, al-Baqillani speaks of "the power whereby God created classes andindividual beings (al-agnasu wa-al-dawat)"13 and al-Guwayni(Sam (69), p. 632, lOf.) says that "the act of naming [or referingto something] is a particular verbal utterance and is a particu-lar entity (qawlun min al-aqwali wa-datun min al-dawat)" andso too (ibid., p. 170, 14) "every action is a being and an entity(say'un wa-dai)." In the formal usage of the As'arites accord-ingly, 'daf, along with "ayn' and 'nafs\ employed as a simplenoun or predicate synonymous with 'say" means an actuallyexistent entity or being as such, its "Self."14 In this formalsense, however, 'say" is synonymous with 'mawgud'. "The defi-nition of 'say" is what exists; the definition of non-existent iswhat is not a say'" (haddu al-say'i huwa al-mawgud; haddu al-ma'dumi huwa alladi laysa bi-say')15. Accordingly, "every being(say') exists and every existent is a being" (Gn, fol. 12r, 15; forthe same assertion concerning 'nafs', see n. 29 below). "'Theexistence of atoms and of accidents' has no meaning other thantheir individual Selves (dawatuhuma); and their being created

12 R. Robert, Baydn muskil al-hadit des ibn Furak: Auswahl nach denHandschriften Leipzig, Leiden, London, und dem Vatikan, Analecta Orientalia 22(Rome, 1941), p. 19, 13f. [hereafter Baydn (K)].

13 Abu al-Qasim al-Baqillani, al-Insdf fimd yagib i'tiqdduh, ed. M. al-Kawtari, 2ndedn (Cairo, 1963), p. 23, 15. Cp. al-As'ari, Risdla ild ahl al-tagr bi-Bdb al-Abwdb[hereafter Tagr], in Dar al-Funiln: llahiyat Fakultesi Mecmuasi 8 (1928), pp. 80-108,at p. 93, llf. (= p. 65, 8f. in the edition of M. A. al-Gulaynid [Cairo, 1987]), where hesays the world has a single creator "ihtara'a a'yanahu... wa-hdlafa bayna agndsihi"using "ayn' where al-Baqillani employs 'ddt'. God's creating the classes of contingentbeings we shall take up later.

14 In denning "ayn' al-Gawhari says (s.v.), "wa-'aynu al-say'i nafsuhu, yuqdluhuwa huwa 'aynan wa-huwa huwa bi-'aynihi."

15 A. S. Abdel Haleem, "Early theological and juristic terminology: Kitdb al-Hududfi l-Usul by Ibn Furak," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 54, 1(1991): 5-41, p. 20, # 13f. [hereafter Hudud].


has no meaning other than the causing of their Selves to existafter they were not entities and beings and Selves (la ma'nd li-igadihima ilia itbatu dawatihima ba'da an lam takun datanwa-say'an wa-nafsan: Gn, fol. 13r, 9)."16 'Daf does not meanessence as essence is commonly associated with what a thing is.The dot of a being is not shared or common with that of otherbeings.

As meaning a single entity or individual being ldaf may beambivalent. That is, it is sometimes employed of compositebeings, as where it is used in Mug (p. 218, cited above) to referto a body or where al-Guwayni says that 'agsam' (greater inbody) means that there is a differential of size between the twobeings in question (bayna al-datayn)11 or where al-Qusayri18

says that "izamu al-daf (magnitude of being) refers to the mul-tiplicity of parts (Tahbir, fol. 78v, 8f.).19 In the most formalsense, however, cdat' properly describes or refers to a primaryentity as such, i.e., to a single, incomposite and indivisiblebeing20 that has actuality of existence either as an independentbeing (one that does not exist in a subject of any kind) or as onethat as such exists in another.

16 The use of the singular noun here seems a bit curious, since the plural plainlyrefers to the multiple instances of each of the two classes. I have for this reasonemended the datuhuma of the first sentence in accord with the plural that followsand for the sake of the sense have translated the three singulars in the final clause asplurals even though I have let them stand in the transcription. What I have tran-scribed as lam takun lacks the diacriticals; I have chosen the feminine because of theplural dawatihima that precedes.

17 Sam (69), p. 401f., where with T read al-datayn for al-dat at p. 401, 2.18 Abu al-Qasim al-Qusayri, al-Tahbirfi al-tadkir, MS Yeni Cami no. 705, fols. 22v-

131v, under the title Sarh asmd' Allah al-husna. An abridged and mutilated versionof the work was published by I. Busyuni (Cairo, 1968) which is here referred to whenit contains the integral text of the passage cited.

19 So too, for example, al-Baqillani speaks of a set of names that signify features ofthings which are "structure and shape, as with 'horse' and 'man' and 'human being'and those analogous nouns that convey the meaning of structure and composition"(al-mufidatu li-al-binyati wa-al-ta'lif: Tarn, p. 235, 9ff.). With this cp. al-Mubarrad 4,p. 276, 3ff.

20 Cf., e.g., Bayan (K), p. 18, Iff., where he contrasts the strict meaning of 'one' toits use with reference to things that are in fact composites or conglomerates, e.g.,when it is said of a man or a house, where what is referred to is in reality an assem-blage of beings (fi al-haqiqati asya'u mugtami'a). Thus 'Abd al-Qahir al-Bagdadi(Usul al-din [Istanbul, 1928], p. 35, 8f.) speaks of bodies as things that are singleunits considered as a class (i.e., members of the class named by 'gism') but not asactually existent beings (mufradun fi al-ginsi duna al-dat). That is, they are mem-bers of a particular, well defined class, but in themselves are not unitary beings andso are not primary entities.


'Mawgicd' is denned, as we have seen, by 'ka'in' and 'tabit'.When used as a simple verb (i.e., neither with a predicate nor asa simple time marker) kana, yakunu is commonly taken by thegrammarians to mean to come to be or occur;21 and so also al-Gawhari (s.v.): "when you use it for the coming to be of some-thing and its occurrence ('an huduti al-say'i wa-wuqu'ihi) itdoesn't need a predicate since it signifies a referent and a time."Ibn Faris in Maqayis (s.v.),22 where he is concerned with settingout the most basic sense of roots and stems, defines it as tooccur or be present: waqa'a or hadara) and 'to be present' isplainly to be understood as to be/exist. There is in classicalArabic no proper equivalent for kana, yakunu as a "completeverb" (i.e., where it neither serves as a time marker nor isrequired simply because of a syntactical feature of the particu-lar clause or sentence). The use of the passive wugida, yugaduin the sense of exist originated in the usage of translations madefrom another language and therefore, since it did not belong tothe lexicon of proper literary Arabic, could not itself beemployed as an equivalent whereby to define kana, yakun. But'to be created', 'to come to be', 'to take place', &c, mean (imply,anyhow), each in its own way, to be, to have (or to have had)actuality in being, and the As'arites commonly use kana,yakunu in this sense. It was thus that Abu 'All al-Gubba'I, al-As'ari's master, takes 'ka'in' in a formal sense as meaning to be,to exist, when he says that to predicate 'baq' (continues to exist,endures/perdures) of God is to say 'He exists not by a havingcome to be' (annahu ka'inun la bi-hudut).23 In discussing themeanings of 'ka'in', al-As'arl says that when one predicates 'is'of God what is meant by 'He is' is that He has actuality in being(amma wasfuhu bi-annahu ka'inun . . . yuradu bi-kawnihi

21 Commonly 'huliqa' and 'waqa'a\as in Sibawayh 1, p. 21, 13 but the 'huliqa' isparaphrased as hadata' by al-Sirafi, SK 2, p. 354.

22 Abu al-Husayn ibn Faris, Maqayis al-luga, ed. A. M. Harun, 6 vols. (Cairo, 1969-1972).

23 Al-As'ari, Maqalat al-islamiyyln [hereafter Maq], ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1929-30), p. 529, 6f. Accordingly 'baq' may not be said of a human being (ibid., p. 531, 6f.The same position is asserted in Tarn, p. 263, 8 and Istiqaq, p. 347); and al-Baqillaniemploys the phrase 'ka'inun bi-gayri hudut', Tarn, p. 263, 8.; cp. 'Abd al-Gabbar al-Hamadani, al-Mugnl fi abwab al-tawhld [hereafter M], 16 vols. (Cairo, 1959-65), 5,p. 237, lOf. Thus the use of 'ka'in' seems to have been common, as 'Abd al-G-abbarsays wa-yusafu ta'ala bi-annahu ka'inun wa-yuradu bihi annahu mawgudun li-annakulla mawgudin yastahiqqu an yusafa bi-dalika (M 5, 232, 10f.). For a discussion ofthe semantics of 'mawgud', 'ka'in', and 'tabit' as equivalents cf. M 5, p. 202.

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 1 7 1

tubutuhu).24 So also al-Ansarl speaks of a class of existent beingsiginsun min al-ka'inat), using 'ka'in' instead of the more usual'mawgud' (Gn, fol. lv, 19).

Predicated of what are entities iasya' I dawat) in the propersense, 'tabit' is synonymous with 'mawgud', but unlike'mawgud' it is also predicated of things (e.g., states of affairsand relationships) which are not considered as beings or entitiesin the formal sense and of which therefore 'mawgud' is notproperly predicated. 'Tabit' is equivocal: used of what are enti-ties (asya' I dawat) in the strict sense of the term it means actu-ally existent, while used of relationships and states of affairs itmeans having actuality.25

According to the formal usage of the As'arites, a say' or dot isa concrete, actually existent entity. A number of scholars regu-larly employ 'thing' to render 'say" as used in these texts, but

24 Mug, p. 43, 12. The use of'tubut' instead of'wugud' here and in ibid., p. 27, 12ff.,translated above, as well as in Tarn, p. 263 (cited in the previous note), is no doubt inorder to avoid the presence of items that do not belong to the lexicon of proper Arabicas recognized by the lexicographers. Thus al-Guwayni says (Sam (69), p. 271, 5) "al-wugudu tubutun 'aid al-tahqiq."

25 Since tabata, yatbutu is often used as a synonym of wugida, yugadu', the IVthform, atbata, yutbitu (most often the masdar, itbat) is sometimes employed with themeaning to cause to exist, as in Gn, fol. 13r, 9f., cited below, n. 36. Concerning theoriginal and more general sense, of tabata, yatbutu', cf. al-Sahibi fi fiqh al-luga, ed.M. el-Chouemi (Beyrouth, 1964), p. 130, where, in discussing the usage of 'inna', IbnFaris says "al-ma'na fi inna Zaydan qa'imun tabata 'indi hada al-hadit," i.e., itintroduces an assertion that seems to be certain/the fact, to present what is truly thecase. The verb is thus used in a number of senses. The phrase "al-tdbitu al-ka'in" inGn, fol. 12r, 14 (cited in n. 6 above) and in Mug, p. 43,12 (cited in the previous note),for example, could be understood either as "that has actuality and exists," i.e., whatactually is and exists, or as "that in fact exists." In the former he is using the verbsas equivalents in order to define 'mawgud', while in the latter it is used in the senseof 'actual', what in fact is [presently] the case. In this latter sense 'tabit' may be usedin the sense of true or validly assertable, as al-Guwayni speaks (Sam (81), p. 87, 5f.)of contradictory theses all of which cannot be taken as valid (maddhibumutanaqidatun yastahilu taqdlru tubuti gami'iha), or in speaking of "the actuallynon-existent," in the phrase "ida arada an yugida gawharan min al-gawahiri al-ma'dumati al-tdbita" (Gn, fol. 13v, 6) where he may mean either presently non-exis-tent or (more likely?) those atoms whose [eventual] existence is given in God'seternal knowing as present^ though in the present now of the world's time are non-existent (cf. Gn, fol. 67r = S.Ir, fol. 73r). Al-Guwayni uses 'tubut' of the ahwal, e.g.,Sam (69), p. 694, 18f. This is closely related to the common use of atbata, yutbitu inthe sense of asserting, making a positive statement as opposed to negating some-thing. The univocity of 'mawgud' in the sense of entity/existent in the usage of theAs'arites is most probably due to the fact that, in contrast to 'ka'in' and 'tabit', thismeaning does not belong to it in the lexicon of ordinary Arabic but only as a caiqueon Syriac 's"kih'.

172 RICHAED M. FRANK

'thing' is far too vague and general a word properly to conveywhat is meant by 'say" as a formal expresssion in the AS'aritemetaphysics. We say, for example, that it was an unexpectedthing for both the Cowboys and the 49'ers to be eliminated inthe playoffs, or that Godel's theorem is an interesting thing orthat security is a good thing, but none of these things would theAs'arites term a say' (or a dat, a nafs, or an 'ayn) in the strictsense of the word.26 So it is that al-Guwayni says that the non-existent is called a say' in ordinary usage and lexically, but is,strictly speaking, neither an 'ayn nor a dat."21 In sum, 'thing'cannot rightly be considered a literal equivalent of 'say" whenthe latter occurs as a technical term in the lexicon of As'aritemetaphysics where it is not equivalent to 'res' or 'aliquid' - einblofies Ding - but is a formal lexeme, distinct from the commonuse of the word in ordinary language.

As descriptive terms, formal predicates, 'dat', 'mawgud', etc.,are universal. "What strictly is meant by existence does notvary in formal predications, since to exist is to have actuality inbeing and an instance of the accident black does not differ from

26 'Say" is, of course, occasionally employed in these texts with the general sense ithas in ordinary language, as Abu al-Ma'ali al-Guwayni says "laysa li-al-'abdi miniqd'i al-maqduri say'," which might best be rendered, "the human agent has no partin..." (K. al-Irsdd [hereafter Ir], ed. M. Y. Musa and A. A. Abd el-Hamid [Cairo 1950],p. 203, 6; regarding variant readings the edition of J.-D. Luciani [Paris, 1938] is alsocited). In the most general sense of "thing," one more commonly finds 'al-amr', aswhere Abu Bakr al-Baqillani says (Hiddyat al-mustarsidin (Part Six), MS al-Azhar,al-tawhid no. (21) 242, fol. l lr , 7f.) that he objects to a given thesis "because it issomething that implies..." (li-annahu amrun yugibu...) and similarly (ibid., fol. 129v,2) that a given thesis "entails one of two things both of which are false" {innahuqawlun yugibu ahada amrayni batilayn). In both these cases the "thing" is anabstract, (the content of) a proposition. Speaking elsewhere of something more con-crete he says (ibid., fol. lOr, 12ff.) that if a given thesis were tenable, "then it wouldpoint to something [sc, a state of affairs]..." (la-dalla 'aid amrin min al-umur...). Soalso with the Mu'tazila, as where Abu RaSid al-Nisaburi, says (al-Masd'il fi al-Hildfbayn al-Basriyyln wa-al-Bagdddiyyin, ed. M. Ziyada and R. al-Sayyid [Beyrouth,1979], p. 65, 3f.) "one of two things must be the case (Idyahlu 'an amrayn), either itis a relationship of need or a relationship of necessity"; and he speaks of non-exis-tence as an 'amr' where we read "non-existence is not something that comes to be...(laysa bi-amrin hdditin...)" (Ziydddt al-Sarh [hereafter ZS], ed. M. A. Abu Zida underthe title Fi al-tawhid (Cairo, 1969), pp. 300, 18f.).

27 Sam (69), p. 125, If.: yusammd say'an itldqan wa-lugatan wa-lam yakun fi al-haqiqati 'aynan wa-ld ddtan. The same use of 'itldq' is found where al-Ansari says(Gn, fol. 27r, 16f.), in reply to an objection, "kaldmund fi al-haqd'iqi Id fi al-itldqdt"(we are talking here about strict and proper meanings, not about mere words).


an instance of the accident white under the description of exis-tence."28 Similarly, al-Ansari says, citing al-Baqillani, thatexistent beings do not differ insofar as they are existent, wherefore it is notnecessary that if some existents are independent beings every existent be anindependent being since it is not because it is an independent being that it isexistent {al-mawgudu Id yahtalifu min haytu annahu mawgudun fa-iddqdma ba'du al-mawguddti bi-nafsihi lam yagib qiyamu kulli mawgudin bi-nafsihi li-annahu lam yakun mawgudan li-qiydmihi bi-nafsihi: Gn, fol. 56r,3f.; cp. Tarn, pp. 259f.).

It is for this reason that the As'arites hold the terms 'say",'mawgud', 'dat\ lnafs\ and "ayn' to be universals that are saidof all entities,29 wherefore "'being' (say') is not applied to anyone class and not to another... and it is possible that there exista being which belongs to no class of contingent entities (say'unlaysa bi-ginsin min al-hawadit)."30 The implications of this arespelled out in the report that al-As'ariheld that existent beings fall into two distinct categories, those whose exist-ing does not require a substrate or something to which they are related andthose that require a substrate or something to which they are related. Thisis the case whether the existence of the being in question be eternal or con-tingent, because even if their existence be eternal it is possible theoreticallyand in fact that they be divided under these two descriptions just as in thecase of contingent existence. And in one of his works he said concerning theterminology employed regarding this matter that whatever does not requiresomething to which it is related is said to be an independent being and what-ever requires something to which it is related is said not to be an indepen-dent being (Mug, pp. 28f.: inna al-mawgudati 'aid qismayni minhd md Idyaqtadi bi-wugudihi md yata'allaqu bihi min mahallin aw-gayrihi wa-minhd md yaqtadi mahallan aw-muta'allaqan bihi wa-sawd'an kdna dalikaazaliyya al-wugudi aw-hddita al-wugudi Id yaftariqu al-hukmu fi ddlika fa-

28 Sam (69), p. 637, 5ff.: inna haqiqata al-wugudi la yahtalifu fi qadaya al-'uquli idal-wugudu huwa al-tubutu wa-al-sawadu la yuhalifu al-bayada fi wasft al-wugud.Cf. al-Kiya' al-Harasi, Usul al-din, MS Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, kalam no. 295, fol.38v, cited in n. 39 below.

29 E.g., Tarn, p. 234, cited above ad loc. n. 2. Though less commonly than 'dat ' or"ayn', 'nafs' too is employed in the sense of entity, e.g., Abu Bakr al-Bayhaqi (al-Asma' wa-al-sifat [Cairo, 1357], p. 286, 2ff.), where he says that to say that God is anafs is to say "annahu mawgudun tabitun gayru muntafin wa-la ma'dumin wa-kullumawgudin nafs"; cp. Mug, pp. 27, 12f., cited above and 254, 13, cited below.

30 Tarn, pp. 193f, where he is speaking only of contingent entities; cp. Gn, fol. 56r,3f., cited above. The phrase 'bi-ginsin' here seems curious, but the sense, i.e., that isnot [an instantiation of] any class, is clear enough. Note also that even though 'hadit'and 'muhdat' may be, and in certain contexts are, formally distinguished they arecommonly employed as synonyms (v. n. 94 below) and are so here translated whereappropriate.


in kana azaliyya al-wugudi amkana wa-gaza inqisamuhu ila hadayni al-wasfayni kama ida kana hadita al-wugud. wa-kana yaqiilu fi ba'di kutubihifi al-'ibarati 'an dalika inna ma la yaqtadl muta'allaqan bihi fa-al-'ibaratu'anhu annahu qa'imun bi-nafsihi wa-ma yaqtadi ma yata'allaqu bihi fa-al-'ibaratu 'anhu annahu la yaqumu bi-nafsihi).

Al-As'ari here divides all existent beings into two basic cate-gories, viz., independent beings (al-qd'imu bi-al-nafs) and thosewhich are not independent beings, those, that is, which mustexist in independent beings as their subjects, and then statesthat each category embraces both eternal (necessary) beingsand temporally contingent beings, viz., God and the atoms onthe one hand and God's eternal attributes and the accidents onthe other. In the realm of logic 'mawgud' is said univocally of allfour. Of the two components of the phrase "a substrate or some-thing to which they are related" the first is reduced to the sec-ond at the end of the passage, as the latter may be understoodto include or to imply what is meant by the former. The expres-sion "something to which they are related" seems at first odd,not to say all too vague. Quite to the contrary, however, the for-mulation is not only altogether clear within the immediate con-text, but is logically and conceptually required for consistency.At this point it will suffice to note that al-As'ari wishes to avoiddescribing God and His eternal attributes by terms which heconsiders to be, in their strictest sense, proper only to createdbeings. He will not say that God is the subject (mahall) or locusof His attributes and tends, moreover, to avoid saying thatGod's attributes are qa'imatun bihi and therefore simplynegates 'qa'imun bi-nafsihi\ The nature of the "relation" isclear enough in the context.31

But the existence of an entity is the entity (wugudu al-say'i

31 We shall have later to examine the AS'arite discussion of the senses of 'qa'imunbi-al-nafs' more closely. Regarding its use in the present passage it would seem obvi-ous that as a general predicate or description its basic sense is "independently exist-ing," i.e., not in another as its bearer, subject or substrate. This use of the expressionis found outside kalam and falsafa, as for example in the statement of Abu al-Qasimal-Zaggagi (al-ldah fi 'Hal al-nahw, ed. M. al-Mubarak [Beyrouth, 1973], p. 93), thatal-harakatu la taqumu bi-nafsiha wa-la tugadu Hid fi harf. So also Abu al-Barakat al-Anbari asserts (al-Insdffi masa'il al-hildf ed. M. M. 'Abd al-Hamid, 4th edn [Cairo,1961], §28, p. 237) that, unlike the verb, the noun is an independent word: al-ismuyaqumu bi-nafsihi wa-yastagni 'an al-fi'li wa-amma al-fi'lu fa-innahu Id yaqumu bi-nafsihi wa-yaftaqiru ild al-ism. The use of the expression in kalam is analogous to(and may well have its origin in) the use of omBunapxToc a/o auGunoCTTaroc byHellenistic authors (e.g., John of Damascus) to describe the ouaia.


huwa huwa: Mug, p. 239,19f.). "There is no distinction betweenbeing (ens) and existence and entity" (Id farqa bayna al-say'iwa-al-wugudi wa-al-ddt: Gn, fol. 12r, 18). "The essential realityof an entity is existence; existence is not a referent distinct fromthe entity" (haqiqatu al-ddti al-wugudu wa-laysa al-wuguduma'nan zd'idan 'aid al-ddt: Sam (69), p. 129, 18f.; cp. Mug, pp.212f.). "Existence is the Self of an entity" (inna al-wugudanafsu al-ddt: Ir, p. 31, 8f.); it is "the Self of any existent entity"(nafsu al-mawgud: Gn, fol. 27v, 23; cp. ibid., fol. 112r, 20, wherethe phrase is "aynu al-ddt'), i.e., is the particular entity as suchand in itself. Here, thus, we find that the formal sense of 'nafs'and ''ayn' (along with 'ddt') is intimately related to their com-mon use as emphatics. "It is impossible to distinguish betweena being and its Self, since the entity is not different from itself(yastahilu al-farqu bayna al-say'i wa-nafsihi id al-say'u layuhdlifu nafsahu: Sam (69), p. 173, 3f.).32 From its use as a kindof emphatic asserting the actual reality of a being (bi-ma'nditbdti al-ddt)53 'nafs' becomes a noun for existent/existence in itsown right. "Lexically, the Self of a being is its existence"(Qusayri, Risdla 2, p. 103, ult.). In the case of a created entity,thus, "we do not assert its having a Self prior to its coming tobe" (lam nutbit li-al-halqi qabla hudutihi nafsan).34 To describeGod as having a Self "refers to the fact of His being existent,since any entity is its Self and its existence."35 Reflecting the

32 Note that the position of al-Guwayni here does not differ in the present matterfrom that of those AS'arites, the great majority in fact, who refuse the concept ofontologically distinct features or states. Since 'nafs', 'ddt', and "ayn' are held to besynonymous and are often employed interchangeably, it is for the most part not prac-ticable to distinguish them in translating. I have here employed 'Self for all threewhere it seems appropriate. That they should not be translated by 'essence' wouldseem obvious. The topic of essence as what essentially a being is we shall take upshortly.

33 Abu Bakr ibn Furak, Muskil al-hadit wa-bayanuh (Hyderabad, 1943), p. 151, 17[hereafter Baydn (H), where variants are mentioned V = MS Vatican, Ar. no. 1406],which is based on Ta'wil, fol. 144v, 2f. and is repeated in al-Bayhaqi, Asma', p. 286,4ff. Following kamd taqulu, Baydn has al-'arab, which was inserted in the margin ofTa 'wil and subsequently deleted. For kamd taqulu V reads mimmd taqulu al- 'arabukamd taqulu, which would seem likely to be the original reading, subsequently con-fused because of the quasi homoioarch, mimmdlkamd taqul.

34 Sam (69), p. 208, 19f., reading nafsan with T and K against the nafsahd ofNaSSar's edition. Note too that the in which is added in line 17 is found neither in Tnor K and is not needed.

35 Inna was fa Alldhi ta'dld bi-anna lahu nafsan ... ma'nd hddd al-itldqi yargi'u ildannahu mawgudun li-anna data al-say'i huwa nafsuhu wa-wuguduhu: Baydn (H),pp. 181f.


common construct use of 'nafs', 'dat', etc., al-Ansari says that"to say 'the existence of the atom' and 'the Self of the accident'is to join a being to itself by means of 'of" (qawlu al-qd'iliwugudu ql-gawhari wa-ddtu al-'aradi huwa idafatu al-say'i ilanafsihi: Gn, fol. 43r, 22f.; v. generally ibid., lines 6ff.). The Selfis the individual existence, the single entity (dat, nafs, 'ayn) assuch, as it is per se (li-nafsihi, li-ddtihi). "The existence ofatoms and accidents has no meaning save the existent Selves -the individual entities - which they are (Id ma'nd li-wugudi al-gawhari wa-al-'aradi ilia datuhuma)."36 Thus it is that Abu al-Qasim al-Isfara'lni says that "the true meaning of the existenceof an instance of the accident black is an existence that makesthe subject black (wugudun yusawwidu al-mahall: S.Ir, fol. 42r,

In sum then, as independent nouns 'dot', 'nafs', and ''ayn'mean entity or being (ens). As descriptive predicates ('ibarat orawsaf) equivalent to 'mawgud' they are universal and are saidof all actually existent entities, both those which are indepen-dent beings and those which must exist in a subject. As univer-sals, neither 'existent' (mawgud) nor 'being/entity' (say', dat,etc.) is considered to be equivocal. "The validity of beingdescribed as existing is not particular to something eternal asopposed to something contingent" (sihhatu al-wasfi bi-al-wugudi Id yahtassu qadiman min muhditin).31 This is impor-tant if one is rightly to understand the metaphysics of classicalAs'arite kalam. They distinguish independent beings from thosethat are not and therefore must exist in another, but the formerare by no means conceived as primary entities (ouaiat) in theAristotelian sense. That is to say, 'being' (i.e., existent/exists) isnot held to be said of independent entities in a primary senseand in a secondary or derived sense of those beings that mustexist in another; 'mawgud' is said equally of the one and ofthe other as having actual existence. And this is true eventhough, of contingent beings, the one general class is termed'gawhar' (which in the translation literature renders ouaia) andis described as qd'imun bi-al-nafs (which is equivalent to

36 Gn, fol. 13r, 9. Thus "the atom's being an atom is, in our view, identical with itsbeing an entity: Sam (69), p. 132, 14, where with T read 'aynu kawnihi datan forgayru kawnihi datan.

37 Mug, p. 139, ult. The indefinite, 'qadiman', is used here because God's eternalattributes are distinguished from His Self.

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES 177

auGvmapxxov) and the other "arad' (which renders TOaufifleftrjxoc). To render 'gawhar' by 'substance' is at best mis-leading in connotation. Nowhere, in short, do the As'arites sug-gest that 'say" or 'da? or 'mawgud' is said in one sense ofindependent beings and in another of those that exist in them.38

The universality of 'exists/existent' is, however, in the realmof words {al-'ibara) and logic. Thus Abu al-Qasim al-Isfara'Inl iscited as saying that that existence which is common is nothingother than the verbal expression that is true of every actuallyexistent being (innama al-wugudu al-samilu huwa al-'ibaratual-salihatu li-kulli mawgud). He describes this as existence inan unrestricted sense and says that it is used of words (al-wugudu al-mutlaqu yansarifu ila al-'ibara: S.Ir, fol. 42r, llff.).So too, 'dat\ 'nafs\ and "ayn' in the realm of words (logic) areuniversal and true of every actually existent entity, while in therealm of the real (in metaphysics) every entity is, in itself and assuch, a particular existence, an entity whose Self/existence doesnot extend beyond itself. Real existence is not something com-mon or shared but is the actuality in being of the particularentity itself.

* * *38 Some formulations might, on first reading, give the impression that independent

entities (al-qd'imu bi-al-nafs) are in some way beings in a primary sense, as for exam-ple where al-Baqillani speaks (Tarn, p. 222, 18) of "the entitative attributes whichexist in entities" (al-ma'dni al-mawgudatu bi-al-dawdt). Again, al-Qu§ayri says "al-qadimu la yaqumu bi-datihi haditun li-anna man qabila datuhu al-hawadita lamyahlu minha" (al-Fusul ft l-u'sul [hereafter Fusul], ed. R.M. Frank in MIDEO, 16[1983], pp. 59-75, at p. 62, If.) and Abu Sa'd al-Mutawalli "al-sifatu mawgudatunma'a al-dati qd'imatun bi-al-ddt" (K. al-Mugnl, ed. M. Bernand, Supplement auxAnnales islamologiqu.es, no. 7 [Cairo, 1986], p. 31, 7); and similar usage is found inR. M. Frank, "Al-Ustadh abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini, an 'Aqida together with SelectedFragments," [hereafter al-Isfara'ini], MIDEO, 19 (1989), pp. 129-202, Fr. #71 andelsewhere. 'Dat' is employed here, however, simply to designate the unnamed"other," i.e., the entity which is the subject or locus in which reside those beingswhose existence is to reside in another (yaqumu bi-gayrihi, yugadu bi-gayrihi). Thusit is that al-Guwayni speaks (Sam (69), p. 174, 11) of "those entities (dawdt) whichwe call accidents" and says (ibid., pp. 180f.) that in the case of some kinds of acci-dents we know their reality as entities immediately, i.e., without the need of drawingan inference (na'lamu anna duruban min al-a'radi tatbutu dawdtani idtirdran). Forthe etymological explanation of the use of "arad' see below, n. 72. That the gawharand 'arad of the classical kalam have conceptually little to do with the ouma and<Tvi|jL3ePi)xoc of Aristotle, v., e.g., Joseph van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und3. Jahrhundert Hidschras, [hereafter Th.u.G], 6 vols. (Berlin, 1991-97), 3, pp. 68f.One might note here also that according to Avicenna (al-Hudud, in Tis' rasd'il fi al-hikma wa-al-tabi'iyydt [Cairo, 1908], pp. 71-102, at pp. 87f.) 'gawhar' may be said ofGod; it is also used of God by the sufi, Ibn Karram who described God as "ahadiyyual-ddti ahadiyyu al-gawhar" (v. Th.u.G. 4, p. 367).


If then we ask what a particular entity is, we ask in effect whatit is for it to exist in itself and as such, to be a being whoseexistence, if it is a created being, instantiates a class, member-ship in which it shares with others of its like. This, in the ter-minology of the texts, is to ask concerning what it really is, itstrue Being or essential reality (haqiqa), its specific characteris-tic (hassiyya), and its Definition (al-hadd). These expressionsare virtually synonymous, as they designate what is meant (al-ma'na) when an entity is named or referred to. Here the mean-ing of these terms differs from that of their more commonusage. In their usual occurrence, that is, they are, with theexception of 'hassiyya', commonly employed to talk about wordsand expressions, as 'haqiqa' signifies the strict or lexically mostproper meaning of a word, 'hadd' its definition, and 'ma'na' itsmeaning, as al-As'arl, speaking of the proper meaning of 'exis-tent' as a universal, says that God and a man are not alike"even though they do coincide in their sharing the proper lexi-cal sense of 'existent'" (wa-in kana qad ittafaqa fi haqiqati al-mawgud).39 In the formal use with which we are presentlyconcerned, however, they refer not to words or intentions but tothe objective reality of beings as such.

Grammatically, 'wasf and 'sifa' both are masdars of wasafa,yasifu and as such may be taken as equivalents in the sense ofdescribing/description.40 "According to some lexicographers,"however, they are not synonymous, since properly speaking'wasf' is the masdar while 'sifa' denotes the feature or property(hilya) signified by the description (Lisdn al-'arab, s.v.). Al-Gawhari, for example, says (s.v.) that "sifa is an attribute suchas knowing or blackness, but this is not what the grammarians

39 Ta.gr, p. 94, 4ff. (= p. 67, 2ff., deleting the ta' marbuta erroneously added to al-magwud in the Cairo edition). Similarly, distinguishing between what is meant byexistence in metaphysics and 'existence' as a general expression, al-HarasI says (fol.38v, Iff.), "The particular characteristic of a being (hdssiyyatu al-say') is its existenceand its existence is its particular characteristic and nothing more; 'existence' is sim-ply a loose expression that is common to disparate beings (laqabun 'amma al-muhtalifat) since it is a concept (qadiyya) generally applicable to disparate beings." Ifone consider the morphological form of 'hassiyya', 'hdss' with its suffixed -iyya, itmight be more appropriate to render it by 'being a particular entity' and in someplaces this would suit very well, even though 'specific/particular characteristic' or thelike is generally more convenient in translating. One should, in any case, keep this (inEnglish) ambivalence in mind.

40 'Wasf and 'sifa' are not everywhere interchangeable, however, since 'sifa' lacksthe verbal force of 'wasf and therefore cannot take an accusative object.

THE AS' ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 179

mean by 'sifa' since in their usage a sifa is an adjective (na't), anadjective being an active noun such as 'ddrib', or a passive onesuch as 'madrub'." So too Ibn al-Sarrag gives a general defini-tion of 'sifa' as "anything that effects a distinction between twodescripta that share in the same verbal expression" (kullu mafarraqa bayna mawsufayni mustarikayni fi al-lafzY1, and goeson to distinguish five kinds of sifat, the first of which is thatwhich is "a feature or state that either exists in the thingdescribed or in something related to it" (hilyatun li-al-mawsufitakunu fihi aw-fi say'in min sababihi) and gives as examples,blueness, redness, length, etc. (cp. Tarn, p. 235, 9ff.). 'Wasf ismentioned only in the third and fourth definitions.

Following the common lexicography, then, the As'arites makea formal distinction between the wasf as what is spoken by onewho describes an entity {qawlu al-wasif) and the sifa as theproperty or attribute that characterizes or belongs to the entityas described.42 The way in which they understand the distinc-tion between the two words is analogous to that which al-Slrafi

41 Abu Bakr ibn al-Sarrag, al-Usul fi al-nahw, 3 vols., ed. A. al-Fatli (Beyrouth,1985), 2, pp. 23f.

42 Cf., e.g., Tarn, pp. 213f. and generally ibid., 213-24. Al-Ansari reports (S.Ir, fols.134v f.) that the distinction was made already by Ibn Kullab.

Ibn Furak reports (Mug, p. 39, 6) that al-A§'ari did not distinguish the two wordsand al-Bagdadi (Usul, pp. 128f., cited by al-Ansari, S.Ir, fol. 134v) that he held thetwo words to be synonymous in the sense of entitative attribute. These reports, how-ever, have to do with but a single question that is of importance in the A§'arite under-standing of the Names of God but is not pertinent to our present discussion; what ismeant is that the wasf- the act of describing, which is the actuality of the descriptiveterm - is an attribute of the describer (al-wasif, al-musammi) in describing, and so ofGod's as He describes Himself (cf. the references cited in n. 45 below concerning thediscussion of the Name, the naming, and the named). In al-AS'ari's normal use ofthe words, he employs 'sifa' consistently in the sense of attribute (e.g., Tagr, pp. 93f.(= pp. 66f), al-Hatt 'aid al-baht, ed. R. M. Frank in MIDEO, 18 [1988]: 135-152, at p.135, 8; in the edition of R. McCarthy under the title R. fi istihsdn al-hawd, in TheTheology ofal-Ash'ari [Beyrouth, 1953], p. 88, 2, and K. al-Luma' [hereafter Luma'(A)], ed. R. McCarthy [Beyrouth, 1968], pp. 14, 17f., 24, 4ff.) and at the same timeemploys 'wasf in the sense of a descriptive expression (e.g., Tagr, p. 95, 2 (= p. 68,ult); the distinction is made fully explicit where he says (ibid., p. 95, 5 = p. 69, 3f.),"these are descriptive expressions that are derived from the most precise names forthese attributes" (inna hadihi awsafun mustaqqatun min ahassi asma'i hadihi al-sifat; in the Cairo edition of Tagr, p. 68, 2, read al-ilahiyya for al-ahliyya with theIstanbul edition; one suspects that yahrugu in the same line might better be read la-haraja, though both editions have the same reading); cp. Luma' (A), p. 22, 9ff. (wherewith the MS read li-dalika for the editor's dalika in line 9). That the formal use ofthe words is rigorously observed does not mean that the word 'sifa' is not, whereappropriate, used in the sense of adjective or adjectival qualifier, as where, e.g., al-Guwaynl speaks of "general qualifiers"(al-sifatu al-'amma: Sam (69), p. 317, 13f.).

180 RICHAKD M. FRANKdraws between 'kalim' and 'kalam' following the principle thatverbs, being semiotically more complex, are secondary to and soderived from their verbal nouns (masdars, which are markedneither for time nor for action and passion). In the present case,al-Baqillani, for example, takes 'wasf as intrinsically verbal(since syntactically it can have a subject and/or an object) and'sifa' as a pure noun and then, speaking in terms of the referentsof the two words, says (Tarn, p. 213, 4ff.) that the sifa exists in orbelongs to the being that is described "and bestows on it (yuksi-buhu) the wasf, which is the descriptive expression that derivesfrom the sifa (al-na'tu alladiyasduru min al-sifa)," i.e., from thenoun that names the particular attribute. Here we see one fea-ture of the important place of the Arabic language and of theanalysis of the classical grammarians in the intellectual back-ground of the mutakallimun and of the role they played in theirthought. The attribute that resides in or belongs to a being is theorigin or ground of the true description of it and the word for thelatter is derived from the noun which names the former.

The usage of these expressions varies contextually and may attimes appear odd or not wholly consistent. A brief considerationof the context, however, will almost everywhere resolve any dif-ficulty. It might be worthwhile to cite here a couple of examples.One often says that a being is "aid was fin', i.e., is as described bya given predicate. Al-Baqillani, for instance, says (Tarn, p. 10,9f.) that "a statement that a being exists and that it is asdescribed by a certain predicate (annahu 'aid ba'di al-awsdf)must be true or false." Thus al-Isfara'ini says (p. 134, 4f.), thatGod knows eternally all contingent beings "under the variousdescriptions that may be said of them as such and in themselves"('aid awsdfihd fi dawdtihd), phrasing the statement in this waybecause in some cases the essential nature of an entity may bepresented in different formulations, as for example, one says ofthe atom that it "occupies space" or "receives accidents." Again,al-Isfara'ini says ('Aqida, p. 138,14f), "The proof that [God] haslife, power, ... is that it is logically inconsistent (mustahil) toassert [His] existence under these descriptions ('aid hddihi al-awsdf: 'lives', etc.) while denying these [entitative] attributes."43

43 Al-Guwayni's formulation in Sam (69), p. 152, 8f., seems somewhat strange as hesays of an atom that "when a particle of life resides in it . . . then there reside in it alsovarious kinds of accidents such as cognitions, ... , etc., and other awsafi al-haya. The

THE AS' ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 1 8 1

Likewise, one finds the expression that something is "fiwas fin" as al-Guwaym talks of an hypothesis that posits thepossibility of "a contingent being that does not require a subjectbut nevertheless does not fall under the descriptions of atoms"(haditun gayru muftaqirin ila mahallin lakinnahu laysa fiawsafi al-gawahir: Sam (69), p. 141, 4f.). So too one says thatsomething is said to be "bi-wasftn" in the sense that it is asdescribed by a given predicate (is validly so described) or thatthe given description is true of something. Al-Isfara'ini says, forexample (p. 137, 14), "If this description were true of it (lawkdna bi-hdda al-wasf), then it would follow that...;" and so also(ibid., 1. 4), "if these two descriptions are eternally true of them(in kanat lam tazal bi-hadayni al-wasfayn), then ..." One says,however, that something is described 'bi-sifatin' in the sensethat it is described as having the particular attribute. Thus"[God] is from eternity and unto eternity described as havingthese attributes (lam yazal wa-la yazalu mawsufan bi-hadihial-sifat) and none of them is similar to the attributes of cea-tures" (Isfara'ini, p. 134, If.).

In sum:We hold that the description entails the attribute just as the attribute entailsthe description, so whoever these attributes are asserted actually to belongto is necessarily to be described as having them and so also whenever thesubject is necessarily described as actually having it the existence of theattribute is necessarily asserted.44

That a given description is manifestly true "entails" or requiresthe actual reality of the attribute and the manifest actuality ofthe attribute entails the truth of, and so requires the assertionof, the description.

problem here is that he cannot say "other attributes (sifat) of life" since cognitions,volitions, etc., are themselves distinct accidents and cannot exist in the accident life.The descriptions which implicitly assert the existence of these accidents ('knows','wills', etc.) are true, however, only when life exists in the subject.

44 Gn, fol. 61v, 23f.: iqtida'u al-wasfi li-al-sifati ka-iqtida'i al-sifati li-al-wasfi fa-man yutbat lahu hadihi al-sifatu wagaba wasfuhu biha kadalika ida wagabawasfuhu biha wagaba itbatu al-sifati lahu (reading li-al-wasfi for bi-al-wasfi in line23 as is required by the context; note that one could vowel man tatbut lahu ratherthan man tutbat lahu, but the following itbat would seem to indicate the former,though either validly states the basic intention of the sentence.) The context hereconcerns God's "essential attributes" (knowing, life, etc.) but is equally valid withregard to the entitative attributes of creatures and to essential attributes that are notdistinct or distinguishable from the Self (nafs/dat) of a being.

182 RICHARD M. FRANKAs we have already noted, it should be kept in mind that

'sifa' is often used in the sense of adjectival qualifier, as where,in Tahblr (p. 33 = fol. 55r, 4f.), a work on the meanings of thedivine names as descriptive expressions, al-Qusayri says that'al-gabbdr' is "min sifati datihi li-annahu ihbarun 'anwugudihi 'aid wasfi al-su'dud," that is, it is a descriptiveexpression (sifa) that, predicated of God, describes Him essen-tially, sc, one whose use states God's existence under a givendescription.

Much to the amusement of their opponents, al-As'ari and hisfollowers make an analogous distinction between tasmiya (thenaming or describing) and ism (the "Name"), holding the for-mer to be a word or expression and the latter to be the essentialcharacteristic of the being that is meant or the attributereferred to and asserted, explicitly or implicitly, by the tas-miya.45 Though this latter distinction is commonly asserted onthe grounds of the analogy with the distinction between 'wasfand 'sifa' and the complexities of its application in specificinstances explained (e.g., Isfara'ini, Fr. #67), it is otherwisealmost never actually employed, probably because prima facie itdoes violence to common lexicography and so sounds absurd.'Ism', in short, they consistently employ in its usual sense ofnoun/name despite the formally asserted distinction.

So too 'ma'na', which most commonly occurs in the sense ofmeaning or intention, is frequently employed by the AS'aritesand Mu'tazilites alike in the sense of 'something' that one hasin mind or refers to explicitly or implicitly, and so sometimes asthe referent or what is intended in the use of a name or descrip-tion (e.g., in S.Ir, fol. 54r, cited below). It occurs very frequentlyin the expression 'ma'nan za'idun 'aid al-ddt' (something dis-tinct from the subject described).46 We shall shortly have occa-

46 E.g., Tarn, p. 227 (§ 383), Insaf, pp. 60f., MutawaUi, pp. 3 If. and Sam (81), p. 45,8ff. So al-Ansari says that 'wasf and 'sifa' are "bi-matobati al-tasmiyati wa-al-ism"(Gn, fol. 96r, 7, q.v. ff.). The use of 'ism' here conforms fully with that of the otherterms we are considering (sc., hadd and haqiqa); see the example presented in n. 86below. The usage is discussed in Tarn, §383ff., though the best account of how thethesis is understood and how treated in terms of various classes of the names of Godis found, together with a discussion of the distinction between 'wasf and 'sifa', in al-Kamil fi ihtisar al-Samil (author unknown), MS III Ahmet no. 1322, fols. 120v ff.[hereafter Jhi]; cf. also S.Ir, fol. 134r and al-Harasi, fols. 145v f.

46 E.g., Sam (69), p. 129, translated above and Mug, p. 16, 3, translated below, &alibi pass. It is thus that 'ma'na' is frequently employed as a term for entitativeattributes (which are sometimes referred to as ma'na attributes (sifatu al-ma'na,


sion to look at this more closely. Here there remain two termsyet to examine.

"All the leading masters hold that the Definition (hadd) is theattribute of what is denned" (sifatu al-mahdud: Sam (81), p. 45,2), i.e., the objective property, characteristic, or Being of the thingas defined.47 The Definition here is not a formula or description."Formulae (al-'ibarat) are not sought for their own sake; they arenot Definitions but rather present Definitions and true natures"{hiya munbi'atun 'an al-hududi wa-al-haqa'iq: Sam (81), p. 54,6f.; cp. also ibid., p. 45, 5f. and 80, 8, cited below). "The Definitionand the denned are one and the same" (S.Ir, fol. 42r, 10)."'Definition' refers to the very Being of what is defined and itsessential characteristic" ('aynu al-mahdudi wa-sifatihi al-datiyya: Kdmil, p. 2, 6f.).48 According to al-Guwayni thus,in the formal language of the theologians, what is intended in giving a defin-ition (al-qasdu min al-tahdld) is to present the particular characteristic of abeing and its true nature (al-ta'arrudu li-hassiyyati al-say'i wa-haqiqatihi)by which occurs the distinction between it and something else. The master[Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini] says what is meant is that because of which [theentity described] is as intended in the description offered (ma'ndhu alladi li-aglihi kana bi-al-wasfi al-maqsudi bi-al-dikr). If someone were to say theDefinition of a being is its meaning (ma'ndhu) and stop there, that would beright or if he said the Definition of a being is its true nature or its particularcharacteristic that would be good.49

sifatun ma'nawiyya), since 'sifa' is also commonly employed for essential attributes(sifatu al-dat, sifatun ddtiyya/nafsiyya) which as such are distinguishable aspects orfeatures - specific characteristics: hassiyyat - of the essential natures of particularbeings. 'Ma'na' occurs thus as two distinct lexemes where, in denning 'accident', al-Ansari says: "ma'na qawlina innahu 'aradun annahu ma'nan qa'imun bi-al-gawhar" (the meaning of 'it is an accident' is that it is a something that exists in anatom: S.Ir, fol. 47v, 19; cp. Mutawalli, pp. 5, 12 and 6, If.).

47 Cf. also ibid., p. 80, 8, Gn, fol. 59v, 13, and S.Ir, fol. 54r, 17, cited below. In someplaces, as will be seen in several of the texts cited here and below, where one is speak-ing of definition in the usual sense of the word, 'tahdid' (to give, present, assert, adefinition) is used instead of 'hadd' in order to avoid all chance of misunderstanding.In rendering the word we have used 'definition' with lower case {d} when 'hadd' isused in the sense of a verbal definition and 'Definition' with uppercase where itmeans an essential property of a being. There is little discussion of these terms in theshorter manuals. They are, however, discussed at length in al-Guwayni's, al-Kafiya fial-gadalKed. F. Mahmud (Cairo, 1978), pp. Iff. and Sam (81), pp. 42ff., as well as inGn and S.Ir.

48 Cf. also Mug, p. 10, 23f., cited below. 'Al-sifatu al-datiyya' here means a featureor property which belongs to and characterizes the individual entity in its beingessentially what it is, as such and in itself.

49 S.Ir, fol. 54r, 6ff.; cf. generally ibid., fols. 54r ff. and Sam (81), p. 83, 14ff., wherethe identical citation from Abu Ishaq is found with the reading kana asadda (would

184 RICHAED M. FRANKOf the several expressions under consideration in the presentcontext 'haqlqa' is, in some respects at least, the most signifi-cant, the overarching one so to speak. There are several waysthat 'haqiqa' might appropriately be rendered, by 'essentialnature', or 'essential reality', for example or, if one wished toretain the semantic resonance and clear overtones of 'haqq'(true/truth), by 'true nature'. In any case, the meaning is clearenough:What is sought in defining something (al-tahdid) is to present the truenature (haqlqa) of the thing by which it is distinct from other things (bihdyatamayyazu 'an gayrihi). A being is only distinct from something else by itsSelf and its true nature, not by something somebody says (S.Ir, fol. 54v, If.).Thus, for example, "acts of speaking (kalam) constitute a class[of accidents] as such and have a true nature and by their truenature they are distinct (yatamayyazu) from other classes [ofmental acts] such as cognitions and volitions (Gn, fol. 74v, 12f).It is as "true natures" or essential realities, that beings areintelligible as what manifestly and in truth they are:The assertion that there is knowledge is ordered to (mutarattibun 'aid) theassertion of the true natures of beings and their characteristic properties.There is no class and no subclass of existent beings iginsun min al-kd 'inat)save that it has a true nature and a characteristic property by which it is dis-tinguished from any other class and whoever grasps its true nature knows it(Gn, fol. lv, 18f.).

Cognitions are related to a being as it really is ('aid md huwa bihi) and by 'asit really is' we refer to the true nature which is inalienable from a being andcharacterizes it specifically (tuldzimu al-say'a wa-tahussuhu). Were this not

be more exact) instead ofkana hasanan at the end. Al-Guwaynl employs 'al-hadd' inboth senses (e.g., tahdid is clearly intended in Sam (81), p. 42. 19fF. and appearsexplicitly p. 43, 7), though he plainly takes it as the essential characteristic of anentity at ibid., pp. 45, 2, 47, 15ff., and 80, 8ff. (cited above) as do al-Isfara'inl and IbnFurak. The discussion of definitions in Sam (81), pp. 42ff. is complex and not every-where easy to follow as it shifts back and forth between the implied disputational con-texts and also views of various authors with none of whom al-Guwayni fully agrees,as his own understanding and analysis of the topic is integrally linked to his concep-tion of real ontological "states" (which allows him to speak of general and particularattributes), a concept which they do not recognize as valid. Al-Guwaynl's polemicallyelaborated opposition to Ibn Furak's describing the haqiqa and the hadd of a beingas its 'ilia (pp. 47f.), for example, is largely due to the latter's refusal to recognize thereality of "states." On the other hand, he disapproves the position of al-Baqillani, whoheld a theory of states, but identified the hadd with the statement of the one whodefines (qawlu al-haddi: v. ibid., pp. 45, 5f. and 47, llf). This whole discussion of def-initions in Sam (81) deserves a thorough analysis.


the case, to speak of knowing would be meaningless (la-ma 'uqila al-'ilm):S.Ir, fol. 158v, Iff.; cp. Sam (81), p. 58, 6f., cited below.

It is only as qualified by their specific or essential characteristicsthat beings are intelligible.50 The "Definition" or "true nature"is that aspect of a being which is its being what essentially it is.Speaking of this formal sense of the words, al-Guwayni says,"The fellows of our school are agreed that 'the true nature' of abeing and its 'meaning' designate its attribute (ragi'ani ilasifatihi), not what is said or spoken by some one" (Sam (81),p. 45, 6f.).The proper precision and precise distinctness [of definitions] is not some-thing that occurs by virtue of verbal expressions (al-hasru wa-al-imtiyazulaysa yaqa'u bi-al-'ibarati) but occur by virtue of the referents of the expres-sions (bi-ma'anl al-'ibarat). The verbal expressions disclose them, signifythem and make them known (taksifu 'anha wa-tadullu 'alayha wa-tu'arri-fuha) and were these referents and attributes not in the things spoken of theverbal expressions would serve to reveal nothing and their established useamong those who employ them would be ineffectual and have no intelligibleobject (ma'lum).51

Said of a particular entity as a member of a primary class of con-tingent entities - of an atom or of a particular accident -'haqiqa', in contrast to 'dat/nafs\ might appropriately be ren-dered by 'essence' as "it is that which specifically characterizesa being and does not extend beyond it" (haqlqatu al-say'i mayahussuhu wa-ld yata'addahu: Gn, fol. 62v, 13f.). It is what

50 Al-dawatu la tu'qalu gayra mawsufa (Iht, fol. 227v, 16). The intended sense of'mawsufa' here is clear enough (cp. the use of 'sifat' in Kdfiya, p. 4, llf., the transla-tion of which follows immediately here, and see generally below). A being is intelligi-ble only as qualified by its essential attributes (as mawsuf Imuttasifun biha), butsince on the other hand knowledge (cognition) is considered as prepositional, a beingis known as mawsuf, i.e., as that of which a given description is true. That knowingis prepositional does not entail that it be articulated.

51 Kdfiya, p. 4, llff. 'Al-hasr' here is the distinctness required for a conceptuallyprecise definition, i.e., its embracing the thing defined in such a way as not only toexclude beings of any other class but also not to exclude any given instance of what isdefined; cf., e.g., Sam (81), pp. 75, 6ff, 46, 4ff., and 55, 12ff. 'Al-imtiydz' is that it pre-sents the thing as distinct in its true nature from things that differ in any essentialrespect; cf., e.g., Iht, fols. 248r, 16 and 253r, 6, where it seems to be basically equiva-lent to 'tamayyuz'. Note the use of the singular verb following al-hasru wa-al-imtiydz;the two are taken together, if not as equivalent, then at least as constituting a singlefeature of correct definitions. By "referents and attributes" (al-ma'dni wa-al-sifdt)here he does not mean entitative attributes or accidents, which are often referred toby the same words, but the entity of whatever kind or class which is named orreferred to and the essential properties of its Being.


unites (gama'a) essentially similar entities as belonging to a sin-gle class (gins). The As'arites (ashdbund) "hold that even thoughcognitions differ [i.e., individually as they have different objects]the essential nature of being a cognition unites them and thatgiven this they share in the common essential nature" (qdlu al-'ulumu wa-in ihtalafat fa-haqlqatu al-'ilmiyyati gdmi'atun lahafa-hiya ma'a ddlika mustarikatun fi al-haqlqati al-gami'a: Gn,fol. 64r, 5). Thus Ibn Furak says that what unites two cognitions"is that they both deserve to be called cognitions" (al-gdmi'ubaynahuma istihqdquhumd li-an tusammaya 'ilmayn).52 It is forthis reason that 'haqiqa' may, in such contexts as these, be ren-dered by 'true nature' or 'essence'. "What is sought when oneasks for a definition is the statement of an attribute shared bythe individual instances of the thing denned" (sifatun yastarikufihd dhddu al-mahdud: Sam (81), p. 80, 8; v. also ibid., p. 45, 5).It is, thus, a principle held by the majority of As'arites (i.e., bythose who reject the notion of "states")that entities (dawai), if they differ, differ per se (tahtalifu bi-anfusiha) and, ifthey are alike, are alike per se. Cognitions share in what it is to be a cognition(al-'ilmiyya); it is the attribute by which cognitions are distinct (al-sifatuallatiyatamayyazu biha al-'ilm) from any other class (S.Ir, fol. 55r, 7ff.).

The true reality or essence (haqiqa) of a being is the "ground"Cilia) of its being what it is. The majority of As'arites, that is,"make no formal distinction between the ground [of its beingwhat it is as such] and the true nature and the Definition...;everything that has a true nature is grounded by its truenature" (kullu di haqiqatin mu'allalun bi-haqlqatihi: S.Ir, fol.46v, 6f.) and consequently they allow that one can say"grounded in itself as an atom is an atom per se.54

52 Sam (69), p. 634, 7f. Concerning something's "deserving to be named/describedby 'x'" see below. Note that 'ilmiyya' is formally understood to be a masdar, i.e., tobe a cognition; it names the reality which is the truth condition of "Urn' when it isused to describe an entity, just as the occurrence of the event named by the masdaris, according to the grammarians, the truth condition of ordinary verbs. In the lan-guage of classical kalam, such forms are not to be understood as abstracts.

53 With this cp. Sam (81), p. 50, 9ff., where al-Guwaynl, arguing from the perspec-tive of his doctrine of "states," attacks this thesis polemically saying that it meansthat two instances of a single class, e.g., two cognitions which have different objects,if they differ per se (li-datayhima), will simply be unique existences (wugudanifardan) each of which is different from the others in every respect. For the traditionalposition cf., e.g., Gn, fol. 64r, 5, cited above.

54 Wa-ld yamtani'u 'inda nufati al-aliwali ta'lilu al-say'i bi-nafsihi id la farqabayna al-'illati wa-al-haqiqati wa-kdna Id yamtani'u an yakuna gawharan U-nafsihi


The interplay of the ambivalences of these expressions and theanalogous resonances of the various forms that are etymologi-cally and semantically associated with them is of some impor-tance to our understanding of the character, sense, andcoherence of the As'arite ontology. Lexically, al-haqq is the truthof a statement or assertion that is true, the opposite of al-bdtil(e.g., Maqdyis and al-Gawhari, s.v.). In ontological discourse it"means existent and actual, what is neither non-existent nornon-actual and in an absolute sense has lexically the meaning'existent'" (al-haqqu bi-ma'na al-mawgudi wa-al-kd'ini laysa bi-ma'dumin wa-ld muntafin wa-al-haqqu al-mutlaqu bi-ma'na al-mawgud: Tahblr, fol. 96v, 5ff.; cp. Fusul, p. 68, 17 and Mug, p.25, 14ff.). Of an entity, thus, it is that whose actual existence isin fact the case (huwa al-mutahaqqiqu kawnuhu wa-wuguduhu:al-Bayhaqi, Asma', p. 310, 22). Tahaqqaqa, yatahaqqaqu meanshere to be actual or real, as one says of atoms, "since their exis-tence is not actual before the existence of contingent entities [sc,of accidents] and is actual together with them, it is obvious thatthey were not and then came to be" (ida intafa wuguduha qablaal-hawaditi wa-tahaqqaqa wuguduha ma'a al-hawaditi fa-banaannaha lam takun fa-kanat: Sam (69), p. 221, llff.). "Haqlqatual-mutahaqqiqi wuguduhu" (Lisdn al-'arab, s. HQQ, citing Ibnal-Atir). 'Tahaqqaqa' is thus often equivalent to, and is usedinterchangeably with,, hasala, yahsulu (e.g., Ir, p. 5, 9f.) and totabata, yatbutu (e.g., Sam (69), pp. 312, 5f. and 313, 5fvand (81),p. 56, 6 and 10) and so may mean to be the case (Sam (69),

wa-la yamtani'u anyuqala ma'lulun bi-nafsihi: ibid., fol. 48r, 7f. = Gn, fol. 58r, 3f.In accord with this Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini is cited as holding that 'hadd', 'haqiqa','ma'na', and "ilia' are synonymous since the ground and what is grounded are oneand the same (Gn, fol. 59v, 20f.; cf. also Sam (81), p. 47, 17ff., where the same for-mula is cited by al-Guwayni only to be rejected on the basis of his understanding of"states"; v. also ibid., p. 48, 7ff. against Ibn Furak and cp. Sam (69), pp. 715f. On thebasis of an analogous notion of "states" al-Baqillani takes the same position as al-Guwayni regarding 'ilia; cf. Gn, fol. 57r, 14ff.). Al-Guwayni accepts the equivalenceof 'haqiqa' and "ilia' in Kafiya (§18) since it is valid in law, even though he does notallow it in kalam. Concerning the origin of the identification of "ilia' and 'haqiqa',etc., see below. Note that the formulation in the preceding citation of Gn (fol. 46v, 6f.)is valid both as these terms are employed in speaking of primary entities and withregard to the presence of entitative attributes in a subject. It is obvious that ' 'ilia' asit occurs in classical kalam texts, were better not translated 'cause'; "ilia' * 'sabab'.We may note here that the As'arites make no distinction between 'li-nafsihi' and 'bi-nafsihi' in the sense of 'per se' (cf. Mug, p. 214, 21f.), nor did al-Gubba'i (cf., e.g., Iht,fol. 64r, 8), against al-Ka'bi who refused to use 'li-nafsihi' on the grounds that itimplied the presence of an 'ilia (cf., ibid., fol. 70r, 6ff.).

188 RICHARD M. FRANKp. 331, llf., citing al-Baqillani), whether of existence (e.g., ibid.,p. 194, 7f.) or of non-existence as what was the case before anentity's existence (al-'adamu al-mutahaqqiqu qabla al-wugud:ibid., p. 226, 4f.).55

Haqqaqa, yuhaqqiqu thus means to confirm the truth of aproposition, to show or prove what has been supposed orasserted. Al-Isfara'ini, for example, says that God is like no cre-ated being "and this is shown by the fact that he cannot be con-ceived in imagination while this is possible of all other beings(tahqiquhu annahu Id yusawwaru ft al-wahmi wa-md diinahuyaqbalu hddihi al-sifa: 'Aqida, p. 133,16; cf. also ibid., p. 130, 7)and speaks thus {ibid., p. 135, 19f.) of "tahqiqu al-'uquli wa-al-dalala." So, al-Guwayni introduces the thesis that contingentbeings cannot have existed from eternity saying, "there are sev-eral ways to show that this is true" (tahqiqu ddlika awguh:(Sam (69), p. 215, 9f.; cf. also Baydn (H), p. 95, 9f.), whileal-Qusayri says (Tahbir, fol. 102r, If.) that something is givenby tahqiq "and is 'irfdnu al-qalb."56 One says that "perceptiondoes not in fact have the non-existent as its object nor can itbe so posited" (gayru muta'alliqin bi-al-'adami tahqlqan wa-ldtaqdiran: S.Ir, fol. 7r, 11). 'Muhaqqaq' is used also, however, asa term for a being as that whose reality is grounded in its truenature (S.Ir, fol, 46v, 6f., cited above). "When one does notknow the essential nature [of a being], he does not know thebeing to which the essential nature belongs (man Idya'lamu al-haqiqata Idya'lamu al-muhaqqaqa bihd),57 sc, du al-haqiqa. It

65 Thus one cannot properly talk of an existing atom as an object of God's power,"since the entity continues to exist and to view it as something merely posited [i.e.,possible] makes no sense when its existence is a known fact" (id al-datu mustamirrual-wugudi wa-ld ma'na li-taqdirihi ma'a tahaqquqi wugudihi: Sam (69), p. 181, 19f;T here reads tahqiq for tahaqquq, but this is most likely an error induced by the pre-ceding taqdir). A contingent entity is, strictly speaking, an object of God's power onlyat the instant of its coming to be (huwa maqduruha hala hudutihi: Iht, fol. 174r, 14;cp. (69), p. 694, 9f.

56 'Tahqiq' is employed by the grammarians in the sense of positive or affirmativeas opposed to negative; e.g., "following a negative 'ilia' introduces an affirmation andfollowing an affirmative introduces a negation" (takunu tahqiqan ba'da al-nafyi wa-nafyan ba'da al-tahqiq) Zaggagi, Huruf'al-ma'ani, MS Laleli, no. 3704/7, fol. 62r, 18f.;cp. Abu al-Hasan Rummani, Ma'ani al-HurufXed. A. Salabi [Jidda, 1987]), p. 33, 10and Zaggagi, Gumal, p. 106, 2f.

57 Sam (81), p. 51, 18f.; cf. also ibid., p. 47, 21: kullu mayuhaqqaqu wa-yuhaddu fa-haqiqatuhu 'illatuhu wa-hadduhu haqiqatuhu. There is general agreement that themuhaqqaq and the haqiqa are one and the same (Sam (81), p. 48, 9f. and Gn, fol. 55v,


is "impossible that two distinct essential natures be joined inone and the same entity with its single essential nature"(istihalatu igtima'i haqlqatayni mutabayinatayni ft muhaq-qaqin wahid: S.Ir, fol. 69v, 12; cf. also Gn, fol. 105v, 6f. and cp.Mug, p. 267, 13f.).

The evocative richness of the equivocities of these expressions- of 'sifa' as a descriptive (i.e., predicate) expression (= 'tas-miyd' I'wasf) and as the objectively real characteristic orattribute of the object described or named, of 'mawsuf as theentity described or as its being as qualified by the essentialattribute presented in the description or naming, of 'hadd' asthe verbal definition of a noun or object (= tahdld) and as theessential characteristic of the object defined, and of 'haqiqa' asthe true (i.e., strict and proper) meaning of a word and as theessential nature or characteristic of that which is truly namedby the given word, and so also that of 'haqq', 'mutahaqqiq', and'muhaqqaq' - is of no little importance for our understanding ofthe As'arite ontology as it manifests a very basic aspect of theirthought.58 The veracity of the naming (haqiqatu al-tasmiya)presents the verity of the named (haqiqatu al-musamma). Theessential reality of a being (dat I nafs) is intelligible as its essen-tial attribute (sifatuhu al-datiyya) is presented to the mind inthe truth of the name (tasmiya) by which, being essentiallywhat it is, it "deserves (yastahiqqu) to be called." Thus it is thatthe two senses of 'haqiqa' and of 'sifa' are formally distinct butare nevertheless inseparably linked the one to the other, asknowing (al-'ilm) is inseparably linked to speech (al-kalam),59

58 One should keep in mind that we are, in the present context, talking only aboutprimary entities as such and the words {tasmiyat I awsaf) that name them (i.e., theparticular class) as such and so present the specific characteristics (al-hassiyyat) thatbelong to them per se as primary entities. Consequently, the haqiqa of a particularword cannot here be that of words such as "alim' (knows) that imply the existence oftwo beings (an entity together with an entitative attribute), as where al-A§'arI saysthat the fact that such predicates are true of two beings does not necessarily imply (layugibu) that the two entities are essentially similar, but only that they are alike inthe true sense of "alim' (Tagr, pp. 93f. [= pp. 66f., where for ittifaqa haqiqatin ila inp. 66, ult. f. read ittifaqan ft haqiqati with the Istanbul edition, p. 94, 3 and delete theta' marbuta erroneously added to al-mawgud in the Cairo edition]). The AS'ariteunderstandings and descriptions of the "truth" and implications of expressions suchas these are complexly diversified and so will have to be examined in a separate study.

59 On how, according to the AS'arites, speaking and knowing are related, cf., e.g., al-Isfara'ini, Fr, #52 and al-Harasi, fol. 225r, f. Also concerning this, cp. the grammari-ans' understanding of interpretation (ta'wil) discussed in our "Meanings are spokenof in many ways," Le Museon, 94 (1981), pp. 259-319, at pp 294f.


The objectively existent is necessarily primary, however: whatjoins two cognitions is not the name (al-tasmiya); what joins[them] is, rather, that they deserve to be called cognitions (Sam(69), p. 634, 7f, cited above). The A&'arites do not speak ofabstraction or of forms; the true natures of real beings (haqa'iqual-dawdt) are not universal "forms" in the Peripatetic sense.They are said to be shared (mustarakun fihd) as individually theyexist in single entities (Selves) that, being essentially identical toone another (mutamdtila), deserve to be called by the same name.The haqiqa is formally identified with the true nature or essenceof an existent individual - its hdssiyya or sifatuhu al-ddtiyya -and so also with the name that most truly presents it as such.We hold that our calling an atom and an accident by these names (awsaf, sc.,'atom' and 'accident') is nothing more than to assert the actuality of the indi-vidual entity to which belongs an essential characteristic by which it is dis-tinct (yatamayyazu) from anything else. These words signify (hadihial- 'ibaratu dallatun 'aid) this essential characteristic, sc., being a volume (al-hagmiyya) in the case of the atom and being a [particle of] black for instancein the case of the accident. The essential nature of a being is what is partic-ular to it and does not extend beyond it (haqiqatu al-say 'i md yahussuhu wa-Idyata'adddhu: Gn, fol. 62v, 12ff.).

In the realm of contingent beings then, there are two principalclasses or categories of primary entities: atoms (al-gawhar) andaccidents (al-'arad). Al-Bagdadi says (Usul, p. 33, 13f.), "Theworld is every being other than God (the Mighty, the Glorious)and the world consists of two kinds [of beings], atoms and acci-dents. Elsewhere (ibid., p. 35, 9ff.) he describes the two thus:Beings that are unitary entities (al-mufradu ft ddtihi) are of two kinds; theone is the single atom (al-gawharu al-wdhid), i.e., the indivisible particle (al-guz'u alladi Id yatagazza'). Every one of the world's bodies is such thatthrough division (bi-al-qisma) one arrives ultimately at an indivisible particle.The second kind of indivisible is every accident as such (kullu 'aradin ft naf-sihi), for it is a single being that requires a single substrate. As for beings thatconstitute a unitary class (al-mufradu bi-al-gins), it is as the fellows of ourschool say, for example, that atoms constitute a single class, even though theyvary in shape and appearance because of the variation of the accidents thatare in them. Of the accidents, every kind is a specific class iginsun mahsus).60

60 Cp. Mug, p. 29, 19f. (inna al-gawahira mutaganisatun wa-a'raduha muhtalifa)and the discussion ibid., pp. 208f. Al-Bagdadi's use here of 'naw" (rendered by 'kind')is vague, as at the beginning of the section he speaks of two "kinds" of single beingsthat exist in the world and subsequently uses the same word to speak of subclasses ofaccidents.


Among contingent beings, all primary entities are thus under-stood to exist as discrete minimal quanta of the kind of beingthat each is. So it is that al-As'ari says that two "particles"belonging to the same basic class of entitative attributes cannotexist simultaneously in the same atom (yaqulu fi sa'iri al-ma'anlinnahu layasihhu wugudu guz'ayni min ginsin wahidin minhafi mahallin wahid).el Ibn Furak speaks (Baydn (K), p. 18, 18ff.)of the single instances, of "particles" both of the atom and of theaccident black (al-guz'u min al-gawhari wa-al-sawdd) as "theleast of what is little and the smallest of what is small" (aqallual-qalili wa-asgaru al-sagir) and goes on to cite the instance of asingle atom and a particle of the accident black (al-gawharu al-wdhidu wa-al-guz'u min al-sawdd); and al-vGuwayni speaks of "aparticle of life" (guz'un min al-hayat: Sam (69), p. 152, 7.Similarly one speaks of al-'arad al-fard (ibid., p. 149, 19) and ofal-'arad al-wdhid (ibid., p. 149, 8 and 24 and p. 151, 10, insert-ing al-wdhid with T). In short, since they exist singly in individ-ual atoms, accidents too exist as discrete "particles."

As we have seen, the atom is conceived as an independententity (qd'imun bi-nafsihi). It is sometimes (e.g., Mug, p. 203,12) referred to simply as "the particle" (al-guz') and so occasion-ally defined as "the particle that is indivisible" (al-guz'u alladi Idyatagazza': Bagdadi, loc. cit. or alladi layaqbalu al-inqisdm: Gn,fol. 9v, If., a definition found already with Mu'ammar; v.Th.u.G. 3, p. 68). This, however, is too vague to stand by itself asa formal definition, since accidents too are conceived as "parti-cles" and as such indivisible. The atom is sometimes more specif-ically defined as that which receives one instance of each class ofaccidents (e.g., Tarn, p. 17,17f. and Bagdadi, pp. 41f.).62 From

61 Mug, p. 16, 3; note that one should read makanayn for mahallayn in line 1. Cf.also Sam (69), p. 156, 6ff.

62 This is sometimes abridged to say that it has (or, more strictly, must have) at leasta color and a single locational accident (kawn); cf., e.g., Mug, p. 243, lOff.; al-As'ari'spreferred formula for denning the atom is "qabilun li-lawnin wahidin wa-harakatinwahida" (ibid., p. 210, 21f.). The first definition given by al-Guwaynl in the section onthe basic nature of the atom (Sam (69), p. 142, 5ff.) is simply "what receives accidents"(mayaqbalu al-'arad), for this is sufficient to present the essential nature of the atom,its hassiyya. It is interesting to note the thesis that since the atom cannot exist with-out a unit of a color it follows that not all colors are visible (cf. ibid., pp. 210f.), as inthe case of air and water (ibid., p. 214, 8ff.; cp. Gn, fol, 18v, 25ff. That the atom can-not exist without inherent accidents (a single instance of jeach class or its contrary ifthe class has or includes contaries), cf. also Ir, p. 23, Iff., Sam (69), pp. 204f., and Gn,fol. 17v, 16f.). This is a question the details of which we need not go into here; for fur-ther information see D. Gimaret, La Doctrine d'al-Ash'ari (Paris, 1990), pp. 43ff.


another angle it is denned as "that which has a portion of sur-face" (ma lahu hazzun min al-misdha: Sam (69), pp. 142, 18f.and 156, 11, citing al-Baqillani). That the isolated atom have anactual portion (hazzun tdbit) of surface area "is not dependentupon there being another atom contiguous to it; it has a quan-tity (qadr) [of surface], but its quantity is not divisible intoparts; an atom is measured by an atom" (laysa li-qadrihiba'dun wa-al-gawharu yuqaddaru bi-al-gawhar: ibid., p. 159,13f., where with T read min al-misdha for fi, al-misdha in line13). Albeit having some surface, the atom has no shape (sakl),though some AS'arite masters spoke of it as if in some way itresembled a circle and others (including ai-Baqillani in onework) as if it resembled a square. In his Naqd al-naqd, however,al-Baqillani said that "since the fact is that the atom has noshape at all, it makes no sense to liken it to something that hasshape (Id ma'nd li-tasbihihi bi-di sakl).e3

One cannot speak of the top or bottom or side of a lone atom."Of itself it has no face or direction (fi ddtihi 'aid al-infirddi lagihata lahu), but when another atom is created together with itand joined to it (ma'ahu mudamman lahu) that one becomes aside of it as it also is a side of the one adjacent to it. [...] Theatoms that surround an atom are the atom's sides." Thus al-As'ari says, "The outer edge of an atom is its side and its limit(haddu al-guz'i gihatuhu wa-nihdyatuhu) and its side isanother atom."64 Accordingly, al-Ansari (Gn, fol. 33r, 1) men-

63 Cited in Sam (69), pp. 158f. Concerning the speaking of the atom as a two dimen-sional figure see Alnoor Dhanani, The Physical Theory ofKalam, Atoms, Space, andVoid in Basrian Mu'tazili Cosmology (Leiden, 1994), p. 98 et alibi.

64 Mug, p. 203, 12ff.; cp. Gn, fol. 102, 20f. 'Indimam Imuddmma' in this context isequivalent to 'ittisal' (Gn, loc.cit.) and to 'igtima", 'mugdwara', and 'ta'lif; cf. Mug,g. 245, 13 and Sam (69), p. 462, 3ff., quoted in Gn, fol. 39r, 8ff., citing al-Baqillani. InSam here omit the dittographied wa-ida ihtassa bi-hayyizihi in line 5, and with Gninsert fa-al-akwdnu mutamatila following al-hayyizu al-wdhid in line 6 and ilayhiafter al-gawhari in line 7 and with Gn and T omit haraka in line 8 and read wa-ldkinfor wa-laysa in line 10.

Shape (sura) and sensible (physical) characteristics (hay'a) cannot be used todescribe the single atom. 'Sura' (form, shape, configuration) is identified by al-Baqillani (Insdf, p. 32) with a composite body (al-gismu al-mu'allaf), and is definedby Ibn Furak (Baydn (H), p. 14, 8) as al-ta'lifu wa-al-hay'a (cp. Istiqdq, p. 424) andby al-Bayhaqi (Asmd', p. 289, 3) as al-tarkib (cp. Ibn Furak, Baydn (H), pp. 19f.,where read sd'i'an for sd'igan in line 19 with V.). 'Sura' is also used of the physical(acoustic) structure or configuration of spoken sentences (cf., e.g., Luma' (A), p. 78, 9,Insdf, p. 156, 21f., and al-Mutawalli, p. 27, 6f.), as the sound of a spoken word, phrase,or sentence is a composite (mu'allaf) and has, as audible, a perceptible character(hay'a). Concerning body as a composite of two or more atoms see below.

THE AS'AEITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 193

tions the atom along side past eternity and future eternity as"among those things that may be grasped by the mind but notby imagination" (mimmd yudraku bi-al-'aqli duna al-wahm).

The essential characteristic of the atom is that it occupies aminimal volume of space. According to one formulation "theatom's occupying space is the very Being of the atom" (innatahayyuza al-gawhari nafsu al-gawhar: al-Harasi, fol. 70v, I).65

As it is necessarily located in and so occupies a unit of space{hayyiz) and has some surface area (misdha), it is a girm, a cor-puscle. Al-Guwayni says:What we understand by 'mutahayyiz' is a corpuscle {girm) and its being acorpuscle does not vary, even though its spatial location and its accidents dovary. [...] The fact that its being a corpuscle does not vary shows that it isnot something affected by the locational accidents (akwdn). [...] One thingby which this may also be demonstrated is that essential attributes (sifatual-nafs) are distinct from entitative attributes (sifatu al-ma'na) by the factthat the entity itself cannot be conceived apart from its essential attribute(bi-anna al-nafsa la tu'qalu duna sifati al-nafs) and the essential attributecannot be conceived apart from the entity itself, while one may conceptuallyposit the entity itself without the entitative attribute (wa-sifatu al-ma'nayaguzu taqdlru al-nafsi dunaha 'aqlan).66

65 This statement is based on the common kalam definition of the gawhar as "thatwhich occupies space" (e.g., Ir, p. 17, and S.Ir, fol. 52r); v. also Sam (69), p. 142, 13ff.(where with T read tahayyuz for hayyiz in line 15), where this is given as a second def-inition, one that is "held by some of our leading authorities."

A. Dhanani is most probably correct in suggesting (The Physical Theory of Kalam,p. 59) that since the word 'gawhar' occurs in the translation literature for Greekouoia, its use for the atom may derive from the conception of oiiaiot as substrate(vmoxei(j£vov, e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1028a6f.). That the description of the atomas qa'imun bi-nafsihi may well derive from the hellenistic description of the ouaia asauOimapxTov was suggested above. It is interesting to note that al-As'ari held that,used of the atom, 'gawhar' is a laqab, i.e., it does not properly name or describe theatom (tasmiyatun 'aid al-talqibi la 'aid al-tahqiq), but is so used "in the technicalusage of the mutakallimun since it is something that can receive accidents and theyexist in it" (Mug, pp. 29, llf. and 291, 2f.; one should perhaps read fa-yugadu bihi forwa-yugadu bihi at p. 29, 12). Though originally a loan word from Persian, in ordinaryArabic a gawhar is a substance, not in the sense of an Aristotelian ouaia, but ratherin the more usual sense as that of which something is made or composed, e.g., clay(Slbawayh 1, p. 274, 17f.; cp. SK, ad Sibawayh 1, p. 228, 22ff.) or iron (Mubarrad 3,p. 272). Concerning the atom's occupying a minimal volume of space, see Dhanani,The Physical Theory of Kalam, which though focused primarily on the Mu'tazilagives a very good analysis of the concept and its background.

66 Sam (69), p. 157, 5ff., where with T, E, and Iht read bi-al-mutahayyiz for bi-al-tahayyuz in line 5 and with T add 'aid following dalla in line 8. Al-Baqillani definesthe atom (lnsdf, p. 16, 20) as what has a volume of space (alladi lahu hayyiz) and inTarn (p. 205, 17) speaks of it as du hayyiz. The akwdn are a class of accidents that


Earlier in the same work he reported that "some of our leadingauthorities say the atom is the corpuscle (al-girm) and this isthe best of the definitions; it includes 'what occupies a space'but is clearer in expression."67 'Girm' is commonly defined (e.g.,Maqayis and al-Gawhari, s.v.) by 'gasad', which is employedoccasionally by the As'arites as a synonym of 'gism'.6S Whenemployed by the As'arites to define or describe the atom, how-ever, 'girm' cannot mean body igism or gasad in the usualsense), for as we shall see body is formally defined as the con-junction of two or more atoms.

Alongside 'girm', the atom is also termed a hagm, a materialvolume or bulk.69 The two words would seem to be taken asbasically equivalent in this context. Thus al-Guwayni, after dis-cussing the occupation of space as an essential attribute of theatom (Sam (69), p. 157, translated above), goes on to say (ibid.,

determine position in space, sc, motion and rest, conjunction, contiguity and discon-tinuity (on this see our "Bodies and atoms: the Ash'arite analysis," in M.E. Marmura(ed.), Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani[Albany, 1984], pp. 39-53, at pp. 44f.). The use of 'kawn' in this sense is taken fromthe description of an atom as being in a particular position in space; see below, n. 88.

67 Sam (69), p. 142, 17f. (reading girm for guz'r with K, T, and E; also with T readtahayyuz for hayyiz in line 15); cf. also, e.g., S.Ir, fol. 47v, 18f. & alibi pass. Al-Guwayni says (Sam (69), p. 156, 9f.) that al-Baqillani preferred this definition.Juxtaposition and contiguity can only occur with a pair of corpuscles (innama taqar-rara dalika fi girmayn): ibid., p. 198, 17ff. It is said that sound (i.e., a single quantumof the accident sound) can exist in an isolated corpuscle iyaguzu qiyamu al-sawti bi-al-girmi al-fard: Iht, fol. 210r, 2). Al-Ansari says (Gn, fol. 24v, 16f.) that what ismeant by 'locations' is the surfaces of atoms and their dimensions as corpuscles (al-muradu bi-al-ahyazi misahatu al-gawahiri wa-aqddri agramiha)... and it is impossi-ble to posit two corpuscles in a single location." (I have paraphrased in order to avoidbarbarous English or something which would be more an exegesis than a transla-tion.) By the plural 'gawdhir' he means bodies and by 'agrdmuhd' the individualatoms of which they are composed. In the previous line he spoke of "mutasakkilunaw girm" and immediately following the passage of Sam (69), cited above, he goes onto say that al-Baqillani often spoke of the atom as "md lahu hazzun min al-misdha."The other AS'arites, however, do not speak of the atom's having surface area.

68 Cf., e.g., Gn, fol. 36r, 12. 'Gasad', however, unlike 'gism', is most often usedspecifically of a living body; cf., e.g., Ta'wil, fol. 119r, 17 and Gn, fol. 36r, 16. In trans-lating a paragraph on definitions of the atom given in Sam (69), p. 156, 4ff.), Dhanani(The Physical Theory ofKaldm, pp. 63f.) renders 'girm' as "corporeal object," whichis at best vague and misleading. I have chosen to use 'corpuscle' here in order to con-vey the sense that it is a minimal solid, the basic component of bodies, though not byitself a body and also because it fits well with hagm. (I was not so meticulous in"Bodies and atoms," p. 44, where I also mistranscribed misaha).

69 Hagm in ordinary usage is commonly taken as a tangible protuberance of a body;v., e.g., Maqayis, al-Gawhari, and Abu al-Hasan ibn Sida, al-Muhkam al-muhit al-a'zam fi al-luga, ed. M. al-Saqa and H. Nassar, 6 vols. (Cairo, 1958-1972), s.v.


11. 13ff.), "Since this is correct, we think about the occupation ofspace understood in terms of the atom's being a solid {hugm)and so know [its occupying space] to be an inalienable propertyof the atom such that one cannot posit the atom as ceasing tooccupy space (fa-wagadnahu laziman li-al-gawhari hatta layuqaddara al-gawharu harigan 'an al-tahayyuz), just as it can-not be conceived as ceasing to be an entity and a being (datansay'an)."70 All these definitions come together in S.Ir (fol. 62r,If.) where the atom is described as "a volume that is an inde-pendent entity which occupies space and receives accidents"(hagmun qa'imun bi-nafsihi mutahayyizun qabilun li-al-'arad).

Accidents are not independent entities; they exist (tugad), are(taqum), or reside (tahill), in atoms. Al-Guwayni in one placedefines them as "created beings that have no volume of spacebut exist in the locus of an entity that occupies space" (al-haditu alladl la hayyiza lahu wa-yugadu bi-haytu datunmutahayyiz: Sam (69), p. 185, 18f.;71 v. also ibid., p. 199, 5f.,cited below). That it is called an "accident" ('arad) is explainedby its being "something that happens to occur in bodies andatoms."72 Although it may be that bodies {gism, gasad) are hereand elsewhere (see n. 100 below) mentioned alongside atoms

70 That is, an atom cannot cease to occupy space and yet be an atom, just as it can-not cease to be an existent entity and yet be an atom. In Ir (p. 17, 7f.) al-Guwaynidefines the atom saying, "It is that which occupies space and whatever is [or has] avolume (hagm) occupies space." The MSS employed in the Cairo edition and in that ofLuciani are equally divided between reading kullu hagmin and kullu di hagmin. S.Ir,fol. 47v, 18f, has wa-ma'na qawlina innahu gawharun annahu hagmun wa-girm.

71 Here reading bi-haytu with the MS and T for the editor's bi-hasabi in line 18. Forthis use of 'bi-hayt' cp. Gn, fol. 14r, 7 (kullu hagmin wa-girmin wa-guttatin ...yastahilu taqdiru tubuti ahadihima, bi-haytu al-tani bi-hildfi al-'aradayn) and fol.32v, 14, translated below. God has no locus (hayt: Gn, fol. 18v, 6). (Note that in our"Bodies and atoms," p. 43 and p. 290, n. 16, the treatment of 'girm' and 'gutta' isquite wayward due to a simplistic assumption of the more ordinary uses of the twowords and a simultaneous failure to read the texts with sufficient care.) In the pre-sent citation (Gn, fol. 14r) the three words are employed simply as synonyms for amaterial entity of some kind. Lexically 'gufta' is commonly taken in the sense of a liv-ing human body, sahsu al-insdn: e.g., al-Gawhari and Abu 'All al-Qali, al-Kitdb al-bari' fi al-luga, facsimile of MS British Library, Or. no. 9811, ed. A. S. Fulton[London, 1933], s.v.). The AS'arites' use of words that commonly mean body is inter-esting in that only 'gism' is formally defined as a body in more or less the ordinarysense of a corporeal object.

72 Bi-annahu ya'ridu fi al-gismi wa-al-gawhar: Mug, pp. 211, 4; "it is the beingthat occurs in the atom, whose ceasing to exist in it is possible while the subject con-tinues to exist" (yasihhu butlanuhu minhu ma'a baqd'i al-hamil: ibid., p. 280, 7);

196 RICHAED M. FRANKsimply as things that are most commonly given to our ordinaryexperience as opposed to theoretical reflection, it is possible thatthey are mentioned in passages such as Mug, p. 211 (cited in theprevious note), despite the principle that no accident can existin more than a single atom (e.g., Mug, pp. 30, 6f. and 207, 10,Sam (69), p. 406, 3ff., and Gn, fols. 13v f. and 39v, 2f.), becauseone subclass of the locational accidents (akwdn) entails the con-junction of two or more atoms so as to constitute a body.73

"Accidents," however, are plainly not conceived after the man-ner of what are termed accidents in the peripatetic tradition,where health, for example, is an accident as being a quality orstate of an entity (an OUCTIOO and as such may be said to be some-thing - a being (6v TI) - only in a secondary or derived sense.What the mutakallimun refer to as accidents they understandto be monadic entities whose existence is the basis of the truthof certain descriptions as they entail, effect or produce {iqtada,awgaba) "qualifications," each of its individual subject, such asits being black or being in motion or being alive, states of affairsthat do not belong to the subject as what essentially it is as suchand in itself, sc, a spatially extended particle. A single quantumiguz') of black (sawad) is an existent entity that residing in theindividual atom is the ground of the truth of its being describedas black (aswad) and a quantum of "rest" (sukun) is the groundof its remaining for one instant in the same location (giha,

"because it is something that occurs in bodies and does not endure": ibid., p. 291; cf.also Tagr, pp. 95f. (= 70, 8ff.), and Ir, pp. 18, 13ff. and see our "Bodies and atoms,"pp. 40f. The sense of 'occurs' here is that the particular accident comes to existmomentarily in the atom.

The two words 'gawhar' and ' 'arad' are intimately associated as categorial terms.So it is that al-AS'ari (along with most of his followers) normally uses "arad' in con-junction with 'gawhar' and 'sifa' in conjunction with 'mawsuf (e.g., Mug, p. 29, 9f.;see also n. 125 below), for though referents of each pair may coincide, the two are notequivalent in what is intended. "Arad' was taken along with 'gawhar' from the trans-lation tradition, while 'sifa' and 'mawsuf as formal terms are taken from the lexiconof ordinary Arabic. In ordinary Arabic usage ' 'arad' commonly refers to somethingwhose occurrence is in one way or another undesirable, e.g., as an illness or misfor-tune (Abu Yusuf ibn Sikkit, Islah al-mantiq, ed. A. M. Sakir and A. M. Harun [Cairo,1970], p. 72; cp. Insaf, pp. 16fl). Interpreting Slbawayh 1, p. 8, 4, al-Sirafi says (SKadloc.) that by "arad' he means "things that occur in sentences in such a way as to vio-late the normal rules."

73 Cf. our "Bodies and atoms" pp. 43ff. (where at p. 49, 2 add 'are formally strict'which was dropped by the printer following 'two predicates'). In the present contextwe need not be concerned with the dispute over whether what are called al-mugawara and al-mumassa are one and the same or are two distinct kinds of acci-dent, discussed, e.g., in Sam (69), pp. 456ff.

THE AS'AKITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES 197

hayyiz) it occupied in the previous instant and so of the truth ofits being described as being at rest (sakin).14 What is importantfor our present context is that no individual accident is ever alasting (baq) or inalienable (lazim) associate of the atom whichis its subject. Each comes to be (yahdutu) in it in the instant it(the accident) is created, ceases to be and is immediatelyreplaced as God creates its like or its contrary in the next suc-ceeding instant.75 The being created (halq) or being made tocome to be (ihddt) of any contingent entity is the actuality of anindividual existence (wugud, dat, nafs). The accident, therefore,though not an independently existing being, is nevertheless anexistent being {say'un mawgud) "because it is something thatactually occurs and whose continuance in existence is not possi-ble" (li-annahu 'aridun Idyasihhu baqa'uhu: Mug, p. 291, If.).Not one of them can exist for more than a single moment and when it ceasesto exist it ceases to exist neither by a contrary nor by an agent who makes itcease to exist (bi-mu'dim); on the contrary, that it cease to exist in the sec-ond moment is altogether necessary (yagibu ...la mahala)" (ibid., p. 13, If.;cf also Tom, p. 18, 4f.).

In contrast to accidents, atoms continue to exist, albeit the pres-ence of accidents in each individual atom is the condition of itsexistence.76 According to al-As'ari and his followers the atomcannot exist without having a color and one of the akwan, i.e.,of the accidents that determine its momentary position igiha) inspace.77 There is, however, some disagreement concerning theontological ground of the atom's continuance in existence andwhat precisely may be the cause of its ceasing to exist.Our fellows state three views concerning the atom's ceasing to exist: the firstis that they cease to exist when continuance is no longer given them (bi-qat'ial-baqa'i 'anha), by God's not creating continuance for them; this is the viewof Abu al-Hasan [al-As'ari]. The second is that they cease to exist when the

74 Contrary to the usage of al-Guwaynl, what is meant by 'hukm' in the context ofthe present study is not an ontologically distinct "state" of the Being of the subject,but rather the fact or state of affairs constituted by the presence of the accident in thesubject. The AS'arite treatment of this matter is complex and, since it lies beyond thescope of the present study, were best taken up elsewhere.

75 Cf., e.g., Mug, p. 13, If., Insaf, p. 16, ult, and Sam (69), p. 175, 7f.76 Cf., e.g., Sam (69), pp. 711f., citing al-Baqillani; on p. 712, 11 read agradihim for

a'radihim.v77 E.g., Mug, p. 246, 5ff., et alibi and Bayan (K), p. 20, 7ff.; the akwan are denned

(Sam (69), p. 198, 9f. and Ir, p. 17, lOf.) as ma. awgaba tahassusa al-gawhari bi-makanin aw taqdiri makan.

198 RICHARD M. FRANKakwan are no longer given them. The third is that they cease to exist byGod's making them cease to exist (bi-i'dami Allahi iyyaha). The last twoways are given by the Qadi [al-Baqillani] (S.Ir, fol. 130r, 18ff. = Gn, fol. 93v,llff.).

The first position, taken by al-As'ari, is that continuance inexistence (al-baqa') is an accident which God creates in theatom.78 The second, which may well have been introduced intothe school by al-Baqillani, is based on the common As'arite doc-trine that the atom cannot exist without some color and a kawn.Exactly what al-Baqillani meant by annihilation (i'dam) in thethird is not clear.79 The thesis that al-baqa' is an accident, dis-tinct from the existence of the atom was accepted by a largenumber of the As'arites, while a few held that it is simply thecontinued existence of the atom (istimraru al-wugud: e.g., al-Mutawalli, p. 21, 4f. and Ir, p. 138f.); the atom continues to exist

78 God creates the accident so that the atom continues to exist instead of ceasing toexist. The way this is formulated in Gn, fol. 92r, 6f., "hatta sara bi-kawnihi baqiyanawla minhu bi-kawnihi faniya" is noteworthy, as it emphasizes the determination(tahsis) of the occurrence of one of two possibilities with respect to the particular atom,sc. its remaining existent or its ceasing to exist, as depending on the choice and actionof God. Since al-baqa' is an accident, al-A§'ari (Mug, p. 239, 7ff.) speaks of particles ofbaqa'. (The occurrence of anwa'uhu in line 7 here with reference to al-baqa' is strangeto say the very least; the sentence states that the accident al-baqd' has no contrary (Iddidda lahu) but that its instances are contrary to one another since two cannot existsimultaneously in the same atom. The presence of the 'anwa" is most likely an error,though how it came about is difficult to imagine.) "In the case of contingent entities[God's] making [them] continue to exist and continuance in existence (al-ibqa' wa-al-baqa') are one and the same, just as causing to move and motion and causing to beblack and [the accident] black are one and the same" (Mug, p. 238, llf.). In hearing thissentence one could focus narrowly on the entity described and hear the masdars 'ibqa",'tahrik', and 'taswid', as passives: being caused to continue in existence, being set inmotion, and being made black, but this comes down to the same basic conception as theactive reading. That is, just as the existence of the atom is God's causing it to existwhich is its being caused to exist (igaduhu), so also the atom's continuing to exist isGod's causing it to continue to exist by His creation of the accident, baqa'. The exploita-tion of the equivocities of this and other masdars is significant.

79 Speaking of the second position, al-Ansari says (S.Ir, fol. 130v, 5ff.) that in thepassage cited al-Baqillam mentions only the akwan because this was most convenientwithin the context of his argument against the Mu'tazila. Al-Baqillani's thesis thatGod annihilates the atom recalls that of the Mu'tazila, according to whom God makesatoms cease to exist by creating their contrary (didduhu), sc, a ceasing to exist (afana') that occurs in no substrate; cf., e.g., Ibn Mattawayh, al-Tadkira fi ahkam al-gawahir wa-al-a'rad, ed. S. N. Lutf and F. B. 'Awn (Cairo, 1975), p. 213, 4ff and gen-erally ibid., pp. 208ff. and M 11, pp. 441ff. One notes al-Baqillani's conception of"states" he most likely took from that of Abu HaSim and it is possible that he tookfrom him as well the notion of the annihilation of the atom whether with modifica-tion or without. On the question of continuance in existence generally, see Iht, fols.73v ff., S.Ir, fols. 124r-130r, Gn, fols. 90r ff.

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so long as God creates accidents in it and ceases to exist whenHe stops.80 Accordingly, in reply to the thesis that in the atom'scontinuing to exist as such no action of God takes place in it, al-Guwayni says that "their continuing to exist does not entailtheir being no longer through God's power; they are His veryactions - their being is His causing them to be - and He maymake them cease to exist if He wills."81 Atoms are, from one per-spective, independent entities, but by and of themselves theycannot exist. They continue to exist as independent entitiesonly so long as God continues to create in them beings that arenot independent entities.82

In the universe of created beings there are only monadic exis-tences. Nothing is indefinite, undetermined, or unlimited.

80 Cf., e.g., al-Mutawalli, p. 31, 15ff., Ir, p. 140, 7ff. and, citing al-Baqillani, Sam(69), pp. 270, 3ff. and 716, 2 and al-Bagdadl, p. 90, 3. The basic reason for which con-tinuance is asserted to be an entitative attribute (accident) is that it is not identicalwith existence; i.e., 'continues to exist' is not synonymous with 'exists', since theformer is not true at the first instant of the atom's existence (cf., e.g., Tarn, p. 263,8ff. and Gn, fol. 91v, 8ff.). Al-Ansari says (S.Ir, fol. 35r, 7ff. and Gn, fol. 90r, 20f.) thatthe doctrine that al-baqa' is "an entitative attribute distinct from the existence [ofthe subject]" (ma'nan za'idun 'aid al-wugud) is the position of al-As'ari and "most ofour fellows" ('dmmatu ashabina). The thesis that al-baqa' is simply an entity's con-tinuing to exist is in part based on the commonly accepted principle that continuancein existence has no contrary since if the atom does not continue to exist it ceases tobe a subject for any accident (cf., e.g., Sam (69), p. 204, 17ff. and S.Ir, fol. 61v, 5f.).Accordingly, one says that whatever continues in existence does so of itself (al-baqibaqin bi-nasfihi: ibid., 35r, 8f.). 'Perdures', that is to say, has no referent other thanthe existence (the Self) of the particular entity (cf., e.g., Ir, pp. 138f.). Al-As'ari'sviews on this question varied; cf., e.g., Mug, pp. 43, 6ff. and 237ff. and al-Mutawalli,p. 31, 15ff. and the texts cited below in the discussion of his several opinions con-cerning God's eternal baqa' and that of His essential attributes. The position of al-Baqillani in Tamt p. 263, is contrary to that commonly attributed to him by laterauthors (cf., e.g., S.Ir, fol. 35r, 13f.) and presented (Gn, fol. 62r, 21f.) as "what he pre-ferred," nor are "states" of being (al-ahwdl) a constitutive part of the ontology setforth there, as they are in Hiddya.

81 Baqd'uhd Idyuhriguhd 'an wuqu'ihd bi-qudratihi fa-hiya 'aynu afdlihi wa-lahuifna'uhd in shd': Iht, fol. 196v, 14ff. Elsewhere he says (Sam (69), p. 175, 6f.) that "inthe moment of its continuation in existence the atom is not correlated to [God's]power and will." That is to say, He does not re-create the Self of the atom in each suc-ceeding instant, but since its continued existence depends on His ongoing creation ofaccidents in it, it is yet dependent on his power and will.

82 It is worth noting_that, in speaking of the impossibility of the atom's existencewithout accidents, al-Guwayni says "yastahilu wugudu al-gawhari bi-ld 'arad" (Ir,p. 140, cited above), using 'yastaljlV, which is normally used of the logically impossi-ble. Similarly al-Ansari says "al-gawharu al-'ari 'an al-a'rddi gayru mumkin" (S.Ir,fol. 26v, 4), using mumkin rather than gd'iz.

2 0 0 RICHARD M. FRANK

There are only discrete quanta of existence, finite in numberand in every other respect (cf. al-Isfara'ini, p. 137, 18, trans-lated below). Each atom is, at each and every moment of itsexistence, determined in its every qualification (hukm) and inevery relation it has to those other atoms to which it is con-cretely related by contiguity or remoteness by a finite set of acci-dents created in it and in the others in every successiveinstant.83 One might suggest that since atoms are independententities and as such continue in existence over time, they haveper se (li-anfusihd) a kind of potency to receive new accidents insucceeding instants. It is obvious, however, that any suchnotion is alien to the As'arite system. The atom is an indepen-dent entity only in the sense that it does not exist in another."Independent" though in one sense it be, it can exist only as andso long as it is the locus or substrate (mahall) of accidents thatcome to be only when and as God wills and whose existence per-dures but for an instant. If one would speak of the atom's poten-tiality to receive accidents, then what is meant by potency canonly be that the atom is the presently actual locus of a possibleact of God's power in the immediately following instant, for itmust necessarily cease to exist the instant that He ceases to cre-ate new accidents in it.

The existence of each accident is particular (muhtass) to thegiven atom which is its subject. According to some, including al-As'ari in several of his works, each accident belongs uniquely tothe particular subject in such a way that its existence in a dif-ferent subject may not be posited (Id yaguzu taqdiruhu fi gayrimahallihi) and if God were to create it anew it would occur onlyin the self same atom in which it was originally created.According to others, however, God determines the particularaccident's existence in the particular subject (ihtisdsuhu bi-mahallihi) and could have willed to create it in another.84 Theformer thesis would seem most probably to be based on theprinciple that God knows eternally the existence of the particu-lar accident in a particular atom and to posit its existence in anatom other than the one in which it actually occurs is to posit an

83 It is characterised by number, limits and dimensions (... ittisafuhu bi-al-'adadiwa-al-hudiidiwa-al-aqtar: Sam (69), p. 571, 8).

84 Cf., e.g., Sam (69), pp. 174, 16ff., where read bi-mahallihi at p. 175, 5 against theeditor's emendation and in 1. 6, omit the sukun on al- 'arad and read mqtd for mqtdywith K and T.


impossibility in that it is to posit as not being that which inGod's eternal knowledge is. Furthermore, if the self same acci-dent is to be re-created, it will have in its re-creation to exist inthe same subject in which it originally existed, otherwise itwould not be the very same entity it was originally - not 'aynuddtihi - since its existence (its Self) is to exist in the particularatom. The latter thesis, on the other hand, is most likely basedon a rigid interpretation of the principle that the re-creation ofan entity is, like its original creation, an initial coming to be outof nothing (e.g., Mug, p. 242, 12ff.).

Accidents, colors, for example, are simple, monadic entitieswhich exist, each one of them, in an individual atom. So also,accidents such as cognitions and volitions, which by theirnatures are correlated to other entities beyond the single atomswhich are their subjects, are also essentially finite and deter-mined (muhtass) in their correlations. A created cognition, exis-tent in its particular substrate, is the presence of a single trueproposition concerning a single object, whether an individualentity, a composite or conglomerate, a class or subclass of enti-ties, or a complex state of affairs. No human cognition or beliefgoes beyond the proposition it presents, as any further judge-ment, sense, or inferrence, true or false, is a new and differentcognitive event, willed and created by God in a given subject atand for a particular instant.

The As'arite identification of what are beings (mawguddt /dawat) in the proper sense of the word is to a large extent basedon the grammarians' analysis of predicational sentences. Thenoun which is the initial term {al-mubtada') - the primary sub-ject of the sentence - is taken as given, that is, as naming some-thing known to the person addressed (cf., e.g., Slbawayh 1, p.22) and it is on this noun that the predicational sentence assuch is formed.85 The assertion, strictly speaking, is the predi-cate (al-habar) and accordingly it is in the predicate that truth

85 Al-mubtada'u kullu ismin ibtudi'a li-yubna 'alayhi al-kalam: Slbawayh 1, p. 278,4. It would seem reasonably clear that the Basrian grammarians view the mubtada'as the logical subject of the kabar, not merely as "in focus." That a kaldm is a com-plete sentence, cf., e.g.. Ibn Ginni 1, p. 17. With the AS'arite analysis we have to dohere only with propositions about actually existent beings. Sentences whose initialsubject refers to things that are not considered beings in the formal sense of the term(e.g., relations: ta'alluqat and ansab) have, in order to achieve logical and conceptualprecision, to be recast in a form in which one or another of the relata is presented asthe subject term (v. infra).


or falsity resides (cf., e.g., al-Mubarrad 3, p. 89 and Ibn al-Sarrag,Usul 1, p. 62, 9ff.). Since it constitutes the assertion, the habarhas a subject term of its own, either one whose referent is iden-tical with that of the initial subject and which therefore need notbe explicitly presented or one whose referent is something otherthan that of the initial subject and so must be made explicit,"otherwise the sentence is incoherent (muhal)" (Mubarrad 4,p. 128, If.; cf. also Ibn al-Sarrag, Usul, 1, p. 64, 3ff.).

The atom is featureless, save for its essential characteristics(sifatu datihi), sc, its occupying a minimal volume of space andits being such that it can receive accidents. When, then, onepredicates 'occupies space' or 'receives accidents' of an atom,the implied subject term of the predicate is the 'it' of '<it>occupies space' (<huwa> mutahayyiz) which refers to the atomitself, since 'tahayyuz', the noun that underlies the description(from which according to the grammarians 'mutahayyiz' isderived), names nothing distinct from the atom itself. Save indefinitions one does not say 'lahu tahayyuz'; to do so is simply tosay that the atom exists, since its occupying space is its exis-tence. The predicate thus is said (is true) of the atom li-nafsihi,by virtue of the Self of the atom, for to assert the actuality of theessential attribute of any being is to assert its existence.86

Again, since the subject term of the predicate presents (refersto) the reason or ground ('ilia) of the truth of an assertion con-cerning the primary subject, one sees the analytic basis onwhich a number of As'arites will say that a contingent entity is"grounded in itself, since the 'ilia and the haqlqa of a being areone and the same and are identical with its existence (v. n. 54above). Similarly 'is a contingent being' (hadit I muhdat) is saidli-al-nafs, since its existence is its being created.87

That an atom be black, on the other hand, is not an essentialattribute, wherefore the ground of its being black must be otherthan the ground of its being an atom. The predicate of 'the atomis black' (al-gawharu aswad) is analysed therefore as 'a [particle

86 One has here again an example of one and the same expression's serving signifi-cantly on two distinct, albeit intimately related planes. It may also serve as an excel-lent illustration of the thesis that al-ismu huwa al-musamma: as the masdar,'tahayyuz' underlies the description/predicate (al-wasf = al-tasmiya) so the Name (al-ism) is what is named, sc, the atom's actually occupying space, which is its essentialattribute and the ground of the truth of the description.

87 Cf., e.g., Mug, p. 28,10f., Sam (69), pp. 328f., and Abu Bakr al-Furaki, al-Nizdmifi usul al-din, MS Ayasofya no. 2378, fol. 66r, 17.

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMAEY ENTITIES 2 0 3

of] black belongs to it' {lahu sawadun) and the particle of blackreferred to by the subject term of analysed predicate must be anentitative attribute whose existence in it is the ground of thetruth of the description or proposition (al-wasf).

The same logic is applied to the atom's being located in a par-ticular position, for "the kawn, according to those who use theword in its most proper sense, is that which effects a being'slocation in a particular space and position (huwa alladi yugibutahsisa al-kd'ini bi-hayyizin wa-giha) and by this attribute it isdistinct iyatamayyazu) from other classes of accidents."88 Theatom's being in the same unit of space it occupied in the imme-diately preceding instant is the basis of our saying that it is atrest (sdkin) or its occupying another, adjacent location is thebasis of our saying that it is in motion (mutaharrik).S9 'It is inmotion' yields on analysis 'a motion belongs to it' (lahuharakatun) and the second subject has a referent distinct fromthat of the primary subject. In another move we may, for exam-ple, make the motion the primary subject: 'this motion exists inthis atom'. Here the analysis of the predicate yields 'the exis-tence of this motion is in this atom', but the existence of anyaccident is to reside in a particular atom (wuguduhu =qiyamuhu fihi) wherefore the second subject is identical withthe primary subject.

The consistent logic of the system is seen in the As'arites' the-sis that when two atoms are conjoined a unit of the accidentconjunction (igtimd', ta'lif, indimam, mumassa) resides in each.

is conjoined with Atom/ is analysed as 'Atom^ to it

88 Sam (69), p. 198, 9f., citing al-Baqillanl. This is the common definition, save thatgenerally one finds 'gawhar' or 'guz" rather than 'ka'in'; cf., e.g., Mug, p. 203, 4f. andSam (69), pp. 157, 2,198, 9f., 451, and p. 451, 2, where he employs a particularly goodformulation. On the origin of the use of 'kawn' in the theology of Abu al-Hudayl seeTh.u.G 3, pp. 234f. Van Ess renders 'kawn' by 'Befindlichkeit', a very felicitous ren-dering, but one for which we have no simple equivalent in English. Note, however,that the AS'arite conception differs somewhat from that of Abu al-Hudayl for whereashe conceived the kawn as something distinct from motion and rest, for them the wordis a general term for motion, rest, conjunction, and disjunction as they constitute adistinct class of accidents (just as 'color' is for black, white, etc.). The details of this(on which see Gimaret, Doctrine, pp. 99ff.) we need not go into here.

89 Cf., e.g., Mug, pp. 204, 17ff. and 243ff., Sam (69), pp. 432, lOff. (citing al-Baqillanl) and 444f. At p. 432 with T read tahsis for tahassus in line 15 and for al-tanlma'a taqdiri baqa'i al-gawhar in line 16 read al-kawnu al-tani min tahsisi al-gawhar(T has al-kawnu al-tani min taqdiri al-gawhar). The AS'arites' conception of motionis rather more subtle than the commonplace definition here cited; cf. ibid., pp. 453f.and 462f., where several earlier masters are cited.

2 0 4 RICHAED M. FRANK

belongs a conjunction with Atom2' (lahu igtima'un bi-...), wherethe referent of the second subject is not identical with that ofthe primary subject and therefore must be distinct from Atom,.In order to take formal account of Atom2 as conjoined withAtom, it is necessary to consider a new proposition of whichAtom2 is the primary subject: 'Atom,,: to it belongs a conjunctionwith Atom/, where again the second subject refers to a beingdistinct from the primary subject. Since it is impossible that asingle accident exist in two atoms, the proposition 'Atom, andAtom2: to them belongs a conjunction' (lahuma igtima'un) isnecessarily false. The conjunction of Atom, with Atom2 is dis-tinct from that of Atom2 to Atom,; they are distinct entities{datan, mawgudan). A body is commonly denned as a compositeconsisting of two or more atoms.90 Al-Ansari, however, statesthat "according to our masters, a body is what is composed or isthat in which there is a composition and a conjunction (al-mu'-talifu aw-mafihi al-ta'lifu wa-al-igtima': Gn, fol. 35v, 13; cp. al-Furaki, fol. 44r, 5). In the minimal composite, then, there aretwo atoms in each of which exists a conjunction and each, byvirtue of its own ta'llf, is conjoined to the other. Following thelogic of the system, then, "a body, in the terminology of the truebelievers, is that which is conjoined (al-mu'talif), so when twoatoms are conjoined they are two bodies, since each one is inconjunction (mu'talif) with the other".91 "Every one of ourreally competent masters (kullu muhaqqiqin min a'immatina)holds that the two atoms are two bodies (Sam (69), p. 402, Iff.,citing al-Baqillani).

The same principle holds in the case of non-contiguity or sep-aration (iftiraq, tabayun, tabd'ud). That a particular instance ofseparation must exist in each of a pair of atoms is obvious. Butwhy posit such an accident in the first place? The reason is thatas an accident - a distinct kawn - conjunction must, within thesystem, have a contrary by which it may be supplanted.Separation, thus, is not conceived simply as the non-conjunctionof any two atoms that are not conjoined, but only of particularatoms under particular circumstances. Separation according toal-As'ari is "one atom's being with another atom (kawnu al-

90 Cf., e.g., Mug, p. 206, 15, Bayan (K), p. 20, 6 (where with V read al-muwahhiduna for 'Imwgdwn in line 5) and al-Mutawalli, pp. 15f.

91 Ir, p. 17, 12, reading gismayn with three MSS against both editors. This thesis,alas, I failed to note in "Bodies and atoms."


gawhari ma'a gawharin) insofar as it is possible for a third tobe between them while they remain exactly as they were or thatthere be a third between them" (Mug, p. 30, 4ff.). According tosome, on the other hand, "separation" is disjunction, that is tosay, an accident that exists only in the case of two atoms thatwere conjoined in the immediately preceding instant.92 Like theother akwan, separation is a distinct non-essential attribute - acontingent ma'na, sc, an accident - that God creates in theindividual atom and which, as created is say'un mawgud. Godalone is an agent in the strict sense of the word and, since to actis to cause something to exist and make it come to be {al-igaduwa-al-ihdat: Iht, fol. 170v, 12ff.), all God's actions are entitiesproperly speaking.93 "What it means to say that a being is an act[of God's] is that it was a [potential] object of His power andcame to exist" {annahu kana maqduran lahu fa-wugid: Gn, fol.24r, 14). And so it is that 'continues in existence' (baq) istreated in the same manner as are the akwan and other acci-dents by those who hold that, since continuance in existencecannot be an essential attribute of a contingent being, it mustbe distinct and therefore an accident. It is something that God"does" to/in an atom - a distinct act.

According to the As'arites, in sum, 'being' {say' I mawgud) isnot said of contingent entities in many ways. 'Tabit', on theother hand, is equivocal (and so noTiXaxoc Aeyo^evov) since 'hasactuality [in being]' may be said not only of entities (asyd') butalso of relations and states of affairs (and of the ahwal, accord-ing to those who recognize them as ontologically distinguishablefeatures of independent entities). 'Mawgud' is not coextensivewith ltabit\ They speak of "accidents" as entities that are dis-tinct from the independent entities in which they exist but, aswe have seen, nowhere suggest that 'say" or 'mawgud' is said of

92 Cf. Sam (69), pp. 458f. All of this is important, e.g., in the discussion of the atomsthat make up a body because when a body moves the interior atoms remain in thesame positions relative to one another while the surface atoms move with respect tothose to which they had been contiguous; cf., e.g. ibid., p. 454, 7ff. Being apart or dis-joined is, thus, not a simple spatial relation (nasab/nisba), since such relations are notaccidents (and therefore not beings, mawgudat). Some authorities distinguishbetween mugawara, mumassa, indimam, et al.; cf., e.g., ibid., pp. 456ff.

93 Kullu ft'lin say'un wa-ddtun: Sam (69), p. 170, 14 (where with T read fa-yuqalufor fa-qdla in line 13; E has fa-qulna). Note also that in many contexts one may readthe noun 'fV either as the simple noun, 'fiT, or as the masdar, 'fa7', and this aseither active or passive, while in some it must be the one and not the other.


them in a different sense from that intended when it is said ofthe spatially extended atoms. As 'mawgud' is said of all existentbeings, so 'muhdat' (contingent entity) is said univocally ofatoms and accidents alike.94 And similarly, 'qa'imun bi-nafsihV(an independent entity) is said of all independent entities and soof atoms as such and 'qa'imun bi-gayrihV of all accidents assuch. Al-qiydmu bi-nafsihi, on the other hand, is, like existence,always particular, as the atom's being an independent entity isits existence and also in the case of each individual accident, itsresiding in another is its individual existence.

Al-Qusayri says that "God initiated the Being of beings not onthe basis of a prior model... He is the one who brought forth noton the basis of any model; ... He makes beings beings and enti-ties entities."95 "It is He who made them entities and atoms andaccidents" (alladl fa'alahu nafsan wa-gawharan wa-'aradan:Mug, p. 254,13f.). "He made the different classes of beings to bedifferent one from another" (hdlafa bayna al-agnas).96 We have,thus, to examine briefly how the AS'arites speak of classes.

It should be noted at the outset that the vocabulary theA§'arites employ to speak of classes and subclasses - kinds,sorts, types, varieties - is, to say the very least, inconsistent.'Qabir is commonly used to designate a very general vclass and'darb' for lowest subclasses, as al-Guwaynl speaks (Sam (69),p. 204, 9ff.) of accidents as a qabil, colors as a gins, and white as

94 Note that though formally a passive participle, 'muhdat' is generally understoodas a synonym of the intransitive 'hadit' (e.g., Ibn Furak's Hudud, #16), being dennedas that whose existence has a beginning (e.g., ibid., Mug, p. 37, 7f., Tarn, p. 194, 3;and Fusul, #3 (p. 60). 'Muhdat' occurs more commonly than does 'hadit'.

95 Mubdi'u al-a'yani la 'aid mitdlin taqaddama... al-munsi'u la 'aid mitdlin... ga'ilual-'ayna 'aynan wa-al-ddta ddtan: Tahblr, fol. 126v, 13ff. (Only the first sentence isfound in the printed edition, p. 92). Note that one could hear the participle 'mubdi'u' aspresent, in which case it is indefinite (and the following word therefore implicitlyaccusative): "God creates..." or as past, in which case the participle is definite by virtueof the annexed definite: "God is the one who created ...". Al-Qu§ayri takes care to notehere that said of God 'mubdi" means to carry out an action that has no precedent (cp.al-Gawhari, s.v.) whence it would seem likely that the past definite is intended. Thismight also suggest that in the present world the exemplars of ongoing and future cre-ation are all given. This, however, is a complex question which I will not go into here.

96 Tagr, p. 93, llf. (= 65, 9); cp. Ta'wil, fol. 108v, 6f. Ibn Furak says (Baydn (H),p. 2, 1 = (K), p. 9, 6) that God created "anwd'an mutafarriqatan wa-agndsanmuttafiqa." 'Gdyara' is employed in the same way where al-QuSayri says (Latd'if 4,p. 313, ad al-Qur'dn 25.53) of salt water and fresh water that God made them differ-ent in their characteristics (gdyara baynahumd fi al-$ifa).


a darb and speaks (Sam (81), p. 27, 3f.) of "darbun min durubial-kalam" and "darbun min durubi al-akwan." The most com-mon terms are 'gins' and 'naw". Though in contrast to theMu'tazilites the As'arites often employ 'naw" to refer to a sub-class of a gins, the use of the words is nowhere consistent andmay vary in a single paragraph.97 Al-Ansari, for example, speaksof classes (or subclasses) using 'naw" at Gn, fol. 74, 9 and thenbut three lines later uses 'gins' in the same sense without dis-tinction, while al-Bagdadi in one place (Usul, p. 35, 12ff.) usesthe two alternatively several times in a single paragraph. 'Sinf(or 'sanft), a somewhat vaguer expression, is^also used in thesense of class or subclass, as al-Ansari says (S.Ir, fol. 40r, If.)that the speakers of Arabic make 'lawn' a general name for thevarieties of color (isman ya'ummu asnafa al-lawri) and make"orad' a name that embraces the varieties of contingent entita-tive attributes (isman yasmalu asnafa al-ma'ani al-muhdata).98

What is important for our present context is that one keep inmind that the use of the terminology is not consistent, evenwith a single author in a single context, and that one cannot dis-cern what is considered a class and what a subclass on the basisof the terminology but only by how they are presented in theparticular passage.

The beings that make up the created universe are divided intotwo classes, atoms and accidents (aqsamu al-muhdatati naw 'anigawahiru wa-a'rad).99 These, that is, are the basic "divisions" orcategories of primary contingent entities. Occasionally one findsbodies igism) included in the list or substituted for atoms.Bodies, however, since they are composites of atoms and acci-dents, do not constitute a class of primary entities.100 As we sawearlier, what joins - i.e., what is, strictly speaking, common totwo cognitions (al-gami'u bayna al-'ilmayn) - is not the name,

97 'Naw" is defined as the name for a subclass of a gins by al-Gawhari, s.v. and thisuse would seem to be implied in Maqdyis, s.v.

98 With this, cp. the statement of al-Qusayri (Latd'ifS, p. 216, ad al-Qur'an 13.3)that God made animals to be of various kinds (nawwa'a) and flowers and fruits to beof diverse sorts (sannafa).

99 Al-FurakI, fols. 71v f. (note that the plural 'aqsam' indicates that 'naw'an' heremeans the most general classes); cf also Tarn, p. 22, 4f (usinggins), Bagdad!, pp. 33,14f. and 35, 9ff. (using naw'), and Sam (81), p. 27, 15ff. (usinggins).

100 In Tagr, p. 93, lOf. (= p. 25, 7f., where with the Cairo edition read agsamihi foragnasihi), al-As'ari divides contingent beings into bodies and accidents as, e.g., doesIbn Furak in Baydn (K), p. 19, 13f. and al-Baqillanl in Insaf, p. 17, 8ff., because it isbodies, not atoms that are the objects of our experience and immediate knowledge.


but rather their essential nature, sc, "that they deserve to becalled cognitions" (Sam (69), p. 634, 7f.; cf. also Gn, fols. 55v, 7ff.and 64r, 5, also cited above). It is the "Definition" that unites theclass of what is denned and excludes from it what does notbelong to it.101 The Definition, what it is to be a knowing, forexample, is common tov all cognitions whether their content bethe same or different (Sam (81), p. 82, 7).It is not excluded that different cognitions fall together under a single defin-ition by virtue of the fact that a single essential nature unites them andencompasses their varieties (tadbutu asnafahu); and so also in the case ofspeaking (al-kalam) it is not excluded that a single definition be common toits varieties (S.Ir, fol. 91v, 18f, citing al-Baqillani).Atoms, as we have seen, constitute a single class every instanceof which is essentially identical to every others (e.g., Mug,p. 256, 22f. and Sam (69), p. 153, 19f.), while accidents aredivided into various classes and subclasses. There are, forexample, five subclasses of sense perception (anwa'u al-idrak)each class being defined as having a particular class of accidentsas their percepta (mudrakun mahsus).102 Longing (al-tamanni)and desire (al-sahwa) are subclasses of volition (Mug, p. 45, 5).

(The single atom is not perceptible.) Thus, although al-Ansari will speak loosely ofbodies as belonging to one and the same class (taganusu al-agsam: Gn, fol. 73v, 10),he states clearly (ibid., fol. 35v, 14ff.) that 'body' is not the name of a class (laysa minasma'i al-agnas) in the strict sense of the term, but is so employed in a kind of looseor improper sense (as a laqab). What he does here is, in effect, to set aside the lexi-cographers' sense of class names as formally improper in kalam. It is following thelatter, ordinary sense of the words that one speaks (Mug, p. 82, lOf.) of structure andappearence (al-kayfiyyatu wa-al-hay'a) as "a class (naw') of accidents." So Ibn Furak,following common usage and that of the grammarians in speaking of class nouns,says that bodies are of two classes (naw'an), living and non-living and that the formerconsist of two classes (naw'an), plants and animals, and finally speaks of men, angels,and jinn as "classes of rational animals" (Bayan (H), pp. 10f.). Similarly followingordinary usage one speaks of "the other questions that belong to this class" (sa'iruma ganasa hadihi al-masa'il: Mug, p. 260, 17) or of two ways of understanding anexpression (naw'ay ma'nahu: ibid., p. 28, 2). Similarly, when al-Guwayni speaks ofsubclasses of speaking (Sam (81), p. 27, cited above) he doubtless means various gen-res, as al-Baqillani speaks of such as poetry, rhymed prose, ordinary prose, oratory,etc. (Hidaya, fol. 185r, 2ff.).

101 Cp. Mug, p. 10, 23f.: al-haddu ma yagma'u naw'a al-mahdudi faqat wa-yamna'u ma laysa minhu anyadhula fihi. On the "Definition" as the essential char-acteristic of the defined, see above. Note the play of the ambivalence of the word inthis and the following citation and see below concerning universals. Regarding theuse of gama'a, yagma'u here, note that common nouns ("class nouns") are sometimestermed asma'un gami'a by the grammarians; e.g., Sibawayh 1, p. 267, 2.

102 Mug, p. 17, 13ff. On the same page read makanayn for the second mahallayn inline 1.


Classes are conceived and identified in terms of the charac-teristic likeness or unlikeness of beings. Al-Guwaynl gives threecommon As'arite definitions of being alike:Those who hold what is correct take the position that two likes (al-mitlan)are any two beings the one of which is the same as the other in the attributesit must or may have. The leading masters often formulate this as "every pairof existents that are the same in the positive attributes they may have (kullumawgudayni mustawiyayni fima yaguzu min sifati al-itbat) and often theysay "they are any two existents for the one of which is necessary what is nec-essary for the other and for the one of which is possible that which is possi-ble for the other and what is impossible for it is impossible for the other."103

Under these definitions, being the same or alike may be inter-preted more or less narrowly depending on how and at whatlevel one takes 'must', 'may', and 'impossible'. True cognitions(al-'ilm) may be considered to form a class (e.g., Gn, fol. 64r, 5),while the a priori principles of reason (mabadi 'u al- 'aql) are asubclass of those cognitions that are given without drawing aninference {min naw'i al-daruriyyat: Mug, p. 18, 8f.).

Likeness may, on the other hand, be defined much more nar-rowly, as al-Isfara'inl, for example, says ('Aqida, p. 137, 16) thatbeing alike (al-tamdtul) entails sharing in all essential attributes;and so too al-As'ari offersv a definition of being alike that is muchlike those reported by al-Guwaynl, but adds at the end that if oneof the two beings in question is unique in any description thatcannot be true of the other it is unlike it.104 Thus, for example,"every pair of true cognitions that present one and the sameobject in the same way are alike (mitldn)" while "any pair of cog-nitions that have two [distinct] objects are unlike regardless ofwhether the two objects be alike or unlike, as the question is thatof the number of objects known not their being unlike" (Gn, fol.68v, 19ff.). Similarly regarding the akwdn, al-As'ari held that"motion from a place is the cessation of rest in it and is a contraryof [rest in it] and motion from one place is a contrary to a motionfrom another place" and the obvious sense of this, says Ibn Furakis that two motions which are identical in every respect(mutamatilan) form a class (gins), all others being different.105

103 Sam (69), p. 292, 5ff. Cp. Insaf, p. 32, 12f. Concerning the meaning of 'sifatu al-itbat' see above.

104 Ida istabadda ahaduhuma bi-wasfin Id yaguzu 'aid sdhibihi... kdna muhdlifanlahu: Mug, p. 209, 9ff.; cf. also ibid., p. 266, 2ff. and Baydn (K), p. 16, llff.

105 Mug, p. 214, 3ff., where read al-mawgudayni al-muhdathayn for al-mawgudinaal-muhdathin in line 7. (The reading tagdnusi al-harakdti wa-ihtildfihd of Mug,


Though the likeness and unlikeness of certain beings is dis-cussed in very precise terms according to the perspective andfocus of the particular context, the general taxonomy of theclasses and subclasses of contingent beings does not seem tohave been a topic in which the AS'arites had much interest, fornot only is the terminolgy for classes and subclasses used indis-criminately (a habit not unfamiliar to Arabic!) but nowhere isthe matter taken up for its own sake in general and in detail.106

The question of classes involves that of universals and in thisthe A&'arites are very precise. Stating the common AS'arite doc-trine al-Ansari says, against al-Guwayni:We do not assert the reality of that in which actuality and existence is nottruly the case (ma la yatahaqqaqu fihi al-tubutu wa-al-wugud). A being (al-say') is sometimes known in conjunction with something else and is some-times known singly, apart from anything else. This is what is meant bygeneral and particular (al-'dmmu wa-al-hdss). This is in accord with theestablished usage of the language (istilahu ahli al-lisan), as they make'color' a general name for the various kinds of colors (isman 'amman li-asnafi al-alwan) and make 'accident' a name that embraces the various sortsof contingent entitative attributes (asndfu al-ma'dni al-muhdata).'Generality' and 'particularity' refer to names, for there is no generality orparticularity in a single entity (al-ddtu al-wahida).

We hold that colors are not common at all {laysat mustarakatan aslan). A[particle of] black's being a color has no meaning (Id ma'na li-kawni al-

p. 214, 5 would seem to be correct in that there is nothing to indicate the contrary.Motion, however, is nowhere mentioned in the paragraph, wherefore one should per-haps read taganusi al-akwan..., since this would more precisely have presented thebasic intention.) Al-Ansari, says (Gn, fol. 38r f.) "... fa-al-kawnu al-tani min ginsi al-kawni al-awwali fa-inna hassiyyata al-kawni igabu tahassusi al-gawhari bi-makanin... wa-ida awgaba al-kawnu al-tani ma awgaba al-kawnu al-awwalu fa-qadtabata tamatuluhuma," i.e., they all determine the atoms being in a particular loca-tion in space. This would seem perhaps to mean that some motions are essentially thesame as some restings if at different times they determine one or several atoms beingin one and the same place.

106 There is a lengthy discussion in Bagdad!, pp. 40ff., where he lists thirty classes(anwa1), but I have not noted such a discussion elsewhere. The numeration of al-Bagdadi here is not coherent since, with his usual sloppiness, he distinguishes simplebelief (i'tiqad) from knowledge (p. 42, 2f.), but does not number it separately.Contrary to Mug, p. 17,13ff. (cited in n. 102 above and S.Ir, fol. 153r, 16), he also listseach mode of sense perception as a distinct class. One may note in this context thatwhere the Mu'tazilites held knowing, error, opinion (the judgement that such andsuch is likely or may be the case) to be varieties of belief (sc, of assent to a proposi-tion) the AS'arites distinguish them vas distinctly different accidents. In Bagdadi,p. 44, 8 read al-zann for al-nazar; cf. S.Ir, fol. 77v, 3ff. and Sam (69), pp. 99f (whereon p. 99, 12, following wagh add al-dalalati yatadammanu al-gahla kama anna al-nazara fi waghi with T.

THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 211sawadi lawnan) other than its being a [particle of] black, nor does [a particleof] white's being a color have any other than its being [a particle of] white.In a color there are not two ways of being a color (laysa fi al-lawni gihatalawniyya). Sharing in the noun 'color' has no precise meaning (al-istirdku fiismi al-lawni laysa lahu tahqiqun),101 for 'color' in an unrestricted sense -without any specification of what is particular - is unintelligible {al-lawnual-mutlaqu... laysa ma'qulari). Indeed, it is a general expression (lafzun'amm) that embraces a plurality of individuals while what actually belongsto each of these individuals is a particular characteristic (hazzu kulliwahidin minhd hdssiyya)... If they say that the general unity of colors inbeing color is an intelligible concept (igtimd'u al-alwani fi al-lawniyyatima'nan ma'qul), we reply that being a color is not at all intelligible by itselfand unspecified {'aid irsdlihd); it is understood in its true reality (tu'qalu'aid haqiqatihd) only when we understand being black and being white andthe like.188

Or, to put it another way:The more particular and more general occur only in words. Generality andparticularity are inconceivable in a single entity (Id yutasawwaru fihd).Being an accident and being a color belong to the convention of language andso also existence, for the existence of a [particle of] black does not belong tothe existence of a [particle of] white insofar as the essential nature is con-cerned. (Gn, fol. 27v, If.; cp. also ibid., fol. 27r, Iff. and Tarn, pp. 233f.)

Similarly al-Guwayni says:Particularity and generality have reality only in utterances (innamdyatahaqqaqdni fi al-aqwdl). A single expression (lafza) may be general orparticular. Generality has no reality in the essential attributes of actual enti-ties (Id tatahaqqaqu fi sifati al-anfusi qadiyyatu al-'umum), since the

107 By 'tahqiq' here he means a strict or precise sense as distinct from a loose orimprecise sense; cp. al-Baqillani's distinction of the use of an expression "'aid al-tahqiq" - its haqiqa strictly considered - as opposed to its use in a loose and impre-cise sense ('ala al-magdz): Hidaya, fol. 147r, 14ff.

108 Gn, fol. 55r, 4ff. = S.Ir, fols. 39vff. Contrary, thus, to the doctrine of al-Guwayniand of al-Baqillani, the common AS'arite teaching is that 'being a color' (al-lawniyya)and the like are simply verbal expressions that of themselves do not signify ontologi-cally distinct aspects or features of the Being of the entities of which they are said. Al-Guwayni too says that as such names are said of beings only on the basis of linguisticconvention (i§tilahan wa-tawqifan: Sam (69), p. 134, 14f.): "particularity and gener-ality have reality only in verbal expressions (innamdyatahaqqaqdni fi al-aqwdl: ibid.,pp. 305f.). Nonetheless, on the basis of his theory of "states" he holds that being acolor is an ontologically real aspect of the being of every existent color (see generallyibid., pp. 292ff. and the very succinct discussion in S.Ir, fol. 39v, 9ff.). This is notexplicitly discussed in the earlier AS'arite manuals that are available, perhaps simplybecause those that we have are all very elementary, though it may be that it becamea topic of serious debate within the school only with al-Guwayni. There is a lengthydiscussion of the varying degrees of generality and particularity of names anddescriptions in Tarn, pp. 218f.


attribute of every Self belongs to it alone and does not extend to another(lazimatun lahu la tata'addahu ila gayrihi).109

Howbeit the available texts do not offer an adequately system-atic presentation of how the majority of As'arite masters for-mally conceived classes and subclasses, certain basic facts arereasonably clear even from the somewhat limited data we haveexamined and can be briefly summarized. The case with units ofthe accident black is clear enough. Its particular characteristic(al-hdssiyya) is its essential nature (al-haqlqa) and this is, ofevery instance, its being a unit or particle of black. As such eachone is identically the same (mumatil) as every other. Each is anaccident and must exist in a single atom and could in principlehave been created in any atom, given the absence of its like orcontrary. And the same is true of cognitions, with the qualifica-tion that they can only exist in atoms in which there also existsa unit of the accident life. The individual's being existent and itsbeing a color are not distinct from its actual reality in and inso-far as it is a [particle of] black. The essential nature is common(gami'a) and so, in a proper sense, "shared" {mustarakun fihd)as it is the basis of their together constituting a basic class ofcontingent entities and of their "deserving" to be named by thenoun 'black'. They are distinguished (tatamayyaza) as a class bytheir having, each one, the common essential nature, not by thename. The reality of the essential nature is the existence of theindividual and has no real being apart from its individualinstantiation; it "does not extend beyond it." General descrip-tions such as 'existent', 'accident', and 'color' do not, accordingto the common view, name ontologically distinct features oraspects of the individual instance of black. One may, in the caseof cognitions, distinguish subclasses according to the samenessor difference of their content, but the nature of being a cogni-tion is common and the basis of their constituting a basic classof contingent entities.110

* * *109 Sam (69), pp. 305f. (with this cp. Gn, fol. 62v, 13f., translated above). 'Qadiyya'

here is used as an equivalent to 'hukm'; tadadd is described as a qadiyya in Gn, fol.17v, 10) while 'qadiyya' and 'hassiyya' are contextually employed as equivalents ibid.,fols. 102v, 13 and 102r, 20 respectively.

110 Involved here is the correlation (ta'alluq) of every cognition to what is known.This, however, is a matter that involves a number of questions that will have to betaken up in another context. Because of the inadequacy of the available data it is notclear whether 'perception' is a general term like color so that each mode of sense per-ception (e.g., sight) is a basic or essential class like cognition, subclasses of which may


It will be appropriate to outline here, before we go on to con-sider the being of God and his essential attributes, the originand sense of the word 'ma'nd ' as a formal term for what I havechosen to call entitative attributes, sc, those that as such are, ormay be, described as themselves existent and so are held to bedistinct (or at least distinguishable) from the Self (nafs, dot) ofthe being to which they belong. In the case of contingent beings,as we have seen, the expression means, in effect, an accident.Albeit there is more or less general agreement regarding whatbasically is meant by the term, the precise sense has not beenclarified and there is little consensus on how it is best to be ren-dered.111

'Al-ma'na'', while in ordinary language properly and mostcommonly employed in the general sense of English 'meaning', isfrequently used as a rather vague and general expression muchlike English 'something'. Thus, for example, the grammarian al-Kissa'I, explaining that one may not omit the hamz of ldi'b\ endsby saying "and there's something else {wa-fihi ma'nan ahar):the hamz may not be omitted either in the singular or in theplural" and goes on to cite a verse of poetry to prove his point.112

That is, there's something else he had in mind and wished to say.It occurs again in a vague sense where al-As'ari says thatAristotle is quoted as saying, "the soul is something (ma'nan)too exalted to be subject to external influences and growth anddecay and is imperishable" (Maq, p. 336, 2f.). Similarly, Aristotleis quoted (ibid, p. 337, 4) as saying that the soul is somethingother than the spirit (ma'nan gayru al-ruh).

be distinguished according to particular classes of objects or whether they took per-ception as an essential class, distinguishing subclasses of two levels. The former alter-native would seem to be the more consistent with the general notion of essentialattributes and specific characteristics.

111 Several scholars regularly translate 'ma'nd' by 'entity' (entite). It seems to me,however, that the rendering is not wholly suitable even though the ma'ani are con-sidered entities (mawgudat, dawat). That is, the normal extension of 'entity' is fartoo broad for it to be appropriate here, since in these texts atoms are conceived asentities, at least in the normal sense of the word, and to stipulate (or simply toassume) a formal restriction that would exclude independent beings would do vio-lence to its most basic sense. I have for a time now chosen to render 'ma'nd' gener-ally by 'entitative attribute' since this seems rather precisely to render the technicalsense of the word in this use and that is our primary concern. It also allows one toretain the implicit presence of the equivocal 'sifa' while specifying the distinctionintended by 'ma'nd'.

112 Abu al-Hasan 'Ali b. Yusuf al-Qifti, Inbah al-ruwdt 'aid anbdt al-nuhdt, ed.M.A. Ibrahim, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1955-1973)1 vol. 3, p. 259.


In some places 'ma'na', as what is meant, has the sense of ref-erent, as Ibn al-Sarrag says, "The noun is what signifies a singlereferent {ma'nan mufrad) and this referent may be a corporealobject (sahs) or a non-corporeal object, a corporeal object beinga man or a stone..."113 We have seen already a number of exam-ples of the use of l ma'na' in the sense of accident, as where theaccident is defined as a ma'na that resides in an atom (S.Ir, fol.47v, 19, cited in n. 46 above). The A§'arites' need for an expres-sion such as 'ma'na' was due to the equivocity of 'sifa'. There isno ambiguity where al-Bagdadi (p. 33, 14f.) defines accidents asattributes {sifat) that reside in atoms, but in other places thereis, most particularly in the expression 'sifatu nafs/daf whenspeaking of God's attributes.

The use of 'ma'na' as a term for entitative attributes origi-nates doubtless in an abridgement of the expression 'ma'nanzd'idun 'aid al-dat'. Al-Guwayni citing formulations of AbuIshaq al-Isfara'ini, quotes him as saying, "a sifatu al-nafs isevery attribute to describe a being as having which refers to theSelf of the being and not to something distinct from it and asifatu al-ma'na is every attribute to describe a being as havingwhich refers to something distinct from the Self, as in the caseof 'knows', 'has power', and the like."114 Just as we saw in thecase of 'is black' or 'moves', 'knows', is analysed as 'lahu'ilmun' (a cognition belongs to him), and the cognition which isthe referent of "ilmun' is distinct from that of the subject termof'<he> knows'.

It would seem likely, thus, that the basic sense or connotationof 'ma'na' here - most conspicuously in the phrase 'ma'nanzd'idun 'aid al-ddt' - is that of referent or, if you will, of a"something" understood as the referent of one of the terms,whether explicit or implicit, of the proposition in question. Thisfits directly with the obvious role of the formal analysis of pred-icates borrowed from the grammarians that is employed to ver-ify precisely what is implied or asserted in formal descriptionsof independent entities and fits as well with the adaptation anduse of other expressions taken originally from the grammarians

113 Usul 1, p. 36 and Idah, p. 50. Other examples of the word's use in the sense ofreferent are given in our "Meanings," pp. 272ff.

114 Sifatu al-nafsi kullu sifatin dalla al-wasfu biha 'aid al-ddti duna ma'nanza'idin 'alayhi wa-sifatu al-ma'na kullu sifatin dalla al-wasfu biha 'aid ma'nanzd'idin 'aid al-ddti ka-al-'dlimi wa-qddiri wa-nahwihimd: Sam (69), p. 308, 9ff.,reading kullu sifatin for kullu wasfin with T in line 10.


and lexicographers such as 'wasf, 'sifa', 'haqiqa', etc., in onto-logical contexts.

Thus it is, for example, that al-Guwayni says (Sam (69),p. 129, 18f.) that "the essential reality of an entity is to exist;existence is not something distinct from the entity (haqiqatu al-ddti al-wugudu wa-laysa al-wugudu ma'nan za'idan 'aid al-ddt). What is here understood by ' ma'nd' is altogether clearwhere al-Ansarl says (Gn, fol. 94v, 14) that continuance (al-baqa') is "ma'nan zd'idun 'aid dati al-bdql" and (ibid., fol. 90r,21) is "sifatun li-al-bdqi zd'idatun 'aid wugudihi." From this,then, 'ma'na' comes to be used alone as the unequivocal expres-sion for an entitative attribute, as in the sentence, "What wemean in saying that something is an accident is that it is anentitative attribute that exists in an atom" (ma'na qawlihdinnahu 'aradun annahu ma'nan qd'imun bi-al-gawhar: S.Ir,fol. 47v, 19). Parallel to the statement of al-Guwayni just cited,al-A§'ari is reported to have said (Mug, p. 28, 9ff.), "An existentbeing does not require an entitative attribute by virtue of whichit is existent in the way that what is in motion requires an enti-tative attribute by virtue of which it is in motion" (al-mawgudu... Idyaqtadi ma'nan bihiyakunu mawgudan... kamdyaqtadi al-mutaharriku ma'nan bihi yakunu mutaharrikan).From this, then, arose the expression ''ma'na attributes' (sifatuma'nan, sifatun ma'nawiyya) where 'ma'nd' is employed as aqualifier in order to make the sense of 'sifa' unambiguouslyclear.115

God too exists and therefore is properly termed a being (say'),an entity (ddt), and an existence (wugud). God is eternal. Albeitin one of his works al-As'ari followed Ibn Kullab in saying thatGod is eternal by virtue of a distinct attribute, i.e., through a

115 The background in the usage of earlier mutakallimun is, alas, not very clear aswe have but few citations and one is never sure as to how exact they are in reflectingthe original vocabulary and language of the individual cited. It is reported (M 6/2,p. 5, 6f., cited by van Ess in "Ibn Kullab und die mihna," Oriens 18/19 [1967]: 92-142,p. 116) that Sulayman b. Garir held "that God's will is a ma'nd that is neither God orother than God." Abu al-Hudayl is reported to have used 'ma'nd' to describe motionand rest (Muhit 1, p. 32, llf.) and also perception (M 5, p. 55, 15). It would certainlyseem to have been used in the later formal sense by 'Abbad, as he is quoted (Maqp. 307, 6ff.) as distinguishing descriptions said of a being li-nafsihi and those (e.g., 'isin motion') said li-ma'nan and also to have used 'li-'illa' for the latter, somethingthat is common with later writers. That al-Salihl also used the word in this sense

2 1 6 RICHAKD M. FRANK

being eternal (bi-qidam), in most of his works he followed hismaster, al-Gubba'I116 in saying that He is eternal per se and thisis the universal opinion of his followers.117 Particular existencesdiffer and God's existence is absolutely unique:The Eternal differs per se from contingent beings and His Self is differentfrom them and so too He is other than they per se and His Self is other thanthey (inna al-qadima muhalifun li-al-hawaditi li-nafsihi wa-nafsuhuhilafun laha wa-kadalika <huwa> gayrun laha li-nafsihi wa-nafsuhugayrun laha: Mug, p. 215, 4f.)."Things' being alike entails their sharing in all essential attrib-utes (al-istirdku ft gami'i sifati al-nafs) and one essentialattribute that contingent beings have of themselves (li-anfusiha)is coming/having come to be (al-hudut)" (al-Isfara'mi, p. 137,16f.). Thus al-Guwayni says that contingent existence is a singletruth that belongs to all contingent entities (al-hudutu haqiqatunwahidatun li-gami'i al-hawadit).118 As formulated the statementreflects the analysis of the Basrian grammarians, according towhose teaching descriptive forms (verbs, participles, etc.) arederived from the verbal noun or masdar that names the event orfact referred to or implied in the descriptive word or expression(cf., e.g., Iddh, pp. 56ff.). Coming/having come to be (al-hudut) isthus the ground ('ilia) or Meaning (ma'nd) and so the truth(haqiqa) of the predicate 'comes/came to be' (hadit) and so also of

would seem clear enough from the report in Maq, p. 396, 3ff. Prof, van Ess called myattention to the report (Maq, p. 496, 9) that Ibn Kullab "said that God is an otherunlike others but would not say that He (it?) is a ma'nd " (wa-la yaqulu innahuma'nan). The sense of the first proposition is clear enough, but the second, is notclear at all. One is tempted to read this along with the statement attributed tounnamed Mu'tazilites (Maq, p. 181, 6f.) who hold that "God is per se a being unlikebeings but one does not say that He is other by an otherness (li-gayriyya)." To takethe pronoun of 'innahu ma'nan' in the statement attributed to Ibn Kullab as refer-ring implicitly to something like "God's being other" may seem somewhat question-able, however, given the way the report is cast, but does at least offer plausible sense.(One might, on the other hand, read li-ma'nan for ma'nan, again taking the pronounto refer to God's being other, but no such variant is listed.) This interpretation wouldseem to gain some support from al-A§'ari's report (Maq, p. 178, 6f., cited by van Ess,op. cit., p. 122) that some of Ibn Kullab's followers said that God's being God (al-ilahiyya) is a ma'na, while others denied it. Cp. their analogous disagreement (citedMaq, pp. 170, 4f. and 547, Iff.) on the question of whether God is or is not eternal byvirtue of "a being eternal" (bi-qidam).

116 Cf, e.g., Abu Muhammad b. Mankdim, Ta'liq 'ala Sarh al-Usul al-hamsa, ed.A. 'Utman under the title, Sarh al-Usul al-Hamsa (Cairo, 1965), p. 182, 13f.

117 Cf., e.g., Mug, pp. 28, 13ff. and 326, 8ff. and al-Bagdadi, p. 90, 7f.118 Sam (69), p. 329, 8f, where with T read wuguh for al-wuguh in line 7 and bal

for the editor's <li-anna> and li-gami'i for <yahtassu> bi-gami'i in line 8.

THE AS' ARITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 2 1 7

'is a contingent entity' (muhdat). For the mutakallimun, how-ever, the assertion is not simply lexical, for the essential truth(haqiqa) of any being is its existencevand is not distinct from theparticular entity, its Self (cf., e.g., Sam (69), p. 129, 18f., citedabove), wherefore 'hadit I muhdaf is said of contingent beings assuch (li-al-nafs): they are per se contingent entities. And onerecalls here that the coming to be of a contingent entity(hudutuhu) is its being created, its being caused to come to be,which is God's act of creating it. Unlike contingent beings, Godexists necessarily (cf., e.g., Luma' (A), p. 18,17 and S.Ir, fol. 9v f.).His existence is unique in that His non-existence is impossible(mustahil).119 Classes are constituted by pluralities of Beings(existences) that, having the same true natures (haqa'iq), areessentially alike. Likeness, however, occurs only between contin-gent entities (al-tamdtulu layaqa'u Hid bayna al-muhdatat: Mug,p. 214, 7f.), as they are, all of them, per se contingent entities(muhdatdtun li-anfusihd). God belongs to no class (laysa bi-digins: e.g., Luma' (A), p. 32, 5f. and Gn, Ms. 29r, 19f. and 32v,14f.). Similarly, al-Baqillani says with regard to the question'What is God?', "If by 'what is He?' you mean to what class doesHe belong (md ginsuhu), He has no class (fa-laysa bi-diginsin)."120 So it is that "even though God is described as a being(bi-kawnihi say'an) one may not say 'He is a being' or 'is oneamong beings' (innahu ahadu al-asyd'i aw-say'un min al-asyd'),for that is to designate a class and to assert similarity" (Sam (69),p. 348,16f.). "God is a being unlike beings" (say'un Id ka-al-asyd',e.g., Ta'wil, fol. l l lv , 10 and 14, and Baydn (H), p. 16, If.).'Being' (say'), therefore, though it is a designation for every exis-tent (simatun li-kulli mawgud: Ta'wil, fol. l l lv , 15), is not saidunivocally of God and of contingent entities. Used of contingentbeings it names a universal class, but God's Being - His Self/

119 Cf., e.g., Tqgr, p. 82, 13f. (=35, 14f.), Luma' (A), p. 17, 9ff., al-Isfara'Im, 'Aqida,p. 138, 17, and Sam (69), p. 186, ult.

120 Tarn, p. 263, 15f.; cf. also ibid., pp. 193f., cited in n. 30 above and cp. Qusayri,Risdla 1, p. 66. Cf. also the citation of Khalil b. Ahmad in Th.u.G 2, p. 223 and see our"Elements in the development of the teaching of al-AS'ari," Le Museon, 104 (1991):141-90, p. 157, n. 40. Ibn Furak reports (Mug, p. 66, 14) that al-As'ari said of Godthat He is the only possible member of His class: inna al-qadima al-azaliyya finaw 'ihi la yaguzu an yakuna aktara min wahid. This seems initially to be inconsis-tent with what he explicitly says in Luma' (A). The context here in Mug, however, isthat each of God's essential attributes is one and unique, as He cannot have twospeakings, two knowings, etc., whence the use of 'naw", though loose or metaphori-cal, is not wholly out of place.

2 1 8 RICHAED M. FRANK

existence - is unique, belonging to no class of beings. Consideredas "the most universal of positive nouns" (Mug, p. 252, citedabove), 'say", like 'mawgud', is unequivocal and does not name aclass. Al-Baqillani says (Insaf, pp. 72f.) regarding God's beingtermed a being, however, "if you mean by 'He is a being' that Heexists and has actuality in being (innahu mawgudun tdbit), thatis alright; but if you mean that he is a being like beings in that Hecomes forth from non-existence like beings that exist after non-existence, this we will not say." When God's Being is considered,the univocity of 'being/ existent' must be qualified.

As we saw earlier, God is commonly described as an "indepen-dent entity" (qd'imun bi-al-nafs). In its basic sense "an indepen-dent entity is an existent being which has no need of a subject inwhichto exist" (al-mawgudu al-mustagnl 'an mahallin yaqumubihi: Sam (69), p. 573, 3f.; cf. also ibid., p. 526, 7 and concerningthe expression see also n. 38 above). 'Independent entity' is notsaid univocally of the atom and of God, however, for God's Beingis such that He exists in no location or volume of space (cf., e.g.,S.Ir, fol. 160r, 12ff., citing al-Isfara'ini, and Baydn (H), p. 119,llf.). He is an independent entity in the sense thatHe requires no substrate and no place and no particular determination norhas He any kind of need: He transcends spaces and locations and limits andphysical characteristics (istigna'uhu 'an al-mahalli wa-'an al-tahslsi wa-'angumlati al-hagati wa-huwa bi-ta'alihi muqaddasun 'an al-ahyazi wa-al-nihayati wa-al-kayfiyya).121

The statement here is made directly against the notion that Godis a kind of material entity that exists somehow in space. This isspelled out in the second sentence, where volume, location,limit, and configuration (kayfiyya) are specifically denied.122 The

v m Gn, fol. 18v, 4f.; cf. also ibid., fol. 36v, ult. and al-Isfara'Ini, p. 134, 13 and cp.

Sam (69), pp. 573f., where al-Isfara'Ini is cited. Note that while as a technical term'mahall' is used as a name for the subject or substrate of an accident or entitativeattribute (e.g., Mug, p. 246, 17ff), it also occurs occasionally in its ordinary meaningof the place or location where one stops or resides, as "it is impossible that two atomsbe in a single mahall" since no two entities belonging to a single class can reside inone and the same mahall simultaneously" (Mug, p. 207, lOff.).

122 Al-As'ari (Mug, p. 82, lOf.) defines al-kayfiyya as "a class (naw') of accidents,viz., composition [of parts] and physical appearance (tarkibun wa-hay'a), somethingwhich is characteristic of created beings;" cf. also, e.g., Insaf, p. 29, 2ff. and al-Qusayri, al-Luma' fi l-i'tiqad, ed. R.M. Frank in MIDEO, 15 (1982): 59-73, at p. 60,19f. This lexical understanding of 'kayf is found already with al-Khalil b. Ahmad (cf.Th.u.G 2, p. 223). Concerning the As'arite analysis, see our "Elements in the devel-opment of the teaching of al-As'ari," pp. 154ff. and "The science of Kalam," ArabicSciences and Philosophy, 2 (1992): 7-37, pp. 24f.


implications of the term 'particular determination' (tahsis) inthe first sentence are far more general however. On one level itdenies the presence of accidents in God, first of any of theakwdn, sc. of those accidents which determine (tuhassis) theindividual atom's specific location in space (cf., e.g., the defini-tion in Ir, p. 17, lOff, and also Sam (69), pp. 157, 2f., 198, 9f, etalibi). Moreover, the existence of a particular accident in a givenatom is specifically determined by an agent (e.g., Sam (69),p. 175, 4ff.). The actuality of any contingent entity or state ofaffairs is determined by the choice of an agent (cf., e.g., ibid.)and the act of determining (al-tahsls) is the act of the will of theagent who causes it to occur precisely when and as it does (ibid.,p. 270, 12f.).123 Its being specifically determined (al-tahsls) evi-dences the act of the agent's will, its coming to be (al-hudut),His power, and its being well-done (al-itqan), His knowledge(Sam (81), p. 66, 12f. and (69), p. 522, 12f.). God's Being is eter-nally necessary and the actuality of what is necessary does notdepend on the determination of an agent.124 So, for example,whereas a human cognition has, through the determination ofGod's will, one rather than another object, God's knowledgebeing infinite and necessary is not specifically determined andtherefore needs nothing to give it specification (Id yufradu fihiihtisdsun fa-Id yaftaqiru ila muhassis: Gn, fol. 68v, 12f.; cf. alsoibid., fol. 64r, 13f., where al-Isfara'ml is cited).

In some works al-A§'ari asserted thatof created beings one does not say 'they are independent beings' becausethere is no being that exists of itself save God (the exalted); created beings

123 Cp. S.Ir, fol. 27v, llff.: wa-min ashabina man qala al-fi'luyadullu 'aid qasdi al-fa'ili wa-iradatihi, fa-inna al-ga'iza tubutuhu wa-intifa'uhu layahtassu bi-al-tubutibadalan min al-intifa'i al-mugawwazi Hid bi-muhassisin qasidin ila iqa'ihi (omittingal-gd'iz after tubutuhu and reading min al-intifd'i for min intifd'i). Thus one saysthat it is impossible that a contingent entity come to be without the one who deter-mines its existence to a specific time and location (istihalatu al-huduti duna al-muhassisi ma'lum: Sam (69), p. 541, 4). Concerning the will and intention of theagent (creator), see Sam (81), p. 66, 12f., (69), pp. 270, 12ff. and 273, 12ff. (citing al-As'ari) and 541, 2, (citing al-Baqillani).

124 Sam (69), p. 269, 5, reading bi-fd'ilin muhassis for bi-al-fd'ili wa-al-muhassis.In the same general passage read wagaba (with T) for ywgb on p. 268, 17; on p. 269add ga'iz before aytfan in line 12 with T and tahaqquq with T and K followingiltazamtum in line 16 and read yatahaqqaq with T for yata'allaq in the last line; onp. 270, T reads al-'adam for al-ma'dum in the first line and both T and K add Id fol-lowing lima in line 11 and T contains the kawna inserted by the editor in line 14.

220 RICHARD M. FRANKare because of the one who has made them be, continue in existence becauseof the one who has made them continue in existence, who brought themforth and made them exist (la qa'ima bi-nafsihi ilia Allahu ta'ala wa-innaal-muhdatati qa'imatun bi-man aqamaha bdqiyatun bi-man abqaha wa-ansa'aha, wa-awgadaha: Mug, p. 29, 5f.; cp. ibid., 43, 6ff. and also pp. 28f.,translated above).

Qdma, yaqumu is here taken as meaning simply to be or exist.125

Atoms are not truly independent; they do not exist of and bythemselves. Thus, while 'independent being' is commonlyemployed in a general sense of a being whose existence requiresno substrate, used of God it means that He is "the independentbeing in the strict and proper sense {al-qa'imu bi-al-nafsi 'aidal-haqiqa), other than whom there is no independent being...and [this] is preferred by the Master [Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini]."126 If this sense of the word is taken as primary,then, it will be said of atoms only in an extended sense(tawassu'an: Gn, fol. 14r, 8ff.).127

God "is neither within the world nor outside it" (S.Ir, fol. 160,14f.). So too He is described as eternal (qadim), which is to say

125 p o r (.jjg u s e of tjje v e r b m j-jjjg s e n s e by the Mutakallimun, cf., e.g., Sam (69),pp. 141, 11 and 199, 5f.: Id ma'nd li-qiyami al-'aradi bi-al-gawhari ilia anyugada bi-haytu wugudi al-gawhar. Though he sometimes employed the expression, al-As'arigenerally refused to say 'al-'aradu qa'imun bi-al-gawhar' or 'al-sifatu qa'imatun bi-al-mawsuf (cf. Mug, 213, If.), preferring the use of 'mawgud' (ibid., p. 29, 7ff. and265, 2ff.). Similarly, he disapproved of the use of 'halla ft' to speak of the accident'sbeing in the atom, on the grounds that 'hulul' is synonymous with 'sukun' and there-fore is properly used of something's occupying a place (makdn), whence is it mostproperly said of the atom and only in an extended sense of the accident's existence inthe atom (ibid., p. 212, 14ff.). It is thus appropriately rendered by 'reside' or 'exist' asmay seem most suitable in terms of the particular context. One should note concern-ing al-As'ari's use of 'qdma bi-' that reports given by later authors tend in many, ifnot most cases, to present his position ad sensum rather than verbatim.

126 Al-Isfara'ini, Fr. #26, where for 'Imhs at p. 150, 8, read al-muhassis; cp. Sam(81), p. 65, 20ff., (69), pp. 423, 8f. and 573^ 20ff., and al-Mutawalli, pp. 20f!

127 In some disputational contexts al-As'ari denied that 'qa'imun bi-al-nafs' may beused of God (cf., Mug, pp. 29, 3f. and 43, 6f.) and is reported to have asserted in anal-ogous contexts that the expression has no strict or proper meaning (haqiqa) eitherwith reference to contingent entities or to the transcendent (cf. Sam (69), pp. 423, 9ff.and 574, 13f.). Much of this is directed against the use of 'gawhar' by Christians (cf.,e.g., Tarn, pp. 75ff. and Sam (69), pp. 524ff. and 571ff). Al-Guwayni acknowledgesthe Christians' claim that in their use the word is equivalent to Greek ouaia not toArabic 'gawhar' as the latter is normally used and understood by the mutakallimun,but he nevertheless refuses to allow the validity of their use (ibid., p. 572, 13ff.; cp. Ir,pp. 46f.). It is possible that al-Guwayni may also have had the philosophers in mindin this polemic (v. Avicenna's view, cited in n. 38 above). All this is, in any case, butdisputational dialectic that is basically irrelevant to the normal use and sense of theexpression.

THE AS'AEITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 2 2 1

that in His existence He is "without limit or temporal extensionanterior to everything that has existed through a coming to be"(annahu mutaqaddimun bi-wugudihi 'aid kulli md wugida bi-al-huduti bi-gayri gdyati wa-ld mudda: Mug, p. 42, 19f.); "Hisexistence has neither temporal extension nor duration; it is notsubject to intervals of time" {laysa li-wugudihi imtidddun wa-ldistimrdrun wa-ld yahinu 'alayhi al-ahydn: Gn, fol. 19r, 22).128

Its having any bound or limit is logically impossible (mustahll),since limitation implies one discrete quantum or more of mag-nitude or of time or of both.129 There is no temporal or spatialrelation between God and contingent entities, "for that whichmakes it possible to speak of temporal and spatial relations isfinitude" (la nisbata bayna al-qadimi wa-al-hdditi bi-al-zamdniwa-al-makdni id al-musahhihu li-qawlin bi-al-ansdbi al-tandhi:Gn, fol. 19v, 23f.) and whatever is infinite in its essential Beingis not related to what is finite (ma la nihdyata li-ddtihi Idyunasibu al-mutandhi: ibid., fol. 20r, 3).130

God is in every respect infinite, without limit:He is infinite in His Being in the sense of the negation of spatial position andlocalization; He is infinite in His existence in the sense of the negation of hishaving a beginning, for He is eternal without beginning or end and perduresforever (azaliyyun abadiyyun samad).lsl So also His essential attributes are

128 Cf. also ibid., fol. 106r f. and also fol. 19v, 4: ida lam yakun li-wugudihi muf-tatahun fa-la yu'qalu fihi al-tandhi wa-al-imtidad. Cf. also Mug, p. 239, 16ff., trans-lated below. This thesis is significant also in that it applies also to God'sforeknowledge of what with respect to our now was and what is and what is to be.

129 Al-Isfara'ini, p. 137, 18: al-dalilu 'aid istihdlati al-haddi wa-al-nihdyati 'alayhianna al-nihdyata tugibu miqddra al-guz'i fa-md fawqahu. I have rendered 'guz" hereby 'discrete quantum of magnitude' in order to allow for instants of time as well as"particles" of accidents and atoms. Cp. Baydn (K), p. 19, lOff.

130 Cp. Gn, fol. 32v, 14f.: al-muqtadi li-al-ansdbi al-nihdydtu wa-man Id niydyatalahu fi ddtihi wa-ld fl wugudihi Id yunasibu al-mutandhiya fi al-makdni wa-al-zamdni wa-man Id haytu lahu Id yunasibu md lahu hayt (omitting the waw followingwugudihi in line 14). What is meant when we speak of an instant or moment of time(waqt) is a number of events, sc, of created realities, that exist simultaneously (cf.,e.g., Ir, pp. 32f.). Thus there is for creatures (for us) a now and a before, but all cre-ated entities are, for God, immediately present in the actuality of their Being (cf., e.g.,Gn, fol. 67r, 6ff.). Note that the use of 'hayt' in Gn, fol. 32v, 15, makes it clear that,though it has no position in space (giha) or place (makdn), the accident has "locus"as it exists in the locus of the atom (cf., e.g., Sam (69) pp. 185, 18f. and 199, 5, andGn, fol. 18v, 6, cited above in n. 71 above). With this, cp. the phrase "al-makdnu wa-al-haytiyya": Gn, fols. 33r, 4f., translated immediately below.

131 The same phrase is found also at Gn, fol. 73r, 5. Various interpretations aregiven for 'samad' (whose meaning in al-Qur'dn 112.2 was a mystery to the lexicogra-phers). Though not offered by the lexicographers (it is not given, e.g., Istiqaq, pp.441ff.) 'who perdures' or 'who perdures forever' is found, e.g., in Ta'wil, fol. 115v,


infinite in their Being, since they belong uniquely to a being that is infiniteand are infinite in their existence because their being eternal is necessaryand so also they are infinite in the objects to which they are correlated, sinceHis knowledge is correlated to an infinity of objects and so also his power...:Gn, fol. 33r, 4ff.; cp. Sam (69), p. 534, 5f.).

God's Being can be neither depicted by thought nor grasped byunderstanding (Id yusawwiruhu al-wahmu wa-la yuqaddiruhual-fahm).132

That God must have ontologically distinct attributes of life,knowledge, will, power, etc., which are analogous to the entita-tive attributes that occur as accidents in contingent beings, isknown "by reasoning from what is phenomenally given to ourobservation to what is hidden from it."133 These are termed"essential attributes," forGod's existence cannot be conceived apart from His essential attributes, notbecause they are attributes of His Self, but because they exist necessarily asHis (wugudu al-ilahi la yu 'qalu duna sifati datihi la li-kawnihd min sifatiddtihi bal li-wugubi wugudiha lahu: Gn, fol. 25r, 9f.).

That is to say, because God's "essential attributes" are comple-ments of His Self, their existence is necessary. His Self can be

12f.; it is the first interpretation given in Tahblr (fol. 109v, 13f. = p. 80) and is plainlyintended in the present context, where the word may perhaps stand last as a termthat combines the first two. It is commonly employed by al-Qu§ayri (e.g., Lata'if 1,pp. 57, 129, et alibi), but is not given by al-Guwayni in Ir (p. 145). Maqayis, as usual,gives only the established basic meanings, saying that there are two stems; one mean-ing al-qasd and the other al-salabatu fi al-say'. The latter serves as the base of onecommonly accepted meaning of 'samad' as it occurs in al-Qur'an (112.2) that isfollowed, e.g., by al-Isfara'inl (p. 134, 7f.), while the former is the base for the morecommonly accepted interpretation, given in al-Gawhari (s.v.) which is followed, e.g.,by al-Zaggagi (Istiqaq, p. 441). Al-Guwayni (Ir, p. 154), along with other AS'arites,gives but the usual lexical definitions. On this see generally Gimaret, Doctrine,pp. 320ff.

132 Al-Qu§ayri, al-Luma' fi l-i'tiqad, p. 61, 18f. This is quite common with A&'aritetheologians (cf., e.g., Insaf, p. 42, 17ff, al-Isfara'Ini, p. 133, 16f., and Gn, fols. 32v f.and 65r, 8), even though they hold that certain aspects of His Being are accessible tothe mind through rational inference (ma'qulu al-dalili gayr mawhumin wa-lamuqaddar: Gn, fol. 32r, 20). For the sense of 'wahm' as thought, cf, e.g., Isfara'ini,p. 136, 22f and Ta'wil, fol. 115r, margin. In Gn, fol. 29r, 14 one reads Id yusawwiruhuwahmun wa-la yuqaddiruhu fikr.

133 M-istidlalu bi-al-sdhidi 'aid al-gd'ib: Mug, p. 14, 7ff.; cf. also ibid., pp 69, 7f. and286, 13ff. and Sirazi, p. 21, 9ff. For a detailed discussion of the matter along with theconditions and methods of such reasoning, cf, e.g., Sam (81), pp. 63ff. It is on thisbasis that one says that the existence of created entities manifests God's will, power, jand knowledge (e.g. ibid., p. 66, cited above). The possibility of such reasoning is |grounded in the haqd'iq of names and descriptions; on this see below. j


abstractly considered and defined as the necessarily existent (al-wagibu al-wugud, al-mustahilu 'adamuhu) apart from His life,power, etc., but given the fact that these attributes are comple-ments of His necessarily existent Self (nafs, dot), His Being can-not be rightly conceived apart from them.134

Since God's essential attributes exist, they are termed "beings."Our leading authorities are agreed in allowing the formula 'God's knowledgeand His existence [i.e., His Self] are two existent beings (say'dnimawgudan)' and so also one may describe His knowledge and power and allHis essential attributes as beings.135

His attributes are, thus, denumerable as such. That is to say,though one may not number God amongst other beings, since todo so would imply that He belongs to some class of beings towhich He is similar (tagnisun wa-tamtil) and also because thisis a usage that is not sanctioned by the revelation, al-As'ari andothers allow that His attributes may be counted.136 Althoughconsidered in itself as such, God's Self is without any conceiv-able division, His essential attributes can nevertheless be dis-tinguished from His Self and from one another.

God's attributes exist together with His Self (al-Mutawalli,p. 31, 7f.). "It is impossible that any of these attributes havecome to be" (inna say'an min hadihi al-sifati la yasihhu anyakuna muhdatan: Tagr, p. 94, 12 = 67f.); they are "eternal byHis being eternal and exist by His existence" (qadlmatun bi-qidamihi wa-mawgudun bi-wugudihl: Insdf, pp. 73, 9 and 80,12f.) and continue in existence through His continuance in exis-tence (Mug, p. 43, Iff.). Although distinguishable from His Selfand from each other, God's essential attributes, unlike the enti-tative attributes of creatures, are not other than He, for to be

134 These attributes are described as some of (or among) His essential attributes(min sifati ddtihi), because they are distinct from (za'idatun 'aid) His existence,which is the primary attribute of His Self, The essential attribute, if you will.

135 S.Ir, fol. 68r, 4ff; cp. Gn, fol 65v, 2ff. and also, e.g., Mug, pp. 66, 8 and 194, 13f.and Iht, fol. 6r f.

136 Cf., e.g., Mug, p. 58, 4ff. and Sam (69), p. 351, 8f., citing al-Baqillani, where withT read tamdniya for nihdya in line 9; cp. Gn, fol. 64v, 9. Concerning its not beingsanctioned by the revelation, cf. Sam (69), p. 350, 7ff., where with T read bi-al-'adadfor bl'd in line 7, yumdtil for yugdnis in line 8, add fa-yu'adda minhd following al-ma'duddt in line 9, and read wa-raddada for wrd in line 13; see generally pp. 350f.,where with T add ahaduhumd anna following ma'nayayn at p. 350, 2 and read sifatiAlldhi subhdnahu asyd'u for al-$ifdti laysat in line 6; the argument cited from al-Isfara'ini (pp. 350f.) makes there no sense in the reading of the printed text. Cf. alsoLuma' (A), p. 32, 5f.


other is to be in some way separate or separable from what isother (e.g., Luma' (A), pp. 12f.); that is, one or both may existwithout the other (cf., e.g., Mug, p. 40, Iff., and Tarn, § 357). Itis impossible, however, that God's attributes be separable fromHim in any way whatsoever, since their being separable is some-thing that would imply His being a contingent entity and Hisnot being God.137 Accordingly, one does not say of God's attrib-utes either that they are He or that they are other than He{Mug, p. 38, 20, Insdf, pp. 25f., al-Mutawalli, p. 31, 5ff., and Gn,fols. 65r, 17ff. and 96r, 6ff.). In the formulation of al-Isfara'ini,"one says neither 'they are He and are not other than He' nor'they are not He and are other than He'" ('Aqida, p. 134, 2; cf.also, ibid., p. 138, 23ff., Ir, p. 137, 5ff., Gn, fol. 96r, 6ff., and al-Bayhaqi, Asmd', p. I l l , 2f.). And "as one does not say that Hisattributes are other than He and does not say that they are He,so also, since the two negations cannot be joined, one does notsay 'they are not He and are not other than He' (... wa-ldyuqdlu lay sat hiya huwa wa-laysat gayrahu)."138 Nor can onesay that God's attributes differ from Him, for to say, e.g., thatHis knowledge is different from Him {muhdlifun lahu) impliesnot only that it is other than He, but also "that it belongs to oneclass and God belongs to a different one." On the contrary, Godand His attributes are not distinct as are members of twodifferent classes of contingent entities (i.e., as are an atom andaccident that resides in it) and neither are they different orthe same (laysd bi-ginsayni wa-ld muhtalifayni wa-ld mutta-fiqayn).139 So too, though God's attributes may be said to differone from another in some instances (Sam (69), p. 331, lOff., cit-ing al-Baqillani, and Ir, p. 137 11 and Gn, fols. 28v f., both cit-ing al-Isfara'ini; cf. also Hiddya, fols. 128v f.), they are not saidto be other to one another or different or the same (agydrun aw-

137 Tagr, pp. 95f. (= 70, 12f.): ... li-anna mufaraqataha ma yugibu hudutahu wa-hurugahu 'an al-ilahiyya (where read gayriyya for gayruhu at p. 96, 1 and add lahufollowing mufaraqataha at 96, 2; and read nafs for tafsir at 96, 3 of the Istanbul edi-tion and tagyir at 70, 14 of the Cairo edition and mimma for lm' in the following lineof both editions). Cf. also Luma' (A), loc. cit.

138 Gn, fol. 65r, 19f., citing al-As'ari; cf. also Iht, fol. 66r, 14ff. The double formula-tions of al-Isfara'ini are significant from a logical point of view, albeit he is cited byal-Harasi (fols. 128v f.) as saying that the argument is chiefly over words; see the gen-eral discussion ibid., fols. 128r ff.

139 Tarn, p. 211, 7ff., reading wa-ld followingginsayn in line 14 with the variant; onthe use of 'muttaftq' see the discussion of the question in Sam (69), pp. 330ff.


muhtalifatun aw-muttafiqa: Mug, p. 40, 7f.140 It is thus that Godis not an object that can be imagined or conceptually grasped byunderstanding. One sees here why, in Mug, pp. 28f. (translatedabove), al-As'ari divides existent entities into those that areindependent beings (God's Self and the spatially extendedatoms) and "those that require a substrate or something towhich they are related" in order to avoid the formula "those thatexist in another," since the 'another' of the latter would, in thecontext, imply that God's essential attributes, are other thanHe.141

There are problems that arise concerning God's "continuingto exist." That is, had the As'arites to deal only with 'eternal' asan exact and proper description of God's Being (His Self) and Hisattributes, things would have been easier. 'Continues/remains'(baqiya, yabqa, baqa'an) occurs in the Koran, however, not onlyas a description of created beings (e.g., 26, 120) but more impor-tantly as a description of God (55, 16), and so must be dealt withas one of the revealed "beautiful names." As we have alreadyseen in the discussion of accidents, some AS'arite masters, mostnotably al-Mutawalli and al-Guwayni asserted that to continuein existence (al-baqa') is simply the continuance of existence(istimrdru al-wugud), and this is the position preferred by al-Baqillani with respect to God's baqa', in good part because of dif-ficulties concerning the eternity of God's essential attributes ifone takes the position that it is an entitative attribute (cf., e.g.,Gn, fol. 92r, 7ff. and cp. Sam (69), pp. 428f.).142

140 Cf. also ibid. p. 58, 4ff. and Gn, fol. 65r, 17, Tarn, p. 211 and Insaf, p. 39, 7f.(inna sifati datihi laysat bi-agyarin lahu wa-ld huwa gayrun li-sifatihi wa-ld sifatuhumutagayiratun ft anfusiha). A similar formulation is given by Abu al-Qasim al-Qusayri, in al-Mu'tamad, MS Murat Buhan, no. 210, fol. 74r, 10f.: ... Id agydrun lahuwa-ld fi anfusiha mutagdyira.

141 This is not the case with the 'gayrihi' of yaqtadi md yata'allaqu bihi minmahallin aw-gayrihi (Mug, p. 28, discussed above), since the '-hi' of 'aw-gayrihi' hererefers to 'mahallin'. Cf. also ibid., p. 29, 9f., where employing 'sifa' as a general termused either for God's attributes or for accidents, sc, the entitative attributes of crea-tures, he says al-sifatu mawgudatun bi-al-mawsufi bihd. Cf. also Tarn, pp. 259f.

142 In Tarn (p. 263, 7ff.), which, as we have noted, is a quite elementary and so stan-dard AS'arite handbook, he asserts the more common thesis. The divisions of theschool concerning God's baqa' seem in some degree to parallel those concerning Hisface (e.g., in al-Qur'dn 55.15f.: "All who are on the earth shall perish; the face of yourLord, glorious and majestic, perdures..."). Abu al-Hasan al-Tabari says (Ta'wll, fol.127v, 7ff.) that "the face of a being is the being itself (waghu al-say'i huwa <huwa>bi-'aynihi) and so also al-Baqillani, using 'ddt' rather than "ayn' (Insdf, p, 38, If.),while in an equivalent formulation al-Guwayni says that 'face' here means existence


The main problem with taking al-baqd' as an entitativeattribute arises because of difficulties in maintaining certainconsistencies in the general conception of entitative attributesand their relation to the independent beings in which they havetheir existence and to one another within the single subject.There is a problem, that is to say, concerning the eternal exis-tence of God's other essential attributes (His sifdt ma'nawiyya),life, knowledge, &c, that does not arise concerning accidentsthat reside in one and the same atom, since by their very naturenone of the latter can exist for more than a single instant. It isthus that al-Mutawalli argues (p. 31, 12ff.) that were al-baqd'an entitative accident distinct from the particular existence thatcontinues to exist (ma'nan zd'idun 'aid al-wugudi al-mus-tamirr), God's essential attributes could not continue to exist.

According to al-A§'ari "what continues to exist is that whichcontinues to exist by a continuance which resides in its Self(yaqumu bi-ddtihi); the Creator (be He praised) continues toexist by a continuance that resides in his Self (bi-baqd'inyaqumu bi-ddtihi) whereas his attributes continue to exist byGod's continuance (be He praised)" (Gn, fol. 90v, 5ff.; cp. ibid.,fol. 62v, 22f.) Or, according to the report of al-Harasi (fol. 142r,7ff.), he said.For my part, I hold that the attributes of God (the exalted) continue to existby the continuance of His Self. The Self continues to exist by a continuancewhich resides in it, viz., an entitative attribute which is distinct from it,while the attributes continue to exist through the continuance of the Self.(and aqulu inna sifati Allahi ta'ala baqiyatun bi-baqa'i al-dati wa-al-datubaqiyatun bi-baqd'in qdma bihd huwa ma'nan zd'idun 'alayhd wa-al-sifdtubaqiyatun bi-baqa'i al-dat).

(Ir, p. 155, 14f.; cf. also ibid., p. 157, 9ff.). Ibn Furak, by contrast, says (Bayan (H),p. 172,18f.) that "our fellows take the position that God has a face and the face is oneof His attributes that exist in His Self (sifatun min sifatihi al-qa'imati bi-datihi)"and, having rejected the thesis that 'wagh' means the Self or existence of a being(ibid., pp. 172f., where V adds hadd waghu al-tariq following bi-qawlihim at p. 172,14), asserts (p. 222, 5ff., where V adds huwa after alladi and correctly lacks al-tani in1. 7) that there is no lexical basis for the thesis that 'face' means dot. Al-As'ari's posi-tion on this seems to have been somewhat inconsistent. Al-Guwaynl says (Iht, fol.125v, 6) that "the sounder of his two responses (asahhu gawdbayhi) concerning theface is that it is the dat," while al-Ansari reports (Gn, fols. 99v f.) that of his two posi-tions the predominant one (azharu qawlayhi) is that it is an attribute distinct fromexistence (sifatun za'idatun 'aid. al-wugud)." Al-QuSayri seems to attempt an inter-mediate position in Lata'if 5, p. 85 (ad al-Qur'an 28.88) and 6, p. 76, 5ff. (ad al-Qur'an 55.26f.).


In order to clarify the sense of continuance in existence wherethe referent is the timeless eternity of God's existence, al-As'arirejected the assertion of those who hold that the meaning of 'al-baqV is thatover which pass two moments of time (ma ata 'alayhi waqtan), saying that,were this true it would be logically impossible to describe anything as con-tinuing to exist other than that over which pass moments of time and thiswould make it logically impossible that God continue to exist (wa-ddlikayuhilu kawna al-bdri'i baqiyan).143

Since, however, continuance in existence is considered by mostAs'arites to be an entitative attribute distinct from the Self oressential Being of the entity that continues to exist,144 there is aproblem concerning God's attributes of life, knowledge, &c,because entitative attributes as such must exist in independententities and so, not being independent entities, cannot them-selves be subjects of the existence of entitative attributes.Al-As'ari distinguished between al-baqd' and attributes such as knowledge andthe power of voluntary action and other entitative attributes which have con-traries, and held that a condition [of the existence] of the latter is that theyexist in the subject that is qualified by them (qiydmuhd bi-al-mawsufi bihd)...but he did not hold it to be a condition of al-baqd' that it exist in that whichcontinues to exist, since continuance in existence has no contrary {li-anna al-baqd'a la didda lahu): Gn, fol. 92v, 2ff.; cp. Mug, p. 239, cited in n. 78 above).

God's continuance, he holds, continues to exist per se (innabaqa'ahu baqin bi-nafsihi: Mug, pp. 326f.) or in the formulationof al-Isfara'Inl (cited in Gn, fol. 98, 8f.) "the Creator's attributescontinue by His continuance and His continuance continues bya continuance which is its Self {sifatu al-bdri'i baqiyatun bi-baqa'in wa-baqa'uhu baqin bi-baqd'in huwa nafsuhu). This isexplained elsewhere in the following terms:

143 Mug, p. 239, 16ff. With this cp. Istiqdq, p. 347, where he says that predicated ofany being other than God, 'al-baqi' has always an explicit or implicit reference to alimited period of time, wherefore it is said truly of God and only metaphorically(magazan) of creatures. Concerning the association of contingent existence withintervals or periods of time, cf, e.g., Gn, fol. 19v, 21ff.

144 Cf. Gn, fols. 90r, 21 and 94v, 14, cited above. In Sir, fol. 35r, 14f. he says that thisis the common view of the school save for al-Baqillani. Regarding the thesis that baqd'is an entitative attribute it is interesting to note that al-Qusayri at the beginning of hisdiscussion of 'The Living' as one of God's Beautiful Names (Tahbir, p. 76) says, "Hislife is one of His essential attributes and is distinct from His baqa'." This seems curi-ous at first, but lexically life is defined as the opposite of death (e.g. Maqayis andIstiqdq, p. 168) and on this basis Abu Ishaq al-Zaggag says (Tafsir asma' Allah, ed.A.Y. Daqqaq [Cairo, 1975], p. 56) that as a description of God "al-hayyu yufidudawama al-wugud" and this is followed by his pupil, al-Zaggagi (Istiqaq, loc. cit.).

228 RICHARD M. FRANK[al-As'ari] said, "The essential attributes of the creator (the exalted) con-tinue to exist by a continuance that exists in the Self of the creator, and if itwere the case that a condition of the [existence of the] continuance is that itexist in that which continues to exist, it would follow that an entitativeattribute exists in an entitative attribute and this is impossible." He said, "Acondition of [the existence of an instance of] continuance is its existing insomething that is not other than that which continues to exist; and betweenGod's existence and His attributes there is no being-other, whence it is notprecluded that they continue to exist by His continuance {la yamtani'ukawnuha baqiyatin bi-baqa'ihi), whereas it is precluded that the accidentcontinue to exist by the continuance of the atom, since it is the case that theyare other to one another.145

Al-baqa' is not commonly discussed as one of God's essentialattributes, but it is clear from "a continuance that exists in theSelf of the Creator" that it is considered an essential attribute,even if one that is in some respects singular compared to theothers taken together. That is, in contingent beings (atoms)knowledge, for example, is an accident that as such has con-traries, opinion, error, unawareness, &c, and the condition ofthe existence of any one of them - of any accident, indeed - isthe absence of its contrary in the particular atom. God's essen-tial attributes, however, are eternal since they are not otherthan His eternally existent Self and therefore can have no con-traries. 'Ma'na' (or 'sifa') in the sense of entitative attribute istherefore, like 'qa'imun bi-al-nafs', equivocal, since God'sattributes, like His existence (wugud = nafs, ddt), are essen-tially different from those of contingent beings. Consequently, itis possible that God's essential attributes continue to exist by acontinuance that exists in a being that "is not other than they."

Al-Ansari also reports that al-As'ari at some point held aposition regarding the eternal existence of God's essentialattributes that differs notably from that which we have justexamined.

145 S.Ir, fols. 124v f. In the sentence Id yamtani'u kawnuha baqiyatin bi-baqa'ihithe phrase 'kawnuha baqiyatin' is used instead of the simpler 'baqd'uhd' in order toavoid the ambivalence of the noun 'baqd" i.e., because the latter may be heard as asimple noun which names and refers to the attribute, whereas what is intended is notthe attribute but the verbal noun in a gerundive sense: continuing [to exist]. The'kawn' functions, in short, as a syntactical particle which serves to nominalize thesentence 'huwa bdqin' so as to make it the subject of la yamtani''. This use of 'kawn'is quite common and has carefully to be distinguished from that in which it is seman-tically significant, as in phrases such as 'kawnuhu 'dliman' in the work of al-Guwayniwho speaks of ontologically real "states" (ahwal) of the Being of entities.


In several of his works he said the [essential] attributes of God (the exalted)of themselves continue to exist. Their Selves are a continuing to exist forthem. [His] knowledge is of itself a continuing to exist and so too with therest of his [essential] attributes.146

Al-Ansari offers no explanation that would clarify the exactsense and implication of this statement fully. The sense, how-ever, would seem clear enough. Even though the Self (nafs/dat)of a being is its existence, continuance is not here simply identi-fied with continuing existence (istimraru al-wugud) as it is withal-Mutawalli and al-Guwayni. That is, because God's essentialattributes are not other than His Self, their non-existence isimpossible (mustahil) and each one of them is of itself thereforeits own continuance in existence. Though evidently not acceptedby any of al-A§'ari's followers, this is nonetheless a quite coher-ent theory of the perpetual existence of God's essential attrib-utes and one that is consistent with al-As'ari's ontology. Themore common thesis, sc, that His attributes are "essential" andtherefore continue to exist because they are not other than Hiseternal Self, is based in part on the idea that the existence ofentitative attributes is secondary to, that is, bound to that oftheir subjects, albeit differently in the case of God's and in thatof those belonging to created entities (atoms).

Regarding God's Being and His attributes we have seen anumber of negations intended to confirm His transcendence: Heis a being unlike beings; He resembles no created being; infiniteHe has no relation (nisba), temporal or spatial, to what is finite;His entitative attributes are neither He nor other than He norare they other one to another or the same; He cannot be pre-cisely grasped by human understanding. Many of these nega-tions were asserted by theologians prior to al-A§'ari. Within theAs'arite context, however, the idea of transcendence they con-vey is limited, compromised in a sense by the simultaneousinsistence on God's entitative attributes, as beings {asya')\ HisSelf and His knowledge are two existent beings (say'ani

146 S.Ir, fol. 125r f.: qala fi ba'di kutubihi sifatu Allahi ta'ala baqiyatun bi-anfusihawa-anfusuha baqa'un laha wa-al-'ilmu baqa'un li-nafsihi wa-kadalika sa'iru sifatihi(reading baqa' for mq' and for 'ilmun, the first of which is a simple scribal error andthe second a lapse, the correct reading for which is obvious. See also Gn, fol. 90v, 10f.,where the same basic report is given verbatim, though without the final sentence,and where also he goes on to say that Abu Ishaq al-Isfara'Ini holds the same position.Whether by the phrase 'fi ba'di kutubihi' he means in several of his works or in onlyone is uncertain, though the latter would seem more likely.


mawguddn). Al-As'arl and his followers reject the position of al-Gubba'I according to which what is asserted to exist {al-mutbat)when one says "God has power to act" is God's very Self(datuhu) (cf., e.g., M 5, p. 205, llff.) or that to say "He knows"is to assert that He exists (itbdtuhu) and that He is unlike what-ever cannot know and so to assert that there are things Heknows (cf., e.g., Maq, pp. 167, 20ff., 524, 8ff., and 531, 9ff.).Against this the As'arites insist that if the truth of a description- the subject's truly being as described - requires the existenceof a ground Cilia) distinct from the subject when said of a con-tingent being, then it must likewise require a distinct groundwhen said of God. To deny this is logically inconsistent (al-Isfara'ini, p. 138, 14f., cited above).147 That is to say, were thisnot so the basic principles of the linguistic analysis of descrip-tive expressions - of verbs and verbal adjectives - would not beuniversally valid; they would, strictly speaking, have no "truemeanings" (haqd'iq) and consequently it would not be possibleto reason from what is phenomenally present to our under-standing to what is not phenomenally presentable.148 TheAs'arites, in short, are fundamentally bound to the linguistictheory of the grammarians. The Koran presents God's eternalspeaking "in a clear Arabic" (bi-lisanin 'arabiyyin mubin:16.103, et alibi) and therein He describes Himself as hearingand seeing (22.61 et alibi), wherefore His hearing and His see-ing must be "two of His essential attributes and distinct fromHis knowing."149 The As'arites can finesse the analysis of'qadim' since it does not occur in the Koran as a description ofGod,150 but they have, as we saw above, rather serious difficul-

147 Cp. Gn, fol. 61v, cited in n. 44. "Al-ismu ida istuqqa min ma'nan istahalaahduhu min gayrihi fa-al- 'alimu istuqqa min al- 'ilmi wa-yastahilu itbatu al-ismi al-mustaqqi bi-duni itbati al-mustaqqi minhu" (Iht, fol. 71r, 13f.). For the sense of'mustahil' here, cp. the use of 'muhal' in Slbawayh 1, p. 8, 13, which is followed inIstiqaq, p. 292, 18f.

148 Cf. al-Mutawalli, pp. 21f., Sam (69), pp. 297f, (81), pp. 63ff. and 72f.; withregard to the reasoning itself see the references given in n. 133 above.

149 Tahbir, fol. 72, Iff.; cf. also Luma' (A), §§ 15ff., Insaf, p. 37, Iff, and Ir, pp. 72ff(where he has then to get rid of taste, smell, etc, as essential attributes, pp. 76f.).

150 'Qadim' commonly means old or ancient: that the time of something is anterior(zamdnuhu sdlif: Maqayis, s.v.; al-qidamu al-'atqu, masdaru al-qadim: Lisan al-'arab, s.v..); "'new' (hadit) is the contrary of 'qidam' (al-Gawhari, s.v.). "God is theqadim in an absolute sense" (Ibn Sida and Lisan al-'arab, s.v.). According to al-As'ari,thus, when said of God "it means that His existence is, without limit or duration,antecedent to every being that exists through a coming to be" (Mug, p. 42, 19f; cp.ibid., p. 27, 17ff, where read al-wugud for al-mawgud in line 19); it is therefore

THE AS'AEITE ONTOLOGY: I PRIMARY ENTITIES 2 3 1

ties in treating 'baq', which does occur. Theologically the ques-tions and issues involved here are of great importance and theteaching of the As'arites on the topic needs to be examined thor-oughly and compared with that of the Hanbalites as well as thatof the Mu'tazila.

So - we have reviewed some of the most basic metaphysical the-ses of classical As'arite teaching and in the process have exam-ined several small sets of words and looked at a few texts thatappear plainly to display their formal meaning as technicalterms, all in hope to see how they reveal certain elemental pre-suppositions and commitments that guided the elaboration ofA&'arite thought and underlay its differences of their theologyfrom that of the Mu'tazilites and of the Hanbalites. While muchremains to be done in this area, I hope that the present effortwill prove of some help.

taken to mean "His existence has no beginning" (la awwala li-wugudihi: e.g., Insaf,p. 99, 6, Bayan (K), p. 19, llf., and al-Mutawalli, p. 12, 8ff.). In this al-A§'ari followedhis master, al-Gubba'i who held that when said of God 'qadim' means His existenceis antecedent in a preeminent sense and that it has no beginning (for al-Gubba'i's dis-cussion of the semantics of the term cf., e.g., M 5, 233). It may be, in part at least,because these interpretations of the word appear to imply a temporal relation ofGod's Being to that of contingent entities, that 'qadim' is frequently defined as mean-ing that God's existence is necessary (e.g., Sam (69), pp 504f.), that His non-existenceis impossible (e.g., Ta.gr, p. 82, 11 [= 35, 14] and al-Isfara'ini, p. 138, 17; see gener-ally Sam (69), pp. 254ff.). It is noteworthy for our present context that al-HarasI says(fols. 72v f.) that both 'qadim' and 'wagib' are here negative.

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THE AS'ARITE ONTOLOGY- I—FRANK