TheArtofWarCOMPLETETEXTSANDCOMMENTARIES

TheArtofWar

MasteringtheArtofWar

TheLostArtofWarTheSilverSparrowArtofWar

SunTzuTranslatedbyThomasCleary

SHAMBHALA

Boston&London2011

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Coverart:Chinese,Armoredguardian(tombfigure),Tangdynasty,700–750,buffearthenwarewithpolychromyandgilding,ht.:96.5cm,GiftofRussellTyson,1943.1139,photobyRobertHashimoto,photo©TheArtInstituteofChicago.

Frontispiece:NineDragons(detail),ChenRong,Chinese,SouthernSongdynasty,dated1244,©2003MuseumofFineArts,Boston,FrancisGardnerCurtisFund;17.1697.

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Classicsofstrategyandcounsel.Selections.Theartofwar:completetextsandcommentaries/translatedbyThomasCleary.—1st.ed.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferences.eISBN978-0-8348-2730-1ISBN978-1-59030-054-11.Militaryartandscience.2.Strategy.3.Management.I.Cleary,ThomasF.,1949–II.Title.U104.C484232003355.02—dc21

CONTENTS

THEARTOFWAR

Translator’sPrefaceTranslator’sIntroduction

1.StrategicAssessments2.DoingBattle3.PlanningaSiege4.Formation5.Force6.EmptinessandFullness7.ArmedStruggle8.Adaptations9.ManeuveringArmies

10.Terrain11.NineGrounds12.FireAttack13.OntheUseofSpies

MASTERINGTHEARTOFWAR

NoteonPronunciationTranslator’sIntroductionTheArtofWarandtheIChing:StrategyandChangeNotesonSourcesPartOne:TheWayoftheGeneral:EssaysonLeadershipandCrisisManagement

PartTwo:LessonsofWar:StudiesinStrategy

THELOSTARTOFWAR

IntroductionSunBin’sArtofWar

Leadership,Organization,andStrategy:HowSunTzuandSunTzuIIComplementEachOther

THESILVERSPARROWARTOFWAR

Translator’sIntroduction1.StrategicMeasurements2.Combat3.PlanningAttack4.Formations5.DispositionandMomentum6.VulnerabilityandSubstantiality7.ArmedStruggle8.AdaptingtoAllChanges9.ManeuveringForces

10.TheLayoftheLand11.NineGrounds12.FireAssault13.EmployingSecretAgents

Sources

THEARTOFWAR

SUNTZU

TRANSLATOR’SPREFACE

TheArtofWar(Sunzibingfa/Sun-tzuping-fa),compiledwellovertwothousandyearsagobyamysteriousChinesewarrior-philosopher,isstillperhapsthemostprestigiousandinfluentialbookofstrategyintheworldtoday,aseagerlystudiedinAsiabymodernpoliticiansandexecutivesasithasbeenbymilitaryleadersandstrategistsforthelasttwomillenniaandmore.In Japan, which was transformed directly from a feudal culture into a

corporateculturevirtuallyovernight,contemporarystudentsofTheArtofWarhaveappliedthestrategyofthisancientclassictomodernpoliticsandbusinesswith similar alacrity. Indeed, some see in the successes of postwar Japan anillustrationofSunTzu’sdictumoftheclassic,“Towinwithoutfightingisbest.”Asastudyoftheanatomyoforganizationsinconflict,TheArtofWarapplies

tocompetitionandconflict ingeneral,onevery levelfromthe interpersonal totheinternational.Itsaimisinvincibility,victorywithoutbattle,andunassailablestrength through understanding of the physics, politics, and psychology ofconflict.ThistranslationofTheArtofWarpresentstheclassicfromthepointofview

ofitsbackgroundinthegreatspiritualtraditionofTaoism,theoriginnotonlyofpsychologybutalsoof scienceand technology inEastAsia,and thesourceoftheinsightsintohumannaturethatunderliethismostreveredofhandbooksforsuccess.Inmyopinion,theimportanceofunderstandingtheTaoistelementofTheArt

ofWarcanhardlybeexaggerated.NotonlyisthisclassicofstrategypermeatedwiththeideasofgreatTaoistworkssuchastheIChing(TheBookofChanges)andtheTao-teChing(TheWayandItsPower),butitrevealsthefundamentalsofTaoism as the ultimate source of all the traditional Chinese martial arts.Furthermore,whileTheArtofWarisunmatchedinitspresentationofprinciple,the keys to the deepest levels of practice of its strategy depend on thepsychologicaldevelopmentinwhichTaoismspecializes.The enhanced personal power traditionally associated with application of

Taoistmental technology is in itself a part of the collective power associatedwithapplicationof theunderstandingofmasspsychology taught inTheArtof

War.WhatisperhapsmostcharacteristicallyTaoistaboutTheArtofWarinsuchawayastorecommenditselftothemoderndayisthemannerinwhichpoweriscontinuallytemperedbyaprofoundundercurrentofhumanism.Throughout Chinese history, Taoism has been a moderating force in the

fluctuatingcurrentsofhumanthoughtandaction.Teachingthatlifeisacomplexof interacting forces, Taoism has fostered both material and mental progress,both technologicaldevelopmentandawarenessof thepotentialdangersof thatvery development, always striving to encourage balance between thematerialandspiritualsidesofhumankind.Similarly,inpoliticsTaoismhasstoodonthesideofbothrulersandruled,hassetkingdomsupandhastornkingdomsdown,accordingtotheneedsofthetime.AsaclassicofTaoistthought,TheArtofWaris thus a book not only of war but also of peace, above all a tool forunderstandingtheveryrootsofconflictandresolution.

TRANSLATOR’SINTRODUCTION

TaoismandTheArtofWarAccording toanold story,a lordofancientChinaonceaskedhisphysician,amemberofafamilyofhealers,whichofthemwasthemostskilledintheart.Thephysician,whosereputationwassuchthathisnamebecamesynonymous

with medical science in China, replied, “My eldest brother sees the spirit ofsicknessandremovesitbeforeittakesshape,sohisnamedoesnotgetoutofthehouse.“My elder brother cures sickness when it is still extremely minute, so his

namedoesnotgetoutoftheneighborhood.“As forme, I puncture veins, prescribe potions, andmassage skin, so from

timetotimemynamegetsoutandisheardamongthelords.”AmongthetalesofancientChina,nonecapturesmorebeautifullythanthisthe

essence of The Art ofWar, the premiere classic of the science of strategy inconflict.AMingdynastycriticwritesofthislittletaleofthephysician:“Whatisessentialforleaders,generals,andministersinrunningcountriesandgoverningarmiesisnomorethanthis.”Thehealingartsandthemartialartsmaybeaworldapartinordinaryusage,

buttheyareparallelinseveralsenses:inrecognizing,asthestorysays,thattheless needed the better; in the sense that both involve strategy in dealingwithdisharmony;andinthesensethatinbothknowledgeoftheproblemiskeytothesolution.As in the story of the ancient healers, in Sun Tzu’s philosophy the peak

efficiencyofknowledgeandstrategyistomakeconflictaltogetherunnecessary:“Toovercomeothers’armieswithoutfightingisthebestofskills.”Andlikethestoryof thehealers,SunTzuexplains there are all gradesofmartial arts:Thesuperiormilitarist foils enemies’plots;nextbest is to ruin their alliances;nextafterthatistoattacktheirarmedforces;worstistobesiegetheircities.*Justastheeldestbrotherinthestorywasunknownbecauseofhisacumenand

the middle brother was hardly known because of his alacrity, Sun Tzu alsoaffirmsthatinancienttimesthoseknownasskilledwarriorswonwhenvictorywasstilleasy,sothevictoriesofskilledwarriorswerenotknownforcunningor

rewardedforbravery.This ideal strategywherebyone couldwinwithout fighting, accomplish the

most by doing the least, bears the characteristic stamp of Taoism, the ancienttraditionofknowledgethatfosteredboththehealingartsandthemartialartsinChina.TheTao-teChing,orTheWayandItsPower,appliesthesamestrategytosocietythatSunTzuattributestowarriorsofancienttimes:

Planforwhat isdifficultwhile it iseasy,dowhat isgreatwhile it issmall.Themostdifficultthingsintheworldmustbedonewhiletheyarestilleasy,thegreatestthingsintheworldmustbedonewhiletheyarestillsmall.Forthisreasonsagesneverdowhatisgreat,andthisiswhytheycanachievethatgreatness.

Written over two thousand years ago during a period of prolonged civilwarfare,TheArtofWaremergedfromthesamesocialconditionsassomeofthegreatest classics of Chinese humanism, including the Tao-te Ching. Taking arational rather thananemotionalapproach to theproblemofconflict,SunTzushowedhowunderstandingconflictcanleadnotonlytoitsresolution,buteventoitsavoidancealtogether.The prominence of Taoist thought in The Art of War has been noted by

scholars for centuries, and the classic of strategy is recognized in bothphilosophical andpoliticalworksof theTaoist canon.The level of knowledgerepresentedbytheupperreachesofTheArtofWar,thelevelofinvincibilityandthe level of no conflict, is one expression of what Taoist lore calls “deepknowledgeandstrongaction.”TheBook of Balance andHarmony (Chung-ho chi/Zhongho ji), amedieval

Taoistwork,says,“Deepknowledgeofprincipleknowswithoutseeing,strongpracticeoftheWayaccomplisheswithoutstriving.Deepknowledgeisto‘knowwithout going out the door, see the way of heaven without looking out thewindow.’Strongactionisto‘groweverstronger,adaptingtoallsituations.’”

IntermsofTheArtofWar,themasterwarriorislikewisetheonewhoknows

thepsychologyandmechanicsof conflict so intimately that everymoveof anopponent isseen throughatonce,andonewhoisable toact inpreciseaccordwith situations, riding on their natural patternswith aminimumof effort.TheBook of Balance and Harmony goes on to describe Taoist knowledge andpracticefurtherintermsfamiliartothequestofthewarrior.

Deepknowledge is tobeawareofdisturbancebeforedisturbance, to

be aware of danger before danger, to be aware of destructionbeforedestruction, tobeawareofcalamitybeforecalamity.Strongaction istrainingthebodywithoutbeingburdenedbythebody,exercisingthemindwithoutbeingusedby themind,working in theworldwithoutbeing affected by the world, carrying out tasks without beingobstructedbytasks.By deep knowledge of principle, one can change disturbance into

order, change danger into safety, change destruction into survival,change calamity into fortune. By strong action on theWay, one canbringthebodytotherealmoflongevity,bringthemindtothesphereofmystery, bring the world to great peace, and bring tasks to greatfulfillment.

As these passages suggest,warriors ofAsiawho usedTaoist orZen arts toachieveprofoundcalmnessdidnotdoso just toprepare theirminds tosustaintheawarenessof imminentdeath,but also to achieve the sensitivityneeded torespond to situations without stopping to ponder. The Book of Balance andHarmonysays:

Comprehension in a state of quiescence, accomplishment withoutstriving,knowingwithoutseeing—thisisthesenseandresponseoftheTransformative Tao. Comprehension in a state of quiescence cancomprehend anything, accomplishment without striving canaccomplishanything,knowingwithoutseeingcanknowanything.

As inThe Art ofWar, the range of awareness and efficiency of the Taoist

adept is unnoticeable, imperceptible to others, because their critical momentstake place before ordinary intelligence has mapped out a description of thesituation.TheBookofBalanceandHarmonysays:

To sense and comprehend after action is notworthy of being calledcomprehension. To accomplish after striving is not worthy of beingcalled accomplishment.To knowafter seeing is notworthy of beingcalled knowing. These three are far from the way of sensing andresponse.Indeed,tobeabletodosomethingbeforeitexists,sensesomething

before it becomes active, see something before it sprouts, are threeabilities that develop interdependently.Thennothing is sensedbut iscomprehended,nothingisundertakenwithoutresponse,nowheredoes

onegowithoutbenefit.

One of the purposes of Taoist literature is to help to develop this specialsensitivityandresponsiveness tomaster livingsituations.TheBookofBalanceandHarmonymentions the“TransformativeTao” in reference to theanalyticalandmeditative teachingsof the IChing, the locusclassicusof the formula forsensitivity and responsiveness. Like the I Ching and other classical Taoistliterature,TheArtofWarhasanincalculableabstractreserveandmetaphoricalpotential. And like other classical Taoist literature, it yields its subtleties inaccordwith thementalityof the reader and themanner inwhich it is put intopractice.The association of martial arts with Taoist tradition extends back to the

legendary Yellow Emperor of the third millennium B.C.E., one of the majorculture heroes of China and an important figure in Taoist lore. According tomyth, theYellowEmperorconqueredsavage tribes through theuseofmagicalmartial arts taught him by a Taoist immortal, and he is also said to havecomposedthefamousYinConvergenceClassic(Yinfuching/Yinfujing),aTaoistwork of great antiquity traditionally given both martial and spiritualinterpretations.Overa thousandyears later,warriorchieftainsoverthrowingtheremnantsof

ancient Chinese slave society and introducing humanistic concepts ofgovernment composed the classic sayings of the I Ching, another Taoist texttraditionallyusedasabasisforbothmartialandcivilarts.ThebasicprinciplesoftheIChingfigureprominentlyinSunTzu’sscienceofpoliticalwarfare,justas they are essential to individual combat and defense techniques in thetraditionalmartialartsthatgrewoutofTaoistexercises.

ThenextgreatTaoisttextaftertheYinConvergenceClassicandIChingwas

theTao-teChing,likeTheArtofWaraproductoftheeraoftheWarringStates,which ravaged China in the middle of the first millennium B.C.E. This greatclassicrepresentstheprevailingattitudetowardwarthatcharacterizesSunTzu’smanual: that it is destructive even for the victors, often counterproductive, areasonablecourseofactiononlywhenthereisnochoice:

Those who assist a leader bymeans of the Tao do not use arms tocoerce the world, for these things tend to reverse—brambles growwhereanarmyhasbeen,badyearsfollowagreatwar.Weapons are inauspicious instruments, not the tools of the

enlightened.Whenthereisnochoicebuttousethem,it isbesttobecalm and free from greed, and not celebrate victory. Those whocelebrate victory are bloodthirsty, and the bloodthirsty cannot havetheirwaywiththeworld.

In a similarway,TheArt ofWar pinpoints anger and greed as fundamentalcausesofdefeat.According toSunTzu, it is theunemotional, reserved, calm,detached warrior who wins, not the hothead seeking vengeance and not theambitiousseekeroffortune.TheTaoteChingsays:

Thosewhoaregoodatknighthoodarenotmilitaristic, thosewhoaregoodatbattledonotbecomeangry,thosewhoaregoodatprevailingoveropponentsdonotgetinvolved.

Thestrategyofoperatingoutsidethesphereofemotionalinfluenceispartofthe general strategy of unfathomability that The Art of War emphasizes incharacteristicTaoist style:SunTzusays, “Those skilled indefensehide in thedeepest depths of the earth, those skilled in attack maneuver in the highestheightsofthesky.Thereforetheycanpreservethemselvesandachievecompletevictory.”ThisemphasisontheadvantageofenigmapervadesTaoistthinking,fromthe

political realmto therealmsofcommerceandcraft,where, it issaid,“Agoodmerchant hides his treasures and appears to have nothing,” and “A goodcraftsman leaves no traces.”These sayingswere adopted byZenBuddhists torepresenttheirart,andtheuncannyapproachtothewarrior’swaywastakenupbothliterallyandfigurativelybyZenBuddhists,whowereamongtheforemoststudentsoftheTaoistclassicsanddevelopersofesotericmartialarts.

Writings on both the civil andmilitary aspects of political organization are

found throughout the Taoist canon. The Book of the Huainan Masters(Huainanzi/Huainan-tzu), one of the great Taoist classics of the early Handynasty,whichfollowedthedramaticendoftheWarringStatesperiod,includesanentirechapteronTaoistmilitarysciencethattakesupthecentralthemeofthepracticeofTheArtofWar:

Inmartialarts,itisimportantthatstrategybeunfathomable,thatformbeconcealed,andthatmovementsbeunexpected,sothatpreparednessagainstthembeimpossible.What enables a goodgeneral towinwithout fail is alwayshaving

unfathomablewisdomandamodusoperandithatleavesnotracks.Onlytheformlesscannotbeaffected.Sageshideinunfathomability,

sotheirfeelingscannotbeobserved;theyoperateinformlessness,sotheirlinescannotbecrossed.

InTheArtofWar,SunTzuwrites,“Beextremelysubtle,eventothepointofformlessness. Be extremely mysterious, even to the point of soundlessness.Therebyyoucanbethedirectoroftheopponent’sfate.”BothSunTzuand themastersofHuainan,agroupofTaoistandConfucian

sagesgatheredbyalocalking,recognizealevelofwisdomwhereconflictdoesnot emerge and victory is not visible to the ordinary eye, but both books are,after all, written in recognition of the difficulty and rarity of this refinedattainment. Like SunTzu’s art ofwar, the strategy of themasters ofHuainanprovidesforactualconflict,notonlyasalastresort,butalsoasanoperationtobecarriedoutunderthestrictestconditions,withappropriateleadership:

Ageneralmust seealoneandknowalone,meaning thathemust seewhat others do not see and know what others do not know. Seeingwhatothersdonotseeiscalledbrilliance,knowingwhatothersdonotknowiscalledgenius.Brilliantgeniuseswin first,meaning that theydefendinsuchawayastobeunassailableandattackinsuchawayastobeirresistible.

TherigorousconditionsofTaoisticmilitaryactionareparalleledbythoseof

Taoistspiritualpractice.Metaphorsofpeaceandwararewidelyusedinmanualsof Taoist meditation and exercise. One of the most basic principles of Taoistpractice,derivingfromtheteachingsoftheIChing,isthemasteryof“emptinessandfullness,”whichhasbothphysicalandpsychologicalimplications.Given an entire chapter in The Art of War, the mastery of emptiness and

fullness is fundamental to the physical accomplishment of Taoist fighting artslikeAbsoluteBoxing,andtotheorganizational,orsociopolitical,aspectof thearts of both civil and military government. Explaining the understanding ofemptinessandfullnessastheWaytocertainvictory,themastersofHuainansay:

This is a matter of emptiness and fullness. When there are riftsbetween superiors and subordinates, when generals and officers aredisaffected with each other, and dissatisfaction has built up in theminds of the troops, this is called emptiness. When the civilianleadership is intelligent and the military leadership is good, when

superiors and subordinates are of like mind, and will and energyoperatetogether,thisiscalledfullness.The skilled can fill their people with energy to confront the

emptinessofothers,whiletheincompetentdraintheirpeopleofenergyinfaceofthefullnessofothers.Whenwelfare and justice embrace thewhole people,whenpublic

worksaresufficienttomeetnationalemergencies,whenthepolicyofselection foroffice is satisfactory to the intelligent,whenplanning issufficienttoknowstrengthsandweaknesses,thatisthebasisofcertainvictory.

Thepoliticalbasisofmilitary strength,or the socialbasisof the strengthofanyorganization, isa teachingthat isalsorooted in theIChing. InTheArtofWar this is given premier importance, as the first item in the first chapter, onstrategy, involves examining theWay of an adversary group—themoral fiber,the coherence of the social order, the popularity of the government, or thecommon morale. Under the right conditions, according to Sun Tzu, a smallgroup could prevail over a large group; and among the conditions that couldmake this possible were justice, order, cohesion, and morale. This is anotherpivotofChinesethoughtthatisalsohighlightedbythemastersofHuainaninthecontextofmilitarystrategy:

Strength is not just a matter of extensive territory and a largepopulation,victoryisnotjustamatterofefficientarmaments,securityisnotjustamatterofhighwallsanddeepmoats,authorityisnotjustamatterofstrictordersandfrequentpunishments.Thosewhoestablishaviableorganizationwill surviveeven if theyare small,while thosewho establish a moribund organization will perish even if they arelarge.

This theme isalsoemphasizedbyanotherof thegreatmilitarystrategistsofoldChina,ZhugeLiangofthethirdcenturyC.E.,whofollowedtheteachingsofSunTzutobecomelegendaryforhisgenius:

The Tao of military operations lies in harmonizing people. Whenpeople are in harmony, they will fight naturally, without beingexhorted to do so. If the officers and soldiers are suspicious of eachother, warriors will not join up; if loyal advice is not heard, smallmindswilltalkandcriticizeinsecret.Whenhypocrisysprouts,evenif

youhavethewisdomofancientwarriorkingsyoucouldnotdefeatapeasant, let alone a crowd of them. This is why tradition says, “Amilitaryoperation is likeafire; if it isnotstopped, itwillburn itselfout.”

Zhuge’sstatusasapracticalgenius issogreat thathiswritings,hisdesigns,andwritingsabouthimareactuallyincludedintheTaoistcanon.LikeTheArtofWar and the Taoist classics, Zhuge’s philosophy of warfare approaches thepositivebywayofthenegative,intheTaoistfashionof“nondoing”:

In ancient times, those who governed well did not arm, those whowere armedwell did not set up battle lines, thosewho set up battlelineswelldidnotfight,thosewhofoughtwelldidnotlose,thosewholostwelldidnotperish.

Thisechoes the ideaofcombatasa lastresort, the idealofwinningwithoutfightingofferedbyTheArtofWar,followingtheteachingoftheTao-teChing.ZhugeLiang also quotes the classic admonition from this revered Taoist text,“Weaponsareinstrumentsofillomen,tobeusedonlywhenunavoidable,”buthe too shares the Taoist historical consciousness that the age of originalhumanitywasalreadygone,and likeSunTzuhewaspersonally involved inatime of raging civilwar. Zhuge’swork in the Taoist canon therefore containsbothrationalviewsandpracticalteachingsforpoliticalandmilitarysecuritythatfollowcloselyonthoseofancientSunTzu:

The administration of military affairs means the administration ofborder affairs, or the administration of affairs in outlying regions, insuchawayastorelievepeoplefrommajordisturbances.This administration is done by authority and military prowess,

executing the violent and rebellious in order to preserve the countryand keep the homeland secure. This is why civilization requires theexistenceofmilitarypreparedness.Itisforthisreasonthatbeastshaveclawsandfangs.Whentheyare

joyful, theyplaywitheachother,whenangry theyattackeachother.Humanshavenoclawsorfangs,sotheymakearmorandweaponstohelpdefendthemselves.Sonationshavearmiestohelpthem,rulershaveministerstoassist

them.Whenthehelperisstrong,thenationissecure;whenthehelperisweak,thenationisinperil.

HereZhugefollowsSunTzudirectly,ashedoesinhisemphasisonleadershipanditspopularbasis.InSunTzu’sscheme,bothcivilandmilitaryleadershipareamong the first conditions to be scrutinized. Zhuge follows Sun Tzu and themasters of Huainan in seeing the strength of leadership based at once onpersonalqualitiesandonpopularsupport.InTaoistthought,powerwasmoralaswellasmaterial,anditwasbelievedthatmoralpowermanifesteditselfbothasself-masteryandas influenceoverothers.Toexplain thestrengthofanationaldefenseforce,Zhugewrites:

Thisinturndependsonthegeneralsentrustedwithmilitaryleadership.Ageneralthatisnotpopularisnotahelptothenation,notaleaderofthearmy.

A general who is “not popular” is one who, according to another way ofreading the characters, “denies the people.” Sun Tzu emphasizes the unity ofwills as a fundamental source of strength, and his minimalist philosophy ofwarfare is a natural outgrowth of the central idea of common interest; on thebasisofthisprinciple,ZhugeLiangagainquotestheTao-teChingtoexpresstheideal of the sage warrior concerned for the body of society as a whole—“Weapons are instruments of ill omen, to be used only when it isunavoidable.”

ZhugealsofollowsTheArtofWarcloselyinhisemphasisonavoidingaction

withoutstrategyaswellasactionwithoutneed:

Theway touseweapons is to carryoutoperationsonlyafterhavingfirst determined your strategy. Carefully examine the patterns of theclimateandterrain,andlookintotheheartsofthepeople.Trainintheuseofmilitaryequipment,makepatternsofrewardsandpunishmentsclear, observe the strategy of opponents, watch out for dangerouspasses enroute, distinguish places of safety and danger, find out theconditions of both sides, be aware ofwhen to advance andwhen towithdraw, adapt to the timing of circumstances, set up defensivemeasureswhile strengtheningyour attack force,promote soldiers fortheirability,drawupplansforsuccess,considerthematteroflifeanddeath—onlywhen you have done all this can you send forth armiesentrusted to generals that will reach out with the power to captureopponents.

Speedandcoordination,centraltosuccessinbattleaccordingtoSunTzu’sartof war, also derive not only from strategic preparedness, but from thepsychologicalcohesiononwhichleadershipdepends;Zhugewrites:

Ageneralisacommander,ausefultoolforanation.Firstdeterminingstrategythencarryingitout,hiscommandisasthoughborneafloatona torrent, his conquest is like a hawk striking its prey.Like a drawnbowwhenstill,likeamachinestartingupinaction,hebreaksthroughwherever he turns, and even powerful enemies perish. If the generalhasnoforesightand thesoldiers lack impetus,merestrategywithoutunificationofwillscannotsufficetostrikefearintoanenemyevenifyouhaveamilliontroops.

MentioningSunTzu’sclassicas theultimatemanual forsuccessfulstrategy,Zhuge concludes his essay onmilitary organization by summing up themainpointsofTheArtofWarasheincorporatedthemintohisownpractice,centeringon those aspects of the training andmood ofwarriors that derive fromTaoisttradition:

Havenohardfeelingstowardanyonewhohasnotshownyouenmity,donotfightwithanyonewhodoesnotopposeyou.Theeffectiveskillofanengineercanonlybeseenbytheeyesofanexpert,theoperationofplansinbattlecanonlybesetinactionthroughthestrategyofSunTzu.

FollowingSunTzu,Zhugeemphasizestheadvantagesofunexpectednessandspeed,capableofreversingotherwiseinsurmountableodds:

Planningshouldbesecret,attackshouldbeswift.Whenanarmytakesits objective like a hawk striking its prey, and battles like a riverbrokenthroughadam,itsopponentswillscatterbeforethearmytires.Thisistheuseofthemomentumofanarmy.

Asmentionedbefore,amongthemainpointsofemphasisinSunTzu’sartofwar is objectivity, and his classic teaches how to assess situations in adispassionatemanner.ZhugealsofollowsSuninthis,stressingtheadvantageofcarefullycalculatedaction:

Thosewhoare skilled in combatdonotbecomeangered, thosewhoareskilledatwinningdonotbecomeafraid.Thusthewisewinbefore

theyfight,whiletheignorantfighttowin.

HereZhugequotesTheArtofWardirectly,addingSunTzu’swarningsabouttheconsequencesofpoorplanning,wastefulactions,andwastefulpersonnel:

A country is exhaustedwhen itmust buy its supplies at high prices,and is impoverished when it ships supplies long distances. Attacksshouldnotberepeated,battlesshouldnotbemultiplied.Usestrengthaccording tocapacity, aware that itwillbe spentwithexcessiveuse.Getridoftheworthless,andthecountrycanbepeaceful;getridoftheincompetent,andthecountrycanbeprofited.

FinallyZhugegoesoninthetraditionoftheTao-teChing,TheArtofWar,andTheMastersofHuainantogivevictorytotheunfathomable:

Askilledattack isoneagainstwhichopponentsdonotknowhowtodefend;askilleddefenseisonewhichopponentsdonotknowhowtoattack.Thereforethoseskilledindefensearenotsobecauseoffortresswalls.This iswhy highwalls and deepmoats do not guarantee security,

whilestrongarmorandeffectiveweaponsdonotguaranteestrength.Ifopponents want to hold firm, attack where they are unprepared; ifopponents want to establish a battlefront, appear where they do notexpectyou.

Thisideaofknowingwhilebeingunknown,repeatedagainandagainasakeytosuccess,isoneofthestrongestlinksbetweenTaoistmeditationandTheArtofWar,forthesecrettothisartof“invisibility”ispreciselytheinteriordetachmentcultivatedbyTaoistsforattainingimpersonalviewsofobjectivereality.Certainof thephilosophical teachingsofearlyTaoismarecommonlyused inpracticalschoolsascodesforexercisesusedinpersonalcultivation.UnderstandingthepracticalaspectofTaoistphilosophical teachingshelps to

cutthroughthesenseofparadoxthatmaybecausedbyseeminglycontradictoryattitudes.ThatSunTzucalmlyteachestheruthlessartofwarwhilecondemningwarmayseemcontradictory if this fact is seenoutside thecontextof the totalunderstandingofthehumanmentalityfosteredbyTaoistlearning.Thesimultaneousappreciationofverydifferentpointsofviewisapowerful

Taoist technique, whose understanding can resolve contradiction and paradox.Themodelof theparadoxofTheArtofWar canbe seen in theTao-teChing,

wherebothruthlessnessandkindnessarepartoftheWayofthesage.“Heaven and earth are not humanistic—they regardmyriad beings as straw

dogs; sages are not humanistic—they regard people as straw dogs,”wrote thephilosopheroftheTao-teChing.AhorrifiedWesternSinologistworkingin the1950s,shortlyafterthetruceinKorea,wrotethatthispassagehad“unleashedamonster,” but to a Taoist this statement does not represent inhumanity but anexerciseinobjectivity,similartoBuddhistexercisesinimpersonality.In modern terms, this sort of statement is no different from that of a

psychologistor sociologistmaking theobservation that theattitudes, thoughts,and expectations of entire nations are not arrived at purely by amultitude ofindependentrationaldecisions,butlargelyundertheinfluenceofenvironmentalfactorsbeyondthecontroloftheindividualoreventhecommunity.AsSunTzu’sclassicattests,theplaceofsuchanobservationintheartofwar

isnottocultivateacallousorbloodthirstyattitude,buttounderstandthepowerof mass psychology. Understanding how people can be manipulated throughemotions,forexample,isasusefulforthosewhowishtoavoidthisasitisforthosewhowishtopracticeit.Seen in this light,TheArtofWar isnomoreacall toarms thana studyon

conditioning is a recommendation for slavery.By so thoroughly analyzing thepolitical, psychological, and material factors involved in conflict, Sun Tzu’sprofessedaimwasnottoencouragewarfarebuttominimizeandcurtailit.An impersonal view of humanity as not themaster of its own fatemay be

necessary to liberate a warrior from emotional entanglements that mightprecipitateirrationalapproachestoconflict;butitisnot,intheTaoistschemeofthings, held to justify destructive behavior.The counterbalance to this view isalso found in theTao-teChing,prefiguring SunTzu’s teachings inThe Art ofWar:

IhavethreetreasuresthatIkeepandprize:oneiskindness,secondisfrugality,andthirdisnotpresumingtotakeprecedenceoverothers.Bykindnessonecanbebrave,byfrugalityonecanreachout,andbynotpresumingtotakeprecedenceonecansurviveeffectively.Ifonegivesupkindnessandcourage,givesupfrugalityandbreadth,andgivesuphumilityforaggressiveness,onewilldie.Theexerciseofkindnessinbattle leads to victory, the exercise of kindness in defense leads tosecurity.

InhisclassicMasterSunlikensmilitaryaction toa“fire,whichburns itselfoutifnotstopped,”andifhisstrategyofsuccesswithoutconflictwasnotalways

attainable, his strategy of hyperefficiency could at least minimize senselessviolenceanddestruction.InTaoist terms,successisoftengainedbynotdoing,and the strategyofTheArtofWar is asmuch inknowingwhatnot todoandwhennottodoitasitisinknowingwhattodoandwhentodoit.Theartofnotdoing—whichincludestheunobtrusiveness,unknowability,and

ungraspabilityat thecoreofesotericAsianmartialarts—belongstothebranchofTaoismknownas the scienceofessence.Theartsofdoing—which includetheexternaltechniquesofbothculturalandmartialarts—belongtothebranchofTaoismknownasthescienceoflife.Thescienceofessencehastodowithstateofmind, thescienceof lifehas todowithuseofenergy.LikeaclassicTaoisttext, it is in truebalanceof these two thatTheArtofWar ismost completelyunderstood.In more modern times, the definitive Taoist statement on this subject is

immortalized in Journey to the West (Hsi-yu chi/Xiyou ji), one of the FourExtraordinary Books of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Drawing on earlierTaoist sources fromwartimeChinaunder theduressofMongol invasions, thisremarkablenovelisaclassicrepresentationoftheresultofwhatinTaoisttermswould be called studying the science of life without the science of essence,material developmentwithout corresponding psychological development, or inSunTzu’stermshavingforcewithoutintelligence.Thecentral figureof thisnovel is amagicalmonkeywho foundsamonkey

civilizationandbecomes its leaderbyestablishinga territory for themonkeys.Subsequently themonkey king overcomes a “devil confusing theworld,” andstealsthedevil’ssword.Returningtohisownlandwith thedevil’ssword, themonkeykingtakesup

the practice of swordsmanship.He even teaches hismonkey subjects tomaketoyweaponsandregaliatoplayatwar.Unfortunately, though ruler of a nation, themartialmonkey king is not yet

rulerofhimself. Ineminently logicalbackward reasoning, themonkey reflectsthat if neighboring nations note the monkeys’ play, they might assume themonkeys were preparing for war. In that case, they might therefore takepreemptive action against the monkeys, who would then be faced with realwarfarearmedonlywithtoyweapons.Thus, the monkey king thoughtfully initiates the arms race, ordering pre-

preemptivestockpilingofrealweapons.Ifitseemsdisconcertingtoreadathirteenth-centurydescriptionoftwentieth-

centurypolitics,itmaybenolesssotoreadabookasoldastheBibledescribingtactics inuse todaynotonlybyguerrillawarriorsbutby influentialpoliticiansand corporate executives. Following the disillusionist posture of the Tao-te

ChingandTheArtofWar,thestoryofthemonkeykingalsoprefiguresamajormovement in modern scientific thought following the climax of the Westerndivorceofreligionandsciencecenturiesago.Themonkeykinginthestoryexercisedpowerwithoutwisdom,disruptingthe

natural order and generally raising hell until he ran into the limits of matter,where he was finally trapped. There he lost the excitement of impulsiveenthusiasm,andhewaseventuallyreleasedtoseekthescienceofessence,underthe strict condition that his knowledge and power were to be controlled bycompassion,theexpressionofwisdomandunityofbeing.Themonkey’s downfall finally comes aboutwhenhemeetsBuddha,whom

the Taoist celestial immortals summon to deal with the intractable beast. Theimmortalshadattemptedto“cook”himinthe“cauldronoftheeighttrigrams,”thatis,toputhimthroughthetrainingofspiritualalchemybasedontheTaoistIChing,buthehadjumpedoutstillunrefined.Buddhaconquersthemonkey’spridebydemonstratingtheinsuperablelawof

universal relativity and has him imprisoned in “the mountain of the fiveelements,” theworld ofmatter and energy,where he suffers the results of hisarrogantantics.After fivehundredyears, at lengthGuanyin (KuanYin), the trans-historical

Buddhist saint traditionally honored as the personification of universalcompassion,showsupattheprisonofthenowrepentantmonkeyandrecitesthistellingverse:

Toobadthemagicmonkeydidn’tservethepublicAshemadlyflauntedheroicsindaysofyore.WithacheatinghearthemadehavocInthegatheringofimmortals;WithgrandiosegallhewentforhisegoTotheheavenofhappiness.Amongahundredthousandtroops,Nonecouldopposehim;InthehighestheavensaboveHehadathreateningpresence.ButsincehewasstymiedonmeetingourBuddha,Whenwillheeverreachoutandshowhisachievementsagain?

Nowthemonkeypleadswiththesaintforhisrelease.Thesaintgrantsthisonthe condition that the monkey devote himself to the quest for higherenlightenment, not only for himself but for society at large. Finally, before

lettingthemonkeygotosetoutonthelongroadahead,asaprecautionthesaintplaces a ringaround themonkey’shead, a ring thatwill tightenandcause themonkey severe pain whenever a certain spell invoking compassion is said inresponsetoanynewmisbehavioronthepartofthemonkey.The Art ofWar has been known for a hundred generations as the foremost

classic of strategy; but perhaps its greatest wizardry lies in the ring ofcompassionthatMasterSunslipsovertheheadofeverywarriorwhotriestousethisbook.Andashistoryshows,themagicspellthattightensitsgripischantedwheneverawarriorforgetsthering.

TheStructureandContentofTheArtofWarTheArt ofWar,permeatedwith the philosophical and political thought of theTao-te Ching, also resembles the great Taoist classic in that it is largelycomposed of a collection of aphorisms commonly attributed to a shadowy,semilegendary author. Certain Taoists regard the Tao-te Ching to be atransmissionofancientlorecompiledandelaboratedbyits“author,”ratherthanacompletelyoriginalwork,and thesamemayverywellbe trueofTheArtofWar. In any case, both classics share the general pattern of central themesrecurringthroughoutthetextindifferentcontexts.ThefirstbookofTheArtofWarisdevotedtotheimportanceofstrategy.As

theclassicIChing says,“Leadersplan in thebeginningwhen theydo things,”and “Leaders consider problems and prevent them.” In terms of militaryoperations,TheArtofWarbringsup five things thatare tobeassessedbeforeundertakinganyaction:theWay,theweather,theterrain,themilitaryleadership,anddiscipline.In this context, theWay (Tao) has to dowith civil leadership, or rather the

relationship between political leadership and the populace. In both Taoist andConfucian parlance, a righteous government is described as “imbuedwith theTao,”andSunTzu themartialist similarlyspeaksof theWayas“inducing thepeopletohavethesameaimastheleadership.”Assessmentoftheweather,thequestionoftheseasonforaction,alsorelates

to concern for the people, meaning both the populace in general as well asmilitary personnel. The essential point here is to avoid disruption of theproductiveactivitiesof thepeople,whichdependon the seasons, and toavoidextremesofweatherthatwouldhandicaporharmtroopsinthefield.Theterrainistobesizedupintermsofdistance,degreeofdifficultyoftravel,

dimensions, and safety.Theuseof scouts andnativeguides is importanthere,

for,astheIChingsays,“Chasinggamewithoutaguideleadsoneintothebush.”

The criteria offered by The Art of War for assessment of the military

leadership are traditional virtues also much emphasized in Confucianism andmedieval Taoism: intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage, andsternness.AccordingtothegreatChanBuddhistFushan,“Humanenesswithoutintelligenceislikehavingafieldbutnotplowingit.Intelligencewithoutcourageis like having sprouts but not weeding. Courage without humaneness is likeknowinghowtoreapbutnothowtosow.”Theothertwovirtues,trustworthinessand sternness, are those by which the leadership wins both the loyalty andobedienceofthetroops.The fifth item to be assessed, discipline, refers to organizational coherence

and efficiency. Discipline is very much connected with the virtues oftrustworthiness and sternness sought after inmilitary leaders, since it uses thecorrespondingmechanismsofrewardandpunishment.Agreatdealofemphasisis placed on the establishment of a clear system of rewards and punishmentsacceptedbythewarriorsasfairandimpartial.ThiswasoneofthemainpointsofLegalism,aschoolofthoughtthatalsoaroseduringtheWarringStatesperiod,stressingtheimportanceofrationalorganizationandtheruleoflawratherthanpersonalisticfeudalgovernment.Followingadiscussionof thesefiveassessments,TheArtofWargoeson to

emphasize the central importance of deception: “Amilitary operation involvesdeception. Even though you are competent, appear incompetent. Thougheffective, appear ineffective.”As theTao-teChing says, “Onewith great skillappearsinept.”Theelementofsurprise,soimportantforvictorywithmaximumefficiency, depends on knowing others while being unknown to others, sosecrecyandmisdirectionareconsideredessentialarts.Generallyspeaking,thetoe-to-toebattleisthelastresortoftheskilledwarrior,

who Sun Tzu says should be prepared but should nevertheless avoidconfrontation with a strong opponent. Rather than trying to overwhelmopponents directly, Master Sun recommends wearing them down by flight,fosteringdisharmonywithin their ranks,manipulating their feelings, andusingtheirangerandprideagainstthem.Thus,insum,theopeningstatementofTheArtofWar introduces the threemain facetsof thewarrior’sart: the social, thepsychological,andthephysical.ThesecondchapterofTheArtofWar,ondoingbattle,stressesthedomestic

consequences of war, even foreign war. Emphasis is on speed and efficiency,with strong warnings not to prolong operations, especially far afield.

Considerable attention is devoted to the importance of conservation of energyandmaterial resources. Inorder tominimize thedrainofwaron theeconomyandpopulation,SunTzurecommendsthepracticeoffeedingofftheenemyandusingcaptiveforceswonoverbygoodtreatment.The third chapter, on planning a siege, also emphasizes conservation—the

general aim is to gain victorywhile keeping asmuch intact as possible, bothsociallyandmaterially, rather thandestroyingwhoeverandwhatever stands intheway.InthissenseMasterSunaffirmsthatitisbesttowinwithoutfighting.Several tactical recommendations follow in pursuit of this general

conservativeprinciple.Firstofall,sinceitisdesirabletowinwithoutbattle,SunTzusaysthatitisbesttoovercomeopponentsattheoutsetbyfoilingtheirplans.Failing that, he recommends isolating opponents and rendering them helpless.Hereagainitwouldseemthattimeisoftheessence,butthepointismadethatspeed does notmean haste, and thorough preparation is necessary.Andwhenvictoryiswon,Sunstressesthatitshouldbecomplete,toavoidtheexpenseofmaintaininganoccupationforce.The chapter goes on to outline strategies for action according to relative

numbers of protagonists versus antagonists, again observing that it is wise toavoidtakingonunfavorableoddsifpossible.TheIChingsays,“Itisunluckytobe stubborn in the face of insurmountable odds.” Furthermore, while theformulation of strategy depends on prior intelligence, it is also imperative toadapt to actual battle situations; as the I Ching says, “Coming to an impasse,change;havingchanged,youcangetthrough.”MasterSunthenmakesnoteoffivewaystoascertainvictory,pursuanttothe

theme that skillfulwarriors fight onlywhen assured ofwinning.According toSun,thevictorsarethosewhoknowwhentofightandwhennottofight;thosewhoknowwhen tousemanyor few troops; thosewhoseofficersandsoldiersareofonemind;thosewhofacetheunpreparedwithpreparation;andthosewithablegeneralswhoarenotconstrainedbygovernment.This lastpoint isaverydelicateone,as itplacesanevengreatermoraland

intellectual responsibility on themilitary leadership.Whilewar is never to beinitiated by themilitary itself, as later explained, but by the command of theciviliangovernment,SunTzusaysanabsenteecivilianleadershipthatinterferesignorantlywithfieldcommand“takesawayvictorybyderangingthemilitary.”Againtherealissueseemstobethatofknowledge;thepremisethatmilitary

leadership in the field should not be subject to interference by civiliangovernmentisbasedontheideathatthekeytovictoryisintimateknowledgeoftheactualsituation.Outliningthesefivewaystodeterminewhichsideislikelytoprevail,SunTzustatesthatwhenyouknowbothyourselfandothersyouare

neverindanger,whenyouknowyourselfbutnotothersyouhavehalfachanceofwinning,andwhenyouknowneitheryourselfnorothersyouareindangerineverybattle.The fourth chapter of The Art of War is on formation, one of the most

important issues of strategy and combat. In a characteristicallyTaoist posture,SunTzuhereassertsthatthekeystovictoryareadaptabilityandinscrutability.As the commentatorDuMu explains, “The inner condition of the formless isinscrutable,whereasthatofthosewhohaveadoptedaspecificformisobvious.Theinscrutablewin,theobviouslose.”Inscrutabilityinthiscontextisnotpurelypassive,doesnotsimplymeanbeing

withdrawn or concealed from others; more important, it means perception ofwhatisinvisibletoothersandresponsetopossibilitiesnotyetdiscernedbythosewholookonlyattheobvious.Byseeingopportunitiesbeforetheyarevisibletoothers and being quick to act, the uncannywarrior can take situations by thethroatbeforemattersgetoutofhand.Following this line of thought, SunTzu reemphasizes the pursuit of certain

victorybyknowingwhentoactandwhennottoact.Makeyourselfinvincible,hesays,andtakeonopponentsonlywhentheyarevulnerable:“Goodwarriorstake their stand on ground where they cannot lose, and do not overlookconditionsthatmakeanopponentpronetodefeat.”Reviewingtheseconditions,Sun rephrases someof his guidelines for assessment of organizations, such asdisciplineandethicsversusrapacityandcorruption.The topicof the fifthchapterofTheArtofWar is force,ormomentum, the

dynamic structure of a group in action. Here Master Sun emphasizesorganizational skills, coordination, and the use of both orthodox and guerrillamethodsofwar.Hestresseschangeandsurprise,employingendlessvariationsof tactics, using opponents’ psychological conditions to maneuver them intovulnerablepositions.

The essence of Sun Tzu’s teaching on force is unity and coherence in an

organization, using the force of momentum rather than relying on individualqualitiesandtalents:“Goodwarriorsseekeffectivenessinbattlefromtheforceofmomentum,notfromindividualpeople.”Itisthisrecognitionofthepowerofthegrouptoevenoutinternaldisparities

and function as one body of force that sets The Art of War apart from theidiosyncratic individualism of the samurai swordsmen of late feudal Japan,whosestylizedmartialartsaresofamiliarintheWest.Thisemphasisisoneofthe essential features that hasmade Sun Tzu’s ancientwork so useful for the

corporatewarriorsofmodernAsia,amongwhomTheArtofWariswidelyreadandstillregardedasthematchlessclassicofstrategyinconflict.The sixth chapter takes up the subject of “emptiness and fullness,” already

noted as fundamental Taoist concepts commonly adapted to martial arts. Theidea is to be filledwith energywhile at the same time draining opponents, inorder, asMaster Sun says, to make oneself invincible and take on opponentsonlywhentheyarevulnerable.Oneofthesimplestofthesetacticsiswellknownnot only in the context of war, but also in social and business maneuvering:“Goodwarriorsgetotherstocometothem,anddonotgotoothers.”Conserving one’s own energy while inducing others to dissipate theirs is

anotherfunctionoftheinscrutabilitysohighlyprizedbytheTaoistwarrior:“Theconsummation of forming an army is to arrive at formlessness,” saysMasterSun,forthennoonecanformulateastrategyagainstyou.Atthesametime,hesays, induce opponents to construct their own formations, get them to spreadthemselves thin; test opponents to gauge their resources and reactions, butremainunknownyourself.In this case, formlessness and fluidity are notmerelymeansof defense and

surprise,butmeansofpreservingdynamicpotential,energythatcouldeasilybelostbytryingtoholdontoaspecificpositionorformation.MasterSunlikensasuccessfulforce towater,whichhasnoconstant formbut,as theTao-teChingnotes,prevailsovereverything inspiteof itsapparentweakness:Sunsays,“Amilitary force has no constant formation, water has no constant shape. Theability to gain victory by changing and adapting according to the opponent iscalledgenius.”The seventh chapter of The Art of War, on armed struggle, dealing with

concretefieldorganizationandcombatmaneuvers,recapitulatesseveralofSunTzu’smain themes. Beginningwith the need for information and preparation,Sun says, “Act after having made assessments. The one who first knows themeasuresoffarandnearwins—thisistheruleofarmedstruggle.”TheIChingsays,“Beprepared,andyouwillbelucky.”Again expounding his characteristic minimalist/essentialist tactical

philosophy,SunTzugoesontosay,“Takeawaytheenergyofopposingarmies,takeawaytheheartof theirgenerals.”Echoinghis teachingsonemptinessandfullness,healsosays,“Avoidkeenenergy,striketheslumpingandreceding.”Totakefulladvantageoftheprinciplesofemptinessandfullness,Sunteachesfourkindsofmasteryessentialtotheuncannywarrior:masteryofenergy,masteryoftheheart,masteryofstrength,andmasteryofadaptation.The principles of emptiness and fullness also display the fundamental

mechanismof the classicyin-yangprinciplesonwhich they arebased, that of

reversionfromonetotheotherattheextremes.MasterSunsays,“Donotstopanarmyonitswayhome.Asurroundedarmymustbegivenawayout.Donotpressadesperateenemy.”TheIChingsays,“Thesovereignusesthreechasers,lettingthegameaheadescape,”and“ifyouaretooadamant,actionisunlucky,evenifyouareright.”TheeighthchapterofTheArtofWarisdevotedtoadaptation,alreadyseento

beoneofthecornerstonesofthewarrior’sart.MasterSunsays,“Ifgeneralsdonot knowhow to adapt advantageously, even if theyknow the layof the landthey cannot take advantage of it.” The I Ching says, “Persist too intensely atwhatiscurrentlybeyondyourdepth,andyourfidelitytothatcoursewillbringmisfortune,nogain.”Adaptabilitynaturallydependsonreadiness,anotherpersistent themeofThe

ArtofWar.MasterSunsays,“Theruleofmilitaryoperationsisnottocountonopponentsnotcoming,buttorelyonhavingwaysofdealingwiththem;nottocount on opponents not attacking, but to rely on having what cannot beattacked.” The I Ching says, “If you take on too much without a solidfoundation,youwilleventuallybedrained,leavingyouwithembarrassmentandbadluck.”In The Art of War, readiness does not just mean material preparedness;

withoutasuitablementalstate,sheerphysicalpowerisnotenoughtoguaranteevictory.MasterSunheredefinesthepsychologicaldimensionsofthevictoriousleader indirectly, by enumerating five dangers—to be too willing to die, tooeagertolive,tooquicktoanger,toopuritanical,ortoosentimental.Anyoneoftheseexcesses,heaffirms,createvulnerabilitiesthatcaneasilybeexploitedbycannyopponents.TheIChingsays,“Whenwaitingonthefringesofasituation,before the appropriate time to go into action has arrived, be steady and avoidgivingintoimpulse—thenyouwon’tgowrong.”The ninth chapter deals withmaneuvering armies. AgainMaster Sun deals

with all three aspects of the warrior’s art—the physical, social, andpsychological. In concrete physical terms, he begins by recommending certainobvioustypesofterrainthatenhancetheoddsofvictory:highground,upstream,the sunny sideofhills, regionswithplentyof resources.Referring toall threedimensions,hethendescribeswaysofinterpretingenemymovements.AlthoughMasterSunneverdismissestheweightofsheernumbersormaterial

might, here as elsewhere there is the strong suggestion that social andpsychological factors can overcome the sort of power that can be physicallyquantified:“Inmilitarymattersitisnotnecessarilybeneficialtohavemore,onlyto avoid acting aggressively; it is enough to consolidate your power, assessopponents, and win people, that is all.” The I Ching says, “When you have

meansbutarenotgettinganywhere,seekappropriateassociates,andyouwillbelucky.”Similarlyemphasizingdirectedgroupeffort,TheArtofWar says,“Theindividualist without strategy who takes opponents lightly will inevitablybecomeacaptive.”Solidaritycallsespecially formutualunderstandingand rapportbetween the

leadershipandthefollowers,achievedthroughbotheducationandtraining.TheConfucian sageMencius said, “Thosewho send people onmilitary operationswithout educating them ruin them.” Master Sun says, “Direct them throughculturalarts,unifythemthroughmartialarts;thismeanscertainvictory.”TheIChing says, “It is luckywhen the rulers nourish the ruled,watching themandbringingouttheirtalents.”Thetenthchapter,onterrain,continuestheideasoftacticalmaneuveringand

adaptability,outliningtypesofterrainandappropriatewaysofadjustingtothem.Itrequiressomethoughttotransferthepatternsofthesetypesofterraintoothercontexts, but the essential point is in consideration of the relationship of theprotagonist to the configurations of the material, social, and psychologicalenvironment.

MasterSun follows thiswith remarksabout fatalorganizationaldeficiencies

forwhichtheleadershipisresponsible.Hereagainemphasisisonthemoraleofunity:“Lookuponyoursoldiersasbelovedchildren,andtheywillinglydiewithyou.”TheIChingsays,“Thoseabovesecuretheirhomesbykindnesstothosebelow.” Nevertheless, extending themetaphor,Master Sun also warns againstbeing overly indulgent, with the result of having troops who are like spoiledchildren.Intelligence, in the sense of preparatory knowledge, is also stressed in this

chapter, where it is particularly defined as including clear awareness of thecapabilitiesofone’s forces, thevulnerabilitiesofopponents,and the layof theland:“Whenyouknowyourselfandothers,victoryisnotindanger;whenyouknowskyandearth,victoryisinexhaustible.”TheIChingsays,“Becareful inthebeginning,andyouhavenotroubleintheend.”The eleventh chapter, entitled “Nine Grounds,” presents a more detailed

treatment of terrain, particularly in terms of the relationship of a group to theterrain. Again, these “nine grounds” can be understood to apply not only tosimple physical territory, but also to “territory” in its social andmore abstractsenses.The nine grounds enumerated by Master Sun in this chapter are called a

ground of dissolution, light ground, ground of contention, trafficked ground,

intersecting ground, heavy ground, bad ground, surrounded ground, and dying(ordeadly)ground.Agroundofdissolutionisastageofinternecinewarfareorcivilstrife.Light

groundreferstoshallowincursionintoothers’territory.Agroundofcontentionisapositionthatwouldbeadvantageoustoeithersideofaconflict.Traffickedground iswhere there is free travel. Intersectingground is territorycontrollingimportantarteriesofcommunication.Heavyground,incontrasttolightground,refers todeepincursionintoothers’ territory.Badgroundisdifficultoruselessterrain. Surrounded ground has restricted access, suited to ambush. Dyinggroundisasituationinwhichitisnecessarytofightatonceorbeannihilated.Describingthetacticsappropriatetoeachtypeofground,MasterSunincludes

consideration of the social and psychological elements of conflict, insofar astheseare inextricablyboundupwithresponse to theenvironment:“Adaptationtodifferentgrounds,advantagesofcontractionandexpansion,patternsofhumanfeelingsandconditions—thesemustbeexamined.”The twelfth chapter of The Art of War, on fire attack, begins with a brief

description of various kinds of incendiary attack, along with technicalconsiderationsandstrategiesforfollow-up.Perhapsbecausefireisinanordinarymaterialsensethemostviciousformof

martialart(explosivesexistedbutwerenotusedmilitarilyinSunTzu’stime),itisinthischapterthatthemostimpassionedpleaforhumanityisfound,echoingthe Taoist idea that “weapons are instruments of misfortune to be used onlywhenunavoidable.”Abruptly endinghis short discussionof incendiary attack,Master Sun says, “A government should not mobilize an army out of anger,militaryleadersshouldnotprovokewaroutofwrath.Actwhenitisbeneficialtodo so, desist if not.Anger can revert to joy,wrath can revert todelight, but anationdestroyedcannotberestoredtoexistence,andthedeadcannotberestoredtolife.”ThethirteenthandfinalchapterofTheArtofWardealswithespionage,thus

coming full circle to link up with the opening chapter on strategy, for whichintelligenceisessential.Againturningtotheefficiency-orientedminimalismandconservatismtowardwhichtheskillsheteachesaredirected,MasterSunbeginsbyspeakingoftheimportanceofintelligenceagentsinmostemphaticterms:“Amajormilitaryoperationisaseveredrainonthenation,andmaybekeptupforyearsinthestruggleforoneday’svictory.Sotofail toknowtheconditionsofopponents because of reluctance to give rewards for intelligence is extremelyinhumane.”Sungoesontodefinefivekindsofspy,orsecretagent.Thelocalspyisone

who is hired from among the populace of a region in which operations are

planned. An inside spy is one who is hired from among the officials of anopposing regime. A reverse spy is a double agent, hired from among enemyspies.Adeadspyisonewhoissentintoconveyfalseinformation.Alivingspyisonewhocomesandgoeswithinformation.Here again there is a very strong social and psychological element in Sun

Tzu’sunderstandingofthepracticalcomplexitiesofespionagefromthepointofviewof the leadership.Beginningwith the issueof leadership,TheArtofWaralso ends with the observation that the effective use of spies depends on theleadership. Master Sun says, “One cannot use spies without sagacity andknowledge,onecannotuse spieswithouthumanityand justice,onecannotgetthetruthfromspieswithoutsubtlety,”andheconcludes,“Onlyabrilliantrulerorawisegeneralwhocanusethehighlyintelligentforespionageissureofgreatsuccess.”

HistoricalBackgroundTheArtofWarwasevidentlywrittenduringtheso-calledWarringStatesperiodofancientChina,whichlastedfromthefifthtothethirdcenturyB.C.E.Thiswasatime of protracted disintegration of theChou (Zhou) dynasty,which had beenfoundedover fivehundredyearsearlierby thepolitical sageswhowrote the IChing. The collapse of the ancient order was marked by destabilization ofinterstate relationships and interminablewarfare amongaspirants tohegemonyinthemidstofever-shiftingpatternsofallianceandopposition.Apreface toStrategiesof theWarringStates (Zhanguoce/Chankuo ts’e), a

classiccollectionofstoriesaboutthepoliticalandmilitaryaffairsofthefeudalstatesofthistime,providesagraphicdescriptionoftheWarringStatesperiod:

Usurperssetthemselvesupaslordsandkings,statesrunbypretendersand plotters set up armies to make themselves super-powers.Increasingly they imitated one another in this, and their posterityfollowedtheirexample.Eventually theyengulfedanddestroyedeachother,colludingwithlargerterritoriesandannexingsmallerterritories,passing years in violent military operations, filling the fields withbloodshed. Fathers and sons were not close to each other, brotherswere not securewith each other, husbands andwives separated—noonecouldsafeguardhisorher life.Virtuedisappeared. In lateryearsthisgrewincreasinglyextreme,withsevenlargestatesandfivesmallstatescontestingeachotherforpower.Ingeneral,thiswasbecausethe

Warring Stateswere shamelessly greedy, struggling insatiably to getahead.

Thegreat humanist philosopher andeducatorConfucius,who lived rightontheeveoftheWarringStatesera,spenthislifeworkingagainstthedeteriorationinhumanvaluesthatmarkedthefallofhissocietyintocenturiesofconflict.Inthe classic Analects of Confucius, the imminent dawn of the Warring Statesperiod ispresaged ina symbolicvignetteofConfucius’ encounterwitha rulerwhomhetriedtoadvise:“LordLingofthestateofWeiaskedConfuciusaboutbattle formations. Confucius replied, ‘I have learned about the disposition ofritualvessels,butIhavenotstudiedmilitarymatters,’andleftthenextday.”Thisstory,as ifrepresentingthedisappearanceofhumanity(“Confuciusleft

the next day”) from the thoughts and considerations of rulers in the comingcenturiesofwar,istakenupbytheTaoistphilosopherChuangtzu,wholivedinthe fourth and third centuries B.C.E., right in the midst of the Warring Statesperiod.AccordingtoChuangtzu’senlargementonthetheme,YenHui,themostenlighteneddiscipleofConfucius,wenttotheteacherandaskedaboutgoingtothestateofWei.Confuciussaid,“Whatareyougoingtodothere?”YenHuisaid,“IhaveheardthatwhiletherulerofWeiisintheprimeoflife,

hisbehaviorisarbitrary—heexploitshiscountrywhimsicallyanddoesnotseehisownmistakes.Heexploitshispeoplefrivolously,evenuntodeath.Countlessmasseshavediedinthatstate,andthepeoplehavenowheretoturn.Ihaveheardyousay,‘Leaveanorderlystate,gotoadisturbedstate—atthephysician’sgate,many are the ailing.’ I would like to usewhat I have learned to consider theguidanceitoffers,sothatthestateofWeimightbehealed.”Confuciussaid,“Youarebentongoing,butyouwillonlybepunished.”VeryfewpeopleofthetimelistenedtothepacifistichumanismofConfucius

andMencius.Somesaytheydidnotlistenbecausetheycouldnotimplementthepolicies advocated by the original Confucians; others say they could notimplement thepoliciesbecause theydidnot listen,because theydidnot reallywanttobehumaneandjust.ThosewholistenedtothepacifistichumanismofLao-tzuandChuangtzu,on

theotherhand,generallyconcealedthemselvesandworkedontheproblemfromdifferent angles. Lao-tzu and Chuangtzu show that the man of aggressiveviolenceappears toberuthlessbut is reallyanemotionalist; then theyslay theemotionalist with real ruthlessness before revealing the spontaneous nature offreehumanity.The ancient Taoist masters show how real ruthlessness, the coldness of

completeobjectivity,alwaysincludesoneselfinitscuttingassessmentofthereal

situation. The historical Buddha, a contemporary of Confucius who himselfcamefromaclanofwarriorsinatimewhenthewarriorcastewasconsolidatingitspoliticaldominance,saidthatconflictwouldceaseifwewouldbeawareofourowndeath.ThisistheruthlessnessofLao-tzuwhenhesaysthattheuniverseisinhumane

andthesageseespeopleasbeinglikethestrawdogsusedforritualsacrifices.Chuangtzu also gives numerous dramatic illustrations of ruthlessness towardoneselfasanexerciseinperspectivedesignedtoleadtocessationofinternalandexternalconflict.This“inhumanity” isnotusedby theoriginalphilosophersasa justification

for quasi-ruthless possessive aggression, but as a meditation on the ultimatemeaninglessnessofthegreedandpossessivenessthatunderlieaggression.In India, Buddhist aspirants used to visit burning grounds and watch the

corpsesofthosewhosefamiliescouldn’taffordacremationrotaway.Thistheydid to terrify the greed and possessiveness out of themselves. After that theyturnedtheirmindstowardthoughtsofidealindividualsandidealsocieties.Similarly,Master Sun has his readers dwell on the ravages ofwar, from its

incipientphasesof treacheryandalienation to its extreme formsof incendiaryattack and siege, viewed as a sort ofmass cannibalism of human and naturalresources. With this device he gives the reader an enhanced feeling for thesignificance of individual and social virtues espoused by the humanitarianpacifists.Fromthispointofview,itisnaturaltothinkoftheTaoistthreadinTheArtof

Warnotasarandomculturalelement,butaskeytounderstandingthetextatallofitslevels.Bythenatureofitsovertsubjectmatter,TheArtofWarcommandedthe attention of people who were less likely to pay serious mind to thepacificisticteachingsoftheclassicalhumanists.Justas the IChingpreservedcertainphilosophical ideas throughallsortsof

political and social change through its popularity as an oracle and book ofadvice,sodidTheArtofWarpreserveacoreofTaoistpracticalphilosophyfromdestructionbyitsantithesis.ParadoxisoftenthoughtofasastandarddeviceofTaoistpsychology,usedto

crossimperceptiblebarriersofawareness.PerhapstheparadoxofTheArtofWarisinitsoppositiontowar.AndasTheArtofWarwarsagainstwar,itdoessobyitsownprinciples;itinfiltratestheenemy’slines,uncoverstheenemy’ssecrets,andchangestheheartsoftheenemy’stroops.

TheCommentators

Thecommentaries in this translationareselected fromastandardcollectionofeleveninterpreters.

CAOCAO(TS’AOTS’AO,155–200C.E.)

CaoCao is one of themost distinguishedmilitary figures of Chinese history.Knownforhiskeenintellectandhiscunning,Caoreceivedanhonorarydegreefor social virtues andbeganhisofficial career at the ageof twenty.Heheld anumber of importantmilitary posts and particularly distinguished himself in acampaignagainstrebelswhenhewasaboutthirtyyearsold.After thishewasgivenalocalministerialposition,butwassoonrecalledto

the region of the capital to take up a regional governorship. Citing healthreasons,CaoCaodeclinedthegovernorshipandreturnedtohishomeland.Whenone of the most violent generals of the Han dynasty deposed the reigningemperor to set up his ownpuppet, however,CaoCao cameout of retirement,spendinghisfamilyfortunetoraiseaprivatearmyinoppositiontothatgeneral.Subsequently promoted to high office by the emperor, Cao Cao overthrew

would-beusurpersandbecameageneralofthehighestrank.Hewaseventuallyennobled and was even encouraged to formally take over the throne of thecrumblingHandynasty,butCaoCaowouldnotdothis,likeninghimselftoKingWenoftheancientChoudynasty,oneoftheauthorsoftheIChing,acivilandmilitary leader whose personal qualities, social policies, and politicalaccomplishments won a loyal following that formed the basis of the nascentChoudynasty,butwhoneversethimselfupassupremeleader.CaoCaowasknownforhisheroism,talent,andstrategy,inwhichhemainly

followedtheteachingsofSunTzu’sclassic,TheArtofWar. Inthetraditionofthe ancient chivalric code, according to which Chinese knights were to belearned in both martial and cultural arts, in addition to his militaryaccomplishmentsCaoCaowasfondofliteratureandissaidtohavemadeahabitofreadingeveryday,evenduringmilitarycampaigns.

MENGSHI(LIANGDYNASTY,502–556)

MengShi,or“Mr.Meng,”isapparentlyknownonlyforhiscommentaryonTheArtofWar.Histimewasmarkedbycivilwarandmassivesuffering.

JIALIN(TANGDYNASTY,618–906)

JIALINseemstobeknownonlyforhiscommentaryonTheArtofWar.DuringtheTangdynasty,Chinaenlargeditsempire,extendingitsculturalandpoliticalinfluence over other peoples, some ofwhom eventually used their experienceunderChinese rule to takeover largepartsofChina themselves.Tang-dynastyChinaalsohelpedestablishnationalgovernmentsinJapan,Tibet,andYunnan.

LIQUAN(TANGDYNASTY,618–906)

LiQuanwas a devotee ofTaoismaswell as themartial arts.He livedon theMountain of FewAbodes,whereBodhidharma, the semilegendary founder ofChanBuddhism, livedduringhis lastyears inChina.Taoist traditionattributesShaolinboxing,apopularschoolofmartialarts, to thissameBodhidharma.LiQuanwas a student of theYinConvergenceClassic (Yinfu jing), a Taoist textattributed to antiquity and traditionally interpreted in bothmartial and culturalterms. He is said to have read this laconic text thousands of times withoutunderstandingitsmeaning.LaterhewenttoBlackHorseMountain,thefamoussiteofthetomboftheFirstEmperorofChina,wherehemetanoldwomanwhogavehimacharmandexplainedthemeaningoftheclassictohim.ThiswomanisidentifiedwiththeOldWomanofBlackHorseMountainoffolklore,whowassaidtohavebeenarulerofancient times,consideredaTaoist immortalbythepeopleoftheTangdynasty.Whateverthetrueidentityofhismentormayhavebeen,LiQuanisknownforhismilitarystrategyandwroteacommentaryontheYinConvergenceClassic from that point of view.Eventually hewent into themountainstostudyTaoism.

DUYOU(735–812)

Du You served as an official military advisor, war councillor, and militaryinspectorinseveralregions.Laterinlifehealsohelddistinguishedpostsinthecentralgovernment,butheeventuallygaveupoffice.

DUMU(803–852)

DuMuwasthegrandsonoftheaforementionedDuYou.Knownasa“knightofunflinchinghonestyandextraordinaryhonor,”heearnedanadvancedacademicdegree and served in several positions at the imperial court. His fortunesdeclined inhis lateryears, andhediedat the ageof fifty.Onhisdeathbedhecomposedhisownepitaphandburnedallofhiswritings.Hewasknownasanoutstandingpoet.

ZHANGYU(SUNGDYNASTY,960–1278)

ZhangYuisknownonlyforhiscommentaryonTheArtofWarandacollectionofbiographiesofmilitaryleaders.TheSungdynastywasatimeofmoreorlessconstantly increasing pressure from north Asia, culminating in the loss of itsancient homeland and finally all of the continental Chinese empire, toMongolianinvaders.

MEIYAOCHEN(1002–1060)

Mei Yaochen served in both local and central governments of the new Sungdynasty that followed several generations of disunity after the collapse of theTang dynasty, and was chosen as one of the compilers and editors of thedocumentsoftheTangdynasty.MeiwasaliterarycorrespondentofthefamouspoetOuYangxiu,andwashimselfadistinguishedwriter.

WANGXI(SUNGDYNASTY,EARLYELEVENTHCENTURY)

WangXiwasascholarintheHanlinorImperialAcademy.HeistheauthoroftwobooksontheSpringandAutumnAnnals(Qunqiu/Ch’un-ch’iu),oneof theConfucianclassicsofancientillustrativehistory.WhileSungdynastyChinawasbeset with endless political, economic, andmilitary problems, its culture wasverylively,withimportantnewdevelopmentsinConfucianism,Taoism,andZenBuddhism.ThesenewformsofpracticalphilosophyexertedastronginfluencenotonlyontheChinesepeoplethemselvesbutevenonthenon-ChinesepeopleswhoweretakingoverpoliticalcontrolinChina,tosaynothingoftheKoreans,Vietnamese,andJapanesewhowerewatchingthecontinentalmainlandandwereexperimentingwiththesenewformsofhighculturefromChina.

CHENHAO(SUNGDYNASTY,EARLYTWELFTHCENTURY)

ChenHaowasknownforhisextraordinarypersonalindependenceandhisgreataspirations.He became an officer of the statewhen hewas only twenty yearsold.When the Jurchen people of northAsia invadedChina in themid 1120s,Chenassembledapatrioticarmytodefendthehomeland.Laterhealsoraisedanarmyinsecrettoputdownanattemptedcoupbyausurper.

HOYANXI(SUNGDYNASTY)

NothingseemstobeknownofHoYanxiotherthanthathelivedduringtheSung

dynastyandwrotethiscommentaryonTheArtofWar.

TheTranslation

The languageof theChineseclassics isdifferent from thatofeven theearliestcommentators, very different from that of the Tang and Sung writers, vastlydifferentfrommodernChinese.AllChineseclassics,extensivelystudiedastheyare, contain words and passages interpreted differently among Chinesecommentators themselves. These differences in reading and understanding aresometimes radical. It is only natural, therefore, that translations of ancientChinese texts into modern Western languages, which differ so greatly fromChinese,shouldthemselvesexhibitaconsiderablerangeofvariety.ThisisespeciallytrueconsideringthepregnancyoftheChineselanguageand

theabundantuseofimageryandallusioninChineseliterature.Therearemanychoices of techniques available to the translator for conveying the contents ofclassicalChinesewritingstothereaderinanotherlanguage.Intwentyyearsoftranslating,neverhaveIseenortranslatedanOrientalclassicthatIdidnotfindsorichastobeabletogenerateatleastthreepossibletranslations.Thereare,again,variousoptionsavailablefordealingwiththissituation.As

inmyothertranslationsfromOrientalclassics,thetechnicalaimofmyapproachtoTheArtofWarhasbeentomakethefleshtransparentandthebonesstandout,to reproduce an abstract form to be filled with the colors of the individualreader’sownlifesituations.ThereforeIhaveomittedsomereferencestocertainlocal content, such itemsas ancientChineseweaponry, not asbeingwithout acertain interest, but as incidental to the question of present day application ofrelationalstructurespresentedinthestrategyoftheclassic.Translation of ideas nevertheless inevitably involves questions of broad

cultural differences and how they are perceived. As far as it is relevant to apolitically sensitive text like The Art of War, to Occidental eyes thedistinguishingmark of traditional Chinese social thought in actual practice isauthoritarianism,and there ismuchempirical evidence to support thisviewofConfuciansociety.Whileitistruethatpersonalloyalty,suchaswouldserveforacementinanauthoritarianstructure,seemstobeesteemedmorehighlyinthesocial thought of China than in that of theWest, nevertheless there is also abroader conception of loyalty to abstractions or ideals that surfaces even inConfucianthought.InConfucianidealism,amandoesnotparticipateinanorganizationorcause

thathedoesnotbelieveisreasonableandjust.Oncehetrulybelievesitisright,

however, a man should not abandon a course of action even if it brings himhardshipandperil.Confuciussaidthatitisadisgracetoberichandhonoredinanunjust state, andhehimselfnearlydied forhis independence.According totheclassics,loyaltydoesnotmeanblindobediencetoanindividualorstate,butincludes the duty of conscientious protest. Loyalty to ideals above allmay berareinpractice,butitalwayswasapartoftheChineseworldview.IntheorganizationalscienceofTheArtofWar,loyaltyisnotsomuchamoral

standardinitselfbutaproductofsocialrelationswithintheorganizationbasedon other professional and ethical standards. The quality of the relationshipbetweentheleadersandthetroopsiswhatcementsloyalty,accordingtoMasterSun,and this is reinforcedbyegalitarianadherence toestablishedstandardsofbehavior.Therearedifferentwaysofinterpretingidealsinreallife,ofcourse,andthere

is not necessarily an unambiguous course of action dictated by the generalconceptofloyalty,whentherearevariouslevelsofrelevancetoconsider.OneofthestoriesrelatedincommentaryonTheArtofWarconcernsthewholequestionof loyalty addressed fromdifferent points of view, illustrating the interplay ofthesedifferentviewsofanappropriatecontextforloyalty.Duringawaracertainbrigadiergeneralhadhisentirecontingentwipedoutin

battle;hehimself foughtuntil theend, then returned toheadquarters to report.Now,sincetherehadbeensomeproblemswithdisciplineandmorale,therewastalkofmakinganexampleofthisgeneral,accusinghimofdesertinghistroops—notdyingwiththem—andputtinghimtodeath.Finally itwasobjected,however, thathehad in fact fought to the lastman,

afterwhich therewas no reason to continue, so he returned for reassignment;thusneitherhisloyaltytohistroopsnorhisloyaltytohisnationcouldbedenied.Furthermore, if he were to be executed, it was argued in his defense, otherswouldnotnecessarilybecowed intoobediencebutwouldmore likelybecomealienated,seeingthattherewasnoreasontoreturnhome.On a level of understanding more sophisticated than that of broad

generalizations, one of the most challenging and rewarding uses of classicalliteratureis theexplorationof thepsychologicalnuancesofbasicconceptsandtheirmanifestationsinpractice.Itischallengingbecauseitdemandsimmersionintheconsciousnessoftheclassicsthemselves;itisrewardingbecauseitopensup realmsof thought beyondpredetermined subjectiveparameters.Thekey tothisappreciationisasensitivitytostructure,traditionallyawakenedasmuchbyallegoryandimageryasbydiscourseandargument.The use of imagery and suggestion inChinese literaturewas practiced as a

fineartintheChanBuddhismoftheTangandSungdynasties,whichinherited

the traditions of the Confucian and Taoist classics as well as those of theBuddhist sutras. ChanBuddhism influenced all the great scholars, artists, andpoetsofChinathenandthereafter,yetChanwasinitsturnindebtedtoclassicalTaoismforsupportintheacceptanceofitssurprisingliterarydevices.Oneofthelinguistictechniquesofthisfineartthatisofparticularconcerntothetranslatoristheuseofambiguity.Taoist and Buddhist literature have been described—both by Easterners

writing for Westerners and by Westerners writing for other Westerners—asparadoxical, so frequently and to such a degree that paradox is commonlyconsidered one of the major characteristics or devices of this literature. TheorientationofTheArtofWar towardwinningwithout fighting, forexample, istypicalofthissortofparadox,whichistheretoinviteattentiontoitsownlogic.Itmay paradoxically be nonparadoxical, therefore, to find that the paradox ofambiguityisanexactscienceintheTaoistliteratureofhigherpsychology.Thefirstmaneuverofthisliteratureistoengagetheparticipationofthereader

in thework, justas theviewer isdrawninto thepatternofsuggestionspunbylinesinspaceonseeinganexpertSung-dynastyinklinedrawing.Theresult ispartly from the writing and partly from the reading; used as a tool for theassessmentofthementalityofthereader,eachaphorism,eachtext,bringsoutaparticular facet of human psychology. Chan Buddhists often used ambiguityprimarily as ameansof nondirectivemirroringof personalities andmind sets;TheArtofWar similarlyhas thepower to revealagreatdealabout its readersthroughtheirreactionsandinterpretations.Asatranslator,therefore,Ihavealwaysconsideredthefaithfulreconstruction

ofanecessaryorusefulambiguity tobeamong themostdifficultsubtletiesofthecraft.CommentatorsonChineseclassicshave long shownhow thoroughlydifferentperspectivescanbeobtainedbyadoptingthedifferentsetsofsubjectorobjectassociationsthatcertainsentencesallow.InthelaterChanschools,itwasopenly stated that classic texts were meant to be read by putting yourself ineveryone’s place to get a comprehensive view of subjective and objectiverelationships,andtheChanwriterstookthistobreathtakinglydistantlengthsinanelaborateimageryoftransformationandinterpenetrationofviewpoints.In a classical aphorism on education frequently encountered in Chan

literature,Confucius said, “If I bring up one corner, and those towhom I amspeakingcannotcomebackwiththeotherthree,Idon’ttalktothemanymore.”AppliedtoaChineseclassic,thisproducesafairdescriptionoftheexperienceofreading such a book. Put in a positive way, Confucius said the classics givehints,suggestionsthatyieldmoreonlywithtimeandthoughtgiventoapplyingthesehintstopresentrealsituations.Similarly,inTaoisttraditiontheyareused

asvisualizationmodels,designedtoawakencertainperceptionsofhumannatureandthehumancondition.ItistheintentionofthistranslationofTheArtofWar,therefore,toreproduce

theclassicasastudyofrelationships,orenergyinpotentialandinmotion,thatcould remain useful through changes in time, linkedwith the perennial Taoisttradition that marks the heart and soul of this classic text. Comments by thereadersmentionedabove,writtenoveraperiodofnearlyathousandyears,havebeen selected not only to elucidate the original text but also to illustrate theshifting of perspectives that the classicmakes possible. The translation of theoriginal has therefore been designed to provide conceptual space for differentviewsinspecificplaces.Thereasonthatclassicsremainclassicsoverthousandsofyears,asTheArtof

War has remained alongwith the works of the original Confucian and Taoistsages,seemstobethattheycontinuetohavemeaning.Thiscontinuingmeaning,moreover, isnotexperiencedonlyovergenerations.Onasmallscale,aclassicyieldssignificantlydifferentmeaningswhenreadindifferentcircumstancesandmoods;onalargerscale,aclassicconveyswhollydifferentworldswhenreadindifferent times of life, at different stages of experience, feeling, andunderstanding of life. Classics may be interesting and even entertaining, butpeoplealwaysfindtheyarenotlikebooksusedfordiversion,whichgiveupalloftheircontentatonce;theclassicsseemtogrowwiseraswegrowwiser,moreusefulthemoreweusethem.

*Noteagain thesimilarityofSunTzu’sadvice tomedicalwisdom: tofoil theenemies’plotsislikekeepinghealthysoastoberesistanttodisease;toruintheiralliances is like avoiding contagion; to attack their armed forces is like takingmedicine;tobesiegetheircitiesislikeperformingsurgery.

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StrategicAssessments

MasterSunMilitaryactionisimportanttothenation—itisthegroundofdeathandlife,thepathofsurvivalanddestruction,soitisimperativetoexamineit.

LIQUAN

Military action is inauspicious—it isonly considered importantbecause it is amatter of life and death, and there is the possibility that it may be taken uplightly.

DUMU

Thesurvivalordestructionofacountryandthelifeordeathofitspeoplemaydependonmilitaryaction,soitisnecessarytoexamineitcarefully.

JIALIN

Thegroundmeansthelocation,theplaceofpitchedbattle—gaintheadvantageandyoulive,losetheadvantageandyoudie.Thereforemilitaryactioniscalledthegroundofdeathandlife.Thepathmeansthewaytoadjust tothesituationand establish victory—find this and you survive, lose this and you perish.Therefore it is said tobe imperative toexamine it.Anancientdocument says,“Thereisawayofsurvival,whichhelpsandstrengthensyou;thereisawayofdestruction,whichpushesyouintooblivion.”

MEIYAOCHEN

Whether you live or die depends on the configuration of the battleground;whetheryousurviveorperishdependsonthewayofbattle.

MasterSunTherefore measure in terms of five things, use these assessments to makecomparisons,andthusfindoutwhattheconditionsare.Thefivethingsaretheway,theweather,theterrain,theleadership,anddiscipline.

DUMU

Five things are to be assessed—theway, theweather, the lay of the land, theleadership,anddiscipline.Thesearetobeassessedatheadquarters—firstassessyourself and your opponent in terms of these five things, deciding who issuperior.Thenyou candeterminewho is likely to prevail.Havingdeterminedthis,onlythenshouldyoumobilizeyourforces.

CAOCAO

Assessments of the following items are to be made at headquarters: theleadership, the opponent, the terrain, troop strength, distance, and relativedanger.

WANGXI

Assesstheleadership,theenvironmentalconditions,discipline,troops,officers,andthesystemofrewardsandpunishments.

ZHANGYU

Master Guan said that assessments should be made at home before sendingtroopsabroad.Assessmentsarethefirstorderofbusinessinmilitaryoperations.Some say that military operations should be adjusted right on the spot, inconfrontation with the opponent, but General Cao Cao says that assessmentsshouldbemadeatheadquarters—this isbecause it is imperative first toassessthewisdomoftheleaders,thestrengthoftheopponent,thelayoftheland,andthe number of troops; then when the two armies confront one another, the

adaptationstobemadearedeterminedbytheleadershipinamannerconsistentwiththesecalculations.Discipline means that regulations are strict and clear. The reason that

leadershipanddisciplinecomelastinthislistoffivethingsisthatwheneveryoumobilizetoattackthosewhohavedoneyouwrong,itisnecessaryfirsttolookintothematterofwhetheryouareappreciatedandtrustedbyyourownpeople,then to assess the favorability or otherwise of weather conditions, and thenexaminethequalitiesoftheterrain.Oncethesethreethingsarefulfilled,thenaleaderisappointedtogoforthontheexpedition.Oncethearmyhasgoneforth,allorderscomefromthegeneral.

WANGXI

HarmonyamongpeopleisthebasisoftheWayofmilitaryoperations;therightweather and an advantageous position help. When these three elements arepresent, then is the time to discussmobilizing the army.Mobilizing the armyrequiresabilityon thepartof the leadership.Whenthe leadership isable, thentherewillbegooddiscipline.

MasterSunTheWaymeansinducingthepeopletohavethesameaimastheleadership,sothattheywillsharedeathandsharelife,withoutfearofdanger.

CAOCAO

Thismeansguidingthembyinstructionanddirection.Dangermeansdistrust.

ZHANGYU

If the people are treatedwith benevolence, faithfulness, and justice, then theywill be of onemind, andwill be glad to serve. The I Ching says, “Joyful indifficulty,thepeopleforgetabouttheirdeath.”

DUMU

TheWaymeanshumanenessandjustice.Inancienttimesafamousministerofstateaskedapoliticalphilosopheraboutmilitarymatters.Thephilosophersaid,“Humaneness and justice are the means by which to govern properly. Whengovernmentiscarriedoutproperly,peoplefeelclosetotheleadershipandthinklittleofdyingforit.”

JIALIN

Iftheleaderscanbehumaneandjust,sharingboththegainsandthetroublesofthepeople,thenthetroopswillbeloyalandnaturallyidentifywiththeinterestsoftheleadership.

MasterSunTheweathermeanstheseasons.

CAOCAO

Therulesoftheancientmilitarystatethatoperationsshouldnotbecarriedoutinwinterorsummer,outofconcernforthepeople.

ZHANGYU(QuotingthefounderoftheTangDynasty)InancienttimesmanysoldierslosttheirfingerstofrostbiteoncampaignsagainsttheHuns,andmanysoldiersdiedofplagueoncampaignsagainst thesoutherntribes.Thiswasbecauseofcarryingoutoperationsinwinterandsummer.

WANGXI(QuotingFanLi)This is the meaning of the saying, “Don’t go into another’s territory at anunfavorabletime.”

MasterSunThe terrain is to be assessed in terms of distance, difficulty or ease of travel,dimension,andsafety.

ZHANGYU

Inanymilitaryoperation,itisimportantfirsttoknowthelayoftheland.Whenyou know the distance to be traveled, then you can plan whether to proceeddirectlyorbyacircuitousroute.Whenyouknowthedifficultyoreaseoftravel,thenyoucandeterminetheadvantagesofinfantryormountedtroops.Whenyouknow the dimensions of the area, then you can assess howmany troops youneed,manyorfew.Whenyouknowtherelativesafetyof theterrain, thenyoucandiscernwhethertodobattleordisperse.

MasterSunLeadership is a matter of intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage,andsternness.

CAOCAO

Ageneralshouldhavethesefivevirtues.

DUMU

TheWayof theancientkingswas toconsiderhumanenessforemost,while themartial artists considered intelligence foremost. This is because intelligenceinvolvesabilitytoplanandtoknowwhentochangeeffectively.Trustworthinessmeans tomakepeoplesureofpunishmentor reward.Humanenessmeans loveandcompassion forpeople,beingawareof their toils.Couragemeans toseizeopportunitiestomakecertainofvictory,withoutvacillation.Sternnessmeanstoestablishdisciplineintheranksbystrictpunishments.

JIALIN

Relianceonintelligencealoneresultsinrebelliousness.Exerciseofhumanenessaloneresults inweakness.Fixationontrustresults infolly.Dependenceonthestrengthofcourageresultsinviolence.Excessivesternnessofcommandresultsin cruelty. When one has all five virtues together, each appropriate to its

function,thenonecanbeamilitaryleader.

MasterSunDisciplinemeansorganization,chainofcommand,andlogistics.

MEIYAOCHEN

Organization means that the troops must be grouped in a regulated manner.Chainofcommandmeansthattheremustbeofficerstokeepthetroopstogetherandleadthem.Logisticsmeansoverseeingsupplies.

MasterSunEvery general has heard of these five things. Those who know them prevail,thosewhodonotknowthemdonotprevail.

ZHANGYU

Everyonehasheardofthesefivethings,butonlythosewhodeeplyunderstandtheprinciplesofadaptationandimpassewillwin.

MasterSunThereforeusetheseassessmentsforcomparison,tofindoutwhattheconditionsare.Thatis tosay,whichpolitical leadershiphastheWay?Whichgeneralhasability?Whohas thebetterclimateand terrain?Whosediscipline iseffective?Whosetroopsarestronger?Whoseofficersandsoldiersarethebettertrained?Whosesystemofrewardsandpunishmentisclearer?Thisishowyoucanknowwhowillwin.

LIQUAN

ApoliticalleadershipthathastheWaywillsurelyhaveamilitaryleadershipthathasintelligenceandability.

DUMU

Ask yourselfwhich political leadership—your own or that of your enemy—isabletorejectflatterersanddrawclosetothewise.

DUYOU

TheWaymeansvirtue.Itisfirstnecessarytocomparethepoliticalleadershipofnationsatwar.

MEIYAOCHEN

Thequestion regardingpolitical leadership is,who isable towin theheartsofthepeople.

HOYANXI

The ancient classic of documents says, “The one who treats me well is myleader,theonewhotreatsmecruellyismyenemy.”Thequestionis,whichsidehasahumanegovernment,andwhichsidehasacruelgovernment.

ZHANGYU

First compare the political leadership of the two nations at war, in terms ofwhich one has the Way of benevolence and good faith. Then examine themilitaryleadership—whohasintelligence,trustworthiness,humaneness,bravery,andsternness.Nowobservewhichsidehastheenvironmentaladvantages.

CAOCAO

Setuprulesthatarenottobebroken,donotfailtopunishanyoffenders.

DUMU

When it comes to establishing rules and regulations, everyone, high and low,shouldbetreatedalike.

DUYOU

Comparewhoseordersarethemoreeffective—whosesubordinatesdonotdaretodisobey.

MEIYAOCHEN

Makeeveryoneequalunderthelaw.

WANGXI

Seewhoisabletomakerulesclearandcommandseasytofollow,sothatpeoplelistenandobey.

DUMU(Onthemattersofstrengthandtraining)When superior and subordinate are in harmony, equally brave in battle, thatmakesforstrength.

DUYOU

Know whose armaments are more effective, and whose troops are carefullychosenandwelltrained.Asitissaid,“Ifsoldiersdonotpracticedaytoday,onthefrontlinestheywillbefearfulandhesitant.Ifgeneralsdonotpracticedaytoday,onthefrontlinestheywillnotknowhowtoadapt.”

DUMU(Turningtothesubjectofpunishmentsandrewards)Rewardsshouldnotbeoutofproportion,punishmentsshouldnotbearbitrary.

DUYOU

Knowwhose system of rewards for the good and punishments for the bad isclearly defined. As it is said, “If rewards are immoderate, there will beexpenditure that does not result in gratitude; if punishments are immoderate,therewillbeslaughterthatdoesnotresultinawe.”

MEIYAOCHEN

Whenpeopledeservereward, thisshouldbedulynotedeven ifyoupersonallydetestthem.Whenpeopledeservepunishment,thisshouldnotbeforgoneeveniftheyareclosetoyou.

CAOCAO(Summingup)Byassessingtheseseventhingsyoucanknowwhowillbevictoriousandwhowillbedefeated.

MEIYAOCHEN

Ifyoucanfindouttherealconditions,thenyouwillknowwhowillprevail.

ZHANGYU

Ifyouaresuperior inallof theseseventhings,youhavewonbeforeyouhaveevendonebattle. Ifyouare inferior inallof theseseven things,youhave losteven before you go into battle. Therefore it is possible to know the victorbeforehand.

MasterSunAssess theadvantages in takingadvice, thenstructureyour forcesaccordingly,to supplement extraordinary tactics. Forces are to be structured strategically,basedonwhatisadvantageous.

CAOCAO

Structuredependsonstrategy:strategyisdeterminedaccordingtoevents.

MasterSunAmilitaryoperationinvolvesdeception.Eventhoughyouarecompetent,appeartobeincompetent.Thougheffective,appeartobeineffective.

CAOCAO

Amilitaryoperationhasnostandardform—itgoesbywayofdeception.

MEIYAOCHEN

Without deception you cannot carry out strategy, without strategy you cannotcontroltheopponent.

WANGXI

Deception is for thepurposeofseekingvictoryoveranenemy; tocommandagrouprequirestruthfulness.

ZHANGYU

Whilestrong in reality,appear tobeweak;whilebrave in reality,appear tobecowardly—thismethodwaseffectiveagainsttheHuns.

LIQUAN

LiQuantoldastoryofhowoneofthegeneralsoftheHandynastyrebelledandjoinedforceswiththeHuns.Theemperorsent tenscoutstoobservethem,andall reported that theycouldbeeffectivelyattacked.Theemperor thensentoneLouJing,whoreportedthat,onthecontrary, theHunscouldnotbeeffectivelyattacked.Whentheemperoraskedhimwhy,hereplied,“Whentwocountriesareat a standoff, they should be flaunting their strengths.When Iwent, all I sawwerethefeebleandtheelderly—surelytheyare‘competentyetappearingtobeincompetent,’soIconsideritunfeasibletoattack.”The emperorwaswroth.He punished Lou Jing for getting in hisway, and

personallysetoutwitha largecontingent.TheywerehemmedinbytheHuns,however,andcutofffromsuppliesforsevendays.This,concludedLi,isthemeaningofanarmyappearingtobeweak.

DUMU

This is a matter of deceptively concealing your state. You should not let theopponentseewhatstateyouarein,foriftheenemyseesyourcondition,hewillsurelyhavearesponse.AnexampleofthisiswhentheHunslettheemissariesofHanonlyseethefeebleandtheold.

DUYOU

This means that when you are really competent and effective you outwardlyappear to be incompetent and ineffective, so as to cause the enemy to beunprepared.

WANGXI

Whenstrong,appearweak.Brave,appearfearful.Orderly,appearchaotic.Full,appearempty.Wise,appearfoolish.Many,appeartobefew.Advancing,appearto retreat.Moving quickly, appear to be slow.Taking, appear to leave. In oneplace,appeartobeinanother.

ZHANGYU

Whenyouaregoing todobattle,make it seemas ifyouare retreating.Whenyouaregoingtohasten,makeitseemasifyouarerelaxing.

MasterSunWhenyouaregoingtoattacknearby,makeit lookas ifyouaregoingtogoalongway;when you are going to attack far away,make it look as if you aregoingjustashortdistance.

LIQUAN

Thisistocausetheopponenttobeunprepared.

MasterSun

Drawtheminwiththeprospectofgain,takethembyconfusion.

MEIYAOCHEN

Iftheyaregreedy,lurethemwithgoods.

ZHANGYU

Showthemalittleprospectofgaintolurethem,thenattackandovercomethem.

DUMU

Whentheenemyisconfused,youcanusethisopportunitytotakethem.

JIALIN

I would have crafty interlopers confuse them, then wait for them to fall intodisarrayinordertotakethem.

ZHANGYU

Usedeceptiontothrowthemintoconfusion,leadthemoninordertotakethem.WhenthestatesofWuandYuewereatwarwitheachother,WusentoutthreethousandcriminalstogiveanappearanceofdisordersoastolureYue.Someofthecriminalsran,someofthemgaveup;theYuearmyfoughtwiththem,onlytobedefeatedbythearmyofWu.

MasterSunWhentheyarefulfilled,bepreparedagainst them;whentheyarestrong,avoidthem.

DUMU

If the enemy’s government is fulfilled—meaning that there is mutual love

between the rulers and the ruled, there is clarity and trustworthiness in thesystemofrewardsandpunishments,andthesoldiersarewelltrained—thenyoushould be on guard against them. Do not wait for a clash to make yourpreparations.Whentheenemy’smilitaryisstrong,youshouldavoidthemforthetimebeing,waitinguntiltheyslackoff,watchingforanopeningtoattack.

CHENHAO

If the enemy does not stir, is complete and fulfilled, then you should preparecarefully.Fulfillyourselftoo,soastobereadyforthem.

HOYANXI

Ifyouonlyseefulfillmentintheenemy,anddonotseeanygap,thenyoushouldbuildupyourpowertobeprepared.

ZHANGYU

Aclassicsays,“Strugglingwiththem,youfindoutwheretheyhaveplentyandwhere they are lacking.” Having plenty is what is meant by being fulfilled,lacking is what is meant by having gaps. Once the military power of theadversaryisfull,youshouldtreatthemasiftheywereunbeatable,andnotattacklightly.Asamilitaryguidesays,“Whenyouseeagap,thenadvance;whenyouseefullness,thenstop.”

JIALIN

Fortheweaktocontrolthestrong,itislogicallynecessarytoawaitachange.

DUYOU

When their storehouses are full and their soldiers are in top form, then youshouldwithdraw in order towatch for an openingwhen they relax, observinganychangesandrespondingtothem.

MasterSunUseangertothrowthemintodisarray.

CAOCAO

Waitforthemtobecomedecadentandlazy.

LIQUAN

Whenthemilitaryleadershipisoftenangered,itsstrategyiseasilythrownintoconfusion,foritsnatureisunstable.

DUMU

Whentheirmilitaryleadershipisobstreperous,youshouldirritatethemtomakethemangry—thentheywillbecomeimpetuousandignoretheiroriginalstrategy.

MEIYAOCHEN

Iftheyarequick-tempered,thenstirthemuptoexcitethemsothattheygointobattlecarelessly.

ZHANGYU

If theyareviolentandeasilyangered, thenuseembarrassment toenragethem,so that their morale is upset—then they will proceed carelessly, withoutformulatingaplan.

MasterSunUsehumilitytomakethemhaughty.

LIQUAN

Iftheyplyyouwithexpensivegiftsandsweettalk,theyareuptosomething.

DUYOU

Whentheyarestirredupandabouttomaketheirmove,thenyoushouldpretendtobecowed,soastoraisetheirspirits;waitforthemtoslackoff,thenregroupandattack.

MEIYAOCHEN

Givetheappearanceofinferiorityandweakness,tomakethemproud.

WANGXI

Appeartobelowlyandweak,soastomakethemarrogant—thentheywillnotworryaboutyou,andyoucanattackthemastheyrelax.

MasterSunTirethembyflight.

CAOCAO

Useswiftnesstowearthemout.

WANGXI

Thismeansmakingalotofsurpriseattacks.Whentheycomeout,yougohome;whentheygohome,yougoout.Whentheygototheaidoftheirleftflank,youheadtotheright;whentheygototheaidoftheirrightflank,yougototheleft.Thiswayyoucantirethemout.

ZHANGYU

Thisway,yourstrengthwillremainintact,whiletheywillbewornout.

MasterSunCausedivisionamongthem.

CAOCAO

Sendinterloperstocauseriftsamongthem.

LIQUAN

Break up their accords, cause division between the leadership and theirministers,andthenattack.

DUMU

Thismeansthatiftherearegoodrelationsbetweentheenemyleadershipanditsfollowers,thenyoushouldusebribestocausedivision.

CHENHAO

If theyarestingy,youbegenerous;if theyareharsh,youbelenient.Thatwaytheir leadership and followers will be suspicious of each other, and you cancausedivisionbetweenthem.

DUYOU

Seduce themwith the prospect of gain, send interlopers in among them, haverhetoricians use fast talk to ingratiate themselves with their leaders andfollowers,anddivideuptheirorganizationandpower.

ZHANGYU

Youmaycauseriftsbetweentheleadershipandtheirfollowers,orbetweenthemandtheirallies—causedivision,andthentakeaimatthem.

MasterSunAttackwhentheyareunprepared,makeyourmovewhentheydonotexpectit.

CAOCAO

Attackwhentheyareslackingoff,makeyourmovewhenagapopensup.

MENGSHIStrikeattheirgaps,attackwhentheyarelax,don’tlettheenemyfigureouthowtoprepare.This iswhyit issaid that inmilitaryoperationsformlessness is themost effective. One of the great warrior-leaders said, “The most efficient ofmovements is the one that is unexpected; the best of plans is the one that isunknown.”

MasterSunThe formation and procedure used by the military should not be divulgedbeforehand.

CAOCAO

Todivulgemeans to leakout.Themilitaryhasnoconstant form, justaswaterhasnoconstantshape—adaptasyoufacetheenemy,withoutlettingthemknowbeforehandwhatyouaregoingtodo.Therefore,assessmentoftheenemyisinthemind,observationofthesituationisintheeyes.

LIQUAN

Attackwhentheyareunpreparedandnotexpectingit,andyouwillsurelywin.Thisistheessenceofmartialarts,tobekeptsecretandnotdivulged.

DUMU

To divulge something means to speak of it. This means that all of theaforementionedstrategiesforsecuringmilitaryvictorycancertainlynotbemade

uniform—first, see the enemy’s formation, and only then apply them. Youcannotsaywhatyouwilldobeforetheevent.

MEIYAOCHEN

Sinceyouadaptandadjustappropriately in faceof theenemy,howcouldyousaywhatyouaregoingtodobeforehand?

MasterSunTheonewhofiguresonvictoryatheadquartersbeforeevendoingbattle is theone who has the most strategic factors on his side. The one who figures oninability toprevail at headquartersbeforedoingbattle is theonewhohas theleast strategic factors on his side. The one withmany strategic factors in hisfavorwins,theonewithfewstrategicfactorsinhisfavorloses—howmuchthemoreso foronewithnostrategic factors inhis favor.Observing thematter inthisway,Icanseewhowillwinandwhowilllose.

ZHANGYU

When your strategy is deep and far-reaching, then what you gain by yourcalculationsismuch,soyoucanwinbeforeyouevenfight.Whenyourstrategicthinkingisshallowandnearsighted,thenwhatyougainbyyourcalculationsislittle,soyoulosebeforeyoudobattle.Muchstrategyprevailsoverlittlestrategy,so those with no strategy cannot but be defeated. Therefore it is said thatvictoriouswarrierswin first and thengo towar,whiledefeatedwarriorsgo towarfirstandthenseektowin.

[2]

DoingBattle

LIQUAN

Firstestablishyourplans,thenprepareyourequipment.Thisiswhythechapteronbattlefollowsthechapteronstrategicassessments.

MasterSunWhenyoudobattle,evenifyouarewinning, ifyoucontinueforalongtimeitwilldullyourforcesandbluntyouredge;ifyoubesiegeacitadel,yourstrengthwillbeexhausted.Ifyoukeepyourarmiesoutinthefieldforalongtime,yoursupplieswillbeinsufficient.

JIALIN

Evenifyouprevailoverothersinbattle,ifyougoontoolongtherewillbenoprofit. Inmilitaryoperations, totalvictory is important; ifyoudullyour forcesand blunt your edge, sustaining casualties and battle fatigue, then youwill beexhausted.

ZHANGYU

When you are spending a great deal ofmoney on amilitary operation, if thearmy isout in the field too long,yourbudgetwillnotbeenough tocover theexpense.

LIQUAN

AstheclassicSpringandAutumnAnnalssays,“Warislikeafire—ifyoudonotputitout,itwillburnitselfout.”

JIALIN

Ifamilitaryoperationgoesonforalongtimewithoutaccomplishinganything,yourrivalswillbegintogetideas.

DUYOU

Armsaretoolsofillomen—toemploythemforanextendedperiodoftimewillbringaboutcalamity.Asitissaid,“Thosewholiketofightandsoexhausttheirmilitaryinevitablyperish.”

MasterSunWhenyour forcesaredulled,youredge isblunted,yourstrength isexhausted,andyoursuppliesaregone,thenotherswilltakeadvantageofyourdebilityandrise up.Then even if youhavewiseadvisers you cannotmake things turnoutwellintheend.

LIQUAN

Alarge-scaleoperationinvolvesenormousexpense,whichnotonlybreaksyoudowninthefield,butalsoexhaustsyouathome.Thereforeawisegovernmentdoesnotkeepitsarmyinthefield.

MasterSunTherefore Ihaveheardofmilitaryoperations thatwereclumsybutswift,but Ihaveneverseenonethatwasskillfulandlastedalongtime.Itisneverbeneficialtoanationtohaveamilitaryoperationcontinueforalongtime.

CAOCAO

Somewinthroughspeed,eveniftheyareclumsy.

DUMU

Some may be clumsy in attack, but they get the upper hand throughextraordinaryswiftness,becausetheyarenotsubjecttotheproblemsofwearingouttheirforcesandusinguptheirresources.

CHENHAO

Asitissaid,beswiftasthethunderthatpealsbeforeyouhaveachancetocoveryourears,fastasthelightningthatflashesbeforeyoucanblinkyoureyes.

MasterSunTherefore,thosewhoarenotthoroughlyawareofthedisadvantagesintheuseofarmscannotbethoroughlyawareoftheadvantagesintheuseofarms.

LIQUAN

Advantages and disadvantages are interdependent—first know thedisadvantages,thenyouknowtheadvantages.

JIALIN

Whenthegeneralsarehaughtyandthesoldiersarelazy,intheirgreedforgaintheyforgetthattheremaybeanunexpectedturnofevents—thisisthegreatestdisadvantage.

DUYOU

Thismeansthatifyouareplanningtomobilizeyourforcesandembarkuponacampaign, if you do not first think about the calamities of danger anddestruction,youwillnotbeabletoreapanyadvantage.

MasterSunThosewhousethemilitaryskillfullydonotraisetroopstwiceanddonotprovide

foodthreetimes.

CAOCAO

This means you draft people into service once and then immediately seizevictory—youdonotgobacktoyourcountryasecondtimetoraisemoretroops.Atfirstyouprovidefood,afterthatyoufeedofftheenemy;andthenwhenyoursoldiersreturntoyourcountry,youdonotgreetthemwithyetmorefreefood.

DUMU

Determinewhether theenemycanbesuccessfullyattacked,determinewhetheryoucandobattle,andonlyafterwardraisetroops—thenyoucanovercometheenemyandreturnhome.

LIQUAN

Donotraisetroopstwice,lestthecitizenrybecomeweariedandbitternessarise.

MasterSunBytakingequipmentfromyourowncountrybut feedingoff theenemyyoucanbesufficientinbotharmsandprovisions.

CAOCAO

Whenyouaregoing togo towar, firstyoumust calculateyourexpenses, andstrivetofeedofftheopponent.

LIQUAN

If you have your own arms and take food from the enemy, then even if thecampaigntakesyoufarafieldyouwillnotlackforanything.

CAOCAO

Armamentsaretakenfromthehomeland,provisionsaretakenfromtheenemy.

MasterSunWhen a country is impoverished by military operations, it is because oftransporting supplies to a distant place.Transport supplies to a distant place,andthepopulacewillbeimpoverished.

LIQUAN

Troopsareraisedrepeatedly,andtheleviesareheavy.

DUMU

MasterGuansaid,“Whenprovisionsgoforthreehundredmiles,thecountryisoutayear’ssupplies;whenprovisionsgoforfourhundredmiles,thecountryisout twoyears’supplies;whenprovisionsgoforfivehundredmiles, thepeoplepalewithhunger.”Thismeansthatfoodshouldnotbetransported,forifitis,theproducerswilllose,sotheycannotbutbeimpoverished.

JIALIN

Transportingsupplies todistantplacesmeans thatwealth isexpended in travelandusedupontransportation,sothatthecommonpeoplebecomepoorerdaybyday.

ZHANGYU

Whensevenhundredthousandfamilieshavetosupportanarmyofonehundredthousand on a distant expedition, the common peoples cannot avoidimpoverishment.

MasterSunThosewho are near the army sell at high prices. Because of high prices, the

wealthofthecommonpeopleisexhausted.

CAOCAO

Whenthearmyhasgoneforth,thosewhoarenearthetroops,greedyformoney,sellathighprices.Thereforethecommonpeoplebecomedestitute.

LIQUAN

Nearthearmythereisalwaystrade;thecommonpeopleuseuptheirwealthtogoalongwithit,andsobecomedestitute.

JIALIN

Whereverthetroopsgather,thepricesofgoodsallsoar.Sincepeoplearegreedyforexceptionalprofits,theyselloffalltheirgoods.Thoughatfirsttheymakeagreat deal of profit, in the end they run out of goods. Also, since there areextraordinarylevies,thosewithsomethingtoselldemandthehighestpricestheycan get; the common people go broke trying to buy things, so the countrynaturallyisimpoverished.

WANGXI

Whensuppliesaretransportedfaraway,thepeoplearewornoutbytheexpense.In the markets near the army, the prices of goods shoot up. Therefore longmilitarycampaignsareaplaguetoanation.

MasterSunWhen resources are exhausted, then levies are made under pressure. Whenpowerandresourcesareexhausted,thenthehomelandisdrained.Thecommonpeoplearedeprivedof seventypercentof theirbudget,while thegovernment’sexpensesforequipmentamounttosixtypercentofitsbudget.

DUMU

If themilitarysituationisnotresolvedandthearmyisnotdemobilized, leviesbecomeincreasinglyoppressive, resulting inexhaustionof theresourcesof thepeople,sothattheylosemostofwhattheyproduce.

HOYANXI

Thepeopleare thebasisofacountry, food is theheavenof thepeople.Thosewhoruleoverothersshouldrespectthisandbesparing.

MEIYAOCHEN

Thecommonpeopleprovidegoods,food,andlaborfortheuseofthemilitary,thus losing most of their own sustenance, while the government providesequipment for theuseof themilitary, thus losingmore thanhalfof itsbudget.Therefore taxes are used up, the army is worn out, and the populace isexhausted. When levies are oppressive and the people are impoverished, thecountryisdrained.

MasterSunThereforeawisegeneralstrivestofeedofftheenemy.Eachpoundoffoodtakenfromtheenemyisequivalenttotwentypoundsyouprovidebyyourself.

CAOCAO

Transportation of provisions itself consumes twenty times the amounttransported.

ZHANGYU

It takes twenty pounds of provisions to deliver one pound of provisions to adistantarmy.Iftheterrainisrugged,ittakesevenmorethanthat.Thatiswhyanablegeneralwillalwaysfeedofftheenemy.

MasterSun

Sowhatkillstheenemyisanger,whatgetstheenemy’sgoodsisreward.

ZHANGYU

Ifyoustirupyourofficersandtroopssothattheyareallenraged,thentheywillkilltheenemy.Ifyourewardyourmenwithspoils,thatwillmakethemfightontheirowninitiative,sotheenemy’sgoodscanbetaken.Thatiswhyitissaidthatwheretherearebigrewardstherearevaliantmen.

DUYOU

Ifpeopleknowtheywillberichlyrewardediftheyovercometheopponent,thentheywillgladlygointobattle.

WANGXI

Thisjustmeansestablishingrichrewards—ifyouletthetroopsplunderatwill,theymaygetoutofhand.

MasterSunTherefore,inachariotbattle,rewardthefirsttocaptureatleasttenchariots.

MEIYAOCHEN

Ifyou rewardeveryone, therewillnotbeenough togoaround, soyouofferarewardtooneinordertoencourageeveryone.

MasterSunChangetheircolors,use themmixedinwithyourown.Treat thesoldierswell,takecareofthem.

CAOCAO

You change their colors to make them the same as your own, you use themmixedinwithyourownsoasnottoleavethemtotheirowndevices.

JIALIN

Youchangetheircolorssothattheywon’tberecognizabletotheenemy.

ZHANGYU

Capturedsoldiersshouldbewelltreated,togetthemtoworkforyou.

MasterSunThisiscalledovercomingtheopponentandincreasingyourstrengthtoboot.

DUMU

By capturing the opponent’s soldiers and using the enemy’s supplies, youincreaseyourownstrength.

MEIYAOCHEN

When you capture soldiers, give them responsibilities according to theirstrengths,takecareofthemkindly,andtheywillworkforyou.

HOYANXI

Ifyouusetheenemytodefeattheenemy,youwillbestrongwhereveryougo.

MasterSunSotheimportantthinginamilitaryoperationisvictory,notpersistence.

CAOCAO

Persistenceisnotprofitable.Anarmyislikefire—ifyoudon’tputitout,itwillburnitselfout.

MENGSHIWhatisbestisaquickvictoryandaspeedyreturn.

MEIYAOCHEN

Inalloftheabove-mentioned,itisimportanttobequick.Ifyouarequick,thenyoucaneconomizeonexpendituresandallowthepeoplerest.

MasterSunHence,weknowthattheleaderofthearmyisinchargeofthelivesofthepeopleandthesafetyofthenation.

CAOCAO

Ifthemilitaryleadershipiswise,thecountryissafe.

MEIYAOCHEN

Thistellsushowseriousthematterofappointingmilitaryleadersis.

WANGXI

The lives of the people and the order of the nation are in the charge of thegenerals. The difficulty of finding good leadership material is a perennialproblem.

[3]

PlanningaSiege

MasterSunThegeneralruleforuseofthemilitaryisthatitisbettertokeepanationintactthantodestroyit.Itisbettertokeepanarmyintactthantodestroyit,bettertokeepadivisionintactthantodestroyit,bettertokeepabattalionintactthantodestroyit,bettertokeepaunitintactthantodestroyit.

CAOCAO

Ifyouraiseanarmyandpenetratedeeplyintoyouropponent’sterritory,keepingonthemove,blockingthespacebetweentheinnerstrongholdandtheoutercitywalls, cutting off communications between inside and outside, then if theopponentsurrenderscompletely,thatisbest.Ifyouattackdestructivelyandtakeanationbyforce,thatisalesseraccomplishment.

JIALIN

Ifyoucankeeptheopponent’snationintact,thenyourownnationwillalsobeintact.Sothisisbest.

LIQUAN

Thismeansthatkillingisnottheimportantthing.

DUYOU

Itisbestifanenemynationcomesandsurrendersofitsownaccord.Toattackanddefeatitisinferiortothis.

HOYANXI

Thebestpolicyistousestrategy,influence,andthetrendofeventstocausetheadversarytosubmitwillingly.

ZHANGYU

ZhangYuquotedastatementbyWeiLiaozi:“Practicingmartialarts,assessyouropponents;cause them to losespirit anddirectionso thateven if theopposingarmy is intact it is useless—this is winning by the Tao. If you destroy theopposingarmyandkill thegenerals,mount the rampartsbyshooting,gatheramobandusurptheland,thisiswinningbyforce.”ZhangYuthenexplained,“SowinningbytheTaoandwinningbyforcemean

thesameaskeepinganationintactanddestroyinganation.Treatingthepeoplemercifullywhilepunishingcriminals,gainingcompletevictorywiththecountryintact,isbest.”

WANGXI

Nation, army, division, battalion, unit—great or small, keep it intact and yourdignitywillbeimprovedthereby;destroyit,andyourdignitywillsuffer.

MasterSunTherefore thosewhowineverybattlearenot really skillful—thosewho renderothers’armieshelplesswithoutfightingarethebestofall.

CAOCAO

Thebestvictoryiswhentheopponentsurrendersofitsownaccordbeforethereareanyactualhostilities.

LIQUAN

Overcomeyouropponentbycalculation.

CHENHAO

Whenyoudobattle, it is necessary tokill people, so it is best towinwithoutfighting.

JIALIN

Best of all is when your troops are held in such awe that everyone comes tosurrender.Thisispreferabletowinningbytrickery,violence,andslaughter.

MEIYAOCHEN

Thisisamatterofdislikingtoinflictinjury.

ZHANGYU

Ifyoucanonlyprevailafterdoingbattle,therewillsurelybemanycasualties,sothisisnotgood.Ifyoumakeitclearwhatistoberewardedandwhatpunished,make your directives reliable, keep your machines in good repair, train andexercise your officers and troops, and let their strengths be known so as toovercometheopponentpsychologically,thisisconsideredverygood.

WANGXI

In military operations, what is valued is foiling the opponent’s strategy, notpitchedbattle.

HOYANXI

HoYanxirelatedthisstory:WhenWangPoofthelatterHandynastystruckChuChienandSuMo,hereturnedtocampafterbattle.Hisenemiesregroupedandtriedtoprovokeanotherskirmish,butWangPorefusedtocomeout.As Wang Po was having a dinner party with his officers, Su Mo’s men

showeredthecampwitharainofarrows.OneofthemevenstruckthewinekeginfrontofWangPo.WangPo,however,sattherecalmly,notstirringabit.At that point an officer remarked that SuMowas already at the end of his

rope and would be easy to strike. Wang Po refused, saying, “Su Mo’smercenariesarefromfaraway,andtheyareshortonsupplies—thatiswhytheyare trying topickawinner-take-all fight. If I closeoffmycampandkeepmysoldiersin,thisiswhatiscalled‘bestofall.’”

MasterSunThereforethesuperiormilitariststrikeswhileschemesarebeinglaid.

CAOCAO

Whentheopponentisjustbeginningtoplanitsstrategy,itiseasytostrike.

DUYOU

Justwhentheopponentissettingupaplantomobilizeitsforces,ifyourarmystrikes and suppresses them, that is best. Therefore one of the great warrior-emperorssaid,“Thosewhoaregoodatgettingridoftroublearethosewhotakecareofitbeforeitarises;thosewhoaregoodatovercomingopponentsarethosewhowinbeforethereisform.”

MEIYAOCHEN

Thismeanswinningbyintelligence.

WANGXI

Itisbesttothwartpeoplebyintelligentplanning.

HOYANXI

Whentheenemybeginstoplotanattackagainstyou,youfirstattackthem—thisis easy. Figure out the direction of the enemy’s plans and deploy your forcesaccordingly,attackingattheoutsetoftheirintentions.

ZHANGYU

ZhangYunoted that somesay thatwhatMasterSunwassayingherewas thatthe best military operation is to attack strategically, meaning to use unusualtacticsandsecretcalculationstoseizevictorywithoutevenbattling.

MasterSunThenextbestistoattackalliances.

LIQUAN

Thismeansattackingwhenalliancearefirstestablished.

CHENHAO

Some say this means that when the enemy has already mobilized and isnegotiating,strikeandovercomethem—thisisnextbest.

MENGSHIIfyoucarryonallianceswithstrongcountries,yourenemieswon’tdaretoplotagainstyou.

MEIYAOCHEN

Thismeanswinningbyintimidation.

WANGXI

Itmeansifyoucannotcompletelythwarttheschemesoftheenemy,youshouldthenworkonhisalliances,totrytomakethemfallapart.

HOYANXI

WhatMasterSunsaidwastoattackwhenyoucomeincontactwiththeenemy,meaningthatwhenyourforcesareabouttoclash,yousetupadummyforcetoscare them andmake them unable either to advance or retreat, and then takeadvantageofthatopportunitytocomeupandconquerthem.Sincetheneighborshavealsobeenhelpedbythisactionofyours,theenemycannotbutbeisolatedandweak.

MasterSunThenextbestistoattackthearmy.

CAOCAO

Thismeanswhenthearmyisalreadyformed.

JIALIN

To be good at successful attack, deploying your forceswithout a hitch, is yetanother notch down.Therefore a greatwarrior-emperor said, “Onewho fightsforvictoryinfrontofbaredbladesisnotagoodgeneral.”

MEIYAOCHEN

Thismeanswinningbyfighting.

MasterSunThelowestistoattackacity.Siegeofacityisonlydoneasalastresort.

CAOCAO

When the enemy has called in its resources and is defending a city, to attacktheminthisconditionisthelowestformofmilitaryoperation.

LIQUAN

When you garrison an army in a walled city, the officers get stale and thesoldiersgetlazy.

DUYOU

Thismeansthatwhenyouattackcitiesandbutchertowns,thisisthelowestformofattack,becausetherearemanycasualties.

WANGXI

Soldiersarekilledandmaimedwithoutnecessarilytakingoverthecity.

ZHANGYU

Thesiegeofcitiesandbutcheringof townsnotonlyagesthearmyandwastesresources,italsohasalotofcasualties,soitisthelowestformofattack.Whenyoubesiegeacity,thenyourpowerwillbeusedupinthat,soyoudoitonlyifitisabsolutelynecessary,asalastresort.

MasterSunTakethreemonthstoprepareyourmachinesandthreemonthstocompleteyoursiegeengineering.

DUMU

He means that it is necessary to take time to really prepare machines andconstructions thoroughly, lest many people be injured. As one of the ancientstrategists said, “Those who cannot deploy their machines effectively are introuble.”

MEIYAOCHEN

If neither intimidation nor intelligence are sufficient to overcome people, andyou have no choice but to attack them where they live, then you must take

adequatetimetoprepare.

ZHANGYU

SomesaythatMasterSun’spointhereisthatyoushouldn’tgetangryandrushtoattack. This is why he says to take time, not because there is necessarily aspecifictime.

MasterSunIf the general cannot overcome his anger and has his army swarm over thecitadel,killingathirdofhissoldiers,andyetthecitadelisstillnottaken,thisisadisastrousattack.

CAOCAO

If thegeneral issoenraged thathecannotwait for thesiegemachines,andhesendshissoldiersoverthewallslikeaswarmofants,thisiskillingandmaimingthesoldiers.

JIALIN

Just ingratiate yourself with the people while causing inward rifts among themilitary,andthecitywillconqueritself.

MasterSunTherefore one who is good at martial arts overcomes others’ forces withoutbattle, conquers others’ cities without siege, destroys others’ nations withouttakingalongtime.

LIQUAN

Use tactics to overcome opponents by dispiriting them rather than by battlingwith them; take their citiesby strategy.Destroy their countries artfully,donot

dieinprotractedwarfare.

MEIYAOCHEN

Battlemeanshurtingpeople,siegemeansdestroyingthings.

HOYANXI

Thismeans attacking at the planning and attacking the alliances, so as not tocometothepointofactuallydoingbattle.Thisiswhyclassicalmartialartssaythatthebestofstrategistsdoesnotfight.Onewhoisgoodatlayingsiegedoesnot lay siegewith an army, but uses strategy to thwart theopponents, causingthem toovercome themselves anddestroy themselves, rather than taking thembyalongandtroublesomecampaign.

ZHANGYU

Askillfulmartialistruinsplans,spoilsrelations,cutsoffsupplies,orblockstheway,andhencecanovercomepeoplewithoutfighting.Onewaythatacitycanbetakenistoattackaplacetheywillbesuretowanttosave,soastodrawtheenemyoutofthecitystrongholdtocometotherescue,andthentakethecitybysneakattack.

DUMU

Whentheenemyisinaconditionthatyoucantakeadvantageof,ifyoudonotlosetheopportunitytocrushthemasif theyweredryrot, thenitwillnot takelong.

MasterSunIt is imperative to contest all factions for complete victory, so thearmy is notgarrisonedandtheprofitcanbetotal.Thisisthelawofstrategicsiege.

CAOCAO

You do not fight with your enemy, but you do win completely, establishingvictoryeverywhere,notgarrisoningarmiesandbloodyingblades.

MEIYAOCHEN

Completevictoryiswhenthearmydoesnotfight, thecityisnotbesieged, thedestruction does not go on long, but in each case the enemy is overcome bystrategy.Thisiscalledstrategicsiege.Inthiswayyoudonotdullyourarmy,andyourprofitisnaturallycomplete.

ZHANGYU

Ifyoudonotfight,yoursoldierswillnotbewounded,ifyoudonotlaysiege,yourstrengthwillnotbeexhausted,ifyoudonotcontinuelong,yourresourceswill not be used up. This is how you establish yourself completely victoriousovertheworld.Therebytherearenoneoftheillsassociatedwithgarrisonsandviolence,andthereare thebenefitsofaprosperouscountryandastrongarmy.Thisisthegoodgeneral’sartofstrategicsiege.

MasterSunSotherule foruseof themilitary is that ifyououtnumber theopponent ten toone,thensurroundthem;fivetoone,attack;twotoone,divide.

CAOCAO

Whenyououtnumbertheenemytentoone,thensurroundthem—thatis,ifthegenerals are equal in intelligence and bravery, and the soldiers are equal incompetence.When you outnumber the enemy five to one, use three fifths ofyour forces for direct attacks, the other two fifths for surprise attacks. If yououtnumbertheenemytwotoone,thendivideyourforcesintotwoparts,onefordirectassaultandoneforsurpriseattacks.

DUMU

Ittakestentimesasmanysoldierstosurroundanopponent,becauseyouhaveto

setyourencirclementupatsomedistancefromtheenemy,sotheareayouarecoveringislarge,andyouhavetobeonstrictguard,thusifyoudonothavealotofsoldierstherewillbegapsandleaks.Now if there is division among the ranks of the enemy, so that there is no

coherentchainofcommand,thentheywillfallapartbythemselves,evenifyoudo not surround them. If you do surround them under such circumstances,needless to say theywill be annihilated.WhenMaster Sun says you need tentimestheirnumbertosurroundtheenemy,thisiswhenyourleadersareequalinintelligence and courage and your soldiers are equal in competence, notwhenthereisdissensionintheenemy’sownranks.

HOYANXI

Whenyoucalculateandcomparethestrengthofyourforcesandthoseofyouropponent,takeintoaccountthetalent,intelligence,andcourageofthegenerals—ifyouare ten timesstronger than theenemy, this is ten toone,andyoucansurroundthem,foilinganyattemptstogetaway.

DUMU

Ifyouarefivetooneagainstyouropponent,thenyoushouldtakethreefifthsofyour forces, divide them into three units to attack the enemy from one side,keeping back two fifths, watching for points of unpreparedness on theopponent’spart,andtakingadvantageofthembysurpriseattacks.

CHENHAO

Whenyourforcesaresaidtobefivetimesthoseof theenemy,this justmeansyouhaveextrapower.Their forcesaredeployedhereand there, sohowcouldyouattack thembyonly three routes?Thespecificnumbershereonly refer toattackingacitadel.

DUMU

Ifyouaretwotooneagainstyouropponent,youshouldtakepartofyourforcesandhavethemheadfortheopponent’scriticalpoints,orattacksomepointthat

theopponentwillsurelygotodefend,sothattheopponentwillsplitofftogotothe rescue, and you can use the other part of your forces to strike them. Theprinciplesofwar arenot amatterofnumbers—ineveryengagement there areboth surprise and frontal attacks, and you do notwait until you have a lot ofsoldierstosetupreservesforsurpriseattacks.

DUYOU

Whenyououtnumbertheopponenttwotoone,thenonepartofyourattackforcemakesadirectassault,onepartmakessurpriseattacks.Astheyareinsufficientto adapt, this confuses the opponent’s soldiers and separates them from theirarmy. So a great warrior-emperor said, “If you cannot divide and move, youcannottalkaboutsurprisemaneuvers.”

MasterSunIfyouareequal, then fight ifyouareable. Ifyouare fewer, thenkeepaway ifyouareable.Ifyouarenotasgood,thenfleeifyouareable.

CAOCAO

Ifyourforcesareequaltothoseoftheenemy,evenifyouaregoodyoushouldstill set up ambushes and surprise attacks to prevail over them.Otherwise, bedefensiveanddonotengageinbattle,orifout-matched,takeyoursoldiersandrunaway.

WANGXI

Tobeablemeanstobeabletomotivateotherstofighttothedeath.Ifyouseizevictorybyraidsandambushes,thisiscalledsuperiorityinintelligence.Itisnotamatterofclashofarmies.

LIQUAN

Ifyoucalculateyourpowertobelessthanthatoftheopponent,thenstrengthenyourdefense,donotgooutandgetyouredgesnapped.Waituntilthemoodof

theenemygetssluggish,andthengooutandattackbysurprise.

DUMU

Ifyourforcesarenotequaltothoseoftheenemy,avoidtheiredgeforthetimebeing,waitingforagap;thenmakeadeterminedbidforvictory.Tobeablealsomeans to be able to endure anger and humiliation, not going out tomeet theopponent’schallenges.

CHENHAO

Thatisnotso.Itjustmeansthatiftheenemy’ssoldiersaremorethanyours,thenyoushouldrunawayfromthem,therebymakingthemhaughtyandusingthisinyourfutureplans.Itdoesnotmeanenduringangerandhumiliation.

JIALIN

If theyaremorenumerous thanyou,retreatandhideyour troopformationssothattheenemydoesnotknow,thensetoutambusherstolieinwaitforthem,setuprusestoconfusethem.This,too,isawayofvictory.

ZHANGYU

Theadvicetokeepawayandnotdobattleiftheopponentismorenumerousalsoappliestothecasewhereallelseisequal,thequalityoftheleadershipandofthetroops.Ifyourforcesareorderlywhiletheirsarechaotic,ifyouareexcitedandtheyaresluggish,theneveniftheyaremorenumerousyoucandobattle.Ifyoursoldiers,strength, strategy, and courage are all less than that of the opponent,thenyoushouldretreatandwatchforanopening.

MasterSunTherefore if the smaller side is stubborn, it becomes the captive of the largerside.

LIQUAN

Ifthesmallersidebattlesstubbornlywithouttakingitsstrengthintoaccount,itwillsurelybecapturedbythelargerside.

MENGSHIThesmallcannotstanduptothelarge—thismeansthatifasmallcountrydoesnotassessitspoweranddarestobecometheenemyofalargecountry,nomatterhowfirmitsdefensesbe,itwillinevitablybecomeacaptivenation.TheSpringandAutumnAnnalssay,“Ifyoucannotbestrong,andyetcannotbeweak,thiswillresultinyourdefeat.”

HOYANXI

HoYanxi told the story ofRightGeneral Su Jian of theHan dynasty, a vice-general in thewarswith theinvadingHunsofancient times.RightGeneralSuand Forward General Zhao of the Forward Army were leading a division ofseveralthousandtroopswhenheencounteredaHunnishforcetentimesaslarge.They fought all day, until the Chinese army was decimated. Now Forward

General Zhao, a foreigner who had earlier surrendered to the Chinese inexchangeforrankandtitle,wasinvitedbytheHunstojointhem,sohetooktherest of hismounted troops, about eight hundred or so, and surrendered to theShanyu, the Hunnish chieftain. Right General Su, now having lost his entirearmy,wasatalosstoknowwheretogo,beingthesolesurvivor.Thegreatgeneralaskedseveralofhistopadviserswhattodoaboutthecase

ofRightGeneralSu.Onesaid,“Wehavenotexecutedasinglevice-generalonthiscampaign.NowthisSuJianhasdesertedhisarmy—weshouldexecutehimtoshowhowseriousweare.”

Butanothersaid,“No,thatisnotright.Theruleofmartialartssaysthatitis

theverystubbornnessofthesmallersidethatmakesitthecaptiveofthelargerside.Now thisSuwasalonewitha few thousand troopswhenhe ran into theShanyuwithafewtensofthousands;hefoughthardforoveraday,notdaringtohaveanyotherthoughtaslongasanyofhissoldierswereleft.Ifweexecutehimnowthathehascomebackbyhimself,thiswouldbeshowingpeoplethereisnosenseinreturning!”

MasterSun

Generals are assistants of the nation. When their assistance is complete, thecountryisstrong.Whentheirassistanceisdefective,thecountryisweak.

CAOCAO

Whenthegeneralsarecompletelythorough,theirplansdonotleakout.Iftheyaredefective,theirformationsarerevealedoutside.

JIALIN

Thestrengthorweaknessofacountrydependson itsgenerals. If thegeneralshelptheleadershipandarethoroughlycapable,thenthecountrywillbestrong.If thegenerals donot help the leadership, andharborduplicity in their hearts,then the country will be weak. Therefore it is imperative to be careful inchoosingpeopleforpositionsofresponsibility.

HOYANXI

Complete means having both ability and intelligence. When a country hasgenerals that are thoroughly able and intelligent, then that country is safe andstrong.Thismeansthatgeneralshavetobecompletelycapableandcompletelyknowledgeable in all operations. Generals in the field must already beacquaintedwithallthesciencesofwarfarebeforetheycancommandtheirownsoldiersandassessbattleformations.

WANGXI

Completemeansthatwhengeneralsaregoodandwise,thentheyarebothloyalandcapable.Tobelackingmeanstobemissingsomething.

ZHANGYU

Whenthestrategyofthegeneralsisthoroughgoing,opponentscannotseeintoit,so thecountry is strong. If there is evena slightgap, thenopponentscan takeaggressiveadvantageofthis,sothecountryisweak.

MasterSunSotherearethreewaysinwhichacivil leadershipcausesthemilitarytrouble.Whenacivilleadershipunawareofthefactstellsitsarmiestoadvancewhenitshouldnot,ortellsitsarmiestoretreatwhenitshouldnot,thisiscalledtyingupthearmies.When thecivil leadership is ignorantofmilitaryaffairsbut sharesequally in the government of the armies, the soldiers get confused.When thecivil leadership is ignorant of military maneuvers but shares equally in thecommandofthearmies,thesoldiershesitate.Oncethearmiesareconfusedandhesitant, troublecomesfromcompetitors.This iscalledtakingawayvictorybyderangingthemilitary.

WANGXI

Togetridoftheseproblems,itisnecessarytodelegateunbridledauthority,soitisimperativethatofficerswhoaretobegeneralsbebothloyalandtalented.

DUMU

Ifthemilitaryweretobegovernedinthesamewayasordinaryciviliansociety,then the soldiers would be confused, because there are already customs ofmilitaryprocedureandcommandineffect.

MEIYAOCHEN

Militaryandcivilaffairsaredifferent,dealingwithdifferentmatters.Ifyoutryto use themethods of civilian government to govern amilitary operation, theoperationwillbecomeconfused.

ZHANGYU

Anationcanbegovernedbyhumanityandjustice,butnotanarmy.Anarmycanbe guided by maneuvering, but not a nation. When there are among civilianofficialsattached tomilitarycommands thosewhodonotknowaboutmilitarystrategy, if they are allowed to share in the responsibilities of the militaryleadership,thenthechainofcommandwillnotbeunified,andthesoldierswill

becomehesitant.

DUMU

Also,ifagenerallackstheplanningabilitytoassesstheofficersandplacetheminpositionswheretheycanusethebestoftheirabilities,insteadassigningthemautomatically and thusnotmaking full useof their talents, then the armywillbecomehesitant.Huang Shigong said, “Those who are good at delegating responsibility

employtheintelligent,thebrave,thegreedy,andthefoolish.Theintelligentaregladtoestablishtheirmerit,thebraveliketoactouttheirambitions,thegreedywelcomeanopportunitytopursueprofit,andthefoolishdonotcareiftheydie.”Ifyourownarmyishesitantandconfused,youbringtroubleonyourself,asif

youweretobringenemiesintoovercomeyou.

MENGSHIWhen the army troops are in doubt about their responsibilities and confusedabout what to do, then competitors will take advantage of this disorganizedconditionandcausetrouble.

MasterSunSotherearefivewaysofknowingwhowillwin.Thosewhoknowwhentofightandwhennottofightarevictorious.Thosewhodiscernwhentousemanyorfewtroopsarevictorious.Thosewhoseupperandlowerrankshavethesamedesirearevictorious.Thosewhofacetheunpreparedwithpreparationarevictorious.Thosewhosegeneralsareableandarenotconstrainedbytheirgovernmentsarevictorious.Thesefivearethewaystoknowwhowillwin.

HOYANXI

Assessyourselvesandyouropponents.

DUYOU

Sometimesalargegroupcannoteffectivelyattackasmallgroup,andthenagainsometimesweaknesscanbeusedtocontrolthestrong.Thosewhocanadapttothe situation are victorious. This is why tradition in the Spring and AutumnAnnalssays,“Militaryconquestisamatterofcoordination,notofmasses.”

ZHANGYU

Among themethods of deploying troops, there areways bywhich a few canovercomemany,andtherearewaysinwhichmanycanovercomeafew.Itisamatterofassessingtheiruseandnotmisapplyingthem.Also, when the generals are all of one mind, the armies coordinate their

efforts,andeveryonewantstofight,thennoonecanstanduptosuchaforce.Beinvincibleatalltimes,soastobepreparedforopponents.AsWuQisaid,

“Whenyougoout the door, be as if youwere seeing an enemy.”AndShiLisaid,“Beprepared,andyouwillnotbedefeated.”Whengeneralshave intelligenceandcourage, theyshouldbeentrustedwith

theresponsibilitytoaccomplishtheirwork,andnotcontrolledbycivilians.

JIALIN

Themovementsof thearmiesmustadapt to thesituationonthespot—nothingcausesmoretroublethantryingtorunthemfrombehindthelines.

WANGXI

If the civilian leadership tries to control able generals, it will be unable toeliminatehesitationandavoidance.Anenlightenedleadershipisonethatknowsits people and candelegate authority effectively. In the field it is necessary totakeadvantageofopportunitiesastheypresentthemselves,withouthesitation—howcanthisbecontrolledfromfaraway?

HOYANXI

Asarule,inamilitaryoperationyouneedtochangetacticsahundredtimesateverypace,proceedingwhenyouseeyoucan,fallingbackwhenyouknowthereis an impasse. To talk about government orders for all this is like going toannouncetoyoursuperiorsthatyouwanttoputoutafire—bythetimeyouget

backwithanorder,thereisnothingleftbuttheashes.

DUMU

DuMu quotedWei Liaozi, saying, “The general is not controlled by heavenabove, is not controlled by earth below, is not controlled by humanity inbetween.Thisiswhy‘themilitaryisaninstrumentofillomen.’Thegeneralisanofficerofdeath.”

MasterSunSoitissaidthatifyouknowothersandknowyourself,youwillnotbeimperiledinahundredbattles;ifyoudonotknowothersbutknowyourself,youwinoneandloseone; ifyoudonotknowothersanddonotknowyourself,youwillbeimperiledineverysinglebattle.

LIQUAN

Ifyouassessyourstrengthandcanfendoffopponents,whatdangeristhere?Ifbecause of your own strength you fail to measure opponents, then victory isuncertain.

DUMU

Compare your government to that of the enemy; compare your militaryleadership to thatof theenemy;compareyour logistics to thatofyourenemy;compare your ground to that of your enemy. Having established thesecomparisons, you will have a preview of superiorities and inferiorities,weaknesses and strengths; this will enable you to prevail every time insubsequentmilitaryoperations.

ZHANGYU

When you know others, then you are able to attack them. When you knowyourself,youareabletoprotectyourself.Attackisthetimefordefense,defenseisastrategyofattack. Ifyouknowthis,youwillnotbe indangereven ifyoufightahundredbattles.

Whenyouonlyknowyourself,thismeansguardingyourenergyandwaiting.Thisiswhyknowingdefensebutnotoffensemeanshalfvictoryandhalfdefeat.Whenyouknowneithertheartsofdefensenortheartsofattack,youwilllose

inbattle.

[4]

Formation

DUMU

Youseetheinnerconditionsofopponentsbymeansoftheirexternalformations.The inner condition of the formless is inscrutable, whereas that of thosewhohaveadoptedaspecificformisobvious.Theinscrutablewin,theobviouslose.

WANGXI

Thoseskilledinmilitaryoperationsareabletochangetheirformationsinsuchawayastoensurevictorybasedontheactionsofopponents.

ZHANGYU

Thismeans theoffensiveanddefensive formationsusedby twoarmies.Whentheyarehiddenwithin, theycannotbeknown toothers;when theyarevisiblewithout, opponents can come in through the chinks. Formation is revealed byattackanddefense,sodiscussionofformationfollowsthediscussionofplanningasiege.

MasterSunIn ancient times skillful warriors first made themselves invincible, and thenwatchedforvulnerabilityintheiropponents.

ZHANGYU

Makingyourselfinvinciblemeansknowingyourself;waitingforvulnerabilityinopponentsmeansknowingothers.

MEIYAOCHEN

Hideyourform,beorderlywithin,andwatchforgapsandslack.

MasterSunInvincibilityisinoneself,vulnerabilityisintheopponent.

DUMU

Keepingyourownmilitaryinorder,alwaysbeingpreparedforopposition,eraseyourtracksandhideyourform,makingyourselfinscrutabletoopponents.Whenyouseethatanopponentcanbetakenadvantageof,thenyouemergetoattack.

WANGXI

Invincibility is a matter of self-defense; vulnerability is simply a matter ofhavinggaps.

MasterSunTherefore skillful warriors are able to be invincible, but they cannot causeopponentstobevulnerable.

DUMU

Ifopponentshavenoformationtofindout,nogaporslacktotakeadvantageof,howcanyouovercomethemevenifyouarewellequipped?

ZHANGYU

Ifyouhideyourform,concealyourtracks,andalwaysremainstrictlyprepared,thenyoucanbeinvulnerableyourself.Iftheformsofstrengthandweaknessofopponentsarenotoutwardlymanifest, thenhowcanyoubeassuredofvictoryoverthem?

MasterSunThatiswhyitissaidthatvictorycanbediscernedbutnotmanufactured.

CAOCAO

Victory canbediscerned to the extent thatyou see a set formation;but to theextentthattheenemyhaspreparations,itcannotbemanufactured.

DUMU

Youcanonlyknowifyourownstrengthissufficienttoovercomeanopponent;youcannotforcetheopponenttoslackofftoyouradvantage.

DUYOU

Whenyouhaveassessedtheopponentandseentheopponent’sformation,thenyoucantellwhowillwin.Iftheopponentisinscrutableandformless,thenyoucannotpresumevictory.

HOYANXI

Thevictorythatcanbeknownisuptoyou,meaningthatyouareprepared.Thevictory that cannot be manufactured is up to the opponent, meaning that theopponenthasnoform.

MasterSunInvincibilityisamatterofdefense,vulnerabilityisamatterofattack.

CAOCAO

Foraninvincibledefense,concealyourform.Whenopponentsattackyou,thentheyarevulnerable.

DUMU

Aslongasyouhavenotseenvulnerableformationsinopponents,youhideyourown form, preparing yourself in such a way as to be invincible, in order topreserveyourself.Whenopponentshavevulnerableformations,thenitistimetogoouttoattackthem.

ZHANGYU

When you know you do not yet have the means to conquer, you guard yourenergyandwait.Whenyouknowthatanopponentisvulnerable,thenyouattacktheheartandtakeit.

WANGXI

Thoseonthedefensivearesobecausetheydonothaveenoughtowin;thoseontheoffensearesobecausetheyhavemorethanenoughtowin.

MasterSunDefenseisfortimesofinsufficiency,attackisfortimesofsurplus.

LIQUAN

Those whose strength is insufficient should defend, those whose strength issuperabundantcanattack.

ZHANGYU

Whenweareonthedefensive,itisbecausethereissomelackintermsofawaytoseizevictory.Sowewaitforwhatweneed.Whenweareontheoffensive,itisbecausewealreadyhavemore thanenoughofwhat it takes toovercomeanopponent.Sowegoforthandstrike.Thismeansthatwewillnotdobattleunlesswearecertainofcompletevictory,wewillnotfightunlesswearesureitissafe.Some people think insufficiencymeansweakness and surplusmeans strength,butthisimpressioniswrong.

MasterSunThoseskilledindefensehideinthedeepestdepthsoftheearth,thoseskilledinattackmaneuver in thehighest heightsof the sky.Therefore they canpreservethemselvesandachievecompletevictory.

CAOCAO

Theyhide in thedepthsof theearthby takingadvantageof thefastnessof themountains,rivers,andhills.Theymaneuverintheheightsoftheskybytakingadvantageofthetimesofnature.

DUMU

Indefense,youhushyourvoicesandobliterateyourtracks,hiddenasghostsandspiritsbeneath theearth, invisible toanyone.On theattack,yourmovement isswift andyour cry shattering, fast as thunder and lightning, as though comingfromthesky,impossibletopreparefor.

WANGXI

Defenseheremeanslyinglowwhenyoudonotseeanyeffectivewaytoattack,sinking into stillnessand recondite silence,not lettingopponents findyouout.Attackisforwhenyouseeanadvantagetoaimfor.Ontheattackyoushouldbeextremelyswift,takingadvantageofunexpectedness,waryoflettingopponentsfindyououtandprepareagainstyou.

MasterSunToperceivevictorywhenit isknowntoall isnotreallyskillful.Everyonecallsvictoryinbattlegood,butitisnotreallygood.

ZHANGYU

Whateveryoneknowsiswhathasalreadyhappenedorbecomeobvious.Whatthe aware individual knows iswhat has not yet taken shape,what has not yetoccurred.Everyonesaysvictoryinbattleisgood,butifyouseethesubtleand

notice the hidden so as to seize victorywhere there is no form, this is reallygood.

WANGXI

Ordinarypeopleseethemeansofvictorybutdonotknowtheformsbywhichtoensurevictory.

LIQUAN

Everyone can easily see armed conflict—this takes no skill. Knowledge thatdoesnotgobeyondwhatthegeneralityknowsisnotreallygood.

JIALIN

Firm indefense,victorious inoffense,able tokeepwholewithoutever losing,seeingvictorybefore ithappens,accuratelyrecognizingdefeatbefore itoccurs—thisiscalledtrulysubtlepenetrationofmysteries.

MasterSunItdoesnottakemuchstrengthtoliftahair,itdoesnottakesharpeyestoseethesunandmoon,itdoesnottakesharpearstohearathunderclap.

WANGXI

Whateveryoneknowsisnotcalledwisdom,victoryoverothersbyforcedbattleisnotconsideredgood.

LIQUAN

Amilitaryleaderofwisdomandabilitylaysdeepplansforwhatotherpeopledonotfigureon.ThisiswhySunTzuspeaksofbeingunknowableasthedark.

MasterSun

In ancient times those knownas goodwarriors prevailedwhen itwas easy toprevail.

CAOCAO

Findout the subtle points overwhich it is easy to prevail, attackwhat canbeovercome,donotattackwhatcannotbeovercome.

DUMU

Whenthestrategyofopponentsfirstmakesanappearance,youoperatesecretlyinsuchawayastobeabletoattackit.Sincetheeffortusedislittle,andyourassuranceofvictoryisdoneinasubtleway,itissaidtobeeasytoprevail.

ZHANGYU

If you are only able to ensure victory after engaging an opponent in armedconflict, thatvictory isahardone.Ifyousee thesubtleandnotice thehidden,breakingthroughbeforeformation,thatvictoryisaneasyone.

MasterSunThereforethevictoriesofgoodwarriorsarenotnotedforclevernessorbravery.Therefore their victories in battle are not flukes. Their victories are not flukesbecause they position themselves where they will surely win, prevailing overthosewhohavealreadylost.

MEIYAOCHEN

Greatwisdom is not obvious, greatmerit is not advertised.Whenyou see thesubtle,itiseasytowin—whathasittodowithbraveryorcleverness?

HOYANXI

When trouble is solved before it forms, who calls that clever?When there is

victorywithoutbattle,whotalksaboutbravery?

ZHANGYU

Secret plotting and covert operations seize victory in formlessness—no onehearsoftheknowledgethatassessesopponentsandensuresvictory,nooneseesthesuccessofthosewhotaketheflagandassassinatethegenerals.Thewaytobe able to win without fail is to see when opponents are in vulnerableformations,andthendispositionyourforcestoprevailoverthem.

LIQUAN

Whenthearmyisold,thesoldiersarelazy,andthedisciplineandcommandarenotunified,thisisanopponentthathasalreadylost.

MasterSunSo it is thatgoodwarriors take their standongroundwhere theycannot lose,anddonotoverlookconditionsthatmakeanopponentpronetodefeat.

LIQUAN

Thearmythatfindsitsgroundflourishes,thearmythatlosesitsgroundperishes.Herethegroundmeansaplaceofstrategicimportance.

DUMU

Ground where one cannot lose means invincible strategy that makes itimpossible for opponents to defeat you.Not overlooking conditions thatmakeopponents prone to defeat means spying out the enemies’ vulnerabilities, notmissinganyofthem.

MasterSunTherefore a victorious army first wins and then seeks battle; a defeated armyfirstbattlesandthenseeksvictory.

CAOCAO

Thisisthedifferencebetweenthosewithstrategyandthosewithoutforethought.

HOYANXI

In amilitary operation, first determine awinning strategy, and only then sendforth the troops. Ifyoudonotplan first,hoping to relyonyourstrength,yourvictoryisuncertain.

JIALIN

Ifyousetforthyourbattlelinesandlightlyadvancewithoutknowingyourownconditionor thatofyouropponent,youmaybeseekingvictory,but in theendyoudefeatyourself.

MasterSunThosewhousearmswell cultivate theWayandkeep the rules.Thus they cangoverninsuchawayastoprevailoverthecorrupt.

CAOCAO

Skilled users of arms first cultivate theWay thatmakes them invincible, keeptheirrules,anddonotmissdefeatistconfusioninopponents.

LIQUAN

Usingharmonytohuntdownopposition,notattackingablamelesscountry,nottaking captives or booty wherever the army goes, not razing the trees orpollutingthewells,washingoffandpurifyingtheshrinesofthetownsandhillsin thecountrysideyoupass through,not repeating themistakesofamoribundnation—all this is called the Way and its rules. When the army is strictlydisciplined, to thepointwhere soldierswoulddie rather thandisobey, rewardsandpunishmentsthataretrustworthyandjustareestablished—whenthemilitaryleadership is such that it can achieve this, it can prevail over an opponent’s

corruptcivilgovernment.

MasterSunThe rules of the military are five: measurement, assessment, calculation,comparison,andvictory.Thegroundgivesrisetomeasurements,measurementsgiverisetoassessments,assessmentsgiverisetocalculations,calculationsgiverisetocomparisons,comparisonsgiverisetovictories.

CAOCAO

Bythecomparisonsofmeasurementsyouknowwherevictoryanddefeatlie.

WANGXI

Theheavyprevailoverthelight.

MasterSunTherefore a victorious army is like a pound compared to a gram, a defeatedarmyislikeagramcomparedtoapound.Whenthevictoriousgettheirpeopletogotobattleasiftheyweredirectinga

massivefloodofwaterintoadeepcanyon,thisisamatterofformation.

DUMU

Whenwateraccumulatesinadeepcanyon,noonecanmeasureitsamount,justasourdefenseshowsnoform.When thewater is released it rushesdowninatorrent,justasourattackisirresistible.

[5]

Force

WANGXI

Forcemeans shifts in accumulated energyormomentum.Skillfulwarriors areabletoallowtheforceofmomentumtoseizevictoryforthemwithoutexertingtheirstrength.

MasterSunGoverninga largenumberas thoughgoverningasmallnumber isamatterofdivisionintogroups.Battlingalargenumberasthoughbattlingasmallnumberisamatterofformsandcalls.

CAOCAO

Formsandcalls refer to the formationsandsignalsused todispose troopsandcoordinatemovements.

MasterSunMakingthearmiesabletotakeonopponentswithoutbeingdefeatedisamatterofunorthodoxandorthodoxmethods.

JIALIN

Whenyoumeetopponentsheadon,withcoordinatedsurpriseattacksallaround,youcanalwayswinandneverlose.

HOYANXI

Amilitary body goes throughmyriad transformations, in which everything isblended. Nothing is not orthodox, nothing is not unorthodox. If themilitia israised for a just cause, that is orthodox. If it adapts to change in face of anenemy,thatisunorthodox.Whatisorthodoxforyou,causeopponentstoseeasunorthodox;what is unorthodox for you, cause opponents to see as orthodox.Theorthodoxisalsounorthodox,andtheunorthodoxisalsoorthodox.Generallyinmilitaryoperations there is always theorthodox and theunorthodox, or thestraightforward and the surprise—victory without use of both orthodox andunorthodoxmethodsisaluckywininwhatamountstoabrawl.

ZHANGYU

Various people have different explanations of what is orthodox and what isunorthodox. Orthodoxy and unorthodoxy are not fixed, but are like a cycle.EmperorTaizongoftheTangdynasty,afamouswarriorandadministrator,spokeof manipulating opponents’ perceptions of what is orthodox and what isunorthodox, then attacking unexpectedly, combining both into one, becominginscrutabletoopponents.

MasterSunFortheimpactofarmedforcestobelikestonesthrownoneggsisamatterofemptinessandfullness.

CAOCAO

Attackcompleteemptinesswithcompletefullness.

ZHANGYU

Alaterchaptersaysthatgoodwarriorsmakeotherscometothem,anddonotgotoothers.Thisistheprincipleofemptinessandfullnessofothersandself.Whenyouinduceopponentstocometoyou,thentheirforceisalwaysempty;aslongasyoudonotgo to them,your force is always full.Attackingemptinesswithfullnessislikethrowingstonesoneggs—theeggsaresuretobreak.

MasterSunInbattle,confrontationisdonedirectly,victoryisgainedbysurprise.

CAOCAO

Direct confrontation is facing opponents head on, surprise forces attackunexpectedlyfromthesides.

MasterSunTherefore those skilled at the unorthodox are infinite as heaven and earth,inexhaustibleas thegreatrivers.Whentheycometoanend, theybeginagain,likethedaysandmonths;theydieandarereborn,likethefourseasons.

LIQUAN

Heaven and earth mean movement and stillness. Rivers represent a ceaselessflux. The changes of unorthodox surprise movements are like the ceaselesschangesoftheweathercycle.

ZHANGYU

Sunandmoontravelthroughthesky,theysetandriseagain.Thefourseasonssucceedoneanother, flourishingand then fadingagain.This isametaphor forthe interchange of surprise unorthodox movements and orthodox directconfrontation,mixingtogetherintoawhole,endingandbeginninginfinitely.

MasterSunThereareonlyfivenotesinthemusicalscale,buttheirvariationsaresomanythat they cannot all be heard. There are only five basic colors, but theirvariationsare somany that they cannot all be seen.Thereareonly five basicflavors,buttheirvariationsaresomanythattheycannotallbetasted.Thereareonly two kinds of charge in battle, the unorthodox surprise attack and theorthodoxdirect attack, but variations of the unorthodox and the orthodox areendless. The unorthodox and the orthodox give rise to each other, like a

beginninglesscircle—whocouldexhaustthem?

MEIYAOCHEN

Thecomprehensivenessofadaptivemovementislimitless.

WANGXI

Opponentscannotexhaustyou.

MasterSunWhenthespeedofrushingwaterreachesthepointwhereitcanmoveboulders,thisistheforceofmomentum.Whenthespeedofahawkissuchthatitcanstrikeandkill,thisisprecision.Soitiswithskillfulwarriors—theirforceisswift,theirprecision isclose.Their force is likedrawingacatapult, theirprecision is likereleasingthetrigger.

DUMU

Their force isswift in thesense that the forceof themomentumofbattlekillswhenitisreleased—thatiswhyitislikenedtoadrawncatapult.

MasterSunDisorder arises from order, cowardice arises from courage, weakness arisesfromstrength.

LIQUAN

If you presume on the orderliness of government and fail to provide for thecomfort of thegoverned, thus creatingmuch resentment, disorder is certain toarise.

JIALIN

If you presume an order, disorder will arise. If you presume on courage andstrength,timidityandweaknesswillarise.

DUMU

Whatthismeansisthatifyouwanttofeigndisordersoastoleadopponentson,first you must have complete order, for only then can you create artificialdisorder.Ifyouwanttofeigncowardicetospyonopponents,firstyoumustbeextremelybrave,foronlythencanyouactartificiallytimid.Ifyouwanttofeignweakness to induce haughtiness in opponents, first you must be extremelystrong,foronlythencanyoupretendtobeweak.

MasterSunOrderanddisorderareamatteroforganization,courageandcowardiceareamatterofmomentum,strengthandweaknessareamatterofformation.

WANGXI

Orderanddisorderarechangesinorganization.Organizationmeansmethodicalregulation.Courageandcowardicearechangesinmomentumorforce.Strengthandweaknessarechangesinformation.

LIQUAN

Whenanarmyhastheforceofmomentum,eventhetimidbecomebrave;whenitlosestheforceofmomentum,eventhebravebecometimid.Nothingisfixedinthelawsofwarfare—theydevelopbasedonmomenta.

CHENHAO

Thebraveactquickly,whilethetimiddragtheirfeet.Whenopponentsseeyouarenotmovingahead,theywillassumeyouaretimid,andwilltakeyoulightly.Youthentakeadvantageoftheirlaxitytousetheforceofmomentumtoattackthem.

MasterSunThereforethosewhoskillfullymoveopponentsmakeformationsthatopponentsaresure to follow,givewhatopponentsaresure to take.Theymoveopponentswiththeprospectofgain,waitingfortheminambush.

CAOCAO

Formations that opponents are sure to follow are formations that give theimpression of exhaustion. Opponents are moved by the prospect of anadvantage.

DUMU

Itdoesnotonlymeangivingtheimpressionofexhaustionandweakness.Whenyou are stronger than your opponent, then you appearworn out to induce theopponent tocome toyou.Whenyouareweaker thanyouropponent, thenyouappear strong to impel the opponent to go away. Thus the movements ofopponents all follow your direction. When you move opponents with theprospectofanadvantage,sinceopponentsarefollowingyou,youwaitfortheminambushwithwell-preparedforces.

WANGXI

Whetheryougetopponentstofollowyou,orgetthemtotakesomething,besureyouhavecracktroopsreadyforthemfirst.

MasterSunThereforegoodwarriorsseekeffectivenessinbattlefromtheforceofmomentum,notfromindividualpeople.Thereforetheyareabletochoosepeopleandlettheforceofmomentumdoitswork.

LIQUAN

When you have the force of momentum in war, even the timid can becourageous. So it is impossible to choose them for their capabilities and givethemtheappropriateresponsibilities.Thebravecanfight,thecarefulcanguard,theintelligentcancommunicate.Nooneisuseless.

MEIYAOCHEN

Itiseasytogetpeopletoactbymeansoftheforceofmomentum,whereasitishard todemandpower in individualpeople.Theablehave tochoose the rightpeopleandalsolettheforceofmomentumdoitswork.

ZHANGYU

The rule for delegation of responsibility is to use greed, use folly, useintelligence, and use bravery, allowing for the natural force of each one, notblaming people for what they are incapable of, but choosing appropriateresponsibilitiesforthemaccordingtotheirrespectivecapacities.

MasterSunGettingpeopletofightbylettingtheforceofmomentumworkislikerollinglogsandrocks.Logsandrocksarestillwheninasecureplace,butrollonanincline;theyremainstationaryifsquare, theyroll ifround.Therefore,whenpeopleareskillfullyledintobattle,themomentumislikethatofroundrocksrollingdownahighmountain—thisisforce.

DUMU

Roll rocks down a ten-thousand-footmountain, and they cannot be stopped—this is because of the mountain, not the rocks. Get people to fight with thecouragetowineverytime,andthestrongandtheweakunite—thisisbecauseofthemomentum,nottheindividuals.

[6]

EmptinessandFullness

DUMU

Militarists avoid the full and strike the empty, so they first have to recognizeemptinessandfullnessinothersandthemselves.

MasterSunThosewhoarefirstonthebattlefieldandawaittheopponentsareatease;thosewhoarelastonthebattlefieldandheadintobattlegetwornout.

JIALIN

Those who first position themselves in an advantageous place and awaitopponentsthereareprepared,sothetroopsarerelaxed.If theopponentsareinan advantageous position, then you should not go to them, butwithdrawyourtroops to another base,making it appear that youwill not oppose their army.Opponentswill then think thatyouhavenostrategy,andwillcomeandattackyou.Thenyoucanturnthingsaroundandmakeopponentstiredwithoutwearingyourselfout.

MasterSunThereforegoodwarriorscauseotherstocometothem,anddonotgotoothers.

DUMU

Causingopponentstocometoyou,youshouldconserveyourstrengthandwaitforthem,notgoingtoopponentsforfearofwearingyourselfout.

ZHANGYU

Ifyoumakeopponentscometofight, thentheirforcewillalwaysbeempty.Ifyou do not go to fight, then your forcewill always be full. This is the art ofemptyingothersandfillingyourself.

MasterSunWhat causes opponents to come of their own accord is the prospect of gain.Whatdiscouragesopponentsfromcomingistheprospectofharm.

HOYANXI

Lurethemwithsomethingtogain,andopponentswillbetiredwhileyouareatease.

ZHANGYU

Theonlyway togetopponents to come toyou is to lure themwithgain.Theonlywaytoensurethatopponentswillnotgettoyouistoharmwhattheycareabout.

CAOCAO

Tobring them toyou, lure themwithgain.Tokeep themfromgetting toyou,attackwheretheywillbesuretogototherescue.

DUYOU

Ifyoucancausethemtorunwhileyouholdanessentialpass,youcanmakeitimpossibleforopponentstogettoyou.Asitissaid,“Onecatatthehole,andtenthousandmicedarenotcomeout;onetigerinthevalley,andtenthousanddeercannotpassthrough.”

MasterSun

Sowhenopponentsareat ease, it ispossible to tire them.When theyarewellfed, it is possible to starve them.When theyareat rest, it is possible tomovethem.

CAOCAO

Youcausethemtroublewithsomeaffair,youcutofftheirsupplyroutestostarvethem, you attack what they like and appear where they will go, thus causingopponentstohavetogototherescue.

LIQUAN

Youattackunexpectedly, causingopponents tobecomeexhausted just runningfor their lives. You burn their supplies and raze their fields, cutting off theirsupplyroutes.Youappearatcriticalplacesandstrikewhentheyleastexpectit,makingthemhavetogototherescue.

DUMU

Theartsofstarvinganopponentdonotstopatcuttingoff supply lines. In thelatesixthcentury,YuwenHuajiledanarmedforcetoattackLiMi.LiMiknewthatHuajiwasshortonsupplies,sohefeignedconciliationinordertowearouthis troops.Huajiwasdelighted,andfedhissoldiersall theywanted,expectingthat LiMiwas going to supply them. Subsequently the food ran out, and thegeneralsfromLiMi’sarmywhohadpretendedtojoinupwithHuajiwentbacktoLiMi’scampwiththeirtroops.ThisfinallyledtoHuaji’sdefeat.

MasterSunAppearwhere they cannot go, head forwhere they least expect you.To travelhundredsofmileswithoutfatigue,gooverlandwheretherearenopeople.

CAOCAO

Makeitimpossiblefortheenemytogettheretotherescue.Appearwherethereisanopeningandstrikeatagap;avoidwheretheyareguarding,hitwherethey

arenotexpectingit.

CHENHAO

Strikingatanopengapdoesnotonlymeanwheretheopponenthasnodefense.Aslongasthedefenseisnotstrict,theplaceisnottightlyguarded,thegeneralsareweakandthetroopsaredisorderly,thesuppliesarescarceandtheforcesareisolated,ifyoufacethemwithanorderlyandpreparedarmy,theywillfallapartinfrontofyou.Thiswayyoudonotneedtolaborandsuffer,foritisasifyouweretravelingoverunpopulatedterritory.

MasterSunTo unfailingly take what you attack, attack where there is no defense. Forunfailinglysecuredefense,defendwherethereisnoattack.

DUMU

Iftheyarealertontheireasternflank,strikeontheirwesternflank.Lurethemonfromthefront,strikethemfrombehind.

LIQUAN

Itiseasytotakeoverfromthosewhohavenotthoughtahead.

CHENHAO

Do not figure on opponents not attacking; worry about your own lack ofpreparation. When you can attack anywhere and defend everywhere, yourmilitarystrategyiscomplete.

WANGXI

Attack their gaps: incompetenceon thepart of themilitary leadership, lackoftrainingamongthetroops,insubstantialityinfortifications, lackofstrictness inpreparations, inability to effect rescues, shortages of food, psychological

disunity.Defendwithfullness:competenceinthemilitaryleaders,excellenceinthe soldiers, solidity in fortifications, strictness in preparation, ability to effectrescues,sufficiencyoffood,psychologicalunity.

ZHANGYU

Thosewhoaregoodontheattackmaneuverintheheightsoftheskies,makingitimpossibleforopponentstoprepareforthem.Ifnoonecanprepareforyou,thenwhereyouattackisunguarded.Thosewhoaregoodonthedefensehideinthedepthsoftheearth,makingit impossibleforopponentstofathomthem.Ifyouareunfathomable,thenwhatyouguardisnotattackedbyopponents.

MasterSunSo in thecaseof thosewhoare skilled inattack, theiropponentsdonotknowwheretodefend.Inthecaseof thoseskilledindefense, theiropponentsdonotknowwheretoattack.

CAOCAO

Thismeanstrueinformationisnotleaked.

JIALIN

When directives are carried out, people are sincerely loyal, preparations fordefense are firmly secured, and yet you are so subtle and secretive that yourevealnoform,opponentsareunsure—theirintelligenceisofnoavail.

MEIYAOCHEN

Those good at attack do not divulge their operational secrets; those good atdefensepreparethoroughly,withoutgaps.

MasterSun

Beextremelysubtle,eventothepointofformlessness.Beextremelymysterious,even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby you can be the director of theopponent’sfate.

DUMU

The subtle is stillness, the mysterious is movement. Stillness is defense,movementisattack.Whetheropponentsliveordiedependsonyou,soyouareasthoughdirectoroftheirfate.

DUYOU

This means being so subtle as to be imperceptible, and to be able to changesuddenlylikeamysteriousspirit.

MEIYAOCHEN

Formlessness means being so subtle and secret that no one can spy on you.Soundlessnessmeansbeingsomysteriouslyswiftthatnoonenoticesyou.

MasterSunToadvance irresistibly, push through their gaps. To retreat elusively, outspeedthem.

HOYANXI

Ifyourforcespushthroughtheopponent’sgapsastheymoveforwardandtakeadvantage of speed when they retreat, then you can overcome the opponentwhiletheopponentcannotovercomeyou.

ZHANGYU

Atastandoff,ifyourushinandstrikewhenyouseeagap,howcantheenemyfendyouoff?Havinggainedtheadvantage,youretreat,hasteningbacktoyourstronghold for self-defense—then how can the enemy pursue you? Military

conditions are based on speed—come like the wind, go like lightning, andopponentswillbeunabletoovercomeyou.

MasterSunThereforewhenyouwanttodobattle,eveniftheopponentisdeeplyentrenchedinadefensiveposition,hewillbeunabletoavoidfightingifyouattackwherehewillsurelygototherescue.

CAOCAOANDLIQUAN

Cut off their supply routes, guard their return routes, and attack their civilianleadership.

DUMU

Ifyouareonyourhome territoryand theopponentsare invaders, thencutofftheirsuppliesandguard their returnroutes. Ifyouareon theopponent’shomeground,thenattackthecivilianleadership.

MasterSunWhen you do notwant to do battle, even if you drawa line on the ground tohold,theopponentcannotfightwithyoubecauseyousethimoffonthewrongtrack.

LIQUAN

Setopponentsoffonthewrongtrackbybafflingthemsothattheycannotfightwithyou.

DUMU

Thismeansthatwhenopponentscometoattackyou,youdonotfightwiththembut rather setupa strategicchange toconfuse themandmake themuncertain,deflectingthemfromtheiroriginalintentiontoattack,makingthemreluctantto

fightwithyou.

ZHANGYU

When you are on your home ground and are well supplied compared to thenumber of soldiers you have,while opponents are on alien territory and havelittlefoodcomparedtotheirnumber,thenitistoyouradvantagenottofight.Ifyouwant to be sure opponentswill not dare come to dobattlewith you eventhoughyouarenotheavilyfortified,letthemseeasetupthatconfusesthemanddeflects their course. For example, when SimaYi was going to attack ZhugeLiang, Zhuge took down his flags and put away his battle drums, opened thegatesandswepttheroad.Yisuspectedanambush,sohewithdrewhisforcesandfled.

MasterSunThereforewhen you induceothers to construct a formationwhile you yourselfareformless,thenyouareconcentratedwhiletheopponentisdivided.

ZHANGYU

Whatisorthodoxtoyou,makeopponentsseeasunorthodox;whatisunorthodoxto you, make them see as orthodox. This is inducing others to construct aformation.Tobeabletousetheunorthodoxasorthodoxandusetheorthodoxasunorthodox,changinginawhirl,makingyourselfunfathomabletoopponents,isbeing formless. Once the opponent’s formation is seen, you then mass yourtroopsagainstit.Sinceyourformisnotrevealed,theopponentwillsurelydivideuphisforcesforsecurity.

MasterSunWhenyouareconcentratedintoonewhiletheopponentisdividedintoten,youareattackingataconcentrationoftentoone,soyououtnumbertheopponent.

ZHANGYU

Seeingwhere theenemy issolidandwhere theenemy is insubstantial,youdonotgotothetroubleofelaboratepreparationsandthereforeareconcentratedintoone garrison. The enemy, on the other hand, not seeing your form, thereforedivides up to cover numerous points—so you with your whole force strikeindividualfragmentsoftheenemy.Thusyouinevitablyoutnumberthem.

MasterSunIfyoucanstrikefewwithmany,youwillthusminimizethenumberofthosewithwhomyoudobattle.

DUMU

While being deeply entrenched and highly barricaded, not allowing anyinformationaboutyourselftobecomeknown,gooutandinformlessly,attackingand taking unfathomably.Harry and confuse enemies so that they divide theirtroopsinfear,tryingtocoverthemselvesonallsides.Itislikeclimbingahighmountaintospyonacitadel—seeingoutfrombehindaveil,youknowallaboutthedispositionoftheenemypersonnel,whiletheenemycannotfigureoutyouroffenseordefense.Thereforeyoucanbeunifiedwhiletheenemyisdivided.Thepower of those who are united is whole, while the power of those who aredivided is reduced. By striking diminished power with whole power, it ispossiblealwaystowin.

MasterSunYourbattlegroundisnot tobeknown, forwhenitcannotbeknown, theenemymakes many guard outposts, and since multiple outposts are established, youonlyhavetodobattlewithsmallsquads.

CAOCAO

When your form is concealed, the enemy is in doubt, and so divides up hiscompany tobeonguardagainstyou.Thismeans thatenemygroupsare smallandeasytohit.

WANGXI

Don’tlettheenemyknowwhereyouwillclash,foriftheyknowtheywillmasstheirstrengthtoresistyou.

MasterSunSowhenthefrontisprepared,therearislacking,andwhentherearispreparedthe front is lacking. Preparedness on the left means lack on the right,preparedness on the right means lack on the left. Preparedness everywheremeanslackeverywhere.

DUYOU

This means that when troops are on guard in many places, they are perforcescatteredintosmallbands.

MasterSunThefewarethoseonthedefensiveagainstothers,themanyarethosewhocauseotherstobeonthedefensiveagainstthemselves.

MEIYAOCHEN

The more defenses you induce your enemy to adopt, the more impoverishedyourenemywillbe.

MasterSunSo if you know the place and time of battle, you can join the fight from athousandmilesaway.Ifyoudonotknowtheplaceandtimeofbattle,thenyourleftflankcannotsaveyourright,yourrightcannotsaveyourleft,yourvanguardcannot save your rearguard, and your rearguard cannot save your vanguard,eveninashortrangeofafewtoafewdozenmiles.

DUYOU

TheancientphilosopherMasterGuansaid,“Gofortharmedwithoutdeterminingstrategy,andyouwilldestroyyourselfinbattle.”

MasterSunAccording tomy assessment, even if you havemanymore troops than others,howcanthathelpyoutovictory?

LIQUAN

If you do not know the place and time of battle, even though your troopsoutnumberothers,howcanyouknowwhetheryouwillwinorlose?

MasterSunSoitissaidthatvictorycanbemade.

MENGSHIIfyoucauseopponents tobeunawareof theplaceand timeofbattle,youcanalwayswin.

MasterSunEvenifopponentsarenumerous,theycanbemadenottofight.

JIALIN

Eventhoughopponentsbenumerous,iftheydonotknowtheconditionsofyourtroopsandyouconstantlymakethemrushabouttryingtocoverthemselves,theywillnothavetimetoformulatebattleplans.

ZHANGYU

Divide their forces, do not let them press forward at once with coordinatedstrength—thenhowcouldanyonefightwithyou?

MasterSunSoassessthemtofindouttheirplans,boththesuccessfulonesandthefailures.Incitethemtoactioninordertofindoutthepatternsoftheirmovementandrest.

MENGSHIAssessopponents’conditions,observewhattheydo,andyoucanfindouttheirplansandmeasures.

CHENHO

Dosomethingfororagainstthem,makingopponentsturntheirattentiontoit,sothatyoucanfindouttheirpatternsofaggressiveanddefensivebehavior.

DUMU

Stir opponents up, making them respond to you; then you can observe theirformsofbehavior,andwhethertheyareorderlyorconfused.ThemilitarywizardWuQidevisedthisstrategyforassessinggenerals:havebraveyoungmenleadcracktroopsonstrikesandrunawayafterskirmishing,withoutbeingpunishedforrunningaway.Thenobservetheenemy’sbehavior—ifthere isorderlyrule,andtheenemydoesnotgivechasetothefleeingtroopsanddoesnottrytotakeadvantagetograbwhatitcan,thismeansthegeneralhasastrategy.Ontheotherhand, if the enemy behaves like a mob, giving chase in total confusion andgreedilytryingtoplunder,youcanbesurethatthedirectivesofthegeneralsarenotcarriedout,soyoucanattackthemwithouthesitation.

MasterSunInducethemtoadoptspecificformations,inordertoknowthegroundofdeath

andlife.

LIQUAN

When you break ranks and set up guerrilla squads, you may lay down yourbannersanddrums,yoursignalsandsymbolsofmilitaryorganization,tousetheappearanceofweaknessinordertoinducethemtoadoptaspecificform.Oryoumay set up false arrays of campfires and banners, to use the appearance ofstrengthinordertoinducethemtoadoptaspecificform.Ifyoudiebygoingtothem and live by getting them to come to you, this way death and life comeaboutdependingontheground.

DUMU

Thegroundofdeathand life is thebattleground. Ifyougo to theenemyonagroundofdeathyouwilllive,whileifyouleavetheenemyonagroundoflifeyou will die. This means that you use many methods to confuse and disturbenemiestoobservetheformsoftheirresponsetoyou;after thatyoudealwiththemaccordingly, soyoucanknowwhatsortofsituationsmean lifeandwhatsortofsituationsmeandeath.

MasterSunTestthemtofindoutwheretheyaresufficientandwheretheyarelacking.

DUMU

Comparewhereyouaresufficientwithwheretheenemyissufficient,comparewhereyouarelackingwithwheretheenemyislacking.

WANGXI

Compare the strength of the enemywith your own, andyouwill knowwherethereissufficiencyorlack.Afterthatyoucanassesstheadvantagesofattackordefense.

MasterSunTherefore the consummation of forming an army is to arrive at formlessness.When you have no form, undercover espionage cannot find out anything,intelligencecannotformastrategy.

ZHANGYU

First you use emptiness and fullness to induce the enemy to adopt a specificformationwhile remaining unfathomable to the enemy, so that ultimately youreachformlessness.Onceyouhavenoperceptibleform,youleavenotracestofollow, so spies cannot find any chinks to see through and those in charge ofintelligencecannotputanyplansintooperation.

MasterSunVictoryovermultitudesbymeansofformationisunknowabletothemultitudes.EveryoneknowstheformbywhichIamvictorious,butnooneknowstheformbywhichIensurevictory.

MEIYAOCHEN

Themultitudesknowwhenyouwin,buttheydonotknowthatitisbasedontheformationsoftheenemy.Theyknowthetracesofattainmentofvictory,butdonotknowtheabstractformthatmakesforvictory.

LIQUAN

Victory in war is apparent to all, but the science of ensuring victory is amysterioussecret,generallyunknown.

MasterSunThereforevictoryinwarisnotrepetitious,butadaptsitsformendlessly.

LIQUAN

Determining changes as appropriate, do not repeat former strategies to gainvictory.

DUMU

Whatever formations opponentsmay adopt, from the beginning I can adapt tothemtoattainvictory.

MasterSunMilitaryformationislikewater—theformofwateristoavoidthehighandgotothelow,theformofamilitaryforceistoavoidthefullandattacktheempty;theflow of water is determined by the earth, the victory of a military force isdeterminedbytheopponent.

LIQUAN

Howcanyouensurevictoryifnotonthebasisoftheenemy’sownposture?Alightbrigadecannotholdoutlong,soifyoukeepitundersiegeitwillinevitablylose;aheavybrigadewillunfailinglyrespondtoaprovocationandexposeitself.Iftheopposingarmyisangry,shameit;ifthearmyisstrong,getittorelax.Iftheopposinggeneralisproud,humiliatehim;ifthegeneralisgreedy,baithim;ifthegeneralissuspicious,spyonhimrightback—thereforethemannerofvictoryisdeterminedaccordingtotheenemy.

MasterSunSoamilitaryforcehasnoconstantformation,waterhasnoconstantshape:theability togain victoryby changingandadaptingaccording to theopponent iscalledgenius.

[7]

ArmedStruggle

LIQUAN

Struggle is pursuit of advantage; once emptiness and fullness are determined,onemaythenstrugglewithothersforadvantage.

WANGXI

Strugglemeansstruggleforadvantage;thosewhogettheadvantagesaretherebyvictorious.Oneshould firstdeterminewhether touse lightorheavyarms,andassesswhethertoapproachindirectlyordirectly,notallowingopponentstotakeadvantageofone’stoil.

MasterSunTheordinaryruleforuseofmilitaryforceisforthemilitarycommandtoreceivethe orders from the civilian authorities, then to gather and mass the troops,quarteringthemtogether.Nothingisharderthanarmedstruggle.

ZHANGYU

To fight with people face to face over advantages is the hardest thing in theworld.

MasterSunThe difficulty of armed struggle is to make long distances near and makeproblemsintoadvantages.

CAOCAO

Whilegiving theappearanceofbeingfaraway,youstepupyourpaceandgettherebeforetheopponent.

DUMU

Foolopponentsintotakingiteasy,thenmakehaste.

MasterSunTherefore you make their route a long one, luring them on in hopes of gain.Whenyousetoutafterothersandarrivebeforethem,youknowthestrategyofmakingthedistantnear.

JIALIN

Whentheopponentreallyhasbutashortwaytogo,ifyoucanlengthenhisroadby sendinghimonwild goose chases, you canmisleadhim so that he cannotcometoyoutofight.

HOYANXI

Youuseaspecialsquadtoluretheopponentonawildgoosechase,makingitseemasthoughyourmainforceisfaraway;thenyousendoutasurpriseattackforcethatgetstherefirst,eventhoughitsetsoutlast.

MasterSunTherefore armed struggle is considered profitable, and armed struggle isconsidereddangerous.

CAOCAO

Fortheskilleditisprofitable,fortheunskilleditisdangerous.

MasterSunTomobilizethewholearmytostruggleforadvantagewouldtaketoolong,yettostruggleforadvantagewithastripped-downarmyresultsinalackofequipment.

So if you travel light, not stopping day or night, doubling your usual pace,

strugglingforanadvantageahundredmilesaway,yourmilitaryleaderswillbecaptured.Strongsoldierswillgettherefirst,thewearylateron—asarule,oneintenmakeit.

JIALIN

Whentheroadislongthepeopleareweary;iftheirstrengthhasbeenusedupintravel,thentheyarewornoutwhiletheiropponentsarefresh,sotheyaresuretobeattacked.

MasterSunStrugglingforanadvantagefiftymilesawaywillthwarttheforwardleadership,andasaruleonlyfiftypercentofthesoldiersmakeit.Struggleforanadvantagethirtymilesaway,andtwooutofthreegetthere.Soanarmyperishesifithasnoequipment,itperishesifithasnofood,andit

perishesifithasnomoney.

MEIYAOCHEN

These three thingsarenecessary—youcannot fight towinwithanunequippedarmy.

MasterSunSoifyoudonotknowtheplansofyourcompetitors,youcannotmakeinformedalliances.

CAOCAO

Youcannotmakealliancesunlessyouknowtheconditions,feelings,andplans

ofopponents.

DUMU

No, thismeans thatyouhave toknowcompetitors’plansbeforeyoucan fightwith them. Ifyoudon’tknow their strategy,youshouldcertainlynotdobattlewiththem.

CHENHAO

Bothexplanationsmakesense.

MasterSunUnlessyouknowthemountainsandforests,thedefilesandimpasses,andthelayofthemarshesandswamps,youcannotmaneuverwithanarmedforce.Unlessyouuselocalguides,youcannotgettheadvantagesoftheland.

LIQUAN

Whenyougointoenemyterritory,youneedlocalpeopletoguideyoualongthemost convenient routes, lest you be hemmed in by mountains and rivers, getbogged downon swampyground, or lack access to springs andwells.This iswhattheIChingmeanswhenitsays,“Chasingdeerwithoutaguideonlytakesyouintothebush.”

ZHANGYU

Onlywhenyouknoweverydetailofthelayofthelandcanyoumaneuverandcontend.

MEIYAOCHEN

Local guides can be captured or recruited, but it is best to have developedprofessionalscouts,whoneednotbepeopleofaspecificarea.

MasterSunSoamilitaryforceisestablishedbydeception,mobilizedbygain,andadaptedbydivisionandcombination.

DUMU

A military force is established by deception in the sense that you deceiveenemies so that they do not know your real condition, and then can establishsupremacy.It ismobilizedbygain in thesense that itgoes intoactionwhenitseesanadvantage.Dividingandrecombiningisdonetoconfuseopponentsandobservehowtheyreact toyou,so that thenyoucanadapt insuchawayas toseizevictory.

MasterSunThereforewhenitmovesswiftlyitislikethewind,whenitgoesslowlyitislikeaforest;itisrapaciousasfire,immovableasmountains.

LIQUAN

It is swift as the wind in that it comes without a trace and withdraws likelightning. It is like a forest in that it is orderly. It is rapacious as fire across aplain,notleavingasinglebladeofgrass.Itisimmovableasamountainwhenitgarrisons.

WANGXI

Itisswiftasthewindinthespeedwithwhichitrushesintoopenings.

DUMU

Itissofieryandfiercethatnonecanstanduptoit.

JIALIN

Whenitseesnoadvantageinaction,itremainsimmovableasamountain,even

thoughopponentstrytolureitout.

MasterSunItisashardtoknowasthedark;itsmovementislikepealingthunder.

MEIYAOCHEN

Hardtoknowasthedarkmeansbeingunobtrusiveandinscrutable.Movinglikethundermeansbeingsofastnoonecangetoutofyourway.

HOYANXI

Youconceal your strategy in order to be able to exert thismuch energy all atonce.

MasterSunToplunderalocality,divideupyourtroops.Toexpandyourterritory,dividethespoils.

ZHANGYU

The rule formilitaryoperations is to feedoff the enemyasmuch as possible.However, in localitieswherepeopledonothaveverymuch, it is necessary todivideupthetroopsintosmallergroupstotakewhattheyneedhereandthere,foronlythenwilltherebeenough.Asfordividingthespoils,thismeansitisnecessarytodivideupthetroopsto

guardwhathasbeengained,not lettingenemiesget it.Somesayitmeansthatwhenyougetlandyoudivideitamongthosewhohelpedyougetit,butinthiscontextIsuspectthisisnotwhatismeant.

MasterSunActafterhavingmadeassessments.Theonewhofirstknowsthemeasuresoffar

andnearwins—thisistheruleofarmedstruggle.

LIQUAN

Thefirsttomoveistheguest,thelasttomoveisthehost.Theguesthasithard,thehosthasiteasy.Farandnearmeanstravel—fatigue,hunger,andcoldarisefromtravel.

MasterSunAnancientbookofmilitaryordersays,“Wordsarenotheard,socymbalsanddrums are made. Owing to lack of visibility, banners and flags are made.”Cymbals, drums, banners, and flagsareused to focus and unify people’s earsand eyes.Once people are unified, the brave cannot proceed alone, the timidcannotretreatalone—thisistheruleforemployingagroup.

MEIYAOCHEN

Tounifypeople’searsandeyesmeanstomakepeoplelookandlisteninconcertsothattheydonotbecomeconfusedanddisorderly.Signalsareusedtoindicatedirectionsandpreventindividualsfromgoingoffbythemselves.

MasterSunSo in night battles you usemany fires and drums, in daytime battles you usemanybannersandflags,soastomanipulatepeople’searsandeyes.

DUMU

Haveyoursoldiersadapttheirmovementsaccordingtoyoursignals.

MEIYAOCHEN

Thereasonyouusemanysignalsistomanipulateandconfusetheperceptionsofenemies.

WANGXI

You use many signals to startle their perceptions and make them fear yourawesomemartialpower.

MasterSunSoyoushouldtakeawaytheenergyoftheirarmies,andtakeawaytheheartoftheirgenerals.

ZHANGYU

Energy iswhatbattledependson.Any living thingcanbe stirred to fight,buteventhosewhofightwithoutregardfordeatharethewaytheyarebecausetheirenergycompelsthemtobethatway.Thereforetheruleformilitaryoperationsisthatifyoucanstirupthesoldiersofallrankswithacommonanger,thennoonecanstanduptothem.Therefore,whenopponentsfirstcomeandtheirenergyiskeen,youbreakthisdownbynotfightingwiththemforthetimebeing.Watchforwhen they slump into boredom, then strike, and their keen energy can betakenaway.As for taking away the heart of their generals, the heart is the ruler of the

general—orderanddisorder,courageandtimidity,allarebasedonthemind.Sothose killed in controlling opponents stir them into disorder, incite them toconfusion,press them into fear—thuscan the schemes in theirheartsbe takenaway.

HOYANXI

Firstyoumustbecapableoffirmnessinyourownheart—onlythencanyoutakeaway theheart ofopposinggenerals.This iswhy tradition says thatpeopleofformertimeshadthehearttotakeawayhearts,andtheancientlawofcharioteerssaysthatwhenthebasicmindisfirm,freshenergyisvictorious.

MasterSunSo morning energy is keen, midday energy slumps, evening energy recedes—therefore those skilled in use of arms avoid the keen energy and strike the

slumpingandreceding.Thesearethosewhomasterenergy.

MEIYAOCHEN

Themorningmeans thebeginning,middaymeans themiddle,and theeveningmeans the end.What this says is that soldiers are keen at first, but eventuallytheyslumpandthinkofgoinghome,soatthispointtheyarevulnerable.

HOYANXI

Everyone likes security and dislikes danger, everyonewants to live and fearsdeath—soifyouchasethemtodeath’sdoorfornoreason,makingthemgladtogotobattle,itmustbebecausetheyhaveangryandcontentiousenergyintheirheartsthathastemporarilybeentakenadvantageoftostirthemintosuchastatethattheygointodangerandimperilthemselveswithoutconcernortrepidation.Invariablytheywillregretthisandshrinkbackinfear.Nowanyweaklingintheworldwill fight in aminute if he gets excited, butwhen it comes to actuallytaking up arms and seeking to do battle, this is being possessed by energy—when this energy wanes they will stop, get frightened, and feel regret. Thereasonthatarmieslookuponstrongenemiesthewaytheylookatvirgingirlsisthattheiraggressivenessisbeingtakenadvantageof,astheyarestirredupoversomething.

MasterSunUsingordertodealwiththedisorderly,usingcalmtodealwiththeclamorous,ismasteringtheheart.

DUMU

Once your basicmind is settled, you should just tune and order it,making itcalmandstable,undisturbedbyevents,notdeludedbyprospectsofgain.Watchfordisorderandclamoramongtheenemyranks,thenattack.

HOYANXI

Ageneral,withonlyonebodyandoneheart,leadsamilliontroopstofacefierce

enemies—gain and loss, victory and defeat, are intermixed; strategy andintelligencechangetenthousandtimes—andthisisplacedinthegeneral’schest.So unless your heart is wide open and your mind is orderly, you cannot beexpected to be able to adapt responsively without limit, dealing with eventsunerringly, facing great and unexpected difficulties without upset, calmlyhandlingeverythingwithoutconfusion.

MasterSunStandingyourgroundawaiting those faraway,awaiting theweary incomfort,awaitingthehungrywithfullstomachs,ismasteringstrength.

LIQUAN

Thisreferstotheforcesofguestandhost.

DUMU

This iswhat ismeant by getting others to come to youwhile avoiding beinginducedtogotoothers.

MasterSunAvoidingconfrontationwithorderlyranksandnotattackinggreatformationsismasteringadaptation.

HOYANXI

Thisiswhatwasearlierreferredtoasavoidingthestrong.

MasterSunSo therule formilitaryoperations isnot to faceahighhillandnot toopposethosewiththeirbackstoahill.

DUMU

This means that when opponents are on high ground you shouldn’t attackupward,andwhentheyarechargingdownwardyoushouldn’topposethem.

MasterSunDonotfollowafeignedretreat.Donotattackcracktroops.

JIALIN

Ifopponentssuddenlyrunawaybefore theirenergyhasfaded, therearesurelyambushes lying inwait to attack your forces, so you should carefully restrainyourofficersfrompursuit.

LIQUAN

Avoidstrongenergy.MeiYaochenadded,“Watchfortheenergytocrumble.”

MasterSunDonoteatfoodfortheirsoldiers.

DUMU

If the enemy suddenly abandon their food supplies, they shouldbe tested firstbeforeeating,lesttheybepoisoned.

MasterSunDonotstopanarmyonitswayhome.

LIQUAN

Whensoldierswanttogohome,theirwillcannotbethwarted.

MEIYAOCHEN

Underthesecircumstances,anopponentwillfighttothedeath.

MasterSunAsurroundedarmymustbegivenawayout.

CAOCAO

Theancientruleofthecharioteerssays,“Surroundthemonthreesides,leavingonesideopen,toshowthemawaytolife.”

DUMU

Showthemawaytolifesothattheywillnotbeinthemoodtofighttothedeath,andthenyoucantakeadvantageofthistostrikethem.

MasterSunDonotpressadesperateenemy.

MEIYAOCHEN

Anexhaustedanimalwillstillfight,asamatterofnaturallaw.

ZHANGYU

Iftheopponentsburntheirboats,destroytheircookingpots,andcometofightitout once and for all, don’t press them, for when animals are desperate theythrashaboutwildly.

MasterSunThesearerulesofmilitaryoperations.

[8]

Adaptations

ZHANGYU

Adaptation means not clinging to fixed methods, but changing appropriatelyaccordingtoevents,actingasissuitable.

MasterSunThegeneralruleformilitaryoperationsisthatthemilitaryleadershipreceivestheorderfromthecivilianleadershiptogatherarmies.Let therebenoencampmentondifficult terrain.Letdiplomatic relationsbe

establishedatborders.Donotstayinbarrenorisolatedterritory.Whenonsurroundedground,plot.Whenondeadlyground,fight.

JIALIN

Beingonsurroundedgroundmeansthereissteepterrainonallsides,withyouinthemiddle,sothattheenemycancomeandgofreelybutyouhaveahardtimegetting out and back. When you are on ground like this, you should set upspecial plans ahead of time to prevent the enemy from bothering you, thusbalancingoutthedisadvantageoftheground.

LIQUAN

Placeanarmyinadeadlysituationandthesoldierswillmakeittheirownfight.

MasterSunThereareroutesnottobefollowed,armiesnottobeattacked,citadelsnottobe

besieged,territorynottobefoughtover,ordersofciviliangovernmentsnottobeobeyed.

LIQUAN

Iftherearenarrowstraitsalongthewayandtheremaybeambushattacks,thatroadshouldnotbetaken.

DUMU

Don’t attack crack troops, don’t try to stop a returning army, don’t press adesperateenemy,don’tattackagroundofdeath.Andifyouarestrongandtheenemy is weak, don’t strike their vanguard, lest you frighten the rest intoretreating.

CAOCAO

Itmaybepossible to strikeanarmy,butnot advisable,because the layof thelandmakes it hard to persist, to stay therewouldmean loss of further gains,presentgainswouldinanycasebeslight,andadesperatearmywillfighttothedeath.When a citadel is small and secure, andhas plentyof supplies, thendonot

besiegeit.Whenaterritoryisofmarginalbenefitandisaseasytoloseasitistowin,thendon’tfightoverit.Whenitisamatterofexpeditingyourwork,don’tbelimitedtothecommandsofthecivilianleadership.

DUMU

Wei Liaozi said, “Weapons are instruments of ill omen, conflict is a negativequality, warrior-leaders are officers of death with no heaven above, no earthbelow,noopponentahead,norulerbehind.”

MasterSunThereforegeneralswhoknowallpossibleadaptationstotakeadvantageof thegroundknowhowtousemilitaryforces.Ifgeneralsdonotknowhowtoadaptadvantageously,eveniftheyknowthelayofthelandtheycannottakeadvantage

ofit.If they rule armieswithout knowing the arts of complete adaptivity, even if

theyknowwhatthereistogain,theycannotgetpeopletoworkforthem.

JIALIN

Even ifyouknowtheconfigurationof the land, ifyourmind is inflexibleyouwillnotonlyfailtotakeadvantageofthegroundbutmayevenbeharmedbyit.Itisimportantforgeneralstoadaptinappropriateways.Ifyoucanchangewiththemomentumofforces,thentheadvantagedoesnot

change,sotheonlyoneswhogethurtareothers.Thereforethereisnoconstantstructure.Ifyoucanfullycomprehendthisprinciple,youcangetpeopletowork.Adaptationmeansthingslikeavoidingaconvenientroutewhenitisrealized

that it has features that lend themselves to ambush; not attacking a vulnerablearmywhen it is realized that the army is desperate and bound to fight to thedeath;notbesieginganisolatedandvulnerablecitywhenitisrealizedthatithasabundantsupplies,powerfulweapons,smartgenerals,andloyaladministrators,sothereisnotellingwhatmighthappen;notfightingoverterritorythatcouldbecontestedwhenitisrealizedthatevenifitwerewonitwouldbehardtokeep,itwouldbeofnouseanyway,anditwouldcostpeoplelifeandlimb;notfollowingthedirectivesof theciviliangovernment,whichordinarilyshouldbefollowed,when it is realized that there would be disadvantage and consequent harm indirectionfrombehindthelines.Theseadaptationsaremadeonthespotasappropriate,andcannotbefixedin

advance.Greed for what can be gained means taking any shortcut, attacking any

isolated army, besieging any insecure city, contesting any territory that can betaken,takingcommandofanyserviceablearmy.Ifyouaregreedyforwhatyoucan get from these things and do not know how to adapt to changes such asoutlined above, not only will you be unable to get people to work, you willdestroythearmyandwoundthesoldiers.

MasterSunTherefore the considerationsof the intelligent always includebothbenefit andharm.As theyconsiderbenefit, theirworkcanexpand;as theyconsiderharm,theirtroublescanberesolved.

HOYANXI

Benefitandharmareinterdependent,sotheenlightenedalwaysconsiderthem.

MasterSunThereforewhat restrains competitors is harm, what keeps competitors busy iswork,whatmotivatescompetitorsisprofit.

ZHANGYU

Puttheminavulnerablepositionandtheywillsurrenderontheirown.Anotherstrategy is to cause rifts in their ranks, causing harm by wearying them andputtingthepeopleoutofwork.

DUMU

Wearenemiesoutbykeepingthembusyandnotlettingthemrest.Butyouhaveto have done your own work before you can do this. This work meansdevelopingastrongmilitia,arichnation,aharmonioussociety,andanorderlywayoflife.

MasterSunSotheruleofmilitaryoperationsisnottocountonopponentsnotcoming,buttorely on having ways of dealing with them; not to count on opponents notattacking,buttorelyonhavingwhatcannotbeattacked.

HOYANXI

Ifyoucanalwaysrememberdangerwhenyouaresecureandrememberchaosintimesoforder,watchoutfordangerandchaoswhiletheyarestillformlessandpreventthembeforetheyhappen,thisisbestofall.

MasterSunTherefore there are five traits that are dangerous in generals: Thosewho are

readytodiecanbekilled;thosewhoareintentonlivingcanbecaptured;thosewho are quick to anger can be shamed; those who are puritanical can bedisgraced;thosewholovepeoplecanbetroubled.

CAOCAO

Thosewhoarebravebutthoughtlessandinsistonfightingtothedeathcannotbemadetoyield,buttheycanbestruckbyambush.

MENGSHIWhenthegeneralistimidandweakandintentongettingbackalive,hisheartisnot really in the battle and his soldiers are not really keen. Both officers andtroopsarehesitant,sotheyarevulnerabletoattackandcapture.

CAOCAO

Quick-tempered people can be lured into coming to you by anger andembarrassment, puritanical people canbe lured into coming to youby slanderanddisgrace.Andifyouappearinaplacetheyaresuretorushtodefend,thosewholovethepeopletherewillinvariablyhastentheretorescuethem,troublingandwearyingthemselvesintheprocess.

MasterSunThesefivethingsarefaultsingenerals,disastersformilitaryoperations.

CHENHAO

Goodgeneralsareotherwise:theyarenotcommittedtodeathyetdonotexpectto live; they act in accord with events, not quick to anger, not subject toembarrassment.When they see possibility, they are like tigers, otherwise theyshut their doors. Their action and inaction are matters of strategy, and theycannotbepleasedorangered.

[9]

ManeuveringArmies

CAOCAO

Thismeanschoosingthemostadvantageouswaystogo.

MasterSunWheneveryoustationanarmytoobserveanopponent,cutoffthemountainsandstaybythevalleys.

LIQUAN

Cuttingoffthemountainsmeansguardingthedefiles,andstayingbythevalleysmeansbeingclosetowaterandfodder.

MasterSunWatchthelight,stayontheheights.Whenfightingonahill,donotclimb.Thisappliestoanarmyinthemountains.

DUMU

Oneversionsays,“Fightgoingdown,notclimbingup.”

MasterSunWhencutoffbywater,alwaysstayawayfromthewater.Donotmeettheminthewater;itisadvantageoustolethalfofthemcrossandthenattackthem.

CAOCAOANDLIQUAN

Youinducetheenemytocrossover.

MasterSunWhenyouwanttofight,donotfaceanenemynearwater.Watchthelight,stayinhigh places, do not face the current of thewater. This applies to an army onwater.

JIALIN

In a river basin your armies can be flooded out, and poison can be put in thestreams.Facingthecurrentmeansheadingagainsttheflow.

DUMU

Italsomeansyourboatsshouldnotbemooreddownstream,lesttheenemyridethecurrentrightoveryou.

MasterSunGorightthroughsaltmarshes,justgoquicklyanddonottarry.Ifyourunintoanarmyinthemiddleofasaltmarsh,staybythewaterplants,withyourbacktothetrees.Thisappliestoanarmyinasaltmarsh.

WANGXI

Should you unexpectedly encounter an opponent in such a situation, here tooyoushouldtakethemostadvantageousfactors,withyourbackstowardthemostsecuredirection.

MasterSunOn a level plateau, take up positions where it is easy to maneuver, keepinghigherlandtoyourrightrear,withlowgroundinfrontandhighgroundbehind.Thisappliestoanarmyonaplateau.

DUMU

ThewarrioremperorTaigongsaid,“Anarmymustkeepriversandmarshes totheleftandhillstotheright.”

MEIYAOCHEN

Chooselevelground,convenientforvehicles;keephills toyourrightrear,andyouwillhaveawayofgettingmomentum.It isconvenientforfighters if theyareheadingdownhill.

MasterSunIt was by taking advantage of the situation in these four basic ways that theYellowEmperorovercamefourlords.

ZHANGYU

AllmartialartsbeganwiththeYellowEmperor[aTaoistruleroflateprehistorictimes,ca.2400B.C.E.],soheismentionedhere.

MasterSunOrdinarily,anarmylikeshighplacesanddislikeslowground,valueslightanddespisesdarkness.

MEIYAOCHEN

High places are exhilarating, so people are comfortable, and they are alsoconvenient for the forceofmomentum.Lowground isdamp,whichpromotesillnesses,andmakesithardtofight.

WANGXI

Whenpeoplespendalongtimeindarkandwetplaces,theybecomedepressedandill.

MasterSunTakecareofphysicalhealthandstaywherethereareplentyofresources.Whenthereisnosicknessinthearmy,itissaidtobeinvincible.

MEIYOACHEN

Those who know these things can be certain of victory by the force of theirmomentum.

MasterSunWhere there are hills or embankments keep on their sunny side, with them toyourrightrear.Thisisanadvantagetoamilitaryforce,thehelpoftheland.

ZHANGYU

Advantageinamilitaryoperationisgettinghelpfromtheland.

MasterSunWhenitrainsupstreamandfrothiscomingdownonthecurrent,ifyouwanttocross,waituntilitsettles.

CAOCAO

Thisislesttheriversuddenlyswellwhenyouarehalfacross.

MasterSunWhenever the terrain has impassable ravines, natural enclosures, naturalprisons, natural traps, natural pitfalls, and natural clefts, you should leave

quickly and not get near them. For myself, I keep away from these, so thatopponentsarenearer to them; I keepmy face to these so thatopponentshavetheirbackstothem.

CAOCAO

In military operations, always keep away from these six kinds of dangerousgroundformation,whilemaneuveringsothatyourenemyisnearthem,withhisbacktothem.Thenyouhavetheadvantage,andheisoutofluck.

MasterSunWhen an army is traveling, if there is hilly territory with many streams andponds or depressions overgrown with reeds, or wild forests with a luxuriantgrowth of plants and trees, it is imperative to search them carefully andthoroughly.Fortheseaffordstationsforbushwackersandspoilers.

ZHANGYU

It is imperative to dismount and search, lest there be ambush troops hiding insuch places.Also, there is concern that spiesmight be lurking therewatchingyouandlisteningtoyourdirectives.

MasterSunWhentheenemyisnearbutstill,heisrestingonanaturalstronghold.Whenheisfarawaybuttriestoprovokehostilities,hewantsyoutomoveforward.Ifhispositionisaccessible,itisbecausethatisadvantageoustohim.

DUMU

What thismeans is that if an opponent does not keep a position on a naturalstrongholdbutstationshimselfinaconvenientplace,itmustbebecausethereissomepracticaladvantageindoingso.

MasterSunWhen the treesmove, theenemy iscoming;when therearemanyblinds in theundergrowth,itismisdirection.

DUYOU

The idea ofmakingmany blinds in the underbush is tomake you think theremightbebushwhackershiddenbehindthem.

MasterSunIfbirdsstartup,thereareambushersthere.Iftheanimalsarefrightened,thereareattackersthere.Ifdustriseshighandsharp,vehiclesarecoming;ifitislowand wide, footsoldiers are coming. Scattered wisps of smoke indicatewoodcutters.Relativelysmallamountsofdustcomingandgoingindicatesettingupcamp.

MEIYAOCHEN

Light troops set up camp, so the dust raised by their comings and goings isrelativelylittle.

MasterSunThosewhosewordsarehumblewhiletheyincreasewarpreparationsaregoingto advance. Thosewhosewords are strong andwho advance aggressively aregoingtoretreat.

CAOCAO

Ifhisemissariescomewithhumblewords, sendspies toobservehimandyouwillfindthattheenemyisincreasinghispreparations.

ZHANGYU

When emissaries come with strong words, and their army also moves ahead,theywanttothreatenyou,seekingtoretreat.

WANGXI

Their words are strong and their posture is aggressive, so you won’t thinkthey’regoingtogoaway.

MasterSunWhenlightvehiclescomeoutfirstandstaytothesides,theyaregoingtosetupabattleline.

CAOCAO

Theyarearrangingthetroopstodobattle.

DUMU

Thelightvehiclesestablishtheboundariesofthebattleline.

MasterSunThosewhocomeseekingpeacewithoutatreatyareplotting.

CHENHAO

Seeking peace without a treaty is a general statement about cases wherecountries have been behaving aggressively toward each other, with neithergivingin,thenallofasuddenoneofthemcomesseekingpeaceandfriendshipfornoapparent reason. Itmustbe thatsome internalcrisishasarisen,andonesidewants a temporary peace to take care of its own problems.Otherwise, itmustbethattheyknowyouhavepowerthatcanbeused,andtheywanttomakeyou unsuspecting, so they take the initiative in seeking peace and friendship,thereaftertakingadvantageofyourlackofpreparationtocomeandtakeover.

MasterSunThosewhobusilysetoutarraysofarmedvehiclesareexpectingreinforcements.

JIALIN

Theywouldn’trusharoundforanordinaryrendezvous—theremustbeadistantforceexpectedatacertaintime,whentheywill joinforcestocomeandattackyou.Itisbesttoprepareforthisrightaway.

MasterSunIfhalftheirforceadvancesandhalfretreats,theyaretryingtolureyou.

DUMU

Theyfeignconfusionanddisordertolureyouintomovingforward.

MasterSunIf they brace themselves as they stand, they are starving.When those sent todrawwaterfirstdrinkthemselves,theyarethirsty.

ZHANGYU

Peoplelosetheirenergywhentheydonoteat,sotheybracethemselvesontheirweaponstostandup.Sinceallthemeninanarmyeatatthesametime,ifoneisstarvingallarestarving.

WANGXI

Bytheseyoucanseetheirranksarepursuedbyhungerandthirst.

MasterSun

Whentheyseeanadvantagebutdonotadvanceonit,theyareweary.

ZHANGYU

When the officers and soldiers are tired out, they cannot bemade to fight, soeveniftheyseeanadvantagetobegained,thegeneralsdonotdaretoproceed.

MasterSunIfbirdsaregatheredthere,theplacehasbeenvacated.

LIQUAN

Iftherearebirdsonacitadel,thearmyhasfled.

MasterSunIftherearecallsinthenight,theyareafraid.

CAOCAO

Whensoldierscallinthenight,itmeansthegeneralisnotbrave.

DUMU

Theyarefearfulanduneasy,sotheycalltoeachothertostrengthenthemselves.

CHENHAO

Ifthereisonepersonintenwithcourage,eventhoughtheotherninearetimidandcowardly,dependingonthebraveryofthatonemantheycanstillbesecure.Nowifthesoldierscalloutinthenight,itisbecausethegeneralhasnocourage,asCaoCaosays.

MasterSunIfthearmyisunsettled,itmeansthegeneralisnottakenseriously.

LIQUAN

Ifthegenerallacksauthority,thearmyisdisorderly.

MasterSunIfsignalsmove,thatmeanstheyareinconfusion.

ZHANGYU

Signalsareusedtounifythegroup,soif theymoveaboutunsteadily, itmeanstheranksareindisarray.

MasterSunIftheiremissariesareirritable,itmeanstheyaretired.

JIALIN

Peopleareirritablewhentheyarefatigued.

MasterSunWhen they kill their horses formeat, itmeans that the soldiers have no food;whentheyhavenopotsanddonotgobacktotheirquarters,theyaredesperateadversaries.

MEIYAOCHEN

Whentheykill theirhorsesforfood,get ridof theircookingutensils,andstayout in the open, not returning to their quarters, they are desperadoes andwill

surelyfighttothedeathforvictory.

MasterSunWhen therearemurmurings, lapses in duties, and extended conversations, theloyaltyofthegrouphasbeenlost.

MEIYAOCHEN

Murmuringsmeanspeoplespittingouttheirtruefeelings,lapsesindutiesmeansnegligenceonthejob;asforextendedconversations,whywouldthestrongfearthealienationofthegroup?

WANGXI

Murmuringsdescribetalkoftruefeelings,lapsesindutiesindicatetroublewithsuperiors.Whenthemilitaryleadershiphaslostthepeople’sloyalty,theytalktoeachotherfranklyaboutthetroublewiththeirsuperiors.

MasterSunWhen theygiveoutnumerous rewards, itmeans theyareatan impasse;whentheygiveoutnumerouspunishments,itmeanstheyarewornout.

DUMU

Whentheforceoftheirmomentumisexhausted,theygiverepeatedrewardstoplease their soldiers, lest they rebel enmasse.When the people areworn out,theydonotfearpunishment,so theyarepunishedrepeatedlysoas to terrorizethem.

MEIYAOCHEN

When people are so worn out that they cannot carry out orders, they arepunishedagainandagaintoestablishauthority.

MasterSunTo be violent at first and wind up fearing one’s people is the epitome ofineptitude.

LIQUAN

Toact inconsideratelyandlaterbeafraidisbraverywithoutfirmness,whichisextremelyincompetent.

MasterSunThosewhocomeinaconciliatorymannerwanttorest.

DUYOU

Iftheycomehumblyinaconciliatorymannerbeforetheyhavebeensubduedinbattle,itmeanstheywanttorest.

WANGXI

Theirmomentumcannotlastlong.

MasterSunWhenforcesangrilyconfrontyoubutdelayengagement,yetdonot leave, it isimperativetowatchthemcarefully.

CAOCAO

Theyarepreparingasurpriseattack.

MasterSunInmilitarymattersitisnotnecessarilybeneficialtohavemorestrength,onlyto

avoid acting aggressively; it is enough to consolidate your power, assessopponents,andgetpeople,thatisall.

CHENHAO

Whenyourmilitarypowerisnotgreaterthanthatoftheenemy,andthereisnoadvantagetomoveon,itisnotnecessarytoaskfortroopsfromothercountries,just to consolidate your power and get people among the localworkers—thenyoucanstilldefeattheenemy.

JIALIN

Alargegroupstrikingasmallgroupisnotheldinhighesteem;whatisheldinhighesteemiswhenasmallgroupcanstrikealargegroup.

MasterSunThe individualist without strategy who takes opponents lightly will inevitablybecomethecaptiveofothers.

DUMU

If you have no ulterior scheme and no forethought, but just rely on yourindividual bravery, flippantly taking opponents lightly and giving noconsiderationtothesituation,youwillsurelybetakenprisoner.

MasterSunIf soldiers are punished before a personal attachment to the leadership isformed,theywillnotsubmit,andiftheydonotsubmittheyarehardtoemploy.

WANGXI

If feelingsofappreciationand trustarenotestablished inpeople’smindsfromthebeginning,theywillnotformthisbond.

MasterSunIfpunishmentsarenotexecutedafterpersonalattachmenthasbeenestablishedwiththesoldiers,thentheycannotbeemployed.

ZHANGYU

When thereareunderlying feelingsofappreciationand trust,and theheartsofthesoldiersarealreadybondedtotheleadership,ifpunishmentsarerelaxedthesoldierswillbecomehaughtyandimpossibletoemploy.

MasterSunThereforedirectthemthroughculturalarts,unifythemthroughmartialarts;thismeanscertainvictory.

CAOCAO

Culturalartmeanshumaneness,martialartmeanslaw.

LIQUAN

Cultural art means benevolence and reward, martial art means sternness andpunishment.

MEIYAOCHEN

Command them humanely and benevolently, unify them strictly and sternly.When benevolence and sternness are both evident, it is possible to be sure ofvictory.

MasterSunWhendirectivesareconsistentlycarriedouttoedifythepopulace,thepopulaceaccepts.Whendirectivesarenotconsistentlycarriedout toedify thepopulace,thepopulacedoesnotaccept.Whendirectivesareconsistentlycarriedout,there

ismutualsatisfactionbetweentheleadershipandthegroup.

DUMU

Consistentmeansallalong: inordinary times it is imperative thatbenevolenceandtrustworthinessalongwithdignityandorderbemanifesttopeoplefromthestart, so that later, if they are faced with enemies it is possible to meet thesituationinanorderlyfashion,withthefulltrustandacceptanceofthepeople.

[10]

Terrain

MasterSunSome terrain is easily passable, in some you get hung up, somemakes for astandoff,someisnarrow,someissteep,someiswideopen.Whenbothsidescancomeandgo, the terrain is said tobeeasilypassable.

Whentheterrainiseasilypassable,takeupyourpositionfirst,choosingthehighandsunnyside,convenienttosupplyroutes,foradvantageinbattle.Whenyoucangobuthaveahardtimegettingback,youaresaidtobehung

up.Onthistypeofterrain,iftheopponentisunprepared,youwillprevailifyougoforth,butiftheenemyisprepared,ifyougoforthanddonotprevailyouwillhaveahardtimegettingback,toyourdisadvantage.When it is disadvantageous for either side to go forth, it is called standoff

terrain.Onstandoffterrain,eventhoughtheopponentoffersyouanadvantage,youdonotgoforit—youwithdraw,inducingtheenemyhalfout,andthenyouattack,toyouradvantage.On narrow terrain, if you are there first, you should fill it up to await the

opponent. If theopponent is there first, donotpursue if theopponent fills thenarrows.Pursueiftheopponentdoesnotfillthenarrows.Onsteepterrain,ifyouaretherefirst,youshouldoccupythehighandsunny

side to await the opponent. If the opponent is there first,withdraw from thereanddonotpursue.Onwide-open terrain, the forceofmomentumisequalized,and it ishard to

makeachallenge,disadvantageoustofight.Understanding these six kinds of terrain is the highest responsibility of the

general,anditisimperativetoexaminethem.

LIQUAN

Thesearetheconfigurationsofterrain;generalswhodonotknowthemlose.

MEIYAOCHEN

The formof the land is thebasisonwhich themilitary isaidedandvictory isestablished,soitmustbemeasured.

MasterSunSoamongmilitaryforcestherearethosewhorush,thosewhotarry,thosewhofall,thosewhocrumble,thosewhoriot,andthosewhogetbeaten.Thesearenotnaturaldisasters,butfaultsofthegenerals.Thosewhohaveequalmomentumbutstriketenwithoneareinarush.Those

whose soldiers are strong but whose officers are weak tarry. Those whoseofficers are strongbutwhose soldiers areweak fall.When colonels are angryandobstreperousandfightontheirownoutofspitewhentheymeetopponents,andthegeneralsdonotknowtheirabilities,theycrumble.

ZHANGYU

Generallyspeaking, theentiremilitary leadershiphas tobeofonemind,allofthemilitaryforceshavetocooperate,inordertobeabletodefeatopponents.

MasterSunWhen the generals are weak and lack authority, instructions are not clear,officers and soldiers lack consistency, and they form battle lines every whichway, this is riot.When thegeneralscannotassessopponents, clashwithmuchgreaternumbersormorepowerfulforces,anddonotsortoutthelevelsofskillamongtheirowntroops,thesearetheoneswhogetbeaten.

JIALIN

Ifyouemploy soldierswithout sortingout the skilledandunskilled, thebraveandthetimid,youarebringingdefeatonyourself.

MasterSun

Thesesixarewaystodefeat.Understandingthisistheultimateresponsibilityofthegenerals;theymustbeexamined.

CHENHAO

Firstisnotassessingnumbers,secondislackofaclearsystemofpunishmentsandrewards,thirdisfailureintraining,fourthisirrationaloverexcitement,fifthisineffectivenessoflawandorder,andsixthisfailuretochoosethestrongandresolute.

ZHANGYU

Thesearewaystocertaindefeat.

MasterSunThecontourofthelandisanaidtoanarmy;sizingupopponentstodeterminevictory, assessing dangers and distances, is the proper course of action formilitary leaders. Those who do battle knowing these will win, those who dobattlewithoutknowingthesewilllose.

ZHANGYU

Onceyouknowtheopponent’sconditions,andalsoknowtheadvantagesoftheterrain,youcanwininbattle.Ifyouknowneither,youwillloseinbattle.

MasterSunTherefore,whenthelawsofwarindicatecertainvictoryitissurelyappropriatetodobattle,evenif thegovernmentsaysthereis tobenobattle. If the lawsofwar do not indicate victory, it is appropriate not to do battle, even if thegovernment orders war. Thus one advances without seeking glory, retreatswithoutavoidingblame,onlyprotectingpeople,tothebenefitofthegovernmentaswell,thusrenderingvaluableservicetothenation.

ZHANGYU

Advancingandretreatingcontrarytogovernmentordersisnotdoneforpersonalinterest,butonly to safeguard the livesof thepeopleandaccordwith the truebenefitofthegovernment.Suchloyalemployeesarevaluabletoanation.

MasterSunLook upon your soldiers as you do infants, and they willingly go into deepvalleyswithyou;lookuponyoursoldiersasbelovedchildren,andtheywillinglydiewithyou.

LIQUAN

Ifyoutreatthemwell,youwillgettheirutmostpower.

MasterSunIfyouaresonicetothemthatyoucannotemploythem,sokindtothemthatyoucannotcommandthem,socasualwiththemthatyoucannotestablishorder,theyarelikespoiledchildren,useless.

CAOCAO

Rewards should not be used alone, punishments should not be relied on inisolation. Otherwise, like spoiled children, people will become accustomed toeither enjoying or resenting everything. This is harmful and renders themuseless.

MasterSunIfyouknowyoursoldiersarecapableofstriking,butdonotknowwhethertheenemyisinvulnerabletoastrike,youhavehalfachanceofwinning.Ifyouknowthe enemy is vulnerable to a strike, but do not know if your soldiers areincapable ofmaking such a strike, you have half a chance ofwinning. If youknowtheenemyisvulnerabletoastrike,andknowyoursoldierscanmakethestrike,butdonotknowifthelayofthelandmakesitunsuitableforbattle,youhavehalfachanceofwinning.

WANGXI

Ifyouknowyourselfbutnottheother,orifyouknowtheotherbutnotyourself,ineithercaseyoucannotbesureofvictory.Andevenifyouknowbothyourselfand your opponent and know you can fight, still you cannot overlook thequestionoftheadvantagesoftheterrain.

MasterSunThereforethosewhoknowmartialartsdonotwanderwhentheymove,anddonot become exhausted when they rise up. So it is said that when you knowyourself and others, victory is not in danger; when you know sky and earth,victoryisinexhaustible.

DUMU

Whenvictoryanddefeatarealreadydeterminedbeforemovementanduprising,youdonotbecomeconfusedinyouractionsanddonotwearyourselfoutrisingup.

MEIYAOCHEN

Whenyouknowwhatistoothers’advantageandwhatistoyouradvantage,youarenotindanger.Whenyouknowtheseasonandtheterrain,youdonotcometoanimpasse.

[11]

NineGrounds

MasterSunAccording to the rule formilitary operations, there are nine kinds of ground.Wherelocalinterestsfightamongthemselvesontheirownterritory,thisiscalledagroundofdissolution.

CAOCAO

When the soldiers are attached to the land and are near home, they fall aparteasily.

MasterSunWhenyouenterothers’land,butnotdeeply,thisiscalledlightground.

CAOCAO

Thismeansthesoldierscanallgetbackeasily.

DUMU

When an army goes forth and crosses a border, it should burn its boats andbridgestoshowthepopulaceithasnointentionoflookingback.

MasterSunLandthatwouldbeadvantageoustoyouifyougotitandtoopponentsiftheygotitiscalledgroundofcontention.

CAOCAO

Ground from which a few could overcome many, the weak could strike thepowerful.

DUMU

Agroundofinevitablecontentionisanynaturalbarricadeorstrategicpass.

MasterSunLandwhereyouandotherscancomeandgoiscalledatraffickedground.

ZHANGYU

Iftherearemanyroadsintheareaandthereisfreetravelthatcannotbecutoff,thisiswhatiscalledatraffickedground.

MasterSunLandthatissurroundedonthreesidesbycompetitorsandwouldgivethefirsttogetitaccesstoallthepeopleonthecontinentiscalledintersectingground.

HOYANXI

Intersecting ground means the intersections of main arteries linking togethernumeroushighwaysystems:firstoccupythisground,andthepeoplewillhavetogowithyou.Soifyougetityouaresecure,ifyouloseityouareinperil.

MasterSunWhen you enter deeply into others’ land, past many cities and towns, this iscalledheavyground.

CAOCAO

Thisisgroundfromwhichitishardtoreturn.

MasterSunWhenyoutraversemountainforests,steepdefiles,marshes,oranyroutedifficulttotravel,thisiscalledbadground.

HOYANXI

Badgroundislandthatlacksstabilityandisunsuitableforbuildingfortificationsandtrenches.Itisbesttoleavesuchterrainasquicklyaspossible.

MasterSunWhenthewayinisnarrowandthewayoutiscircuitous,soasmallenemyforcecanstrikeyou,eventhoughyournumbersaregreater,thisiscalledsurroundedground.

MEIYAOCHEN

Ifyouarecapableofextraordinaryadaptation,youcantravelthisground.

ZHANGYU

Ongroundthat ishemmedininfrontandwalledoffbehind,asingledefendercanholdoffathousandmen,soonsuchgroundyouwinbyambush.

MasterSunWhenyouwillsurviveifyoufightquicklyandperishifyoudonot,thisiscalleddyingground.

CHENHAO

People on dying ground are, as it were, sitting in a leaking boat, lying in aburninghouse.

MEIYAOCHEN

Whenyoucannotpressforward,cannotretreatbackward,andcannotruntothesides,youhavenochoicebuttofightrightaway.

MasterSunSolettherebenobattleonagroundofdissolution,lettherebenostoppingonlight ground, let therebenoattackonagroundof contention, let therebenocutting off of trafficked ground.On intersecting ground form communications,on heavy ground plunder, on bad ground keep going, on surrounded groundmakeplans,ondyinggroundfight.

LIQUAN

Onagroundofdissolution,thesoldiersmightrunaway.

MEIYAOCHEN

Lightgroundiswheresoldiershavefirstenteredenemyterritoryanddonotyethave their backs to the wall; hence the minds of the soldiers are not reallyconcentrated,and theyarenot readyforbattle.At thispoint it is imperative toavoid important cities and highways, and it is advantageous to move quicklyonward.

CAOCAO

It is not advantageous to attack an enemy on a ground of contention;what isadvantageousistogettherefirst.

WANGXI

Trafficked ground should not be cut off, so that the roads may be used

advantageouslyassupplyroutes.

MENGSHIOn intersecting ground, if you establish alliances you are safe, if you losealliancesyouareinperil.

CAOCAO

Onheavyground,plunderingmeansbuildingupsupplies.LiQuanadded,“Whenyouenterdeeplyintoenemyterritoryyoushouldnot

antagonizepeoplebyactingunjustly.WhenthefounderofthegreatHandynastyentered the homeland of the supplanted Qin dynasty, there was no rapine orpillage,andthisishowhewonthepeople’shearts.”

LIQUAN

Onbadground,sinceyoucannotentrench,youshouldmakehastetoleavethere.

CAOCAO

Onsurroundedground,bringsurprisetacticsintoplay.

CHENHAO

If they fall into dying ground, then everyone in the army will spontaneouslyfight.Thisiswhyitissaid,“Putthemondyingground,andthentheywilllive.”

MasterSunThose who are called the good militarists of old could make opponents losecontact between front and back lines, lose reliability between large and smallgroups,losemutualconcernforthewelfareofthedifferentsocialclassesamongthem, lose mutual accommodation between the rulers and the ruled, loseenlistmentsamongthesoldiers,losecoherencewithinthearmies.Theywentinto

actionwhenitwasadvantageous,stoppedwhenitwasnot.

LIQUAN

They set up changes to confuse their opponents, striking themhere and there,terrorizinganddisarrayingtheminsuchawaythattheyhadnotimetoplan.

MasterSunItmaybeasked,whenalarge,well-organizedopponentisabouttocometoyou,howdoyoudealwithit?Theansweristhatyoufirsttakeawaywhattheylike,andthentheywilllistentoyou.

WANGXI

Firstoccupyapositionofadvantage,andcutoff theirsupplyroutesbyspecialstrikeforces,andtheywilldoasyouplan.

CHENHAO

What they likedoesnot onlymean the advantages they relyon, itmeans thatanythingenemiescareaboutisworthcapturing.

MasterSunThe condition of a military force is that its essential factor is speed, takingadvantage of others’ failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect,attackingwheretheyarenotonguard.

CHENHAO

Thismeansthat totakeadvantageofunpreparedness, lackofforesight,orlackofcautiononthepartofopponents,it isnecessarytoproceedquickly,itwon’tworkifyouhesitate.

MasterSunIn general, the pattern of invasion is that invaders become more intense thefarthertheyenteralienterritory,tothepointwherethenativerulershipcannotovercomethem.

DUMU

Thepatternof invasiveattack is that if theyenterdeeply intoenemy territory,soldiers come to have the determination to fight to the death—they aresingleminded,sothenativerulerscannotbeatthem.

MasterSunGleanfromrichfields,andthearmieswillhaveenoughtoeat.Takecareofyourhealth and avoid stress, consolidate your energy and build up your strength.Maneuveryourtroopsandassessstrategiessoastobeunfathomable.

WANGXI

Consolidate your keenest energy, save up your extra strength, keep your formconcealedandyourplanssecret,beingunfathomable toenemies,waiting foravulnerablegaptoadvanceupon.

MasterSunPut them in a spot where they have no place to go, and they will die beforefleeing.If theyaretodiethere,whatcantheynotdo?Warriorsexert theirfullstrength.Whenwarriorsareingreatdanger,thentheyhavenofear.Whenthereisnowheretogotheyarefirm,whentheyaredeeplyinvolvedtheysticktoit.Iftheyhavenochoice,theywillfight.

CAOCAO

Whenpeoplearedesperate,theywillfighttothedeath.

MasterSunForthisreasonthesoldiersarealertwithoutbeingdrilled,enlistwithoutbeingdrafted,arefriendlywithouttreaties,aretrustworthywithoutcommands.

DUMU

Thismeansthatwhenwarriorsareinmortaldangereveryonehighandlowhasthesameaim,so theyarespontaneouslyon thealertwithoutbeingdrilled,arespontaneously sympathetic without being drafted, and are spontaneouslytrustworthywithouttreatiesorcommands.

MasterSunProhibit omens to get rid of doubt, and soldierswill never leave you. If yoursoldiershavenoextragoods, it isnot that theydislikematerialgoods. If theyhavenomore life, it is not that theydonotwant to live long.On theday theordertomarchgoesout,thesoldiersweep.

CAOCAO

They abandon their goods and go to their death because they have no choice.Theyweepbecausetheyallintendtogototheirdeath.

DUMU

If they have valuable possessions, soldiersmay become attached to them andlackthespirittofighttothedeath,andallarepledgedtodie.

WANGXI

Theyweepbecausetheyaresostirredup.

MasterSunSoaskillfulmilitaryoperationshouldbelikeaswiftsnakethatcounterswithits

tail when someone strikes at its head, counters with its head when someonestrikesatitstail,andcounterswithbothheadandtailwhensomeonestrikesatitsmiddle.

ZHANGYU

This represents themethodof abattle line, responding swiftlywhen struck.Amanualofeightclassicalbattleformationssays,“Makethebackthefront,makethefronttheback,withfourheadsandeighttails.Maketheheadanywhere,andwhentheenemylungesintothemiddle,headandtailbothcometotherescue.”

MasterSunThequestionmay be asked, can amilitary force bemade to be like this swiftsnake?Theanswer is that itcan.Evenpeoplewhodislikeeachother, if in thesameboat,willhelpeachotheroutintrouble.

MEIYAOCHEN

Itistheforceofthesituationthatmakesthishappen.

MasterSunThereforetetheredhorsesandburiedwheelsarenotsufficientlyreliable.

DUMU

Horsesare tetheredtomakeastationarybattle line,wheelsareburiedtomakethevehiclesimmovable.Evenso,thisisnotsufficientlysecureandreliable.Itisnecessarytoallowadaptationtochanges,placingsoldiersindeadlysituationssothattheywillfightspontaneously,helpingeachotheroutliketwohands—thisisthewaytosecurityandcertainvictory.

MasterSun

To even out bravery and make it uniform is the Tao of organization. To besuccessfulwithboththehardandsoftisbasedonthepatternoftheground.

CHENHAO

Iftheordersarestrictandclear,thebravecannotadvancebythemselvesandthetimidcannotshrinkbackbythemselves,sothearmyislikeoneman.

ZHANGYU

Ifyougettheadvantageoftheground,youcanovercomeopponentsevenwithsoft,weaktroops—howmuchthemorewithhard,strongtroops?Whatmakesitpossibleforbothstrongandweaktobeusefulistheconfigurationoftheground.

MasterSunThereforethoseskilledinmilitaryoperationsachievecooperationinagroupsothatdirectingthegroupislikedirectingasingleindividualwithnootherchoice.

DUMU

Peoplehavingnootherchoiceisametaphorfortheeasewithwhichtheycanbedirected.

MasterSunThebusinessofthegeneralisquietandsecret,fairandorderly.

MEIYAOCHEN

Ifyouarequietandinconspicuous,otherswillnotbeabletofigureyouout.Ifyouareaccurateandorderly,otherswillnotbeabletodisturbyou.

ZHANGYU

Hisplansarecalmanddeeplyhidden,sonoonecanfigurethemout.Hisregimeisfairandorderly,sonoonedarestakehimlightly.

MasterSunHecankeepthesoldiersunaware,makethemignorant.

LIQUAN

Thisisbecausehisplansareasyetunripe,andhedoesnotwantthesoldierstoknow them, because it is appropriate to enjoy the final accomplishment withthembutnottoplantheinitialstrategywiththem.

DUMUANDZHANGYU

This is tomake themknownothingbut to followorders,unawareofanythingelse.

MasterSunHechangeshisactionsandreviseshisplans,sothatpeoplewillnotrecognizethem. He changes his abode and goes by a circuitous route, so that peoplecannotanticipatehim.

ZHANGYU

Whenpeopleneverunderstandwhatyourintentionis,thenyouwin.TheGreatWhite Mountain Man said, “The reason deception is valued in militaryoperations is not just for deceiving enemies, but to begin with for deceivingone’sowntroops,togetthemtofollowunknowingly.”

MasterSunWhenaleaderestablishesagoalwiththetroops,heislikeonewhoclimbsuptoahighplaceandthentossesawaytheladder.Whenaleaderentersdeeplyinto

enemyterritorywiththetroops,hebringsouttheirpotential.Hehasthemburntheboatsanddestroythepots,drivesthemlikesheep,noneknowingwheretheyaregoing.

CAOCAO

Heunifiestheirminds.

LIQUAN

Anarmythatcomesbackisonethathasburneditsboatsandbridges tomakefast its will; since the soldiers do not know the plans, they do not think oflookingbackeither,sotheyarelikeherdedsheep.

MasterSunTo assemble armies and put them into dangerous situations is the business ofgenerals. Adaptations to different grounds, advantages of contraction andexpansion,patternsofhumanfeelingsandconditions—thesemustbeexamined.

DUMU

When he talks about the advantages and disadvantages of contraction andexpansion, he means that the ordinary patterns of human feelings all changeaccordingtothevarioustypesofground.

MasterSunGenerally, the way it is with invaders is that they unite when deep in enemyterritory but are prone to dissolvewhile on the fringes.When you leave yourcountry and cross the border on amilitary operation, that is isolated ground.When it is accessible from all directions, it is trafficked ground. Whenpenetration isdeep, that isheavyground.Whenpenetration is shallow, that islightground.Whenyourback is toan impassable fastnessandbeforeyouarenarrowstraits,thatissurroundedground.Whenthereisnowheretogo,thatisdeadlyground.

Soonagroundofdissolution,Iwouldunifythemindsofthetroops.Onlightground, Iwouldhave themkeep in touch.Onagroundof contention, Iwouldhavethemfollowupquickly.Onanintersectingground,Iwouldbecarefulaboutdefense.Onatraffickedground,Iwouldmakealliancesfirm.Onheavyground,Iwouldensurecontinuoussupplies.Onbadground,Iwouldurgethemonward.Onsurroundedground, Iwouldcloseup thegaps.Ondeadlyground, Iwouldindicatetothemthereisnosurviving.So the psychology of soldiers is to resist when surrounded, fight when it

cannotbeavoided,andobeyinextremes.

DUMU

Notuntil soldiersaresurroundeddo theyeachhave thedetermination to resistthe enemy and sustain victory.When they are desperate, they put up a uniteddefense.

MENGSHIWhentheyarefallenintodirestraits,theyobeycompletely.

MasterSunTherefore those who do not know the plans of competitors cannot preparealliances. Those who do not know the lay of the land cannot maneuver theirforces.Thosewhodonotuselocalguidescannottakeadvantageoftheground.Themilitaryofaneffectiverulershipmustknowallthesethings.Whenthemilitaryofaneffectiverulershipattacksalargecountry,thepeople

cannot unite. When its power overwhelms opponents, alliances cannot cometogether.

WANGXI

Ifyouareabletofindoutopponents’plans, takeadvantageof theground,andmaneuveropponentssothattheyarehelpless,thenevenalargecountrycannotassembleenoughpeopletostopyou.

ZHANGYU

Ifyourelyontheforceofwealthandstrengthtohastilyattackalargecountry,yourownpeoplewill resent thesufferingthiscausesandwillnotunitebehindyou.Ifyouposeanoverwhelmingmilitary threat torivalnations, their leaderswillfearyouandnotdaretoformalliances.

MasterSunThereforeifyoudonotcompeteforalliancesanywhere,donotfosterauthorityanywhere, but just extend your personal influence, threateningopponents, thismakestownandcountryvulnerable.

ZHANGYU

Ifyoudonotcompeteforalliesandhelpers,thenyouwillbeisolated,withlittlehelp.Ifyoudonotfosteryourauthority,thenpeoplewillleaveandthecountrywill weaken. If you lash out in personal rage, threatening neighbors withviolence,thenintheendyoubringdestructiononyourself.Anotherinterpretationisthatifanenemycountrycannotuniteitspeopleand

assembleitstroops,anditsalliancescannotcometogether,thenyoushouldcutoffitsrelationsandtakeawayitsauthority,sothatyoucanextendyourdesiresand awe your enemies, so that their citadels can be taken and their countriesoverthrown.

MasterSunGiveoutrewardsthatarenotintherules,giveoutdirectivesthatarenotinthecode.

MEIYAOCHEN

Considerthemerittogivethereward,withoutrulessetupbeforehand;observetheopponenttomakepromises,withoutpriorsetupofcodes.

JIALIN

When you want to take a citadel and overthrow a nation, you establishpunishmentsandrewardsoutsideyourcountry,andcarryoutdirectivesoutsideyourgovernment,soyoudonotsticktoyourordinaryrulesandcodes.

MasterSunEmploy the entire armed forces like employing a single person. Employ themwithactual tasks,donot talk to them.Motivate themwithbenefits, donot tellthemaboutharm.

MEIYAOCHEN

Just employ them to fight, don’t tell themyour strategy.Let themknowwhatbenefitthereisinitforthem,don’ttellthemaboutthepotentialharm.

WANGXI

Ifthetruthleaksout,yourstrategywillbefoiled.Ifthesoldiersworry,theywillbehesitantandfearful.

ZHANGYU

Humanpsychologyis togoforperceivedbenefitsandtry toavoidprospectiveharm.

MasterSunConfrontthemwithannihilation,andtheywillthensurvive;plungethemintoadeadlysituation,andtheywillthenlive.Whenpeoplefallintodanger,theyarethenabletostriveforvictory.

MEIYAOCHEN

Untiltheyaretrappedondifficultground,soldiersarenotfullyconcentratedinmind; once they have fallen into danger and difficulty, then the question of

winningorlosingdependsonwhatpeopledo.

MasterSunSothetaskofamilitaryoperationistoaccorddeceptivelywiththeintentionsofthe enemy. If you concentrate totally on the enemy, you can kill its militaryleadershipathousandmilesaway.Thisisskillfulaccomplishmentofthetask.

DUMU

If youwant to attack an enemybut do not see an opening, then conceal yourformanderaseyourtracks,goingalongwithwhattheenemydoes,notcausinganysurprises. If theenemy is stronganddespisesyou,youappear tobe timidand submissive, going along for the moment with his strength to make himhaughty,waitingforhimtobecomecomplacentandthusvulnerabletoattack.Iftheenemywantstoretreatandgohome,youopenupawaytolethimout,goingalongwithhisretreatso thathewillnothaveanydesire tofight,ultimately totakeadvantageofthistoattack.Bothofthesearetechniquesofaccordingwiththeenemy.

ZHANGYU

Firstyougoalongwith their intentions, subsequentlyyoukill theirgenerals—thisisskillinaccomplishingthetask.

MasterSunSoon thedaywar isdeclared,bordersare closed,passportsare tornup,andemissariesarenotletthrough.

ZHANGYU

Once top-level assessments have been made and military strategy has beendeveloped, then the borders are sealed and passports are revoked, not lettingmessengersthrough,lesttherebeinformationleaks.

MasterSunMattersaredealtwithstrictlyatheadquarters.

MEIYAOCHEN

Strictnessatheadquartersintheplanningstagereferstosecrecy.

MasterSunWhenopponentspresentopenings,youshouldpenetratethemimmediately.Gettowhattheywantfirst,subtlyanticipatethem.Maintaindisciplineandadapttotheenemy inorder todetermine theoutcomeof thewar.Thus,at firstyouarelikeamaiden, so the enemyopenshisdoor; thenyouare likea rabbit on theloose,sotheenemycannotkeepyouout.

[12]

FireAttack

MasterSunThere are five kinds of fire attack: burning people, burning supplies, burningequipment,burningstorehouses,andburningweapons.The use of fire must have a basis, and requires certain tools. There are

appropriatetimesforsettingfires,namelywhentheweatherisdryandwindy.Generally,infireattacksitisimperativetofollowuponthecrisescausedby

the fires. When fire is set inside an enemy camp, then respond quickly fromoutside.Ifthesoldiersarecalmwhenfirebreaksout,wait—donotattack.Whenthefirereachestheheightofitspower,followupifpossible,holdbackifnot.

DUMU

Ingeneral, fire isused to throwenemies intoconfusionso thatyoucanattackthem. It is not simply to destroy enemies with fire. When you hear fire haserupted,youshouldthenattack;oncethefirehasbeenbroughtundercontrolandthe people have settled down, it is no use to attack, soMaster Sun says youshouldrespondquickly.

MasterSunWhenfirecanbesetoutintheopen,donotwaituntilitcanbesetinsideacamp—setitwhenthetimeisright.

ZHANGYU

Firecanalsobesetoutside,inthefield;itisnotnecessarytowaituntilfirecanbesetinsideanenemycamp.Aslongasthereisanopportunity,firecanbesetatanappropriatetime.

MasterSunWhenfireissetupwind,donotattackdownwind.

MEIYAOCHEN

Itisnoteffectivetogoagainstthemomentumofthefire,becausetheenemywillsurelyfighttothedeath.

MasterSunIfitiswindyduringtheday,thewindwillstopatnight.

MEIYAOCHEN

Adaytimewindwillstopatnight,anightwindwillstopatdaylight.

MasterSunArmies must know there are adaptations of the five kinds of fire attack, andadheretothemscientifically.

ZHANGYU

Itwillnotdojusttoknowhowtoattackotherswithfire,itisimperativetoknowhow to prevent others from attacking you.You should figure out theweatherpatternsandadherestrictlytotheprincipleofsettingfireattacksonlyonsuitablywindydays.

MasterSunSotheuseoffiretohelpanattackmeansclarity,useofwatertohelpatattackmeansstrength.Watercancutoff,butcannotplunder.

ZHANGYU

Whenyouusefiretohelpanattack,clearlyyoucanwinthereby.Watercanbeused todivideupanopposingarmy,so that their force isdividedandyours isstrong.

MasterSunTowininbattleormakeasuccessfulsiegewithoutrewardingthemeritoriousisunluckyandearnsthenameofstinginess.Thereforeitissaidthatanenlightenedgovernmentconsidersthis,andgoodmilitaryleadershiprewardsmerit.Theydonotmobilizewhen there is no advantage, do not actwhen there is nothing togain,donotfightwhenthereisnodanger.

ZHANGYU

Armaments are instruments of ill omen, war is a dangerous affair. It isimperativetopreventdisastrousdefeat,soitwillnotdotomobilizeanarmyforpettyreasons—armsareonlytobeusedwhenthereisnochoicebuttodoso.

MasterSunAgovernmentshouldnotmobilizeanarmyoutofanger,militaryleadersshouldnotprovokewaroutofwrath.Actwhenitisbeneficial,desistifitisnot.Angercanreverttojoy,wrathcanreverttodelight,butanationdestroyedcannotberestored to existence, and the dead cannot be restored to life. Therefore anenlightenedgovernmentiscarefulaboutthis,agoodmilitaryleadershipisalerttothis.Thisisthewaytosecureanationandkeepthearmedforceswhole.

CAOCAO

Donotusearmsbecauseofyourownemotions.

WANGXI

Ifyouareinconsistentinyourfeelings,youwilllosedignityandtrust.

ZHANGYU

Ifthegovernmentisalwaysprudentabouttheuseofarms,itcantherebymakethenationsecure.Ifthemilitaryleadershipisalwayswaryoftakingwarlightly,itcanthereforekeepthearmedforceswhole.

[13]

OntheUseofSpies

MasterSunAmajormilitaryoperationisaseveredrainonthenation,andmaybekeptupforyearsinthestruggleforoneday’svictory.Sotofailtoknowtheconditionsofopponents because of reluctance to give rewards for intelligence is extremelyinhumane, uncharacteristic of a true military leader, uncharacteristic of anassistant of the government, uncharacteristic of a victorious chief. So whatenables an intelligent government and awisemilitary leadership to overcomeothersandachieveextraordinaryaccomplishmentsisforeknowledge.Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by

analogy, cannotbe foundoutby calculation. Itmustbeobtained frompeople,peoplewhoknowtheconditionsoftheenemy.Therearefivekindsofspy:Thelocalspy,theinsidespy,thereversespy,the

deadspy,andthelivingspy.Whenthefivekindsofspiesareallactive,nooneknows theirroutes—this iscalledorganizationalgenius,and isvaluable to theleadership.Local spies are hired from among the people of a locality. Inside spies are

hired fromamong enemyofficials.Reverse spies are hired fromamong enemyspies.Deadspies transmit false intelligence toenemyspies.Livingspiescomebacktoreport.

ZHANGYU

Insidespiesaredrawnfromamongdisaffectedofficialsoftheopposingregime,orfromamongrelativesofofficialswhohavebeenexecuted.

DUMU

Amongofficialsoftheopposingregime,thereareintelligentoneswholosetheirjobs, there are those who are punished for excesses, there are also greedyfavorites.Therearethoseconfinedtothelowerranks,therearethosewhofailtoget appointments, there are thosewho seek to take advantage of a collapse toextend their ownwealth and power, and there are thosewho always act withdeceitandduplicity.Anyofthemcanbesecretlyapproachedandbribedsoastofindoutconditionsintheircountryanddiscoveranyplansagainstyou;theycanalsobeusedtocreateriftsanddisharmony.

LIQUAN

Whenenemyagentscometospyonyou,bribethemgenerouslytomakethemspyforyouinstead.Theyarethenreversespies,renegades,ordoubleagents.

WANGXI

Reverse spies are enemy spies who are detained and induced to giveinformation,orwhoaresentbackwithfalse information.Deadspiesare thosewho are fooled by their own leaders into passing on false information to theenemy;whenthefactsaredetermined,theyareinevitablykilled.

DUYOU

When your spies are given false information that they hand on to the enemywhen they are captured, the enemy makes preparations according to thisinformation.Whenthingsturnoutdifferently,thespiesthendie.Thereforetheyarecalleddeadspies.

DUMU

Livingspiesarethosethatcomeandgowithinformation.Forlivingspies,itisimperativetochoosethosewhoareinwardlybrightbutoutwardlyappeartobestupid,whoare inconspicuous inappearancebut strongofheart,whoare fast,powerful, and brave, who are immune to seduction, who can endure hunger,cold,anddishonor.

MasterSunThereforenooneinthearmedforcesistreatedasfamiliarlyasarespies,nooneis given rewardsas richas thosegiven to spies, andnomatter ismore secretthanespionage.

DUYOU

If spies are not treated well, they may become renegades and work for theenemy, leaking out information about you. They are given rich rewards andreliedupontodo theirwork. If theydonotkeep theirespionagesecret, this issuicidal.

MasterSunOne cannot use spies without sagacity and knowledge, one cannot use spieswithout humanity and justice, one cannot get the truth from spies withoutsubtlety.Thisisaverydelicatematterindeed.Spiesareusefuleverywhere.

DUMU

Everymatterrequirespriorknowledge.

MasterSunIfanitemofintelligenceisheardbeforeaspyreportsit,thenboththespyandtheonewhotoldaboutitdie.

MEIYAOCHEN

Thespyiskilledfor leakinginformation, theonewhotoldabout it iskilledtostophimfromtalking.

MasterSunWheneveryouwanttoattackanarmy,besiegeacity,orkillaperson,firstyoumust know the identities of their defending generals, their associates, their

visitors,theirgatekeepers,andtheirchamberlains,sohaveyourspiesfindout.

DUMU

Wheneveryouaregoingtoattackandfight,firstyouhavetoknowthetalentsofthepeopleemployedby theopponent,soyoucandealwith themaccording totheirabilities.

MasterSunYoumustseekoutenemyagentswhohavecometospyonyou,bribethemandinduce them to stay with you, so you can use them as reverse spies. Byintelligence thusobtained,youcan find localspiesand insidespies toemploy.Byintelligencethusobtained,youcancausethemisinformationofdeadspiestobeconveyedtotheenemy.Byintelligencethusobtained,youcangetlivingspiestoworkasplanned.

ZHANGYU

By means of these reverse spies, you find out greedy locals and vulnerableofficialswhocanbeinducedtoworkforyou.Bymeansofthesereversespies,you can find out how the enemy can be deceived, and send dead spies tomisinformthem.Bymeansofthesereversespiesyoucanfindouttheconditionsoftheenemy,sothatlivingspiescangoandreturnasplanned.

MasterSunIt is essential fora leader to knowabout the five kindsof espionage,and thisknowledgedependsonreversespies,soreversespiesmustbetreatedwell.

DUMU

It isby findingout theconditionsof theenemy through theagencyof reversespies that all the other kinds of espionage can be used, so reverse spies,renegadesordoubleagents,aremostimportantandmustbetreatedwell.

MasterSunSoonlyabrilliantrulerorawisegeneralwhocanusethehighlyintelligentforespionageissureofgreatsuccess.Thisisessentialformilitaryoperations,andthearmiesdependonthisintheiractions.

DUMU

Itwillnotdoforthearmytoactwithoutknowingtheopponent’scondition,andtoknowtheopponent’sconditionisimpossiblewithoutespionage.

MASTERINGTHEARTOFWAR

ZHUGELIANGANDLIUJI

NOTEONPRONUNCIATION

The Chinese proper names in this book are transliterated in Pinyin, the mostwidelyacceptedmethodof romanization forChinese. Inactualusage,Chinesephoneticsare socomplex thatadetailed treatmentofChinesepronunciation isoutsidethescopeofthisbook.Forthecomfortandeaseofthereader,however,itisusefultonoteafewlettersthatarecommonlyusedinPinyinspellingbutarerelativelyuncommoninEnglishandaregivendifferentvalues.Therearefiveconsonantsthataretypicallyfoundtocauseproblemsbecause

of their special usage: c, q, x, z and zh. The following chart represent roughequivalentstotheseconsonantsinEnglish:

cresemblestsqresembleschxresemblesshzresemblesdzzhresemblesj

TRANSLATOR’SINTRODUCTION

Skilledwarriorsofoldweresubtle,Mysteriouslypowerful,Sodeeptheywereunknowable.

TaoTeChing

BeextremelysubtleEventothepointofformlessnessBeextremelymysteriousEventothepointofsoundlessnessTherebyyoucanbethedirectorOfanopponent’sfate

TheArtofWar

Change and movement have their times; safety and danger are inoneself. Calamity and fortune, gain and loss, all start from oneself.Thereforethosewhomasterchangearethosewhoaddressthemselvestothetime.Forthosewhoaddressthemselvestothetime,evendangerissafe;forthosewhomasterchange,evendisturbanceisorderly.

TheBookofBalanceandHarmony

Thestudyandpracticeofstrategiclivinginthemidstofallsituationsandeventshave been a central concern of practical philosophers of all the great culturessinceancienttimes.InChina,oneoftheoldestlivingcivilizationsonearth,theclassicalphilosophersconcernedthemselveswithhumanity’sstruggletosurviveand find security in themidst of endless change andmovement.Many of theancient teachers of wisdom were also artisans and scientists, seeking newstrategies for living in their study of human nature and destiny; others werepolitical and even military leaders, studying the most complex and difficultproblemsofsociety.AccordingtothephilosophersofancientChina,whenthepristinesociability

ofhumanityhadbecomedistortedbypersonalambitions, it fell intoa stateofperpetual innerwar. Thiswarmanifested itself in social unrest, class conflict,and eventually armed aggression. From this time on the philosophersmade ittheir particular concern to study mechanisms of human conflict and developtheirunderstandingintopracticalsciencesofcrisismanagement.For this reason, very early classicalChinese literature is already examining

wardeliberately,notonlyfromthepointofviewofwhenandhowtoprosecutewar,butalso from thepointofviewof its impactonsocietyand the resultingethicalimplications.TheYinConvergenceClassic,forexample,isconsideredamostancientTaoisttext,believedtoantedateeventheTaoTeChing(“TheWayandItsPower”),havingsuchconsequentprestigethatitisavidlystudiedbybothsocial strategists and mystics: in a typically laconic manner this short workalready summarizes the attitudes to war later adopted by various schools ofthought,includingtheperennialTaoistandConfucianphilosophies:“Cutoffonewellspring, that of profiteering,” the classic says, “and that is ten times betterthanmobilizingthearmy.”Later the Tao Te Ching, undoubtedly the most famous pure Taoist classic,

elaboratedonthethemeofgreedasthemotiveforceunderlyingaggression:

WhentheworldhastheWay,Runninghorsesareretiredtotillthefields.WhentheworldlackstheWay,War-horsesarebredinthecountryside.Nocrimeisgreaterthanapprovingofgreed,Nocalamityisgreaterthandiscontent,Nofaultisgreaterthanpossessiveness.

ThesamefundamentalthemeiscarefullyelaboratedintheIChing(“BookofChanges”), another early Chinese classic, one that is devoted, as the titlesuggests, to a science of mastering change, the basic fact of life. The samepassageof theYinConvergenceClassic goeson to explain that cuttingoff thewellspringofgreedbeginsathome:“Introspect three timesdayandnight,andthat is ten thousand times better than mobilizing the army.” This is also onemeaning of the now proverbial line of the Tao Te Ching: “The journey of athousandmilesbeginswiththefirststep,”whichfromtheoriginalmayalsobetranslated,“Thejourneyofathousandmilesbeginsatyourfeet.”Laterclassicsalsofollowthistheorythatsocialreformmustbeginwithinthe

individual, and the implication that inward renewalofconscience isultimatelymore effective than external imposition of law. For this reason Chinese

philosophers concluded that education was of ever-increasing importance tosociety as awhole. They often had radically different ideas about the kind ofeducationtheyconsiderednecessary,butallofthemagreedtoincludethestudyof conflict.Andas it turnedout, in spiteof thevarietyof their ideasonothersubjects, theancientChinesephilosophersoftencame to the sameconclusionson conflict. Thus the classics on strategy in conflict, such as the famoushandbookknownasTheArtofWarbySunTzu,generallycontainanamalgamofthemajorphilosophiesofancientChina,particularlythosederivedfromtheIChing.ThehistoryofwarfareinChinareachesbackintoancientmythsrepresenting

great warriors as mystics and magicians whose legendary struggles came totypify the philosophers’ ideals of justice and social service in the earlyemergence of civilization. The realities of war in historical times were neverquite as clear and simple as the paradigms of legend, but certain fundamentalimages and concepts were tenaciously held by politicians, philosophers, andwarriorsthroughoutthecenturiesintheirthinkingaboutcontentionandconflict.China is a heterogeneous civilizationwithvast territories encompassing and

bordering on an even greater variety of peoples. Its history is marked bycenturiesofwarfarebothcivilandforeign.Thepersistenceofcertaincausesandpatternsofconflictovernearlythreethousandyearsmakesthestudyofwarfareandthephilosophyofthewarriorspotentiallyinstructiveandevenenlightening,bringingouttheessenceofconflict.Reducedtosimpleformulae,thepowerstrugglesthatunderliethreethousand

yearsofwarfareinChinarepresentelaborationsofafewbasicantagonisms.TheearlywarfareofChinesefolklorewastribalwaramongthepeopleswholivedormoved along the Yellow River. Certain tribes came to dominate others, untilrelatively large andquite powerful confederations developed along theYellowRiverduringthe thirdandsecondmillenniaB.C.E.During theextended livesoftheseconfederations,warfarebrokeoutamongregional interests in thecontrolof the clanswho organized and dominated them.This gradually intensified infrequency and violence, culminating in a prolonged period of virtuallycontinuouswarfareappropriatelyknownastheeraoftheWarringStates,whichlastedfromthefifththroughthethirdcenturiesB.C.E.Arelentless campaignof the late third century finally ended these interstate

warsandcreatedaunitedChinaforthefirsttimeinhistory.Thiswasfollowedbywars of expansion,which are analogous to the ancient tribalwars throughwhich the proto-Chinese people originally established dominance over theYellowRiverbasin.UndertheunitedChineseregime,warfarebetweentheruledand the rulers became a typical pattern of conflict, in which regionalism

continuedtoplayapart.Strugglesbetweenlocalinterestsandcentralcontrol,andbetweenoverclasses

and underclasses, played themselves out in various combinations andelaborationsoftheseelementsthroughcountlesscivilandforeignintriguesandwars in thecenturies tocome.Added to thiswereclanandfamilyrivalries,aswellaspoliticalconflictsamongtheintelligentsia,palaceeunuchs,andimperialin-laws. On greater and smaller scales, the race for power and possessionsbecame a distinct facet of human events, to which practical philosophersrespondedwithascienceofsecurityandstrategicaction.Someofthemostpoignantstatementsonwarandwarriorhoodoriginateinthe

classicTaoTeChing,generallythoughttohavebeencompiledduringtheearlytomiddleWarringStatesera.InthecharacteristicfashionofTaoism,thispopulartextseeksouttheconfluenceofethicalandpracticalwisdom:

Weapons,beinginstrumentsofillomen,Arenotthetoolsofthecultured,Whousethemonlywhenunavoidable,Andconsideritbesttobealoof.Theywinwithoutbeautifyingit:ThosewhobeautifyitEnjoykillingpeople.ThosewhoenjoykillingpeopleCannotgettheirwilloftheworld.Whenyouareinascendancyofpower,

Youhandleitasyouwouldamourning:Whenyouhavekilledmanypeople,Youweepfortheminsorrow.Whenyouwinawar,Youcelebratebymourning.

The same classic also describes the skilled warrior in similar terms, as theantithesisofbravadoandviolence:

Skilledwarriorsofoldweresubtle,Mysteriouslypowerful,Sodeeptheywereunknowable.Justbecausetheyareunknowable,Iwilltrytodescribethem:

TheirwarinesswasasthatofoneCrossingariverinwinter;TheircautionwasasthatofoneInfearofallaround.Theywereseriousasguests,Relaxedasiceatthemeltingpoint.Simpleasuncarvedwood,Openasthevalleys,Theywereinscrutableasmurkywater.

ThisTaoiststreamofthoughthadadistinctinfluenceonthestrategicoutlookofThe Art ofWar, and elements of its penetrating criticism of tyranny in allformsalsoappearintheideasofthelaterWarringStatesphilosophersMoziandMencius.Bothofthesethinkers,especiallyMozi,wereactivists,notedfortheirstrongviewsonwarfare.Teaching that socialwell-beingderives fromuniversal love,Mozidescribed

warfare as mass murder and ridiculed the states of his time for punishingindividual thefts and murders while rewarding pillage and massacre. Mozihimself designed war machinery and organized a highly mobile brigade ofasceticreligiouswarriorstogototherescueofsmallstatesvictimizedbylargerones.Afterhispassing,Mozi’sfollowerscontinuedthistraditionuntilabouttheendoftheWarringStatesera.Mencius, who lived somewhat after the time of Mozi, is famous for his

elaborationoftheteachingsofthegreateducatorConfucius.WhereasMozihadfocusedhisattentiononinterstateconflicts,Menciuswasmoreconcernedwithclassconflicts.Hisworkstronglyupholdstheprincipleandpracticeofidentityof interests as essential to social and political health. Accordingly, Menciusrepudiated the last vestiges of ancient beliefs in the divine right of kings, andarticulatedthemoralbasisofrebellionbyoppressedpeoples.BothMoziandMenciuscametoberegardedbyTaoistsasoftheirnumberin

some sense, as were Confucius and other early philosophers whowrote the IChingandTheArtofWar. In the secondcenturyB.C.E., allof these schoolsofthoughtwereincorporatedinsomewayintoonebook,thedistinguishedTaoistclassic known as The Masters of Huainan. The subject matter of thisextraordinarybookcoversawiderangeofinquiryincludingpolitics,sociology,ecology, biology, andpsychology,weaving them into aunified scienceof life.The Masters of Huainan combines the teachings of the I Ching, the Tao TeChing,andthehigherteachingsofTheArtofWar,astypifiedinastoryonawayto practice the dictum of the last-mentioned classic of strategy, that “to win

withoutfightingisbest.”

WhenthestateofJinmarchedonthestateofChu,thegrandeesofChuaskedthekingtoattack,butthekingsaid,“Jindidnotattackusduringthe reignofour formerking;now that Jin is attackingusduringmyreign,itmustbemyfault.Whatcanbedoneforthisdisgrace?”The grandees said, “Jin did not attack us in the time of previous

ministries; now that Jin is attacking us during our administration, itmustbeourfault.”ThekingofChubowedhisheadandwept.Thenheroseandbowed

tohisministers.When the people of Jin heard about this, they said, “The king of

Chuandhisministersarecompetingtotaketheblameonthemselves;and how easily the king humbles himself to his subordinates. Theycannotbeattacked.”SothatnighttheJinarmyturnedaroundtogohome.ThisiswhytheTaoTeChingsays,“Whocanacceptthedisgraceof

anationiscalledruleroftheland.”

The Masters of Huainan relates another anecdote to illustrate a corollaryprinciple of The Art of War, to the effect that when contention escalates toconflict there is already loss even invictory, and this can lead to evengreaterlossevenafterithasended:

TheMartialLordofWeiaskedoneofhisministerswhathadcausedthedestructionofacertainnation-state.Theministersaid,“Repeatedvictoriesinrepeatedwars.”The Martial Lord said, “A nation is fortunate to win repeated

victoriesinrepeatedwars.Whywouldthatcauseitsdestruction?”Theminister said, “Where there are repeatedwars, the people are

weakened;whentheyscorerepeatedvictories,rulersbecomehaughty.Lethaughtyrulerscommandweakenedpeople,andrareis thenationthatwillnotperishasaresult.”

EventuallythewholerangeofChinesethoughtonthepracticalitiesoflifewasinherited by the Chan Buddhists, who subjected the understanding of everyschoolofideastothemostrigorousexaminationinordertoculltheessenceandsenseofeachone.ThusoneofthemostexcellentpresentationsofthehierarchyofChinese philosophies ofwar can be found in thewritings of the illustrious

eleventh-centuryBuddhistMingjiao,whowasascholarandhistorianaswellasamasterofChanBuddhistmysticism:

The use of arms is for dealing with criminal acts; it comes fromhumanitarianism and is based on justice. It comes fromhumanitarianism in the sense of sympathy for thosewhose lives arebeing disrupted, and is based on justice in the sense of stoppingviolence.When violence is stopped justly, there is mutual realignment, not

mutual disturbance.When thosewhose lives are disrupted are pitiedforhumanitarianreasons,plansaremadetofosterlife,nottokill.Thereforethearmedactionsoftheidealizedleadersofancienttimes

arecalledcorrectivepunishmentsandcampaignsforjustice.WhensocialcohesionwanedandtheWarringStateseraset in, the

courseofmilitarysciencechanged:humanitarianismandjusticefadedout;insteadmilitaryaffairscamefromviolenceandwenttotreachery.Strong states became unrestrained through militarism, large statesgrewarrogantbecauseoftheirarmies,angrystatesusedtheirweaponsto incite disturbance, and greedy states used their armed forces toinvadeothers.“Militaryactionisaperverseaffair,usedbythecivilizedonlywhen

unavoidable.”Thereforesagesvaluemoralpower,notmilitarypower.Thisiswhythosewhounderstandmilitaryscienceshouldnotruntheworldalone.“Puttingonarmorisnotthewaytopromoteacountry’swelfare;it

isforeliminatingviolence.”“A lost country wars with weapons; a dictatorship wars with

cunning; a kingdomwarswith humanitarian justice; an empirewarswithvirtue;autopiawarswithnondoing.”

A later Chan Buddhist, also an enlightened scholar and poet, added otherpointsofviewtohispredecessor’saccountoftheclassicalphilosophiesofwar.Herecordedhisobservationsinhauntinglybeautifulpoetrywhilehidinginthemountainsafterfallingvictimtoanintrigue.AstrongTaoistelement,partoftheancient heritage ofChanBuddhism, is evident in the poet’s incisive vision ofhistory and impartial understanding of the beauty and tragedy of contendinginterestsinthecourseofhumanlife.

ImpressionsonReadingHistory

TheenlightenedandthegoodgetthingsdoneonlyfromtimetotimeWhilepettybureaucratsalwayssupportoneanother.OnceslanderersandflatterersgettheirwishesSagesandphilosophersaredeterred.TheGreatProcessmakesmyriadbeingsOfcountlessdifferenttypes.FragrantandfoularenotputtogetherThehumaneandtheviolentapplydifferentnorms.IfyouputthemtogetherHowcantheygetalong?

LamentofaSoldier’sWifeYou’rebetteroffgrassbytheroadsideThanwifetoasoldieratwar.TheweddingbednotevenwarmHerman’snowonthenorthernfront.SheremembersthedaytheypartedHowthesnowflewo’erthelandscapeBowandarrowsheavyathissideIcesplittinghishorse’shoovesHeissofarfromhomeHowcantheyhopetomeet?ItsaddenshereventoseesunandmoonThatshineonbothherandhermanPiningandpiningshelongsWhenwilliteverend?EverynightinlaboreddreamsHerspiritcrossesthenorthernfrontsofar.ButthereisaruleinthearmyTobecarefulallofthetimeTheycannotthinkofhomeandfamilyButworkmindlesslyfordefenseSinceancienttimesmenloyaltodutyAllhavelearnedtodie.

TheArtofWarandtheIChing:StrategyandChange

TheArtofWarandtheIChingaretwoperennialChineseclassics,ancientbooksthat have been studied by civil andmilitary strategists throughout the ages inChina and neighboring Asian countries. The Art of War includes the culturalwithin the martial; the I Ching includes the martial within the cultural. InclassicalChinesepolitical ideology,militarystrategywasasubordinatebranchof social strategy. Accordingly, the first line of national defense againstdisruptionoforderbyexternalorinternalforceswasbelievedtolieinthemoralstrengthofaunitedpeople.Itwasfurthermaintainedthatpeoplecouldbeunitedbypoliciesthatfosteredthegeneralwelfare.SinceunitywasdistinguishedfromuniformityintheIChing,purist ideologymaintained that thesepolicieshad tobeadaptedtothetime,place,andpeopletheyweresupposedtoserve.ThefollowingstudiesofTheArtofWarsurveybothideasandevents in the

philosophyand applicationof conflictmanagement according to this tradition.TheconnectionbetweenthephilosophyandorganizationalscienceofTheArtofWar and the even more ancient I Ching is cited in the introduction to mytranslation of The Art of War. In order to put this classic of strategy in itsphilosophicalperspective,itislogicaltobeginwiththeteachingsoncontentionandmilitaryactionoutlinedintheIChingitself.To many readers both East and West, the I Ching may be familiar as an

ancient book of omens, used formillennia as a fortune-telling handbook. It isstill undoubtedly used for prognostication, but this practice has not beenendorsed by leading philosophers or political scientists. Divination has beenexplicitlyprohibitedbymilitaryscientistsat leastasfarback inhistoryasTheArtofWaritself.Forthesocialscientist,theIChingisabookofstrategicassessments,whose

designissupposedtohelptheindividualleadamorerationalandeffectivelife.Itsstructureisbasedonaquadrangleoffourfundamentalsetsofideas,onwhichrevolves a cycle of three hundred and sixty states of opportunity.The numberthreehundredandsixtycorrespondstothedaysofthelunaryear,whichinturnisemblematicof totalityandcompleteness.Thesestatesaregroupedintosixtymajorconfigurations,representedbysymbolicsigns,orhexagrams,consistingof

sixelementseach.Everyhexagramisgivenanameandatheme,whichstandsforsomeaspectof

life and development in the midst of change. This is accompanied byobservations and images of possibility and change that can take place withinhuman relationships under such conditions, when analogous opportunitiesdevelopinthecourseofevents.Thesixelementswithineachhexagramarealsoaccompanied by observations and images that further analyze the theme fromdifferent points of view, according to the various relative positions in whichpeoplemayfindthemselvesundergivenconditions.ThetwothemesintheIChingthataremostprominentlyrelevanttoastudyof

IChing influence inThe Art ofWar would be those of the sixth and seventhhexagrams,“Contention”and“TheArmy.”Consideredinsuccessionaccordingto the traditional order of study used for temporal events, the observations ofthesetwoIChingthemesformanoutlineofclassicalthinkingonthestructureofconflictresponse.The statement of the I Ching on the hexagram for “Contention” reads, “In

contention there is sincerity.” Cheng Yi, one of the best I Ching readers inhistory, an idealist interpreter under the influence of Taoism and ChanBuddhism,explains this ideasimplybysaying that“Contentionarisesbecauseofneed.”Withcustomaryambiguity, thisremarkapplies tobothpredatoryanddefensivewarfare.Initsoverallsymbolism,thehexagramfor“Contention”showsinternaldesire

and outward strength. This combination is taken to represent the greedy andaggressive possibilities in human psychology and behavior that lead tocontention.Thus the “need”ChengYi calls the source fromwhich contentionarisesmaybeunderstoodtorefertotheinternalforcescompellinganaggressoraswellastheexternalforcesnecessitatingdefenseagainstaggression.In the code of ethics outlined in the I Ching, contention is considered

justifiablewhen it is in resistance to oppression, or in opposition to sufferingcausedbygreedandaggression.Thisprinciple isconfirmed inall threeof themajor Ways of Chinese thought, in Confucianism and Taoism as well as inBuddhism.Therefore“contentionthatisjust”alsoarisesbecauseofneed.Thisisthe “sincerity in contention” of which the I Ching speaks. Cheng Yi says,“Without sincerity and truthfulness, contention ismerely intrigue and leads tomisfortune.”ThiscodeisalsoreflectedinthepracticalteachingsofTheArtofWar.Inthe

chapteron“ManeuveringArmies,”MasterSunsays,“Tobeviolentatfirstandwind up fearing one’s people is the epitome of ineptitude.” In the chapter on“FireAttack,”hesays,“Agovernmentshouldnotmobilizeanarmyoutofanger,

leadersshouldnotprovokewaroutofwrath.Actwhenitisbeneficial,desistifitisnot.”The IChing’s statement on “Contention” continues, “[When] obstructed, be

careful to bebalanced, for thatwill lead to good results. Finality leads to badresults.”ChengYisays:

Peoplewhocontendmatchtheirreasoningwithothersinanticipationof a decision. Though theymay be sincere and truthful, [if there iscontention, that means] they are necessarily obstructed; somethingmust be unresolved, for if that were not the case, thematter wouldalreadybeclearandtherewouldbenodispute.Since the matter is not yet settled, one cannot necessarily say

whetheritwillturnoutwellorbadly.Thereforethereisgreatconcernthatanauspiciousbalancebeachievedandmaintained.Ifyouachievebalance, thatbodeswell.“Finality leads tobadresults”means that ifyouconcludeaffairswithunmitigatedfinality,thatbodesill.

On thesameprinciple, in thechapteron“FireAttack”TheArtofWar says,“Anger can revert to joy, wrath can revert to delight, but a nation destroyedcannot be restored to existence, and the dead cannot be restored to life.Therefore an enlightened government is careful about this, a good militaryleadershipisalerttothis.”InitstechnicalsenseinIChingphilosophy,astateofbalanceorcenteredness

means an attitude that is not affectedby emotion.According to the traditionalformula as cited in The Book of Balance and Harmony, a neo-Taoist classicbasedontheIChing,“Beforeemotionsarise iscalledbalance;whenemotionsarise yet are moderate, this is called harmony.” Traditional Taoist teachingunderstands balance to mean being objective and impartial. In the classicalformulaof“balanceandharmony,” thisobjective impartiality isalwaysplacedfirst, because it is held to be the practical means whereby harmony cansubsequentlybeattained.Because of the serious consequences of decisionsmade in contention, the I

Ching adds to its statement, “It is beneficial to see a great person.” This is astockphrase,traditionallyunderstoodtomeanthatrealwisdomandknowledgeareessentialandcannotbereplacedbyemotionalopinion.ChengYidescribesgreatpeople,orpeopleofwisdom,as thosewho“cansettledisputeswithfirmunderstandingthatisbalancedandtrue.”The Art of War also places great emphasis on the importance of mature

guidance, which becomes increasingly critical in times of conflict and crisis:

“Leadership is amatter of intelligence, trustworthiness, humaneness, courage,and sternness” (“StrategicAssessments”).According to classical philosophers,impartialwisdom isvaluable to allparties in adispute, insofar as loss alreadystarts with contention and is maximized when contention becomes conflict.Furthermore, for those already involved in struggle, effective deployment ofenergiesdependsonguidanceorleadershiptoconcentratethem.In both classical and modern terms, the I Ching’s statement that “it is

beneficial to see great people” is also taken to refer to the importance ofeducation,exposingthepopulationtothethoughtsofgreatminds; this tooisaform of leadership, one which philosophers believed should also inform theexerciseofpersonalleadership.The final word of the I Ching’s observation on the general theme of

“Contention” says, “It is not beneficial to cross great rivers.” According toChengYi, thismeans that one should take safety precautions and not becomereckless in contention. According to the tradition of strategists, knowledge ofconditionsisthebasisofcautionandpreparedness:initschapteron“PlanningaSiege,” The Art of War says, “If you do not know others and do not knowyourself, youwill be imperiled in every single battle.” In actual conflict, thisnaturallyextends tomattersof logistics: in thechapteron“DoingBattle,”TheArtofWaralsosays,“Whenacountryisimpoverishedbymilitaryoperations,itis because of transporting supplies to a distant place. Transport supplies to adistantplace,andthepopulacewillbeimpoverished.”The remark that “it isnotbeneficial to crossgreat rivers” in contention can

also be read as a restatement of the basic principle of ethical contention thatdistinguishesitfrominvasiveandaggressiveaction.Inthechapteron“Terrain,”The Art of War says, “One advances without seeking glory, retreats withoutavoiding blame, only protecting people.” Similarly, the Taoist classic TheMastersofHuainan saysofadventurism,“Covetouspeoplewithmanydesiresarelulledtosleepbypowerandprofit,seducedintolongingforfameandstatus.Theywishtoriseintheworldthroughexceptionalcunning,sotheirvitalityandspiritaredailydepletedandbecomefurtherandfurtheraway.”Thethemeof“Contention”isfurtheranalyzedintheIChing’sstatementson

eachindividualelementofthehexagram.Thefirstelementshowslowlinessandweakness.Thestatementofthetextsays,“Whenyoudonotpersistforeverinanaffair, there is a little criticism,but the end is auspicious.”ChengYi explains,“This is because contention in general is not something that should beprolonged;andweakpeopleinlowpositionsinparticularhardlyeverhaveanyluckincontention.”TheArtofWaralsoreflectsthisprincipleofminimalisminitsstrategy;inthe

chapter on “Doing Battle,” it says, “When you do battle, even if you arewinning,ifyoucontinueforalongtimeitwilldullyourforcesandbluntyouredge;ifyoubesiegeacitadel,yourstrengthwillbeexhausted.Ifyoukeepyourarmiesoutinthefieldforalongtime,yoursupplieswillbeinsufficient.”ChengYi’sobservationthatpowerlesspeopleinpositionsofweaknessrarely

have luck in contention also illustrates one reason why peasant uprisingsthroughoutChinesehistoryhavegenerallyhadamongtheirleaderspeoplefromthe intellectual, religious,military,oraristocraticclasses.ChengYi says,“It isbecausethereiscorrespondingassistancefromahigherlevelthatpeopleinthisposition are able to refrain from persisting in an affair,” since collaborationreducesconflict.According to interpretationbasedonethical idealism, thesecondelementof

the hexagram represents ambitious strength contending against a just order.Because this is contention motivated by personal desire and not by moralnecessity, it is countermanded in the I Ching’s statement: “Not pressing yourcontention, go back to escape in your hometown; then youwill be free fromfault.”ChengYiexplains,“Ifyouknowthatwhat isrightandjust isnot tobeopposed,andyougobackhometo livemodestly,mindingyourownbusiness,thenyouwillbefreefromfault.”The third element of the “Contention” hexagram represents peoplewho are

pliable and weak in positions of relative strength. In the construction of ahexagram, the thirdposition is strong insofaras it represents thehighestplaceamong the lower echelons. This corresponds to positions of subordinateauthority, onmore local and diffuse dimensions than the authority and powerrepresentedbytheupperstrataofthehexagram,whichrepresentthehigherandmoreconcentratedlevelsofinfluenceandleadership.In“Contention,”weaknessat thetopof thelowerechelonsisrepresentedas

characteristicof situations inwhichcontentionarises.The IChing’s statementreads, “Living on past virtues, be steadfast.” What the text means by “pastvirtues”maybethelaborofone,two,three,ormoregenerations,generationsofworkformingthebasisforthestatusofthepresentgeneration.Fromthispointofview,tobesteadfast(astockIChingtermalsomeaning“chaste”and“true”)can mean being careful not to lose what progress has been made, even overgenerations. In the context of the theme of this sign, to be steadfast or chastewouldimplythatlosingordespoiling“pastvirtues”bycontendingforwhatisasyetunearnedissomethingtobepositivelyavoided.Inhisinterpretation,theidealistChengYigivesaveryspecificunderstanding

ofwhatthislinemeanstohiminthecontextofonegeneration:“Livingonpastvirtues,” he says, “means living on what one has earned according to one’s

means.” “Being steadfast,” he continues, “means being firmly in control ofoneself.” Again, this line of the I Ching contains parallel social and strategicteachings.WhenTheArtofWarsays,initschapteron“Formation,”that“goodwarriorstaketheirstandongroundwheretheycannotlose,”thisalsomeansthatwarriorsarelivingonpastaccomplishmentswhentheystandonsecuregroundinwar.Conversely,whenTheArtofWarisreinterpretedsociologically,themeaning

ofthispassageisidenticaltotheunderstandingofthesocialidealistChengYi—whenwarriors for goodwant to take their standongroundwhere they cannotlose,theycandosoonlybylivingonwhattheyhaveearnedaccordingtotheirmeansandbybeingincontrolofthemselves.This sort of parallelism of principle in different realms is characteristic of

literaturederivedfromorinfluencedbyTaoistandBuddhistschools;anditisnodoubtafactorintheperennialpopularityofworkssuchastheIChingandTheArtofWarbeyondtheiroriginalcontexts.The I Ching’s reading for the third element of “Contention” also says,

“Dangerendsupallright.”ChengYiexplains,“Thoughyoubeindanger,ifyouknow how to be wary, you will have good luck in the end.” The word fordanger, another standard I Ching term, also means “strict,” “intense,” and“diligent,”encompassingreferencetobothproblemandsolutioninonesymbol,in accord with the I Ching principle of “using unfortunate events for goodpurposes,”suchasusingstressfulsituationstoarousethewillpowertoovercomeobstacles.The Art ofWar, in “NineGrounds,” says, “If they are to die there,what can theynot do?Warriors exert their full strength.Whenwarriors are ingreatdanger,thentheyhavenofear.”ThefinalsayingoftheIChingstatementonthethirdelementof“Contention”

is, “If you work for the king, you will not accomplish anything.” Cheng Yiinterprets this to mean that people like those represented by this componentshouldnotarrogate to themselves theaccomplishments that takeplace throughparticipationinanexistingsystemorapublicforum.Inthissensetheyneedtorecognize that they are “livingon the past virtues” ofmanyother people, andthereforenotcontendforspecialprominenceordistinctionsimplyonaccountofhavingdonetheirwork.Echoing this principle of unobtrusive action and unassuming service, in the

chapteron“Formation”TheArtofWarsays,“Inancienttimesthoseknownasgoodwarriorsprevailedwhenitwaseasy toprevail.Therefore thevictoriesofgoodwarriorsarenotnotedforclevernessorbravery.”ThisisalsocharacteristicofTaoistphilosophy;whileundramatic,theindicatedapproachisheldforthasawaytosuccess:theTaoTeChingsays,“Planfordifficultywhenitisstilleasy,

dothegreatwhenitisstillsmall.”TheArtofWarcontinuesitsdescriptionoftheunassumingwarriorsofoldby

saying,“Thereforetheirvictoriesinbattlearenotflukes.Theirvictoriesarenotflukesbecause theyposition themselveswhere theywillsurelywin,prevailingover those who have already lost.” They take advantage of the structure andmomentuminsituations,sotheydonotseemtobedoinganythingthemselves;thisisoneaspectoftheTaoist“nondoingthatdoeseverything.”

The fourth element of the “Contention” hexagram represents people with

personalpoweratthebottomoftheupperechelons.Thesearepeoplewithintheestablished power structure who are forceful and contentious, people whosestrengthisnotinbalance.TheIChingaddressessuchsituationsintheseterms:“Notpressingyourcontention,youreturntoorderandchange.Remainsteadfastforgoodfortune.”Inastrategicreconstructionof thisprinciple, thechapteron“DoingBattle”inTheArtofWarsays,“Itisneverbeneficialtoanationtohavea military operation continue for a long time. Therefore those who are notthoroughlyawareofthedisadvantagesintheuseofarmscannotbethoroughlyawareintheadvantagesintheuseofarms.”Again using an idealistic ethical framework of interpretation, Cheng Yi

explains that the contentious personwithin a duly established power structurehasnoone tocontendwith justly, thereforenotpressingcontention isa socialduty.Returning toorder, according toCheng,meansovercoming theemotionsthat feed contentiousness, so as to change the mentality to an evenminded,objectiveviewoftruefacts.Whenthismorepositiveattitudeisstabilized,thereisnormallybetterluckinsocialrelationsandconsequentconflictresolutionandavoidance.ChengYigoesontosay,“Ordermeansrealtruth;ifyouloserealtruth,thatis

to go against order. So coming back to order is returning to truth. Ancientclassics speak of themore obviousmanifestations and consequences of goingagainstorderintermsofthebrutalizationanddestructionofpeoples.”TheArtofWarsays,“Anationdestroyedcannotberestoredtoexistence, thedeadcannotbe restored to life,” merging utilitarian strategy and humanitarian ethics toconcludethatincasesofcontention“towinwithoutfightingisbest.”ChengYicontinues:“Thepointisthatwhenstrengthisnotbalancedcorrectly

it behaves impulsively; it does not stay peacefully in place. Because it is notbalancedcorrectlyitisnotsteady;anditispreciselythisinsecuritythatmakesitcontentious.Ifyoudonotpressanycontentionthatyoushouldnotpress,andgobacktofindouttherealtruth,youwillchangeinsecurityintosecurity,whichis

fortunate.”The fifth element of the “Contention” hexagram represents a strong and

balanced leadership able to settle contention. The statement reads, “Thecontentionisveryauspicious.”ChengYi interprets thusly:“Settlingcontentioninawaythatisbalancedaccuratelyisthewaytoresultsthatareveryauspiciousandcompletelygood.”Healsowarnsthattheobjectofcontentionisnotvictorybyanymeans,oratanycost:“Remember,”hewrites,“thattherearecaseswherepeopleareveryluckybuttheresultsarenotentirelygood.”Projecting the concept of “auspicious contention” into the domain of crisis

management,inthechapteron“PlanningaSiege”TheArtofWarsays,“Thosewhowin every battle are not really skillful—thosewho render others’ armieshelplesswithoutfightingarethebestofall.”Intermsthatcanbeseenasethical,yetevenwhenpurelyutilitarianstilltranslateintohumanitarianpracticalitiesonthebattlefield,TheArtofWaralsosays,“Actwhenitisbeneficial,desistifitisnot,”and“donotfightwhenthereisnodanger”(“FireAttack”).The sixth and topmost element of the “Contention” hexagram represents

aggressivepeopleinhighpositions,“atthepeakofpowerandalsoattheendofcontention,”ChengYisays,“characteristicofthosewhobringcontentiontoitsultimateconclusion.”Herethismeanspeoplewhoadamantlypursuecontentiontoitsfinallimit;ChengYisays,“Whentheyindulgeintheirstrength,andwhentheygetdesperate,peopleresorttocontention,thuscausingthemselvestroubleandevendestroyingthemselves,alogicalconclusion.”Liu Ji, the scholar-warriorwhose recitalsofhistoryandmilitary scienceare

presentedinPartTwoofthisbook,appliesthisprincipletothemonumentalSuidynasty. The Sui dynasty briefly united China in the late sixth century, afterhundredsofyearsofcivilandcolonialwarfare.Speakingofthesecondemperor,whoinheritedtheempirehisfatherhadlaboredtoconsolidate,LiuJisaid,“Itisnot that his countrywas not large, nor that his peoplewere notmany.But hemade a hobby of martial arts, and he liked to fight; so he practiced with hisweapons every day, and went on endless expeditions to attack neighboringpeoples. Then things took a turn, and his army was beaten while his cabinetopposed him. Is he not ridiculous to people of later generations?Had humanrulersnotbetterbecareful?”Aggressiveandcontentiouspeopleinhighpositions,usedtogettingtheirway,

donotsufferonlywhentheyhappentofail;eveninsuccesstheyareindanger,forthissuccessitselfbecomesanobjectofcontentionthatcontinuestoanimatetheaggressivetendenciesofallpeopleonthislevel.TheIChing’sstatementonthis point says, “Honor given you will be taken away from you three timesbeforethedayisout.”

According to Cheng Yi, in a military, governmental, or other institutionalcontext,“evenifpeoplecontendsuccessfullytotheend,untiltheyarerewardedforservicetotheregime,thisrewardisstillanobjectofcontention—howcanitbekeptsecure?”LiuJigivesanexcellentversionofthetraditionalformulationoftheansweramongtherulesofwarrelatedinhishistorystories:“Whenyouhavewon,beasifyouhadnot.”

Whencontentionis takentoits limit, itbecomesconflict,andconflict takentoextremes leads to armament and war. Therefore the hexagram following“Contention”intheconventionalorderoftheIChingisthehexagramfor“TheArmy.”Thewordusedforthissignhasawholefamilyofmeanings,including“amilitaryforce,”“amilitaryexpedition,”and“amilitaryleader.”Fromthelastsense is derived another common usage of the same Chinese character, themeaningof“teacher,director,ormasterofanartorscience.”Theideaoftheteacherfitsinwiththeneedsofmilitarycommandorgeneral

crisis management; and the image of war is also used in both Taoism andBuddhism as a general metaphor for contending with any sort of difficulty,hardship, or problem, whether or not it involves interpersonal conflict. Thisconceptalsopassedintothevocabularyoffolkloreandproverb.The statement on the hexagram of “The Army” says, “For the army to be

right,mature people are good.Then there is no fault.”The implication is thatthere is a rightway to use arms, and this leads back to the basic principle ofethical warfare according to the Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist ways ofthought: thatwarshouldbeundertakenonlyasa last resort,andonly ina justcause.Thisgenerallymeansdefensivewar,butitcanalsomeanpunitivewartostop the strong from bullying the weak. In either case, leadership has both amoralandatechnicalbasis.TheessaysofZhugeLiangtranslatedinPartOneofthis book are particularly concerned with the characteristics and capacities of“maturepeople”capableofmaintainingjusticeandorderinmilitarymatters.AccordingtotheclassicaltraditionsofChina,warshouldbeminimizedeven

when it is justified. In ethical terms, this principle could be extended tomeanwarthatisnotminimizedisforthatveryreasonnotjust;inthestrategicscienceofTheArtofWar,prolongingorexpandinghostilitiesunnecessarilyisregardedasoneofthemajorcausesofself-destruction,whichisconsideredneitherethicalnorpractical.Thismeansinprinciplethattherightwaytocarryoutwar,intheevent of its necessity, is normally the right way from both humanitarian andutilitarianpointsofview.History demonstrates clearly enough that in the absence of education from

modelmoralleadership,warcaneasilyturnintorapineandbloodlust,anoutlet

offrustrationandoppression.Ontheotherhand,withouteducationfrommodeltechnical leadership, armed forces can become clumsy and ineffective even iftheyarelargeinnumbers.ThereforetheIChingsays,“maturepeoplearegood,”andadds,“thenthereisnofault.”ThisparallelmoralandtechnicalleadershipisconstantlyemphasizedbyZhugeLiangandothernotedstrategists.ChengYiexplainsthisstatementon“TheArmy”intheseterms:“Thecourse

pursuedbythearmyshouldbecorrect:ifyouraiseanarmyandmobilizetroopsinacausethatisnotrightandonlycreatestrouble,thepeopledonotreallyobey,theyaremerelycoerced.Thereforetheguidingprincipleofthearmyshouldbeuprightness.”Furthermore,notonlydoessolidarityrequirethatthecausebejustintheeyes

of those expected to fight for it, but competent leadership is also essential todirectandfocustheprocessofstruggle.ChengYisays,“Evenifthearmyactsintherightway,theleadersmustbematuretoobtaingoodresults.Afterall,therearethosewhoareluckybutalsofaulty,andtherearethosewhoarefaultlessbutstill not lucky. To be lucky and also faultless is asmature as people can get.Maturepeoplearesternandworthyofrespect.Ifthosewhoaretoleadagrouparenotrespected,trusted,andobeyedbythegroup,howcantheygetthepeopletofollowwillingly?”MasterSuntheMartialistmakesthesamepointintheopeningchapterofThe

ArtofWar:“TheWaymeans inducing thepeople tohave thesameaimas theleadership,so that theywillsharedeathandshare life,withoutfearofdanger”(“StrategicAssessments”).ZhugeLiang’s essays ongeneralship in the presentvolume stress the theme of harmonization among the different echelons of anorganizationaswellas society ingeneral.LiuJi’swar stories, in turn, includeseveralcasesofdeliberateuseofsternnessandkindnessinspecificproportiontounifythemindsofamilitaryforce.Thefirstelementofthehexagramfor“TheArmy”representsthebeginningof

mobilization.Thestatementoftheoriginaltextsays,“Thearmyistogoforthinanorderlymanner.Otherwise,doingwellturnsoutbadly.”ThisthemeoforderpermeatesTheArtofWar,whichviewsthefunctionsandmalfunctionsoforderfromvariousangles.ThegreatstatesmanandwarriorZhugeLiangisparticularlyfamousforhis insistenceuponorder in timesofcrisis.Asacommander,he issaidtohavebeenstrictyetimpartial,withtheresultthathispeopleregardedhimwithsimultaneousaweandadmiration,sothathewasbothhonoredandobeyed.TwotraditionalChineseconceptsoftheroleormodeofhumanleadershipin

maintaining order were explained by a distinguished Chan Buddhist in theseterms:“Therearethosewhomovepeoplebyenlightenedvirtueandthosewhomakepeopleobedientbythepowerofauthority.Itislikethephoenixinflight,

which all the animals admire, or tigers and wolves stalking, which all theanimals fear.” In themartial tradition, authoritymeansnot only rank, but alsopersonalpower,awesome,charismatic,orboth.ClassicalChinesethoughtrefersto this as a combinationof the cultural and themartial, and this is consideredstandard for civilization after the prehistoric fall of humanity from pristinesimplicity.Even in the pacifist schools ofBuddhism andTaoism, themartial image is

retained for various practices, including critical analysis, intuitive penetration,andpsychologicalpurification,aswellashygienicandtherapeuticexercises.Itis well known, furthermore, that certain exercisemovements are also used totrain strength for combat, andothermovements canbe speededup toproducemartialeffects.OnefamousexampleofthisisthatoftheShaolinBoxers,aschoolrecognized

by Taoists but associated by them with Chan Buddhism. The appearance offighting monks in China was in the defense of the country against invaders;followersofoffshootsof thesepracticesalsokept theoriesofclassicalchivalryin their own codes, thus scattering the original principles of the I ChingthroughoutChinesechivalricloreinthemiddleages.ChengYialsotakesacharacteristicallymoralviewoftheIChing’sstatement,

“Thearmy is togo forth inanorderlymanner;otherwisedoingwell turnsoutbadly.” To the idealist Cheng, this reaffirms the importance of ethical humanvaluesinconflict.Hesays,“An‘orderlymanner’meansacombinationofjusticeandreason.Thismeansthatthemissionofthearmyistostopdisorderandgetridofviolence.Ifthearmyactsunjustly,thenevenifitdoeswelltheaffairturnsoutbadly.Inthissense,‘doingwell’meanswinningvictories;‘turningoutbadly’meanskillingpeopleunjustly.”The second element of “The Army” hexagram represents the military

leadership. It is placed in a subordinate position with respect to the civilleadership,representingtheprinciplethatthemilitaryexiststoservethenationandpeople,nottheotherwayaround.ChengYisays,“Thatmeanstheleaderofthearmyshouldbetheleaderonlyinthearmy.”ZhugeLiang,whowasbothacivilandmilitarydirector,alsosaid,“Culturetakesprecedenceoverthemartial.”TheIChing’sstatementonthesecondelementreads,“Inthearmy,balanced,

one is fortunate andblameless,”meaning, “the leadershipof amilitia is luckyandblamelessifitisbalanced.”ChengYisays,“Thosewhoassumesolecharge(of amilitia) yetwhomanage to steer a balancedmiddle course are fortunatebecauseofthis,andareblameless.”Inrespecttothenatureofmilitaryauthorityinthetotalcontextofsocietyas

symbolizedbythishexagram,ChengYidefinesonemeaningofbalanceinthese

terms: “The point seems to be that if one presumes upon authority one straysfromtherightpathofsubordination;yetifonedoesnotexerciseauthoritythereisnowaytoaccomplishanything.Thereforeitisbesttofindabalancedmiddleway.” In abstract terms, a general stands for someonewhohas been entrustedwith the responsibility for a task and, while exercising leadership andorganizational skills to carry it through, does sowith the awareness that fieldcommand,whilecompletely in thehandsof thegeneral, isbasedondelegatedauthority. Although the qualities of leadership are essential in the leader of adelegation,itisthepurposeandnotthepersonthatisofparamountimportanceinthewholeevent.The statement of the I Ching on this element also says, “The king thrice

bestows a mandate.” This restates the constitutional imperative of I Chingculture, that the authorization formilitia andmilitary action comes from civilgovernment.Itisalsotakentomeanthatifamilitiaorotherspecialtaskforcedoes its job well, then it is deemed trustworthy and therefore gives peace ofmind to the populace. The practice of employing standing armies for publicworksprojectsoriginallygrewoutofthisprinciple.When this practicewas employed in China, it brought armies closer to the

general populace, often providing unique opportunities for contact betweenpeoplefromradicallydifferentareasofChina,allthewhilegivingthemilitary—andbyextensionthegovernment—achancetoestablishpublicrapportbymodelbehavior.ZhugeLiangwasoneofthoseknownforhisgeniusatwinningpopularsupportandwashighlyacclaimedasaciviladministrator.HismethodofsuccessseemstohavebeenbasedtoalargeextentonhisconsistentpracticalapplicationofTaoistandConfucianethicalprinciples.This is something that distinguishes Zhuge Liang from many other

intellectualsandadministratorsinChinesehistory.Mostsuchpeopledidatleastreadorhearabouttheseprinciples,butmanyusedthemonlywhenitsuitedtheirimmediatepersonalambitionstodoso.TheepicTalesoftheThreeKingdoms,aneoclassical historical novel strongly flavored with Taoist psychology,immortalizesthespiritualbrillianceofZhugeLiangasitsatirizesandridiculesthewarmongerswhohadaclassicalprinciplehandytorationalizeeveryactofgreed,treachery,andviolence.ChengYi explains the I Ching’s statement on bestowingmandates in these

terms: “If it is employed in the best possible way, the army can accomplishworks and make the world peaceful. It is for this reason that rulers entrustgeneralswith importantmandates time and again.” InTheArt ofWar,MasterSun also says, “Thus one advances without seeking glory, retreats withoutavoidingblame,onlyprotectingpeople,tothebenefitofthegovernmentaswell,

thusrenderingvaluableservicetothenation”(“Terrain”).ZhugeLiangsays,“Agoodgeneraldoesnotrelyorpresumeonstrengthorpower.Heisnotpleasedbyfavoranddoesnotfearvilification.Hedoesnotcravewhatevermaterialgoodshesees,andhedoesnotrapewhateverwomenhecan.Hisonlyintentionistopursuethebestinterestsofthecountry”(“LoyaltyinGenerals”).Incivilianterms,anydelegatedauthorityputspeopleinasimilarpositionto

thatofthearmyinIChingsociology;fromthepointofviewofIChingethics,itisnaturalreasontocarryoutthedutiesofthisdelegatedauthorityinanorderlyandthereforeefficientmanner,withoutarrogatingarbitraryauthoritytooneself.ChengYisays,“Eventhoughitisinchargeofitself,whateverthepowerofthearmycanbringaboutisallduetowhatisgiventoitbytheleadership,andanyaccomplishmentisallinthelineofduty.”TheIChingandderivativeworksonplanningallstressthedangerofthemilitaryleavingitssubservientpositionandusurping the position of the civil authority. Any specialization can threatensocietyinthesamewaywhenitbecomesself-servinginsteadofsubservienttothewholebodyofsociety.TheBiblicalsayingthat“thesabbathwasmadeforman,andnotmanforthe

sabbath” is similar in this sense: reason says that institutions are created toprovide service for humanity, not to advance the personal interests of thosemandated to serve. In the same vein, Zhuge Liang writes, “When offices arechosenforpersons,thereisdisorder;whenpersonsarechosenforoffices,thereisorder.”The proliferation of titles, offices, and emoluments to satisfy members of

powerful andwell-connected clans and interest groupswas always one of thebanes of Chinese government and religion, increasing the burdens on thetaxpayers while hastening sclerosis in practical administration. Taoistphilosophers said that this can happen in anydomain of organized activity, ofwhichnationalgovernmentisahighlyvisibleandconsequentialexample.ZhugeLiangemphaticallystressedtheideathatgovernmentshouldbestreamlined,inaccordwithTaoist political theory,muchofwhich is particularlydesigned foruseintimesofconflictandduress.Thethirdelementofthehexagramfor“TheArmy”symbolizesthesecondary

leaders within the army. The reading emphasizes the special importance ofmutualunderstandingandorder in the relationshipson this level,aswellas inrelationshipsbetweenthislevelofthechainofcommandandthecentralmilitaryleadership.Thisisalsoontheanalogyofthesubordinationofthewholemartialentitytothewholeculturalentity.TheIChing’sstatementonthethirdelementsays,“Itbodesillforthearmyto

havemany bosses.”Discord and competition in the lower ranks of command

naturally weaken the whole body, especially by damaging and distorting theconnection between the leadership and the common soldiery. Cheng Yiinterprets,“Theresponsibilityforamilitaryexpeditionshouldbeunified;oneinapositionofauthorityshouldconcentrateonthis.”Thisalsoapplies,likeotherIChing metaphors, to other domains; in this case to the negative effects ofextreme division and disunity on analogous levels of organization, from theorganizationofanindividuallifetotheorganizationofacollectiveenterprise.TheArtofWaralsomakesapointofthevulnerabilityinherentindisunityand

directsitsstrategyatthisweakness:inthechapter“NineGrounds,”MasterSuntheMartialistsays,“Thosewhoarecalledthegoodmilitaristsofoldcouldmakeopponents lose contact between front and back lines, lose reliability betweenlarge and small groups, lose mutual concern for the welfare of the differentsocialclassesamongthem,losemutualaccommodationbetweentherulersandthe ruled, lose enlistments among the soldiers, lose coherence within thearmies.”Thisisthefamiliarruleof“divideandconquer,”amplifyingtheIChingruleandcarryingitintoeachdimensionofanorganization.The fourth element of the hexagram for “TheArmy” represents being in a

weak position and at a disadvantage in times of conflict. The statement says,“The army camps; no blame,” meaning that it is normal to hold back orwithdraw from an impossible position. Identical strategic principles areemphasized several times in The Art of War, as in the chapter on “ArmedStruggle,” which says, “Avoiding confrontation with orderly ranks and notattacking great formations is mastering adaptation.” In the chapter on “NineGrounds,”italsosaysthatgoodmilitaristsofyore“wentintoactionwhenitwasadvantageous,stoppedwhenitwasnot.”Thefifthelementrepresentsthecivilleadership,whoseauthorityisthesource

of the military’s mandate. Since this serves as a general representation ofdelegation of authority for special purposes, the civil leadership is behind thescenes in“TheArmy.”The IChing’s statement,whichsimplysummarizes thelogic and ethic ofwarfare, begins, “When there are vermin in the fields, it isadvantageous to denounce them; then there will be no fault.” Cheng Yiunderstands this tomean eradicating activemenaces to society, distinguishingthis from acts of tyrannical aggression and paranoia: “The army should bemustered onlywhen aggressors are hurting the people. . . . If it is a case likewhenvermingetintothefieldsanddamagethecrops,anditisjustlyappropriatetohunt themdown, thenhunt themdown;act in thiswayandtherewillbenofault. Act at whim, thus harming the world, and the fault is great indeed. To‘denounce’meanstomakeclearwhathasbeendonewrong,inordertostopit.Some martial tyrants have scoured the very mountains and forests for those

whom theyconsidered ‘vermin,’but itwasnot that therewerevermin in theirownfields.”The IChing’s statement concludes, “Amature person leads the army; there

willbebadluckiftherearemanyimmaturebosses,eveniftheyarededicated.”ThisisarecapitulationofthegeneraldoctrineoftheIChingontheimportanceofwisdominleadershipandunityinorganization.ChengYisays,“Thewaytomandate ageneral todirect anarmycalls forhavingamatureperson lead theforce....Ifagroupofimmaturepeoplebossthearmy,thenevenifwhattheydoisright,itwillturnoutbadly.”Theneedforcertainqualitiesinmilitaryleadershipandunityinorganization

isamongthefirstpremisesofTheArtofWar,andisacentral themeofZhugeLiang’s writings on generalship. In his essay “Capacities of Commanders,”Zhugedescribes thegreatest ofmilitary leaders in grandiose terms thoroughlyconsistentwith IChing idealism:“Onewhosehumanitariancareextends toallunder his command, whose trustworthiness and justice win the allegiance ofneighboringnations,whounderstandsthesignsoftheskyabove,thepatternsofthe earth below, and the affairs of humanity in between, andwho regards allpeopleashisfamily,isaworld-classleader,onewhocannotbeopposed.”Thesixthand final elementof thehexagramfor“TheArmy” represents the

end of themission of the armed forces and the reintegration of warriors intociviliansociety.Thiscanstandsymbolicallyfortheabsorptionoftheresultsofany specialization into the whole body of society. In the context of civil orinternational warfare, here the I Ching reaffirms both the parallel and thecontrastbetweenmartialandcivilmatters,asdefinedthroughoutitstreatmentofthistheme.Here, at the end of “TheArmy,” the IChing says, “The great leader has a

commandtostartnationsandreceivesocialstanding.”Originallycastinafeudalsetting,thisstatementillustratesaprinciplemoregenerallyunderstoodhereandnowinbureaucraticorcorporatecontexts,forbureaucraciesandconglomeratesare the heirs of feudalism, though they rendered and consumed their parentssometimeago.Because many of the qualities needed for crisis management were also

qualitiesneededforordinarymanagement,andbecauseacompleteeducationinChinawasbelievedtoencompassbothculturalandmartialarts,apersonmightbe both a military and a civilian leader, simultaneously or at different times.Zhuge Liange and Liu Ji are outstanding examples of individuals who werecalledupontofulfillbothmilitaryandcivilianduties.

The IChing implies thatwarriors rejoin civilizationwhenwar is over, thusavoidingthepitfallsofasociallyisolatedwarriorcasteandalsocontributingtheknowledge,character,andexperiencegainedinwartothesocietyforwhichthewar was waged. According to the I Ching’s statement, the ideal governmentcontributes to this reintegration by entitling warriors according to theirachievements. Cheng Yi says, “The great leader rewards the successful withentitlement,makingthemoverseersofgroups,andgivesthemsocialdistinctionfor their capability.” This is an example of the more general principle ofmeritocracy,acornerstoneofIChingideologywrittenintothefundamentalsofConfucianphilosophy.The underlying implication in the case of “The Army” and its end is the

corollary doctrine, embraced by strategists like Zhuge Liang, that militarypersonnel,andespeciallymilitaryleaders,shouldhaveagoodgeneraleducationaswell as special technical andmilitary training. InChinese this is called thecombination of wen and wu. Wen, or culture, deals with the cultivation ofconstructivesocialskillsandvalues.Wu,orthemartial,dealswithbothpracticaland theoretical sciences of crisis management. According to Chinese militaryscience in the I Ching–Taoist tradition as represented by The Art ofWar andcertainlateradepts,balanceinwenandwu isbelievedtobebetterforwarriorsevenoncampaignsandincombat,aswellaswhentheyareeventuallyreinstatedintociviliansociety.ThereforetheIChing’sstatementconcludeswith thewarning,“Pettypeople

arenottobeemployed.”Inthiscontext,thestatementmeansthatwhenitcomestointegratingwarriorsintosociety,achievementinwarshouldnotbeviewedinisolationastheonlycriterionofadvancement,indisregardofthemoralintegrityand total person of the individual concerned. Cheng Yi says, “As for pettypeople,eveniftheyhaveachieved,theyarenottobeemployed.Thereismorethanonewaytoraiseanarmy,goonanexpedition,andachievesuccess;thosewhodosoarenotnecessarilygoodpeople.”ZhugeLiang isamodelexampleofa leader inboth realms,abelovedcivil

administratoraswellasadistinguishedstrategistandgeneral.HiswritingsshowaparticularlydeepsavorofseriousIChinglearning,combiningConfucianandTaoist thought into an ethical yet pragmatic program for acute crisismanagement. Because of his fidelity to the classic traditions of humanitarianwarrior-statesmen, the original roots and broad outlines of Zhuge Liang’sthoughtcanbetracedinthefecundabstractionsoftheIChingitself.Thisisalsotrue of the work of Liu Ji, who goes even further than Zhuge Liang into thederivative traditions, especially the practical strategy andwarrior ethos ofTheArtofWar.

NOTESONSOURCES

TaoistWorksCitedThe Yin Convergence Classic (Yinfujing). Included in Vitality, Energy,Spirit:ATaoistSourcebook,translatedandeditedbyThomasCleary,fromShambhalaPublications.TaoTeChingTheMastersofHuainan(Huainanzi).Acondensed translationof this textappears inTheBook of Leadership and Strategy: Lessons of theChineseMasterstranslatedbyThomasCleary,fromShambhalaPublications.The Book of Balance and Harmony (Zhonghoji), translated by ThomasCleary,fromNorthPointPress.

IChingStudiesMaterial from and about the I Ching is excerpted from two translations byThomasCleary:IChing:TheTaoofOrganizationandIChingMandalas (bothfromShambhalaPublications).

HistoricalMaterialForbackgroundonLiu Ji Iused theMingdynastichistoryandother standardreferenceworks.ForbackgroundontheBuddhistrebellionsinwhichtheMingdynastyhaditsearlyroots,IamindebtedtotheextensivehistoricalintroductionofJ.C.Cleary’sZibo:China’sLastGreatZenMaster.ForcorroborationofLiuJi’s recitals and other historical documentation, I am also indebted toLiZhi’sHiddenDocuments(Zangshu)andHiddenDocumentsContinued(Xuzangshu).ThestorieswithLiuJi’s introductionsthataretranslatedinthepresentvolumearedrawnfromExtraordinaryStrategiesinaHundredBattles(Baizhanqilue),evidently themostpopularofLiu’smany literaryworks.Theexcerpt fromhisworkTheCulturedOne is fromLiu’sYoulizi. Liu’s poems are translated fromChengyibowenshu.ForbackgroundonZhugeLiangIusedRecordsoftheThreeKingdoms(Sanguozhi),acourthistoryofthatera;TalesoftheThreeKingdoms(Sanguoyanyi), amuch later historical novel about the civilwars of the time,writtenfromaverydifferentpointofviewthanthecourthistoryonwhichitisbased;andWorksbyandabouttheLoyalLordatArms(Zhongwuhouji),astudyof Zhuge Liang found in the Taoist canon. The translations from Zhuge’swritings contained in this volume are taken from collections of his essays,letters,andpoetryincludedverbatimintheaforementionedstudyofhislifeandworkintheTaoistcanon.BesidesSunTzu’sTheArtofWar,LiuJialsoquotesthefollowingsourcesfor

hisrulesofbattle:“BookoftheLatterHanDynasty”(Houhanshu)“DialoguesofLi,LordofWei”(LiWeigongwenda)“Sima’sRules”or“Sima’sArtofWar”(Simabingfa)“SixSecrets”(Liutao)“ThreeStrategies”(Sanlue)“ZuoFamilyTraditionontheSpringandAutumnAnnals”(Zuochuan)

PARTONE

TheWayoftheGeneral

EssaysonLeadershipandCrisisManagementZhugeLiang

Translator’sIntroduction

ZhugeLiang, commonlyknownbyhis style,Kongming,was born around theyear180,thesonofaprovincialofficialinthelatterdaysoftheHandynasty.Atthat time, the dynastywas thoroughly decrepit, nearly four hundred years oldand on the verge of collapse. Formost of his adult life, Zhugewas to play amajorroleinthepowerstrugglesandcivilwarsthatfollowedthedemiseoftheancientHan.Orphaned at an early age, he and his younger brother were taken in by an

uncle, a local governor in southernChina.When this unclewas replacedwithanotherofficer,heandhischargeswenttojoinanoldfamilyfriend,amemberofthe powerful Liu clan who was currently a governor in central China. TheimperialhouseofHanwasabranchof thegreaterLiuclan,whichasawholeretained considerablewealth, prestige, and influence even after the passing oftheHandynastyitself.Zhuge Liang’s uncle died during his sojourn in central China. Then in his

twenties, Zhuge stayed there, supporting himself by farming. According toRecordsof theThreeKingdoms,at thisearlyageZhugewasawareofhisowngenius,butfewtookhimseriously;hewas,afterall,anorphanandsubsistencefarmer. His fortunes took a turn, however, when the great warrior Liu Bei,founderof thekingdomofShuinwesternChina,garrisonedin theareawhereZhugeLiangwasliving.Zhugewasrecommendedtothewarriorchiefbyamemberoftheinfluential

Xu clan, which produced many outstanding Taoists of the early churches.According toRecords of the ThreeKingdoms, Zhuge’s friend said toLiuBei,“ZhugeKongmingisadragoninrepose—wouldyouwanttomeethim?”LiuBeisaid,“Youcomewithhim.”Thefriendsaid,“It ispossibletogoseethisman,butyoucannotmakehim

cometoyou.You,General,shouldgooutofyourwaytolookinonhim.”TherecordstatesthatLiuBeifinallywenttoseeZhugeLiang,addingthathe

hadtogonofewerthanthreetimesbeforetheyounggeniusagreedtomeetthewarriorchieftain.Whenat length theywere together, therecordcontinues,LiuBeidismissedeveryoneelsesothathecouldbealonewithZhugeLiang.Thenhe said, “The house of Han is collapsing; treacherous officials are usurping

authority; the emperor is blinded by the dust.”Thewarlordwent on to solicitZhuge’sadvice,andZhugebecameoneofhis topstrategists.Thestoryof thisfamousmeetingisrelatedinthefirstofLiuJi’swartales.TheintriguesoftheeraoftheThreeKingdomsaretoocomplextodetailhere;

indeed, they fill the one hundred chapters of themassive neoclassic historicalnovelTalesoftheThreeKingdoms.Sufficeittosayherethatthetimewasoneofconstantturmoil,tension,andstrife.Inthemidstofunendingwarfareamongthethree kingdoms, Zhuge Liang was appointed to positions of highestresponsibilityinbothcivilandmilitaryleadership.WhenLiuBeidied,hisheirwasstillyoung,soZhugeLiangalsoservedasthe

defactoregentforthenewkingaswellasatopgeneralandstrategist.Heneverfell in battle, but he did die on a campaign, garrisoned in the field. Carryingburdensenoughtokilltwomen,ZhugeLiangsuccumbedtoillnessattheageoffifty-four. Immortalized in literature for his intelligence and humanity, hewasgreatly admired as a warrior and administrator. His last will and testament,addressedtotheyoungrulerofShu,illustratesthethoughtandcharacterofthisremarkableindividual:

It seems tome that I ama simpletonbynature.Having run into thetroubles of the times, I mobilized an army on an expedition north.Beforebeingabletoachievecompletesuccess,Iunexpectedlybecamemortallyill,andnowIamonthebrinkofdeath.I humbly pray that the ruler will purify his heart, minimize his

desires,restrainhimselfandlovethecommonpeople,conveyrespectto the former ruler, spread humaneness through the land, promoteconscientiousindividualistsinordertogetwiseandgoodpeopleintopositionsof responsibility,and throwout traitorsandcalumniators inordertomakethemannersofthepeoplemoresubstantial.Ihaveeighthundredmulberrytreesandeightacresofthinfields,so

mychildrenandgrandchildrenareself-sufficientinfoodandclothing.I am abroad, without any particular accoutrements; I weargovernment-issueclothingandeatgovernment-issuefood,anddonothaveanyothersourceofincomeformypersonaluse.WhenIdie,donot let therebe any extra cottonon the corpse, or any special burialobjects,forwhichIwouldbeindebtedtothenation.

As this testament shows, there is a strongundercurrent ofTaoist thought inZhugeLiang’s attitudes toward life andwork.This undercurrent is evenmoreevident in his letters of advice to his nephew and his son. To his nephew he

wrote:

Aspirations should remain lofty and far-sighted. Look to theprecedentsof thewise.Detach fromemotionsanddesires;get ridofany fixations. Elevate subtle feelings to presence of mind andsympatheticsense.Bepatientintightsituationsaswellaseasyones;eliminateallpettiness.Seek knowledge by questioning widely; set aside aversion and

reluctance.Whatlossisthereindignity,whatworryisthereoffailure?Ifyourwillisnotstrong,ifyourthoughtdoesnotopposeinjustice,

you will fritter away your life stuck in the commonplace, silentlysubmitting to the bonds of emotion, forever cowering beforemediocrities,neverescapingthedownwardflow.

Tohisson,hegavethisadvice:

Thepracticeofacultivatedmanis torefinehimselfbyquietudeanddevelop virtue by frugality.Without detachment, there is no way toclarifythewill;withoutserenity,thereisnowaytogetfar.Studyrequirescalm,talentrequiresstudy.Withoutstudythereisno

way to expand talent; without calm there is no way to accomplishstudy.If you are lazy, you cannot do thorough research; if you are

impulsive,youcannotgovernyournature.The years run off with the hours, aspirations flee with the years.

Eventuallyoneagesandcollapses.Whatgoodwillitdotolamentoverpoverty?

Finally, Zhuge’s own motto illustrates a central quality for which he isespecially honored, the quality of sincerity. Zhuge’s honesty and integrity inpublic and private life are legendary, and his writings on social and politicalorganizationshowthatheconsideredsincerity fundamental tosuccess in thesedomains.Heformulatedtheruleofhislifeinthismotto:

Opportunistic relationships can hardly be kept constant. Theacquaintance of honorable people, even at a distance, does not addflowersintimesofwarmthanddoesnotchangeitsleavesintimesofcold: it continues unfading through the four seasons, becomesincreasinglystableasitpassesthrougheaseanddanger.

The following essays on leadership and organization are taken from acollection of works by and about Zhuge Liang,Records of the Loyal Lord ofWarriors,aspreservedintheTaoistcanon.

TheWayoftheGeneral

TheAuthorityoftheMilitaryLeadershipMilitary authority, directing the armed forces, is a matter of the authoritativepoweroftheleadinggeneral.Ifthegeneralcanholdtheauthorityofthemilitaryandoperateitspower,he

overseeshissubordinateslikeafiercetigerwithwings,flyingoverthefourseas,goingintoactionwheneverthereisanencounter.If the general loses his authority and cannot control the power, he is like a

dragoncastintoalake;hemayseekthefreedomofthehighseas,buthowcanhegetthere?

ChasingEvilsTherearefivetypesofharmindecadenceamongnationalarmedforces.Firstistheformationoffactionsthatbandtogetherforcharacterassassination,

criticizingandvilifyingthewiseandthegood.Secondisluxuryinuniforms.Third is wild tales and confabulations about the supernatural. Fourth is

judgmentbasedonprivateviews,mobilizinggroupsforpersonalreasons.Fifth is making secret alliances with enemies, watching for where the

advantagemaylie.Allpeoplelikethisaretreacherousandimmoral.Youshoulddistanceyourself

fromthemandnotassociatewiththem.

KnowingPeopleNothing is harder to see into than people’s natures.Thoughgood and bad aredifferent, their conditions and appearances are not always uniform. There aresome people who are nice enough but steal. Some people are outwardlyrespectfulwhileinwardlymakingfoolsofeveryone.Somepeoplearebraveonthe outside yet cowardly on the inside. Some people do their best but are notloyal.Hardthoughitbetoknowpeople,thereareways.Firstistoquestionthemconcerningrightandwrong,toobservetheirideas.Secondistoexhaustalltheirarguments,toseehowtheychange.Thirdistoconsultwiththemaboutstrategy,toseehowperceptivetheyare.Fourthistoannouncethatthereistrouble,toseehowbravetheyare.Fifthistogetthemdrunk,toobservetheirnature.Sixthistopresentthemwiththeprospectofgain,toseehowmodesttheyare.Seventh is to give them a task to do within a specific time, to see how

trustworthytheyare.

TypesofGeneralsThereareninetypesofgenerals.Thosewhoguidewithvirtue,whotreatallequallywithcourtesy,whoknow

whenthetroopsarecoldandhungry,andwhonoticewhentheyarewearyandpained,arecalledhumanisticgenerals.Thosewhodonottrytoavoidanytask,whoarenotinfluencedbyprofit,who

woulddiewithhonorbeforelivingindisgrace,arecalleddutifulgenerals.Thosewho are not arrogant because of their high status,who do notmake

muchoftheirvictories,whoarewisebutcanhumblethemselves,whoarestrongbutcanbetolerant,arecalledcourteousgenerals.Those whose extraordinary shifts are unfathomable, whosemovements and

responsesaremultifaceted,whoturndisasterintofortuneandseizevictoryfromthejawsofdanger,arecalledclevergenerals.Those who give rich rewards for going ahead and have strict penalties for

retreating,whoserewardsaregivenrightawayandwhosepenaltiesarethesameforallranks,eventhehighest,arecalledtrustworthygenerals.Thosewhogoonfootoronawar-horse,withthemettletotakeonahundred

men,whoareskilledintheuseofclose-rangeweapons,swords,andspears,arecalledinfantrygenerals.Thosewhofacethedizzyingheightsandcrossthedangerousdefiles,whocan

shootatagallopasifinflight,whoareinthevanguardwhenadvancingandintherearguardwhenwithdrawing,arecalledcavalrygenerals.Those whose mettle makes the armies tremble and whose determination

makes light of powerful enemies, who are hesitant to engage in petty fightswhilecourageousinthemidstofmajorbattles,arecalledfiercegenerals.Thosewhoconsiderthemselveslackingwhentheyseethewise,whogoalong

withgoodadvicelikefollowingacurrent,whoaremagnanimousyetabletobefirm,whoareuncomplicatedyethavemanystrategies,arecalledgreatgenerals.

CapacitiesofCommandersThe capacities of commanders are not the same; some are greater, some arelesser.Onewhospiesouttreacheryanddisaster,whowinstheallegianceofothers,is

theleaderoftenmen.Onewhorisesearlyinthemorningandretireslateatnight,andwhosewords

arediscreetyetperceptive,istheleaderofahundredmen.Onewhoisdirectyetcircumspect,whoisbraveandcanfight,istheleaderof

athousandmen.Oneofmartialbearingand fiercenessofheart,whoknows thehardshipsof

others and spares people from hunger and cold, is the leader of ten thousandmen.Onewho associateswith thewise and promotes the able,who is careful of

how he spends each day, who is sincere, trustworthy, andmagnanimous, andwhoisguardedintimesoforderaswellastimesofdisturbance,istheleaderofahundredthousandmen.One whose humanitarian care extends to all under his command, whose

trustworthiness and justice win the allegiance of neighboring nations, whounderstandsthesignsoftheskyabove,thepatternsoftheearthbelow,andtheaffairs of humanity in between, andwho regards all people as his family, is aworld-classleader,onewhocannotbeopposed.

DecadenceinGeneralsThereareeightkindsofdecadenceingeneralship.

Firstistobeinsatiablygreedy.Secondistobejealousandenviousofthewiseandable.Thirdistobelieveslanderersandmakefriendswiththetreacherous.Fourthistoassessotherswithoutassessingoneself.Fifthistobehesitantandindecisive.Sixthistobeheavilyaddictedtowineandsex.Seventhistobeamaliciousliarwithacowardlyheart.Eighthistotalkwildly,withoutcourtesy.

LoyaltyinGenerals“Weapons are instruments of ill omen”; generalship is a dangerous job.Therefore if one is inflexible there will be breakdowns, and when the job isimportanttherewillbedanger.Thisiswhyagoodgeneraldoesnotrelyorpresumeonstrengthorpower.He

isnotpleasedbyfavoranddoesnotfearvilification.Hedoesnotcravewhatevermaterialgoodshesees,andhedoesnotrapewhateverwomenhecan.Hisonlyintentionistopursuethebestinterestsofthecountry.

SkillsofGeneralsTherearefiveskillsandfourdesiresinvolvedingeneralship.The five skills are: skill in knowing the disposition and power of enemies,

skillinknowingthewaystoadvanceandwithdraw,skillinknowinghowemptyorhowfullcountriesare,skillinknowingnature’stimingandhumanaffairs,andskillinknowingthefeaturesofterrain.Thefourdesiresare:desirefortheextraordinaryandunexpectedinstrategy,

desireforthoroughnessinsecurity,desireforcalmamongthemasses,anddesireforunityofheartsandminds.

ArroganceinGeneralsGenerals should not be arrogant, for if they are arrogant they will becomediscourteous, and if they are discourteous people will become alienated fromthem.Whenpeoplearealienated,theybecomerebellious.Generalsshouldnotbestingy,forif theyarestingytheywillnotrewardthe

trustworthy, and if theydonot reward the trustworthy, the soldierswillnotbededicated.Ifthesoldiersarenotdedicated,thearmedforcesareineffective,andifthearmedforcesareineffective,thenationisempty.Whenanationisempty,itsopponentsarefull.Confuciussaid,“Peoplemayhave the finest talents,but if theyarearrogant

andstingy,theirotherqualitiesarenotworthyofconsideration.”

MilitaryPreparednessMilitary preparedness is the greatest task of the nation. A small mistake canmake a huge difference.When the force ofmomentum bywhich soldiers arekilledandgeneralsarecapturedcanmovewithsuddenrapidity,shouldwenotbewary?Thereforewhenanationisintrouble,therulerandministersurgentlyworkon

strategy,selectingthewiseandassessingtheabletodelegateresponsibilitiestothem.Ifyoucountonsafetyanddonotthinkofdanger,ifyoudonotknowenough

tobewarywhenenemiesarrive,thisiscalledasparrownestingonatent,afishswimminginacauldron—theywon’tlasttheday.Traditionssay,“Withoutpreparation,militaryoperationsareunfeasible.”“Preparednessagainsttheunexpectedisawayofgoodgovernment.”“Even bees have venom—how much the more do nations. If you are

unprepared,eveniftherearemanyofyou,merenumberscannotbecountedon.”

Aclassicdocumentsays,“Onlywhenwedoourtasksareweprepared;when

weareprepared,thereisnotrouble.”Thereforetheactionofthemilitaryforcesmusthavepreparation.

TrainingSoldierswithouttrainingcannotstanduptooneoutofahundredopponents,yettheyaresentoutagainstahundredeach.ThisiswhyConfuciussaid,“Tosendpeopletowarwithoutteachingthemiscalledabandoningthem.”Itisalsosaid,“Teachthepeopleforsevenyears,andtheytoocangotowar.”Thereforesoldiersmustbetaughtwithoutfail.Firsttraintheminconductand

duty,teachthemtobeloyalandtrustworthy,instructtheminrulesandpenalties,awethemwithrewardsandpunishments.Whenpeopleknowenoughtofollowalong,thentraintheminmaneuvers.Onepersoncanteachten, tenpeoplecanteachahundred,ahundredpeople

can teach a thousand, a thousand can teach ten thousand, thus developing thearmedforces.Trainlikethis,andopponentswillsurelylose.

CorruptionintheArmedForcesInmilitaryoperations itmayhappen that scouts arenot careful of their signalfires;ortheremaybemistakesincalculationandconsequentdelays,infractionsof rules, failure to respond to the time and situation, disorder in the ranks,callous and unreasonable demands made by superiors on their subordinates,pursuit of self-interest, lack of concern for the hungry and cold, tall tales andfortunetelling,rabblerousing,confusingtheofficers,refusalofthemettlesometo submit to authority, contempt of superiors, or using supplies for personalenjoyment.Thesethingscorruptthearmedforces.Whentheyarepresent,thereiscertaintobedefeat.

LoyalHeartsThose who would be military leaders must have loyal hearts, eyes and ears,clawsandfangs.Withoutpeopleloyaltothem,theyarelikesomeonewalkingatnight,notknowingwheretostep.Withouteyesandears,theyareasthoughinthedark,notknowinghow toproceed.Without clawsand fangs, theyare likehungrymeneatingpoisonedfood,inevitablytodie.Therefore good generals always have intelligent and learned associates for

their advisors, thoughtful and careful associates for their eyes and ears, braveandformidableassociatesfortheirclawsandfangs.

CarefulWatchingThelossofanarmyisalwayscausedbyunderestimatinganopponentandthusbringingondisaster.Thereforeanarmygoesoutinanorderlymanner.Iforderislost,thatbodesill.Therearefifteenavenuesoforder:

1.Thoughtfulness,usingsecretagentsforintelligence2.Organization,gatheringnewsandwatchingcarefully3.Courage,notbeingdisturbedbythenumberoftheenemy4.Modesty,thinkingofjusticeanddutywhenseeingtheopportunityforgain5.Impartiality,beingegalitarianinmattersofrewardsandpunishments6.Forbearance,beingabletobearhumiliation7.Magnanimity,beingabletoacceptthemasses8.Trustworthiness,sothattherecanbeseriouscooperation9.Respect,honoringthewiseandable10.Clarityofmind,notlisteningtoslander11.Reason,notforgettingpastexperience12.Humankindness,takingcareofthesoldiers13.Loyalty,devotingoneselftothenation14.Moderation,knowingtostopwhenyouhaveenoughofanything15.Planning,assessingyourselffirst,andthenassessingothers

FormationofOpportunityToovercometheintelligentbyfollyiscontrarytothenaturalorderofthings;toovercome the foolish by intelligence is in accord with the natural order. Toovercometheintelligentbyintelligence,however,isamatterofopportunity.

Therearethreeavenuesofopportunity:events,trends,andconditions.When

opportunitiesoccur througheventsbutyouareunable to respond,you arenotsmart.When opportunities become active through a trend and yet you cannotmakeplans,youarenotwise.Whenopportunitiesemergethroughconditionsbutyoucannotactonthem,youarenotbold.Those skilled in generalship always achieve their victories by taking

advantageofopportunities.

GoodGeneralshipGoodgeneralsofancienttimeshadsomeoverallprinciples:

1. Showpeoplewhentoproceedandwhentowithdraw,andpeoplewilllearnregulation.

2. Arraythemonthelinesrightlyandjustly,andpeoplewillbeorderly.3. Showrespectforthembyyourjudgments,andpeoplewillbeenthusiastic.4. Motivatethemwithrewardsandpenalties,andpeoplewillbetrusting.

Regulation,order,enthusiasm,andtrustaretheoverallprinciplesofgenerals,bywhichtheyareabletoensurevictoryinbattle.Themediocrearenotlikethis:theycannotstoptheirtroopswhentheyretreat,

theycannotcontroltheirtroopswhentheyadvance,theymixupgoodandbad,the soldiers are not given instruction and encouragement, rewards andpunishmentsarenotfair.Becausepeoplearenottrusting,thewiseandthegoodwithdraw,whileflatterersarepromoted.Suchanarmywillthereforeinevitablybedefeatedinwar.

DiscerningBasesIfyouattackevilsbasedonsocialtrends,noonecanrivalyouindignity.Ifyousettle victory based on the power of the people, no one can rival you inachievement.Ifyoucanaccuratelydiscernthesebasesofaction,andadddignityandfaith

to them, you can take on themost formidable opponent and prevail over themostvaliantadversary.

VictoryandDefeatWhen thewiseand talentedare in thehigherpositionsandundesirablesare inlowpositions,thearmedforcesarehappy.Whenthesoldiersarescared,iftheytalktoeachotherofvaliantcombat,looktoeachotherformartialdignity,andurgeeachotheronbyrewardsandpenalties,thesearesignsofcertainvictory.When thearmieshavebeen shakenup several times, if the soldiersbecome

lazy,insubordinate,untrustworthy,andunruly,iftheyscareeachotherwithtalkabouttheenemy,iftheytalktoeachotheraboutbooty,makehintstoeachotherofdisasterandfortune,orconfuseeachotherwithweirdtalk,thesearesignsofcertaindefeat.

UsingAuthorityPeople’s lives depend on generals, as do success and failure, calamity andfortune;soiftherulershipdoesnotgivethemthepowertorewardandpunish,thisisliketyingupamonkeyandtryingtomakeitcavortaround,orlikegluingsomeone’seyesshutandaskinghimtodistinguishcolors.Ifrewardsareuptopowerfulciviliansandpunishmentsdonotcomefromthe

generals, peoplewill seek personal profit—thenwhowill have any interest infighting?Evenwithsuperlativestrategyandperformance,self-defensewouldbeimpossibleunderthesecircumstances.ThereforeSunTzutheMartialistsaid,“Whenageneral is in thefield, there

aresomeordershedoesn’tacceptfromthecivilianruler.”Itisalsosaid,“Inthearmy,youheartheordersofthegenerals,youdon’thearaboutcommandsfromtheemperor.”

GrievingfortheDeadGoodgeneralsofancienttimestookcareoftheirpeopleasonemighttakecareofabelovedchild.Whentherewasdifficultytheywouldfaceitfirstthemselves,and when something was achieved they would defer to others. They wouldtearfully console the wounded and sorrowfully mourn the dead. They wouldsacrificethemselvestofeedthehungryandremovetheirowngarmentstoclothethecold.Theyhonoredthewiseandprovidedfortheirliving;theyrewardedandencouragedthebrave.Ifgeneralscanbelikethis,theycantakeoveranywheretheygo.

AlliesTo operate, the armed forces need allies as consultants and assistants to theleadership.Everyone looks up to thosewho are thoughtful and have unusual strategies

beyond the ordinary ken, who are widely learned and have broad vision, andwhohavemanyskillsandgreattalents.Suchpeoplecanbemadetopallies.Thosewhoarefierce,swift,firm,andsharpareheroesofanage.Suchpeople

canbemadesecond-rankedallies.Thosewhotalkalotbutnotalwaystothepoint,whoareslightinability,with

little that is extraordinary, are people with ordinary capabilities. They can bebroughtalongasthelowerclassofallies.

ResponsivenessWhenyouplanfordifficultyintimesofease,whenyoudothegreatwhileitisstill small,whenyouuse rewards firstandpenalties later, this is refinement inuseofthemilitary.Whenthetroopsarealreadyonthebattlefield,thecavalriesarechargingeach

other, the catapults have been set in position, and the infantriesmeet at closerange,ifyoucanuseawesomeauthoritativenesstoconveyasenseoftrustsuchthatopponentssurrender,thisisabilityinuseofthemilitary.If you plunge into a hail of arrows and rocks, facing off in a contest for

victory,withwinningandlosingdistinct,ifyouradversaryiswoundedbutyoudie,thisisinferiorityinuseofthemilitary.

TakingOpportunitiesTheartofcertainvictory,themodeofharmonizingwithchanges,isamatterofopportunity.Whobuttheperspicaciouscandealwithit?Andofallavenuesofseeingopportunity,noneisgreaterthantheunexpected.

AssessingAbilitiesThosewhoemployedwarriorsskillfullyinancienttimesassessedtheirabilitiesinordertocalculatetheprospectsofvictoryordefeat:

Whohasthewiserruler?Whohasthemoreintelligentgenerals?Whohasthemoreableofficers?Whosefoodsuppliesaremostabundant?Whosesoldiersarebettertrained?Whoselegionsaremoreorderly?Whosewar-horsesareswifter?Whoseformationsandsituationaremoredangerous?Whoseclientsandalliesaresmarter?Whoseneighborsaremorefrightened?Whohasmoregoodsandmoney?Whosecitizenryiscalmer?

When you consider matters along these lines, structural strengths andweaknessescanbedetermined.

FacilitatingBattleAscorpionwillstingbecauseithaspoison;asoldiercanbebravewhenhecanrelyonhisequipment.Thereforewhentheirweaponsaresharpandtheirarmorisstrong,peoplewill readilydobattle. Ifarmor isnotstrong, it is thesameasbaringone’sshoulders.Ifabowcannotshootfar,itisthesameasaclose-rangeweapon.Ifashotcannothitthemark,itisthesameashavingnoweapon.Ifascoutisnotcareful,itisthesameashavingnoeyes.Ifageneralisnotbraveinbattle,itisthesameashavingnomilitaryleadership.

StrikingPowerSkilledwarriorsofancienttimesfirstfoundouttheconditionoftheirenemies,andthenmadeplanstodealwiththem.Thereisnodoubtofsuccesswhenyoustrikeenemiesunderthefollowingconditions:

Theirfightingforcesarestale.Theirsuppliesareexhausted.Theirpopulaceisfullofsorrowandbitterness.Manypeoplearephysicallyill.Theydonotplanahead.Theirequipmentisindisrepair.Theirsoldiersarenottrained.Reinforcementsdonotshowup.Nightfallswhentheystillhavealongwaytogo.Theirsoldiersarewornout.Theirgeneralsarecontemptuousandtheirofficersinconsiderate.Theyneglecttomakepreparations.Theydonotformbattlelinesastheyadvance.Whentheydoformbattlelines,theyarenotstable.Theyaredisorderlywhentheytraveloverroughterrain.Thereisdiscordbetweencommandersandsoldiers.Theybecomearrogantwhentheywinabattle.Thereisdisorderintherankswhentheymovetheirbattlelines.Thesoldiersaretiredandpronetoupset.Thearmyissupplied,butthepeopledonoteat.Eachmanmovesonhisown—somegoahead,somelagbehind.

Whenopponentshave the followingqualities,however,withdrawandavoidthem:

Superiorsareconsiderateandsubordinatesareobedient.Rewardsaresureandpunishmentscertain.Theforcesaresetoutinanorderlyfashion.Theygiveresponsibilitytothewiseandemploytheable.Thearmyiscourteousandmannerly.Theirarmorisstrongandtheirweaponskeen.Theyhaveplentyofsuppliesandequipment.

Theirgovernmentandeducationaresubstantial.Theyareongoodtermswithalloftheirneighbors.Theyarebackedbygreatnations.

PsychologicalConfigurationsSome generals are brave and think lightly of death. Some are hasty andimpulsive. Some are greedy and materialistic. Some are humane but lackendurance.Someareintelligentbuttimid.Someareintelligentbuteasygoingatheart.

Those who are brave and think lightly of death are vulnerable to assault.

Those who are hasty and impulsive are vulnerable to delay. Those who aregreedyandmaterialisticarevulnerabletoloss.Thosewhoarehumanebutlackendurance are vulnerable to fatigue. Those who are intelligent but timid arevulnerabletopressure.Thosewhoareintelligentbuteasygoingarevulnerabletosuddenattack.

OrderlyTroopsIn military operations, order leads to victory. If rewards and penalties areunclear, if rulesand regulationsareunreliable,and if signalsarenot followed,evenifyouhaveanarmyofamillionstrongitisofnopracticalbenefit.An orderly army is one that is mannerly and dignified, one that cannot be

withstood when it advances and cannot be pursued when it withdraws. Itsmovements are regulated and directed; this gives it security and presents nodanger. The troops can bemassed but not scattered, can be deployed but notwornout.

InspiringSoldiersHonor themwith titles, present themwith goods, and soldierswillingly comejoin you. Treat them courteously, inspire them with speeches, and soldierswillinglydie.Givethemnourishmentandrestsothattheydonotbecomeweary,make the code of rules uniform, and soldiers willingly obey. Lead them intobattlepersonally,andsoldierswillbebrave.Recordevena littlegood, rewardevenalittlemerit,andsoldierswillbeencouraged.

Self-ExertionSagesfollowtherulesofheaven;thewiseobeythelawsofearth;theintelligentfollowprecedent.Harm comes to the arrogant; calamity visits the proud. Fewpeople trust those who talk too much; few people feel indebted to the self-serving. Rewarding the unworthy causes alienation; punishing the innocentcausesresentment.Thosewhoseappreciationorangerareunpredictableperish.

HarmonizingPeopleHarmonizing people is essential in miliary operations. When people are inharmony, they will fight on their own initiative, without exhortation. If theofficersandthesoldiersaresuspiciousofoneanother,thenwarriorswillnotjoinup.Ifnoheedispaidtothestrategiesoftheloyal,thensmall-mindedpeoplewillbackbite.Whenthesproutsofhypocrisyarise,evenifyouhavethewisdomofthegreatwarrior-kingsofold,youwillnotbeable toprevailoveranordinaryman,much less a whole group of them. Therefore tradition says, “Amilitaryoperationislikefire;ifitisnotstopped,itburnsitselfout.”

TheConditionofaGeneralAccordingtothecodeofgeneralship,generalsdonotsaytheyarethirstybeforethe soldiers have drawn from the well; generals do not say they are hungrybeforethesoldiers’foodiscooked;generalsdonotsaytheyarecoldbeforethesoldiers’firesarekindled;generalsdonotsaytheyarehotbefore thesoldiers’canopiesaredrawn.Generalsdonotusefansinsummer,donotwearleatherinwinter,donotuseumbrellasintherain.Theydoaseveryonedoes.

OrderandDisorderWhenanationisperilousanddisorderly,andthepeoplearenotsecureintheirhomes,thisisbecausetherulerhasmadethemistakeofneglectingtofindwisepeople.When the wise are disaffected, a nation is in peril; when the wise are

employed, a nation is secure. When offices are chosen for persons, there isdisorder;whenpersonsarechosenforoffices,thereisorder.

ObservantGovernmentAnobservantandperceptivegovernmentisonethatlooksatsubtlephenomenaandlistens tosmallvoices.Whenphenomenaaresubtle theyarenotseen,andwhenvoicesaresmalltheyarenotheard;thereforeanenlightenedleaderlookscloselyatthesubtleandlistensfortheimportanceofthesmallvoice.

Thisharmonizes theoutsidewith the inside,andharmonizes the insidewith

theoutside;sotheWayofgovernmentinvolvestheefforttoseeandhearmuch.Thuswhenyouarealerttowhatthepeopleinthelowerechelonshavetosay,

andtakeitintoconsideration,sothatyourplansincludetherankandfile,thenallpeopleareyoureyesandamultitudeofvoiceshelpsyourears.This is thereasonfortheclassicsaying,“Asagehasnoconstantmind—thepeoplearethesage’smind.”

RulersandMinistersFor rulers, generosity to subordinates is benevolence; forministers, service ofthe government is duty. No one should serve the government with duplicity;ministersshouldnotbegivendubiouspolicies.Whenbothsuperiorsandsubordinatesaregiventocourtesy, thenthepeople

areeasy toemploy.Whensuperiorsandsubordinatesare inharmony, then theWay of rulers and ministers is fulfilled: rulers employ their ministerscourteously, while ministers work for the rulers loyally; rulers plan thegovernmentpolicies,whileministersplantheirimplementation.

KnowledgeableRuleRulers are considered knowledgeable according to howmuch they have seen,andareconsideredcapableaccordingtohowmuchtheyhaveheard.Everyoneknowsthesayingthatanintelligentrulerisconstantthroughtheday

and night, discharging the affairs of office by day and attending to personalmattersatnight.Yettheremaybegrievancesthatdonotgetahearing,andtheremaybeloyalpeoplepromotinggoodwhoarenottrusted.Ifgrievancesarenotheard, thebentcannotbestraightened. Ifpromotionof

good is not accepted, the loyal are not trusted and the treacherous enter withtheirschemes.This is themeaning of the proverb in the ancient “Classic of Documents”:

“Heavenseesthroughtheseeingofmypeople,heavenhearsthroughthehearingofmypeople.”

NotKnowingConfucius said that an enlightened ruler does not worry about people notknowing him, he worries about not knowing people. He worries not aboutoutsiders not knowing insiders, but about insiders not knowing outsiders. Heworries not about subordinates not knowing superiors, but about superiors notknowingsubordinates.Heworriesnotabout thelowerclassesnotknowingtheupperclasses,butabouttheupperclassesnotknowingthelowerclasses.

AdjudicationWhenrulersadjudicatecriminalcasesandexecutepunishments,theyworrythattheymay be unclear. The innocentmay be punishedwhile the guiltymay bereleased. The powerful may arrogate to themselves alone the right to speak,while the powerless may have their rights infringed upon by those who beargrudges against them.Honestymay be distorted; thosewho arewrongedmaynotgetachancetoexpress themselves.Thetrustworthymaybesuspected; theloyalmaybeattacked.Theseareallperversions,problemscausingdisasterandviolence,aberrationscausingcalamityandchaos.

DisturbanceandSecurityItissaidthatwhenofficialsaresevereineverything,nooneknowswhereitwillend. If they feed off the people so severely that people are hungry andimpoverished,thisproducesdisturbanceandrebellion.Encourage people in productive work, don’t deprive them of their time.

Lighten their taxes, don’t exhaust their resources. In this way the country ismadewealthyandfamiliessecure.

AppointmentsTheofficialpolicyofmakingappointmentsshouldbetopromotetheuprightandplace themover the crooked.Governing a country is likegoverning thebody.Thewaytogovernthebodyistonurturethespirit;thewaytogovernacountryistopromotethewise.Lifeissoughtbynurturingthespirit;stabilityissoughtbypromotingthewise.Sopublicservantsaretoanationaspillarsaretoahouse:thepillarsshould

notbeslender;publicservantsshouldnotbeweak.Whenpillarsareslenderthehousecollapses;whenpublicservantsareweakthenationcrumbles.Thereforethewaytogovernanationistopromotetheuprightoverthecrooked;thenthenationissecure.

PillarsofStateFor strong pillars you need straight trees; for wise public servants you needuprightpeople.Straight treesare found in remoteforests;uprightpeoplecomefromthehumblemasses.Thereforewhenrulersaregoingtomakeappointmentstheyneedtolookinobscureplaces.Sometimestherearedisenfranchisedpeoplewithsomethingofvalueinthem;

sometimes there are people with extraordinary talent who go unrecognized.Sometimes there are paragons of virtue who are not promoted by theirhometowns;sometimestherearepeoplewholiveinobscurityonpurposes.Sometimes there are people who are dutiful and righteous for purely

philosophical or religious reasons. Sometimes there are loyal people who arestraightforward with rulers but are slandered by cliques. Ancient kings areknown to have hired unknowns and nobodies, finding in them the humanqualitieswherebytheywereabletobringpeace.

EvaluationandDismissalTheofficial policyof evaluation anddismissal shouldbe topromote thegoodand dismiss the bad. An enlightened leadership is aware of good and badthroughout the realm, not daring to overlook even minor officials andcommoners,employingthewiseandgood,anddismissingthegreedyandweak-minded.Withenlightenedleadershipandgoodcitizens,projectsgetaccomplished,the

nation is orderly, and thewisegather like rain; this is theway topromote thegood and dismiss the bad, setting forth what is acceptable and what isblameworthy. Therefore a policy of evaluation and dismissal means effort toknowwhathurtsthepeople.

WhatHurtsthePeopleTherearefivethingsthathurtthepeople:

1.Therearelocalofficialswhousepublicofficeforpersonalbenefit,takingimproperadvantageof theirauthority,holdingweaponsinonehandandpeople’slivelihoodintheother,corruptingtheiroffices,andbleedingthepeople.2. There are cases where serious offenses are given light penalties;there is inequality before the law, and the innocent are subjected topunishment,evenexecution.Sometimesseriouscrimesarepardoned,thestrongaresupported,andtheweakareoppressed.Harshpenaltiesareapplied,unjustlytorturingpeopletogetatfacts.3. Sometimes there are officials who condone crime and vice,punishing those who protest against this, cutting off the avenues ofappeal and hiding the truth, plundering and ruining lives, unjust andarbitrary.4. Sometimes there are senior officials who repeatedly changedepartmentheadssoastomonopolizethegovernmentadministration,favoring their friends and relatives while treating those they dislikewith unjust harshness, oppressive in their actions, prejudiced andunruly.Theyalsousetaxationtoreapprofit,enrichingthemselvesandtheirfamiliesbyexactionsandfraud.6. Sometimes local officials extensively tailor awards and fines,welfare projects, and general expenditures, arbitrarily determiningpricesandmeasures,withtheresultthatpeoplelosetheirjobs.

Thesefivethingsareharmfultothepeople,andanyonewhodoesanyoftheseshouldbedismissedfromoffice.

MilitaryAction“Weaponsareinstrumentsofillomen,tobeusedonlywhenitisunavoidable.”Thepropercourseofmilitaryactionistoestablishstrategyfirst,andthencarryitout.Monitortheenvironment,observethemindsofthemasses,practicetheuseofmilitary equipment, clarify the principles of reward and punishment,watchthe schemes of enemies, note the perils of the roads, distinguish safe anddangerousplaces,findouttheconditionsofthepartiesinvolved,andrecognizewhentoproceedandwhentowithdraw.Followthetimingofopportunities,setuppreparationsfordefense,strengthenyourstrikingpower,improvetheabilitiesofyoursoldiers,mapoutdecisivestrategies,andconsiderlifeanddeathissues.Onlyafterdoingallthisshouldyousendoutarmedforces,appointingmilitaryleadersandextendingthepowertocaptureenemies.Thisistheoverallschemeofthingsinmilitarymatters.

RewardsandPenaltiesA policy of rewards and penalties means rewarding the good and penalizingwrongdoers. Rewarding the good is to promote achievement; penalizingwrongdoersistopreventtreachery.Itisimperativethatrewardsandpunishmentsbefairandimpartial.Whenthey

know rewardsare tobegiven, courageouswarriorsknowwhat theyaredyingfor;whentheyknowpenaltiesaretobeapplied,villainsknowwhattofear.Therefore, rewardsshouldnotbegivenwithoutreason,andpenaltiesshould

not be applied arbitrarily. If rewards are given for no reason, thosewho haveworked hard in public service will be resentful; if penalties are appliedarbitrarily,uprightpeoplewillbebitter.

ClarityandConsistencyGeneralsholdauthorityoverlifeanddeath.Iftheyallowthosewhoshouldliveto be killed, or allow thosewho should be killed to live, or if they get angrywithout discernible reason, or their punishments and rewards are not clear, orcommands are inconsistent, or they carry their private affairs over into publiclife,thisisdangerousforthenation.Iftheirpunishmentsandrewardsarenotclear,theirdirectiveswillnotalways

befollowed.Iftheyallowthosewhoshouldbekilledtolive,treacherywillnotbe prevented. If they allow those who should live to be killed, soldiers willdefect. If theyget angrywithoutdiscernible reason, their authoritywillnotbeeffective.Iftheirrewardsandpunishmentsarenotclear,thelowerechelonswillnot be encouraged to achieve. If policies are inappropriate, orderswill not beobeyed.Ifprivateaffairsarecarriedoverintopubliclife,peoplewillbeoftwominds.Iftreacheryisnotprevented,itisimpossibletolastlong.Ifsoldiersdefect,the

rankswillbedecimated.Ifauthorityisineffective,thetroopswillnotriseupinthefaceoftheenemy.Ifthelowerechelonsarenotencouragedtoachieve,theupperechelonshavenostrongsupport.Ifordersarenotobeyed,affairswillbechaotic.Ifpeopleareoftwominds,thecountrywillbeindanger.

PleasureandDispleasureDispleasure should not lead you to harm people who have done no wrong;pleasureshouldnotleadyoutogoalongwiththosewhodeservetobeexecuted.Pleasure should not induce you to forgive those who have done wrong;

displeasureshouldnotinduceyoutoexecutetheinnocent.Pleasure and displeasure should not be arbitrary; personal prejudices ignore

worthypeople.Ageneralshouldnotstartabattleoutofpersonaldispleasure;itis imperative to goby the collectivewill. If he does go into battle because ofpersonaldispleasure,itwillcertainlyresultindefeat.

CultureandtheMilitaryCulturetakesprecedence;themilitarycomesafter.Ifyouputvictoryfirst,youwillsurelygetbeatenlater;ifyoustartoutwithanger,youwillsurelyregretitlater.Oneday’sangercandestroyyourwholelife.Thereforeasuperiormanisstern but not ferocious: hemay get angry, but not furious; hemayworry, butdoesnotfear;hemayrejoice,butisnotoverjoyed.

OrganizationA policy to quell disorder involves minimizing offices and combining duties,gettingridofembellishmentinfavorofsubstance.First organize directives, then organize penalties. First organize the near at

hand,thenorganizethefarremoved.Firstorganizetheinner,thenorganizetheouter. First organize the basic, then organize the derivative. First organize thestrong,thenorganizetheweak.Firstorganizethegreat,thenorganizethesmall.Firstorganizeyourself,thenorganizeothers.

InstructionandDirectionApolicyofinstructionanddirectionmeansthoseaboveeducatethosebelow,notsayinganythingthatisunlawfulandnotdoinganythingthatisimmoral,forwhatisdonebythoseaboveisobservedbythosebelow.To indulge oneself yet instruct others is contrary to proper government; to

correct oneself and then teach others is in accord with proper government.Therefore true leaders first rectify themselves and only after that do theypromulgate their directives. If they are not upright themselves, their directiveswillnotbefollowed,resultingindisorder.Therefore the Way of leadership puts education and direction before

punishment.Tosendpeopletowarwithouteducationistantamounttothrowingthemaway.

ThoughtandConsiderationApolicyof thoughtandconsiderationmeansgiving thought towhat isnearathandandconsideringwhat is remote.As it is said, “Ifpeopledonot considerwhatisremote,theywillhavetroublenearathand.”Therefore“educatedpeoplethink without leaving their positions.” Thinking means correct strategy,considerationmeansthinkingofplansforeventualities.Oneisnottoplanpolicywhenitisnotone’splacetodoso,orconsidertheschemeofthingsthatarenoneofone’sbusiness.Majoraffairs arise indifficulty,minoraffairs arise inease.Therefore ifyou

want to think of the advantages in a situation, it is imperative to consider theharm;ifyouwanttothinkaboutsuccess,itisimperativetoconsiderfailure.Danger arises in safety, destruction arises in survival. Harm arises in

advantage, chaos arises in order. Enlightened people know the obvious whentheyseethesubtle,knowtheendwhentheyseethebeginning;thusthereisnowayfordisastertohappen.Thisisduetothoughtfulconsideration.

StrengthinGeneralsGeneralshavefivestrengthsandeightevils.The five strengths are: noble behavior that can inspire the common people,

socialvirtues thatcanelevate their reputations, trustworthinessanddutifulnessin personal relationships, universal love encompassing all the people, andpowerfulactiontosucceedintheirtasks.The eight evils are: inability to assess right and wrong when formulating

strategy,inabilitytodelegateauthoritytothewiseandthegoodintimesoforder,inabilitytometeoutjustpunishmentsforincidentsofdisorder,inabilitytohelpthe poor in times of plenty, insufficient intelligence to guard against threatsbefore they have taken shape, insufficient thought to prevent subtle dangers,inabilitytoexpresswhatisknownintuitively,andinabilitytoavoidcriticismindefeat.

SendingOuttheArmedForcesInancienttimes,whenanationwasintrouble,therulerwouldselectawisemanandhavehimfastforthreedaysinquietseclusionbeforegoingtothegateofthenationalshrine,wherehewouldstandfacingsouth.Hethentookahighcourtiertopresentaceremonialaxetotheruler,whointurnwouldpassitbythehandletothegeneral,saying:“The military leadership settles matters outside the borders,” and also

directinghimintheseterms:“Whereyouseetheenemytobeempty,proceed;whereyouseetheenemyto

befull,stop.“Donotlookdownonothersbecauseofyourownelevatedrank.“Donotopposethecommonconsensuswithpersonalopinions.“Donotturnfromtheloyalandtrustworthythroughtheartificesoftheskilled

buttreacherous.“Donotsitdownbeforethesoldierssit;donoteatbeforethesoldierseat.“Bearthesamecoldandheatthesoldiersdo;sharetheirtoilaswellastheir

ease.“Experience sweetness and bitterness just as the soldiers do; take the same

risksthattheydo.“Thenthesoldierswillexertthemselvestotheutmost,anditwillbepossible

todestroyenemies.”

Havingacceptedthesewords,thegeneralledthearmedforcesoutthroughthe

city’sgateofillomen.The ruler, seeing thegeneraloff,knelt and said, “Advanceand retreat area

matteroftiming—militaryaffairsarenotdirectedbytherulerbutbythegeneral.Therefore ‘There isnoheavenabove,noearthbelow,noadversaryahead,andnorulerbehind.’Thustheintelligentthinkbecauseofthis;themettlesomefightbecauseofthis.”

SelectiononAbilitiesIn military action, there are men who like to fight and enjoy battle,singlehandedly takingonpowerfulopponents;gather them intoone squadandcallthem“thewarriorswhorepaythenation.”There are mettlesome men with ability and strength, courage and speed;

gatherthemintoasquadandcallthem“thewarriorswhocrashthebattlelines.”Therearethosewhoarelightoffoot,goodwalkersandrunners;gatherthem

intoasquadcalled“thewarriorswhocapturetheflag.”Therearethosewhocanshootonhorseback,swiftasflight,hittingthemark

everytime;gatherthemintoonesquadandcallthem“thegallopingwarriors.”There are archers whose aim is accurate and deadly; gather them into one

squadandcallthem“thewarriorsofthefightingedge.”There are thosewho can shoot heavy crossbows and catapults accurately at

great distances; gather them into one squad and call them “the warriors whocrushtheenemy’sedge.”These six kinds of skilled warriors should be employed according to their

particularskills.

TheUseofKnowledgeGeneralshiprequiresonetofollownature,dependontiming,andrelyonpeopleinordertoachievevictory.Therefore, if natureworks but the timing doesn’twork, and yet people act,

thisiscalledopposingthetime.If the timingworks but nature isn’t cooperating, and still people act, this is

calledopposingnature.Iftimingandnaturebothwork,butpeopledonotact,thisiscalledopposing

people.

Thosewhoknowdonotopposenature,donotoppose the time, anddonot

opposepeople.

NotSettingUpBattleLinesIn ancient times, those who governed well did not arm, and those who werearmedwelldidnotsetupbattlelines.Thosewhosetupbattlelineswelldidnotfight,thosewhofoughtwelldidnotlose,andthosewholostwelldidnotperish.Thegovernmentofthesagesofoldwassuchthatpeoplewerecomfortablein

theirhomesandenjoyedtheirwork,livingtooldagewithouteverattackingoneanother.“Thosewhogovernwelldonotarm.”WhenKingShun(reigned2255–2207B.C.E.)organizedrulesandpenaltiesfor

wrongdoing, he accordingly created knights, or warriors. But people did notviolate therules,andnopenaltieswereenforced.“Thosewhoarmwelldonotsetupbattlelines.”Later,KingYu(reigned2205–2197B.C.E.)madeapunitiveexpeditionagainst

theMiaotribes,butallhedidwasdemonstratethemartialandculturalarts,andtheMiaopeoplebecamemorecivilized.“Thosewhosetupbattlelineswelldonotfight.”King Tang (reigned 1766–1753 B.C.E.) and King Wu (reigned 1134–1115

B.C.E.)pledgedarmiesforonemilitaryoperation,bywhichthewholelandwasdecisivelypacified.“Thosewhofightwelldonotlose.”WhenKingZhaoofChu(reigned515–488B.C.E.)ranintodisaster,hefledto

Qinforhelp,andultimatelywasabletogethiskingdomback.“Thosewholosewelldonotperish.”

SincerityinGeneralsAn ancient document says, “Those who are contemptuous of cultured peoplehavenowaytowinpeople’sheartscompletely;thosewhoarecontemptuousofcommonpeoplehavenowaytogetpeopletoworkashardastheycan.”Formilitaryoperationsit isessential tostrivetowintheheartsofheroes, to

make the rulesof rewardsandpunishments strict, to includebothcultural andmartialarts,andtocombinebothhardandsofttechniques.

Enjoysocialamenitiesandmusic;familiarizeyourselfwithpoetryandprose.

Puthumanityandjusticebeforewitandbravery.Instillnessbeasquietasafishinthedeep,inactionbeasswiftasanotter.

Dissolve enemies’ collusion; break down their strengths. Dazzle people withyourbanners;alertpeoplewithcymbalsanddrums.Withdrawlikeamountaininmovement,advancelikearainstorm.Strikeand

crushwithshatteringforce;gointobattlelikeatiger.Pressenemiesandcontainthem;lureandenticethem.Confusethemandseize

them;behumbletomakethemproud.Befamiliaryetdistant;weakenthembylendingstrength.Givesecuritytothoseindanger;gladdenthoseinfear.Ifpeopleopposeyou,

takewhattheysaytoheart;ifpeoplehavegrudges,letthemexpressthemselves.Restrainthestrong,sustaintheweak.Gettoknowthosewithplans;coverup

anyslander.Whenthereisbooty,distributeit.Do not count on your strength and take an opponent lightly. Do not be

conceitedaboutyourabilitiesandthinklittleofsubordinates.Donotletpersonalfavorcongealintoauthority.Planbeforeacting.Fightonlywhenyouknowyoucanwin.Donotkeepthespoilsofwarforyourownpossessionanduse.Ifgeneralscanbelikethis,peoplewillbewillingtofightwhentheygivethe

orders,andtheenemywillbedefeatedbeforeanybloodisshed.

PARTTWO

LessonsofWar

StudiesinStrategyLiuJi

Translator’sIntroduction

LiuJiwasbornin1311C.E.,duringtheYuandynasty.Anexceptionallybrilliantscholar,heearnedanadvanceddegreeinthestatecivilserviceexaminationsandwas promoted to public office. While in office, Liu gained a reputation forintegrity and honesty, but while these qualities endeared him to the localpopulace theymadehimamarkedmanamong the rulingMongol elite.Asanalien dynasty that had to depend on the nativeChinese bureaucracy, theYuanregime was wary of close bonding between local officials and the people atlarge.It had already been a long-standing policy of the Chinese government to

appointofficialstopostsoutsideoftheirownhomeareas,inordertopreventthegrowthof local factionalism.This in turnproducedotherproblems,but inanyeventthewholesyndromeofuneasestemmingfromtensionbetweencentralandregional interests naturally became aggravated under alien regimes like theMongolYuan.ThistensionisapervasivethreadofChinesehistory,onethatisclearlyevidentinthetriumphsandtrialsofthegreatLiuJi.In1348Liuwasappointedby theYuangovernment todirectacontainment

actionagainstaninsurrection,forLiuwasnotonlyabrilliantscholarbutalsoadistinguished strategist.Checked byLiu’smasterful engineering, the leader ofthe rebellionattempted to savehimselfwithahandsomebribe.Liu refused sothe rebel went to Peking, the Mongols’ capital in China, and succeeded inbribinghiswayintofavorthere.Nowthesecessionistwasgivenanofficeandastipendforhistrouble,while

LiuJi’srelationshipwiththeregimedeterioratedfurther.Eventuallyheretiredtohisancestralhomeland.Hereheattractedafollowingwithoutreallytryingtodoso, as many people came to him fleeing the depredations of that same rebelleaderwhohadboughthiswaydirectlyintotheYuangovernment.In1366LiuwasinvitedtotheheadquartersofZhuYuanzhang,onetimefollowerofawarriorbandofradicalWhiteLotusBuddhists,nowaleaderofoneofthepopularanti-YuanmovementsrisinginthesouthofChina.Zhu was immediately impressed by the strategic thinking of the elder Liu,

whowasnowfifty-fiveandwellseasonedinpoliticalandmilitaryaffairs.UnderLiu’sableguidance,ineightyearsZhuestablisheddominanceoveralltheother

insurrectionistsinthesouthandmovednorthtooverthrowtheMongolusurpers.WhenZhusetup theMingdynasty, restoringnative rule toChina,Liu Jiwasoneofhismost trustedadvisorsandmadeperhaps thegreatest contribution totheestablishmentoftheneworder.LiuJi’sdeathin1375attheageofsixty-fourhasaringoftragicironytoit,

butfromanotherpointofviewitwouldseemtobeanoutcomeofhisheroismandhisfinallessontotheworld.Thoughhewasthetargetofenviousinterlopersthroughouthisdistinguishedcareer,LiuJihimselfwasknownforimpartialityinhisjudgments;thiswasonereasonhisadvicewassohighlyesteemed,butitalsocosthimhislife.OneofthemenwhoseproposedappointmenttohighofficewasrejectedbyLiuJicontrivedtoeffectLiu’sdownfallbyconvincingtheemperorthatLiuwasplotting toestablishhisownpowerbase.Liuwas strippedofhisemolument,andthewhispererwaspromoted.TheshockandoutrageoftheeventdestroyedLiu’shealth,andhesoonpassed

away.Hehadtoldtheemperorquitehonestlythatitwasnotimpossibletofindgood men for government if he were really sincere, but none of those theemperorhadwithhimwereworthy.Inparticular,hewarnedtheemperorthattheindividualwhowastointrigueagainsthimwaslikeachariothorsethatmaywellbreakitsharness.Asitturnedout,itwastheinterloper,nowahighofficialofthenewMingdynasty,andnotLiuJi,whohadbeenschemingtoestablishhisownpowerbaseforacoupd’état.HeevenformedallianceswithMongoliannoblesofthedefunctYuandynasty,hopingtooverthrowtheMing.Whentheplotwasdiscovered, over thirty thousand people were convicted of conspiracy. So thefinallessonofLiuJiwasthathalfofgoodadviceisknowingwhentotakeit.AshesaidtotheemperorofMingChina,“Whyworrythatthereisnotalentinthecountry?Justletanenlightenedleadershipseekitwholeheartedly.”LiuJiisfamousnotonlyasawarrior,strategist,andstatesman,butalsoasa

poet and writer. One of his early works, entitled The Cultured One, writtenduring his first retirement, illustrates his philosophy of life, society, andgovernment. In a passage on conflict avoidance, Liu demonstrates hisunderstandingoftheTaoistattitudecharacteristicofthehigherstrategyextolledinSunTzu’sclassicTheArtofWar:

Good warriors lessen opponents, bad warriors increase opponents.Those who decrease opponents flourish thereby, those who increaseopponentsperish.Ifyouwanttotakeotherpeople’snations,thenthepeopleofthose

nations are all your opponents. Therefore those who are good atlesseningopponentsdonotcausepeopletoopposethem.

Thereasonwiseleadersofoldhadnoopponentswasthattheyusedtheiropponentstoopposeopponents.Onlythemosthumanepeopleintheworldcanusetheiropponentstoopposeopponents;forthisreasonopponentsdidnotopposethem,andeveryonecapitulated.

FurtherinsightsintoLiu’spoliticalandpracticalthinkingcanbegleanedfromhispoetry.SeveralofhisversesshowhisprofoundgraspofthecontradictionsofhistoricalprocessesandtheparadoxicalstrategyofTheArtofWaratitsbest:

Anationdoesnotprosperitself;Ifitspeoplehaveenough,itisprosperous.Rulersarenotpowerfulthemselves;Whentheyhavemanyknightstheyarestrong.Sowhenthosefullofenvyareinoffice,Knightsretiretoprivatelife,Andrulersjustbleedthemwithtaxes.Whenbureaucratsadvance,peoplegethurt,Andthenthenationiswounded.

Whenforcebringslossoffreedom,Alittleflexibilitycanovercomeagreatpower.Whenthereisstasisinformation,EventhemightyandferociousCannotconquerthesmallbutsecure.Thusaman-eatingtigercannotswallowasingleporcupine,Butagoatleashmaybeusedtoharnessninegeldedbulls.

ThereareimpassesandsuccessesAsamatterofcourse:Onecannotprevailjustbywits.Famemaybegainedorlost,Andcannotbeachievedbyforce.Soevenifyouhavenoworldlyambitions,Youwon’tnecessarilyescapeslander.Evenifyouseeknothingfromothers,Youradvicewon’tnecessarilybeputintoeffect.

ThosewhosavetheworldfromchaosArenotoccupiedwithpettymatters;

ThosewhoaccomplishtheongoingevolutionoftheworldArenotconceitedoversmallaccomplishments.SothatwhichcutsrottingfleshIsnottobeconsideredasharpsword,AndthatwhichpenetratesanakedbodyIsnottobeconsideredagoodbow.

Liu Ji’s philosophy of war is epitomized in certain chapters from hisneoclassic Extraordinary Strategies of a Hundred Battles. This book, basedmainlyonTheArtofWar and its congeners, is oneofLiu’smost famous andpopularworks; it is the source of thewar tales translated in Part Two of thisbook.Thefollowingselectionswouldseemtosummarizebothphilosophicalandstrategicmainstaysofhisthinkingonconflictmanagement,showinghisintimateconnectionwithclassictraditions.

ForgettingaboutWarfareSagesareverycarefulnottoforgetaboutdangerwhensecure,nottoforgetaboutchaosintimesoforder.Evenwhenthereispeaceintheland, it will not do to abandon the military altogether. If you lacksufficientforesight,youwillbedefenseless.Itisnecessarytodevelopcultured qualities internally while organizing military preparednessexternally.Beconsiderateandgentletowardforeigners,bewareoftheunexpected.Routinemilitaryexercises in eachof the four seasons isthe way to show that the nation is not oblivious to warfare. Notforgettingaboutwarfaremeansteachingthepeoplenottogiveupthepracticeofmartialarts.

The rule is “Even if the land is at peace, to forget about warfare

leadstocollapse.”

CautioninWarInwarfare,youshouldremaincautious.Gointoactiononlywhenyouseethatitwillbeadvantageous;ifyouseenoadvantage,thenstop.Beprudentanddonotacttooreadily.Thenyouwillnotfall intodeadlysituations.Theruleis“Beimmovableasamountain.”

RelaxationIn war, you should not relax when you have scored a victory. Youshould be evenmore strictly on guard against enemies, still diligentevenwhileatease.Theruleis“Beprepared,andyouwillhavenotrouble.”

SecurityWhenenemiescome fromfaroffat thepeakof theirenergy, it is totheiradvantagetofightrightaway;soincreaseyourdefenses,preserveyoursecurity,anddonotrespond—waitforthemtowinddown.Eveniftheytrysomethingtoagitateyouandpickafight,donotmove.Theruleis“Bestillwheninasecureplace.”

ChangeThe essence of the principles of warriors is responding to changes;expertise is a matter of knowing the military. In any action it isimperativetoassesstheenemyfirst.Ifopponentsshownochangeormovement, thenwait for them.Takeadvantageofchange to respondaccordingly,andyouwillbenefit.The rule is “The ability to gain victory by changing and adapting

accordingtoopponentsiscalledgenius.”

MilitarismWeaponsareinstrumentsofillomen,warisimmoral.Reallytheyareonlytoberesortedtowhenthereisnootherchoice.It isnotrighttopursue aggressive warfare because one’s country is large andprosperous,for thisultimatelyendsindefeatanddestruction.Thenitistoolatetohaveregrets.Militaryactionislikeafire—ifnotstoppeditwillburnitselfout.Militaryexpansionandadventurismsoonleadtodisaster.The rule is “Even if a country is large, if it is militaristic it will

eventuallyperish.”

Like theworks of all the great philosophers of the East, Liu Ji’s stories ofstrategy are primarily aimed at stimulating thought and analyzing situations.Evenwhileexampleandanecdotearecommonlyusedinthepresentationsofthe

classical thinkers, the questions of when and how to apply principles are bynatureopen.Confuciussaid,“IfIbringuponecornerandyoucannotcomebackwith the other three, Iwon’t talk to you anymore.” Symbolically, this famousstatementisunderstoodtomeanthatpracticalphilosophyyieldsrelativelylittlewithoutcontextandreflection.BecausethesetalesfromChinesehistoryarestoriesofwar,thereishorrorin

them.Asaneditor,LiuJidoesnotsaywhatshouldhappenfromanethicalpointofviewbutobserveswhatcananddoeshappentohumanthinkingandbehaviorintheeventofcontentionandconflict.Ononelevel,thestoriesaremeanttobeviewed with detachment, as a method of understanding human behaviorobjectively.Onanotherlevel,eventhesensationalismofthishorrorisoriginallydidactic, fortifying the traditional moral repulsion from warfare with directemotionalandphysicalrepulsion.Nevertheless,inthefinalanalysistherationalandethical ingredientsintheuseofthesetalesontheartofwarareinevitablysuppliedbytheindividualwhousesthem,evenifonlybydefault.Accordingtolegend,whenSolomonwasofferedwisdomorriches,hechosewisdomandwasgrantedrichesaswell.

ChronologyofHistoricalPeriodsinLiuJi’sTales

SPRINGANDAUTUMNERA(722–481B.C.E.)ThiseraisgenerallycitedtomarkearlytomiddlestagesofthedeteriorationoftheclassicalZhoudynastyandthebeginningsofmilitarism.Confuciuslivedinthelastcenturyofthisperiod.TheTaoistclassicTaoTeChingisalsopopularlybelievedtohavebeencompiledaroundtheendofthisera.

WARRINGSTATESERA(480–246B.C.E.)A period of prolonged civil war among the various states of the oldconfederationunderthetitularheadoftheZhoudynasty.TheWarringStateseraisgenerallycitedtomarkmiddletolatestagesofthedegenerationanddemiseoftheZhoudynasty.Agreatdealofclassicalliteraturefromvariousschoolsdatesfromthisperiod,includingtheworksofMoziandMenciusaswellasTheArtofWar.

THEQINDYNASTY(246–206B.C.E.)Thefirstimperialdynasty,destroyingtheoldsystemoffeudalstatesinfavorofuniformlawadministeredbyacentralgovernment.ThenameQin(pronouncedlike the English word chin) would seem to be the root of the English wordChina,whichbearsnorelationtowhattheChinesecallthemselves.BringingtheWarringStates era to a closeandunifyingChinapolitically andculturally, theQindynastywasshortbuteventful.

THEHANDYNASTY(206B.C.E.–220C.E.)Under thewastefulandcruel regimeof the secondemperorofQin therewerewidespread insurrections thateventually toppled thedynasty.TheHandynastywasestablishedby thewarriorparty thatemergedvictorious in thesubsequentpowerstruggle.TheHandynastylastedfornearlyfourhundredyears,withoneshort interruption in the earlyyearsof theCommonEra.TheHanorder left aprofoundmarkonChineseculturalconsciousness,and theChinesepeoplecallthemselvesandtheirlanguageHan.TheTaoistclassicMastersofHuainan,heirtothepoliticalphilosophyofTheArtofWar,datesfromthefirstcenturyoftheHandynasty.

THEERAOFTHETHREEKINGDOMS(190–265C.E.)TheeraoftheThreeKingdomsreferstotheextendedstrugglefordominionovertheterritoriesofthelateHan.Chinawasdividedintothreecompetingkingdoms—Wei,Shu,andWu—vyingtoreconstructthedecayedempireundertheirownregimes.Manyfamouswar talesandanecdotesonstrategyare takenfromthisera,whichwasthetimeofZhugeLiangandthenotoriousgeneralCaoCao.CaoCao’sowncommentariesonTheArtofWarareincludedinthefirstbookinthisvolume.

THEJINDYNASTY(265–420C.E.)TheJindynastysupplantedWei,whichhademergedvictoriousamongtheThreeKingdoms.TheJindynastywasseriouslychallenged,andits imperialdomainsreduced,byotherNorthandCentralAsianpeopleswhosetupnumerousstatescollectivelyknownastheSixteenKingdoms.

THENORTHERNANDSOUTHERNDYNASTIES(420–589C.E.)The Northern dynasties were under non-Chinese rule, the Southern dynastiesunder Chinese rule. During this period there were conflicts both within andbetween theNorthernandSoutherndynasties.Thisperiod lasted for thebetterpartofthefifthandsixthcenturies.

THESUIDYNASTY(558–618C.E.)TheSuidynastyreunifiedChina in the latesixthcentury, thencollapsedunderthe duress of rebellions against the government for the exorbitant costs of thepoliciesandprogramsofthesecondemperor.

THETANGDYNASTY(618–905C.E.)SupplantingtheSui,theTangdynastylastedfornearlythreehundredyearsandis considered a peak in the cultural history of China. The Chinese empireexpanded under the Tang and influenced the development of new nations inJapan,Korea, andTibet.Buddhism flourishedwith increased input from Indiaand Central Asia, which then diffused from China into the newer nationssurrounding it. China also renewed contact with the West during the Tangdynasty through the entry ofChristianity and Islam.As a global powerChinadeclinedafterthepeakoftheTangdynasty,reenteringcenturiesofconflictswithotherAsianpeoples.ThetalesofwarrecitedbyLiuJiendattheTangdynasty,rangingfromtheSpringandAutumneratothebeginningoftheTang.

LessonsofWar

CalculatedBattleLiuJisaid:The reasonable course of action in any use of arms starts with calculation.

Before fighting, first assess the relative sagacityof themilitary leadership, therelativestrengthoftheenemy,thesizesofthearmies,thelayoftheland,andtheadequacy of provisions. If you send troops out only after making thesecalculations,youwillneverfailtowin.Theruleis“Sizingupopponentstodeterminevictory,assessingdangersand

distances,isthepropercourseofactionformilitaryleaders”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“Terrain”).

LiuBei(161–223)wasoneofthewarriorgiantsofThreeKingdomsfame.HeestablishedthekingdomofShu,orShuHan,envisionedasacontinuationoftheHandynastyinthewesternpartoftheChineseheartland,theancientregionofShu.In the last days of theHandynasty,LiuBeiwent three times to askZhuge

Liang for advice on strategy. Zhuge Liang was to become one of the mostfamousstrategistsinhistory.Zhuge Liang told Liu Bei, “Ever since the beginning of the current power

struggleforwhatisleftoftheHanempire,manymettlesomemenhavearisen.Countless prefectures and districts have been taken over by suchmen. If youcomparecurrentcontendersfornationalpower,oneofthem—thenotoriousCaoCao—wasonce an unknownwith a small force, yet hewas able to overcomeanotherwarlordwithamuchlargerfollowing.Thereasontheweakerwasabletoprevailoverthestrongerisnotsimplyamatterofcelestialtiming,butalsoofhumanplanning.CaoCaonowhasamillionfollowers;hecontrolstheemperorandgivesorderstothelords—hecannotreallybeopposed.

“Anotherwarlord,incontroloftheareaeastoftheriver,isalreadythethird

generation hegemon there. The territory is rugged and the people are loyal tohim;theintelligentandcapableserveinhisemploy.Hewouldbeasuitableally,

buthecannotbecountedon.“Here there is easeofcommunicationand transport. It is a landsuitable for

militaryoperations.If itsrulercannotkeepit, thiswouldseemtobeaboontothe general. Do you have any interest in it? To the southwest are precipitousnatural barriers, beyond which lie vast fertile plains. That land is called theheavenlyprecinct,anditiswheretheHandynastyreallybegan.“Now the governor of that region is ignorant andweak.To the north is the

strongholdof the independentTaoist cult of theCelestialMasters.Thepeoplearerobustandthelandisrich,buttheydonotknowhowtotakecareofit.Menofknowledgeandabilitywanttofindanenlightenedleader.“General, you are a descendant of the imperial family, and are known

everywhereforintegrityandjustice.Yougatherheroicmenandeagerlyseekthewise. If you occupy this whole region, guard the crags and defiles, establishgoodrelationswith theforeign tribes to thewestandsouth,makefriendswiththe warlord east of the river, and work to perfect internal organization, thenwhenthereisanupheavalinthetotalpoliticalsituationandyoumobilizeyourarmies,thecommonpeoplewillsurelywelcomeyouwithfoodanddrink.Ifyoucan reallydo this,hegemonycanbeestablished, and thehouseofHancanberevived.”LiuBeiagreed,anditturnedoutasplanned.

FightingSchemesLiuJisaid:Wheneveropponentsbegin toscheme,attackaccordingly, foiling theirplans

sothattheygiveup.Theruleis“Thesuperiormilitaryartiststrikeswhileschemesarebeinglaid”

(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“PlanningaSiege”).

Around500B.C.E.,intheSpringandAutumnera,thelordofJinwantedtoattackthestateofQi.HesentanemissarytoQitoobservethegovernmentthere.ThelordofQiwinedanddinedtheemissary.Thewineflowedfreely,andthe

emissaryaskedtodrinkfromthelord’scup.Thisisagestureoffamiliarity,andsucharequestundersuchcircumstancesisaninsult.Thelordsaid,“Ioffermycuptomyguest.”After theemissaryofJinhaddrunkfromthe lord’scup,oneof theeminent

nobles of theQi court came forward, removed it, and personally continued toservewinetotheemissaryinanothercup.

Nowtheemissary,feigninginebriation,stoodupindispleasureandsaidtothehighest cabinet official at the court of Qi, “I desire themusic of the duke ofZhou.Ifyoucanplayit,Iwilldanceitforyou.”ThedukeofZhouwasthefounderoftheZhoudynasty,whichwasbeginning

todisintegrateintheSpringandAutumnera.ThehighofficialofQisaid,“Ihavenotpracticedit.”TheemissaryofJinleft.TheLordofQisaidtothenobleandtheofficial,“Jinisabigstate.Nowyou

have angered the emissary of that great state, who came to observe ourgovernment.Whatshallwedo?”The eminent noble said, “I could see the emissary was not ignorant of

etiquette,soIwouldnotgoalongwithhimwhenhetriedtoshameourstate.”Thecabinetofficialsaid,“ThemusicofthedukeofZhouisthemusicofthe

national leader.Onlya rulerdances it.Thatemissary is theservantofanother,yethewantedtodancethemusicofleaders—thatiswhyIdidn’tperform.”Asfortheemissary,hewentbackandreportedtothelordofJin.Hesaid,“Qi

cannotbeattackedatthistime.Itriedtoinsulttheirlord,andacourtnobleknewit;Itriedtoviolatetheiretiquette,andthehighestofficialperceivedit.”

Confuciussaidofthecourtnoblewhotookthelord’scupfromtheemissarythathe“couldstopathrustfromathousandmilesawaywithoutleavingthetable.”

EspionageandWarfareLiuJisaid:Whenever you move against anyone, before mobilizing the army first use

spies to seewhether the opponents aremany or few, empty or full, active orquiet.Thenyoucanbeverysuccessfulandneverfailtowininbattle.Theruleis“Spiesareusefuleverywhere”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“Onthe

UseofSpies”).

InthesixthcenturyC.E.,duringtheeraoftheNorthernandSoutherndynasties,GeneralWeiof thecourtofZhouwasthemilitarygovernorofJadeWallCity.GeneralWeiwasknownforhisexemplarybehaviorinhisofficialcapacity.Hewasskilledatmanagementandable towinpeople’shearts.Allof thespieshesentintotheterritoryoftheQicourtdidtheirutmostforhim,andcertainpeopleofQiwhomWeihadbribedsenthimreportsbyletter.ThereforetheZhoucourtknewallaboutthemovementsofQi.

Now the primeminister ofQiwas aman of sagacity and courage.GeneralWeiloathedhim.OneofWei’sofficers,whoknewquiteabitaboutdivination,said,“Nextyeartherewillbeslaughterintheeast.”ThekingdomofQiwastotheeastofZhou.Weihad thisofficer composea songwithadoubleentendresuggestingthattheprimeministerofQiwasplottingacoupd’état;thenhehadhissecretagentsplantthissonginthemaincityofQi.Subsequently theredevelopeda rift between theprimeministerofQi and a

certain general.WhenWei heard of this, he further exacerbated it. The primeministerwaseventuallyexecuted.When the ruler of Zhou heard that the prime minister of Qi was dead, he

issued an amnesty for that territory, then mobilized a large army to attack,ultimatelydestroyingthekingdomofQi.

EliteFightersLiuJisaid:Whenever you do battle with opponents, it is imperative to select brave

leaders and crack troops to be your vanguard. One purpose of this is thestrengthenyourownwill;anotheristobreakdowntheopponent’sforce.The rule is “Thosewhodonot sort out the levels of skill among their own

troopsaretheoneswhogetbeaten”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“Terrain”).

Intheyear207,twosonsofamajorwarlordoftheThreeKingdomserafledtothenorth.There they joined forceswith anorthern tribal people, theWuheng,who raided Chinese territory from time to time. Cao Cao set out on anexpeditionnorthtostopthetribalincursions,intendingtostrikedownthesonsoftheChinesewarlordaswell.Thatautumn,withtheroadsnorthmadeimpassablebyheavyrains,CaoCao’s

troops made their way two hundred miles through the hinterland, tunnelingthroughmountainsandfillinginravines.TheyreachednorthtotheterritoryoftheTuranianXianbeitribes,thenheadedforthehomelandoftheWuheng.BeforeCaoCao’sarmyhadgonemuchmorethanahundredmiles,theywere

discovered by the enemy.The brothers, togetherwith several tribal chieftains,ledalargeforceofmountedfightersagainstthem.Now Cao Cao’s equipment was in transport behind him, and few of his

soldierswerewearingarmor.Everyonewasworried.CaoCaoclimbedhighupamountainsidetosurveythesituation.Seeingthat

their opponents’ battle lineswere disorderly, he allowedhis soldiers to attack,

appointingoneofhisbestcommanderstoleadthevanguard.The enemy troopswere routed.A number of tribal leaderswere killed, and

manythousandmountedwarriorssurrenderedtotheHanChinese.

BattlingonGoodFaithLiuJisaid:In any battle with an opponent, when soldiers face almost certain death

withoutregretorfear,itistrustthatmakesthemthatway.Whentheleadershipistrustworthyandhonest,followersareearnestandfreefromdoubt;sothereiscertainvictoryinbattle.Theruleis“Thetrustworthydonotcheat”(“SixSecrets,”“OnGeneralship”).

During the Three Kingdoms era, the king of Wei personally directed anexpedition against the kingdom of Shu. He sent a huge force of light troopsundercovertoproceedinstealthtowardShu.NowZhugeLiang,ministerandgeneralofShu,hadtakenupapositioninthe

mountains, guarding the passes with well-equipped troops. He had the troopsreplacedregularly,keepingacontingentofaboutone-halftoone-thirdthesizeofthestrikeforcenowadvancingfromWeitoShu.TheWeiarmyarrivedandsetupbattlelinesjustastheShuguardwasinthe

processofchanging.Zhuge’saidesurgedhimtokeepthedepartingtroopstherefor anothermonth to add their strength to the replacements in face of such apowerfulenemyforce.Zhugesaid,“Mycommandofthemilitaryisbasedontrustandgoodfaith.To

losetrustbytryingtogainanadvantageisamistakemadebymenofold.Thosewho are due to leave pack their gear quickly,waiting for their time to come,whiletheirwivesandchildrenstandintheirdoorwaysbackhome,countingthedays.Althoughwearefacingacrisis,itwillnotdotoabandonwhatisrightandjust.”ThusGeneralZhugeLiang urged all thosewhose tour of dutywas done to

leavethefrontandreturnhome.Now those who were scheduled to leave were all so pleased by this

announcement that theyasked tobeallowed to stay foronemorebattle.Theystirredup theircourage,determined to fight to thedeath, saying toeachother,“Evenifwedie,thatisstillnotenoughtorepaythekindnessofMasterZhuge.”On thedayofbattle, everyone inZhuge’s army rushed forwardwithdrawn

sword, each soldier taking on ten of the enemy. They killed one of the Wei

leaders,droveoffanother,andwonagreatvictory inasinglebattle.Thiswasbecauseoftrustandgoodfaith.

InstructionandWarfareLiuJisaid:Whenever you want to raise an army, it is necessary first to instruct it in

warfare.Whenthesoldiersaretrainedinwaysofscatteringandmassing,andarethoroughlyfamiliarwiththesignalsforpassivityandaction,advanceandretreat,thenwhentheymeetopponentstheyrespondtodirectionbysignals.Thenyoucandobattlewithoutfailingtowin.The rule is “To have uninstructed people go into battle is tantamount to

abandoningthem”(Confucius,Analects).

IntheWarringStatesera,thenotoriousmartialistWuQi(d.381B.C.E.),generalof thewarring state ofWei, spoke in these terms: “People always die atwhattheycannotdoandaredefeatedbywhatisnotadvantageoustothem.Theruleformilitaryoperationsistostartwithinstructionandtraining.Onepersonwholearns to fight can teach tenpeople, tenpeoplewho learn to fight can teach ahundred people, a hundred can teach a thousand, a thousand can teach tenthousand,tenthousandcanteachenoughpeopleforthreearmies.“Let them learn all the adaptations: maximizing the distance traveled by

opponentswhileminimizingyourown,wearingopponentsdownwhilestayingrested yourselves, starving opponents out while keeping yourselves well fed,knowingwhentoformacircleandwhentoformasquare,whentositandwhentorise,whentomoveandwhentostop,whentogorightandwhentogoleft,whentogoaheadandwhentofallback,whentosplitupandwhentojoin,whentobandtogetherandwhentospreadout.“When they have practiced all of this, then give the fighters weapons. To

makethemexpertinthisiscalledthebusinessofamilitaryleader.”

CaringinWarLiuJisaid:Whatmakessoldiersinbattleperfertochargeaheadratherthanretreateven

for survival is the benevolence of the military leadership. When the soldiersknow their leaders care for them as they care for their own children, then thesoldierslovetheirleadersastheydotheirownfathers.Thismakesthemwilling

todieinbattle,torequitethebenevolenceoftheirleaders.Theruleis“Lookuponyoursoldiersasbelovedchildren,andtheywillingly

diewithyou”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“Terrain”).

During the Warring States era, when the Wei general Wu Qi was militarygovernorofWestRiver,heworethesameclothesandatethesamefoodasthelowestofhissoldiers.Hedidnotuseamattositon,andhedidnotridewhentraveling.Hepersonallycarriedhisownbundleofprovisionsandsharedthetoilandhardshipsofthesoldiers.Once,whenoneof thesoldierswassufferingfromafesteringwoundonhis

arm,thegeneralhimselfsuckedoutthepus.Whenthatsoldier’smotherheardaboutthis,shebegantomourn.Someonesaidtoher,“Yoursonisasoldier,yetthegeneralhimselfsuckedthe

pusfromhiswound—whatistheretomournabout?”

Thewomansaid,“LastyearGeneralWudidthesamethingformyhusband,

and as a result my husband fought in battle without taking a backward step,finallydyingatthehandsofanenemy.Nowthatthegeneralhastreatedmysoninthiswaytoo,Ihavenoideawherehewilldie.ThisiswhyImournhim.”ItwasbecauseWuQiwasstrictwithhimselfwhile impartial towardothers,

andhadwontheheartsofhissoldiers,thataLordofWeihadmadehimmilitarygovernorofWestRiver.WuQifoughtseventy-sixmajorbattleswithlordsoftheotherwarringstates,andgainedcompletevictorysixty-fourtimes.

AuthorityandWarfareLiuJisaid:Whensoldiers inbattleforgeaheadanddonotdare tofallback, thismeans

they fear theirown leadersmore than they fear theenemy. If theydare to fallbackanddarenot forgeahead thismeans they fear theenemymore than theyfeartheirownleaders.Whenageneralcangethistroopstoplungerightintothethickofragingcombat,itishisauthorityandsternnessthatbringsthisabout.The rule is “To be awesome and yet caring makes a good balance”

(“DialoguesofLi,LordofWei”).

DuringtheSpringandAutumnera,thestateofQiwasinvadedbythestatesofJinandYan.AtfirsttheinvadersovercamethemilitaryforcesofQi.OneoftheeminentnoblesofthecourtofQirecommendedthemartialistTian

RangjutothelordofQi.Tothisman,latercalledSimaRangju,isattributedthefamousmilitaryhandbook“Sima’sArtofWar,”or“Sima’sRules.”In recommendingRangju, the court noble said to the lordofQi, “Although

Rangju is an illegitimate descendant of a noble family of another state, hiscultureisattractivetopeopleandhismilitaryprowessisawesometoopponents.Pleasetryhim.”ThelordofQi thensummonedRangju todiscussmilitarymatterswithhim.

The lordwas very pleasedwithwhat Rangju had to say, and hemade him ageneral,appointinghimtoleadanarmytoresisttheaggressionoftheforcesofYanandJin.Rangjusaid,“Iamlowlyinsocialstatus,yetthelordhaspromotedmefrom

theranksandplacedmeaboveeventhegrandees.Thesoldiersarenotyetloyalto me, and the common people are not familiar with me; as a man of littleaccount,myauthorityisslight.Irequestoneofyourfavoriteministers,someonehonoredbythestate,tobeoverseerofthearmy.”Thelordaccededtothisrequestandappointedanoblemantobetheoverseer.

Rangju took his leave, arranging to meet the nobleman at the militaryheadquartersatnoonthefollowingday.ThenRangjuhastenedbacktosetupasundialandawaterclocktoawaitthenewoverseer.Nowthisnewoverseerwasaproudandhaughtyaristocrat,andheimagined

that as overseer he was leading his own army. Because of his pride andarrogance,hedidnotseeanyneedtohurry,inspiteofhispromisewithRangjuthemartialmaster.Hisrelativesandcloseassociatesgavehimafarewellparty,andhestayedtodrinkwiththem.At noon the next day, the new overseer had not arrived at headquarters.

Rangju took down the sundial and emptied thewaterclock.He assembled thetroopsandinformedthemoftheagreementwiththenewoverseer.Thateveningthenoblemanfinallyarrived.Rangjusaidtohim,“Whyareyou

late?”He said, “My relatives, who are grandees, gave me a farewell party, so I

stayedforthat.”Rangjusaid,“Onthedayamilitaryleaderreceiveshisorders,heforgetsabout

hishome;whenapromiseismadeinfaceofbattle,oneforgetshisfamily;whenthewardrumssound,oneforgetshisownbody.Nowhostilestateshaveinvadedourterritory;thestateisinanuproar;thesoldiersareexposedattheborders;thelord cannot rest easy or enjoy his food; the lives of the common people alldependonyou—howcanyoutalkaboutfarewellparties?”Rangjuthensummonedtheofficerinchargeofmilitarydisciplineandasked

him, “According to military law, what happens to someone who arrives later

thananappointedtime?”Theofficerreplied,“Heissupposedtobedecapitated.”Terrified, the aristocrat had amessenger rushback to report this to the lord

andbeseechhim forhelp.But thehaughtynoblemanwas executedbefore themessenger even returned, and his execution was announced to the army. Thesoldiersallshookwithfear.Eventually the lord sent an emissarywith a letter pardoning the nobleman,

whowas, after all, thenewoverseer of the army.The emissarygalloped rightintocamponhorsebackwiththelord’smessage.Rangjusaid,“Whenageneralisinthefield,thereareordershedoesn’ttake

fromtheruler.’”He also said to the disciplinary officer, “It is a rule that there shall be no

gallopingthroughcamp,yetnowtheemissaryhasdone just that.Whatshouldbedonewithhim?”Theofficersaid,“Heshouldbeexecuted.”The emissary was petrified, but Rangju said, “It is not proper to kill an

emissaryofthelord,”andhadtwooftheemissary’sattendantsexecutedinhisstead.Thistoowasannouncedtothearmy.Rangjusenttheemissarybacktoreporttothelord,andthenhesetoutwith

thearmy.Whenthesoldiersmadecamp,Rangjupersonallyoversawthediggingofwells,constructionofstoves,preparationof foodanddrink,andcareof thesick.Hesharedallofthesuppliesoftheleadershipwiththesoldiers,personallyeating the same rations as they. He was especially kind to the weary andweakened.After threedays,Rangjucalled the troops toorder.Even thosewhowere ill

wantedtogoalong,eagertogointobattleforRangju.WhenthearmiesofJinandYanheardaboutthis, theywithdrewfromthestateofQi.NowRangjuledhis troops to chase them down and strike them. Eventually he recovered lostterritoryandreturnedwiththearmyvictorious.

RewardandBattleLiuJisaid:Forsoldierstostrivetoscalehighwallsinspiteofdeepmoatsandshowersof

arrowsandrocks,or forsoldiers toplungeeagerly into the frayofbattle, theymustbeinducedbyseriousrewards;thentheywillprevailoveranenemy.The rule is “Where there are serious rewards, there will be valiant men”

(“ThreeStrategies,”alsoin“SixSecrets”).

AttheendoftheHandynasty,wheneverCaoCaoplunderedacityandobtainedrareandbeautifulobjects,hewouldalwaysusethemtorewardachievement.Topeoplewhohadworkedhardandwereworthyofreward,hewouldnotbegrudgeeven a thousand pieces of gold, while to those without merit he would givenothing.Thereforehewasabletowinbattleafterbattle.

PunishmentandBattleLiuJisaid:Whatwillmakesoldiersinbattledaretogoforwardandnotdaretoretreatis

astrictpenaltyforanyonewhoretreatsevenaninch.Thusitispossibletogainvictorybythismeans.The rule is “Punishment should be immediate” (“Sima’sRules,” “Duties of

theEmperor”).

YangSu (d. 606)was agreat general of thebrief butmomentousSuidynasty(589–617).Hiscommandwasstrict andorderly;anyonewhoviolatedmilitaryorderswasimmediatelyexecuted,withnoexceptions.WheneverGeneralYangwas about to face an opponent, hewould look for

peopletomakemistakessohecouldexecute them.Sometimesoverahundredmenwouldbekilled;itwasneverlessthanseveraldozen.Hehimselfwouldtalkandlaughcasuallyastheflowingbloodfloodedthegroundbeforehim.Thenwhen he faced the enemy on the battle line, hewould first command

threehundredmentoattack.Iftheywereabletobreaktheopponent’sbattleline,theywereallright;iftheyreturnedwithoutbeingabletostrikethroughenemylines,theywouldallbeexecuted,regardlessoftheirnumber.ThenGeneralYangwouldsendaheadanothertwoorthreehundredmen,and

again killed any who returned. As a result, the commanders and soldierstrembled in fear and were determined to fight to the death. Therefore theyconsistentlywoninbattle.

DefensiveBattleLiuJisaid:Inanybattle,ifanotheristheaggressorandyouarethedefender,youshould

notbe tooquick to fight. Ifyourarmy is at rest and the soldiersarewatchingover their homes, you should gather people to guard the cities and fortify themountain passes, cutting off the aggressors’ supply routes.When they do not

succeed indrawingyou intobattle, and their suppliesdonot reach them,waituntiltheyarewornoutandthenstrikethem.Ifyoudothisyouwillalwayswin.Theruleis“Fightingonyourownterritoryiscalledagroundofdissolution”

(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“NineGrounds”).

WuDi(371–409)wastheMartialEmperoroftheLaterWeidynasty,aforeignregimeinnorthernChinaundertheruleoftheTobapeople.Hepersonallyledanexpedition against the Later Yan dynasty, another foreign regime in northernChina, this one under the rule of the Xianbei people, who had invaded Tobaterritory.TheWeiarmyfailedinitsactionagainstYan,andtheYanemperorwantedto

strikeback.Amilitaryaidecameforth,however,andsaid,“Theancientswouldfirstbesureofvictoryintheplanningbeforegoingontheoffensive.NowtherearefourreasonswhyWeicannotbeattacked,andthreereasonswhyYanshouldnotact.”TheemperorofYansaid,“Whatarethesereasons?”Theaidesaid,“TheWeiarmy isdeep insideour territory,and itsadvantage

lies in battle on the open fields; this is one reasonwhy it cannot be attacked.Indeed, it has penetrated so far that it is near our capital, so it is on deadlyground,where the invadingsoldiersknowtheyhavenochoicebutfight to thedeath; this is the second reason they cannot be attacked. Furthermore, thevanguardhasalreadybeendefeated,sotherearlinesmusthavebeentightenedup;thisisthethirdreasonnottoattack.Finally,theyaremanywhilewearefew;thisisthefourthreasontheycannotbeattacked.“As for the reasons why Yan should refrain from action: first of all, a

governmentarmyisfightingonitsownterritory;soweshouldnotact.Second,if it actsanddoesnotprevail, itwillbehard tomake theheartsof thepeopleresolute;soweshouldnotact.Third,ourdefensesarenotyetready,andwearenot prepared for the coming of an enemy; again, we should not act. Thesesituationsareallavoidedbywarriors.“Itwouldbebesttosecureourdefensesandwaitineasefortheenemytotire.

Theyhavetotransportgrainoverhundredsofmiles,andthereisnothingintheopenfieldstotake.Eventuallytheywillweardown,sothatiftheyattack,manyof their soldiers will die.When their army grows stale and discords develop,thenriseupagainstthemandyoucanovercomethem.”TheYanemperorpraisedthestrategicthinkingofthemilitaryaide.

OffensiveBattle

LiuJisaid:Inbattle, if theadversary is thedefenderandyouare the invader, just try to

penetrate deeply. If you penetrate deeply into their territory, defenders cannotwin.Thisisbecauseofwhatiscalledtheinvaderbeingonheavygroundwhilethedefenderisonlightground.The rule is “Invaders become more intense the further they enter alien

territory”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“NineGrounds”).

In theearlyHandynasty,HanXin (d.196B.C.E.) andZhangEr (d.202B.C.E.)mobilizedanarmyofseveraltensofthousandstoattackthestateofZhao.HanXinwas an outstandingmilitarist involved in thewarswaged to establish theHandynasty.ZhangErwasoneofanumberoflocalfeudalkingswhosestateswereallowedtoexistwithinthestructureoftheearlyHanempire.Now the king of Zhao and the lord of Cheng-an massed an army of two

hundredthousandmenatastrategicpass,todefendagainsttheinvaders.OneofthecouncillorsofZhao,however,saidtothelordofCheng-an,“IhearthatHanXin’s armyhas been campaigning successfully, and now, reinforced byZhangEr’sarmy,hewants todescendonZhao.His stringofvictorieshas takenhimfromhisown land to fight far abroad;newsofhispower robspeopleof theircourage,anditisimpossibletostanduptohimdirectly.“I hear that Han Xin is transporting supplies from a great distance. The

soldiers have the look of hunger; they eat irregularly and never sleep on fullstomachs.Now the road through the pass is too narrow for two cars to travelabreast,orforagroupofhorsementorideinformation;sotheirsuppliesmustbebehindthem.“Pleaseletmetakeaspecialforceofthirtythousandtocuttheirsupplylines

off fromthebyways.Yousecureyour fortificationsanddon’t fightwith them.Theycannotgoforward;theycannotreturn;theycannotplunderanythingfromthefield.Beforetendaysareup,theheadsofbothleaders,HanXinandZhangEr,canbehangingfromyourflagpole.Pleasepayheed;otherwiseyouwillbecaptured.”ButthelordofCheng-anwasself-righteousanddidnotlistentothisstrategy.

Eventuallyhewaskilled.

StrengthandBattleLiuJisaid:Wheneveryoufightwithopponents,ifyouarenumerousandstrong,youcan

feignweaknesstoenticeopponentswhowillthinklittleofcomingtofightwithyou.Strikethemwithyourbestsoldiers,andtheirforceswillbedefeated.Theruleis“Thougheffective,appeartobeineffective”(SunTzu,TheArtof

War,“StrategicAssessments”).

LateintheeraoftheWarringStates,ageneralofthestateofZhaonamedLiMu(d. 228 B.C.E.) was permanently stationed on the northwest frontier to defendChineseterritoryagainstincursionsbytheHuns.Forconvenience,hesetupanofficetocollecttaxesandforwardthemtohisheadquartersatthefront,wherehespentthemonthesoldiers.Everydayhehadcattleslaughteredtofeedthetroopswell.General Li had the soldiers practicemounted archery and watch over their

signal fires,andheemployedmanyspiesand informants.AfterwardshemadehiscommandersandsoldierspromisetopullbackintoacloseddefenseandnottofightwhenevertheHunscame.AnyonewhodaredtotakeaHuncaptivewastobeexecuted.They did this for several years, and although nothingwas lost to theHuns,

they considered LiMu a coward. Even the Zhao frontier troops thought theirleader was timid. The king of Zhao remonstrated with General Li, but thegeneralcontinuedtodoasbefore.Finally, the king recalled General Li and replaced him with someone else.

Now,undertheirnewleader,theChinesegarrisonsoldierswentoutandfoughtwhenever theHuns showed up.After littlemore than a year theChinese hadtakenseveralbeatings from theHunsandhadsufferedconsiderable loss.Asaresult,itwasimpossibletofarmorraiseanimalsinthefrontierregion.NowLiMuwasaskedto takeoveronceagain,butheclaimedtobe illand

refused to leave home. The king pressed him to lead the army, so Li finallyagreedontheconditionthathebeallowedtopursuehisformerpolicy.Thekingacceptedthisprovision,soGeneralLiwentbackandfollowedhisoriginalplan.TheHunscameagain,butthoughtheydidn’tgetanything,theythoughtGeneralLiwasaweakling.The frontier soldiers won prizes every day, but prizes were not what they

wanted. What all of them wanted was a fight. Now General Li had thirteenhundred specially selected chariots outfitted and picked out thirteen thousandhorsemen,fiftythousandseasonedsoldiers,andahundredthousandarchers.Allofthemdrilledandpracticedcombat.Now themilitary authorities allowed the localpeople to let their flocks and

herds out. People filled the fields. When the Huns showed up, General Lipretendedtobeatalossandevenletthemtakeseveralthousandcaptives.

WhentheHunchieftainheardaboutthis,heledahugecrowdonamassraidintoChineseterritory.GeneralLisetupmanysurprisebattlelinesandhadhisarmyfanoutonboth

sides to attack. In this way the Chinese routed the Huns. They killed over ahundredthousandhorsemenandputthetribalchieftaintoflight.FormorethantenyearsafterthattheHunsdidnotdaretocrosstheborderof

Zhao.

WeaknessandBattleLiuJisaid:Wheneveryoudobattlewithopponentswhooutnumberyouandarestronger

thanyou,youshouldsetupmanybannersandincreasethenumberofstovesyoubuild,givingtheappearanceofstrengthtopreventopponentsfromfiguringoutyournumbersandpower.Thenadversarieswillnotbequicktofightwithyou.Ifyoucanleavequickly,thenyourwholearmycanescapeharm.Theruleis“Strengthandweaknessareamatterofformation”(SunTzu,The

ArtofWar,“Force”).

During the Later Han dynasty (25–219), a group of the seminomadic Qiangpeople of Central Asia, whowere ancestors of themodern Tibetans, revoltedagainsttheHanChineseempire.TheHanempressdowagerappointedaleadingstrategisttobethemilitarygovernorofthatarea,butahordeofseveralthousandQiangcutoffthenewgovernor’smarch.The governor stopped his troops immediately and announced that he was

going to send to the imperial court for reinforcements. Learning of this, theQiangdivideduptocombthesurroundingcountryside,lookingfortheChinesemessengerswhohadbeensenttotheHancourtforhelp.NowthattheQiangmilitiawasscattered,theChinesegovernorproceededby

forcedmarches night and day, covering over thirtymiles a day. He had eachmesssergeantmaketwostovesatfirst,andthenincreasethenumberofstoveseachday.TheQiangdidnotdaretoattack.Someonesaidtothegovernor,“ThefamousmartialistSunBindecreasedhis

campfires,whileyouincreasedthem.Also,youwentmorethanthreetimesthemaximumdailymarchrecommendedinmilitaryclassics.Whyisthis?”Thegovernorsaid,“Theenemyhadmanysoldiers,Ihadfew.Iincreasedthe

fire stoves to make them think the local militia was coming to welcome us.Thinkingwearemanyandtravelingfast,theyhesitatetopursueus.SunBinsaw

weakness;Igivetheappearanceofstrength.Thesituationsarenotthesame.”

HauteurandBattleLiuJisaid:Whenyouropponents are strongandoutnumberyou, so thatyoucannotbe

sureofprevailing,youshouldusehumilityandcourtesytomakethemhaughty,then wait for an opening that offers an opportunity of which you can takeadvantage,andyoucanbeatthem.Theruleis“Usehumilitytomakethemhaughty”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,

“StrategicAssessments”).

DuringtheeraoftheThreeKingdoms,warlordsofWeiinthenorth,Wuinthesouth,andShuintheweststruggledamongoneanotherforhegemonyovertheremainsof theChinese empire.Atonepoint a leadinggeneral ofShumade aforaynorth,wherehecapturedoneWeigeneralandsurroundedanother.NowthegeneralofWuwhowasstationedattheborderwithWeiandShuleft

hispostonaccountofillness.HewasvisitedbyanotherWugeneral,whosaidtohim,“TheShugeneralisrightontheborder—whydidyouleave?Therewillbetroubleifnoonestandsinhisway.”TheretiredWugeneralsaid,“Youareright,butIamveryill.”TheotherWugeneral said, “TheShugeneral is proudof his achievements,

andhishauteur isoverbearing.Hehasalsoheardofyour illness,and issurelythatmorethelaxinhisprecautions.Ifyouattacknow,whenheisn’texpectingit,youcancaptureorrestrainhim.Thiswouldbeagoodstrategytopresenttotheking.”TheretiredWugeneralsaid,“TheShugeneralisabraveandmettlesomeman.

Heisalreadyhardtoopposeonthisaccount.Furthermore,hehastakencontrolofstrategicterritory,wherehehaswongreatprestige.Withhisrecentsuccessesandhisgrowingboldness,itisnoteasytoplotagainsthim.”WhentheretiredWugeneralgottothecapitalcity,thekingofWuaskedhim,

“Ifyouareill,whocanreplaceyou?”The retired general recommended the otherWugeneral,withwhomhe had

hadtheforegoingconversation,saying,“Heisadeepthinkerandhastheabilitytobearresponsibility.Consideringhisorderlythinking,Iregardhimassuitableforthisimportantpost.Furthermore,heisnotyetwellknown,sothegeneralofShudoesn’thatehim.Noonecouldbebetter.Ifyougivehimthejob,havehimconcealhis actionsoutwardlywhile inwardly looking foropportunities to take

advantage;thenhecanovercomethegeneralofShu.”SothekingofWusummonedtheothergeneralandpromotedhim.Whenthis

newWugeneraloftheborderguardarrivedatthefrontierregion,hesentaletterto the Shu general. The letterwas fawning and obsequious, flattering the Shugeneral.TheWugeneralalsowrotetotheShugeneralofhisconcernabouttheleading warlord of Wei and expressed hope that the general of Shu wouldcontainthismenace.WhentheShugeneralreadthisletter,henotedthehumilityexpressedbythe

generalofWuandhisdesireforthegoodwillofShu.Asaresult,thegeneralofShurelaxedandwasnolongerhostile.NowthegeneralofWureportedthistothekingofWu,andexplainedhowtheShugeneralcouldbecaptured.SothekingofWusentanundercoverforceupnorth,appointingtwogenerals

to lead the vanguard. In this way, the kingdom of Wu was able to wrestimportantterritoryfromthegripofthewarriorgeneralofShu.

DiplomaticRelationsLiuJisaid:Whenever you go to war, establish cordial relations with neighboring

countries. Form alliances to draw them into helping you. If you attack yourenemiesfromthefrontwhileyouralliesattackfrombehind,yourenemieswillsurelybevanquished.Theruleis“Onintersectingground,formcommunications”(SunTzu,TheArt

ofWar,“NineGrounds”).

DuringtheeraoftheThreeKingdoms,atonepointthetopgeneralofShuhadone of theWei generals surrounded. The high command ofWei sent anothergeneraltotherescue.Asithappened,thewatersoftheHanRiverroseviolently,enablingtheShugeneraltocapturetheleaderoftheWeireinforcements,withalarge contingent of infantry and cavalry. The Shu general sent his own troopsshootingdowntheswollenriverinboatstostriketheWeiforces.Nowat this time thepuppet emperorof thedissolvingHandynastyhadhis

temporarycapitalnotfarfromthewarzone.CaoCao,theWeiwarlordgeneralwhomanipulatedthepuppetemperor,thoughtthecapitalwastooclosetoenemylines,andhewantedtomoveitoutofreach.Oneof thegreatministersofWei,however,objected toCaoCao’splan.He

said, “The reinforcementswe sentwere overcome by the river—it is not thatthey failed in defensive battle. As far as the overall policy of the state is

concerned,nothingislost;soifwemovethecapitalnow,thiswillcomeacrossto the enemy as a sign ofweakness, and itwill alsomake the local populaceuneasy.“ThekingofWuandthekingofShuareoutwardlyclosebutinwardlydistant;

nowthat thetopgeneralofShuisgettinghisway, thekingofWuisnodoubtdispleased. We should induce the king of Wu to stop the Shu general frombehind—then the siege surrounding our Wei general will automatically belifted.”CaoCaofollowedthissuggestionandsentanemissarytoestablishanalliance

with thekingofWu.Subsequently thekingofWusentoneofhisgenerals toattacktheterritoryoftheShuwarlordgeneral,andtheWugeneralwasabletowresttwodistrictsfromthegripofShu.Asaresult, thegeneralofShufinallyabandonedhissiegeoftheWeiarmyandlefttheregion.

FormationandBattleLiuJisaid:Whenever you do battle, if the enemy army is very large, then set up false

formationsasfeints todivertanddividetheenemyforcesbyinducingthemtobelievetheyhavetodividetheirtroopstodefendagainstyou.Oncetheenemyforces are divided, therewill be relatively few troops in each contingent.Youcanconcentrateyourforces intoone,soas tooutnumbereachgroupofenemysoldiers.Strikefewwithmany,andyouwillnotfailtowin.The rule is “Induce others to construct a formation while you yourself are

formless”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“EmptinessandFullness”).

Intheyear200,neartheendofthemoribundHandynasty,thewarlordCaoCaofaced offwith one of hismain competitors.His opponent sent two strategistswith a top commander to lead an attack on an army led by one ofCaoCao’smen,whilehehimselfledanotherforcetofollowup.AsforCaoCao,hewenttorescuehismen,whowerenowundersiege.One

ofhisadvisors,however,warnedhimthathehadtoofewtroopswithhimtodobattle,andthatitwouldbenecessarytodividetheenemy’sforces.Consequently,followingtheplanoutlinedbyhisadvisor,CaoCaoledacontingentupbehindhisadversary,whothushadtosendpartofhisownforcebacktodealwithCaoCao.NowCaoCaoledhisarmyonaforcedmarchtowardthepositionbeingheld

by his other troops under siege. When they were nearly there, the opposing

commander took fright and turned around to fight Cao Cao’s newly arrivedreinforcements.Nowthat theopponents’forcesweredivided,CaoCaohadtwotopgenerals

launchadevastatingattack,killingtheenemycommanderandliftingthesiege.

MomentumandBattleLiuJisaid:In battle, momentum means riding on the force of the tide of events. If

enemiesareonthewaytodestruction,thenyoufollowupandpressthem;theirarmieswillsurelycollapse.Theruleis“Usetheforceofmomentumtodefeatthem”(“ThreeStrategies”).

In265,theMartialEmperorofJinfoundedtheJindynasty,heraldingtheendofthe era of the Three Kingdoms. Establishing himself by overthrowing thedynastysetupbyCaoCaointhenorthernkingdomofWei,theMartialEmperorofJinalsohadasecretplantodestroythesouthernkingdomofWu.Manyofhiscourtiers,however,wereopposedtotheideaofattackingWu.Only three of theMartial Emperor’sministers were in favor of his plan to

destroy Wu. One of them was ultimately appointed military director of theborderregion.When the newmilitary director of the border region reached his command

outpost,hehadthesoldiers’armorandequipmentrepaired,andpolisheduptheirmartial skills. Finally he selected a special force of elite troops, who thenlaunchedasuccessfulassaultagainstthearmyofoneoftheleadinggeneralsofWu.NowthemilitarydirectorpetitionedtheJinemperorforpermissiontomakea

full-scaleattackonthekingdomofWu.Theemperorsentbackamessagetellingthedirectortowaituntilthefollowingyearforsuchamassiveundertaking.But themilitary director wrote a letter back to the emperor, explaining the

situationintheseterms:“Inanyaffair, it is imperative tocomparegainand loss.With this invasion,

theprospectsofgainare80to90percent,whiletheprospectsoflossare10to20percent.Ifwestop,nothingwillbeaccomplished.Thecourtierssaywecanbebeat,buttheycannottell.Itisjustthattheyarenotthestrategists,sotheygetnocreditforourmilitarysuccesses.Theareallembarrassedathavingspokeninerrorbefore,sotheyopposethisundertaking.“Sinceautumnourmovementsagainsttheenemyhavebecomeobvious;ifwe

stop now, they might develop a scheme in fear—they may move the capital,increase fortifications, and relocate the populace. If their citadels cannot beattackedandthereisnoplunderinthecountryside,nextyearmaybetoolatetocarryoutourplans.”Whenthisletterfromthemilitarydirectoroftheborderregionarrivedatthe

capital,theemperorhappenedtobeplayingchesswithoneoftheministerswhodidapproveoftheemperor’splantodestroythekingdomofWu.Theministersaid, “YourMajesty is highly intelligent and has greatmilitary acumen. Yournation is rich and your armies are strong. The king of Wu is decadent andvicious,killingofftheworthyandable.Ifyouattackhimnow,themattercanbesettledwithoutmucheffort.”Theemperor thengavehispermission tomoveagainst thekingdomofWu.

Now themilitarydirectorof theborder region launchedhiscampaign, scoringsuccessive military victories and winning over the provinces of Wu as theprovincialauthoritiesdefectedfromWuandswitchedtheirallegiancetoJin.Thatsummertherewasheavyflooding,andthecommandersoftheJinarmy

suggestedtothemilitarydirectorthattheywaituntilwintertogoonthemoveagain, as floods always brought epidemics. The director, however, said that along entrenched enemy cannot easily be overcome, and insisted on riding themomentumof their victories all theway to the final overthrowof the king ofWu.Pursuing this course of action, the Jin army encountered little further

resistance.Finally,intheyear280,theJindynastyannexedtheformerkingdomofWu.

KnowledgeandBattleLiuJisaid:Wheneveryoumobilizeanarmytoattackanenemy,itisimperativetoknow

thelocationofbattle.Whenyourarmygetsthere,ifyoucaninducetheenemyforces tocomewhenyouexpect them,youwillwininbattle. Ifyouknowtheplace and timeofbattle, thenyourpreparationswill be concentrated andyourdefenseswillbefirm.Therule is“Whenyouknowtheplaceandtimeofbattle, thenyoucanjoin

the fight froma thousandmiles away” (SunTzu,TheArt ofWar,“EmptinessandFullness”).

DuringtheWarringStatesera, thestatesofWeiandZhaoattackedthestateof

Han,whichappealedtothestateofQiforhelpinthisemergency.ThegovernmentofQisentoneofitsgeneralswithanarmy,whichmarched

directly for the capital ofWei, the aggressor.When the invadingWei generalheardofthis,heleftthestateofHanandreturnedtoWei.NowtheQigeneralreceivedsomeadvicefromSunBin,anotedstrategistand

descendant of the famous SunWu (SunTzu), legendary author ofThe Art ofWar.MasterSunsaid,“ThearmiesofWei,Zhao,andHanarefierceandthinklittleofQi,whichtheyregardascowardly.Agoodwarriorwouldtakeadvantageofthistendencyand‘leadthemonwithprospectsofgain.’“According toTheArtofWar, struggling for an advantage fiftymiles away

willthwarttheforwardleadership,andonlyhalfofthosewhochaseprospectsofgaintwenty-fivemilesawaywillactuallyget there.HavethearmyofQienterWeiterritoryandmakethousandsofcampfires;onthenextdayhavethemmakehalf thatnumberofcampfires,andonthenextdayhavethemmakehalfagainthatnumber.”TheQiarmydidasSunBinhadadvised.TheWeigeneralwasdelighted to

hear that thenumberofcampfireswasdwindlingdaybyday, thinking that themenofQiweredefecting.Hesaid,“IknewthesoldiersofQiwerecowards—they’ve been in our territory for only three days now, andmore than half thearmyhasrunaway.”Consequently,theWeigenerallefthisinfantrybehindandhastenedinpursuit

oftheQiarmywithonlyapersonalforceofcracktroops.Calculatingthespeedoftheirpursuit,SunBinconcludedthatbynightfalltheWeiforcewouldreachanareaofnarrowroadsanddifficultpassage,aplacesuitableforambush.NowSunBinhadalargetreecutdownandstrippedofitsbark.Onthebare

loghewrote, “ThegeneralWeiwilldieat this tree,”andhad itplacedon theroadwheretheWeitroopswouldpassthatnight.Thenhehadseveralthousandexpertarchersconcealthemselvesneartheroad.WhentheWeigeneralcametotheplacewherethestrippedloghadbeenset

across the road, he lit a torch to readwhat had beenwritten on it. Before hefinishedreading,thearchersofQi,forwhomthekindlingofthetorchbecameasignal to fire, loosed their arrows all at once, throwing theWei troops into apanic.Realizinghehadbeenoutwittedandhismenwerebeaten,theWeigeneralkilledhimself.

ReconnaissanceLiuJisaid:

The first rule of maneuvering an army is to send out scouts forreconnaissance. Small brigades of scouts, keeping a fixed distance from themovingarmy,reconnoiterinalldirections.Iftheyseeahostilearmy,theyrelaythisinformationbacktothecommander,whothendirectsthesoldierstoprepare.Theruleis“Thosewhofacetheunpreparedwithpreparationarevictorious”

(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“PlanningaSeige”).

InthefirstcenturyB.C.E.,duringtheHandynasty,oneofthetribesoftheancientQiang people rebelled against the Chinese empire. They broke into frontierfortifications,attackedcities,andkilledofficials.At that time a certain RearGeneral Zhao (137–52 B.C.E.)was over seventy

yearsold;theemperorconsideredhimtoooldforwarfare,andsentamessagetoaskthegeneraltonominateareplacement.Thegeneralsaid,“Hearingaboutsomethingahundredtimesisnotasgoodas

seeingitonce.Itishardtopredictthecourseofamilitaryoperation,soletmerideouttoseeconditionsformyselfsothatIcanpresentaplan.”Headded,“TheQiangrebelsareasmallminoritytribeandcannotlastlongin

defianceof amajor power.Please leave this up tome, old as I am, anddon’tworryaboutit.Theemperorsmiledandgavehimpermission.When theChinese general reached the disturbed area, he comman deered a

cavalryoftenthousandmountedwarriors.TomoveagainsttheQiangtheyhadtocrossariver,butthegeneralfearedthattheQiangmightcutthemoff,sohefirstsentthreegroupstocrossbynight.Whentheyreachedtheotherside,theysetupabattleline,andtherestofthecavalrycrossedoverthenextmorning.Hundreds ofQiang riders appeared,watching theChinese cavalry from the

side.TheChinesegeneralsaidtohistroops,“Ourwarriorsandhorseshavejustarrivedandaretiredout,sodonotgivechasetotheQiang.Theyareallexperthorsemen,difficult to stop, andour soldiersmightbe tempted topursue them.Ouraiminstrikingthisrebellioustribeistoexterminatethem,soletusnotbeeagerforsmallgains.”ThuscommandinghismennottoattacktheQiang,thegeneralsentridersout

to reconnoiter themountain ahead. The scouts did not find any of the Qiangtribesmen,andthecavalrycrossedthemountaininthemiddleofthenight.Thegeneralcalledhisofficerstogetherforaconferenceandsaid,“Iknowthe

Qiangrebelscannotdoanything.Iftheyhadsentseveralthousandmentoguardthemountain,howcouldourtroopshavepenetratedthisfar?”Sothegeneralsawtoitthattherewasconstantreconnaissance,sendingscouts

out to considerable distances. Whenever he moved his troops he made

preparationsforbattle,andwhentheystoppedtheybuiltfortifiedcamps.Theoldgeneralwaswellable tobear thisheavyresponsibility,andhe lookedafterhiswarriors verywell.He never foughtwithout strategic planning and eventuallysucceededinpacifyingtheregion.

StrivinginBattleLiuJisaid:Whenever you engage inwarfarewith enemies, you should strive to be the

firsttooccupyadvantageousterrain,sothatyoucanwininbattle.Iftheenemygets there first, do not attack; wait for a change such that you can strikeadvantageously.Theruleis“Lettherebenoattackonagroundofcontention”(SunTzu,The

ArtofWar,“NineGrounds”).

Intheyear234,duringtheeraoftheThreeKingdoms,thekingdomofShusentanarmyoutontheroadnorth,towardthekingdomofWei.OneofthemilitaryleadersofWeiwarnedhispeoplethattheShuarmywasintendingtooccupythenorthernplain,buttherewerethosewhodisagreed.One of the great generals of Wei, however, thought that this advisor was

correct,andhestationedagarrison in thenorthernplainbefore theShuforcesarrived. TheWei garrison had not yet finished building fortifications when ahugearmyfromShushowedup.TheWeiforcesstruckback,andafterafewdaystheShugeneralledhisarmy

west.MostoftheWeicommandersthoughttheShuarmywasgoingtoattackthewesternprovincesofWei;oneofthem,however,disagreed,sayingthattheShugeneralwasjustmakingthingslookthatwayasastrategicrusetoluretheWeiforceswest,whereastherealintentionoftheShugeneralwastoattacktheeast.ThatnighttheShuarmydidinfactattackintheeast.Becauseofthewarning

oftheperceptivecommander,however,theWeiarmywaspreparedanddidnotsufferaloss.

GoingontheAttackLiuJisaid:Inwarfare,attackisamatterofknowingtheadversary.Ifyousendouttroops

onlywhenyouknowthattheadversaryisvulnerableforsomereasonandcanbe

defeated,thenyouwillnotfailtowin.The rule is “Vulnerability is amatter of attack” (SunTzu,The Art ofWar,

“Formation”).

DuringtheeraoftheThreeKingdoms,thewarlordgeneralCaoCaoofWeisentoneofhisgeneralstobethemilitarygovernorofaborderarea.ThisWeigeneralgarrisonedhistroopsthere,makingmanyricefields.Healsosentsecretagentsinto the kingdom ofWu to the south, to invite the cooperation of a group ofdissidentswithinthatkingdom.One of the leading generals ofWu said, “The landwhere theWei army is

garrisonedisveryfertile.Oncetheyharvestacropofricethere, theirnumberswillsurelyincrease.Ifthisgoesonforafewyears,CaoCaowillbehardtostop.Weshouldgetridofthemassoonaspossible.”SotheWugeneralmadeareportontheseconditionstothekingofWu,who

then personally went on the expedition against Cao Cao’s garrison. The Wuforcesgotthereinadayandanight.Thekingaskedhisgeneralsaboutstrategy,and theyall suggestedmakingahigh fortification,which they saidcouldwitheffortbebuiltrapidly.But the leadingWugeneral said, “They have already fortified the city they

occupy,andreinforcementsaresuretobearriving,makingitimpossibletogetatthem.Nowtherainsarestarting,andweshouldtakethisopportunitytoattack;forifwestayafewdayswewillsurelyreturnexhausted,andtheroadsbackwillbedifficult.Ithinkthatwouldbedangerous.“Nowas Isee thiscity, it isnotall thatsecure. Ifweattack itonfoursides

while our armed forces are at their keenest, theWei occupation army can bethrownout ina short time,andwecangetbackhomebefore the rivers swell.Thisisthewaytocompletevictory.”ThekingofWufollowedthisadvice.TheWuforcesstagedanalloutattackon

the city and very soon overthrew theWei occupation. The leader of theWeireinforcementswasontheroadwhenheheardthenewsthatthecityhadfallen,andhepromptlywithdrewonlearningofWei’sdefeat.

AsfortheWugeneralwhohadrecommendedthissuccessfulcourseofaction,

thekingofWurewardedhimforhisachievement,makinghimmilitarygovernorofthearea.

DefenseandBattle

LiuJisaid:Inwarfare,thedefenderistheonewhoknowshimself.Ifyouknowyouhave

no reasonable chance of winning, then for the time being stay firmly on thedefensive,waitingforatimewhentheadversarycanbebeaten.Ifyouwaitfortherighttimetoattack,youwillalwayswin.The rule is “Invincibility is amatter of defense” (SunTzu,TheArtofWar,

“Formation”).

Around themiddleof thesecondcenturyB.C.E.,during the reignof the fourth-generationemperoroftheHandynasty,sevenstates—Wu,Chu,andfiveothers—rebelledagainst imperial authority and tried to secede from the empire.Theemperorappointedoneofhisdistinguishedgeneralstoleadthereprisalsagainsttherebelliouseasternstates.Thegeneralmadeapetitiontotheemperor,stating,“ThearmedforcesofChu

arehighlymobileandhardtofight.LetuscedethestateofLiangtothemandthencutofftheirsupplyroutes.Ifwedothis,wecanstopthem.”Theemperoragreedtothis,andthegeneralwentouttojointhearmy.Rightatthattime,theWuarmywasattackingthestateofLiang,andthelocal

governmentofLiang,indesperation,askedtheimperialHangeneralforhelp.But the general led his troops northeast to a walled city and took up a

defensiveposition there.ThekingofLiangsentanemissary topleadwith theimperialgeneral,butthegeneralkepttohisployanddidnotgototherescue.Now thekingofLiang sent anappeal to theemperorhimself.Theemperor

orderedhisgeneraltorescueLiang,butthegeneraldidnotobeythecommand;insteadhefortifiedthecitywallsandrefusedtocomeout.Inthemeanwhile,hesentmountedcommandersouttocutoffthesupplyroutesbehindthearmiesofWuandChu.

When the armies ofWu and Chu ran low on supplies andwere getting so

hungrytheywantedtogohome,theytriedtoprovoketheimperialgeneralintoafightseveraltimes.Thegeneral,however,nevercameout.Onenighttherewasafearfulcommotioninthecampoftheimperialgeneral,

asfightingstarted.Thefightingspreadtotheskirtsofthegeneral’stent,buthelay there stoically and would not get up. After a while the disturbance dieddown.TheWuarmyrushedthesoutheastcornerofthecity,sotheimperialgeneral

haddefensesbuiltuponthenorthwestperimeter.BeforelongtheWuarmydidinfactrushthenorthwestwall,buttheycouldnotgetin.

NowthearmiesofWuandChuwerestarving,sotheywithdrewandstartedbacktotheirhomelands.Atthispointtheimperialgeneralsenthisbestsoldiersouttorunthemdown,andhismenroutedthetroopsofWuandChu.The king of Chu abandoned his armed forces and ran away with a few

thousandbodyguardstoholeupsouthoftheLongRiver.ThearmyoftheHanempirenow took advantageof this victory to chase theChuarmiesdownandcatchthemall,conqueringtheterritoriesofChu.TheimperialgeneraloftheHansentoutanorder,saying,“Anyonewhogets

thekingofWuwillbegivenarewardofathousandpiecesofgold.”Inlittlemorethanamonth,amanofYue,astateneighboringWu,showedup

withtheheadofthekingofWu.Thewholecivilwarhad takensevenmonths;WuandChuwerecompletely

pacified.

PostponingBattleLiuJisaid:In war, when adversaries are orderly in their movements and are at their

sharpest, it isnotyet timetofightwith them; it isbest tofortifyyourpositionandwait.Watch for their energy towane after being on alert for a long time;thenriseandstrikethem.Youwillnotfailtowin.The rule is“Delayuntilotherswane” (“ZuoFamilyTraditionon theSpring

andAutumnAnnals”).

In the early days of the Tang dynasty (618–905), the founder of the dynastycampaignedagainstawarlordwhohad takenover territorial ruleat theendofthe preceding Sui dynasty (588–618).When the Tang founder surrounded thewarlordintheancienteasterncapital,theleaderofaconcurrentpeasantrebellionbrought his whole following to rescue the Sui warlord. The Tang founder,however,blockedthepeasantarmyatanoutlyingmountainpasscalled“MilitaryFastness.”Whenthepeasantarmymassedeastoftheriver,stretchingovermiles,allthe

commandersintheTangfounder’sarmylookedfrightened.Thefounderhimselfrodehighupthemountainwithafewhorsementoviewthepeasantarmy.Seeingthemasses,thefounderoftheTangdynastysaid,“Thismobhasnever

seenamajoradversary,andnowitisgoingthroughanarrowdefileinachaoticcondition,withoutorderinthearmy.Thefactthattheyaremassingnearthecitymeanstheythinklightlyofus.Ithinkthatifourforcesdonotmove,butwaitfor

theirspirits towinddown,after theyhavebeeninthefieldforalongtimethefighterswillgethungryandwillsurelywithdrawontheirown.Ifwethenstrikethemastheyarepullingout,wecansurelyovercomethem.”The peasant army stayed in battle formation from before dawn until after

noon.Thefightersgothungryandtired,andbeganlookingaroundandfightingoverfoodanddrink.Now the Tang founder had one of his commanders lead three hundred

mountedwarriorssouthtogalloppastthewesternflankofthemob,givingtheseinstructions:“Ifthemobdoesn’tstirwhenyouchargepast,stopandcomeback.Ifyousensethemstirring,turnandchargeeast.”Whenthehorsemengallopedpast,thepeasantsdidstir,andtheTangfounder

gave theword to attack.Theychargeddown themountainside into thevalley,followingthevalleyeastandattackingtheinsurgentsfrombehind.Theleaderof thepeasants,onceamilitaryofficer, ledhisfightersaway,but

before they could regroup, the Tang founder struck them with light mountedtroops,mowingthemdownwherevertheywent.Themobscatteredtothefourwinds,andtheirleaderwascapturedalive,onlytobekilledlaterinthecapitalcityofthenewTangempire,intheyear621.

EmptinessinBattleLiuJisaid:Inwarfare, ifyouarevoidofpower,youfeigntheappearanceoffullnessin

suchawaytheenemiescannottellhowemptyorpowerfulyoureallyare.Thentheywillbehesitanttoengageyouinbattle,andyoucankeepyourforcesintact.The rule is “When opponents are unwilling to fightwith you, it is because

theythinkitiscontrarytotheirinterests,orbecauseyouhavemisledthemintothinkingso”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“EmptinessandFullness,”LiuJi’sownparaphrase).

During the era of the Three Kingdoms, when Zhuge Liang, general of thekingdomofShu,wasstationedatoneofthemostcriticalstrategicpassesontheborderof thekingdomofWei,hewas leftalone toguard the fortresswith tenthousandtroopswhentheotherShugeneralswentsouthwiththeirarmies.NowSimaYi,generalofthekingdomofWei,ledtwentythousandtroopsto

attackZhugeLiang.WhentheyreachedapointsometwentymilesfromtheShuoutpost, Sima Yi sent scouts to reconnoiter. When the scouts returned, they

reportedthatZhugeLianghadlittlemanpowerinthecitadel.Meanwhile,ZhugeLiangalsoknewoftheimminentarrivaloftheWeiarmy;

he fearedhemight behardpressed andwanted to recall oneof theotherShugenerals,whohad leftearlierwithhis troops.Theywerealready toofaraway,however,andtherewasnothingtheycoulddotohelp.Now thedefendingShu commanders andofficers paled in fear, for noneof

themknewwhattodo.ZhugeLiang,however,remainedcomposed.Heorderedhissoldierstotakedownthebanners,putawaythewardrums,andstayinsideasmuch as possible.He also had all the gates of thewalled city opened and thestreetscleaned.SimaYi,theWeigeneral,hadthoughtthatZhugeLiangwasbeingcautious;

and now that he saw this apparent weakness, he suspected that there wereambusherslyinginwait.Soheledhistroopsbackupintothemountainstothenorth.The next day at mealtime, Zhuge Liang was laughing with his assistants,

saying,“NodoubtSimaYithoughtIwasonlyfeigningweaknessandmusthavehadambushershidden,soheranoffthroughthemountains!”

BattlingwiththeFullLiuJisaid:Inwarfare,ifyouropponentsarefullofpower,bewellpreparedandtheywill

notreadilymakeanymoves.Theruleis“Whentheyarefulfilled,bepreparedagainstthem”(SunTzu,The

ArtofWar,“StrategicAssessments”).

In theearlydaysof theeraof theThreeKingdoms,when thefirst rulerof thekingdomofShu originally established himself as a local king of a part of theregion of Shu, he appointed a formidablewarrior as forward general, handinghimaceremonialaxeofauthority.Thesameyeartheforwardgeneralgarrisonedan army on the border of the kingdomofWu; he also led a siege against thearmyofoneofthegeneralsofthekingdomofWei.CaoCao, oneof the leadingwarriors ofWei, sent a commanderwith some

troopstorescuehisbrothergeneral,nowbeingbesiegedbytheforwardgeneralofShu.Thatautumntherewereheavyrains,however,causingtheHanRivertoflood,thusdrowningthetroopssentbyCaoCao.Thechiefcommanderofthesetroops surrendered to the forward general of Shu, and another of the Wei

commanderswasalsocaptured.SomedissidentfactionswithinthekingdomofWeialsoacceptedordersfrom

theforwardgeneralofShuandbecamehissupporters.Asaresult,thepowerofthewarriorofShushookallofChina.

FightingTooReadilyLiuJisaid:Whenever you are going to fight with an enemy, you must measure the

adversary carefully before you send out armed forces. If you sally forthrecklesslyandfightwithoutaplan,youwillsurelybedefeatedbytheenemy.Theruleis“Theboldwillreadilyclash,readilyclashwithoutknowingwhatis

totheiradvantage”(WuQi,“OnGeneralship”).

DuringtheSpringandAutumnera,thestateofJinfoughtawarwiththestateofChu. The lord of Jin knew that the Chu general was short tempered andimpulsive;soheseizedtheChuambassadortoangerthegeneral.

Enraged,theChugeneraldidinfactattacktheJinarmy,andhisforceswere

routed.

UsingProfittoFightLiuJisaid:Wheneveryouareatwar,iftheopponent’sgeneralisstupidandinflexible,he

canbe luredwith theprospectofgain.When theopponent is sogreedy togetsomethingthatheisnotmindfulofdanger,youcanovercomehimbyambush.The rule is “Draw them inwith the prospect of gain” (SunTzu,TheArt of

War,“StrategicAssessments”).

During theSpringandAutumnera, thestateofChuattacked thestateofJiao.OneoftheofficialsofChusaid,“Jiaoissmallbutvolatile.Beingvolatile,itisnodoubtlackinginplanning.Letususeunarmedmendisguisedaswoodcuttersforbait.”Thisplanwasfollowed,andtheJiaosidecapturedthirtymen.Thenextday

menofJiaocameouttofightandchasedthemenofChuintothemountains.NowtherewereChupeoplesittingonthenorthernperimeterofthecitadelof

Jiao,andotherslyinginwaitinthemountains;sowhenthemenofJiaochased

the Chu agents into the mountains, they ran into the ambush and suffered aheavydefeat.

FightingAttackersLiuJisaid:When you and your rivals are keeping to your respective borders, if rivals

plunderyour territory and thusdisturb thepopulace in theoutlying areas, youcouldsetupambushesatnaturalbarriers,oryoucanconstructartificialbarriersagainstthem,sothatenemieswillnotreadilytrytoinvade.The rule is “What discourages opponents from coming is the prospect of

harm”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“EmptinessandFullness”).

Around thebeginningof theeighthcentury,when the illustriousTangdynasty(618–905) was nearly a hundred years old, there was a problem between theChinese empire and a Turkic people known in Chinese as the Tuque. At onepoint the general overseer of the north, an officer of the imperial Chineseorganization,wasbeaten inabattlewith theTurks.He thensummonedahighministeroftheTangcourttoleadanattackagainsttheTurks.The marauding Turks had already left the immediate vicinity when the

imperialministerarrived.Heledhistroopsafterthem,andattackedtheircampthatverynight,routingthem.At first the Turks and the North Army of Tang China had recognized the

YellowRiverastheboundarybetweentheirterritories.OnthenorthbanktherewasaplacewheretheTurkswouldgotoprayattheirshrineeachtimetheyweregoingtoraidChineseterritorytothesouth.NowatthistimeoneoftheTurkickhans,whowaseventuallytobekhanof

all theTurks,madeasuddenall-outattackon thewesternTurks.TheChineseminister-generalwhohadcomefromcourt toleadthepunitiveexpeditiontookadvantageofthisdrainontheTurkstoseizeterritorynorthoftherivertobuildadefensive fortress. The Chinese called this fortress “Citadel of AcceptingSurrender,” after the fortress built eight centuries earlier by the Han dynastyChinese to stop the incursions of the Huns. This was the way the minister-generalintendedtostoptheTurksfromraidingChineseterritorytothesouth.Oneof theTanggrandeesobjected that the lineof defense against northern

tribeswastraditionallysetsouthoftheriver,andifthiscitadelwerebuiltontherangelandoftheTurks,itwouldinevitablywindupintheirhands.Theminister-general, who had, after all, gone at the request of the general overseer of the

north,insistedonhavingthefortressbuilt,andtheemperorofChinafinallygavehispermission.Theminister-generalproposedtokeepthegarrisontroopsthereforayearto

helpwith thework.Twohundredmenranaway togohome,but theminister-generalhadthemcaughtandkilledat thewallofthefortress.Thewholearmyshookinfear,andthedrafteesworkedashardastheycould.Asaresult, threefortresseswerebuiltinsixtydays.Thefortresseswereoverahundredmilesapartandborderedonthenorthern

desert.TheChinese armyopenedupahundredmilesof territory and setupawatchpostwitheighteenhundredtroopsonamountainfurthernorth.FromthenontheTurksdidnotdaretocomeoverthemountainstograzetheir

horses,andtherewerenomoreyearlyraidsonthenorthernterritoriesofTang-dynastyChina. Enormous expenditureswere thus eliminated, and the garrisonarmywasgreatlyreduced.

FearlessnessinDangerLiuJisaid:When you battlewith opponents, if you fall into a situationwhere there is

dangerofdestruction,youshouldinspireyoursoldierstofighttothedeath,fortheywillwiniftheyforgetaboutsurviving.Theruleis“Whenwarriorsareingreatdanger,thentheyhavenofear”(Sun

Tzu,TheArtofWar,“NineGrounds”).

ThemonumentalHandynastyofChinalastedformorethanfourhundredyears,withbutabriefinterruptioninthemiddle,abouttwothousandyearsago.Duringthishiatusafter twocenturiesof thedynasty,acertainmilitarycommandersethimselfupaskingofShuinwesternChina.NowoneoftheloyalistgeneralsoftheHandynastyinvadedShutoattackthe

warlordking.TheHanloyalistoverthrewadistrictofShu,andallthefortressesintheareasurrendered.The emperor of China, however, warned the general, “There are over a

hundred thousand troops in the capital of Shu, so it will not do to take themlightly. Just occupy the position you have taken; if they come to attack you,don’t fight with them. If they don’t come after you, then move yourencampmentsuptopressurethem.Whentheygrowweary,thenyoumayattackthem.”But the loyalist general didn’t listen to the emperor’s advice. Taking

advantageofthegainshehadalreadymade,hepersonallyledacavalryovertwohundredthousandstrongtorideagainstthecapitalcityofShu.Whenhecamewithinafewmilesofthewalledcity,thegeneralsetupcamp

on the north bank of the river. Then he had pontoon bridges made and sentanothergeneraltogarrisonaboutsevenmilesaway,southoftheriver.Nowtheemperorwasalarmed.Heupbraided the loyalistgeneral ina letter,

saying, “After all my instructions, how can you disobey me? Now you haveentereddeeply intoenemyterritory,andyouhavesetupseparatecamps.Yourtwo camps won’t be able to reach each other in an emergency. If the enemysendsabrigade topinyoudownandattacks theothercampinforce,once theothers are defeated you will be beaten. Please take your army back to yourstronghold.”Butbeforetheimperialmessagehadreachedhisgeneral,theself-proclaimed

kingofShuactuallydidsendahundredthousandsoldierstoattackonecampofHan loyalists, and anotherhundred thousand soldiers toblock theother camp,preventingthetwogeneralsoftheHandynastyfromhelpingeachother.Theforcesof thefirst loyalistgeneralstageda tremendousbattle that lasted

allday,buttheygottheworstofitandraninsidethewallsofthecitytheyhadoccupied.NowthearmyofthekingofShusurroundedthem.At this point the Han general called his commanders together and tried to

rousetheirspirits,speakingtothemintheseterms:“Wehavecrossedthemostrugged territory together and have fought our way over hundreds of miles,winningeverywhere.Nowwehavepenetrateddeeply intoenemyterritoryandarenearthecapitalcity.Butweandourallycamparebothundersiege,andwecan’t join forces. It is hard to tell what might happen. I want to send anundercover force to join up with our ally camp south of the river. If we cancooperatewithlikeminds,peoplewillfightoftheirownaccord,andmuchcanbeaccomplished.Otherwisewewillsufferatotalloss.Thechancetowinorloseisinthisoneoperation.”Thecommandersagreed.So theyclosed thecampandstayed inside for threedayswhile they feasted

thesoldiersandfedthehorses.Thentheysetupalotofbannersandflags,andkeptthefiresburningconstantly,leadingthehorsesoutbynighttojoinupwiththeothercampofHandynastyloyalists.Unawareofthis,theShugeneralledanattacksouthoftheriverthedayafter

thetwocampsofHanloyalistshadsecretlyjoinedtogether.Theloyalistsfoughtbackwiththeirwholeforce.Thefightingcontinuedfrommorninguntilevening,buttheloyalistsfinallyroutedtheShuarmyandkilleditstwogenerals.Now the imperialHangeneral led his troops back to his base of operations

andleft theothercampofloyalists theretoopposetheself-proclaimedkingofShuhimself.Thegeneral reportedeverything to theemperor,severelyblaminghimselffornothavingfollowedtheemperor’sdirectionsfromthestart.

The emperor replied, “You were quite right to return to your base of

operations inShu.ThekingofShuwillsurelynotdare toattackbothyouandthe other loyalist army. If he attacks the others first, you send your wholeinfantryandcavalryathimfromyourbasewithinShu.Whenhefindsheisindangerandatanimpasse,youwillsurelybeathim.”Now theHan loyalistgeneraldidbattlewith thekingofShuon theground

betweentheHanoutpostand thecapitalofShu.Theyfoughteight times,withtheimperialHanloyalistswinningalleightbattles,finallydrivingtheShuarmybackbehindthewallsofthecapitalcity.Atthispoint,thekingofShuhimselfledtenthousandmenoutofthecityfor

anall-outbattle.TheHangeneral sent twohugecontingentsof elite troops toattack the Shu forces. The army of the king of Shu took a thrashing and ranaway.OneoftheHancommanders,chargingrightintothefray,stabbedthekingofShutodeath.Thenextdaythecitycapitulated.Theheadoftheself-proclaimedkingofShu

waschoppedoffandsenttotheimperialcapitalofChina.ThusendedthecivilwarintheregionofShuintheearlydaysoftherenewedHandynasty,theso-calledeasternorlatterHan,whichlastedforanothertwohundredyears.

HungerandBattleLiuJisaid:Wheneveryoumobilizeanarmyonapunitiveexpeditionandpenetratedeep

intoenemyterritory,ifyoulackforprovisionsyouwillneedtosendtroopsoutto plunder. If you take over enemy storehouses and stockpiles, using theirsuppliestofeedyourarmy,thenyouwillwin.Theruleis“Byfeedingofftheenemy,youcanbesufficientinbotharmsand

provisions”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“DoingBattle”).

During the period of the Northern and Southern dynasties, a general of thenorthernZhoudynasty ledanarmyacross the river to take the territoryof theChendynastyinthesouth.OneofthegeneralsoftheChendynastyledanarmytostriketheZhouinvaders.It was autumn, and the rains caused the river to flood, cutting off supply

routes. The men of Zhou were worried, but their general sent out troops toplunderwhattheyneededforthearmy.NowtheZhougeneralwasafraidthattheChengeneralwouldrealizehewas

shortofsupplies,sohehada largemoundofearthraisedinhiscampandhadthemoundcoveredwithgrain,tomakeitlooklikeahugepileofgrain.Hetheninvitedpeoplefromthelocalvillagesonthepretextofaskingaftertheirwelfare;heletthevillagersseetheartificialgrainpileandthensentthemaway.Asaresult,theChengeneralheardaboutthegreatheapofgrainandthought

itwasreal.TheZhougeneralalsobuiltmorefortificationsandsetupbarracks,showingthathewasreadyforaprotractedcampaign.Nowagriculturewasruinedinthatarea,andtheChengeneralwasataloss.

AtfirstlocalpeoplerodefastboatswithsuppliesofgrainfortheChenarmy,buttheZhou general devised a scheme to put a stop to this.He sent boats to theChen army, boats that hadbeendisguised to look like the supply boats of thelocalpeople,butwhichinrealityconcealedambushers.TheChensoldiers,seeingtheboatscomingdowntheriverandthinkingthey

carriedfood,plungedintothecurrentintheireagerness.Insteadtheambushershiddenintheboatscapturedthem.ThereweresomedissidentsintheZhouarmywhodefectedtotheChenside,

and theChengeneral took themall in.ThegeneralofZhou tookahorse to aboat,thenhadsomeoneintheboatwhipit;herepeatedthisseveraltimes,untilthe horse learned to fear boats andwould not board. Then he stationed someambushers along the river bank, and sent a pretended defector to the Chengeneral,mountedonthehorsethatfearedboats.When theChengeneral sent somemen togreet thedefector, theyviedwith

eachothertogetthehorse.Butthehorsetookfrightandwouldn’tboardtheboatwith the soldiers; and in the commotion the Zhou ambushers rose from theirhidingplacesalongtheriverbankandkilledeveryoneof themensentbytheChengeneral.Later,whenrealsupplyboatsorrealdefectorscamealong,theChengeneral

feareditwasanotherZhouambushandwouldn’ttakethemin.Thustherewasastandoffformorethanayear,andtheChenarmywasultimatelyunabletostoptheZhouinvaders.

FightingonFullStomachsLiuJisaid:

Whenenemiescomefromfarawayand their suppliesdonot last, then theyarehungrywhileyouarewellfed.Insuchasituationyoushouldstrengthenyourdefensesandnotengageinbattle.Holdthematastandoffsolongthattheywearout.Cut off their supply routes. If they retreat, send bushwhackers after themundercovertoattackthembysurpriseontheirwayhome;thenyouwillnotfailtobeatthem.Theruleis“Standingyourgroundawaitingthosefaraway,awaitingtheweary

in comfort, awaiting the hungry on full stomachs, ismastering strength” (SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“ArmedStruggle”).

TheTangdynasty,duringwhichChinawasaleaderofworldcivilizationsintheartsandsciences,lastednearlythreehundredyears.Itwasformallyestablishedintheyear618,supplantingtheSuidynasty.TheSuidynastyisdistinguishedforhavingunifiedChinaaftertheprotracted

civil wars of the era of theNorthern and Southern dynasties. The heir of thefounder of Sui, however, used his inherited power to undertake aggressiveimperialist campaigns that alienated the people and brought the dynasty to aswiftdestruction.AftertheSuicollapsed,thewarlord-administratorsofthenewempire,whichhadneverbeen fullydemilitarized,were foremost among thosewhoscrambledforthepowerrelinquishedbythehouseoftheSui.One of the Sui warlords continued to occupy a certain area even after the

foundingoftheTangdynastyhadbeenformallyproclaimedelsewhere.WiththehelpofCentralAsianTurks,theSuiwarlordinflictedaseriesofdefeatsontheTangarmies.ThewarlordwassosuccessfulthatheevensentoneofhisgeneralsintoTangterritorytoexpandhisownbailiwick.Asaresult,thefounderoftheTangdynastyledanexpeditionagainsttheSui

warlord in theyear619.TheTangwarrior-prince,whoestablished thedynastyand set his father on the throne, told his own generals, “The Sui warlord’sgeneral is deep in our territory, along with all their elite troops and bestcommanders.Itseemstome,however,thatwhiletheirarmyislarge,theymustreally be short of supplies, seeing as how they are plundering to sustainthemselves. Their intention is to do battle quickly.We should strengthen ourfortificationsandwaitforthemtostarve.Weshouldn’trushintoafight.”The Tang forces followed the reasoning of their leader, strengthening their

defenseswhilecuttingoff enemysupply lines.Eventually they starvedout theSuiarmy.

FatigueandBattle

LiuJisaid:In warfare, if there is an advantageous position but the enemy has already

occupiedit,ifyouthenheadintobattlethereyouwillbefatiguedandthereforesufferdefeatatthehandsoftheenemy.Theruleis“Thosewhoarefirstonthebattlefieldandawaitopponentsareat

ease;thosewhoarelastonthebattlefieldandheadintobattlegetwornout”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“EmptinessandFullness”).

After the civil wars of the Three Kingdoms period, the Jin dynasty wasestablished,supplanting thevictoriouskingdomofWei.TheJindynasty lastedfrom265 to420,but itwaschallengedbya seriesofkingdoms ruledbynon-Chinesepeoples.TheselatterwerecalledtheSixteenKingdoms,andtheywereestablished by warlord-kings from among five Central Asian minorities whoadopted elements of the cultures of East and South Asia in their rise tonationhood.Intheearlyfourthcentury,ahighministeroftheJindynastysentanarmyof

morethanonehundredthousandtroopstoattackoneofthesekingdoms,whichwas ruled by a race of people known in Chinese as Jie, descendants of theancientXiongnuHuns.TheleaderoftheJieintendedtoresistaggressively,butsomeonewarnedhim,

“TheChinesearmyiswelltrainedandpowerful;itisimpossibletostanduptoit.Fornowletusstrengthenourdefensivepositionsandthus‘breaktheiredge.’There is a difference in the power of attack and the power of defense; if weremainonthedefensivefornowwewillgaincompletevictory.”But theJie leadersaid,“TheChinesearmyhascomefromafar; thesoldiers

arephysicallyexhaustedandinaraggedanddisorderlycondition.Wecanbeattheminonebattle—howstrongcantheybe?Howcanweletthemgo,whenwehave the opportunity to attack them before reinforcements arrive? Ifwe drawbacknowand theChinese takeadvantageofourwithdrawal toattackusonceourarmyisinmotion,itwillbeeverymanforhimself—thenhowcanwefortifyourdefensiveposition?Whatyouarerecommendingisawaytoself-destructionwithoutevenafight.”AndintheendtheleaderoftheJiekilledthemanwhoobjectedtoaggressive

defenseagainsttheChinese.NowtheJiewarrior-kingappointedavanguardcommanderandorderedthat

any laggards be executed. He set up a dummy force on top of a hill, thenstationed two ambush forces on either side. Thewarrior-king personally led abrigadetomeettheChineseinbattle,andthenpretendedtoflee.TheChinesecommandersenthismentochasetheJiewarriorsas theyfled.

NowhiddenJieambushersroseupandattackedthepursuers.TheChinesewereroutedandhadtoretreat.

VictoryinBattleLiuJisaid:Whenyoudefeatenemiesinbattle,itwillnotdotobecomehaughtyandrest

onyourlaurels;youshouldbestrictlypreparedforadversariesatalltimes.Thenevenifenemiesdoattack,youwillbereadyandwillnotsufferharm.Theruleis“Onceyouhaveprevailed,beas ifyouhadnot”(“Sima’sArtof

War”).

ThebriefbutmomentousQindynasty(246–207B.C.E.)putanendtocenturiesofcivilwarandunifiedChina for the first time inmore than fivehundredyears.ThefounderofQinsupplantedtheself-cannibalizingfeudalismofancientChinawith civil bureaucracy and rule of law, unifying bothmaterial and intellectualculture in China to an unprecedented degree. The Qin also expanded itsinfluence beyond the realm of ancientChina and established the firstChineseempire.Thesecondemperor,whodidnothaveallofhisfather’squalities,exhausted

thenewempireveryrapidlywithhisimperialschemes.Thustherewasintensediscontent inmanypartsofChina, and theQindynastywasoverthrown in itssecondgenerationbywidespreadrebellions.Oneoftheleadersofamajorpeasantuprisingsenttwoofhismostpowerful

alliesagainst strategicQinpositions,and theyscoredaseriesofvictoriesoverthe imperial armies.Asa result, the rebel leaderbegan to take theQinarmieslightly,andhebecamesomewhathaughty.Someone advised the rebel leader, “Having prevailed in battle, if the

commandersbecomehaughtyandthesoldiersbecomelax, theywill inevitablysufferdefeat.Nowyoursoldiersaregettingabitlazy,whiletheQinforcesgrowbytheday.Ifearthemforyoursake.”The rebel leader, however, would not listen. He sent this advisor as an

emissary to another state.On theway, this emissarymet an ambassador fromthatverystate,andaskedhimifheweregoingtoseetherebelleader.When the ambassador replied in the affirmative, the emissary of the rebel

leader said, “Our leader’s army is now headed for certain defeat; if you goslowlyyouwillescapedeath,butifyougoquicklyyouwillmeetdisaster.”As it turned out, the imperial Qin forces launched a total assault on the

peasant army, inflicting a crushing defeat on the rebels. The leader of theuprisinglosthislife.

DefeatinBattleLiuJisaid:Whenyouaredefeatedbyenemiesinbattle,donotfear.Youshouldthinkof

howtofindbenefitinhavingsufferedharm:serviceyourequipment,rouseyoursoldiers,andwatchfortheenemytoslackoffsothatyoucanattack.Thenyouwillprevail.The rule is “Through injury trouble can be resolved” (Sun Tzu,The Art of

War,“Adaptations,”LiuJi’sownparaphrase).

In the early fourth century, there took place the infamous “Riots of the EightKings,” civil wars among feudal kings of the Chinese empire under the Jindynasty.Atonepoint,thekingofHojiansentoneofhisgeneralstoattackthekingof

Changsha.TheemperoroftheJindynastypersonallysentaforcetoopposetheHojian army, but a division of Hojian guerrilla fighters broke through theimperialarmy.ThentheHojianarmyenteredtheancientcapitalofChina.Nowtheemperor’sgeneral, followingorders,wentafter theHojianarmy in

the capital city. When the Hojian soldiers saw the imperial cavalcade in thedistance, they began to have fears, and their commander could not stop them.Ultimately the demoralizedHojian forces suffered a crushing defeat, with thedeadandwoundedfillingthestreets.TheHojiangeneralretreatedtoanoutlyingposition.Everyonewasbrokenin

spiritandhadnomorewilltofight.ManyofthemurgedtheHojiangeneraltofleebynight.The general, however, responded, “It is a matter of course for there to be

victory and defeat in amilitary action.What is important is to use failure toachievesuccess.Wewillpressfurtherforwardandconstructfortifications,thenattack themwhen they least expect it. This is how to use surprise tactics in amilitaryoperation.”So that very night the remaining Hojian forces advanced under cover to a

position very near to the capital city. The leader of the imperial army,meanwhile,havingjustwonaresoundingvictory,didn’tpaymuchattentiontothesemaneuvers.Butthenwhenhesuddenlyheardthatsiegefortificationshadbeenbuiltoutsidethecity,heledhistroopsouttofight.Intheend,theimperial

armywassoundlybeatenandhadtoretreat.

TakingtheInitiativeLiuJisaid:Inwar,whenyouperceiveareasonablepossibilityofconqueringtheenemy,

thenitisappropriatetostrikequickly.Thenyoucanwineverytime.Theruleis“Proceedwhenyouseeit tobeappropriate”(WuQi,“Assessing

theEnemy”).

Intheearlydaysof theTangdynasty,oneof theleadingTanggeneralsdealtatellingblowtotheTurks.TheTurkishkhanfledtosafetyinthemountains,thensentanambassadortotheTangcourttoapologizeandrequestthattheChineseempireacceptthefealtyoftheTurks.TheTang court sent the same general towelcome theTurks.Butwhile the

khanoutwardlysoughttohavehisallegianceaccepted,hestillhaddoubtsinhismind,andtheChinesegeneralsensedthis.Meanwhile,theTangcourtalsosentanambassadortotheTurkstoreassurethem.Now the Chinese general said to one of his chief assistant commanders,

“Whenourambassadorarrives,theTurkswillsurelyfeelsecure.Ifwesendoutacavalrytoattackthemnow,wewillsurelygainourdesire.”The assistant commander said, “But the emperor has already accepted the

Turks’ surrender, and our own ambassador will be among them—what aboutthat?”Thegeneralsaid,“Thisisanopportunitynottobelost—whyholdbackjustto

sparetheambassador’slife?”ThentheChinesegeneralquicklymobilizedhistroopsandsetouttorideon

theTurks.TheyencounteredoverathousandTurkishscoutsonthewayandtookthemallcaptive.When the Turkish khan saw the ambassador of the imperial Tang court, he

was very happy and did not worry about the Chinese army. The Chinesevanguard,meanwhile, tookadvantageoffog toadvance,andthekhanwasnotawareoftheirimminentattackuntiltheywerejustafewmilesaway.TheTurkshadnotevenhadenoughtimetoarraytheirbattlelineswhenthe

Chinesearmystruckthem.TheChinesebeheadedovertenthousandTurksandtookmorethanahundredthousandmenandwomencaptive,includingthesonofthekhanhimself.TheChinesealsocaughtandkilledoneoftheprincessesoftheSuidynasty,

which had preceded theTang as the ruling house ofChina. This princess hadbeenactivelyencouragingtheTurkstoattacktheTangChinese,hopingtherebytoreestablishtheSuidynasty.TheTurkishkhanfled,buthewassubsequentlycapturedandpresentedtothe

Tangcourt.NowChineseterritorywasexpandedallthewaytothegreatdesert.

ProvocationandBattleLiuJisaid:Inwarfare,whenyourencampmentsandthoseofyourenemiesarefarapart

andyourforcesareofequalstrength,youmaysendoutlightcavalrytoprovokethem,waitinginambushforthemtorespond.Bythesetactics,theirarmiescanbebeaten.Ifenemiestrythesamestrategyonyou,don’tattackthemwithyourwholearmy.Therule is“When theenemy is farawaybut tries toprovokehostilities,he

wantsyoutomoveforward”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“ManeuveringArmies”).

Concurrentwith theChinese Jindynasty (third to fifth centuries)were sixteenkingdoms ruled by five different Central Asian peoples. These kingdomsincluded former Chinese territory within their domains and adopted certainelementsofChineseculture.Thisstoryconcernsaconflictbetweentwoofthesekingdoms,oneundertheleadershipoftheQiang,ancientrelativesofthemodernTibetans,andtheDi,anotherancientpeoplewhobecameincreasinglySinicizedduringtheJindynasty.TheDi rulersent twoofhisgeneralswith infantryandcavalry toattack the

Qiang, who were occupying a walled city in northern China. The Qiang,however, responded to this provocation by simply strengthening the city’sfortifications,refusingtocomeoutandfight.One of the Qiang generals said, “The Di commander is a stubborn and

inflexibleman, easy to annoy. Ifwe senda long lineof troops to applydirectpressure to his defensive position, he will surely get angry and come out toopposeus.Wecantakehiminonebattle.”Theothergenerals agreed, so they sent three thousandQianghorsemenand

soldiers to thevery thresholdof theDiencampment.The leaderof theDiwasinfuriatedandsentallofhisbesttroopsouttofight.TheQiangbrigadepretendedtobeoverwhelmedandwithdrew,withtheDiin

hot pursuit. Just as the Di overtook the Qiang, the Qiang turned around andlashedback.NowthemainQiangforcealsoarrived,andtherewasatremendous

battle.TheQiangkilledtheDicommanderandtookallofhistroopsprisoner.

Slow-PacedBattleLiuJisaid:Thegeneral rule forbesiegingwalledcities is that it is tobeconsidered the

tacticof last resort, tobedoneonlywhenthere isnootherchoice.Evenif thecitywallsarehighandthemoatsaredeep, if therearemanymendefendingitbut few supplies and no reinforcements from outside, then it can be taken bystranglehold.The rule is “Move slowly as a forest” (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, “Armed

Struggle”).

DuringtheeraoftheSixteenKingdoms,theEarlyYandynastywasestablishedbyaleaderoftheXianbeipeopleintheyear337.Atonepointinthisturbulentperiod,thekingofYanfounditnecessarytofighttheself-proclaimedkingofQi,awarlordwhohadinheritedhisfather’sarmyandpledgedfealtytoJin-dynastyChinatotheeast.AfterproclaiminghimselfkingofQi,asavassalofChinathewarlord-kingmadewarontheXianbeikingdomofEarlyYan.TheYanforcessurroundedthekingofQiinawalledcityinnorthernChina.

TheYan commanders wanted to attack the city as soon as possible, but theirgeneral said, “There are timeswhen it is best togo slowly. Ifweare equal inpower,buttheyhavestrongreinforcementsoutside, thereisthepossibilitythatwemaygetpinnedbetweenthem,havingtroubleinfrontofusandbehindus.Inthatcase,ifweweregoingtoattackitwouldhavetobedonequickly.“Ontheotherhand,ifwearestrongerthantheyare,andtheyhavenooutside

reinforcements,weshouldkeepastrangleholdonthemuntiltheycavein.ThisiswhatTheArtofWarmeanswhenitsays,‘Surroundthemifyouhavetentimestheirnumber,attackifyouhavefive.’“Nowthearmyof thekingofQi is large,morale is stillgood,and theyare

occupying a secure citadel. If we all put forth every last bit of strength andattacked themwith the greatest possible intensity,we could take the city in amonthortwo;butwewouldsurelylosemanyofoursoldiers.“Theessentialthingistobeabletoadapt.”Sosaying,theYangeneralhadawallofbunkersbuilttokeepwatchoverthe

city,untiltheYanarmyfinallystrangledthestrongholdandtookit.

SwiftBattleLiuJisaid:Whenyoubesiegeacity, if theenemyhasabundantsupplies, fewmen,and

outsidereinforcements,itisimperativetoattackquicklyinordertowin.Theruleis“Inamilitaryoperation,extraordinaryspeedisvaluable”(Records

oftheThreeKingdoms).

DuringtheeraoftheThreeKingdoms,whenfactionsoftheregionsofWei,Shu,andWucompeted forhegemonyover the remainsof theChineseempireafterthe fallof theHandynasty,atonepointageneralofShudefected toWeiandwassubsequentlymademilitarygovernorofanareacalled“NewCity.”Beforelong,however,thenewgovernorestablishedrelationswiththekingdomofWuandtransferredhisallegiancebacktoShu,rebellingagainstWei.NowSimaYi,aleadinggeneralofWei,sentasecretmilitaryforcetostrike

thetraitor.Hiscommanderssaid,“NowthatheisconnectedwithShu,weshouldobservefromadistancebeforemakingourmove.”ButtheWeigeneralreplied,“Heisunreliableandlacksasenseofduty.Thisisatimewhenloyaltiesareindoubt,andweshouldhastentoresolvemattersbeforehehassettleddown.”So theWei troops traveledby forcedmarchesdayandnight toarriveat the

outskirtsofNewCity.BothWuandShusentreinforcementstohelpthedefector,sotheWeigeneraldividedhisforcestoresistthem.Attheoutsetoftheseevents,thedefectorhadwrittentothechiefstrategistof

Shu, “New City is so far away from the center of Wei that I will have myfortificationsallreadybythetimetheemperorinWeiisinformedofmyactions.My commanders are well prepared, and my location is protected by naturalbarriers.ThegreatgeneralofWeiwillsurelynotcomehimself,andevenifhiscommanderscometheycannottroubleme.”ButthenwhentheWeiforcearrived,thedefectorinformedtheShustrategist,

expressinghissuprise:“IthasonlybeeneightdayssinceImademymove,andtheWeiarmyisalreadyatthecitywall.Howextraordinarilyswifttheyare!”There was an outlying citadel surrounded on three sides by water, and the

defector had a wooden barricade built outside for extra protection. The Weitroops,however,crossedthewaterandsmashedthebarricade,pressingrightuptothecitywalls.On the tenth day, several of the defector’s own men assassinated him and

openedthegatesofthecity,surrenderingtothekingdomofWei.

OrderlinessandBattleLiuJisaid:Inwarfare,iftheenemy’sranksareorderlyonthemoveandthesoldiersare

calm,itwillnotdotoenterintobattlewiththemtooreadily.Itisbettertowaitforachangeorstirwithinthemtostrike;thenyoucanwin.Theruleis“Avoidingconfrontationwithorderlyranksandnotattackinggreat

formations is mastering adaptation” (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, “ArmedStruggle”).

This story is related to the preceding story, about the general of the ThreeKingdoms erawho defected from Shu toWei, became amilitary governor inoutlyingterritory, thendefectedbacktoShubutalsohadtieswithWu.Atonepointheevendeclaredindependence,withthediplomaticrecognitionofthekingofWu.Accordingtothisstory,thegreatWeigeneralSimaYilaunchedhisexpedition

against the seceding defectorwhen this took place. His forces came in secretacross theriverandsurroundedthecitadelof the traitor,but thentheyleft thatcityandheadedfortheheartlandoftheregion.TheWeicommanderssaid,“Surroundingthecitadelwithoutlayingsiegetoit

wasnotagoodexampletoshowthewarriors.”TheWeigeneral said, “The rebels are securelyentrenchedandwant to take

advantageofthattotireourarmy.Ifwebesiegethecity,wewillbefallingrightintotheirtrap.Therebelsaremassedhere,sotheirhomesareempty;ifweheadright for the localheartland, thepeoplewillbeafraid. If theycome to fight infear,wearesuretobeatthem.”So theWei armymarched through in orderly ranks.When the secessionists

sawthearmy,theycameoutafteritanddidactuallytrytofaceit.ThentheWeigeneralhaditsownsoldiersstrikebackatthem,routingtherebels.

EnergyandBattleLiuJisaid:Generals wage war through the armed forces, the armed forces fight by

energy.Energyprevailswhenitisdrummedup.Ifyoucanenergizeyourtroops,don’tdoittoofrequently,otherwisetheirenergywilleasilywane.Don’tdoitattoogreatadistanceeither,otherwisetheirenergywillbeeasilyexhausted.Youshoulddrumuptheenergyofyoursoldierswhenenemiesarewithinacalculatedcriticaldistance, having your troops fight at close range.When enemieswane

andyouprevail,victoryoverthemisassured.The rule is “Fight when full of energy, flee when drained of energy” (Wei

Liaozi,“RigorofWar”).

DuringtheSpringandAutumnera,thestateofQiattackedthestateofLu.Thelord of Lu was about to go to battle when one of his warriors asked toaccompanyhim.Sothelordandthewarriorrodetothebattlefieldinthesamechariot.NowthelordofLuwasabouttogivethesignalforthewardrumstostirup

the soldiers, but the warrior said, “Not yet.” Then when the men of Qi haddrummedthreetimes,thewarriortoldthelordofLu,“Now!”TheQiarmywasdefeated,andthelordofLuaskedthewarriorhowthishad

comeabout.Thewarriorreplied,“Braveryinbattleisamatterofenergy.Onceenergyisdrummedup,asecondtrymakesitwane,anditdisappearsatthethird.Theywereexhaustedwhilewewerefull,soweovercamethem.”Thisstorywaslatertoldasaclassiccaseoftheweakersuccessfullyopposing

thestrongerthroughmasteryofenergy.

FightingontheWayHomeLiuJisaid:When you clash with enemies, if they withdraw and head home for no

apparent reason, it is imperative to observe them carefully. If they are in factexhaustedandoutofsupplies,youcansendcommandosafterthem;butiftheyareanexpeditiononthewayhome,youcannotstandintheirway.Theruleis“Donotstopanarmyonitswayhome”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,

“ArmedStruggle”).

Intheyear198,neartheendoftheHandynasty,thewarlordCaoCao,whowasto become one of the most powerful competitors for the remains of the Hanempire,hadoneofhisrivalssurroundedwhenanotherrivalsentreinforcementstoopposehim.ThereinforcementstookupapositionbehindCaoCao,guardingthepassesthroughthemountainstocutoffhiswayback.Cao Cao’s army couldn’t go forward, and now it had enemies before and

behind it. That night Cao Cao’smen tunneled through the defiles to give theappearance that they were trying to get away. In reality they lay in ambush,waitingfortheenemiestocomeinpursuit.CaoCao’srivalcameafterhimwithhisentirearmy,andCaoCao’ssoldiers

destroyed it ina surpriseattack.LaterCaoCao toldoneofhis advisors, “Theenemy tried to ‘stop an army on its way home,’ and also fought with us on‘deadlyground,’soIknewwewouldwin.”

PursuitandBattleLiuJisaid:Whenever you pursue people on the run, chasing beaten soldiers, youmust

make surewhether they are really fleeing or just feigning. If their signals arecoordinatedandtheirordersareuniformlycarriedout,eveniftheyarerunningaway inapparentconfusionandchaos theyarenotdefeated.Theysurelyhaveplansforsurpriseattacks,soyoumusttakethisintoconsideration.If,ontheotherhand,theirsignalsaredisorderlyanduncoordinated,ifallsortsofdifferentordersanddirectivesareholleredandshouted, then this is therealfearfulnessthatisfeltindefeat.Insuchacaseyoumaypursuethemvigorously.The rule is “When you pursue people on the run, do not desist; but if the

enemy stopson the road, then think twice” (“Sima’sArt ofWar,” “DeployingGroups”).

Intheyear618,thefounderofthenewlydeclaredTangdynastymovedagainstoneofthelastwarlordsoftheprecedingSuidynasty.OneoftheSuiwarlord’sgenerals,opposingtheTangfounder,wasseverelybeatenandputtoflight.TheTangfounderchaseddowntheSuisurvivorsandsurroundedthem.Many

of theSuicommanderssurrenderedright thenandthereon thebattlefield.TheTangfoundergavethembacktheirhorsesandletthemgo.Momentslater,eachoftheSuicommanderscameridingback.NowtheTang

founder knew the real condition of the Suiwarlord.As the leader of the newdynasty advanced his troops to close in, he sent a diplomat to thewarlord toexplain the advantagesof capitulation and the risksof resistance.Thewarlordfinallysurrendered.The generals of the young Tang founder congratulated him, and took the

opportunitytoask,“Whenyouhadtheenemyontherun,youleftyourinfantryandroderightuptothecityrampartswithouteventakinganysiegeequipment.Wewereallindoubtastowhetherwecouldtakethecity,yetyoudid—how?”TheTang founder said, “Themen under the command of the Suiwarlord’s

general are all outsiders, people from a completely different region.Althoughourarmybeat them,wedidn’tkillorcapturetoomany.Ifwegavethemtime,theywouldallgointothecity,wherethewarlordwouldtaketheminandtreat

themashisown—thentheywouldnotbeeasytoovercome.Iknewthat ifwepressuredthem,thesoldierswouldallrunawaybacktotheirhomeland,leavingnooneheretofightforthewarlord.“Thewarlord’sspiritisbrokenwithmortalterror;thatiswhyhesurrendered,

outoffear.”

NotFightingLiuJisaid:Whenopponents inwarfareoutnumberyou,or theyaremorepowerful than

you are, orwhen you are at a tactical disadvantage, orwhen they have comefromfarawaybutstillhavesupplies,inanyofthesecasesitwillnotdotofightwiththem.It isbest tofortifyyourdefensesandholdthemoff longenoughtowearthemdowntothepointofvulnerability.Theruleis“Itisuptoyounottofight”(“DialoguesofLi,LordofWei”).

In the early years of the Tang dynasty, the founder of the new regime led anarmyagainstoneofthewarlordsofthedefunctSuidynasty,awarlordwhohadjoinedforceswiththeTurksagainsttheTangarmies.Oneofthefounder’scousins,ayoungmanofseventeenwhowaslatertobea

minister of state,wentwith theTang army.The twoyoungmen—the founderhimselfbeingonly slightlyolder thanhis cousin—climbed the citadelofGemWallCity,overlookingadeepvalley,toobservethebattlelinesoftherebels.TheTang founder looked at his cousin and said, “The rebels are coming to

facemeinbattlecountingontheirnumbers.Whatdoyouthink?”Theyoungerwarriorreplied,“Thethrustofthisbandofrebelsisnottobemet

directly.Theywillbeeasytofoilbystrategy,hardtocontendwithbystrength.Letussecureourpositionsoastoblunttheiredge.Theyarearag-tagmobandcannot last long. When their supplies start to run out, they will disperse bythemselves.Wecancapturethemwithoutevenfighting.”TheTangfoundersaid,“Yourperceptionaccordswithmine.”As it turnedout, theSui fighters fledbynightwhen their food ranout.The

Tang army chased them into the next country and put them to flight in oneskirmish.

AvoidingBattleLiuJisaid:

Whenyouareatwarwithstrongenemies,atfirsttheirenergyiskeen,whileyourmomentumisweak,soitishardtoholdthemoff.Avoidthemforthetimebeing,andyoucanprevail.The rule is “Avoid thekeen energy, strike the slumpingand receding” (Sun

Tzu,TheArtofWar,“ArmedStruggle”).

In theyear189,oneof thegeneralsof the imperialarmiesof theHandynastywassentouttoquellagroupofdissidentswhotriedtosecedefromtheempire.Thesecessionistshadsurroundedawalledcity,andthegeneralwasappointedtoputdowntheirinsurrection.An imperial minister noted for his violent and cruel personality urged the

general to proceed quickly, but the general said, “Even supposing victory ineverybattle,itisstillbettertowinwithoutfighting.ThereforeMasterSunsaysinTheArtofWar,‘Skillfulwarriorsfirstmakethemselvesinvincible,thenwatchforvulnerabilityintheiropponents.’“Now the city that the rebels have surroundedmay be small, but it iswell

fortified and not easily taken.The secessionists have beenmaking a powerfulattack,yetthecityhasnotfallen;sotheymustbetired.Tostrikethemwhentheyarefatiguedisthewaytocompletevictory.”Thesiegewenton,butthecitydidnotfall;completelywornout,atlengththe

rebelarmydisbanded.Nowtheimperialforceswentafterthem.Atthispoint,theimperialministeradvisedthegeneral,“AsMasterSunsays

inTheArtofWar,‘Donotpressadesperateenemy,’and‘donotstopanarmyonitswayhome.’”Thegeneralrefusedtolistentotheministerandwentinpursuitoftherebels

onhisowninitiative,deliveringacrushingblow.

SurroundingEnemiesLiuJisaid:Whenever you surround enemies, you should leave an opening to make it

appear to them that there is away to survive, thuscausing them to relax theirdeterminationtofight.Thuscancitadelsbetakenandarmiesbebeaten.Theruleis“Asurroundedarmymustbegivenawayout”(SunTzu,TheArt

ofWar,“ArmedStruggle”).

In the lastdaysof theHandynasty, thewarlordCaoCaosurroundedacertaincity.Enragedwhenthecityrefusedtocapitulate,CaoCaoswore,“Whenthecity

falls,wewillburyeveryoneinitalive!”Thesiegewentonfordays,butthedefendersofthecitystilldidnotgiveup.

NowCaoCao’sbrothersaid tohim,“Asurroundedcitymustbeshownawayout, a way to survival. Now that you have announced your intention to buryeveryonealive, thishascausedall thepeople todefend it for theirownsakes.What ismore, thecitywallsarestrongand theirsuppliesareabundant.Aswebesiegethecity,oursoldiersarebeingwounded;andtimeisdraggingonastheyholdout.Nowwehavestationedourtroopsoutsideawell-fortifiedcityandareattackingenemieswhowillfighttothedeath—thisisnotgoodstrategy.”SoCaoCaofollowedhisbrother’sadvice,andinthiswayhefinallycaptured

thecity.

SurrenderLiuJisaid:Inwar, if enemies come to surrender, it is imperative to seewhether or not

their intention is genuine.Observe them and keep on guard at all times.Giveyourcommandersstrictdirectionstokeepthetroopsinastateofreadiness.Thenyouwillprevail.Theruleis“Acceptasurrenderasyouwouldtakeonanopponent”(“Bookof

theLatterHanDynasty”).

In197,thewarlordCaoCaoattackedoneofhisrivals,whosurrenderedtohim.After that,however, theconquered rival attackedCaoCaooutof spite,killingCaoCao’snephewandeldestson.CaoCaohimselfwasstruckbyastrayarrowduringtheassault.NowCaoCaomovedhis troops.His rival camewith a cavalry to raidCao

Cao’s army, but Cao Cao beat him back. Finally this rival ran away to joinanotherwarlord.CaoCaosaid tohiscommanders,“When Iovercame this rivalofmine,my

mistakewasnottotakehostagesrightaway.Seewhathashappenedasaresultanddonotmakethesamemistakeagain.”

HardshipLiuJisaid:Essential to generalship is to share the pleasures and pains of the troops. If

youencounterdanger,donotabandon the troops tosaveyourself,donotseek

personalescapefromdifficultiesconfrontingyou.Rather,makeeveryeffort toprotectthetroops,sharingintheirfate.Ifyoudothis,thesoldierswillnotforgetyou.The rule is “When you see danger and difficulty, do not forget the troops”

(“Sima’sArtofWar”).

During the era of the Three Kingdoms, when the warlord Cao Cao of WeireturnedfromhisexpeditionagainstthekingofWu,heleftagarrisonofaboutseven thousand troops under three of his commanders. Cao Cao himself nowwent on an expedition against the leader of a semireligious popular militia,leaving the garrison chief with sealed instructions. On the outside of theinstructionswaswritten,“Openthisiftheenemycomes.”Beforelong,thekingofWubroughthistroopstosurroundtheWeigarrison.

SotheinstructionsofCaoCaowereopenedandfoundtosay,“IfthekingofWucomes, let two of our commanders go out to engage him in battle; let onecommanderstayinthecitadeltodefendit.Thegarrisonchiefisnottofight.”MostoftheWeitroopleaderswereindoubtabouttheseinstructions,butone

ofthetopcommanderssaid,“WithCaoCaoawayonanexpedition,theenemyiscertaintobeatus.ThisiswhyCaoCaoleftthoseinstructions.Ifwestrikebackat the Wu troops before they close in on us, breaking the force of theirmomentum, then we can calm the minds of our troops. Once that isaccomplished,wecanhold thecitadel.Thepotential forvictoryordefeat is inthisoneaction—howcananyofyoudoubtit?”That night theWei commander called for volunteers to gowith him. Eight

hundred soldiers came forward.He killed some cattle to provide themwith aheartyfeast,forthenextdaytherewouldbeamajorbattle.At dawn, theWei commander put on his armor and went out to fight. He

plungedfirstintotheenemybattleline,killingdozensofmenandcuttingdowntwooftheirleaders.Shoutinghisname,theWeicommandercrashedintoenemylines,fightinghiswaytothekingofWu.WiththeWeicommandercuttinghiswaytowardhimthroughthewarriorsof

Wu,thekingwasterrified.Notknowingwhattodo,heandhisbodyguardsranto high ground, the king defending himself with a halberd. The warriorcommanderofWeicalledtothekingofWutocomedown,butthekingdidnotdare to move. Then the king regrouped his soldiers and surrounded the Weicommander.TheWeicommanderstruckatthesurroundingWusoldiersleftandright,then

charged straight ahead and broke through, so that he and several dozen of hismenwereabletogetout.

Nowtherestof thesurroundedWeiforceshoutedto theircommander,“Areyou going to abandon us?” The commander then broke back in through thesurroundingWu soldiers and got hismen out.None of theWu fighters couldstanduptothewarriorofWei.Thebattlewentonfrommorninguntilmidday,untilthemenofWulosttheir

spirit.ThentheWeitroopswentbacktothecitadeltofortifytheirdefenses.NoweveryonecalmeddownandgladlyobeyedtheWeicommand.WhenthekingofWubesiegedthecitadel,hecontinuedhisattackfortendays

without success. Finally he withdrew. The Wei commander gave chase andnearlycapturedthekingofWuhimself.

EasyBattleLiuJisaid:Theruleofoffensivewarfareisthatthosewhogotheeasywayprevailover

their opponents. If your enemies are garrisoned in several places, there willinevitablybesomeplacesstrongerandbettermannedthanothers.Inthatcase,you should keep your distance from their strong points and attack their weakpoints; avoid placeswhere they havemany troops and strikewhere they havefew—thenyouwillnotfailtowin.Theruleis“Goodwarriorsprevailwhenitiseasytoprevail”(SunTzu,The

ArtofWar,“Formation”).

In the latterpartof thesixthcentury,northernChinawasunder theruleof theXianbei, a northern Asian people culturally and politically influenced bycenturiesofcontactwithChinesecivilization.TwokingdomsformedbyXianbeileaders, theNorthern Zhou dynasty and theNorthernQi dynasty, foughtwitheachothertoexpandtheirterritories.TheMartialEmperorofZhouattackedacertainprovinceofQi,butoneofhis

ministerssaid,“Thatprovinceisacriticalstrategicarea,whereelite troopsaremassed.Evenifwebesiegeitwithallofourmightitmaynotbepossibleforusto get our way. Let us attack another area, where there are fewwarriors andgentleterrain,aplacethatwillbeeasytotakeover.”TheMartialEmperorrefusedtolistentothisadvice,andultimatelyfailedto

succeedinhisundertaking.

BattleinExtremity

LiuJisaid:Inwar, if yougreatly outnumber your enemies, theywill fear yourmilitary

strengthandfleewithoutputtingupafight.Insuchanevent,donotchasethem,forpeoplewillfightbackinextremity.Youshouldfollowthemslowlywithanorderlyarmy;thenyouwillwin.The rule is “Do not press a desperate enemy” (Sun Tzu, The Art of War,

“ArmedStruggle”).

In the first centuryB.C.E., during theHan dynasty, a Chinese imperial generalmovedagainstoneofthetribesoftheQiang,anancientrelativeofthemodernTibetan people. The Han general led his army up to the campgrounds of theQiang,wheretheyhadbeenstationedforquitesometime.Thetribalwarriors,infact,hadbeengarrisonedthereforsolongthattheyhad

grownslack.ThuswhentheysawthehugeChinesearmyin thedistance, theyabandonedtheirequipmentandranaway,intendingtocrosstheriverthatformedanaturalboundarytothearea.The road was narrow and cramped, and the Chinese general pursued the

fleeing Qiang at a leisurely pace. Someone said to him, “We are going tooslowlytofollowuponouradvantage.”Butthegeneralreplied,“Thisisacasewhere ‘a desperate enemy is not to be pressed.’ If we go easy, they will runwithoutlookingback;butifwerushthem,theywillturnaroundandfighttothedeath.”AlloftheofficersoftheimperialChinesearmyagreedwiththegeneral.WhentheQiangtribesmenplungedintotheriver,hundredsofthemdrowned

andtherestranaway.

WarringinAccordwithNatureLiuJisaid:Whenyouwanttoraiseanarmyandmobilizeitagainstcriminalsinorderto

givecomforttothepeople,itisimperativetodosoaccordingtonaturaltiming.Youwillalwayswinwhenyoumobilizemilitaryforcesagainstenemiesunderthe following conditions: their leadership is benighted and their governmentpolicies are arbitrary; their armed forces are overbearing and their people areworn out; they drive out good and wise people; they judicially murder theinnocent.Enemieslikethiscanbebeaten.The rule is “You successfully carry out a punitive strike when you follow

natural timing” (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, “Strategic Assessments,”

commentaries;alsoin“Sima’sArtofWar,”“DeterminingRanks”).

Thesixth-centuryNorthernQidynastywasoneoftheshort-livedreignsoftheturbulent era of the Northern and Southern dynasties. It was founded by theyoungerbrotheroftheassassinatedkingofQi,asecond-generationvassaloftheWeidynasty,whichwasanon-Chineseempire that includednorthernChina initsterritory.TheNorthernQidynastylastedforonlytwenty-eightyears,withsixrulersofthreegenerations.The last emperor of Northern Qi was popularly called “The Sorrowless

Emperor.”Heappointeddishonestandtreacherouspeopletoadministertheruleofgovernmentandtositontheboardofhisadvisorycouncil.Allofthesepeoplehadtheirownpersonalcliques,whosememberstherebyweregivenpromotionsthatwereoutoforder.Officialpostswereobtainedbybribery,andpeoplewereoppressed and persecuted by arbitrary policies. There was also internecineconflictamongthevassals,resultinginthejudicialmurderofinnocentministers.TheMartial Emperor ofNorthernZhou (543–578)was also non-Chinese, a

chieftanoftheNorthAsianXianbeipeople.GraduallyseeingthesignsthattheNorthernQidynastywascollapsingandgoingunder,assoonashesawitsbasiscrumblelikealandslidehetookthisopportunitytodestroyit.Thelastemperorof Northern Qi capitulated to Northern Zhou, and his whole clan wasexterminated.

HealthandWarfareLiuJisaid:Whenyouareatwar,ifyourarmyhassufferedasetback,itisimperativeto

examinethephysicalandmentalhealthofthesoldiers.Iftheyarehealthy,theninspirethemtofight;iftheyarerundownandlowinspirits,thennurturetheirhealthforthetimebeing,untiltheyareagainfitforservice.Theruleis“Takecareofyourhealthandavoidstress,consolidateyourenergy

andbuildupyourstrength”(SunTzu,TheArtofWar,“NineGrounds”).

TheFirstEmperorofChina,whounitedChinainthethirdcenturyB.C.E.,wasthefounderoftheimperialQindynasty.Atonepointinhisconquestsheplannedtoattack the ancient land of Chu and asked one of his commanders, a certainGeneralLi,“IwanttotakeChu—howmanytroopswillbeneeded?”GeneralLireplied,“Nomorethantwohundredthousand.”Then the emperor put the same question to another commander, General

Wang.GeneralWangsaid,“Therehavetobeatleastsixhundredthousand.”TheemperorsaidtoGeneralWang,“Youmustbegettingold!Howcanyou

be so timid?” And he appointed General Li to lead an army of two hundredthousandtroopsinanattackonChu.

GeneralWang,nothavinggotten the job, announced that hewas ailing and

wentintotemporaryretirement.NowGeneralLiattackedChuanddealttheindependentstateacrushingblow.

Thenhewithdrewhis troops to takeupaposition to thewest;but themenofChu followed him, not pitching camp for three successive days, and finallyroutedtheQinarmy,killingsevencaptainsandputtingGeneralLitoflight.Hearingnewsofthis,theemperorwaswroth.HepersonallywenttoGeneral

Wang and insisted that he return to active duty. GeneralWang said, “I am amuddledoldman;ifyouinsistonemployingmeforthismission,Iwillneedsixhundredthousandmen.”Thistimetheemperoragreed.WhenthemenofChuheardofthis,theymobilizedalloftheirarmedforcesto

resist the Qin army under General Wang. General Wang, however, juststrengthenedhisfortificationsanddidnotdobattle.Hegavehissoldiersplentyof resteveryday,allowing them tobatheandwash theirclothing.Healso fedthemwellandgenerallyprovidedfortheircomfort,sharingintheirlot.Afterquiteawhileof this,GeneralWangasked if thesoldierswereplaying

sportsincamp.Whenheheardthattheywere,hedeclared,“Nowtheyarefitforaction!”Themen ofChu, unable to oppose theQin army in battle,withdrew to the

east.GeneralWangpursuedthemandstruckthemdown,killingtheirleaderandputtingthesoldiersofChutoflight,achievingasettlementbymilitarymeans.

THELOSTARTOFWAR

SUNTZUII

INTRODUCTION

Few things might seem as unlikely as ancient Chinese warriors rising up inmodern American business schools, corporate boardrooms, and Hollywoodmovies,buttheretheyare.The rise of the new China, the power of the global marketplace, the

intensificationofinternationalcompetitionandrivalry—alloftheseelementsofcontemporary affairs may contribute in some way to present-day interest inancientclassicsofstrategyandconflictmanagement.This literature, however, may have yet another function—perhaps not as

apparent, but no less important than what emerges from its use in business,diplomacy,andwarfare.Whilethestudyandapplicationofstrategicthinkinginthese areasmay be necessary to secure the economic, political, and territorialunderpinningsofdemocracy,thesecannotguaranteefreedomunlessindividualsandpeopleshavetherightandtheopportunitytorecognizeandunderstandallofthe operative influences in their lives andon theirminds—not only those thathappentobe,oraremadetoappear,mostevidenttoeverydayawareness.Onlythusistruefreedomofchoicepossibleinareal,practicalsense.One of the most important functions of strategic literature in the public

domaintoday,therefore,maybetoenhancethegeneralunderstandingofpoweranditsusesandabuses.Byunderstandingpower—howconfigurationsofpowerwork, how masses of people are influenced, how individuals and peoplesbecome vulnerable to internal contradictions and external aggression—it ispossibletoobjectivelyandtruthfullyassesstheoperationoftheworldwelivein—and, we might hope, to learn to avoid the abuses of power to which themassive,impersonalinfrastructuresofmodernlifeareinherentlyprone.Themost famousofancientChinesestrategicmanuals isTheArtofWarby

Sun Tzu, an outstanding military consultant of China’s Warring States era.Somewhatmorethanahundredyearslater,alinealdescendantofthisSunTzu,or“MasterSun,”alsorosetoprominenceasadistinguishedstrategist.ThiswasSun Bin, whose name means Sun theMutilated. He became Sun Tzu II, thesecondMasterSun,whoseownArtofWarwasonlyknowninpartuntilanearlycomplete,ifsomewhatdamagedversionrecordedonbamboostripswasrecently

discoveredinanancienttomb.It is not accidental that the great classics of Chinese political and military

strategyemergedfromthechaosandhorroroftheEraoftheWarringStates.Theconditions of the time, and their effect on the morale and philosophy of thepeople, are graphically described in the traditional anthology known asStrategiesoftheWarringStates:

Usurperssetthemselvesupaslordsandkings;statesthatwererunbypretenders and plotters established armies to make themselves intomajor powers. They imitated each other at thismore andmore, andthose who came after them also followed their example. Eventuallytheyoverwhelmed anddestroyedone another, conspiringwith largerdomainstoannexsmallerdomains,spendingyearsatviolentmilitaryoperations,fillingthefieldswithblood.Fathers and sons were alienated, brothers were at odds, husbands

and wives were estranged. No one could safeguard his or her life.Integrity disappeared. Eventually this reached the extreme whereseven large states and five smaller states contested each other forpower.Thisallhappenedbecausethewarringstateswereshamelesslygreedy,strugglinginsatiablytogetahead.1

According toancientdocuments,SunBinstudiedwarfarealongwithacertainPangJuan,who laterbecameahigh-rankingmilitary leader.Their teacherwassupposed to have been themysterious sageWangLi, known as theMaster ofDemonValley,oneofthemostredoubtablestrategictheoristsofalltime.ReputedlytheauthorofTheMasterofDemonValley, themostsophisticated

of all strategic classics, Wang Li was a Taoist recluse. According to Taoistrecords,whilecertainstudentsofhisbecameprominentstrategistsactiveinthemeleesoftheWarringStates,theMasterofDemonValleytriedinvaintoinducethem to use their knowledge to convert thewarlords to Taoism rather than tohegemonism.Legendhas it that theMasterofDemonValley lived forhundredsofyears.

WhilethissortoffableisordinarilyconnectedtoesotericTaoistlife-prolongingtheoriesandpractices,inthiscaseitmayalludetothemaintenanceofahighlysecretive hidden tradition. Such a pattern of esoterism in the preservation andtransmission of potentially dangerous knowledge was typical, to be sure, ofancientChineseschools,particularlyunderconditionsofsocialdisorder.The book known as The Master of Demon Valley most certainly contains

muchthatisnotintheloreofthefirstSunTzu’spopularArtofWar.2Thebook

of Sun Tzu II, Sun the Mutilated, also bears the stamp of extraordinaryknowledge that may in fact derive from the school of the Master of DemonValley. The reason for secrecy, which also explains the extremely crypticlanguage used in recording such texts, ismade clear in the conclusion toTheMaster of Demon Valley: “Petty people imitating others will use this in aperverseandsinisterway,eventothepointwheretheycandestroyfamiliesandusurpcountries.”3ThisisthetraditionofSuntheMutilated.AftercompletinghisstudyoftacticalstrategywiththemysteriousMasterof

DemonValley,SunBin’s schoolmatePang Juanwashiredby the court of thestateofWei,wherehewasappointedtotherankofgeneral.Concernedthathisown abilitieswere unequal to those of SunBin,General Pang Juan devised aplantoremovehimfromthescene.Toencompasshisrival’sdownfall,PangJuanhadSunBininvitedtoWeiasif

to consult with him. When Sun Bin arrived, however, Pang Juan had himarrested as a criminal. Falling victim to the plot and condemned as a convict,SunBinhadbothfeetamputatedandhisfacetattooed.Thisiswhyhecametobe known as Sun the Mutilated. Such punishments were designed to reducepeopletothestatusofpermanentoutcasts.Sun Bin, however, was evidently undaunted by this setback. Perhaps he

consideredhimselfmostatfaultforhavingfallenintoPangJuan’strap.Inanycase,whilehewasaconvict/slave,SunBingainedaprivateaudiencewithanemissaryofthestateofQiwhowaspassingthroughWeienroutetothestateofLiang.Takingadvantageofhisopportunity,SunBinastoundedtheambassadorwithhisextraordinaryknowledgeofstrategyandwarfare.

Recognizingthevalueofsuchamind,theemissarysmuggledMasterSunout

ofWeiintohisownstateofQi.NowtherulerofQiwantedtomakeSunBinageneral,buthepleadedinfirmityonaccountofhavingbeenjudiciallymaimed.Asaresult, thestrategistwasinsteadappointedmilitaryconsultant tothegreatgeneralTianJi.SunBin’sskillintheclassicalstrategyofhisancestorSunWuandhisteacher

WangLiisillustratedbyafamousstoryofhisservicetoQi,immortalizedinthepopular Extraordinary Strategies of a Hundred Battles by the great Mingdynastywarrior-scholarLiuJi:4Whentwostatesattackedathird,thevictimizedstateappealedto thestateofQiforhelp.ThegeneralofQiaskedSunBinforadvice.MasterSunsaid,“Theaggressorarmiesarefierceandthinklittleofyourarmy,whichtheyregardascowardly.Agoodwarriorwouldtakeadvantageofthistendencyand‘leadthemonwithprospectsofgain.’

“According toTheArtofWar, struggling for an advantage fiftymiles awaywillthwarttheforwardleadership,andonlyhalfofthosewhochaseprospectsofgaintwenty-fivemilesawaywillactuallygetthere.Haveyourarmyenterenemyterritoryandmakethousandsofcampfires;onthenextdayhavethemmakehalfthatnumberof campfires, andon theday following thathave themmakehalfagainthatnumber.”The general had his army do as Sun Bin advised. The enemy general was

deceivedbythismaneuver,delightedtohearthatthenumberofcampfireswasdwindlingdaybyday,assumingthatthemenofQiweredefecting.Hesaid,“Iknew the soldiers ofQiwere cowards—they’ve only been in our territory forthreedaysnow,andmorethanhalftheirarmyhasrunaway!”As a result of this misperception, the enemy general left his own infantry

behindandrushedinpursuitoftheQiarmywithnothingbutapersonalforceofcrack troops. Calculating the speed of their pursuit,Master Sun theMutilatedconcludedthatbynightfallhisopponentswouldreachanareaofnarrowroadsdifficulttopassthrough,aplacesuitableforambush.NowMasterSunhadalargetreefelledandstrippedofbark.Thenhewroteon

thebarelog,“ThegeneralofWeiwilldieatthistree,”andhaditplacedontheroadwheretheaggressortroopsofWeiwouldpassthatnight.ThenMasterSunhadseveralthousandexpertarchersconcealthemselvesneartheroad.

When thegeneralofWei,SunBin’sopponent, came to theplacewhere the

strippedloglayacrosstheroad,thegeneralhadatorchkindledforlighttoreadthewritingonthelog.Beforehehadfinishedreadingtheinscriptionstatingthathehimselfwoulddierighttherethatnight,thearchersplacedbySunBinloosedtheirarrowsatthesightofthetorch,throwingtheenemyintoapanic.Realizinghe had been outwitted and his troops beaten, the general of Wei committedsuicide.ThusthetacticsofMasterSuntheMutilatedencompassedvictoryatminimal

cost.Thisisoneofthecardinalprinciplesofthescience.

Sun Bin’s book of strategy, long known by fragments and only recentlydiscoveredinthesameancienttombinwhichthepreviouslyunknownversionofSunTzu’sArt ofWarwas found,wasmost likely compiledbydisciples.Likeother works of pre-imperial China, this text appears to be a collection ofaphorismsandanalects, largelyorganizedinalateralassociativemannerratherthaninalinearprogressiveorder.ThebookbeginswithacrypticstoryofSunBin’sultimate triumphoverhis

old nemesis, Pang Juan, using the strategy of misdirection advocated by hisancestor SunWu. This account, which is intrinsically obscure and subject todifferent readings and interpretations, mainly serves to establish the superiormasteryofMasterSuntheMutilated.Undoubtedly,itwasforthispurposethatthe followers of Sun Bin introduced their account of their master’s teachingswiththisstory.The textgoeson torecordsomeofmasterSunBin’sconversationswith the

kingandthegeneralTianJiofQi, towhomheactedasconsultant.After that,thebookproceedstodealwithaseriesofrelatedtopics,focusingonhard-coreissuesoftacticsandstrategy.ThebookofSunBinisacompositetext,basedonaChinese senseofholisticorder rather thanaHellenic senseof logic.Thus itcovers a wide range of subjects as a totality, without the linear progressionfamiliartoscholasticWesternthought.Asanesotericworkofmilitarystrategy,furthermore, it is by nature highly secretive, recorded in extremely difficultlanguage,oftensubstitutinghomonymiccharactersinakindofcrypticcode.AcenturydeeperintothechaosofWarringStatesChina,whileretainingthe

ancient moral foundations of SunWu’sArt of War, Sun Bin went that muchfurther than his distinguished ancestor in detailing practical tactics. Likewhatcan be found in other strategic manuals, moreover, Sun Bin’s methods arerepresented by structures that operate as metaphors for events and activitiesother than warfare, in the domains of government, diplomacy, business, andsocialaction.There is aChinese saying, “Thewise seewisdom, thegood seegoodness.”

HowpeopleinteractwithpowerfulandsecretivelorelikeTheArtofWarisheldto reveal something about their inner character—and this function itself is aclassicmaneuverofstrategicart.

Notes

1.CitedinTheArtofWarinthisvolume.IthasoftenbeennotedhowmuchthehighlycompetitivecontemporaryinternationalmarketplaceresemblestheEraoftheWarringStates.

2. For a complete translation of the esoteric classic of strategy known asTheMaster of Demon Valley, see Thomas Cleary, Thunder in the Sky: On theAcquisitionandExerciseofPower(Boston:Shambhala,1993).TheMasterofDemonValley containsmuchmoreof thepsychological, social, andpoliticaldimensionofstrategyinactionthandoesSunTzu’srenownedTheArtofWar,which is more strictly military. The Master of Demon Valley illustrates the

Taoist ideas and techniques in traditional strategymoreprominently thandoeitheroftheSuns,SunTzuI(SunWu)orSunTzuII(SunBin).TaoistlegendaboutWangLi,theMasterofDemonValley,hasthemaestroweepingoverhiswayward disciples who became famous military strategists but failed toconvertthelordstothemoraldimensionsoftheTao.

3.Cleary,ThunderintheSky,76.4.ForLiuJi’sowncommentaryonhowthisstoryillustratestheartofwar,seeMasteringtheArtofWar inthisvolume,undertheheading“KnowledgeandBattle.”

SunBin’sArtofWar

[1]

TheCaptureofPangJuan

Inthepast,whentherulerofLiangwasgoingtoattackHandan,thecapitalofZhao,hesenthisgeneral,PangJuan,toChuqiuwith80,000armedtroops.

*SunBin’sTheArtofWarbegins,appropriatelyenough,withthestoryofhowhevanquishedhisarchrival,PangJuan.TheshiftingalliancesofChina’sEraoftheWarringStatescreatedenormousconfusionanduncertainty;andthechaoticandunpredictablenatureofthepoliticalscenewasruthlesslyexploitedbycivilandmilitaryleadersaswellasbyfreelanceconsultants.ToreadancientChinesewarstorieslikethis,whichdonotnecessarilyfollowastraightline,andwhoseactionisinherentlyandperhapsdeliberatelyconfusing,observetherelationshipsandinteractionsaswellastheoverall“plot.”

WhenKingWeiofQi(B.C.E.356–320)heardofthis,hehadhisgeneral,TianJi,lead80,000armedtroopstotherescue.PangJuanattackedthecapitalofWey.GeneralTianJiaskedMasterSunBin,

“WhatshouldIdoifIdonotrescueWey?”

WhenSunBinwas offered a generalship byKingWei, he refused the honor;ostensiblyhedidsoonaccountofhisphysicaldisabilities,butperhapsforotherstrategic reasonsaswell. Instead,hewasappointedmilitaryadviser to the topgeneral,TianJi.

Master Sun said, “Please attack Rangling to the south. The walled city ofRanglingissmall,butitsprovinceislarge,populous,andwellarmed.ItistheessentialmilitaryzoneineasternWei; it ishardtobesiege,soIwouldmakeashowofconfusion.WereItoattackRangling,IwouldhavethestateofSongtomysouthandthestateofWeytomynorth,withShiqiurightintheway,somysupplylineswouldbecutoff;Iwouldthusmakeashowofincompetence.”

TwoessentialprinciplesofconflictoutlinedbySunBin’sdistinguishedancestorSunWuare illustratedhere.Oneconcerns theway todrawanenemyoutofa

secure position by attacking a place of strategic value, somewhere that theopponent is sure to go to the defense. TheMaster of Demon Valley, anotherWarringStates–erastrategist,alsodescribedthepracticeofdrawingpeopleoutin interactions by observing their structures of psychological defense. Theexerciseof tact,aswellasapparent lackof tact,maybothbeused instrategicencountersasmeansofobservingreactionpatternsinactualorpotentialalliesoradversaries, either from a “closed” undercover position (disguised as tact) orfrom the shifting, roving, deceptively “open” position of the provocateur(disguisedaslackoftact).The second principle illustrated here is the use of deceit for strategic

advantage inhostile situations. In this case, theparticular avenueofdeceptionemployedisthatofdeliberatelygivingtheappearanceofconfusionandlackofskill in order to make an enemy contemptuous, complacent, and thereforecareless, rendering the enemy vulnerable to counterattack. Thus, in situationswhere strategy is the paramount guide of affairs, it is customary not to takeanythingnaivelyatfacevalue;yetitisthereforecrucialtoattaintheintelligenceand balance to avoid becoming excessively imaginative and lapsing into self-defeatingparanoia.

SoGeneralTianbrokecampandracedtoRangling.Subsequently, General Tian summoned Master Sun and asked, “Now what

shouldIdo?”MasterSunsaid,“Whichofthegrandeesofthecitiesareignorantofmilitary

affairs?”GeneralTianreplied,“ThoseinQi-chengandGao-tang.”

Here, the leastcompetentarebeingselectedbecausetheyare tobepawnsinalarger game. Their role, which they are to play unawares, is to keep up theappearanceof lackofskilland intelligenceon thepartof the leadership.Theyare also being set up to be sacrificed for a larger cause; this is one of thenotoriousThirty-SixStrategies.

MasterSunsaid,“Get thesegrandees to takechargeofdefenseof theircities.Fanoutand thenclose inonall sides, circlingaround.Fanningoutand thenclosinginwithabattlefront,circlearoundtostationcamouflagedsoldiers.Withyour vanguard forceful, have your main force continuously circle around andstriketheopponentfrombehind.Thetwograndeescanbesacrificed.”SoQi-chengandGao-tangwereseparatedintotwounits,andadirectassault

onRanglingwasmadeinanattempttoswarmthecity.Camouflagedambusherscircled around and struck from behind; Qi-cheng and Gao-tang were routed,succumbingtothestrategy.

Master Sun advised General Tian to draw the opponent in by this show ofincompetence, then come upon the enemy from behind with a sneakcounterattack. In this case, the opposing side added another layer of the samestrategy, thereby succeeding ingainingan immediateaim,yet also falling intothetrapofMasterSunBin.Themasterstrategisthadalready taken thispossibility,or indeed likelihood,

fullyintoaccount;thepurposeofthesiegeorderedbySunBinwasnottowinitsostensible aim, but to render his opponent vulnerable.When you see a target,andyouseepeopleaimingforthetarget,trytoseewhattheactualpurpose—ineffect, that is—might be: the target, the aiming, the attention of onlookers,whatevermightpossiblybegainedfromacombinationofsomeorallof theseunderprevailingconditions,orpossiblysomethingelseagain.

GeneralTiansummonedMasterSunandsaid,“IfailedinthesiegeofRangling,and also lostQi-cheng andGao-tang,whichwere defeated strategically.NowwhatshouldIdo?”Master Sun said, “Please send light chariots galloping west to the city of

Liang,toenragethem;followupwithyourtroopssplituptomakeitlookasiftheyarefewinnumber.”

It may seem dangerous to enrage an enemy; and indeed it may be, so it isimperative to examine the specific conditions of themoment. The purpose ofstrategicuseofangerinthiswayistoblunttheeffectivenessofanopponentbymaking him lose his head and expend his energy wildly, without deadlyconcentration. The great heavyweight champion boxers Jack Johnson andMuhammadAliwere particularly renowned for their consummate skill in thisart. In some cultures, what Americans call “in your face” manners ormannerisms are in fact either active examples or not-quite-dead relics of thistypeofstrategicbehavior,developedwithinthecontextofsocialconditionsthattend to force people to assume such behavior, if for no other reason thaninstinctiveself-preservation.ThereisanotherfunctionofangernotedinclassicsofChinesestrategy,thatof

enraging one’s own forces against a powerful enemy in order to add to thepsychologicalmomentumof one’s attack and suretyof one’s defense.AncientNorse berserkers, from whom we derive the word berserk, practiced this on

themselves.InAmericanpugilism,thelegendarymiddleweightboxingchampionStanley

Ketchelwasfamousforthisberserkerlikepractice.PowerfulenoughinhisragetofloorthegreatheavyweightchampionJackJohnsonhimself,Ketchelseemstohavebeenoneofthefewtrulyviolentyoungmenwhoostensiblysucceededinthisprofession.Hishabitual indulgence inhisownpassions,however, andhisconsequent forgetfulness of passion as a double-edged sword—capable ofmakingmenkillersaswellasbuffoons—waspreciselywhatledtohisownearlydeath. One of the most murderous of men ever to box under theMarquis ofQueensburyrules,StanleyKetchelwasonlytwenty-fouryearsoldwhenhewasshottodeathbyanangrycuckold.Nowadays,thepracticeofenragingone’stroopsagainstanenemyseemstobe

widely used. Film clips of such training procedures are even to be seen onnational educational television from time to time. The use of such tactics onsoldiers of a highly diverse nationwith ancestral roots all over theworld hasveryseriousdrawbacks.Alreadyevidentonthebattlefield,thesedrawbacksareparticularlyglaringwhenviewedinthetotalcontext,includingtherelationshipbetweencivilsocietyanditsownmilitary.Itmaybeforthisreasonthatstrategiclore in China, a land of great regional diversity, generally speaks more ofenragingothersthanenragingone’sownminionsoralliesagainstothers.Inthisconnection,itmaybenoteworthythatSunBin’sbookonstrategydoes

not vilify his arch enemy Pang Juan, the man responsible, out of paranoidjealousy,forhavingSunBin’sfeetamputatedandhisfacetattooedasacriminal.The book contains no hint, for example, of SunBin attempting to enrage hisadvisee General Tian against Pang Juan; nor does he leave a string ofuncomplimentary epithets in hiswork to curse hismalefactor until the end oftime.ThisdoesnotmeanSunBinhadnofeelings,ofcourse;onlythathekepthis professional cool in spite ofwhat emotions hemight have felt at heart. Insuchcases,itshouldbenoted,thisvirtueisnotnecessarilyamoralvirtue;itmaynotbeanymorethanastrategicvirtue.Tomakethisdistinctionclearlyisitselfastrategicadvantage,foritdiminishesvulnerabilitytoconfusion,whichcanoccurandcanalsobeexploitedinanydomain,dimension,orform.

General Tian did asMaster Sun recommended, andGeneralPang did in factcome by forced march, leaving equipment behind. Master Sun attacked himrelentlesslyatGuiling,andcapturedGeneralPang.

All along, Sun Bin’s strategy had been aimed at getting General Pang tooverreachandexposehimselfcarelessly,intheprocessalsotiringhistroopsout

andtrickingthemintocomingtothefraytoolightlyequipped.

That is why it was said that Master Sun was a consummate expert at hisbusiness.

In sum, Sun Bin got General Tian to employ classic tactics of misdirection,inwardandoutwarddeception,givingup something inorder toget somethingmorevalued, strategicallyexploiting thequirks,weaknesses,andshortcomingsofhumanneurological,perceptive,andemotionalfunctionstoachieveaspecificpurpose.TheTaoistclassicTaoTeChingsays,“TheTaoisuniversal; itcanbeused for the right or the left.” Thismeans that natural laws can be caused tooperateinwaysthatmaybeamoralorevenimmoralaswellasinwaysthatmaybemoral.ItisforthisreasonthatdevelopmentofbothcharacterandperceptivitywasinancienttimesatraditionalTaoistrequisiteforlearningtopracticetheTaoinone’sownlife.

*CommentaryonSunBin’stextisprovidedbythetranslator.

[2]

[TitleLost]

WhenMaster Sunmet KingWei, he said, “Amilitia is not to rely on a fixedformation;thisisthewaytransmittedbykingsofyore.”

The reasons for not relying on a fixed formation are both defensive andoffensive. In terms of defense, predictability means vulnerability, since anadversarywhoknowshowyouwillreacttoagivensituationwillbeabletotakeadvantage of this knowledge to scheme against you. If you are not sopredictable, on theother hand, not onlywill adversaries beunable to pinpointtheirtargets,buttheirattentionwillbeweakenedbydispersal.Whenopponentscannotpredictwhatyouwilldo,theycannotactagainstyou

withinevitableeffect;andwhentheyrealizetheycannotpredictwhatyouwilldo,theyhavetobemorewatchfulwithoutknowingquitewhattheyarewatchingfor, thus exhausting the energy of attention and progressively diluting itseffectiveness.Thisleadsnaturallyintotheoffensiveaspectofunpredictability;enemieswho

cannottellwhenorwhereyoumightactaretherebypreventedfrompreparingasure defense. Their attention is thus necessarily spreadmore thinly, and theirmentalenergynaturallywanesonaccountoftheaddedburden.Thebuildupofconstantly mounting anxiety accelerates this process, and aggressivelyunpredictable behavior that is fundamentally intended to increase tensionsucceedsdoublyinitsfunctionbytheaddedtensioninherentinfutilereactionstomisdirection.

“Victory in war is a means of preserving perishing nations and perpetuatingdying societies; failing to win in war is how territory is lost and sovereigntythreatened.Thisiswhymilitarymattersmustbeexamined.”

InhersmallbutpowerfulbookPrisonsWeChoosetoLiveInside(1987),DorisLessing observes the tragedy of those who believe in freedom and peace but

inhibit their own liberation and fulfillment by refusing to examine themechanismsofoppressionandwar.Ifwewishtoremedymalignantconditions,sheargues,weneedtounderstandthoseconditionsandhowtheyaffectus.Thisis precisely the logic of the ancient Art of War: Know your enemy, knowyourself,knowwhereyouare,knowwhatisgoingon.The idea of smashing the mechanisms of oppression and war may be

emotionallystimulating,butit isbothchildishandexactlycontrarytostrategiccommon sense because it falls into the simplest of traps. Dismantling thesemechanisms,notdreamingofsmashingthem,isasounderandmoreintelligentapproach—provided it is not just a calmer dream and is actually empoweredwithknowledgeandunderstandingoftheirdesignsandoperations.These reasons for studying the art ofwar are already set forthwith simple

clarity by classical philosophers ofChina,whomSunBin is informally citinghere.Insum,thelogicalpurposeoflearningabouttheworkingsofconflictistobeabletopreserveinnocentsfromaggression,oppression,anddestruction.Thisisconsideredtobeanintelligentandcivilizedextensionofthenaturalinstinctofself-preservation.This applies not only to warfare in a literal sense, but to all fields of

competitionandcontention,alldomainsofhostilityandconflict.Beforewecanfairlyunderstandwhatwemightbeable todoaboutanything,weneed toseewhataimsarebeing servedandwhatmeansarebeingemployed.Without thismentalequipment,wearelikelytobecomeunabletoreacttotryingsituationsinanybutemotionallyoverchargedbutpragmaticallyinefficientways.

“Thosewhoenjoymilitarism,however,willperish;andthosewhoareambitiousforvictorywillbedisgraced.Warisnotsomethingtoenjoy,victoryisnottobeanobjectofambition.”

TheTaoistclassicTaoTeChingsays,“Fineweaponsareimplementsofillomen:Peoplemaydespisethem,sothosewhoareimbuedwiththeWaydonotdwellwiththem.”Thepacificismexpressedhereisnotsentimentalornaive;notethatthe text says people “may despise” weapons, not that people “do” despiseweapons, or that people “all” despise weapons. Weaponry fetishes are welldocumented throughout the world from ancient to modern times, andcontemporarysociologicalandpsychologicalresearchershavetestifiedtoformsof this phenomenon so comparatively subtle as to be normally unidentified assuch. Not being adequately described or identified as such in everydayconsciousness,theseinfluencesthereforeposeamoreinsidiousthreattohumanstabilitythangrosserandmorereadilyidentifiableformsofweaponryfetishism.

TheTaoTeChingcontinues,“Weapons,beinginstrumentsofillomen,arenottools of the cultured, who use them onlywhen unavoidable. They consider itbest to be aloof; theywinwithout beautifying it.Thosewhobeautify it enjoykillingpeople.”Also,“Thegoodareeffective,thatisall;theydonotpresumetograbpowerthereby.Theyareeffectivebutnotconceited,effectivebutnotproud,effectivebutnotarrogant.Theyareeffectivewhentheyhavetobe,effectivebutnot coercive.” These passages of the quintessential Taoist classic reflect withampleclarity thepristineTaoist inspirationofSunBin’sconceptof theproperplaceofwarfareinhumanaffairsasillustratedintheintroductiontothischapterofhisclassicmanual,onstrategicadvicetoaking.

“Actonlywhenprepared.Whenacitadelissmallandyetitsdefenseisfirm,thatmeans ithassupplies.When thereare fewsoldiersandyet thearmy isstrong,thatmeanstheyhaveasenseofmeaning.Iftheydefendwithoutsuppliesorfightwithoutmeaning,nooneintheworldcanbefirmandstrong.”

Toact onlywhenprepared is the cardinal rule of allmartial arts and strategicaction, and indeed of all business and creative endeavor. This perennialadmonition is followed by a series of diagnostic guidelines, because properpreparationisonlypossiblewithknowledgeofconditionsfororagainstwhichpreparationisbeingmade.In this particular case, insofar as his remarks are introductory, Master Sun

takes a general approach and summarizes the main parameters according towhich conditions can be usefully described: the material and the mental ormoral.Asisoftenthecase,thisissimplyamatterofcommonsense,notonlyinwarfare,but inanyconstructiveactivity. It isnecessary tohaveaconcentratedsenseofpurposetomakeeffectiveuseofmaterialresources,anditisnecessarytohaveadequatewherewithaltosustaintheefforttoactualizetheaim.

“WhenYaoruled the land inantiquity, therewereseven instanceswhereroyaldecreeswererejectedandnotcarriedout;twoamongtheeasterntribes,fourintheheartlandofChina,...Nothingcouldbegainedfromjustlettingthingsgo,so Yao fought and won, and established himself strongly, so that everyonesubmitted.“In high antiquity, Shennong warred against the Fusui tribe, the Yellow

Emperor warred on the region of Shu-lu. Yao struck down the Gong Gongpeople,Shunstruckdown...anddroveofftheSanMiaotribes.Tangbanisheda despot, King Wu struck down a tyrant. The Yan tribe of the old Shangconfederacyrebelled,sotheDukeofZhouovercameit.

“ThereforeitissaidthatifyourvirtueisnotcomparabletotheFiveEmperorsofAntiquity,yourabilityisnotcomparabletotheThreeKingsofold,andyourwisdomisnotcomparabletotheDukeofZhou,evenifyousayyouaregoingtobuilduphumanenessandjusticeanduseritualandmusictogovernpeacefully,thusputtingastop toconflictanddepredation, it isnot thatYaoandShundidnot want to be thus, but that they were not able to do so; that is why theymarshaledwarriorstorectifymatters.”

HereMasterSun is also following classical tradition in citing events from thelegendsofancientculturalheroestounderscoretheneedtounderstandtheartofwar even in just and peaceful societies. Shennong was a prehistorical leader,associated with the development of agriculture, horticulture, and herbalmedicine.TheYellowEmperor,whoissupposedtohavereignedinthetwenty-seventhcenturyB.C.E., isoneofthemostimportantfiguresofTaoism,believedtohavestudiedandcollectedabroadspectrumofesotericknowledge.YaoandShun, ancient kings of the twenty-fourth and twenty-third centuries B.C.E., aredepicted as paragons of just rulership. King Tang was the founder of theShang/Yin dynasty in the eighteenth centuryB.C.E.;KingWu and theDuke ofZhouwerefoundersoftheZhou(Chou)dynastyinthelatetwelfthcenturyB.C.E.Yao, Shun, Tang,Wu, and theDuke of Zhouwere particularly revered in theConfucian tradition,which emphasized justice andhumaneness in governmentandpublicservice.TheFiveEmperorsandThreeKings,althoughdifferentlynamedandlistedin

various traditional sources, collectively refer to legenday leaders symbolizingprototypes of wisdom and humanity in Taoist, Confucian, and other Chinesepoliticaltraditions.ThereasoningSunBinisusinghereincitingtheseimages,echoedineminentTaoistclassicssuchasTheMastersofHuainanandWen-tzu,isthis:Sinceevengreatleadersofthepastrenownedforthebenevolenceoftheirregimeswerenotabletoavoidhostilities,itfollowsthatrulersoflatertimes,nomatterhowgoodtheirintentions,cannotaffordtoignorethescienceofconflictmanagement and ignore the arts of strategy. The Masters of Huainan, acomprehensive Taoist classic of the second century B.C.E., illustrates thishumanistic approach to the issue of military preparedness: “Those who usedarms in ancient timesdidnotdo so to expand their territoryorobtainwealth;theydidsoforthesurvivalandcontinuityofnationsonthebrinkofdestructionandextinction,tosettledisorderintheworld,andtogetridofwhatharmedthecommonpeople.”

[3]

QuestionsofKingWei

King Wei of Qi asked Master Sun about military operations in these terms:“When twoarmiesareamatch foreachotherand theircommandersareatastandoff,withbothsidesholdingfirmandneitherwillingtomakethefirstmove,whatshouldbedoneaboutthis?”Master Sun replied, “Test the other side bymeans of light troops, led by a

brave man from the lower echelons. Aim to cause a setback, not to gain avictory. Create a hidden front to harass their flanks. This is considered greatsuccess.”

Thepurposeofaimingtocauseasetbackratherthangainavictoryistotestthestrengthoftheopponentwithoutrevealingthedepthofone’sownresources.Thehidden front stands behind the dummy test front, awaiting the adversary’sreaction.Thissortofmaneuvertakesplacesinallsortsofinteractions.InJapanese,the

overt content of an interpersonal transaction is called theomote,whichmeans“front,”ortatemae,whichmeans“setup”;whiletheulteriormotiveiscalledtheura,meaning“back,”orhonne,meaningsomethinglike“truevoice.”Whilethestrategicuseofgapsbetweenovertexpressionandcovert intentionisprobablyuniversalnegotiatingpractice,culturaldifferencesinthemannerofitsoperationandperceptionmayobscurerelevantparallelsinapparentlydifferentbehaviors.Description of this tactic is useful for defensive purposes, because alertness

and perceptivity can be enhanced simply by keeping it in mind. When inadversarial,disadvantageous,orsimplyunfamiliarcircumstances,itisusefultoremember that one and the same conversation or confrontation cansimultaneously accomplish two ormore purposes.What it all reallymeans inactualeffectdependsonthewayinwhichthetotaltransactionisunderstoodandthemannerinwhicheachpartyperceivesandreactstotheother’sovertmovesandcovert intentions.SunBin’sdistinguishedpredecessor,SunWu,wrote,“Ifyou know yourself and also know others, you will not be endangered in ahundredbattles.”

KingWeiasked,“Arethereproperwaystoemploylargeandsmallforces?”MasterSunreplied,“Thereare.”KingWeiasked,“IfIamstrongerandmorenumerousthanmyenemy,what

shouldIdo?”MasterSunanswered,“Thisisthequestionofanintelligentking.Whenyour

forcesarelargerandmorepowerful,andyetyoustillaskabouthowtoemploythem,thisisthewaytoguaranteeyournation’ssecurity.Givethecommandforan auxiliary force. Disarray the troops in confused ranks, so as to make theothersidecomplacent,andtheywillsurelydobattle.”

Complacency undermines strength, so the powerful can retain their power byavoiding complacency, while encompassing the downfall of adversaries byprojecting such an image of incompetence as to induce complacency andcontempt.SunWuwrote,“Evenwhenyouare solid, stillbeon thedefensive;evenwhenyouarestrong,beevasive.”

KingWeiasked,“WhentheenemyismorenumerousandstrongerthanI,whatshouldIdo?”MasterSunsaid,“Givethecommandforaretractablevanguard,makingsure

tohidetherearguardsothevanguardisabletogetbacksafely.Deploythelongweapons on the front lines, the short weapons behind,withmobile archers tohelp the hard-pressed. Have the main force remain immobile, waiting to seewhattheenemycando.”

The function of the vanguard is to harass the adversary, whether to induceexasperation,todrawacounterattackthatwouldleavetheopponentvulnerable,ortoinducetheenemytodivideandsplitofforotherwiseabandonapositionorconfigurationofpower.Therearguard,naturally,istheretocoverandbackthevanguardup,whilethemainforceliesinwaittofollowuponanyconfusionorweakeningoftheopponent’spower.This passage also provides a useful metaphor for resource allocation in

challengingsituations,orwhendealingwithintractableproblems.Thevanguardis research, the rear guard is development, the main force is the existinginfrastructureandresourceallocationalreadyinplace.The vanguard has to be “retractable” in that effective research needs to be

flexible and adaptive, ready to start anew in fresh directions as conditionsrequire.Fixedcommitmentsthatareunresponsivetochangingconditions,likeavanguardthatcannotbewithdrawn,aremorevulnerabletobeingcompromisedbythevagariesoftheunpredictableandtheunforeseen.

Inahighlycompetitiveenvironment,developmentasthe“rearguard”backingupvanguardresearch iskept“hidden,”orsecret,so thateveryone isnotdoingthe same thing at the same time. This makes constructive, evolutionarycompetitionpossible,whilehelpingtomaintainarelativelyopenspaceinwhichpublicopinioncanbeexpressed.The “main force” of existing infrastructure (including abstract, conceptual

infrastructuresofculture)remainsimmobileinthesensethatitrequiresadegreeof stability inorder to functioneffectively,yetmust“seewhat theenemywilldo” in order to evolve the organs and operations needed by the society, thecompany,andtheindividualtomanagechallengingorthreateningsituations.

KingWeiasked,“SupposetheenemycomesoutwhenIgoout,andIdonotyetknowwhosenumbersaregreater;whatshouldIdo?”

The reply to this question ismissing. Based on relevantmaterials in this andrelated texts, it might be surmised that Master Sun would be likely to haverecommended tacticsdesigned to feelout theopponentwhileconcealingone’sownstrengths.

KingWeiasked,“Howshouldoneattackdesperadoes?”MasterSunanswered,“...[Wait]untiltheyfindawaytolive.”

ThemostancientChineseclassic,theIChing,orBookofChanges,isthefirsttooutline this particular strategy of not driving opponents to deadly desperation.There,thisissymbolizedbyakingonahuntusingonlythreechasers,leavingone corner of the dragnet open in order to give the prey a fighting chance toescape.The principle is that a “cornered rat” may turn on its pursuer with

inconceivablydeadlyforceifitisdriventoafrenzyinabsolutedespair.Givenachance to escape, the reasoning goes, vanquished opponents will not becomeembittereddiehardsandneednotbeimprisoned,suppressed,orexterminatedtoachieveandmaintainpeaceandsocialorderintheaftermathofconflict.

KingWeiasked,“Howdoyouattackequals?”MasterSunreplied,“Confusingthemandsplittingthemup,Iconcentratemy

troops to pick them off without the enemy realizing what is going on. If theenemydoes not split up, however, settle downanddonotmove; do not strikewherethereisdoubt.”

Confusingandsplittinganopponent’sforceisdoneinordertodiffuseandbluntthe enemy of an attack aswell as to compromise the security of the enemy’sdefense.Strikingthediffusewithconcentratedforceisawaytoshiftthebalanceof strategic factors inone’sown favorwhen facinganadversaryof equal sizeand strength. Concentration and diffusions are both mental and physical,applying to attention,momentum, force, numbers, andmaterial resources.Theexistenceofdoubtmeansthatthereisdiffusionofattention,resultinginlossofconcentration;thereforeitisrecommendedthatnoactionbeinitiatedindoubtfulsituations.

KingWeiasked,“Isthereawaytostrikeaforcetentimesmysize?”Master Sun replied, “Yes. Attackwhere they are unprepared, actwhen they

leastexpectit.”

ThistacticistakendirectlyfromTheArtofWarbySunWu(SunTzu).Theideais thatgreaterpowerandresourcesdonotguaranteetacticalsuperiority if theyare not effectively employed. The purpose of deception as a strategic art,therefore, is to prevent adversaries from using their aggressive and defensivecapacitiesaccurately.

KingWeiasked,“When the terrain isevenand the troopsareorderly,andyettheyarebeatenbackinanengagement,whatisthereason?”MasterSunsaid,“Thebattlefrontlackedanelitevanguard.”

Thefunctionofanelitevanguard is toharass,splitup,confuse,andotherwisesoftenuptheadversary.

King Wei asked, “How can I get my people to follow orders as an ordinarymatterofcourse?”MasterSunsaid,“Betrustworthyasanordinarymatterofcourse.”

Ifevertherewasagoldenkeytotheartofleadership,perhapsthisisit:Togetpeople to follow orders as a matter of course, be trustworthy as a matter ofcourse. The practical philosopher Confucius is on record as observing thatpeoplewillnotobeyleaderstheydonottrust,eveniftheyarecoerced;whereastheywillfollowleaderstheydotrust,evenwhennothingissaid.

King Wei exclaimed, “Excellent words! The configurations of warfare areinexhaustible!”

Inexhaustibility of configurations means endless adaptation. When surprisetacticsarerepeatedoverandover,theybecomeconventionalizedandlosetheirstrategicvalue.Whenconventionaltacticsarealteredunexpectedlyaccordingtothesituation,theytakeontheelementofsurpriseandincreaseinstrategicvalue.Thus it is said that the surprise becomes conventional,while the conventionalbecomesasurprise.

General Tian Ji asked Master Sun, “What causes a militia trouble? Whatthwarts an opponent?What makes walls impregnable?What makes one missopportunities?Whatmakesonelosetheadvantageoftheterrain?Whatcausesdisaffection of people?May I ask if there are underlying principles governingthesethings?”Master Sun replied, “There are. Terrain is what causes militias trouble,

narrowpassagesarewhatthwartopponents.Thusitissaid,‘Amileofswampisacommander’snightmare;...tocrossover,theyleavetheirfullarmorbehind.’That’swhyIsaythatitistheterrainthattroublesanarmy,narrowpassagesthatthwartanopponent,barbedwirethatmakeswallsimpenetrable,....”

Intheoriginal,partsofSunBin’sreplyaremissing.Themaster’sexplanationsofhowopportunitiesaremissedandhowdisaffectionoccursarelost,butsimilarthemes appear elsewhere in classical strategic lore, being critical issues ofleadership.Generallyspeaking,opportunitiesare lost throughmisinformationor lackof

information, faulty evaluation of intelligence, lack of courage or initiative,indolence,preoccupation,orsimilarflawsinbasicmanagement.ThegreatcivilandmilitaryleaderZhugeLiangsaid,“Therearethreeavenuesofopportunity:events,trends,andconditions.Whenopportunitiesoccurthrougheventsbutyouare unable to respond, you are not smart.When opportunities become activethrough a trend and yet you cannot make plans, you are not wise. Whenopportunitiesemergethroughconditionsbutyoucannotactonthem,youarenotbold.”Healsosaid,“Ofallavenuesofseeingopportunity,noneisgreaterthanthe unexpected.” Disaffection arises from arbitrariness and unfairness,particularlyinmattersofrewardsandpunishments,privilegesandopportunities.Citingancienttradition,ZhugeLiangwroteinhisadviceforcommanders,“Donotturnfromtheloyalandtrustworthybecauseoftheartificesoftheskilledbuttreacherous.Do not sit down before your soldiers sit down, do not eat beforeyoursoldierseat.Bearthesamecoldandheatasyoursoldiersdo;sharetheirtoilaswellas theirease.Experiencesweetnessandbitterness justasyour soldiersdo;takethesamerisksthattheydo.Thenyoursoldierswillexertthemselvesto

theutmost,anditwillbepossibletodestroyenemies.”

TianJiasked,“Onceamovingbattle linehasbeenestablished,howdoesonegetthewarriorstoobeyorderswithoutfailwhengoingintoaction?”MasterSunsaid,“Bestrict,andindicatehowtheycanprofitthereby.”

The effort inspired by commonality of purpose is by nature greater, moregenuine,andmorereliablethantheeffort inspiredbyauthoritariandemandsorfixed wages alone. This point is underscored in the following question andanswer.

TianJiasked,“Arerewardsandpunishmentscriticaltowarriorship?”MasterSunsaid,“No.Rewardsaremeansofencouragingthetroops,tomake

the fighters mindless of death. Punishments are means of correcting disorder,makingthepeoplerespectauthority.Thesecanenhancetheoddsofwinning,buttheyarenotwhatismostcrucial.”

Thereareinherentlimitstorewardsandpunishments.Excessinpresentationofrewards can be ruinous because of material cost, and by the creation ofsecondarycompetition.Excessinpunishmentscanberuinousbecauseofcostinpersonnel,andbythecreationofanatmosphereoffearandsuspicion.

Tian Ji asked, “Are planning, momentum, strategy, and deception critical towarriorship?”MasterSunanswered,“No.Planningisameansofgatheringlargenumbers

of people.Momentum is used to ensure that soldierswill fight. Strategy is themeans of catching opponents off guard. Deception is a means of thwartingopposition.Thesecanenhancetheoddsofwinning,buttheyarenotwhatismostcrucial.”

Aninspiringplancanmagnetizeattentionandgalvanizeefforts,butthiscannotguaranteepositiveenvironmentalconditions.Momentumcanjoinamultitudeofsmaller energies into a stream of major force, but this cannot guarantee theaccuracy of aim and direction needed to overcome an intractable obstacle.Strategy can enable one to outwit adversaries when it works, but that cannotprevent them from regrouping and counterattacking. Deception may throwopponents off your trail or off their guard, but that does not guarantee aneffectiveoffensetoputanendtotheconflict.Allofthesethingsmayhavetheirplace in tacticalaction, inshort,butnooneof themissufficient tobe in itself

quintessentialtovictory.

Flushed with anger, Tian Ji retorted, “These six things are employed by allexperts, and yet you, Maestro, say they are not crucial. If so, then what iscrucial?”MasterSunreplied,“Sizinguptheopposition,figuringoutthedangerzones,

makingsuretosurveytheterrain,...areguidingprinciplesforcommanders.Tomakesureyouattackwherethereisnodefenseiswhatiscrucialtowarriorship....”

PartofSunBin’sreplyisalsomissinghere,buttheoverallsenseofthepassageemphasizes preparedness and surprise. Both of these factors are stressedthroughoutclassicalstrategicliterature.

TianJiasked,“Isthereaprincipleaccordingtowhichadeployedarmyshouldnotengageincombat?”Master Sun answered, “Yes. When you occupy a narrow strait and have

furtherincreaseddefensivefortificationofthisfastness,bequiet,beonthealert,anddonotmove.Letnothingseduceyou,letnothingangeryou.”

Whenyouareinasecureposition,ifyourisetoanenemy’sbaitandletyourselfbedrawnout throughgreedor rage, thenyougiveupyour security to exposeyourselftoindefiniterisks.

TianJiaskedMasterSun,“Isthereaprincipleaccordingtowhichoneshouldnotfailtoengageincombateveniftheoppositionisnumerousandpowerful?”Master Sun said, “Yes. Fortify your ramparts to enhance determination,

solidify group cohesion with strict uprightness. Evade them to make themhaughty,lurethemtotirethem,attackwheretheyareunprepared,actwhentheyleastexpectit,andmakesureyoucankeepthisup.”

Evading a powerful enemy to give the impression of weakness or lack ofconfidenceisatactictoinducearrogance,complacency,andover-confidenceinordertoweakentheenemy’stensionandattention.Luringtheenemyonfruitlesschasesisatactictoweardowntheenemy’sstaminaandpatience.Actingoutsideof expectation and strikingwhere there is nodefense aregeneral principlesofstrategy,buttheyareparticularlyrecommendedincaseswherethereissomuchdifferenceinrelativestrengththatdirectconfrontationisunfeasible.

TianJiaskedMasterSun,“WhatistheAwlFormationfor?WhatistheGoose

Formation for? What are elite troops for? What is rapid-fire shooting withpowerful bows for? What is a whirlwind battle line for? What are commonsoldiersfor?”MasterSun replied,“TheAwlFoundation is forpiercing tightdefensesand

breakingedges.TheGooseFormationisforsnipingonflanksandrespondingtochanges. . . . Elite troops are for crashing through battle lines to capturecommanders.Rapid-fireshootingwithstrongbowsisforeaseofbattleandtheability toholdout fora long time.Awhirlwindbattle line is for . . .Commonsoldiersareforsharingtheworktobringaboutvictory.”

The Awl Formation may be thought of as an intense, acute concentration ofenergy, especially adapted to breaking through obstacles and breaking downresistance. The Goose Formation may be envisioned as still having aconcentratedfocus,butalsomaintainingabroaderperipheralconsciousnessandcapacity; the expanded scope of its breadth of action is particularly useful forpickingoffopponents fromtheside,while thecombinationofsharplyfocusedandevenlydistributedconcentrationisespeciallysuitableforeffectiveadaptivityinaction.The elite vanguard, supporting artillery, and common soldiers may be

translated into civil terms as research, development, and production.Researchmaybe likened toanelitevanguard,whichmustbreak through thebarriersofexistingconventiontoseizethepotentialoftheunknown.Developmentsupportsresearch by pragmatic follow-up, through which the potential advantagesbroughttolightbyresearchcanbetestedandprovedthroughtransformationintoconcretepracticalities, so that researchcontinuesbecauseofdemonstrationsofitsutilityindevelopmentofwhatisuseful.Productionrationallyfollowsproofofutility,enablingthebenefitstobeactualizedonapublicscale.

MasterSunadded,“Enlightenedrulersandknowledgeablecommandersdonotexpectsuccessbycommonsoldiersalone.”

In both martial and productive endeavors, success is obtained through thecooperation of people of different skills, talents, and capacities. When thepotentialsinherentinthesedifferentcapacitiesareeachactivatedanddeployedinsuchawayastobringabouttheirmaximumcollectiveeffect,thentheymaybesaidtobecooperating.Cooperationisnotsimplyamatterofeveryonedoingthesamethingregardlessoftheirindividualcapacities.To extend this remark of Master Sun to the previous simile of research,

development, and production, it may be observed in modern history that

economiesbasedonproductionwithoutresearchanddevelopmenthavebeenorbecome more dependent and more vulnerable than those that have combinedresearch,development,andproductionwithinthemselves.It may be, of course, that all economies have, somewhere within them, all

three of these elements in some measure. The fact is, however, that in themoderncurrency/credit-basedglobaleconomy,researchanddevelopmentcanbeand have been both forced to and allowed to becomemore vestigial inmanyeconomiesatvarioustimesthanisreallyhealthy—eitherforthelocaleconomyinquestionor,inthelongrun,fortheglobaleconomyitself.

These observations include all tiers of an economy. Ongoing research and

development are as important in relation to production in such apparentlydiversedomainsasanimalhusbandry,agriculture,andtheservicesectorastheyareinscience,technology,andmanufacturingindustries.

WhenMasterSunemergedfromtheseinterviews,hisdisciplesaskedhimaboutthequestionsofKingWeiandhisgeneral,TianJi.MasterSunsaid,“KingWeiaskedaboutninematters,TianJiaboutseven.Theyareclose toknowledgeofwarriorship,buttheyhavenotyetreachedtheWay.“I have heard that thosewhoare always trustworthy as amatter of course

will flourish, and those who act justly . . . Those who use arms withoutpreparation will be wounded, while armed desperadoes will die. The thirdgenerationofQiisaworry!”

Master Sun Bin’s fears for Qi were in fact borne out by history in threegenerations.AlthoughQihadbecomeoneofthemostpowerfulofstatesintheaftermathof thebreakupof theoldZhoudynasty federation, eventually it fellthrough intrigueandpoor judgment.Five smaller states applied toQi forhelpagainstthedepredationsoftherapaciousstateofQin(Ch’in),whicheventuallywould take over all of ancient China and establish the first empire. As ithappened,oneof thechiefadvisorsof thereigningkingofQisoldout toQin,acceptingbriberytoadvocatetheQincauseattheQicourt.SidingwithQinontheadviceofthistraitor,Qiwasbetrayedandannexedbyitssupposedally.ThemightyQinarmiesthenoverthrewthefivesmallerstateswithease.Itmayseem like soundstrategy, ifnot soundmorality, tohelp thepowerful

againsttheweak;andthismayhavebeenareasonforthekingofQitoacceptandpursuewhatturnedouttobearuinoustacticrecommendedbyatraitor.NotonlydidthekingofQiviolatethetraditionalTaoistmoralityofwarfareteaching

that the weak should be protected against the strong; from a purely strategicpoint of view, he also overlooked the tactical potential latent in the verydesperationofthefivesmallerstatesappealingforassistanceagainstapowerfulcommonenemy.

[4]

TianJiAsksaboutRamparts

[*Tian Ji asked SunBin, “Would it be effective ifmy troops in the field keepstrengtheningtheirbarricades?”MasterSunreplied,“This is thequestionofanenlightenedcommander,one

whichpeopleoverlookanddonotstress.Itisalsoonedetestedbyopponents.”

Itisonethingtoplaceataskforceinthefieldandexpectittogetthejobdone;itis another to see to the ongoing development and adaptation of this force toemergenciesandchangingconditions.

TianJisaid,“CanIhearaboutit?”Master Sun answered, “Yes. This is used to respond to sudden changes, or

wheninconfined,closed-offdeadlygrounds.ThisishowIcapturedPangJuanandPrinceShen.”

It is strategically necessary to provide for the ability to handle unforeseendevelopments, unpredicted shifts in the action, and unexpected impasses. Thecapacity to strengthen defenses under such adverse conditions is essential tomountaneffectiveoffense.

TianJi said,“Fine,but thoseeventsarealreadypast,andIhavenotseen theformationsinvolved.”]MasterSunsaid,“Barbedwirecanbeused toserve the functionofamoat,

wagonscanbeused to serveasabarricade.Shields canbeused to serve thefunctionoframpartblinds.Longweaponscomenext,asameansofhelpingoutindanger.Smallspearsarenext, tobackup the longweapons.Shortweaponsarenext, to inhibit theenemy’s returnand strikehimwhenhe flags.Bowsarenext,toserveinplaceofcatapults.Thecenterhasnooneinit,soitisfilledwith...Whenthesoldiersareset,therulesarefulfilled.“Thecodesays,‘Placethebowsafterthebarbedwire,thenshootasisproper.

Atoptheramparts,bowsandspearsarehalfandhalf.’”

Abasic principle of practical adaptation is to employwhatever is available athandtoaccomplish the task.This includes theartofsubstitutingwhatonehasfor what one lacks, and the ability to organize resources in such away as tomaximizetheeffectsobtainedfromtheircombinationandcooperation.

“Arulesays,‘Actafterhavingseenwhatspiessentoutcomebackandsay...Keepwatchersatintervalswheretheycanbeseen.Onhighground,havethemarrayedrectangularly;onlowground,havethemarrangedcircularly.Atnight,letthemsignalwithdrums;duringtheday,letthemsignalwithflags.’”

Self-knowledge and knowledge of the opposition are considered critical tosuccessfulprosecutionoftheartofwar.Themaininfrastructuresconnectedwiththese tasks are a system of external intelligence gathering and a system ofinternalcommunications.

*Bracketsenclosereconstructions.

[5]

EliteTroops

MasterSunsaid,“Thevictoryofamilitialiesinitselitecorps,itscourageliesinorder,itsskillliesinconfigurationandmomentum,itsadvantageliesintrust,itseffectivenessliesinitsguidance,itsrichnessliesinquickreturn,itsstrengthliesingivingthepeoplerest,itsinjuryliesinrepeatedbattle.”

Theelitecorpsisthevanguardthatbreaksthroughorsmashesdowntheedgeofanenemy’slineofattackordefense,thuscreatingalossofmomentumoragapofvulnerability.Courage is said to be a matter of order in that an orderly formation or

organization unites the efforts of people having diverse physical andpsychological capabilities, thereby evening out individual disparities; the boldand mettlesome bolster and encourage the less robust, while the presence ofweakerandmorecautiouselementsrestrainstheoverlyrambunctious.Skillinconfigurationandmomentumisamatteroforganizingpeopleinsuch

a way that they operate as one unit, the force of which can then be directedcoherentlytoachieveanintensefocusofpowerandimpact.Advantage and effectiveness lie in trust and guidance because trust in

leadership unifies the people and empowers the leadership.Without guidance,trustisblind;withouttrust,guidanceispowerless.Richness lies in quick return because this is the way to avoid excess

expendituresofconstructiveenergyandmaterialresources.Strengthliesinrestbecausethisisthewaytoavoiduselesswasteandrecoverfromexertion.Injurylies in repeated battle because continued expenditure of energy and materialresources inevitablywearsdownthestrengthofa force,evenawinningforce,ultimatelymakingitvulnerabletolossofcapacitytoavoid,resist,orwithstandantagonisticfactors.

MasterSunsaid,“Actingwithintegrityisarichresourceforwarriors.Trustisadistinguishedrewardforwarriors.Thosewhodespiseviolencearewarriors fittoworkforkings.Thosewhowinmanycohortsovercome...”

Actingwithintegrityiswhatwinsthetrustofleaders,commanders,colleagues,andsubordinates,aswellas thepeopleat large.Trustsolidifiesandempowersworking relationships, enabling the individual to operate at full personalpotential,withtheeffectivecooperationofothers.Warriors who despise violence are fit to work for kings in two important

senses. One of the most ancient principles of the art of war is that the bestvictory iswonwith the leastviolence; thosewhodespiseviolenceandyetarewarriorsarethosewhoaremostefficientattheirwork.Warriorswhoarefondofviolence, furthermore,haveaprivatemotivationandcannotbe trusted to fightforapubliccause;itisthosewhodespiseviolencewhocanonlybemovedtogointo battle under conditions of objective necessity. The Tao Te Ching says,“Thosewhoenjoykillingcannotgettheirwilloftheworld.”Also,“Whenyouwinawar,youcelebratebymourning.”

MasterSunsaid,“Thereare fiveconditions thatalways lead tovictory.Thosewho have authorized command over a unified power structure are victorious.Those who know the Way are victorious. Those who win many cohorts arevictorious.Thosewhosecloseassociatesare inharmonyarevictorious.Thosewhotakethemeasureofenemiesandsizeupdifficultiesarevictorious.”

Aunifiedpowerstructurecanbeexpectedtobemoreeffectivethanonethatisinternallyrupturedorfragmented.TheWay,accordingtoSunBin’spredecessorSunWu,means“inducing thepeople tohave thesameaimas the leadership,”thus achieving internal unity of aspiration as well as external unity oforganization.Winningsupportisnaturallyconducivetosuccess,butdisharmonyandlackof

integrity within an inner circle of leadership will undermine effectiveness.Knowledge of conditions, of adversaries as well as of critical environmentalcircumstances,isessentialtoeffectiveemploymentofcapacitiesandresources.

MasterSunsaid,“Therearefivethingsthatalwaysleadtofailure.Inhibitingthecommanderleadstofailure.NotknowingtheWayleadstofailure.Disobediencetothecommanderleadstofailure.Notusingsecretagentsleadstofailure.Notwinningmanycohortsleadstofailure.”

The skills of a directorate cannot materialize in action without an effectiveorganizational structure and chain of command responsive to its initiatives.Inability to achieve this degree of order, by the same token, not only thwartsleadership but is also a failure of the directorate itself. Poor leaders and

recalcitrantfollowersearneachother’smistrust,perhapsbecausetheircommoncause does not really motivate them, or because their private interests areoriginallytoostrongandtoodisparatetoachieveunityofpurposeandeffort.Theuseofsecretagentsisforthepurposeofcollectingvitalinformationand

the purpose of disseminating crucial misinformation. Secrecy is involved ingathering information because knowledge is power and therefore guarded;secrecy is involved in spreading misinformation to maintain the effect ofillusion.

Master Sun said, “Victory lies in consummation of . . . , a clear system ofrewards, selecting elite troops, and taking advantage of enemies. . . . This iscalledthesecurityofagreatmilitary.”

A clear and reliable system of rewards is established to create a unifiedmotivationalstructurecapableofeffectivelydirectingtheattentionandeffortofpersonnel.Elitetroops,whosefunctionandimportanceasvanguardforcesweredefined

earlier, need to be chosen expertly, based on actual capacity, training, andaccomplishment.The realpointof takingadvantageof enemies is towinby superior tactical

skillratherthanbyoverwhelmingviolenceorforce.Itisbasedinthefirstplace,ofcourse,onthepremisethatthesituationhasalreadyreachedthepointwhereenmityexistsandconflictcannolongerbeavoidedbyanymeans.

MasterSunsaid,“Thereisnocommandwithoutleadership.“[Therearethreeelementsof]order:Firstistrust,secondisloyalty,thirdis

willingness.Whereinisloyalty?Loyaltytothegovernment.Whereinistrust?Inreliablerewards.Whereiniswillingness?Willingnesstogetridofthebad.“Without loyalty to the government, one may not presume to employ its

military.Butforreliabilityinrewards,thepeasantswillnotbevirtuous.Butforthewillingnesstogetridofthebad,thepeasantswillnotberespectful.”

Amilitia,oraspecialtaskforceofanykind,mayaccomplishsomethingwithitsresources and skills, but if the effect is not in harmony with the legitimateunderlyingaimsofthenationortheorganization—whichincludethepoliciesofthe rulership or directorate as well as the aspirations of the citizens or theworkers—it will be impossible to maintain lasting success and build uponsuccessiveachievements.

[6]

TimingCombat

MasterSunsaid,“Betweenskyandearth,nothingisasnobleashumanity....The right seasonal timing, the advantages of the terrain, harmony amongpersonnel—ifthesethreethingsarenotgained,thereiscalamityeveninvictory.Thereforeitisbettertogivebeforefighting,onlydoingbattlewhenthereisnochoice.”

Evenvictoryiscalamitouswithouttherightseasonaltiming,theadvantagesofthe terrain, and harmony among personnel, because under these conditionsvictorywillhavebeenwonatthecostoflossofproductivelabor,environmentaldestruction,andexcessivelyhighcasualtyrates.TheTaoistclassicTaoTeChingsays,“Ifonewereboldbuthadnomercy,ifonewerefar-rangingbutnotfrugal,ifonewentaheadwithoutdeference,onewoulddie.”Theconclusionthatitis“bettertogivebeforefighting,onlydoingbattlewhen

thereisnochoice”isalsoreflectedintheTaoTeChing,whichclaimsthatthisisancient philosophy: “There are sayings on the use of arms: ‘Let us not beaggressors,butdefend.’‘Letusnotadvanceaninch,butretreatafoot.’”

“Thuswhenyouhavefoughtforthetranquilityofthetime,thenyoudonotworkthemassesanymore.Thosewhodobattlewronglyorunmethodicallygainsmallvictoriesbyattrition.”

Thespecialeffectsandallocationsneededtomeetemergenciesbecomeruinousif continued compulsively after the job has been one.TheTaoTeChing says,“Calculated sharpness cannot be kept for long. . . . When one’s work isaccomplishedhonorably,toretireisthenaturalway.”Thevictoriesoftheunjustandunmethodicalareattainedbyattritionbecause

theyaregainedbyfightingwhenhonestand innocentpeopleneed tobeabouttheirbusiness.

MasterSunsaid,“Thosewhowinsixoutof tenbattlesgoby thestars.Thosewhowinsevenoutoftenbattlesgobythesun.Thosewhowineightoftenbattles

go by the moon. . . . Those who win ten out of ten battles have skilledcommandersyetgiverisetocalamity....”

Thosewhowin all the battles can give rise to calamity by draining resourcesthroughcontinuedprosecutionofwarfare;bycreatinganaggressivemomentum,anappetite forconquest;andby fallingprey tocomplacencyandcarelessness.Thereisanancientsayingthatrepeatedvictoryinrepeatedwarfareproducesahaughty leadership commanding an exhausted populace, eventually therebyruininganation.

“...Therearefivethingsthatmakeforfailure;withevenoneofthesefive,youwon’t win. Thus among ways of war, there are cases where many people arekilledbut the commandersand troopsarenot captured, therearecaseswherecommandersandtroopsarecapturedbuttheirbasecampisnottaken,therearecaseswhereabaseistakenbutthegeneralisnotcaptured,andtherearecaseswherethearmyisoverthrownandthegeneralkilled.So,ifyoufindtheWay,noonecansurviveagainstyou.”

Theancient text isbroken,so it isnotclearwhat is intendedherebythe“fivethings that make for failure.” There appears later in the text, however, anextensivelistoffailuresincommanders.Thesenseofthetextthatdoesremainisthattherearemanygradesofvictory

anddefeat,manyshadesofgray.Partoftheartofwarisunderstandinghowfinaltheoutcomeofaparticulardefeatorvictoryis,seeinghowgainsmightbelostandhowlossesmightberegained,usingthisknowledgetoplanforsecurityorrecovery.Onlywithcomprehensiveperspectiveandfluidlyadaptablestrategyisit possible todealunfazedwith all sorts of contingencies, even those seemingmostdesperate.

[7]

EightBattleFormations

Master Sun said, “One who leads a militia with inadequate intelligence isconceited.Onewholeadsamilitiawithinadequatecouragehasaninflatedego.Onewho leads amilitia without knowing theWay and does battle repeatedlywithoutbeingsatisfiedissurvivingonluck.”

Unlessonehasadequateinformationandalsotheintellectualabilitytoprocessitusefully,onecannotwillfullyexercisecommandwithoutaninflatedopinionofone’s abilities; thus defect is added to lack, providing for a perilous situation.One who takes on leadership in spite of such dangers is foolhardy, notcourageous;andonewhotakesonleadershipinpsychologicalcompensationforinnerlackoffortitudeissupremelyegotistical,endangeringothersforpersonalpride.Onewho takeson leadershipwithnothingbutwitlessambitionmaygetsomewherebydintofperseverance,butnogainattainedinthismannercanbestabilizedsafelyonapermanentandpeacefulbasis.

“Bringing security to a large country, expanding a large dominion, andsafeguardingalargepopulacecanonlybedonebyknowingtheWay.Knowingthe Way means knowing the pattern of the climate and the lay of the land,winning the hearts of the people, knowing the conditions of enemies, knowinghow to set up the eight battle formations, engaging in combat onlywhen it isobvious you will win, otherwise keeping your peace; this is the kind ofcommanderappointedbyasuccessfulruler.”

Thesecretofthemasterwarriorisknowingwhentofight, justasthesecretofthe artist is knowing when to perform. Knowledge of technical matters andmethods is fundamental, but not sufficient to guarantee success; in any art orscience of performance and action, direct perception of the potential of themomentiscrucialtoexecutionofamasterstroke.

MasterSunsaid,“Theuseofeightbattleformationsincombatisbasedontheadvantages of the terrain, using whichever of the eight formations is most

suitable.Deployabattle formationin threeparts,eachwithavanguardandabackup,eachawaitingorderstoact,actingonlyonorders.Useonetofight,twotodefend;useonetoinvade,twotorally.“Whenanopponent isweakand confused, send your elite troops in first to

takeadvantageofthis.Whenanopponentisstrongandorderly,sendyourlessertroopsinfirsttolurethem.“Whenchariotsandcavalryareinvolved,dividethemintothreegroups;one

to the left, one to the right, and one in the back. On even ground, use morechariots; in narrow gorges, use more cavalry. On perilous ground, use morearchers.“Whetherthegroundisruggedoreasy,itisimperativetoknowwhatground

isviableandwhatgroundisdeadly;occupytheviableandattackthedeadly.”

[8]

TerrainandSecurity

Master Sun said, “Generally speaking, a course over terrain through sunnygroundiscalled‘outside,’whileonethroughshadygroundiscalled‘inside.’”

Inmetaphorical terms, the “outside” is the obvious, the evident, the open andaboveboard; the “inside” is the subtle, the concealed, the ulterior orunderhanded.The“outside”inthissensemayalsorefertocommonconsensus,the“inside”toprivateorcovertpower.Thepointofdefiningthesedistinctionsastheyapplytoagivensituationistomatchthenatureofafeasibleapproachtofitthecharacterofanaccessiblerouteintheprocessofpursuingchosenaims.

“Thestraightanddirectiscalled‘rope,’whilethecrookedandtortuousiscalled‘string.’ When properly organized according to the character of the route, abattle formation does not get confused. Those on a straightway thrive, whilethoseonatortuouscoursehalfdie.”

It may be wondered why anyone would take a tortuous course with thisunderstanding. The answer, aside from real or feigned incompetence, maysimplybelackofchoice,oneoftheprimarymotivationsofwarriorsfollowingthetraditionofTheArtofWar.This aphorism applies to the moral dimension of behavior as well as the

strategic aspect. Truth or honesty may seem inconvenient under certaincircumstances, but the compensation is freedom from confusion andconservation of energy. The whole process of creating and maintaining falseappearances to conceal and foster ulteriormotives requires somuch time andenergy for its own operation that this preoccupation alone can become amotivation in itself that is powerful enough, however secondary itmay be, toturnintoacompulsivemodeofbehavior.

“In general, when it comes to the matter of a battle ground, the sun is theessentialelement.”

Onanactualbattlefield,themostadvantageouspositiontooccupyinrelationtothesunistohaveitatyourbackandinyouropponent’seyes.Inmetaphoricalterms,asthesourceof light thatmakesitpossibletomaneuver, thesunstandsforintelligence.Strategically,intelligencemeansreconnaissanceandinformationaswellasthespecificmeansandmethodsofgathering,processing,andapplyingknowledge.Thequestion thatneeds tobeconsidered first iswhat sources andtechniquesofintelligencearepracticalundergivenconditions.

“Windmaycomefromeightdirections,andmustnotbeforgotten.”

Dependingonitsdirectioninrelationtothedirectionoftacticalmaneuversonabattlefield, wind affects vision, hearing, coordination, and stamina.Symbolically, wind is traditionally used to represent external influences thataffect statesofmind.The“eightwinds”aregainand loss, censureandpraise,honoranddisgrace,painandpleasure.Insofaraspsychologicalstatesinfluencepersonal interaction and professional performance, the action of the “eightwinds”must be considered in the course of organizing andmanaging a groupwork situation or developing and implementing an operational strategy of anykind.

“Crossingwater,headingupanincline,orgoingagainstthecurrentofariver,campingondeadlyground,orfacingwoods,areequallyworthyofnotebecausethesearenotconducivetovictory.”

Crossingwater is perilous because the process of the passage creates inherentvulnerability to attack, difficulty of defense, and inhibition of movement. Amaneuver is not conducive to victory if it puts one even temporarily in thepositionofa“sittingduck”toadversaries,ifitrequiresanexcessiveexpenditureof effort and attention, or if it involves placing oneself in the midst ofcompromisingobstaclesunderpressure,orevenunderfire.By heading up an incline, going the hard way, not only do you lose the

advantages ofmomentum and gravity formovement or offense, you also turntheseforcesagainstyourowndefensiveinterests.Goingagainstthecurrentnotonlysapsyourstrength,italsoputsyoudirectly

inthefiringlineofwhatevercomesdownthecurrentfromupstream,bychanceor by hostile design.Going against the current of affairs not only drains yourenergy,itplacesanyresultsofeffortbeyondthepaleofcontemporaryrelevance.Campingondeadlygroundmeansoccupyinganindefensibleandinescapable

position,sittinginanopentrap,waitingforsomeonetoshutit.Facingwoodsis

situating yourself in a milieu where malefactors and interlopers can readilyconcealthemselvesinthesurroundings.

“Mountains stretching southward are viable mountains, mountains stretchingeastwardaredeadlymountains.Water flowingeastward is viablewater,waterflowingnorthwardisdeadlywater.Ifitdoesnotflow,itisstagnantwater.“The order of superiority of five terrains is as follows: Mountains are

superiortohighhills,highhillsaresuperiortolowhills,lowhillsaresuperiortorollingground,rollinggroundissuperiortowoodedflatlands.“The five outstanding kinds of vegetation are thickets, brambles, hedges,

reeds,andsedges.“Theorderofsuperiorityoffivekindsofearthisasfollows:Greenovercomes

yellow, yellow overcomes black, black overcomes red, red overcomes white,whiteovercomesgreen.“The five deadly terrains are: natural wells, natural bowls, natural

entanglements, natural clefts, and natural pitfalls. These five graveyards aredeadlyground,sodonotstaythere.“Donotgodownhillinspring,donotgouphillinautumn.Themainbodyof

thearmyandthebattleformationsshouldnotbearrayedtotheforwardright;theyshouldcircletotheright,nottheleft.”

The advantage or disadvantage of a particular element or configuration of asituation depends not only on its own specific characteristics, but also on itsinterrelationshipwithother factorsand itsplace in the totalcontext.Factors toexamine inmakingstrategicassessments includeelementsofprotectionversusvulnerability, concealment versus exposure, freedom of movement versusimpedimentandrestriction,clarityofperspectiveandvisionversusobstructionand partiality, fertility or supportiveness versus aridity or hostility. When themeasuresofthesevariousfactorsandtheirinterplayhavebeenassessed,thenitispossible todevelopamoreobjectivepictureof thepotential and limitationsinherentinagivensituation.

[9]

ConfigurationsofForceandStrategicPlanning

Master Sun said, “Fangs and horns, claws and spurs, harmonizing whenpleased, fightingwhenangry—theseare in thecourseofnatureandcannotbestopped. Therefore those who have no natural defenses plan strategically forthemselves;thisisthebusinessofwiseleaders.“The Yellow Emperor invented the sword, symbolizing it by the battle line.

Hou Yi invented the bow, symbolizing it by a rush of force. King Yu inventedboatsandchariots,symbolizingthesebyadaptivechange.KingTangandKingWuinventedspearsandhalberds,symbolizingstandardsignals.Thesefourarefunctionsofweaponry.”

While traditionalTaoistmilitary sciencecondemnsmilitarismasboth immoraland inefficient, nevertheless, defensive, protective, peacekeeping, and punitivecapabilitiesareconsideredrationalandnatural.SunBinfollowstraditionhereinnamingthemartialactionsandcontributionsofavarietyofancientsagekingsandcultureheroestojustifythejudicioususeofarmsforpacificationandorder.

“Inwhatsenseisaswordabattleline?Youmaywearaswordalldaywithoutnecessarilyusingit;hencethesaying,‘Setoutabattleline,butwithoutfighting.’Consider a sword as a battle line: If the sword has no sharp point, even thebravestwarriorwillnotdare...;ifabattlelinehasnoelitevanguard,anyonewho dares lead it forward with exceptional courage is extremely ignorant ofmilitary science. If a sword has no handle, even a skilled warrior cannot goahead...;ifabattlelinehasnobackup,anyonewhodarestoleadanadvancewithoutbeingaskilledwarriorisignorantofmilitaryaffairs.”

Aswordmusthaveapoint,acuttingedge,ahandle,andaridge.Ataskforcemusthavedirection,skills,maneuverability,andbackbone.Directionmeanstherelationship between objective aims and active leadership. Skills need to bedeployedselectively,accordingtoconditions,andappliedtopreciseobjectives.In order to effect accurate and useful direction of skills, a mechanism of

command and control is necessary. In order to carry out directions, anorganization needs an adequate degree of inner cohesiveness, such as can beachievedbyacommonlysharedmoralbackbone.Inthesesenses,aswordcanbeasymbolorametaphorforabattleline,which

can in turn represent a task force of any kind. To wear a sword withoutnecessarilyusingitmeanstobepreparedbutnotanxious;theforceisnotthereforitsownsake,butforaspecificpurpose.Tooperatetheforcewhenitisnotnecessary is a wasteful mistake in itself, and can also evoke undesirablereactionsfromthepolitical,social,economic,andnaturalenvironments.

“Thuswhenyouhaveavanguardandabackupwithunshakable trust ineachother,opponentswillflee.Ifyouhaveneithervanguardnorbackup,....”

Thevanguardisneededtomaketheinitialcracksinthefacadeofaggressors;thebackup is needed to finish the job of breaking down and through the enemyfront. The key expression here is “with unshakable trust in each other.” Thisinnercohesionistheelementthatfortifiesagrouptothedegreethatitcanmakeopponents flee; oneof the critical elements of good leadership is evoking andstrengtheningmutualtrustandinternalharmonyamongmembersofthegroup.

“Inwhatsenseisthebowarushofforce?Shootingfrombetweenshoulderandarm, killing people a hundred paces away without their knowing where it iscomingfrom—thisiswhythebowissaidtobearushofforce.”

A rush of force may be envisioned as a force of movement initiated or“launched” within a relatively small compass that goes on to exert a wide-ranging effect by the force of that initial momentum. In this sense it may besymbolizedbythebowandarrow.

“Inwhatsenseareboatsandchariotsadaptivechanges?Whenhigh,....”

Boatsriseanddipwiththewavesandthetide,chariotstravelupanddownhillsand around curves. These symbolize adapting responsively to changes incircumstancesinthecourseofprogress.

“Inwhatsensearespearsandhalberdssignalstandards?...Signalstandardsaremostlyflagsbydayandmostlydrumsbynight,usedasmeansofdirectingthebattle.”

Spears and halberds are models for signal banners because of their frontline

position aswell as their length and consequent visibility. Sound is usedwhenvisual signals are ineffective.Metaphorically, vanguardweaponry representingsignal standards reflects the use of outstanding indicators—such as economicindices,technologicaldevelopments,orprogressivesociopoliticaladaptations—toevaluatethestateofanationorcommunity.

“Thesefourthingsarefunctionsofweaponry.Everybodyconsidersthemuseful,butnooneknowstherightwaytousethem.“Overall,therearefourmilitarysciences:battleformation,force,adaptation,

and direction. Thorough understanding of these four is ameans of destroyingpowerfulenemiesandcapturingfiercecommanders.”

Battle formation represents thedispositionanddeploymentof resources.Forcerepresentstheenergyandmomentumofanendeavororamovement.Adaptationrepresents the capacity to respond effectively to changes.Direction representstheaimandguidanceofenergyandeffort.

[10]

MilitaryConditions

MasterSunsaid,“Ifyouwanttoknowtheconditionsofamilitaryforce,archeryisanappropriatemodel.Thearrowsarethesoldiers,thebowisthecommander,andthearcheristheruler.”

The arrows are the power, the bow concentrates and releases themomentum,whilethearchertakesaim.

“Anarrowistippedwithmetalandfletchedwithfeatherssothatitwillbesharpandflystraight....Ifyouorganizesoldierssothattherearguardisheavywhilethefrontislight,theymaybeorderlywhenarrayedinbattleformation,buttheywillnotobeywhenorderedtochargetheenemy.Thisorganizationofsoldiersisnotinaccordwiththemodelofthearrow.”

Insufficient force in thevanguardmakes it impossible toopenupenoughof agapintheresistancetoallowatellingfollow-through.

“Thecommanderisthebow:ifthegripisnotrightwhenthebowisdrawn,therewill be an imbalance of strength andweakness, resulting in disharmony, suchthattheforceimpartedbythetwoendsofthebowwillbeunequal,andthusthearrowswillnothitthetargeteveniftheyareproperlyweightedandbalanced.Ifacommanderdoesnotharmonize . . .successfully, theywillstillnotovercometheenemy.”

Acommanderhastomotivateagroupofpeopleuniformlyenoughtogetthemtooperate in harmony. If some are highly enthusedwhile others are cynical andrecalcitrant, theenergyof thegroupcannotbe focusedaccuratelyand releasedeffectively.

“Ifthearrowsareproperlyweightedandbalanced,andthebowdrawstrueandsendsarrowswithuniformforce,yetifthearcherisnotright,hestillwon’thitthetarget.Ifthesoldiersarebalanced[andthecommanderiscompetent,ifthe

civilleadershipisawry,]theystillcannotovercomeenemies....”

Even the best resources, human and material, however superbly coordinated,cannot consummate a successfuloperation if theoverall aimof the total forceanditsmomentumareofftarget.

“Thusitissaid,‘Thewayamilitiaovercomesanopponentisnodifferentfromthewayanarcherhitsatarget.’Thisisthewayofwarfare.”

[11]

PracticingSelection

Master Sun said, “The guiding principle for mobilizing warriors and movingpeopleisthebalancescale.Thebalancescaleisthemeansofselectingthewiseandchoosingthegood.Yinandyangarethemeansofrallyingthemassesandmeeting opponents.When an accurate scale is restacked . . . as long as it isfaithful,itiscalledinexhaustible.”

Thebalancescale isused to represent leadership,becausea leadermustaboveall be able to weigh and measure, to assess and evaluate all human andenvironmentalfactorsrelevanttoanenterpriseoranundertaking.Theabilitytoselectappropriatepersonnelforaspecificjobisaparticularlyvaluableassetintheexerciseofleadership.Asfortheuseof“yinandyang”torallypeopleandfaceadversaries,thishas

awide rangeofmeanings,basedon thebroad spectrumof associationsofyinandyang.Inbasictermsrelevanttothisdiscussion,yinmayhavethemeaningofself-effacement,docility,orconformity,complementedbyyangasself-assertion,initiative,oractivity;theserefertoharmonizingwithallies(yin)andstrikingoutagainstenemies(yang).

“Whenarticulatingdirectionandestablishingastandardofmeasure,focusonlyonwhatisappropriate.”

If would seem to be a truism to say that focus should be only on what isappropriate,buttheideaofinexhaustibilityofanaccuratescalementionedinthetext above suggests that there is, as the Chinese say, an “eye” in the word“appropriate.”Themainideaisthatwhatisappropriatedependsonthesituationandcannotbedetermined inadogmaticorperemptory fashion.Thuswith thesuccessivearisingofnewsituationsandnewrealities,reexaminationofaimsandmeasures is necessary to ensure the maintenance of effective alignments ofeffortswithactualities.

“Privateandpublicwealthareone.Therearethosewhohavetoolittlelifeand

toomuchmoney,and thereare thosewhohave too littlemoneyand toomuchlife:onlyenlightenedrulersandsagesrecognizethem,andthuscankeepthemin place. When those who die are not bitter, those who are bereft are notresentful.”

Privateandpublicwealthareone from thepointofviewof the totalityof theeconomy; the manner in which wealth circulates back and forth between theprivate and public sectors defines the economy in certain ways, of whichenlightened leadership must be aware in order to understand the real andpotentialeffectsofprogramsandpolicies.Tohavetoolittle lifeandtoomuchmoneymeanstohavemorewealth than

canbeeffectivelyusedundertheseconditions;tohavetoolittlemoneyandtoomuch life means to have more energy or talent than can be constructivelyemployedundertheseconditions.Thewealthofasocietythatcanbalancethesetwoextremesdoesnotleakaway.Whenpeoplediewithoutbitternessandleavenoresentmentbehindthem,that

meanstheydidthebesttheycouldundertheconditionsinwhichtheylived.

“Whenthereisanabundanceofmoneyandgoods,thingsareeasy.Whenthingsareeasy, thepeopledonotattribute themerit to theirrulers. . . .Therefore toaccumulate wealth for the people is the means whereby you may accumulatewealthyourself;thisishowwarriorslast....”

ThiskeyideaofSunBinisbasedontraditionalphilosophy.Inhiscommentaryon the classic I Ching, or Book of Changes, the educator Confucius wrote,“Thoseabove secure theirhomesbykindness to thosebelow.”Also, “Leadersdistribute blessings to reach thosebelow them,while avoidingpresumptionofvirtue.”AccordingtothelaterTaoistMastersofHuainan,whocompiledagreatdealofancientphilosophicalandscientificlore,“Whenpeoplehavemorethanenough, they defer; when they have less than enough, they contend. Whenpeople defer, courtesy and justice are born; when they contend, violence anddisorderarise.”

[12]

KillingSoldiers

MasterSunsaid,“...Whenyouknowsoldiersaretrustworthy,don’tletothersalienatethem.Fightonlywhenyouaresuretowin,withoutlettinganyoneknow.Inbattle,don’tforgetyourflanks,don’t...”

Mostofthischapterismissingorcorrupt.Evenwhen people are known to be trustworthy, their loyalty should not be

takenforgranted.Interlopersmayattempttoalienatethem,andcomplacencyorarrogance on the part of leadership makes it easier for divisiveness andrecalcitrancetotakerootinthelowerechelons.Fightingonlywhensure towin isstandardwisdomin thephilosophyof the

artofwar transmittedbySunWuandSunBin.Thispolicyhelps toeliminateconflict management to the greatest possible degree. Even the Thirty-SixStrategies,fullasitisofdraconianmaneuvers,saysattheend,“Ofthethirty-sixstrategies,flightisbest.”Flanksshouldnotbeforgotten,becauseotherwiseyoumightbeoutflanked.In

general terms, this means that peripheral awareness should be deliberatelymaintained along with centrally focused awareness, so that the power of theessentialthrustofaneffortorundertakingisnotunderminedbylackorfailureofcoordinatedbackupandsupportmeasures.

[13]

ProlongingEnergy

MasterSunsaid,“Whenmassingtroopstoassemblearmedforces,thethingtodoisstimulateenergy.Whenbreakingcampandconsolidatingforces,thethingtodo iskeep thesoldiersorderlyandsharpen theirenergy.Whenonabordernearan enemy, the thing todo is intensify energy.When thedayof battlehasbeenset,thethingtodoisstabilizeenergy.Onthedayofbattle,thethingtodoisprolongenergy.“. . . , thus awing the soldiers of the armed forces, ismeans of stimulating

energy. The general commands . . . ,which command ismeans of sharpeningenergy.Thegeneralthen. . .wearssimpleclothingtoencouragethewarriors,asameansofintensifyingenergy.Thegeneralgivesanordercommandingeverysoldiertomusterthreedays’rations,andthepeopleinthehomesofthenationmake...;thisisameansofstabilizingenergy.Thegeneralsummonshisguardanddeclares,‘Foodanddrinkshouldnot...’Thusenergyisprolonged.”

Theprocessofstimulating,sharpening,intensifying,stabilizing,andprolongingenergyneeds tobe rationalizedso that itcanbe repeatedwhennecessary.Theoriginalmeaningof thewordenergyusedhere in the text includesmentalandphysical aspects of energy, and both mental and physical momentum areconsideredcritical to the successofanaction.The timingofeachstage in theprocess is crucial, so the key to effective leadership is to coordinate thepsychologicalandphysicalinspirationandreadinessofparticipantsinanactionwiththetimingofdevelopmentsintheunfoldingofactualevents.

[14]

OfficialPosts

MasterSunsaid,“Wheneveryousetouttroops,makebattleformationsefficient,andorganizearmedforces,whensettingupofficialpostsyoushoulddosoinamanner appropriate to the individual, indicate ranks by means of insignia,promote and demote to grade people, march in an orderly fashion to . . . ,organize soldiersbyhomeland, delegateauthority to thosewhoare leaders intheirownlocalities.Clarifyconfusionbysignalflagsandchariots,disseminateordersbymeansofgongsanddrums.”

Setting up official posts in a manner appropriate to the individual meansassigning people to duties and responsibilities matching their capacities andtalents.Ranks are indicated by insignia so that organizational order and chain of

commandcanbemadeclearinanimpersonalmanner.Personnelaregradedbypromotionanddemotion toadjust theirpositions to

their abilities and achievements, and to provide a system of rewards andpunishmentsfullyintegratedintothefunctionaloperationoftheorganization.Soldiers are organized by homeland for the sake of the inner cohesion of a

unit;authorityisdelegatedtolocalleaderswhoalreadyhavestandingintheeyesoftheirownpeople.

“Tokeepsoldiers in line,use themethodof following tracks.Campsare tobeguardedby the strongestmen.Overtakearmiesbymeansofa continuous lineformation;adjusttheformationtocontaindisorder.Positionyourarmyonhighground,useacloudlikeformationforarrowandmissilecombat.Toavoidbeingsurrounded,usea formation likeawindingriver.To takeoutavanguard,shutofftheroad;whenitisonthevergeofdefeat,circlearound.Whengoingtotherescue, put on pressure from outside. In a hectic battle, use mixed lines. Useheavyarmstofaceaconcentratedforce,uselightarmstofaceascatteredforce.Toattackasecuredposition,useamovingbattlement.”

Themethodoffollowingtracksmeansthateachsuccessiveindividualinalineof movement follows in the tracks of the preceding individual. In generalrepresentative terms, thismeans using available forces of internal cohesion tokeepagroupactionfocusedoncollectiveaims.Guarding camp does not offer the glamour, excitement, or opportunity for

exploit found on the front lines. Untutored thinking might expect the mostpowerfulormostheroicpersonneltobestrictlyelitevanguardmaterial,butthesecurity of the base of operations is essential if the action is to succeed. If acamp is poorly defended, those in the field can be cut off from behind andisolated;theywillhavenoresortindefeatandnobackupinvictory.Theconfigurationofanoperation,thedispositionofresourcesandpersonnel,

dependsontheaim,theterrainandenvironmentalconditions,andthesituationandconditionofadversaries.Thisiswhyitissaidthatasuccessfulforcehasnoconstantconfiguration.Highgroundispreferredbecauseitiseasiertocommandaviewoftheterrain,

and because it puts attacking opponents at a gravitational disadvantage andmakes itpossible to launchanassaultwithextramomentum.The same thingscouldalsobesaidofmoralhighground,providedthepositionisauthenticandeffective,notamereposture.Adiffusecloudlikeformationisusedforarrowandmissileattackbecauseitis

therebypossibletorainprojectilesoverawideareawhileminimizingcasualtiesunderreturnfirebyspreadingoutratherthanclustering.A formation like a winding river is used to avoid being surrounded, by

repeatedly outflanking adversaries and thereby thwarting attempts to encircleyourforce.Avanguardisstoppedbyblockingoffitsrouteofadvanceandthencircling

aroundtoisolateitandattackfrombehind.Whengoing to therescue,pressure isputonfromoutside inorder todivert

the adversary’s attention and energy away from the beleaguered party, thusmakingiteasiertosecureescapefromadifficultsituation.Usingmixedlinesinahecticbattlemeansarrayingforcessothattheyarenot

restrictedbytheirformationbutareabletomoveinanydirection,thusbeingina position to give and receive support fromall sides in themidst of a chaoticfray.Heavyarmsareusedagainstaconcentratedforcebecauseofitsdensity,and

because of the kind of target it affords; intensely focused assault with heavyarmsmaximizesthepowerandefficacyofanattack.Lightarmsareusedagainsta scattered force for the sake of the mobility needed to oppose a relativelydiffusetarget.

Amovingbattle line isusedagainsta securedposition to takeadvantageofthe limitations imposed on the maneuverability of an occupying force by therequirementsofsecurityanddefense.

“Use square formations on level ground, use pointed formationswhen settingoutbattlelinesfacinghigherground.“Useroundformationsonruggedground.Useyourforcesstrategicallywith

alternatingaggressivenessandwithdrawal.Againstanorderlybattleline,useasquareformationwithwings;inamorespread-outbattle,closeinlikeabird’sbillshutting.Whentrappedinruggedterritory,openupawayoutbyoutcirclingtheenemy;ongrassandsand,youhave tocut throughout in theopen.Whenyouhavewoninwarandyetstillmaintain troops in the field, it is tokeepthenationonthealert.”

Asquareformationissuitedtolevelgroundbecauseitiseasytosetoutatightbattlefrontwithamatchingbackupand flankspoised toeithercircleor spreadout.Metaphorically speaking, on a level field of action—when conditions arefair, being functionally similar or equivalent on all sides—it is appropriate toproceedina“square”orconventionalmanner.Apointedformation isusedwhenfacinghighergroundbecauseof theneed

forasharpedgetoresistandbreakthroughthemomentumofadownhillcharge.An overwhelming force should not be met with direct resistance, unless theresistancecanbefocusedsosharplyandaimedsoadroitlythatitdoesnotabsorbthefullforcebutrathersplitsitapart.Aroundformationisusedinruggedterritorybecauseinacirclethepositions

in the front, rear, and flanks canbe spaced in suchaway that communicationandcontactcanbemaintainedinspiteofnaturalbarriers,andtheformationcanexpand,contract,ormodifyitsshapeasacoherentwhole.Inmetaphoricalterms,emphasisison“roundness”orstrategicadaptabilitywhenconditionsareunevenandunfair,becauseconventionalmethodsarenotsuretoworkwithpredictableefficacyinsuchasituation.Alternating aggressiveness andwithdrawal are used to confuse andmislead

opponents;retreatafteranassaultisacommontactictodrawanadversaryintoacompromised position. The notorious “hard cop, soft cop” method ofinterrogationisanapplicationofthisprinciple.ThesametacticwasusedagainstprisonersofwarbycommunistChineseagentsinKorea.A square formation with wings is used to outflank and engulf a contained

battleline.Againstamorescatteredforce, individualsorsquadscanbepickedoffbyclosing in fromtwosides, likeabirdofpreysnatchingananimal in its

bill.Whenonruggedterritory,itisnecessarytousethedifficultyoftheterrainto

your own advantage, using natural obstacles to help you to outmaneuveradversariesratherthanlettingthemkeepyoutrapped.Wherethegroundisflatand open, in contrast, it is necessary to cut right through because there is nonatural cover. Here again there is ametaphorical contrast between the use ofsubterfuge and deviousness when at an unfair disadvantage and the use of amoreopenanddirectapproachonanevengroundwherenoonehasanunfairadvantage.Maintaining troops in the field after awar iswon is normally not indicated

because of the drain on the economy. It is only justified tactically when thesituationhasnotbeencompletelystabilizedandit is imperativetokeeponthealert.

“...Inthickundergrowth,movelikeasnake;tomakeiteasywhenweary,travelin aGooseFormation. In dangerous straits, use amedleyofweaponry;whenretreating,dissolveintotheunderbrush.”

Zigzaggingthroughobstacleslikeasnakeratherthanplowingthroughthemlikeabulldozerhastheadvantagesofconservingenergy,minimizingenvironmentaldestruction, and leaving a less obvious trail. Traveling in a Goose Formationmakesiteasywhenwearybypositioningpeoplewheretheycaneasilykeepincontactwitheachotherandcometoeachother’sassistanceandyetnotstumbleover one another.Amedley ofweaponry is used in dangerous straits becausedifferentweaponshavedifferenteffectiverangesandusages,sohavingavarietyof armsat hand increases resources andenhances adaptability.Dissolving intotheunderbrushwhenretreatingmeansrelyingonconcealmentratherthanspeedofflight,whichisnaturallycompromisedbythefatigueandstressofbattle.

“Whencirclingmountainsandforests,usecircuitousroutesandgobystages;toattack cities, use theirwaterways,Organize night retreats bymemo; use relaysignalsfornightalarms.Usetalentedwarriorsfordoubleagents.Placetroopsarmedwithclose-rangeweaponrywhereconvoysaresuretopass.”

Onemaytakeacircuitousroutetooutflankanopponent’sposition,ortowearyanopponent inpursuit.Thepurposeofgoingbystages is toavoiddebilitatingweariness.Waterwaysareconvenientforattackingcitiesbecausetheirfunctionalrelationship to cities makes them ideal delivery systems for assault forces;waterways can also be blocked or poisoned. Night retreats are organized by

memo for security reasons, so that theordersandplans for retreatdonot leakout.Relaysignalsareusedfornightalarmstocompensateforlimitedvisibility.Talentedwarriorsareusedfordoubleagentsbecausetheirtalentscanwinthemtheconfidenceofadversariesforwhomtheyappeartobeworking.Ambushingconvoys reduces defensive expenditures by diminishing the enemy’s fightingcapacitywithminimaleffort.

“For incendiary warfare, deliver the fuel in wagons. When setting out abattlefront of blades, use a pointed formation. When you have few soldiers,deploy themwith a combination ofweapons; a combination ofweaponry is awaytopreventbeingsurrounded.”

Thebest firepower delivery system to use in a given situationdependson thenature of the particular form of firepower to be employed and the local andtemporalenvironmentalfactorsaffectingtransport.The use of a pointed formation in a battlefront of bladed weapons is

recommended to maximize the effective range of the weaponry whileminimizingthedangersofaccidentalinjuriesinacrush.Deployingasmallforcewithavarietyofweaponryisawaytoenhancethe

efficiency and adaptability of each individual warrior. In particular, armingeveryone with both long-and short-range weapons increases their chances ofpreventingalargerenemyfromsurroundingthembyholdingtheenemyatbayorbreakingthroughattemptstooutflankandencirclethem.

“Patching up the lines and linking fragments is a way to solidify battleformations.Swirlingandinterlacingisameansofdealingwithemergencies.Awhirlwindkickingupdustcanbeusedtotakeadvantageofunclarity.Hidingoutandhatchingschemesisawayofprovokingafight.Creepinglikeadragonandpositioningambushersisawaytofightinthemountains....”

Patchinglinesandlinkingfragmentsmeansregroupingyourforces.Amediocrecommander,oramediocreforce,isonethatdoesthisonlyafterbeingrouted;thetruewarrior, incontrast, is constantly solidifying in thisway,groomingpowerunderallconditions.Oneof thereasonsTurkishcaptives inNorthKoreawereable to resist communist Chinese brainwashing techniques was because theycontinually regrouped in spite of all efforts by their captors to destroy groupcohesionandleadership.Swirling and interlacing work together as a way of meeting emergencies.

Swirling is a technique of dodging direct onslaughts while simultaneously

launching one’s own assault from constantly changing angles; interlacingreinforcestheswirlinglineswithoutcompromisingtheirfluidity.Awhirlwindkickingupdust,ormassdistractionorconfusionofanysort,can

be used as a cover for covert operations or sneak attack. It iswidely used bythieves,especiallypickpockets.Hiding out and hatching schemes is a way of provoking fights because it

arouses thesuspicionsandfearsofenemies.For thisreason, theappearanceofbeing open and aboveboard is also used as a diversionary tactic, presentingadversaries with a nonsuspicious front while plotting against them under thecoveroftheirownfalsesenseofsecurity.Guerrilla tactics are recommended for mountain warfare because of the

inherentdifficultiesofmountainous terrain.Once in sucha situation, themostpracticalwayoutistousethedifficultiestoone’sadvantageagainstadversaries.

“Sneakingupunexpectedlyonsoldiersisawayoffightinginthedark.Takingastandontheoppositesideofariverisawayofclashingwithasmallerforce.”

Sneaking up on enemies unawares is more precise, efficient, and economicalthan random bombardment. Forcing an opponent to cross a natural barrier,rendering itself vulnerable to attack as it does so, is a way of keepingexpenditurestoanabsoluteminimum.

“Tatteringbannersisawaytofoolenemies.Achariottraininswiftformationisawaytopursueremnantforces.”

Tatteringbannersmeansgivingtheappearanceoffatigueanddistressinordertomakeopponentscontemptuous,haughty,and thereforecarelessandunpreparedforahardfight.Moreancientworkonstrategydrawslimitstothedistancestowhichafleeing

enemyshouldbepursuedbyfootsoldiersandbycavaliers.Thereasonforthisistolimitexpenditureoftimeandenergy,andtoavoidbeingluredintoambushes.The use of a chariot train to chase down remnant forces provides for greaterswiftnessandstaminainadvanceandwithdrawalthancanbeachievedonfoot,andmorepowerfuldefensiveandoffensivecapabilitiesthanhorsebackfightersalone.

“Abilitytomoveanarmyatamoment’snoticeisawaytobepreparedagainstthosewhoarestronger.Spreadingoutoverwaterorswamplandisawaytofightwithfire.”

Whenstrengthisoverbearing,itcanbeneutralizedbyyielding;theflexibilitytochangeatanimpasseisonevarietyofthismaneuver.Lao-tzusaid,“Thesoftestcandrivethehardest.”Theuseofenvironmentalorotherambient factors inherentlyantagonistic to

specific kindsof force is anothermodeof softnessovercominghardness; herethismannerofdefenseistypifiedbyusingwatertocontrolfire.

“Retreatingundercoverofdarkness,likeacicadaleavingitsshell,isameansof luringanenemyon.A light,mobile task forceof specially trained troops isusedtoopposeablitzattack.”

Theimageofacicadaleavingitsshellisatraditionalrepresentationofstrategicmaneuvering whereby a semblance or facade is left in place to convey amisleadingimpression,whiletherealpowerorforcehasbeenmovedelsewhere,poised for a surprise assault on the opponent who had been deceived byappearances.Inthecaseofablitzattack,thenatureoftheactionmakesitinherentlycostly

to mount direct opposition.Mobility is therefore essential to counter such anattack,so that themostdangerousanddestructivewasteofahead-oncollisionmaybeavoidedwhilemorepatientandmoreeffectivedefensivemeasuresarearrangedandcarriedoutbystrategicallyharrying,diverting,andsplittinguptheoncomingforce.

“A stiffened and thickened battle line is used to attack fortifications. Makingbreaksinsurroundinggroundcoverisawaytocreateconfusion.”

Theprecisemanner inwhichabattle line isstiffenedandthickenedwithextraweaponryandpersonneldependsonthecharacteristicsofthefortificationsundersiege.Thegeneral idea is toprovide for the flexibility toconcentrateordilutemanpowerandfirepowerfreelyenoughtoadaptsuccessfullytorapidlychangingneedsandchallenges.Groundcoverprovidingcamouflageunderwhichtomaneuverisundoubtedly

useful, but unmitigated covermay frustrate an opponent somuch as to inciterandom fire or blanket fire. When breaks are made in the ground cover, incontrast,tacticalmovementsoftroopsthroughthesebreakscanbestagedsoastocreateconcretebutfalseimpressionsofthestrengthanddispositionofthoseunder cover. Thus instead of the risk of an uncontrolled release of fear, it ispossibletotakeadvantageofacalculatedmanipulationofapprehension.

“Pretending to leavebehinda small loss isaway tobaitanopponent.Heavyweaponryandsevereviolenceareusedinactivecombat.Tomaneuveratnight,usesignalsoppositetothoseusedduringtheday.”

Appearingtomakeaconcessioninordertobaitanadversaryisatacticthatmaybeusefulwhentryingtolureanenemyoutofafastness,orwhentryingtoslowdownanadvancingforcewithoutputtingupdirectopposition.Itseemsredundanttosaythatheavyweaponryandsevereviolenceareusedin

activecombat,butthisisanindirectwayofteaching,somewhat likemakinganoise to produce an echo. The point of making such an apparently obviousstatementistoemphasizethebasictacticalprinciplethatcombatisalastresort,thatitisbettertowinbystrategythanbyviolence.Thereasonforvaryingsignalsistomakethemmoredifficultfortheenemyto

read. This is an example of the principle that “the unconventional becomesconventional, the conventional becomes unconventional.” Surprise tactics andsecretusagesbecomeroutineiftheyareemployedtoomuch;routineshavetobechangediftheelementofsurpriseistobeexploited.

“Excellent salaries and useful supplies aremeans of facilitating victory. Firmandstrongwarriorsareneededtorepelassaults....”

Excellentsalariesaremeansoffacilitatingsuccesswhentheyareusedtoattractandmaintainsuperiorpersonnelanddependableloyalty.The usefulness of useful supplies is another self-evident tautism used as a

sound to produce an echo. In this case, the echo is the idea that the utility ofsupplies is not only amatter of quantity, but also of quality. The question ofuseful qualities is one that changes according to situations, so every operationneedstobeconsideredintermsofitsparticularneeds.Firmnessandstrengtharequalitiespropertoallwarriors.Thepointofsaying

thatsuchwarriorsareneededtorepelassaultsisanotherwayofexpressingtheprinciplethatthesequalitiesarenotproperlyusedforaggressionbutfordefenseandprevention.

[15]

StrengtheningtheMilitary

Therearesignificantlacunaeineverysentenceofthischapter,suchastomakeitimpracticaltoattempttoproduceanaccurateandmeaningfultranslation.

[16]

TenBattleFormations

Generally speaking, thereare ten kindsof battle formations.Thereare squareformations, round formations, sparse formations, dense formations, pointedformations, formations like a flock of geese, hooklike formations, confusingformations,fireformations,andwaterformations.Eachofthesehasitsuses.Square formations are for cutting off, round formations are for massing

solidly. Sparse formations are for bristling, dense formations are for beingimpossible to take.Pointed formationsare forcutting through, formations likegooseflocksareforhandlingbarrages.Hooklikeformationsmakeitpossibletoadapt and change plans, confusing formations are for deceiving armies andmuddlingthem.Fireformationsareusedforrapiddestruction,waterformationsareusedforbothoffenseanddefense.Theruleforsquareformationsistomakethecenterthinandthesidesthick,

with the main line at the back. The sparse array in the center is used forbristling.

“Bristling” refers to giving the illusion of being bigger and stronger than onereallyis,justasananimalbristleswhenfacedwithanaturalenemy.

Theruleforsparseformationsisforaddedstrengthandfirmnessincaseswherethereislittlearmorandfewpeople.Thewarrior’stechniqueistosetupbannersandflagstogivetheappearancethattherearepeoplethere.Thereforetheyarearrayed sparsely,with space in between, increasing the banners and insignia,withsharpenedbladesreadyattheflanks.Theyshouldbeatsufficientdistancetoavoidstumblingovereachother,yetarrayeddenselyenoughthattheycannotbesurrounded; this isamatter forcaution.Thechariotsarenot togallop, thefootsoldiersarenottorun.Thegeneralruleforsparseformationsisinmakingnumerous smallgroups, which may advance or retreat, may strike or defend,mayintimidateenemiesormayambushthemwhentheyweardown.Inthiswayasparseformationcansuccessfullytakeanelitecorps.Theruleforadenseformationisnottospacethetroopstoofarapart;have

them travel at close quarters, massing the blades yet giving enough room towield them freely, front and rear protecting each other. . . . If the troops arefrightened, settle themdown.Do not pursue opponents in flight, do not try tostopthemfromcoming;eitherstrikethemonacircuitousroute,orbreakdowntheir elite troops. Make your formation tightly woven, so there are no gaps;whenyouwithdraw,dosoundercover.Inthisway,adenseformationcannotbebrokendown.A pointed formation is like a sword: if the tip is not sharp, it will not

penetrate;iftheedgeisnotthin,itwillnotcut;ifthebaseisnotthick,itcannotbedeployedonthebattlefront.Thereforethetipmustbesharp,theedgemustbethin,andthemainbodymustbethick;thenapointedformationcanbeusedforcuttingthrough.

Inahookedformation,thefrontlinesshouldbestraight,whiletheleftandrightflanks are hooked. With gongs, drums, and pipes at the ready, and flagsprepared,thetroopsshouldknowtheirownsignalandflag....A confusing formationmust use a lot of flags and insignia, and drum up a

racket.Ifthesoldiersareinacommotion,thensettlethemdown;ifthechariotsaredisorderly,thenlinethemup.Whenallisinorder,thebattlelinesmoveswitha shocking commotion, as though it had come down from the sky or emergedfromtheearth.Thefootsoldierscomeonunstoppably,continuingalldaylonginexhaustibly.The rules for incendiarywarfare are as follows.Oncemoats and ramparts

havebeenmade,constructanothermoat.Pilekindlingeveryfivepaces,makingsurethepilesareplacedatevenintervals.Afewmenareneededtosetthefires;they must be fast and efficient. Avoid being downwind; if the fire hasoverwhelmedyou,youcannotfightawinningbattle,andyouwilllosewhetheryoustayputorgointoaction.Theruleforincendiarywarfareisthatthegroundshouldbelowandgrassy,

sothatenemysoldiershavenowayout.Undertheseconditions,itisfeasibletousefire.Ifitiswindy,ifthereisplentyofnaturalfuel,ifkindlinghasbeenpiledup,andiftheenemyencampmentisnotcarefullyguarded,thenafireattackisfeasible. Throw them into confusionwith fire, shower themwith arrows, drumandyell to encourageyour soldiers,usingmomentum tohelp them.Thesearetheprinciplesofincendiarywarfare.Theruleforamphibiouswarfareistohavealotofinfantryandfewchariots.

Havethemfullyequippedsothattheycankeepupwhenadvancinganddonotbunchupwhenwithdrawing.Toavoidbunchingup,gowith thecurrent;maketheenemysoldiersintotargets.

Therule forwarfareonthewateris touselightboats toguidetheway,usespeedboats for messengers. If the enemy retreats, pursue; if the enemyapproaches,closein.Becarefulaboutadvancingandwithdrawinginanorderlymanner, according to what is prudent under prevailing conditions. Be on thealertastheyshiftpositions,attackthemastheysetupafront,splitthemupastheyorganize.Asthesoldiershaveavarietyofweaponsandchariots,andhaveboth mounted troops and infantry, it is essential to find out their quantities.Attacktheirboats,blockadethefords,andinformyourpeoplewhenthetroopsarecoming.Thesearetherulesofamphibiouscombat.

[17]

TenQuestions

Inthischapter,classicaltacticsaredefinedaccordingtotheirusefulnessingivensituations.Allof thesestrategiesare tobefoundinTheArtofWar, theearliermanual by Sun Bin’s distinguished predecessor, Sun Wu. Typical examplesincludefeigningflighttosplitupopponentsandsetthemupforacounterattack;dividing and regrouping to confuse and overwhelm enemies; seeking theadvantageof the terrainaccording toconditions; feinting tomisleadopponentsandcreateopenings;attackingwherethereisnodefense;inducinglazinessandarrogance in adversaries by appearing irresolute; seducing opponents intoambushes;strikingunexpectedlywithsuchspeedthatthereisnotimetomountadefense.

Someoneasked,“Supposetwoarmiesarefacingoffwithequalfodderandfood,comparablepersonnelandweaponry,bothaggressoranddefenderwary.If theenemyusesaroundbattleformationforsecurity,howshouldweattackit?”[MasterSunBinreplied,]“Tostrikeanopponentlikethis,divideyourforces

intofourorfivegroups,oneofwhichclosesinandthenfeignsdefeatandflighttogivetheappearanceoffear.Oncetheopponentsseeyoutobeafraid,theywillunthinkingly split up to give chase.Thus their securitywill be disrupted.Nowmobilize your cavalry and drummers, attacking with all five groups at once.When your five divisions get there together, all of your forces will cooperateprofitably.Thisisthewaytostrikearoundformation.”“Suppose two armies are facing off, and our opponents are richer, more

numerous,andmorepowerfulthanweare.Iftheycomeinasquareformation,howdowestrikethem?”“Tostrikesuchaforce,[usingasparse]formationto[assault]them,contrive

tosplit themup.Clashwith them, thenappear torunawaybeaten, thencomekill them frombehindwithout letting them knowwhat is going on. This is thewaytostrikeasquareformation.”“When two armies face off, suppose the enemy is numerous and powerful,

forcefullyswiftandunyielding,waitingwithabattlelineofcracktroops;howdo

westrikethem?”“Toattackthem,itisnecessarytodivideintothree.Onegroupstretchesout

horizontally.Thesecondgroup...sothattheenemyleadersareafraidandtheirtroopsare confused.Onceboth lowerandupper echelonsare in disarray, thewholearmyisrouted.Thisishowtostrikeabattleformationofelitetroops.”“Whentwoarmiesfaceoff,supposetheenemyisnumerousandpowerful,and

stretchesoutinahorizontalbattleline;meanwhile,wesetoutourfronttoawaitthem,butwehavefewtroops,andeventheseareunskilled.Howdowestrike?”“You must divide your troops into three battalions. Train a suicide squad;

havetwobattalionsstretchoutabattlefront,extendingtheflanks,whiletheelitespecially trainedgroupattacks theenemy’s strategicpoints.This is theway tokillcommandersandcrashhorizontalbattlefronts.”“When twoarmies faceoff, supposewehavea lot of infantrybut ten times

fewerchariotsthantheenemy;howdowestrike?”“Keep to rugged terrain, carefully avoiding wide-open level ground. Level

ground is advantageous for chariots, rugged terrain is advantageous forinfantry.Thisisthewaytoattackchariots.”“Whentwoarmies faceoff,andoursidehasplentyofchariotsandcavalry,

buttheenemyhastentimesasmuchpersonnelandweaponsaswehave,howdoweattackthem?”“Toattackthem,becarefultoavoidconstrictinglandformations;inducethem

to pass through to level, open ground, where your chariots will have anadvantage and be able to strike even if the enemy has ten times themen andweaponryyouhave.Thisisthewaytoattackinfantry.”“When two armies face off, suppose our supplies are irregular and our

personnelandweaponsareinadequate,sowehavetomakeanall-outattackonanenemytentimesoursize,howdowestrike?”“Tostrikeinthiscase,oncetheenemyhasoccupiedafastness,you...turn

aroundandattackwheretheyhavenostrength.Thisisastrategyforaggressivecontention....”“When two armies face off, suppose the enemy commander is brave and

cannot be intimidated, the enemy’s weaponry is powerful, their troops arenumerous, and they are in a secure position. Their soldiers are all brave andunruffled, theircommander is fierce, theirweaponry ispowerful, theirofficersarestrongand theirsuppliesareregular,so thatnoneof the local leaderscanstanduptothem.Howdowestrikethem?”“To strike in this case, let them thinkyou lack resolve, feign lackofability,

andappeartohaveadefeatistattitude,soastoseducethemintoarroganceandlaziness,makingsure theydonot recognize the real facts.Then,on thisbasis,

strikewheretheyareunprepared,attackwheretheyarenotdefending,pressurethosewhohaveslackedoff,andattackthosewhoareuncertainorconfused.Aslongastheyarehaughtyandwarlike,whenthearmiesbreakcampthefrontandrearbattalionswillnotlookoutforeachother;soifyoustrikethempreciselyatthis point, itwill be as though you hada lot ofmanpower. This is theway tostrikealargeandpowerfulforce.”“When two armies face off, suppose the enemy holds the mountains and

occupies the defiles, so that we cannot get to them if we are far off yet havenowherenearbytotakeastand;howdowestrikethem?”“Tostrikeinthiscase,sincetheenemyhaswithdrawntoafastness...then

putthemindanger;attackwheretheyaresuretogototherescue,soastogetthem to leave their fastness, and thus find out their intentions; set outambushers,providereinforcementstobackthemup,andstriketheenemytroopswhiletheyareonthemove.Thisisthewaytoattackanopponentoccupyingafastness.”“When two armies face off, aggressor and defender both arrayed in battle

lines,supposetheenemytakesabasketlikeformation,soitseemstheywantustofallintoatrap;howdowestrikethem?”“Tostrike in thiscase,movesoquickly that the thirstyhaven’t timetodrink

andthehungryhaven’ttimetoeat;usetwothirdsofyourforces,andaimforacritical target. Once they . . . have your best and most well trained soldiersattacktheirflanks....Theirwholearmywillberouted.Thisisthewaytostrikeatabasketformation.”

[18]

[TitleLost]

Thischapterissofragmentarythateventheorderofthestripsisuncertain.

[19]

DistinctionsbetweenAggressorsandDefenders

In warfare, there is an aggressive party and a defensive party. Aggressionrequiresmoretroopsthandefense;whentherearetwiceasmanyaggressorsasdefenders,itisstillpossibletoopposethem.Thedefenderistheonewhoisfirsttogetsetup,theaggressoristheonewho

is last to get set up.Thedefender secures the groundand settles his forces toawaittheaggressor,whocomesthroughnarrowpasses....

Thetermsaggressoranddefenderherearenotdefinedinreferencetoinvasionanddefenseofthehomelandofoneofthepartiesbyanother,butinreferencetoconfrontation on mutually contested ground. The first to get set up is thedefender,intermsofdefendingaclaimoraconquest;whilethelasttogetsetupistheaggressor,intermsofchallengingthatclaimorconquest.

When soldiers retreat even in face of the threat of decapitation, and refuse tooppose the enemy as they advance, what is the reason? It is because theconfiguration of forces is unfavorable and the lay of the land is notadvantageous.Iftheconfigurationofforcesisfavorableandthelayofthelandisadvantageous,peoplewilladvanceontheirown;otherwise, theywillretreaton their own. Those who are called skilled warriors are those who takeadvantageofconfigurationsofforcesandthelayoftheland.

The point of these statements, which may seem repetitive truisms, is thatauthoritariancoercivenessisnotultimatelyeffective,whetherinwarorinpeace,iffornootherreasonthanthat therewillalwaysbepeoplewhofollownaturalintelligence whatever others may say. True leaders are not those who forceothers to followthem,but thosewhoareable toharmonize thewillsofothersandunifytheoveralldirectionoftheirenergies.

If youkeepa standingarmyof100,000 troops, theywon’t have enough to eatevenifthepopulacehassurpluses....Therewillbemoresoldiersincampthaninaction,andthoseincampwillhaveplentywhilethoseinactionwillnothave

enough.

Standing armieswere a comparatively recent development in the time of SunBin, but here it is evident that the civil andmilitary economic pressures andimbalancesresultingfromsuchasystemwerequiteapparenttohim.

Ifyouhaveanarmyof100,000troopsandsendthemoutinbattalionsof1,000,the enemy may repel you with battalions of10,000 each. So those skilled atwarfareareskilledattrimmingenemiesdownandcuttingtheirforcesapart,likeabutcherdismemberingacarcass.Thosewhoareable to splitupothers’armiesandcontrolothers’ forcesare

adequate even with the smallest quantity; those who are unable to split upothers’armiesandcontrolothers’forcesareinadequateeveniftheyhaveseveraltimesthefirepower.

Taking on too much at once can sap any amount of energy and thwart thesuccessful completion of any undertaking. Parceling tasks into manageableportionswithoutlosingsightoftheoveralldesignofthewholeendeavorisoneof the arts of leadership at all levels, from personal self-management tocorporate,community,andpoliticaldomainsofaction.

Doyousupposethatthesidewiththemosttroopswins?Thenitisjustamatterof going into battle based on head count. Do you suppose the wealthier sidewins? Then it is just a matter of going into battle based on measurement ofgrain.Do you think the sidewith sharperweapons and stronger armorwins?Thenitwouldbeeasytodeterminethevictor.Therefore the rich are not necessarily secure, the poor are not necessarily

insecure, themajoritydonotnecessarilyprevail,minoritiesdonotnecessarilyfail.Thatwhichdetermineswhowillwinandwhowill lose,who issecureandwhoisinperil,istheirscience,theirWay.

According toTheArtofWar bySunBin’sdistinguishedpredecessorSunWu,the“Way”isthatwherebythewillsofthoseaboveandthosebelowareunited.In other words, the Way is the guiding ideal, principle, or means ofaccomplishingcollectivegoals,thatwhichsubtendstheorderandmoraleofanorganization. Without this cohesion, the superiority of numbers, supplies, orequipmentcannotguaranteesuccess.

Ifyouareoutnumberedbyopponentsbutareabletosplitthemupsotheycannot

help others . . . the stoutness of their armor and efficiency of their weaponscannot assure them strength, and even soldiers having courage and powercannotusethemtoguardtheircommanders,thenthereisawaytowin.

Conversely, if it is possible to undermine the cohesion of a more powerfulopponent, it is thereby possible to compensate for disadvantages of numbers,arms,orotherformalandmaterialfactors.

Therefore intelligentgovernmentsandcommanderswithknowledgeofmilitarysciencemustpreparefirst;thentheycanachievesuccessbeforefighting,sothattheydonotloseasuccessfulaccomplishmentpossibleafterfighting.Therefore,whenwarriorsgoout successfullyandcomebackunhurt, theyunderstand theartofwar.

Inmakingpreparationsforstruggle,itisnotonlynecessarytoconsiderhowbestto prevail, but also how best to handle the aftermath of struggle, how tosafeguardthefruitsofvictory,andhowtomakethebestoffurtheropportunitiesthatariseasa resultofsuccess. It isalso imperative,ofcourse, to includedueconsiderationofproblems,difficulties,andthechancesofdefeat,inordertobeableto“gooutsuccessfullyandcomebackunhurt.”

[20]

Experts

Even thoughan enemyarmyhasmany troops, an expert can split themup sothattheycannothelpeachotherwhilebeingattacked.Therefore the depth of your moats and the height of your ramparts do not

make you secure, the strength of your chariots and the effectiveness of yourweaponry do not make you awesome, and the bravery and strength of yoursoldiersdonotmakeyoupowerful.Therefore experts take control of mountain passes and take account of

obstacles; they take care of their troops, andare able to contract and expandfluidly.Ifenemieshavemanytroops,expertscanmakethemasiffew;ifenemystoresof foodareenough to fill their troops,expertscanmake themstarve; ifenemies stay in theirplacesunmoving, experts canmake them tire. If enemieshave won the world, experts can cause division; if enemy armies areharmonious,expertscanbreakthemup.

Followingontheprecedingchapter,thisonebeginsbyemphaticallyrestatingthecritical importance of group cohesion, beyond even that of sheermaterial andenergetic factors.One of the essential elements of cohesion, furthermore, is acomprehensiveandcoherent strategy that canoutwardlyadapt toall situationswhileinwardlymaintainingintegrityofpurposeandmoraleinpursuinggoals.

Somilitaryoperationshavefourroutesandfivemovements.Advanceisaroute,andwithdrawalisaroute;totheleftisaroute,andtotherightisaroute.Togoforwardisamovement,toretreatisamovement;togototheleftisamovement,andtogototherightisamovement.Tostayputsilentlyisalsoamovement.Expertsmake sure tomaster the four routes and fivemovements. Therefore

whentheyadvance,theycannotbeheadedoffinfront;andwhentheywithdraw,theycannotbecutoffbehind.Whentheygototheleftorright,theycannotbetrappedontreacherousground.Whentheystayputsilently,theyarenottroubledbyopponents.Thusexpertsdrivetheirenemiestotheirwits’endinallfourroutesandfive

movements.Whenenemiesadvance,expertspress themin front;whenenemiesretreat, experts cut them off from behind. When enemies move left or right,expertstraptheminroughterrain.Whenenemiessilentlystayput,theirtroopscannotescape trouble.Experts canmakeenemiesputaside theirheavyarmorandrushlongdistancesbyforceddoublemarches,sotheycannotrestwhentheyget tiredandsick,andcannoteatanddrinkwhen theygethungryand thirsty.Thusdoexpertspressenemiestoensurethattheycannotwinatwar.Youeattoyourfillandwaitfortheenemytostarve;youstayputcomfortably

andwaitfortheenemytotire;youkeepperfectlystillandwaitfortheenemytostir.Thuswillthepeoplebeseentoadvancewithoutretreating,treadonnakedbladeswithoutturningontheirheels.

Relentlesspressureisonewaytothwartanopponent’sstrategyateverystepandthereby systematically undermine morale. Made from a position of relativesecurity, unremitting pressure is supported and strengthened by the specificpsychologicaleffectsvisiteduponbothpartiesbythissortoftactic.

[21]

FiveDescriptionsandFiveCourtesies

There are five descriptions ofmilitary forces. The first is called awesomeandpowerful.Thesecondiscalledproudandarrogant.Thethirdiscalledadamantto the extreme. The fourth is called greedy and suspicious. The fifth is calledslowandyielding.Anawesomeandpowerfulforceyoutreatwithhumilityandsoftness.Aproud

and powerful force you keep waiting with courteous respect. An extremelyadamantforceyoutakebyseduction.Agreedyandsuspiciousforceyoupressinfront, harass at the sides, andusedeepmoats andhighbarricades tomake ithard for them to keep supplied. A slow and yielding force you terrorize byharrassment;shakethemup,surroundthem,andstrikethemiftheycomeout.Iftheydonotcomeout,thenencirclethem.Militaryactionshavefivecourtesiesandfiveharshactions.Whatarethefive

courtesies? If it invades a territory and is too courteous, a militia loses itsnormalstate.Ifitinvadesasecondtimeandistoocourteous,amilitiawillhaveno fodder. If it invadesa third timeand is toocourteous,amilitiawill lose itsequipment.Ifitinvadesafourthtimeandistoocourteous,amilitiawillhavenofood.Ifitinvadesafifthtimeandistoocourteous,amilitiawillnotaccomplishitsbusiness.Violently invadinga territoryonce iscalledaggression.Violently invadinga

second time is called vanity. A third violent invasion, and the natives will beterrorized. A fourth violent invasion, and the soldiers will be givenmisinformation.Afifthviolentinvasion,andthemilitiawillbewornout.Therefore,courtesyandharshnessmustbeintermixed.

An invasion or a takeover has to command respect and collaborationwithoutcausingterroranddisaffectionifitistoavoideitherabsorptionandvitiationofitspowerontheonehand,orresistanceandrepulsionontheother.

[22]

MistakesinWarfare

Ifyouwanttouseunrestamongthepeopleofanenemystate...toinhibitthestrengthsoftheenemystate’smilitary,youwillwearoutyourownmilitary.

Fanningflamesofunrestamongapeopleisonewaytoattacktheirgovernmentand also inhibit the strength of their military by preoccupation with civildisturbance. This does not guarantee, however, that people aroused by suchprovocationswillnecessarilysidewithyourcause.Thistacticisthusaslikelytoresultinanoverallincreaseinresistancetooutsidecontrol,thuswearingdownthemechanismsbywhichtheattempttoassertcontrolismade.

Ifyouwanttostrengthenandincreasewhatyourstatelacksinresponsetotheabundanceofanenemystate,thiswillquicklyfrustrateyourarmy.

Competing with a rival on a sheerly quantitative basis leads to excessivelynarrowfunnelingofenemyandresourcesalonglinesdeterminedtoorigidlybyfixation on fear of the competition. This results in frustration through lack offlexibility, foresight, and discretionary resources needed to adapt to changingcircumstancesintheenvironmentatlarge.

If your preparations are all set, and yet you cannot thwart the enemy’sequipment, your armywill be disrespected. If your equipment is not effective,whileyourenemyiswellprepared,yourarmywillbecrushed....

Theunspokenpointoftheseapparenttruismsisthatwhenobjectiveassessmentsindicatethatyouareinsuchaposition,itisbettertoavoidengagementwiththeopponent.Thisisnotsimplybecauseoftheimmediatelikelihoodofdefeat,butbecause of the long-term strategic disadvantages of humiliation anddemoralization.

Ifyouareskilledatarrayingbattlelines,andyouknowtheoddsforandagainst,andknowthelayoftheland,andyetyourarmyisthwartedtimeandagain,that

meansyoudonotunderstandbothdiplomaticvictoryandmilitaryvictory.

Purelymilitary or strategic factors are not considered sufficient guarantees ofvictory.ThisiswhytheWay,whichinthiscontextmeansthesocialrationaleforaction, the moral/morale factor, is regarded so critically even in what wouldotherwiseseemtobestrictlytacticalmatters.

...[If]thearmedforcesareincapableofgreatsuccess,thatmeanstheydonotrecognizeappropriateopportunities.Ifthemilitarylosesthepeople,thatmeansit is unawareof its own faults and excesses. If thearmed forces requiremucheffort toaccomplish little, thatmeans theydonotknow theright timing. If themilitarycannotovercomemajorproblems,itisbecauseitcannotunitetheheartsof the people.When the armed forces have a lot of regrets, it is because theybelieved inwhatwas dubious.Whenwarriors cannot see fortuneanddisasterbeforethesehavetakenshape,theydonotknowhowtoprepare.

Disorientation,disaffection, inefficiency,disunity,delusion, lackof foresight—these are basic problems that undermine successful collective effort.Understandingwhytheyhappenisasimportantasrecognizingthemwhentheyhappen.

Ifwarriorsarelazywhentheyseegoodtobedone,aredoubtfulwhentherighttimetoactarrives,getridofwrongsbutcannotkeepthisup,thatisthewaytostagnation.Whentheyarehonestanddecenteventhoughambitious,politeevenwhenfavored,strongthoughyielding,flexibleyetfirm,thisisthewaytothrive.Ifyoutravelthepathtostagnation,evenheavenandearthcannotmakeyou

flourish. Ifyoupractice theway to thrive,evenheavenandearthcannotmakeyouperish.

An ancient Taoist saying goes, “My fate depends on me, not on Heaven.”Strategists did not believe in predestination and did not encourage people toconsult fortune-telling books and hope for the best. They taught people toexamine their own situations and their own actions, and to take consciousresponsibilityfortheirownbehavioranditsconsequences.

[23]

JusticeinCommanders

Commandersmustbejust;iftheyarenotjust,theywilllackdignity.Iftheylackdignity,theywilllackcharisma;andiftheylackcharisma,theirsoldierswillnotfacedeathforthem.Thereforejusticeistheheadofwarriorship.

Justice alsomeans duty. Commanders who are not just and do not commandjustice lack dignity because those under their command will not fear to beunruly.

Commandersmustbehumane; if theyarenothumane, their forceswillnotbeeffective. If their forces are not effective, they will not achieve anything.Thereforehumanenessisthegutofwarriorship.

Ifcommandersarenothumane, theirforceswillnotbeeffectivebecausetherewill be no bond of loyalty between them. The troops of a leader who is nothumanewilllackmotivationtofightloyallyforthecause.

Commandersmusthaveintegrity;withoutintegrity,theyhavenopower.Iftheyhavenopower,theycannotbringoutthebestintheirarmies.Thereforeintegrityisthehandofwarriorship.

Withoutintegrity,commandershavenopowerbecausetheydonotbackuptheirwordswiththeirdeedsandthereforecannotinspireconfidenceandtrust.

Commandersmustbe trustworthy; if theyarenot trustworthy, theirorderswillnot be carried out. If their orders are not carried out, then forceswill not beunified.Ifthearmedforcesarenotunified,theywillnotbesuccessful.Thereforetrustworthinessisthefootofwarriorship.

Trustworthiness cements the relationship of commander and forces, letting theforces know they can expect to be rewarded for doingwell and punished forcowardiceorunruliness.

Commanders must be superior in intelligence; if they are not superior inintelligence,...theirforceslack[resolution].Thereforeresolutionisthetailofwarriorship.

Resolution derives from intelligence through the repose of confidence in anintelligentplanofaction.

[24]

EffectivenessinCommanders

Thischapterisall infragments.Thenextfivechaptershavesomelacunae,buttheyarelargelydescriptiveandself-explanatory.Theyneednoelucidation,butwillneverthelessyieldmoretoreflection.

[25]

FailingsinCommanders

Thesearefailingsincommanders:

1. Theyconsiderthemselvescapableofwhattheyareunabletodo.2. Theyarearrogant.3. Theyareambitiousforrank.4. Theyaregreedyforwealth.5. ...6. Theyareimpulsive.7. Theyareslow.8. Theylackbravery.9. Theyarebravebutweak.10. Theylacktrustworthiness.11. ...12. ...13. ...14. Theylackresolution.15. Theyarelax.16. Theyarelazy.17. ...18. Theyarevicious.19. Theyareself-centered.20. Theyarepersonallydisorderly.

Thosewithmanyfailingssuffermanylosses.

[26]

LossesofCommanders

Thesearelossesofcommanders:

1. Whentheylosepurposeintheirmaneuvering,theycanbebeaten.2. If they take inunrulypeopleanddeploy them,keepdefeatedsoldiersandputthembackinbattle,andpresumetohavequalificationstheyreallylack,theycanbebeaten.

3. Iftheykeeparguingoverjudgmentsofrightandwrong,andkeepdebatingoverelementsofstrategy,theycanbebeaten.

4. Iftheirordersarenotcarriedoutandtheirtroopsarenotunified,theycanbebeaten.

5. If their subordinatesare refractoryand their troopswon’twork for them,theycanbebeaten.

6. Ifthepopulaceisembitteredagainsttheirarmedforces,theycanbebeaten.7. Ifanarmyisoutinthefieldtoolong,itcanbebeaten.8. Ifanarmyhasreservations,itcanbebeaten.9. Ifthesoldiersflee,theycanbebeaten.10. ...11. Ifthetroopspanicrepeatedly,theycanbebeaten.12. Ifthecourseofamilitaryoperationturnsintoaquagmireandeveryoneis

miserable,theycanbebeaten.13. Ifthetroopsareexhaustedintheprocessofbuildingfortifications,theycan

bebeaten.14. ...15. Ifthedayiscomingtoanendwhenthereisyetfartogoandthetroopsare

eagertogetthere,theycanbebeaten.16. ...17. ...thetroopsareafraid,theycanbebeaten.18. Ifordersare repeatedlymodifiedand the troopsaredilatory, theycanbe

beaten.

19. Ifthereisnoespritdecorpsandthetroopsdonotcredittheircommandersandofficerswithability,theycanbebeaten.

20. Ifthereisalotoffavoritismandthetroopsarelazy,theycanbebeaten.21. Ifthereisalotofsuspicionandthetroopsareindoubt,theycanbebeaten.22. Ifcommandershatetohearitwhenthey’veerred,theycanbebeaten.23. Iftheyappointincompetents,theycanbebeaten.24. Iftheykeeptheirtroopsoutinthefieldsolongastounderminetheirwill,

theycanbebeaten.25. If they are scheduled to go into combat but theirminds are still divided,

theycanbebeaten.26. Iftheycountontheothersidelosingheart,theycanbebeaten.27. If their actions hurt people and they rely on ambush anddeception, they

canbebeaten.28. ...29. Ifthecommandersoppressthesoldiers,sothetroopshatethem,theycanbe

beaten.30. Iftheycannotgetoutofnarrowstraitsincompleteformation,theycanbe

beaten.31. Ifthefrontlinesoldiersandbackupweaponryarenotevenlyarrayedinthe

forefrontofthebattleformation,theycanbebeaten.32. Iftheyworrysomuchaboutthefrontinbattlethattheyleavetherearopen,

or they worry so much about the rear that they leave the front open, orworry somuch about the left that they leave the right open, orworry somuchabouttherightthattheyleavetheleftopen—iftheyhaveanyworryincombat,theycanbedefeated.

[27]

StrongandWeakCities

Ifacityisinamarshyareawithouthighmountainsordeepcanyons,andyetitabutsuponhillsonallfoursides,itisastrongcity,nottobebesieged.Iftheirarmyisdrinkingrunningwater—thatis,waterfromalivesource—itisnottobebesieged.Ifthereisadeepvalleyinfrontofthecityandhighmountainsbehindit,itisastrongcity,nottobebesieged.Ifthecityishighinthecenterandlowontheoutskirts, it isastrongcity,not tobebesieged.If therearejoininghillswithinthecityprecincts,itisastrongcity,nottobebesieged.Ifanencampedarmyrushestoitsshelters, thereisnolargeriverencircling

them,theirenergyisbrokendownandtheirspiritsweakened,thentheycanbeattacked.Ifacityhasadeepvalleybehinditandnohighmountainstotheleftandright,itisavulnerablecityandcanbeattacked.Ifthesurroundinglandisarid,acityisonbarrengroundandcanbeattacked.Ifthetroopsaredrinkingbrackishwater,orstagnantorstalewater,theycanbeattacked.Ifacityisinalargeswampyareawithnolargevalleys,canyons,orabuttinghills,itisaweakcityandcanbeattacked.Ifacity isbetweenhighmountainsandhasnolargevalleys,canyons,oradjoininghills, it isaweakcityandcanbeattacked. Ifacityhasahighmountaininfrontofitandalargevalleybehindit,sothatitishighinfrontandlowinback,itisaweakcityandcanbeattacked.

[28]

[TitleLost]

...!Whenreinforcementsarrive,theycanbebeatentoo.Soageneralruleformilitaryoperationsis thatgroupsoverfifteenmilesapartcannotcometoeachothers’rescue—howmuchlesswhentheyareatleastthirtyanduptoahundredor more miles apart! These are the extreme limits for grouping and spacingbattalions.Therefore military science says that if your supplies do not match those of

opponents, do not engage them for long; if your numbers do notmatch up tothoseofopponents,donotgetembroiledwiththem;...ifyourtrainingdoesnotmatch that of opponents, do not try to contest themwhere they are strongest.Oncethesefiveassessmentsareclear,amilitaryforcemayactfreely.Soamilitaryoperation...headsforopponents’strategicfactors.First,take

their fodder. Second, take their water. Third, take the fords. Fourth, take theroad.Fifth,taketheruggedground;sixth,takethelevelground....Ninth,takewhat they consider most valuable. These nine seizures are ways of takingopponents.

[29]

[TitleLost]

...Theconcentratedprevailoverthescattered,thefullprevailovertheempty,theswiftprevailovertheslow,themanyprevailoverthefew,therestedprevailovertheweary.Concentrate when there is reason to concentrate, spread out when there is

reason tospreadout; fillupwhen there isreason for fullness,emptyoutwhenthereisreasonforemptiness.Goonthebywayswhenthereisreasontogoonthe byways, go by the highwayswhen there is reason to go by the highways;speedupwhenthereisreasontospeed,slowdownwhenthereisreasontoslowdown.Massinlargecontingentswhenthereisreasonforhugemasses,groupinsmall contingents when there is reason for small groups. Relax when there isreasontorelax,workhardwhenthereisreasontoworkhard.Concentrationandscatteringinterchange,fullnessandemptinessinterchange,

byways and highways interchange, swiftness and slowness interchange, manyand few interchange, relaxation and labor interchange. Do not confront theconcentratedwithconcentration,donotconfrontthescatteredbyscattering.Donotconfrontthefullwithfullness,donotconfronttheemptywithemptiness.Donotconfrontspeedwithspeed,donotconfrontslownesswithslowness.Donotconfront many with many, do not confront few with few. Do not confront therelaxedwhenyouare inastateof relaxation,donotconfront thewearywhenyouareinaconditionofweariness.Theconcentratedandthespread-outcanopposeeachother, thefullandthe

empty can oppose each other, those on byways and those on highways canopposeeachother,thefastandtheslowcanopposeeachother,themanyandthefewcanopposeeachother,therestedandthetiredcanopposeeachother.Whenopponentsareconcentrated,youshouldthereforespreadout;whentheyarefull,you should therefore be empty. When they go over the byways, you shouldtherefore take thehighways.When they speed, you should thereforego slowly.Whentheyaremany,youshouldthereforeusesmallcontingents.Whentheyarerelaxed,youshouldthereforelabor.

[30]

SurpriseandStraightforwardness

Thepatternofheavenandearthistorevertwhenaclimaxisreached,towaneonwaxingfull.[Thesunandmoon,yinandyang,]areexamplesofthis.Thereisalternate flourishing and dying out; the four seasons exemplify this. There isvictory,andthereisfailuretoprevail;thefiveelementsexemplifythis.Thereisbirth,andthereisdeath;allbeingsexemplifythis.Thereiscapacityandthereisincapacity; all living creatures exemplify this. There is surplus, and there isdeficiency;formationandmomentumexemplifythis.So whoever has form can be defined, and whoever can be defined can be

overcome.Thereforesagesusewhat isoverwhelminginall things toovercomeallthings;thereforetheirvictoriesareunstoppableandinexhaustible.Warfareisamatterofformalcontestforvictory.Noformisimpossibletoovercome,butnooneknowstheformbywhichvictoryisobtained.

Tousewhatisoverwhelminginallthingstoovercomeallthingsmeanstousenatural forces and intrinsic momenta to accomplish a task. This is whyintelligent leadership is essential to certain victory no matter how much rawforceisavailable.Noformisimpossibletoovercomebecauseformationshaveinherentlawsor

patternswhosedevelopmentsandmovementscanbepredicted.Nooneknowstheformbywhichvictoryisobtainedinageneralsensebecausethereisnosetform that will guarantee victory, and in a particularized sense because thespecificformthatwinsinagivencaseprevailsbecauseofitsinscrutabilitytotheopposition.

Changes of formand victory are infinite, coterminouswith heaven and earth;theycouldneverbe fullywrittendown.Form isamatterofusingwhatever issuperior to win. It is impossible to use the bestof one form to overcome allforms.Thereforecontrolofformsisone,butthemeansofvictorycannotbeonlyone.

Adaptability is a perennial keynote to strategic thinking, but if the centralintegrity of leadership is compromised, whether in capacity or purpose,adaptability can degenerate into pliability, fragmentation, or dissipation ofenergy. By the same token, if the central integrity of leadership is lacking inintrinsic strength and the leadership resorts to dogmatic ideological andauthoritarianwaystocompensate,flexibilityofthoughtandactionaresacrificedtostabilizationofa fixedstructure, finally leading to inability tosafeguard thefoundation of the structure no matter how stable its internal dimensions mayremain.

Thereforeexpertsatwarfare see the strengthsofopponents,and therebyknowtheir weaknesses; seeing their deficiencies, they thereby know their surpluses.They see victory as clearly as they see the sun andmoon; their attainment ofvictoryislikewaterovercomingfire.To respond to a formwith a form is directness, to respond to formwithout

form is surprise. Directness and surprise are endless, having distinct places.Organizeyourdivisionsbysurprisestrategy,controlothersbythefiveelements,battlethemwith...Whenthedivisionsaredetermined,thenthereisform;whenaformisdetermined,thenthereisdefinition....Sameness is inadequate to attain victory; therefore difference is used, for

surprise.Therefore stillness is surprise to themobile, relaxation is surprise totheweary,fullnessissurprisetothehungry,orderlinessissurprisetotheunruly,many are a surprise to the few.When the initiative is direct, holding back issurprise;whenasurpriseattackislaunchedwithoutretaliation,thatisavictory.Thosewhohaveanabundanceofsurprisesexcelingainingvictories.

Surprisetacticsarevaluedtothwartaccurateanticipationofyourmovementsonthepartofopponents.Continuousfluidityisneeded,because“Surprisebecomesconventional,conventionbecomessurprise.”

Sowhenone jointaches,allhundred jointsaredisabled,because theyare thesamebody.Whenthevanguardisdefeatedandtherearguardisineffective,itisbecausetheyareinthesameformation.Thereforeinbattleconfigurations,. . .therearshouldnotovertakethefront,andthefrontshouldnottrampletherear.Forward movements should follow an orderly course, and withdrawal shouldreturninanorderlymanner.

Forces and resources are organized formaximal efficacy on the offensive andminimalvulnerabilityonthedefensive.Theartoforganization,fromthispoint

of view, is to enable different units of power to operate in concert and alsoindependently, without these two capacities interfering with each other inpractice.

Whenpeopleobeyruleswithoutrewardsorpunishments, theseareorders thatthepeoplecancarryout.Whenthehigharerewardedandthelowpunished,andyetthepeopledonotobeyorders,theseareordersthatthepeopleareunabletocarryout.Togetpeopletoflyinthefaceofdeathwithoutturningontheirheels,in spite of poormanagement, is something even a legendary hero would findhardtodo;sotoputthisresponsibilityonordinarypeopleisliketryingtogetarivertoflowinreverse.Thereforeinbattleformations,winnersshouldbestrengthened,losersshould

be replaced, the weary should be rested, the hungry should be fed. Then thepeoplewillonlyseetheenemy,andwon’tseedeath;theywillnotturnontheirheels even though they tread on naked blades. Sowhen flowingwater finds acourse,itcanevenwashawaybouldersandsnapboatsintwo;whenpeopleareemployedinamannerconsistentwiththeirnature, thenordersarecarriedoutlikeaflowingcurrent.

Leadership,Organization,andStrategy:HowSunTzuandSunTzuIIComplementEachOther

Sun Bin the Mutilated was a lineal descendant of the famous Sun Wu theMartialist,whoseArtofWarisperhapsthebestknownoftheclassicsofstrategy.In 1972 a hitherto unknown version of SunWu’sworkwas discovered in anarchaeologicalfindatSilverSparrowMountaininChina’sShandongProvince.This version of Sun Wu’s Art of War predates the traditional commentariesthroughwhichthisclassicaltextisordinarilystudied.AlthoughSunWuand,toalesserextent,SunBin,havelongbeenknowntohistory,recentdevelopmentshavemadethembothnewdiscoveries.Anacademicattempt to translate thenewlydiscoveredArtofWar has been

made, unfortunatelywithout success, being based on the erroneous belief thattheChineseworldviewlacksintelligibilityandpredictability.Sinceallstrategy(and language, for that matter) depends on intelligibility and predictability, arepresentation of strategic literature as lacking these factors is, quite naturally,inherentlyflawedandintrinsicallymisleading.Inanycase,havingfoundthatacademicworkofnovalueinthisconnection,

for purposes of comparison with Sun Bin I draw on my own originalunpublishedtranslationofthenewlyrediscoveredtextofSunWu’sArtofWar.

Threeessential featuresof tactical formulations standout inbothSunWuandSunBin: leadership, organization, and strategy.Leadership is necessary to thecohesionanddirectionoforganization,and to theelectionand implementationofstrategy.Organizationisneededtobeeffectiveonalargescale;andstrategyis needed to plan the functional economy of action undertaken by theorganization.Thesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetween the tactical scienceofSunBinand

that of his predecessor Sun Wu are clearly apparent, and follow predictablepatterns. Sun Wu, the elder tactician, tends to be more summary and moreabstract;SunBin,thesuccessor,isinclinedmoretowarddetailandconcreteness.Whenviewedtogetherintheiressences,therefore,thecomplementarydesignsofthese twomajor strategists yield a fuller picture of the foundations of tactical

thinking.Leadership is without question the major issue underlying all strategic

science,inasmuchasitrepresentsdirectionandpurposeinbothideologicalandpracticaldomains.SunWudefinesthebasicpillarsofgoodleadershipintermsof five requirements: knowledge, trustworthiness, humaneness, valor, andstrictness.This is amore concentratedversionof the formulationgiven in theearlier classic, Six Strategies, which refers to the qualities of humaneness,justice,loyalty,trustworthiness,courage,andstrategyasthe“sixdefenses”thataleader,oranelitecorps,shouldcommandandembodytosafeguardagriculture,industry,andtrade.Sun Bin also emphasizes requirements in leadership similar to those

enumeratedbyhispredecessors:

Onewholeadsamilitiawithinadequateintelligenceisconceited.Onewholeadsamilitiawithinadequatecouragehasaninflatedego.Onewho leads a militia without knowing the Way and does battlerepeatedlywithoutbeingsatisfiedissurvivingonluck.

These parameters might be summarized as knowledge, valor, wisdom, andmodesty.SunBinnotes thedominant flawsofcharacter in thosewhoare lacking the

essential qualities of leadership to underscore the pragmatic nature of theserequirements. He also goes further into specifics to illustrate those factors ofleadershipthatleadtosuccessandthosethatleadtofailure.Hesays,

Therearefiveconditionsthatalwaysleadtovictory.Thosewhohaveauthorized command over a unified power structure are victorious.ThosewhoknowtheWayarevictorious.Thosewhowinmanycohortsare victorious. Those whose close associates are in harmony arevictorious. Those who take the measure of enemies and size updifficultiesarevictorious.

Qualities conspicuously absent in classical descriptions of good warriors andgoodleadersarebloodthirstiness,violenceoftemper,andoverweeningambition.SunBinalsosaid:

Thosewhoenjoymilitarism,however,willperish;andthosewhoareambitiousforvictorywillbedisgraced.Warisnotsomethingtoenjoy,victoryisnottobeanobjectofambition.

Theprimarypractical reasonfor thiswarning isexplainedby theeldermaster,SunWu:

Thosenotcompletelyawareofthedrawbacksofmilitaryactioncannotbecompletelyawareoftheadvantagesofmilitaryaction.

ThereforeSunBinoutlinessourcesofdefeatinstrategicoperations:

There are five things that always lead to failure. Inhibiting thecommander leads to failure. Not knowing theWay leads to failure.Disobedience to the commander leads to failure. Not using secretagentsleadstofailure.Notwinningmanycohortsleadstofailure.

Pursuingasimilaranalysisoffailuresofleadership,theeldermaster,SunWu,inaccordancewith his dictum that “The considerations of thewise include bothprofit and harm,” also outlines what he calls five dangers inmilitary leaders,whichmaybesummarizedasfollows:

Thosewhowillfighttothedeathcanbekilled.Thoseintentonsurvivalcanbecaptured.Thosequicktoangerarevulnerabletocontempt.Puristsarevulnerabletoshame.Emotionalhumanitariansarevulnerabletoanxiety.

Typicallymoredetailedthanhispredecessor,SunWu,SunBindevotesseveralchapters to outlining the qualifications and requirements of leadership. Thevarious attributes of leadership are pictured as parts of the body, all of themforming an integral whole; Justice, from which derives dignity and thencecharisma, is the head of warriorship. Humaneness, which encourageseffectiveness, is the gut of warriorship. Integrity, as a foundation for power,bringsout thebest inarmies,so it is thehandofwarriorship.Trustworthiness,which fosters obedience, fromwhich derives unity, is the foot ofwarriorship.Intelligencefostersresolution,whichisthetailofwarriorship.Sun Bin also outlines failings and losses in commanders at considerable

length.Failingsincommandersinclude

considering themselves capable of what they are unable to do,arrogance, ambition, greed, impulsiveness, slowness, cowardice,weakness, unreliability, irresoluteness, laxity, laziness, viciousness,egocentricity,unruliness.

Whilethefunctionoftheleader—thatis,toimpartordertotheactionofagroup—naturally requirescertaincapacities in thepersonof the leader, theeffectivepower of the leader to direct an organization also depends on the structuralintegrityororderoftheorganization.SunWusummarizesorderintheseterms:“Orderinvolvesorganizationalstructure,chainofcommand,andlogistics.”Theimportanceofpreparingfunctionalbasesofoperationisalsostressedbythelatermaster, SunBin: Intelligent governments and commanderswith knowledge ofmilitary science must prepare first; then they can achieve success beforefighting.To achieve success before fighting is to outdo competitors in strategic

advantages, including qualities of leadership and personnel, and integrity oforganizationalstructure.The importance of integrity in the order is made abundantly clear in the

classicofSunWu,wherehesays,

When order is consistently practiced to educate the people, then thepeople are obedient. When order is not practiced consistently toeducate the people, then the people are disobedient. When order isconsistentlypracticed,thatmeansitiseffectiveforthegroup.

The principle that the operative order must be consistent with the effectivecharacterandcapacityofthegroupisalsoemphasizedbySunBin,whosays,

When people obey rules without rewards or punishments, these areordersthatthepeoplecancarryout.Whenthehigharerewardedandthe low punished, and yet the people do not obey orders, these areordersthatthepeopleareunabletocarryout.

Thestrategic importanceoforder is the intensiveexertionof forceorcapacitythat order makes possible. Sun Wu explains it in this way: “What normallymakesmanagingalargegroupsimilartomanagingasmallgroupisasystemoforder.”ThefacilitationofintensiveexertionisforcefullyillustratedbySunBinin these terms: “When all is in order, the battle line moves with a shockingcommotion.”Torepresent theinnercohesionof theorganization,bywhichtheintegrity of the order ismaintained, SunBin again uses the image of a body,implyingthatthetotalintegrityanddisciplineofthewholeorderdependsonthepersonal integrityanddisciplineofeach individual in theorganization:“Whenonejointaches,allhundredjointsaredisabled,becausetheyarethesamebody.”Theactualizationofaneffectivelyunifiedorder is thusnaturallyamatterof

critical concern. Primary emphasis is placed on the moral and intellectualcharacterofleadershipbecausethisunificationcannotbeattainedbysimplefiat.According to Sun Wu, the attainment of objective organizational integritydependsontherealizationofsubjectiveorganizationalunity:

Ifsoldiersarepunishedbeforeanemotionalbondhasformed[withtheleadership],theywillnotbeobedient,andiftheyarenotobedienttheyare hard to direct. If penalties are not enforced once this emotionalbondhasformed, then thesoldierscannotbedirected.Sounite themculturally and unify them militarily; this is considered the way tocertainvictory.

Thiswastheconcernofthekingwhoasked,“HowcanIgetmypeopletofollowordersasanordinarymatterofcourse?”TothisSunBinreplied,“Betrustworthyas an ordinary matter of course.” The need for correspondingly effectiveobjectiveorderdoes,nevertheless, remain imperative;SunWusays:“Whetherthereisorderorunrulinessdependsontheoperativelogicoftheorder.”Intermsoforganizationalstructure,thelogicofanoperationdependsonthe

recognition and employment of individual capacities in such a way as tomaximize their efficiencywithin the body of thewhole, as noted by SunBinwhen he says, “When setting up official posts, you should do so in amannerappropriatetotheindividual.”The purpose of this selectivity, of course, is not to fulfill the ambitions of

individuals irrespectiveof thewelfareof thegroup,but toenhancetheinternalharmonyandthereforesurvivalvalueof theorganization,asSunBinexplains:On the one hand, “If their orders are not carried out and their troops are notunified,commanderscanbebeaten”;whileontheotherhand,SunBinalsoadds,

When flowingwater findsacourse, it canevenwashawaybouldersand snap boats in two; when people are employed in a mannerconsistentwiththeirnature,thenordersarecarriedoutlikeaflowingcurrent.

Thequalificationsofleadershipandtherequirementsoforderapply,moreover,toeverysteponthechainofcommand,fromthetopcommanderinchargeofthewholegrouptotheindividualinchargeofpersonalperformance.SunWusaid,

Those who press forward without ambition for fame and retreatwithout trying to avoid blame,who only care for the security of the

peopleandthusare inharmonywith theinterestsof thesocialorder,theyaretreasuresofthenation.

Subordinationofselfishambitionorpersonalvanitytothewelfareofthegroupdoesnotdenybutratheraffirmstheworthoftheindividual,becausethepropercombinationofteamworkandindividualresponsibilityiswhatgetsthejobdone.ThesamebasicprinciplesarealsoechoedbySunBin:

Acting with integrity is a rich resource for warriors. Trust is adistinguished reward for warriors. Those who despise violence arewarriorsfittoworkforkings.

In addition to character and organizational ability, the capacity for intelligentplanningisessentialtoleadership.InthewordsofSunWu:“Thosewhodonotknow the plans of competitors cannot enter capably into preliminarynegotiations.”Skill in tactical thinkingisconsiderednormalfor leaders—notaproduct of cunning artifice, but a natural application of intelligence to therealitiesoflifeasitis.SunBinexplainsitthisway:

Fangsandhorns,clawsandspurs,harmonizingwhenpleased,fightingwhenangry—theseareinthecourseofnature,andcannotbestopped.Therefore those who have no natural defenses plan strategically forthemselves;thisisthebusinessofwiseleaders.

Theessenceofstrategicthinking,thepivotonwhichtacticalactionrevolves,issituationaladaptation,as indicatedbytheeldermaster,SunWu:“Leaderswhohavemasteredtheadvantagesofcomprehensiveadaptationtochangesarethosewhoknowhowtocommandmilitias.”It is this ability to adapt to changes, furthermore, that allows thewarrior to

remainunruffledinthemidstofchaoticupheaval,asSunWuobserves:“Mastersofmilitaryaffairsmovewithoutconfusion,mobilizewithoutexhaustion.”Inthisway the actions and measures taken by the leader can be based on objectiveresponse to the situation, unaffected by subjective emotions, unfazed by thepressuresofthemoment,asSunBinsays:“Letnothingseduceyou,letnothinganger you.” The elder master, Sun Wu, remarks: “To face confusion withcomposureandfaceclamorwithcalmismasteryofheart.”By remaining calm yet alert, uncaptivated and unperturbed, the leader can

concentrate mental energies on essential tasks, and not be sidetracked byambientunrest.Conversely,skillfulfocusalsoenablestheleadertobethatmuch

lessdistractedandsomuchthemoresereneandunruffled.SunBinsays,“Whenarticulatingdirectionandestablishingastandardofmeasure,onlyfocusonwhatisappropriate.”Thishelps toalleviate internalunrest in the ranksby relieving themindsof

subordinates from unnecessary concerns; and it also serves to help maintainsecurity by having people usefully occupied while keeping future plans inreserve, to be revealed only at the appropriate time. As SunWu describes it,“Theaffairsofmilitarycommandersarekeptinscrutablebyquietcalm.”The inner inaccessibility of the leader is, of course, strategic, andmust not

translate into aloofness and unconcern, for then itwould endanger rather thansafeguard the security of an organization or an operation. As Sun Bin says,“Whenyouknowsoldiersaretrustworthy,don’tletothersalienatethem.”Evenwhilemaintainingahiddensecrecy,theleadershipmustbeintimatelyacquaintedwith conditionswithin andwithout the organization, as illustrated in the oftenquoted dictum of Sun Wu, so simple yet so telling: “Knowing others andknowingyourself,victorywillnotbeimperiled.”The meaning of “knowing,” so complex and so critical in the context of

strategic thinking,may refer or allude in a given case to any one ormore ofnumerous diverse yet more or less indirectly related phenomena, includinginformation,misinformation, disinformation, and censorship—and, in addition,understanding,misunderstanding,illusion,anddeception.Thewholescienceofdeliberateconstructionof these formsandshadowsof

“knowledge,”andthemanipulationoftheirspecificinterrelationships,iscrucialtotacticalactionatitsmostsophisticatedlevel.Thisistheunderlyingfactthathas given rise to the famous dictum of Sun Wu, which is itself so oftenmisrepresented, misconstrued, and misunderstood, that “Warfare is a path ofsubterfuge.”Whenever either of the masters Sun involved himself in a discussion of

concretetacticsinactualsituations,itbecomesclearthatthenotionofwarfareasa path of subterfuge, the practice of seizing control of the opponent’s verythoughtsandperceptions,underliesthewholescienceofsituationalmasteryandeffectivesurprise.Sun Wu says, “Make a show of incompetence when you are actually

competent,makeashowineffectivenesswhenyouareinfacteffective.”SunBinelucidates,

Let them think you lack resolve, feign lack of ability, and appear tohave a defeatist attitude, so as to seduce them into arrogance andlaziness,making sure they do not recognize the real facts. Then, on

thisbasis,strikewheretheyareunprepared,attackwheretheyarenotdefending,pressurethosewhohaveslackedoff,andattackthosewhoareuncertainorconfused.

One reason for the use of surprise tactics is that they are ordinarily moreeconomical than conventional tactics, insofar as they are designed to strike atpoints of least resistance. To obtain the greatest advantage with the leastembroilmentisoneofthekeyartsofwar.Defensivemaneuveringisthusmorethandefensive.Notonlyisitameansof

storingenergy, it isaway to spyout the intentionsandabilitiesofopponents.SunWuadvises,“Evenwhenyouaresolid,stillbeonthedefensive;evenwhenyouarestrong,beevasive.”Followinguponthisidea,SunBinadds:“Donotpursueopponentsinflight,”

forthatwouldexpendpreciousenergyandalsoexposeone’sownpositionandcapacity.Theseconservativeandevendefensivemaneuversarebasesforattack,which

likedefensebeginswiththementalaspectofwarfare.SunWuproposestacticsthat radicallyminimize one’s own expenditureswhile putting the opponent atmaximumdisadvantage:“Useanger tomakethemupset,usehumility tomakethemarrogant.”Followingupon this,SunBingivessomefurtheradviceonaconvenientwaytoachievethelattereffect:“Disarraytroopsinconfusedranks,soastomaketheothersidecomplacent.”The underlying idea is to put off on the enemy as much of the burden of

warfare as possible, while reserving oneself intact. This is why the moralphilosophy of warfare from which these texts arise is fundamentallynonaggressive and is ethically based on response rather than initiative. Frommoralphilosophy,thisistranslateddirectlyintopracticalstrategy,asillustratedbySunWuinhistacticaldictum,“Tirethemwhiletakingiteasy,causedivisionamongthemwhileactingfriendly,”andechoedbySunBin’sadvice:“Youeattoyourfillandwaitfortheenemytostarve;youstayputcomfortablyandwaitfortheenemytotire;youkeepperfectlystillandwaitfortheenemytostir.”The power accumulated by the practice ofmaximum economy achieved by

secrecy and reserve is enhanced by the ability to compromise the power ofopponents.Sinceadirectapproach todiminishing theenemy’s forcewouldbemostcostly,again thescientificapproach ispreferred,asSunBin illustrates inhis pivotal dicta: “Confuse them and split them up,” and “Those skilled atwarfare are skilled at trimming enemies down and cutting their forces apart.”Strategicpreferencefor thisapproach isalsoevident in theadviceofSunWu,when he says, “A superior military operation attacks planning, the next best

attacksalliances.”Theseareprimarywaysofsplittingupopponents’forces.SunBinadds,“Attackthemas theysetupafront,split themupas theyorganize,”explainingthelogicofsuchmaneuversintheseterms:

Thosewhoareabletosplitupothers’armiesandcontrolothers’forcesareadequateevenwiththesmallestquantity;thosewhoareunabletosplitupothers’armiesandcontrolothers’forcesareinadequateeveniftheyhaveseveraltimesthefirepower.

Oneaspectofforcesplittingisthedeliberatedividingofattention.Thistypeofstrategy is commonandgeneral in application, as in the advice of SunWu to“Strikewheretheyareunprepared,emergewhentheyareleastanticipatingit,”andthecounselofSunBinto“Attackwheretheyareunprepared,actwhentheyleastexpectit.”Thissenseofopportunetimeandplaceis,furthermore,notsimplyamatterof

the enemy’s concrete preparedness, but also a question of mental energy andmorale. Sun Wu advises, “Good warriors avoid keen spirits, instead strikingenemies when their spirits are fading and waning.” To this may be added,pursuanttothealreadystipulatedneedtoknowbothothersandselfinordertoacteffectively,SunBin’sessentialcaveat:“Actonlywhenprepared.”Thecriticaldiscernmentofpowerconfigurations,oftherelationshipsbetween

one’sownstatesandthoseofopponents,isunderscoredinSunWu’ssummaryofthisaspectoftacticalstrategy:“Theancientswhowereskilledincombatfirstbecame invincible, and in that condition awaited vulnerability on the part ofenemies.”The economyof this approach is strongly emphasized in SunBin’ssuggestion that the best preparation is that which enables you to avoidembroilmentinpersistenthostilities:“Intelligentgovernmentsandcommanderswith knowledge of military science must prepare first; then they can achievesuccessbeforefighting.”Preparation sufficient to secure victory in advance requires knowledge of

environmental factors.Both the eldermaster, SunWu, and his successor, SunBin, emphasize the importance of prior knowledge. Sun Bin says, “It isimperativetoknowwhatgroundisviableandwhatgroundisdeadly;occupytheviableandattackthedeadly.”HereSunWugoesintosomedetail,specifyingtheappropriatemeasurestotakeonparticulargrounds:

Onagroundofdisintegration,donotfight.Onshallowground,donothalt. On a ground of contention, do not attack. On a ground ofintercourse, do not get cut off.On axial ground,make alliances.On

deep ground, plunder. On bad ground, keep going. On surroundedground,planahead.Ondeadlyground,fight.

Thetimingofanoperationisascriticalasthefieldofoperation.SunBinsays,“Fight only when you are sure to win, without letting anyone know.”Concentration and targeted release of power require inward certainty andoutwardsecurityformaximumefficiency,asillustratedbySunWu’sdictumthat“Crushingforceisduetotimingandcontrol.”Itisnotenoughtohavethepower;itmustbefocusedanddirected,asSunBin

says: “When your forces are larger and more powerful, and yet you still askabouthowtoemploythem,thisisthewaytoguaranteeyournation’ssecurity.”Relianceonsuperiorforceisnotmerelyriskybutintrinsicallycostly,sinceit

depends on the logic of expenditure. The need to devise effective structuresthrough which force can be concentrated and given aim is an establishedstrategic priority, but it is complicated by the fact that even an effectiveformulation loses its edgeonce it has become routine.AsSunWupoints out,“Usually, battle is engaged in a conventional manner but is won by surprisetactics....Surpriseandconventiongiverisetoeachotherincycles.”Onceatactichasbecomehabitual,itseffectivenessislost;theenemycansee

through the strategy and be preparedwith a countermaneuver. Thus SunBinwarns,“Whoeverhasformcanbedefined,andwhoevercanbedefinedcanbeovercome.” This is not only a basic principle of defensive warfare; it is alsofundamentaltooffense,asexplainedbySunWuintheseterms:“Ifyouinduceotherstoadoptaformwhileyouremainformless,thenyouwillbeconcentratedwhiletheenemywillbedivided.”Formlessness,whichalsomeansfluidityofform,isthusnotmerelydefensive

but isalsoeffectiveasanoffensiveposture.SunBinsays,“Amilitia isnot torelyona fixedformation,”becausefixation leads toexhaustion,paralysis,andlossofopportunity.ThusSunWuteaches,

The consummate formation of a militia is to reach formlessness.Wherethereisnospecificform,evendeeplyplacedagentscannotspyitout;eventhecannystrategistcannotschemeagainstit.

Thisdoesnotmeanthatthereisnoformwhatsoever,butthat thereisnofixedform,asSunBinexplains:

Formisamatterofusingwhateverissuperiortowin.Itisimpossibletousethebestofoneformtoovercomeallforms.Thereforecontrolof

formsisone,butthemeansofvictorycannotbeonlyone.

TheideathatfluidadaptabilityunderliessuccessfulstrategyismadequiteclearinthecorrespondingdictumofSunWuthat“Amilitiahasnopermanentlyfixedconfiguration,noconstantform.Thosewhoareabletoseizevictorybyadaptingtoopponentsarecalledexperts.”The need for flexibility is emphasized in strategic literature partly because

variation is in the nature of things, as Sun Wu notes in remarking that “Noelementisalwaysdominant,noseasonisalwayspresent.”Theabilitytochangetacticsisnotonlynecessaryforadaptationtoexternalchangesincircumstances;itisstrategicallynecessaryinordertobaffleopponents.SunWubringsthisoutwhen he says, “The task of a military action is to unobtrusively deceive themindsofenemies,”andSunBinconfirms that“Expertsdrive theirenemies totheirwits’ends.”ThusSunWuadvises,

When the enemy presents an opening, be sure to penetrate at once.Preemptwhat the enemyprefers, secretly anticipating him.Actwithdisciplineandadapttotheoppositioninordertosettlethecontest.

ThisfluidskillfulnessisdescribedbySunBinintheseterms:“Torespondtoaformwithaformisdirectness,torespondtoformwithoutformissurprise.”For opponents of the expert, the question of whether one uses form or

formlessness,conventionorsurprise,ultimatelybecomesaformlesssurpriseinitself.Forthetactician,itissimplyamatterofwhatwillworkeffectively;asSunWusays:“Donotmobilizewhenitisnotadvantageous,donotactwhenitisnotproductive,anddonotfightwhennotimperiled.”Afterallfactorshavebeenconsidered,andthelogicoftheoperationisclear,

thedecisiontomobilizecanbeapproachedwithintelligence.Then,ifstrategicnecessitycallsforit,subterfugeistheessenceoftheartofwar.AsSunWusays,inhiscolorfuldescriptionoftacticalsurprise,“Atfirstyouarelikeavirgingirl,towhomtheenemyopenshisdoor.Thenyouarelikeajackrabbitontheloose,whichtheenemycannotkeepout.”The prominence of subterfuge and deception in the techniques of classical

strategists such as Sun Wu and Sun Bin often gives the impression ofthoroughgoingruthlessness.Whatmustberememberedisthattacticalaction,asunderstood by these ancient thinkers, is not only considered from a materialpoint of view, but also from psychological and philosophical points of view.Thusstrategyislegitimatelyconceivedintheaftermath,andinthereflection,of

moralandethicalconsideration.ThiscriticalfactorisimmediatelyevidentinSunWu’sownintroductiontothe

subject:“Warisanationalcrisis;itisnecessarytoexaminethegroundsofdeathand life,and theways to survivalandextinction.”Thepremise thatwarfare isjustifiedby itsmoralground,notby itsoutcome, isoftenoverlookedby thosewhofocusonlyonstrategypersewithoutkeepingtheethicaldimensionofthecontexteverpresentinthebackground.ThismoralandethicalbasisunderlyingthetraditionofSunWuandSunBin

canbefoundfullyexpressedintheclassicSixStrategies,whichisabasicsourcebookforallthegreatworksofthistype.ThisclassicisattributedtoasageofthetwelfthcenturyB.C.E.,a teacherofkingsfromwhosevastbodyofworkderivethemainsourcesofChinesecultureandcivilization.ItisinthevoluminousSixStrategies thatbothethicalandpragmaticaspects

ofstatecraftandstrategycanbeclearlyseen,foreshad-owingthelaterteachingsofSunWuandSunBinonstrategicfactorsofleadership,order,andcommand.The original teachings of the Six Strategies on the subject of leadership

includethewholeperson,fromcharacter,mentality,attitude,andconductasanindividual, tomanners and techniques proper to professionalmanagement andleadershipskills:

Be calm and serene, gentle and moderate. Be generous, notcontentious;beopenheartedandevenminded.Treatpeoplecorrectly.Don’t give arbitrary approval, yet don’t refuse out of mere

contrariness.Arbitraryapprovalmeanslossofdiscipline,whilerefusalmeansshuttingoff.Lookwiththeeyesofthewholeworld,andthereisnothingyouwill

notsee.Listenwiththeearsofthewholeworld,andthereisnothingyouwillnothear.Thinkwith themindsof thewhole land,and therewillbenothingyoudonotknow.Ifyouare lazyevenwhenyousee there isgoodtobedone,when

you are hesitant even though the time is right, if you persist insomethingknowingitiswrong,thisiswheretheWayhalts.Whenyouare flexible and calm, respectful and serious, strong yet yielding,tolerantyetfirm,thisiswheretheWayarises.When duty prevails over desire, this results in flourishing; when

desire prevails over duty, this results in perishing.When seriousnessprevails over laziness, this results in good fortune. When lazinessprevailsoverseriousness,thisresultsindestruction.

Earlier mention was made of the so-called six defenses listed in the SixStrategies,which are analogous toSunWu’s parameters for leadership.These“six defenses” are actually qualities and capabilities of capable commanders:humaneness, justice, loyalty, trustworthiness, courage, and strategy. The SixStrategiesalsolistswaysofchoosingpeopleforthesesixdefenses:

Enrichthemandseeiftheyrefrainfrommisconduct,inordertoprovetheirhumaneness.Ennoblethemandseeiftheyrefrainfromhauteur,inordertoprovetheirsenseofjustice.Givethemresponsibilitiesandseeiftheyrefrainfromautocraticbehavior,inordertoprovetheirloyalty.Employthemandseeiftheyrefrainfromdeceit,inordertoprovetheirtrustworthiness.Endangerthemandseeiftheyareunafraid,inordertoprovetheircourage.Burdenthemandseeiftheyareunflagging,inordertoprovetheirstrategicapproachtoproblems.

TheprinciplesoforderelucidatedintheSixStrategiesare,liketheprinciplesofleadership,forerunnersoftheconceptsoforganizationutilizedbybothSunWuandSunBin.Some of themost powerful of these are the diagnostic principles bywhich

defectsinasystemcanbeidentified.Amongthesearetheso-calledSixRobbersandSevenDestroyers.TheSixRobbersare:

Officialswhobuildhugemansionsandestatesandpasstheirtimeinentertainment,tothedetrimentoftheintegrityofleadership.Workerswhodon’twork,butgoaroundgettingintoothers’business,disruptingorder.Officialswhohavecliquesthatobscurethegoodandwiseandthwarttheenlightened.Ambitiousofficerswhoindependentlycommunicatewithleadersofotheroutfits,withoutdeferencetotheirownleaders.Executiveswhodisregardrankandlookdownonteamwork,andareunwillingtogototroubleforemployers.Strongfactionswhooverpowerthosewhoareweakandlackinginresources.

TheSevenDestroyersare:

Thosewholackintelligenttacticalstrategybutarepugnaciousandcombativeoutofambitionforrewardsandtitles.Self-contradictingopportunists,pretenderswhoobscurethegoodandelevatethebad.Thosewhoputontheappearanceofausterityanddesirelessnessinordertogetsomething.Thosewhopretendtobeeccentricintellectuals,puttingonairsandlookingontheworldwithaloofcontempt.Thedishonestandunscrupulouswhoseekofficeandentitlementbyflatteryandunfairmeans,whodisplaybraveryoutofgreedforemolument,whoactopportunisticallywithoutconsiderationofthebigpicture,whopersuadeleaderswithtalltalesandemptytalk.Thosewhocompromiseprimaryproductionbyneedlessluxury.Thosewhousesupposedoccultartsandsuperstitiouspracticestobewilderdecentpeople.

Because selection and employment are considered part of the overall task ofmanagement,thequestionarisesastowhytheremaybenoeffectiveresultsevenif the leadership tries to promote theworthy. The answer provided by theSixStrategies is that in such cases, promotion of the worthy is more form thanreality,goingonthebasisofvulgarpopularityorsocialrecommendationandnotfindingreallyworthypeople:

Iftheleadershipconsidersthepopulartobeworthyandtheunpopulartobeunworthy,thenthosewithmanypartisansgetahead,whilethosewithfewpartisansfallbehind.Ifso, thencrookswillbeeverywhere,obscuring theworthy; loyal administratorswill be terminated for nowrongdoing,whiletreacherousbureaucratswillassumerankbymeansoffalserepresentation.

THESILVERSPARROWARTOFWAR

SUNTZU

TRANSLATOR’SINTRODUCTION

In 1972, a number of fragments of The Art of War were discovered at anarcheologicalsiteatSilverSparrowMountaininChina’sShandongProvince.Inaddition to extensive remnants ofSunBin’s lostArt ofWar (published in thisvolumeasTheLostArtofWarbySunTzuII),archeologists foundpreviouslyunknown fragmentsofSunTzu’sTheArtofWar.Unfortunately,muchof thismaterial was found in such physically deteriorated condition (having beenentombedformorethantwothousandyears)thattherearemanylacunae.Somefragments are so disjointed as to be useless. There are, however, somecomparatively intact elements of this newly discoveredmaterial that illustratecertainfacetsofSunTzu’sstrategicthinking,includingpoliticalfactors.InTheQuestionsofWu, the king ofWuquestionsSunTzu about ruination

and survival. Sun Tzu replies that ruination is a result of inadequate landdistribution, overtaxation, bureaucratic hypertrophy, arrogance in the rulingclass,andaggressivenessinthemilitary.Incontrast,SunTzucontinues,survivalresultsfromadequatelanddistribution,minimaltaxation,frugalityintheupperechelons,andenrichmentofthegeneralpopulace.InFourAdaptations,SunTzuexplainsthestatementsthatthereareroadsnot

tobefollowed,armiesnottobeattacked,citadelsnottobebesieged,landnottobe contested, and orders of the ruler not to be followed. The roads not to befollowedarethosealongwhichshallowpenetrationintoenemyterritoryleavesuncertaintyastowhatisahead;thosealongwhichdeeppenetrationintoenemyterritorydoesnotallowforconsolidationofgainsallalongtheway;thosealongwhich movement is not advantageous, yet stalling would result in captivity.Armies not to be attacked are those that do not seem strong enough to avoiddefeat,andyetinthelongrunmaybeexpectedtohavesurpriseformationsandskillfultactics.Citadelsnottobebesiegedarethosethatcouldbetaken,andyet,even if taken, would be no help in making progress and would also beimpossibletodefendafterward.Ifone’sforceisinsufficient,SunTzucontinues,a citadel will surely not be taken; but even if a citadel would surrender ifbesiegers had advantageous conditions, and even if no loss would ensue ifconditionswerenotfavorableforasiege,undertheseconditionsacitadelisnot

to be attacked. Land not to be contested refers to wilderness where soldierscannotliveofftheland.Ordersnottobefollowedarethosethatcontradicttheforegoingfouradaptations.InThe YellowEmperor’sDefeat of the RedEmperor, SunTzu recounts the

tactics used by the semimythological Chinese cultural hero Huang Di, “TheYellowEmperor,”inrisingtoascendancyoverneighboringtribes.WhenHuangDi attacked tribes to the south, east, north, andwest, in each casehekept theshady sides of mountains to his right, followed strategic routes, kept naturalbarriers to his back, and thus destroyed his opponents and annexed theirterritories.Then he let the people rest, allowing the cereal crops to ripen, anddeclaredamnesty.

[1]

StrategicMeasurements

Warisanationalcrisis;itisnecessarytoexaminethegroundsofdeathandlifeandthewaystosurvivalandextinction.Thusyoumeasuremilitiasintermsoffiveparameters,comparingthemintermsofstrategicmeasurementstofindouttherealsituation.Firstisguidance.Secondisclimate.Thirdisground.Fourthisleadership.Fifthisorder.Guidanceiswhatinducespopularaccordwiththerulership,sothepeopleare

willingtofollowittodeathandfollowitinlife,withoutopposition.Climate refers to darkness and light, cold and heat, the structure of the

seasons.Groundmaybehighorlow,nearorfar,treacherousoreasy,broadornarrow,

deadlyorviable.Leadershipisamatterofknowledge,trustworthiness,humaneness,valor,and

strictness.Orderinvolvesorganizationalstructure,chainofcommand,andlogistics.Allleadershaveheardofthesefivethings;thosewhoknowthemprevailover

those who do not. That is why we make comparisons in terms of strategicmeasurements—to find out the real situation. Which civil leadership hasguidance?Whichmilitaryleadershiphasability?Whoseclimateandgroundsareadvantageous? Whose order is enforced? Whose forces are stronger? Whoseofficers and soldiers are better trained? Whose rewards and punishments areclearer?InthiswayIknowwhoisgoingtowinandwhoisgoingto lose.If leaders

listentomystrategy,theirmilitaryactionswillbevictorious.ThenIwillstay.Ifleadersdonotlistentomystrategy,theirmilitaryactionswillbefailures.ThenIwill leave. One can assess advantages through listening, then take up anappropriatepostureormakeanappropriatedispositiontobolsterone’sexterior.Totakeupapostureoradispositionmeanstomanipulatestrategyaccording

toadvantage.Warfareisapathofsubterfuge.Thatiswhyyoumakeashowofincompetencewhenyouareactuallycompetent,makeashowofineffectivenesswhenyouareinfacteffective.Whennearby,youappeartobedistant,andwhen

distant,youappeartobenearby.Seducing opponents with prospects of gain, take them over by means of

confusion.Evenwhenyouaresolid,stillbeonthedefensive;evenwhenyouarestrong,be evasive.Use anger tomake themupset, usehumility tomake themarrogant.Tirethemwhiletakingiteasy,causedivisionamongthemwhileactingfriendly.Attackwheretheyareunprepared,emergewhentheyleastexpectit.Thismeansthatthevictoriesofwarriorscannotbetoldofbeforehand.Thosewho figure out how towin before doing battle have themajority of

advantageousplans,whilethosewhoseschemesprovetobefailuresevenbeforebattlehave fewer advantageousplans.Thosewithmany suchplanswin, thosewithfewsuchplans lose; there isnoneedtoevenmentionthosewithnosuchplans.WhenIviewasituationinthisway,itbecomesevidentwhowillwinandwhowilllose.

[2]

Combat

Ageneral rule formilitaryoperationscalls fora thousandchariots, a thousandleather-coveredwagons,ahundredthousandarmoredtroops,andprovisionsforseveralhundredmiles.Thusinternalandexternalexpenses,includingtheneedsof ambassadors and advisors, materials such as glue and lacquer, andmaintenanceofvehiclesandarmor,costsathousandpiecesofgoldaday;onlythuscanyoumobilizeaforceofahundredthousandtroops.Inactualcombat,whatis importantis towin;goontoolong,andyoublunt

yourtroopsandsnapyouredge.Besiegeacitadel,andyourstrengthisdepleted;keep an army in the field too long, and the resources of the nation will beinsufficient.Whenyoubluntyourtroops,snapyouredge,depleteyourstrength,and exhaust your resources, rivals will arise to take advantage of yourpredicament. Then it will be impossible to effect a good ending, even withknowledge.Thereforeinmilitaryaffairswemayhearofbeingclumsybutswift,whilewe

never see the skillful prolonging an action. This is because a nation neverbenefitsfromprolongingamilitaryaction.Sothosewhoarenotcompletelyawareofdrawbacksofmilitaryactioncannot

becompletelyawareofadvantagesinmilitaryaction.Those who use militias skillfully do not draft conscripts twice or ship

provisions over and over; taking necessities from the nation and feeding offopponents,thearmycanthusbesufficientlyfed.The reason that nations are impoverished by their armies is that thosewho

sendtheirarmiesfarawayshipgoodsfaraway,andwhengoodsareshippedfaraway,thefarmersgrowpoor.Thosewhoarenearthearmyselldear,andbecauseof high prices money runs out.When the money runs out, there is increasedpressure to appropriate things for military use. Exhausting the heartland,drainingthehouseholds,thistakesupseventypercentofthepeasants’expenses.Asfortheexpensesofthegovernment,theruinedchariots,thehorsesrendereduseless, thearmorandweaponry, theoxenandtransportvehicles takeupsixtypercent.

This iswhy awise leader strives to feedoff the enemy.The amount of theenemy’s food you eat is equivalent to twenty times that amount of your ownfood; the amountof the enemy’s fodderyouuse is equivalent to twenty timesthatamountofyourownfodder.So what gets opponents killed is anger, what gets you the advantage over

opponentsisthespoils.Thus,inachariotbattle,whenyoursidehascapturedatleasttenchariots,awardthemtothefirsttomakeacapture;changetheflagsandusethechariotstogetherwithyours,treatingthesoldierswellandprovidingforthem.Thisiscalledovercominganopponentandgrowingevenstronger.So in amilitary operationwhat is important is to prevail; it is not good to

prolongit.Thus a leader who commands a militia knowledgeably has the fate of the

peopleinhishands;thesafetyordangerofthenationisuptohim.

[3]

PlanningAttack

Thegeneral rule formilitary operations is that keeping a nation intact is best,whiledestroyinganation isnext; keepingamilitia intact isbest, destroyingamilitiaisnext.Keepingabattalionintactisbest,destroyingabattalionisnext.Keeping a company intact is best, destroying a company is next. Keeping asquadintact isbest,destroyingasquadisnext.Thereforeonehundredpercentvictoryinbattleisnotthefinestskill;foilingothers’militaryoperationswithoutevenfightingisthefinestskill.Thus a superior military operation attacks planning, the next best attacks

alliances;thenextattacksarmedforces,thelowestattackscitadels.Theruleforattackingacitadelisthatitisonlydoneoutofsheernecessity.It

takes three months to prepare the equipment and another three months toconstructearthmoundsagainstthewallsofthecitadel.When a military leader cannot contain anger and has his men swarm the

citadel,thiskillsathirdofhissoldiers;withthecitadelstillnottaken,thisisafiascoofasiege.Thereforeonewhousesthemilitaryskillfullyfoilsthemilitaryoperations of others without fighting, takes others’ citadels without attacking,and crushes others’ states without taking a long time, making sure to remainintact to contend with the world, so that his forces are not blunted and theadvantagecanbecomplete.Thisistheruleforplanningattack.Sotheruleformilitaryoperations is that ifyououtnumberopponents tento

one,thensurroundthem;fivetoone,attackthem;twotoone,fightthem.Ifyouareevenlymatched,youcandividethem;ifyouareless,youcandefendagainstthem.Ifyouarenotasgood,thenyoucanevadethem.Thuswhatwould be firmness in the face of a small opponentwill get you

capturedbyalargeopponent.Military leaders are assistants of nations. When their assistants are

thoroughgoing, nations will be strong; when their assistants are negligent,nationswillbeweak.Sotherearethreewaysinwhichacivilianleadertroublesamilitia.Callingon

themilitiatoadvanceunawarethatitshouldnotadvanceatthatpoint,orcalling

onthemilitiatoretreatunawarethatitshouldnotretreatatthatpoint,iscalledfetteringthemilitia.Civilgovernmentparticipatingintherunningofthemilitarywithout understanding military affairs leads to confusion among the soldiers.Civil government sharing the responsibilities of the military withoutunderstandingmilitarystrategyleadstomistrustamongthesoldiers.Onceyourmilitaryforcesareconfusedanddistrustful,rivalswillgiveyoutrouble.Thisiscalleddisorientingthemilitaryandbringinginconquerors.Sotherearefivewaystoknowwinners.Thosewhoknowwhentofightand

when not to fight are winners. Those who know the uses of large and smallgroups are winners. Those whose upper and lower echelons have the samedesires are winners. Those who await the unprepared with preparedness arewinners. Those whose military leaders are capable and not dominated by thecivilianleadersarewinners.Thesefiveitemsarewaystoknowwinners.So it is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be

imperiledinahundredbattles.Ifyoudonotknowothersbutdoknowyourself,youwillwinsomeandlosesome.Ifyoudonotknowothersanddonotknowyourself,youwillbeimperiledineverybattle.

[4]

Formations

The ancients whowere skilled in combat first became invincible, and in thatconditionawaitedvulnerabilityonthepartofenemies.Invincibilityisuptoyouyourself;vulnerabilitydependsontheopponent.Thereforethosewhoareskilledin combat can become invincible but cannot make opponents vulnerable tocertaindefeat.Thisiswhyitissaidthatvictorycanbediscernedbutcannotbemade.Invincibilityisamatterofdefense,vulnerabilityisamatterofoffense.When

youdefend,itisbecauseyouareoutgunned;whenyouattack,itisbecausetheopponentisnomatch.Thoseskilledatdefensehideinthedeepestdepthsoftheearth;thoseskilled

at offensemaneuver in the highest heights of the sky.Thus they can preservethemselvesandmakevictorycomplete.Thosewhoseperceptionofhowtowinisnotbeyondcommonknowledgeare

notthemostskillfulofexperts.Itdoesn’ttakemuchstrengthtoliftastrandofhair, it doesn’t take clarity of eye to see the sun and moon, it doesn’t takesharpnessofeartohearthunder.Thoseconsideredgoodwarriorsinancienttimeswerethosewhowonwhenit

waseasytowin.Thusthevictoriesofgoodwarriorshavenothingextraordinaryabout them:Theyarenotfamedforbrilliance,notaccordedmeritforbravado.Thustheirvictoriesinbattlearenotindoubt.Theyarenotindoubtbecausethemeasures theytakearesure towin,sincetheyareovercomingthosewhohavealreadylost.Therefore those who are skilled in combat take a stand on an invincible

ground without losing sight of opponents’ vulnerabilities. Thus a victoriousmilitia wins before ever seeking to do battle, while a defeated militia seeksvictoryafterithasalreadygottenintoafight.WhenthosewhoemploymilitaryforcesputtheWayintopracticeandkeepits

laws, they can thereby judge the outcome. The laws are as follows: first ismeasure,secondiscapacity,thirdisorder,fourthisefficacy,fifthisvictory.Thegroundgivesrisetomeasures,measuresproducecapacity.Capacitygivesriseto

order,orderproducesefficacy.Efficacygivesrisetovictory.Thusavictoriousmilitiaislikeaweightbalancedagainstanotherweightthat

is five hundred times less, while a defeated militia is like a weight balancedagainst another weight that is five hundred times greater. Those who get thepeople to fight from a winning position are as though opening up dammedwatersintoamile-deepcanyon;thisisamatteroftheformationofforce.

[5]

DispositionandMomentum

Whatnormallymakesmanagingalargegroupsimilartomanagingasmallgroupis a system of order.Whatmakes fighting a large group similar to fighting asmallgroupistheuseofemblemsandsignals.Whatenablesmilitaryforcestotakeonenemieswithoutdefeatistheimplementationofsurprisetacticsaswellasconventionalstrategies.Whatmakesamilitaryinterventionaseffectiveasastonethrownoneggsisdiscernmentofopeningsandsolidity.Usually battle is engaged in a conventionalmanner but is won by surprise

tactics.Sothosewhoaregoodatsurprisemaneuversareendlessastheskyandearth; inexhaustible as the great rivers; finishing, then starting again, asepitomizedbythesunandmoon;dyingandthenbeingreborn,asepitomizedbythefourseasons.There areonly fivenotes, but their various combinations are infinite.There

are only five colors, but their various combinations are infinite. Combatdispositions are either conventional or extraordinary, but the variouscombinations of convention and surprise are endless. Surprise and conventiongive rise toeachother incycles, likeabeginninglessandendlesscircle—whocanexhaustthem?The fact that thevelocityof rushingwater can reach thepointwhere it can

sweepawayboulders isdue tomomentum; the fact that thestrikeofabirdofpreycanattainacrushingforceisduetotimingandcontrol.Thusthoseskilledat combat make sure their momentum is closely channeled and their timingcloselycontrolled.Theirmomentumislikedrawingacatapult,theirtimingandcontrolare likepulling the trigger. In themidstofconfusion, theyfightwildlywithoutbeing thrown intodisarray; in themidstofchaos, their formationsareversatile,sotheycannotbedefeated.Rebellion arises fromorderliness, cowardice arises frombravado,weakness

arises from strength. Whether there is order or unruliness depends on theoperativelogicoftheorder.Braveryandcowardicedependontheconfigurationsandmomentumofpower.Strengthandweaknessdependonformation.Therefore, those who are good at maneuvering enemies mold them into

specific formations, to which the enemies may be sure to conform. Giveopponentsanopportunity theyaresure to take,maneuvering themin thisway,thenwaitinambushforthem.Forthesereasons,thosewhoareskilledincombatlooktodispositionofforce

andmomentum;theydonotputtheonusonindividualpeople.Thatiswhytheycanchoosepeopleyetputtheirtrustinmomentum.Torelyonmomentumistogetpeopletogointobattlelikerollinglogsandrocks.Bynature,logsandrocksremain still on even ground and roll when the ground is steep; they remainstationarywhen square, they rollwhen round. Thus themomentum of peoplewho are good at combat is like rolling round rocks down a high mountain,becauseofthedispositionofforce.

[6]

VulnerabilityandSubstantiality

Generallyspeaking,thosewhohavetakenuptheirpositiononabattlefieldfirstandawaittheenemytherearefresh,whilethosewhotakeuptheirpositiononabattlefieldlastandthusrushintocombatarewearied.Thereforeskilledwarriorsbringotherstothemanddonotgotoothers.Whateffectivelyinducesenemiestocomeoftheirownaccordistheprospect

ofgain;whateffectivelypreventsenemiesfromcomingisthethreatofharm.Sotoeffectivelytirearestedenemy,starveawell-fedone,orstirupacalmone,isamatterofgoingwheretheenemyissuretogivechase.Thosewho travel hundreds ofmileswithout fatigue can do so by traveling

uninhabitedlands.Thosewhoalwaystakewhattheybesiegedosobyattackingwhere there is no defense. Those whose defense always stands firm defendwhereattackiscertain.Thereforeagoodattackisoneagainstwhichanenemydoesnotknowwhere

todefend,whileagooddefenseisoneagainstwhichanenemydoesnotknowwhere to attack. Be subtle, subtle even to the point of formlessness; bemysterious,mysteriouseventothepointofsoundlessness:Thusyoucancontroltheenemy’sfate.Toadvanceunstoppably,strikeatopenings.Toretreatelusively,movetoofast

fortheenemytocatchupwithyou.Thus,whenyouwanttofight,thewaytoletanenemyhavenochoicebuttofightwithyou,eventhoughheissecurebehindhighrampartsanddeepmoats,istoattackwhereheissuretogototherescue.Whenyoudon’twanttofight,tomakeanenemyunabletofightwithyouevenifyouareonlydefendingalinedrawnintheground,diverthisaim.Thus, ifyou induceothers toadopta formwhileyou remain formless, then

you will be concentrated while the enemy will be divided. When you areconcentrated and thus united, whereas the enemy is divided into ten, you areattackingwith ten times his strength, so you are a large contingent while theenemy is in small groups. If you can attack small groups with a largercontingent,thenyouwillhavefewertofightagainstatatime.Your battleground should be unknown, because if it is unknown, then the

enemywillhavetopostmanydefensivepositions,andwhentheenemyhastomanmanydefensivepositions,thenyouwillhavefewerpeopletofightagainstatatime.Thuswhentheyaremannedinfront,theyareundermannedintherear;when

theyaremannedintherear,theyareundermannedinfront.Whenmannedattheleft, they are undermanned to the right; when manned at the right, they areundermanned to the left. When they are manned everywhere, they areundermannedeverywhere.Thosewhoareundermannedarethosewhoareonthedefensive against others; those who have plenty of personnel are those whocauseotherstobeonthedefensiveagainstthem.Therefore,ifyouknowthegroundofcombatandthedayofcombat,youcan

gotobattlehundredsofmilesaway.Ifyoudonotknowthegroundofcombatorthedayofcombat, thenyourleftflankcannothelpyourrightflank,yourrightflankcannothelpyourleftflank,yourforwardwingcannothelpyourrearguard,and your rear guard cannot help your forwardwing.Howmuch less can theyhelpeachotherwhenthereisadistanceofmiles!Accordingtomycalculations,althoughtheenemyhasmanytroops,stillthat

hardly increases their chances of victory! That is why I say victory can beachieved;eveniftheenemyisnumerous,theycanbemadetonotfight.Thusyouplotagainstthemtodiscernwinningandlosingstrategies,youwork

on them to discern their patterns of action.You induce them to adopt specificformations to discern deadly and viable grounds, you skirmish with them todiscernwheretheyaresufficientandwheretheyarelacking.So the consummate formation of a militia is to reach formlessness.Where

thereisnospecificform,evendeeplyplacedagentscannotspyitout;eventhecannystrategistcannotschemeagainstit.Whenyouplanvictoryforthemassesbasedonformation,themassescannot

discernit;everyoneknowstheformofyourvictory,butnooneknowstheformbywhichyouachievedvictory.Thisiswhyavictoryinbattleisnotrepeated;adaptiveformationisofendless

scope.The formationofamilitia is symbolizedbywater.Water travelsaway from

higherplaces toward lowerplaces;militaryvictory is amatterof avoiding thesolidandstrikingsatopenings.Thecourseofwaterisdeterminedbyearth,thewaytomilitaryvictorydependsontheopponent.Thus a militia has no permanently fixed configuration, no constant form.

Thosewhoareabletoseizevictorybyadaptingtoopponentsarecalledexperts.Noelementisalwaysdominant,noseasonisalwayspresent.Somedaysare

shorter,somearelonger;themoonwanesawayandthenreappears.

[7]

ArmedStruggle

Thegeneral rule formilitaryoperations is that themilitary leadershipgets theorderfromthecivilianleadershiptoassembleanarmy,gathertroops,andmassatthefront.Nothingisharderthanarmedstruggle.The difficulty of armed struggle ismaking a circuitous route into themost

directway,turningproblemsintoadvantages.Thuswhen you take a circuitous route—thereby leading on opponentswith

theprospectofgain—leavingafterothersbutarrivingbeforethem,thenyouaretheonewhoknowsstrategicuseofcircuitousness’sdirectness.Thusarmedstrugglecanbeprofitableandcanbeperilous.Ifyoumobilizethewholearmytofightfortheadvantage,youwillbetoolate;

ifyouleavethearmybehindtofightforadvantage,thenequipmentwillbelost.Thus if you rushoffwithyour armor in storage,marchingdouble timeday

andnight to fight for advantage too far away, thenyour topcommandwill becaptured;thestrongestwillgettherefirst,laggardslater,andasaruleonlyoneintenwillmakeitatall.If you struggle for advantage at a considerable distance, your vanguard

commanderwillbefelled,andasaruleonlyhalfyourforcewillevergetthere.Ifyoustruggleforadvantageatasomewhatlesserdistance,thentwooutofthreewillgetthere.Thereforeanarmywillperishifithasnoequipment,nofood,ornoreserves.Sothosewhodonotknowtheplansofcompetitorscannotentercapablyinto

preliminary negotiations; those who do not know the lay of the land cannotmaneuver a militia; those who do not use local guides cannot gain theadvantagesoftheterrain.Thereforeamilitaryforcestandsondeceitandmovesaccordingtoadvantage;

divisionandcombinationarethemeansofadaptation.Whenitmovesswiftly,itislikethewind;whenitmovesslowly,itislikeaforest;whenitraids,itislikefire;whenit isstill, it is likeamountain.Inscrutableas thedarkness, itmoveslike thunder rumbling.To plunder an area, it distributes its troops; to broaden

territory, it parcels out defense of the critical positions. Action is taken afterweighingstrategy.The first side to know how to make strategic use of circuitous and direct

routesistheonetowin;thisisalawofarmedconflict.Aclassiconmilitaryordersays,“Gongsanddrumsareusedbecausewords

cannotbeheard;pennantsand flagsareusedbecause soldierscannot seeeachother.”Thusgongsanddrumsaremostlyusedinnightcombat,whilepennantsandflagsaremostlyusedindaycombat.Gongs,drums,pennants,andflagsaremeansofunifyingthepeople’searsand

eyes.Oncethepeopleareunified,thentheboldcannotpushaheadalone,whilethetimidcannotfallbackalone.Thisistheruleforemployingalargegroup.Thus the armed forcesmay have their spirit taken away,while the generals

mayhave theirheart takenaway. In thisconnection, in themorningspiritsarekeen, in theafternoonspirits fade, in theeveningspiritswaneaway.Thereforegoodwarriorsavoidkeenspirits,insteadstrikingenemieswhentheirspiritsarefading and waning. This is the mastery of mood. To face confusion withcomposureandfaceclamorwithcalmis themasteryofheart.Tostayclose tohometofacethosewhocomefromfaraway,tofacethewearyinaconditionofease, to face the hungrywith full stomachs is themastery of strength.Not tostandinthewayofanorderlymarchandnottoattackanimpeccablebattlelineisthemasteryofadaptation.Sorulersformilitaryoperationsarenottofacehighground,nottogetbacked

upagainstahill,nottopursueafeignedretreat,nottoattackfreshtroops,nottochaseafterdecoys,nottotrytostopanarmyonthewayhome,toleaveawayoutforasurroundedarmy,andnottopressadesperateenemy.Thesearerulesformilitaryoperations.

[8]

AdaptingtoAllChanges

Thegeneral rule formilitaryoperations is that themilitary leadershipgets thedirectivefromthecivilianleadershiptoassemblethearmyandmassthetroops.Do not camp on rugged ground. Establish diplomatic relations on open,

accessible ground. Do not tarry on isolated ground. Where you may besurrounded,planahead.Wherethesituationisdeadly,fight.Therearesomeroadsthatarenottobetaken.Therearesomearmiesthatare

nottobeattacked.Therearesomecitadelsthatarenottobebesieged.Therearesome territories that are not to be contested. There are some governmentdirectivesthatarenottobeaccepted.Therefore military leaders who have mastered the advantages of

comprehensive adaptation to changes are those who know how to commandmilitias.Ifmilitaryleadershavenotmasteredtheadvantagesofcomprehensiveadaptation tochanges, theneven if theyknow the layof the land, theycannottake advantage of it. If they govern the military but do not know the art ofadaptingtoallchanges,eveniftheyknowofvariousadvantages,theycannotgetpeopletooperateeffectively.Therefore the considerations of the wise include both profit and harm.

Becausetheyconsiderprofit,theirworkisreliable;becausetheyconsiderharm,theirproblemscanberesolved.So what inhibits competitors is the possibility of harm, what keeps

competitorsoccupiediswork,whatsendscompetitorsrunningistheprospectofgain.Thusaruleofmilitaryactionisnottodependonenemiesnotshowingup,butratherrelyonhavingmeansofdealingwiththem;don’tdependonenemiesnotattacking,butratherrelyonhavingyourowninvulnerability.Thus there are five dangers inmilitary leaders.Thosewhowill fight to the

death can be killed. Thosewho are intent on survival can be captured. Thosewho are quick to anger are vulnerable to contempt. Purists are vulnerable toshame.Emotionalhumanitariansarevulnerabletoanxiety.Thesefivethingsareexcesses inmilitary leaders; they are disastrous formilitary operations. Thesefivedangersarewhatoverturnarmiesandkillcommanders,soitisimperativeto

examinethem.

[9]

ManeuveringForces

Whenever you position your forces, size up your opponents. When you cutthroughmountains, keep to thevalleys; camponhighground, looking towardthelight,anddon’tfightuphill.Thisishowtomaneuverinthemountains.When you cut across bodies of water, you must distance yourself from it.

Wheninvaderscomeacrosswater,don’tmeet theminthewater; lethalfcrossbeforeyouattackthem,andyouwillgettheadvantage.Whenyouaregoingtodo battle, do not meet invaders near water. Camp on high ground, lookingtowardthelight,anddonotfacethecurrentofariver.Thisishowtomaneuveraroundbodiesofwater.Whenyoucut throughsaltmarshes, justhurry togetoutasfastasyoucan,

without stopping at all. If you skirmish in a marsh, stick by the water andgrasses, with your back to clusters of trees. This is how to maneuver inmarshland.Onplains, takeupyourposition in levelspotswithhighgroundto theright

andtheback,deadlygroundinfrontandviablegroundbehind.This ishowtomaneuveronlevelterrain.It was the advantage of these four ways of maneuvering that enabled the

YellowEmperortoovercomefourrulers.Generally speaking, armies prefer high ground to low ground, sunlight to

shade.Takecareoftheirhealthandtakeuppositionsinplacesthatcansupportyou, so that the soldiers do not fall ill. This is considered the way to certainvictory.Whenyoucometohillsorembankments,positionyourselfonthesunnyside,

keepingthemtoyourrightandyourback.Thisisadvantageousforbattle,beinghelpedbythelayoftheland.Whenitrainsupriver,thewaterwillbefrothing;donotcrossuntilitsettles.

Wheneveryoucutthroughanaturalravine,anaturalenclosure,anaturalprison,anatural trap,anaturalpitfall,oranaturalcleft,besure togetoutof thereassoon as possible, because you should not be near them. I stay far away fromthem,sothattheenemyisnearertothemthanI;Ifacethem,sothattheenemy

hashisbacktothem.If therearecanyonsandravinesnearby thearmy,orponds, reeds,mountain

forests,orthickets,itisimperativetosearchthemthoroughly,againandagain,becausetheseareplaceswhereambushersandinterloperslurk.When enemies are nearby yet quiet, they are relying on a natural fastness;

whentheyarefarawayyetprovokingafight,theywantyoutomoveforward.Iftheyhaveoccupiedlevelground,thatisbecauseitisadvantageous.Themovementoftreessignalsadvance;blindsintheundergrowtharethereto

mislead.Birdsrisingupsignalbushwhackers;animalsbeingstartledmeansomeoneis

takingcoverthere.Dust rising high and sharp signals chariots coming; low and wide means

infantryiscoming.Scatteredwispsmeanfirewoodisbeingbrought.If thereislittledust,andtheyarecomingandgoing,thatmeanstheyaresettingupcamp.Thosewhospeakhumblyyetincreasetheirpreparationsaregoingtoadvance;

those who talk tough and move forward aggressively are going to withdraw.Whenlightvehiclescomeforthfirstandstaybytheflanks,theyaresettingoutabattleline.Thosewhoseekpeacewithoutatreatyarescheming;thosewhorusharound

arrayingforcesareexpectingreinforcements.Thosewhohalfadvanceandhalfretreataretryingtodrawyouin.When they brace themselves up as they stand, it means they are starving;

whenthosewhosejobitistodrawwaterarethefirsttodrink,itmeanstheyarethirsty.Whentheydonotmoveonanobviousadvantage,itmeanstheyaretiredout.Birds gathering mean a place is deserted. Calls in the night indicate fear.

Unrestamongthetroopsmeansthecommanderisnotrespected.Whensignalpennantsaredisturbed,thatmeansdisorder;whenemissariesare

irritable, thatmeanstheyarefatigued.Whentheyfeedtheirhorsesgrainwhiletheyeatmeat,whenthetroopshavenocanteensanddonotreturntocamp,theyaredesperate.Murmurings,shirking,andwhisperingindicatelossofthegroup.Repetitious

rewardssignalanimpasse,repetitiouspunishmentssignalfrustration.Thosewhoareviolentatfirstandthenwindupfearingtheirpeopleareineptintheextreme.Those who come in a conciliatory manner want to rest. When a militia

confrontsyouangrilybutputsoffengagement,andyetdoesnotleave,youmustwatchcarefully.A militia is not helped by large numbers, but by avoiding violent

aggressiveness. It isenough toconsolidateyourstrength, sizeupenemies,and

win people. Only those who thoughtlessly slight opponents are sure to becapturedbyothers.If soldiers are punished before an emotional bond [with the leadership] has

formed,theywillnotbeobedient,andiftheyarenotobedienttheyarehardtodirect. If the soldiers have formed an emotional bond and penalties are notenforced,thentheycannotbedirected.Sounitethemculturallyandunifythemmilitarily;thisisconsideredthewaytocertainvictory.Whenorderisconsistentlypracticedtoeducatethepeople,thenthepeopleare

obedient.Whenorderisnotpracticedconsistentlytoeducatethepeople,thenthepeople are disobedient.When order is consistently practiced, that means it iseffectiveforthegroup.

[10]

TheLayoftheLand

Thelayofthelandmayoffernoresistance,oritmayhangyouup,oritmaygetyouintoastandoff,oritmaybeconstricting,oritmaybeprecipitous,oritmaybevastandfar-flung.When you can go and opponents can come, thatmeans the lay of the land

offersnoresistance.Onlandthatoffersnoresistance,positionyourselffirstonhighsunnyground,wheretherearethebestsupplyroutes,anditisadvantageousincaseofabattle.When it is possible to go but hard to return, thatmeans the lay of the land

hangsyouup.Whentheterraincauseshang-ups,youwillwinifyoulaunchanattackonanunpreparedenemy,but ifyou launchanattackagainstapreparedenemyanddonotwin,youwillhavetroublereturning,toyourdisadvantage.Whenitisofnouseforyoutoactanditisofnouseforyourenemytoact,

thisiscalledastandoff.Wherethelayofthelandhasyouinastandoff,donotrisetoanybait theenemymightsetforth;withdrawinstead,toluretheenemyhalfout,whereuponyoucanattacktoyouradvantage.Onconstrictingterrain,ifyouoccupyitfirst,besuretofillituptoawaitthe

enemy. If the enemy occupies it first, do not pursue if the enemy fills thenarrows.Pursueiftheenemydoesnotfillthenarrows.Onprecipitous terrain,besure to takeupyourpositiononahighandsunny

placetoawaittheenemy.Iftheenemyoccupiesitfirst,withdrawandleave;donotpursue.Onfar-flungterrain,whenforcesareequalanditishardtostartafight,itis

unprofitabletodobattle.These are six ways of adapting to the terrain, which is the ultimate

responsibilityofthecommanderandmustbeexamined.Soamilitiamayrush,mayslack,mayfall,maycrumble,maybedisorderly,

ormay be losers. These six are not natural disasters; they are the fault of thecommanders.Thosewhohaveequalpowerbutwhostriketenwithoneareinarush.When

the soldiers are strong but the officers areweak, there is slackness.When the

officers are strongbut the soldiers areweak, they fall.Whenhighofficers arewrathful anduncontrollable, andwhen they encounter an enemy they fight ontheir own out of resentment, and the commanders do not know their abilities,theycrumble.Whenthecommander isweakandnotauthoritative, instructionsare not clear, officers and soldiers are inconstant, and battle lines are formedeverywhichway, this is disorder.When the commanders are unable to assessenemies, take on many opponents with few troops, weakly attack strongeropponents,andhavenospecialforcesintheirmilitias,theyarelosers.These are sixways to defeat. This is the ultimate responsibility ofmilitary

commandersandmustbeexamined.Thelayofthelandisacooperatingfactorinamilitaryoperation.Thewayof

superiorcommandersistosizeuptheenemysoastoensurevictory,assessingthequalitiesanddimensionsof the terrain.Thosewhoknow thisanduse it inbattlearesurewinners;thosewhodonotknowitandyetengageincombataresurelosers.Thus if military science indicates certain victory and yet the civilian

leadershipdeclaresthereshallbenofight, it isallrighttoinsistonfighting.Ifmilitaryscienceindicatesfailure,andyetthecivilianleadershipcallsforafight,itisbetternottofight.Therefore[militaryleaderswho]pressforwardwithoutambitionforfameand

retreat without trying to avoid blame, who only care for the security of thepeopleandthusareinharmonywiththeinterestsofthecivilianleadership,aretreasuresof thenation.Suchleadersviewtheir troopsasbabesinarms; that iswhythetroopsarewillingtoenterdeepvalleyswiththem.Theylookupontheirsoldiersasbelovedchildren;thatiswhytheyarewillingtodiewiththem.Butiftheleadersaresonicetothesoldiersthattheycannotcommandthem,iftheyaresosentimentalthattheycannotenforceorders,iftheyletthesoldiersmisbehaveandcannotgovernthem,asiftheywerespoiledchildren,thentheseleadersarenottobeemployed.Ifyouknowyoursoldiersarereadytostrikeanddonotrealizetheenemyis

notproperlyvulnerable,youhavehalfachanceofsucceeding.Ifyouknowtheenemyisvulnerabletoastrikebutdonotrealizeyoursoldiersarenotinproperconditiontostrike,youhavehalfachanceofsucceeding.Ifyouknowtheenemyisvulnerableandyoursoldiersarereadytostrike,andyetyoudonotrealizethelayofthelandmilitatesagainstbattle,youhavehalfachanceofsucceeding.So masters of military affairs move without confusion, mobilize without

exhaustion.Thus it is said, “Knowing others and knowing yourself, victorywill not be

imperiled; by knowing the ground and knowing the climate, victory can be

complete.”

[11]

NineGrounds

According to the lawsofmilitaryoperations, there isgroundofdisintegration,shallowground,groundofcontention,groundofintercourse,axialground,deepground,badground,surroundedground,andgroundofdeath.Agroundofdisintegrationiswherelocalpowersfightamongthemselveson

theirownterritory.Shallowgroundiswhereyoupenetrateenemyterritory,butnotdeeply.Agroundofcontentionisonethatwouldbenefityouifyougotitandwould

alsobenefityourenemiesiftheygotit.Groundofintercourseisthatoverwhichyoucangoandotherscancome.Axialgroundisthatwhichissurroundedonthreesidesbycompetinginterests

andwouldenablethefirsttogetittowintheworld.Deepgroundiswhenyoupenetrateenemyterritorysofarthatmanyoftheir

citiesandtownsarebehindyou.Bad ground is mountain forests, defiles, marshes, and places generally

difficultofpassage.Surroundedgroundiswherethewayinisnarrowandthewayoutistortuous,

soeveninlargenumbersyouarevulnerabletoattackbyasmallband.Agroundofdeathiswhereyouwillliveifyoubattlequicklyanddieifyou

donotbattlequickly.Onagroundofdisintegration,therefore,donotfight.Onshallowground,donothalt.Onagroundofcontention,donotattack.Onagroundofintercourse,donotgetcutoff.Onaxialground,makealliances.Ondeepground,plunder.Onbadground,keepgoing.Onsurroundedground,planahead.Ondeadlyground,fight.Thoseknownas skilledwarriorsofoldcouldmake it soenemies’vanguard

andrearcouldnotcontacteachother,largeandsmallcontingentscouldnotrely

oneachother,thehighandlowrankswouldnothelpeachother,theleadershipand the followers could not control each other, soldiers left and could not bereconvened, and troop[s] were not orderly when assembled. When it wasadvantageous,theyacted;otherwise,theydidnot.Itmaybeasked,howdoyou faceanoncomingenemywho ismassive and

wellordered?Firstdeprivehimofwhathelikes,andhewilllisten.Thetrueconditionofmilitaryactionisthatitsessentialfactorisspeed,taking

advantage of others’ shortcomings, going by unexpected routes, attackingunguardedspots.The general pattern of invasion is that deep penetration results in total

concentration, such that defenders cannotwin.Glean from rich fields, and thearmedforceswillbeadequatelyfed.Becarefuloftheirhealthanddonotstrainthem;consolidateenergyandbuildupstrength.Inmaneuveringtroops,calculatestrategysoastobeunpredictable.Putthemwheretheyhavenowheretogo,andtheywilldiebeforegivingup.Inthefaceofdeath,howcanwarriorsnotexerttheir strength to theutmost?Whenwarriorsare inextremeperil, theyhavenofear; when they have no way out, they are firm. When they have gotten indeeply,theysticktoit;whentheyhavenochoice,theywillfight.Thustheyarewatchful without being trained, enlist without being drafted, are won overwithoutpromises,areloyalwithoutbeingforced.Prohibitsoothsaying,eliminatewhatisdubious,andtheywillstaytothedeath.Our warriors have nothing extra, but not because they dislike goods; their

lives are up, but not because they dislike longevity. On the day the order isissued, the soldiers weep; tears wet the chests of those who are sitting, tearsstreamdownthefacesofthoselyingdown.Castintocircumstanceswheretheyhavenowayout,however,theyshowlegendarybravery.Thus skillfulmilitary operations are like a swift serpent. Strike at the head,

and the tail whips around to lash back; strike at the tail, and the head whipsaroundtolashback;strikeatthemiddle,andbothheadandtailwhiparoundtolashback.Itmaybeaskedwhetheramilitiacanbemade tobe like thatswift serpent.

Theansweristhatitcan.ThepeopleofWuandthepeopleofYuehdislikeeachother,butwhentheyareinthesameboattheywillhelpeachotherlikerightandlefthands.Soitisthattetheredhorsesandburiedwheelsarenotadequatelyreliable;the

principle of order is to even out bravery, as though it were uniform. Whenfirmnessandflexibilityarebothsuccessful,thisisamatterofthepatternoftheground.Thusonewhocommandsamilitiaskillfullyachievessuchcooperationthatitislikecommandingasingleindividualwhohasnochoice.

Theaffairsofmilitary commanders arekept inscrutablebyquiet calm,keptorderlybyuprightness andcorrectness.Theyare able tokeep the soldiers andofficers in the dark, so the people will not know anything; they change theiroperations and revise their plans, so no one can discern them. They changewheretheyarestayingandtakeremoteroutes,sothatnoonecanthinkahead.Whentheyleadthesoldierstowardanaim,itislikeclimbinguptoahighplaceand throwing away the ladder;when they lead themdeep into the territory ofcompetitorsandunleashtheirenergy,itislikeherdingsheep,whoaredriventhiswayandthatwithoutknowingwheretheyaregoing.Mastering the armed forces andputting them indangerous straits are called

thebusinessofgenerals.Itisimperativetoexaminethevariationsintheterrain,the advantages in contraction or expansion, and the principles of humanpsychology.The general pattern of invasions is that they are concentrated when they

penetratedeeply,diffusewhentheirpenetrationisshallow.Whenyoucampaigninforeigncountries,thatistobeonisolatedground.That which is accessible from all sides is axial ground. A penetrating

incursion is called deep ground, while a slight incursion is called shallowground. That which is impassible behind and constricted ahead is surroundedground.Wherethereisnowayoutisdeadlyground.Therefore,ongroundsofdisintegration,Iwouldunifytheirwills.Onshallow

grounds, Iwouldhave themkeep in touch.Ongroundsofcontention, Iwouldfollowupquickly.Ongroundsofintercourse,Iwouldmakesureofmydefenses.Onaxialgrounds,Iwouldsolidifymyalliances.Ondeepground,Iwouldensurea continuous supply of food. On bad ground, I would forge ahead. Onsurrounded ground, I would stop the gaps. On deadly ground, I would showthemthereisnowaytogetoutalive.Sothepsychologyofwarfareistoresistwhensurrounded,fightwhenthereis

nootherchoice,andgoalonginextremes.Thus it is that those who do not know the plans of competitors are

incompetent toenter intopreliminarynegotiations; thosewhodonotknowthelayofthelandareincompetenttomaneuverarmedforces;andthosewhodonotemploy localguidesareunable to takeadvantageof theground.Amilitia thatlacks knowledge of even one of these things is not themilitia of an effectiverulership.Themilitiaofaneffectiverulershipissuchthatwhenitattacksalargecountry

thecitizens therewillnotrally,andwhenit threatensenemies, theycan’tevengettheiralliestojointhem.Soifyoudonotsetyourcommunicationsinorderthroughouttheworldand

do not develop worldwide power, but try to intimidate opponents, relying onyourownpersonalauthority,theresultwillbethatyourstrongholdscanbetakenandyourdomaincanbeoverthrown.Giveoutrewardsthatarenotintherules,andsetforthordersthatarenotin

thecode,maneuveringthearmedforceslikeemployingasingleindividual.Getthem going on concrete tasks, without talking about it; get them going afteradvantages,without telling themof thedangers. [Hanversion:Get themgoingbyprospectsofharm,withouttellingthemaboutprospectsofgain.]Cast themintoperditionandtheywillsurvive;plungethemintodeadlysituations,andthentheywilllive.Onlywhenpeoplehavefallenintodangerdotheyhavetheabilitytocreatetheoutcome.Thereforethetaskofamilitaryactionistounobtrusivelydeceivethemindsof

enemies. Herd enemies all in one direction, and you can kill the commanderhundredsofmilesaway.Thisisconsideredskillfulaccomplishmentofthetask.So on the day of mobilization, borders are closed and passports rescinded;

emissaries are not allowed to get through. The affair is treated with rigor atheadquartersinordertoexecutethetask.When theenemypresentsanopening,besure topenetrateatonce.Preempt

whattheenemyprefers,secretlyanticipatinghim.Actwithdisciplineandadapttotheoppositioninordertosettlethecontest.Soatfirstyouarelikeavirgingirl,towhomtheenemyopenshisdoor.Then

youarelikeajackrabbitontheloose,whichtheenemycannotkeepout.

[12]

FireAssault

In general, there are fiveways of using fire for offensive purposes. First is toburnhumanbeings.Secondistoburnstores.Thirdistoburnequipment.Fourthistoburnwarehouses.Fifthistoburnsquadrons.To set fires you need the proper basis, and the proper basis requires

elementary tools.There are seasons and days for setting fires; the seasons arewhentheweatherisdry,andthedaysarewhenitiswindy.Inany fire assault, it is imperative to followupon thecrises causedby the

fivekindsoffire.Whenfire isseton the inside, followitupquicklyfromtheoutside. When fire breaks out, if the soldiers remain calm, do not attack;intensifythefiretotheextreme,thenfollowupifpossible,stopifnot.Iffirescanbesetoutside,donotwaituntilyougetinside;setthefireswhen

the timing is right. When the fires are set upwind, do not attack downwind.Whenwindpersiststhroughtheday,itstopsatnight.Ingeneral,armedforcesshouldknowthereareadaptationsofthefivekindsof

fireassault andobserve themscientifically.Thus thosewhosupport anassaultwith fire are clear, while thosewho support an assault withwater are strong.Watercanbeusedtoisolate,butnottopillage.Tofailtorewardthemeritoriousaftervictoryinbattleorasuccessfulsiegeis

ill-advised; it gets you the reputation of stinginess. So it is said that anenlightenedleadershipconsidersthisandagoodcommandercarriesitout.Theydo not mobilize when it is not advantageous, do not act when it is notproductive,anddonotfightwhennotimperiled.Rulers should not go towar in anger, commanders should not battle out of

wrath.Actwhen it isuseful;otherwise,donot.Angercan switchback to joy,wrathcanswitchbacktodelight,butaruinedcountrycannotberestoredandthedeadcannotberevived.Thereforeintelligentrulersareprudentinthesemattersand good commanders are alert to these facts. This is the way to keep thecountrysafeandthearmedforcesintact.

[13]

EmployingSecretAgents

Whenyoumobilizeanarmyofahundredthousandandgoonathousand-mileexpedition, the expenses of the commoners and the contributions of thegovernment amount to a thousand pieces of gold a day. There is internal andexternal disquiet, people collapse in the roads, and seven hundred thousandfamiliesareunabletodotheirwork.Toholdoutforyearsinthestruggleforoneday’striumphandyetbestingywithrewardsandignorantof theconditionsofthe enemy is extremely inhumane; this is not themark of a leader ofmen, ahelperofagovernment,oratriumphantchief.Sowhat enables intelligent rulers and good commanders tomove in such a

way as to overcome others and accomplish extraordinary achievements isadvanceknowledge.Advanceknowledgecannotbeobtainedfromsupernaturalbeings, cannot be had by analogy, and cannot be found out by calculation; itmustbeobtainedfrompeoplewhoknowtheenemy’scondition.Thus there are five ways of employing secret agents. There are local

informers,insideagents,doubleagents,doomedagents,andagentswhohavetostayalive.Whenthefiveagentsareoperatingsimultaneouslyandnooneknowstheirroutes,thisisaneffectiveorganizationofsupremevaluetoaruler.Local informants are agents recruited from among the local people. Inside

agents are recruited from among others’ officials. Double agents are recruitedfrom among enemy spies. Doomed agents are those who are deliberatelymisinformedsothattheywilltransmitmisinformationtotheenemy.Agentswhohavetostayalivearethosewhoaretoreportback.Therefore,nooneinthearmedservicesisappreciatedasmuchasthesecret

agents,noawardsarericherthanthosegiventosecretagents,andnobusinessismoresecretthanespionage.Onlythewisecanusesecretagents,noonebutthehumanecanemploysecretagents,andnonebutthesubtlecangetthetruthfromsecret agents. Subtle indeed, subtle indeed! Secret agents can be usefuleverywhere.Whenanitemofintelligenceisheardbeforeithasbeenreportedbyanagent,

bothagentandtheonetowhomitwastolddie.

Whenever there isanarmed forceyouwant toattack,acitadelyouwant tobesiege,orapersonyouwant tokill,youmust firstknowthe identitiesof thedefending commanders, their associates, their visitors, their gatekeepers, andtheirchamberlains.Makesureyouragentsfindoutallofthis.Youmust findoutenemyagentswhohavecometospyonyou,so thatyou

canbribethemandgetthemonyourside,soyoucanusethemasdoubleagents.Theknowledge thusgainedenablesyou to recruit andemploy local informersandinsideagents.Theknowledgethusgainedenablesyoutogetdoomedagentstoreportmisinformationtotheenemy.Theknowledgethusgainedenablesyouto employ agents who are to come back alive in a manner conforming toexpectations.It is imperative for rulers toknowabout the fivekindsofsecretagent.This

knowledgedependsondoubleagents,sodoubleagentsshouldbetreatedwell.When theYin dynasty arose in ancient times,YiYinwas inXia;when the

Zhou dynasty arose, Lu Ya was in Yin. So only enlightened rulers of wisecommanderswhocanusethehighlyintelligentassecretagentsaresureofgreatsuccess.This isessential formilitaryoperations, thebasisonwhich thearmedforcesact.

Sources

TheArtofWar,bySunTzu, translatedbyThomasCleary.Boston:ShambhalaPublications,1988.Copyright©1988byThomasCleary.

MasteringtheArtofWar,byZhugeLiangandLiuJi, translatedandeditedbyThomasCleary.Boston:ShambhalaPublications,1989.Copyright©1989byThomasCleary.

The Lost Art ofWar, by Sun Tzu II, translated with commentary by ThomasCleary. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996. Copyright © 1996 byThomasCleary.

The Silver Sparrow Art of War, by Sun Tzu, translated by Thomas Cleary.Boston:ShambhalaPublications,2000.Copyright©2000byThomasCleary.(PublishedoriginallyinClassicsofStrategyandCounsel,VolumeOne.)

BooksbyThomasCleary

TheBookofFiveRings,byMiyamotoMusashi

Here isoneof themost insightful textson thesubtleartsofconfrontationandvictorytoemergefromAsianculture.Writtennotonlyformartialartistsbutforleadersinallprofessions,thebookanalyzestheprocessofstruggleandmasteryoverconflictthatunderlieseverylevelofhumaninteraction.

TheBookofLeadershipandStrategy:LessonsoftheChineseMasters

The subtle arts of management and leadership have been developed overthousandsofyearsbytheChinese.Collectedhereareinsightfulteachingsonthechallenges of leadership on all levels, from organizational management topoliticalstatecraft.

TheHumanElement:ACourseinResourcefulThinking

InsightfullessonsfromthegreattraditionsofAsianthoughtontheessentialsofwise leadership, decision-making without prejudice, inspiring loyalty andmaintainingauthority,encouragingthebestinpeople,andmore.

TheJapaneseArtofWar:UnderstandingtheCultureofStrategy

MilitaryruleandthemartialtraditionofthesamuraidominatedJapaneseculturefor more than eight hundred years. Citing original Japanese sources that arepopularamongJapanesereaderstoday,ClearyrevealsthehiddenforcesbehindJapaneseattitudesandconductinpolitical,business,social,andpersonallife.

MasteringtheArtofWar,byLiuJiandZhugeLiang

Composed by two prominent statesmen-generals of classical China, this bookdevelops the strategies of Sun Tzu’s classic,The Art ofWar, into a completehandbookoforganizationandleadership.

ThunderintheSky:SecretsontheAcquisitionandExerciseofPower

Understanding the development and practice of power—based on an in-depthobservation of human psychology—has been a part of traditional Chinesethought for thousands of years. This book presents two secret classics of thisancientChinesetradition.

TrainingtheSamuraiMind:ABushidoSourcebook

Throughtheages,thesamuraihavebeenassociatedwithbushido,theWayoftheWarrior-Knight. With a rich collection of writings on bushido by warriors,scholars,politicaladvisors,andeducatorsfromthefifteenthcenturythroughthenineteenth century,Cleary provides a comprehensive, historically rich viewofsamurailifeandphilosophy.

Ways of Warriors, Codes of Kings: Lessons in Leadership from the ChineseClassics

Hereisaconciseanduser-friendlypresentationoftheancientChineseprinciplesofleadershipandstrategyinthewordsofthemastersthemselves.Clearyhasputtogether this collection of gems of wisdom from six of the great classics,includingexcerptsfromhisbest-sellingtranslationofTheArtofWarandotherlesser-knownbutinsightfultexts.

ZenLessons:TheArtofLeadership

Thisguidetoenlightenedconductforpeopleinpositionsofauthorityisbasedonthe teachings of several great Chinese Zen masters. It serves as a guide torecognizingthequalitiesofagenuineZenteacher;italsoservesasastudyofthecharacter and conduct necessary for themasteryof anypositionof power andauthority—whetherreligious,social,political,ororganizational.

Formoreinformationpleasevisitwww.shambhala.com.

ExcerptfromTheCompleteBookofFiveRingstranslatedbyKenjiTokitsu

eISBN978-0-8348-2199-6

WritingsontheFiveElements(Gorinnosho)

THESCROLLOFEARTH

SchooloftheTwoHeavensUnited,Nitenichiryu,1isthenamethatIgivetothewayofstrategy.2InthistextIamgoingtoexplainforthefirsttimewhatIhavebeenstudyingindepthformanyyears.Atthebeginningof thetenthmonthofthe twentieth year of Kanei [1643], I came to Mount Iwato in the Higo3prefectureofKyushutowrite.Ipayhomagetoheaven,IprostratetothegoddessKannon,andIturntowardtheBuddha.MynameisShinmenMusashinokami,FujiwaranoGenshin,4andIamawarrior,bornintheprefectureofHarima.5Mylifenowaddsuptosixtyyears.6Ihavetrainedinthewayofstrategysincemyyouth,andattheageofthirteen

Ifoughtaduelforthefirsttime.MyopponentwascalledArimaKihei,aswordadeptof theShinto ryu,andIdefeatedhim.At theageofsixteenIdefeatedapowerful adept by the name of Akiyama, who came from the prefecture ofTajima.7 At the age of twenty-one I went up toKyoto and fought duelswithseveraladeptsoftheswordfromfamousschools,butIneverlost.Then I traveled in several fiefs and regions in order to meet the adepts of

differentschools.Ifoughtmorethansixtytimes,8butnotoncewasIbeaten.Allthathappenedbetweenmythirteenthandmytwenty-eighthortwenty-ninthyear.AttheageofthirtyIreflected,andIsawthatalthoughIhadwon,Ihaddone

sowithouthavingreachedtheultimatelevelofstrategy.Perhapsitwasbecausemy natural disposition prevented me from straying from universal principles;perhapsitwasbecausemyopponentslackedabilityinstrategy.Icontinued to trainand toseekfrommorning tillnight toattain toadeeper

principle.WhenIreachedtheageoffifty,Inaturallyfoundmyselfonthewayofstrategy.Since that day I have livedwithout having a need to search further for the

way.9When I apply the principle of strategy to theways of different arts andcrafts, Ino longerhaveneedfora teacher inanydomain.Thus, incomposingthisbook,IdonotborrowfromtheancientBuddhistorConfucianistwritings;Idonotuseancientexamplesfromthechroniclesorthetraditionofthemilitaryart.I beganwritingon the tenthof the tenthmonth, at night, at thehourof the

tiger,10with theaimofexpressingthe trueideaofmyschool, lettingmymind

reflectinthemirrorofthewayofheavenandthewayofKannon.Strategyis thepracticethat isnecessaryinwarriorfamilies.11Apersonwho

directs warfare must learn it, and soldiers must also be familiar with it.Nowadaysthosewhoknowthewayofstrategywellarerare.Asfaras thewayisconcerned,severalof themexist.ThelawofBuddhais

theway that saves people. Theway ofConfucianism is theway that leads tocorrectness in literature. Medicine is the way that cures illnesses. The poetteachesthewayofpoetry.Thereexistanumberofwaysinthearts—thatoftheman of taste,12 that of the practitioner of archery, and those of other arts andcrafts. Adepts train in these in their fashion, according to their manner ofthinking, and are fondof them in accordancewith their dispositions.Butveryfewlikethewayofstrategy.Firstofall,warriorsmustfamiliarizethemselveswithwhatisknownas“the

two ways,” literature and the martial arts. That is their way. Even if you areclumsy,youmustpersevereinstrategybecauseofyourposition.Thatwhichawarriormustalwayshaveinhismindisthewayofdeath.But

thewayofdeathisnotreservedonlyforwarriors.Amonk,awoman,apeasant—anyperson—canresolvetodieforthesakeofasocialobligationorhonor.Inthewayofstrategythatwarriorspractice, theaimofactionmustbetosurpassothers in all domains. Awarrior has to win in combat against one or severalopponents,bringfametohislord’snameandhisown,andestablishhispositionowingtothevirtueofstrategy.Somepeopleperhapsthinkthateveniftheylearnthe way of strategy, it will not be useful in real practice. On this point, it issufficienttotraininitforit tobeusefulatall timesandtoteachitforit tobeusefulinallthings.Thisishowthetruewayofstrategymustbe.

ConcerningtheWayofStrategyFromChinatoJapan,overalongtime,apersonwhopracticesthiswayhasbeenknownasanadeptofstrategy.Forawarrior,itisnotpossiblenottostudyit.13Nowadays there are certain people to be found everywhere who declarethemselves accomplished practitioners of strategy, but in general they practiceonly the sword. Recently the Shinto priests of Kantori and Kashima in theprefecture of Hitachi14 have founded schools, saying that their art wastransmitted to themby thegods, and theyhavepropagated their art invariousfiefs.Among the ten talents and the seven arts that have long been known,15

strategy is considered to be a pragmatic domain.16 Since it is a pragmatic

domain,itisnotappropriatetolimititjusttothetechniqueofthesword.Onthebasisoftheprinciplesoftheswordalone,17youwillnotbeabletounderstandtheswordwell,andyouwillbefarfrombeinginaccordwiththeprinciplesofstrategy.There are peoplewhomake a profession out of selling the arts. They treat

themselvesasarticlesofmerchandiseandproduceobjectswithaviewtosellingthem. This attitude is tantamount to the act of separating the flower from thefruit.And itmust be said that the fruit in this casedoesnot amount tomuch.They adorn the way of strategy with flowery colors, lay out a display oftechniques, and teach their way by creating first one dojo, then another.Someonewhomightwant tolearnsuchawaywiththegoalofmakingmoneyshouldkeepinmindthesaying“Strategy,inadequatelylearned, is thecauseofseriouswounds.”18Ingeneral,fourwaysexistfortraversinghumanlife:thoseofthewarrior,the

peasant, the artisan, and the merchant.19 The first is the way of the peasant.Peasantspreparevarioustoolsandarevigilantwithregardtothechangingoftheseasons,yearafteryear.Thatisthewayofthepeasant.Thesecondisthewayofthemerchant.Amanufacturerofsake,forexample,

buysthenecessarymaterialsandmakesprofitsthatcorrespondtothequalityofhis product—this is thewayhe goes through life.Allmerchants pass throughhumanlifemakingmoreorlessprofitfromtheirbusinesses.Thatisthewayofbusiness.Thethirdisthewayofthewarrior.Warriorsmustmakevariousweaponsand

know the richness20 of eachweapon. That is theway of thewarrior.Withoutlearning how to handle weapons, without knowing the advantages of each ofthem,awarriorislackingsomewhatineducation.Thefourthisthewayoftheartisan.Acarpenterfollowshiswaybyskillfully

makingvarioustoolsandknowingwellhowtousethem.Hecorrectlylaysoutconstructionplansusingblackcordsandasquare.21Hegoes through lifewithhisartwithoutwastingamoment.Thisisthewaythefourwaysshouldbe,thoseofthewarrior,thepeasant,the

artisan,andthemerchant.Iamgoingtospeakofstrategybycomparingit to thewayof thecarpenter.

Thiscomparisonhastodowithahouseconstructedbycarpenters.Wespeak,forexample, of a noble house, awarrior house,22 or the FourHouses.23We alsospeakofthedeclineorcontinuationofahouse;intherealmofart,wealsospeakofahouseinthesenseofaschoolorastyle.24 It isbecausethetermhouse isusedinthesewaysthatImakethecomparisonwiththewayofthecarpenter.

Theworddaiku,carpenter,iswrittendai,“fully,”ku,“tobeverycleverat.”Inthesameway, thewayofstrategyisbuiltuponingenuityofgreatfullnessandscope.ThatiswhyIcompareittothewayofthecarpenter.Ifyouwanttolearnstrategy,youmust contemplate thesewritings and train ceaselessly, themasteranddiscipletogether,sothatthemasterisliketheneedleandthediscipleislikethethread.

ComparisonoftheWayofStrategywiththeWayoftheCarpenterAgeneral,likeamastercarpenter,shouldknowtheoverallrulesofthecountryandadjusttherulesofhisownprovincetofitwiththem,justasthewayofthemaster carpenter consists in regulating the measurements of the house he isgoingtoconstruct.Themaster carpenter learns the structural pattern for building a tower or a

temple and knows the construction plans for palaces and fortresses.He buildshousesbymakinguseofpeople. In thisway the chief carpenter and thechiefwarriorresembleeachother.25Inconstructingahouse,onemust firstchoosewood that issuitable.For the

front pillars, wood is chosen that is straight, without knots, and of goodappearance. For the rear pillars, one chooseswood that is straight and sturdy,evenifithasafewknots.Itisappropriatetousewoodsthatarelessstrongbutof handsome appearance for the sills, the lintels, the sliding doors, and theshoji.26Thehousewilllastforalongtimeevenifknottedortwistedwoodisused,on

the condition that the strength needed for the different parts of the house isaccuratelyassessedandthequalitiesofthewoodusedarecarefullyexamined.Itis appropriate to use somewhatweak, knotty, or twistedwood for scaffoldingandthenafterwardforheating.Inusingmen,themastercarpentermustknowthequalitiesofthecarpenters.

In accordance with their high, medium, or low ability, he must assign themdifferenttasks,suchasconstructionofthetokonoma;27oftheslidingdoorsandthe shoji; or of the sills, lintels, and ceilings. It is appropriate to have supportframing done by those with not much skill, and wedges made by the mostunskillful. If one is able to discern the qualities ofmen in thismanner, workprogressesquicklyandefficiently.Being fast and efficient; being vigilant with regard to the surroundings;28

knowingsubstanceanditsfunction;29knowing thehigh,medium,or lowlevelof ambient energy;30 knowing how to energize the situation; and knowing the

limitsof things:Aboveall, amaster carpentermustpossessall those. It is thesamefortheprincipleofstrategy.

TheWayofStrategyBothavassalandasoldieraresimilar toacarpenter.31The lattersharpenshistools,makesothertools,andcarriestheminhiscarpenter’sbox.Followingtheorders of the master, he accomplishes his work efficiently; his measurementswill be exact for the smallest detail work as well as for the long externalcorridors.32 Sometimes he roughs out the pillars and beams with his adze orplanesthepostsofthetokonomaandtheshelves;sometimeshecarvesopenworkin planks or sculpts wood. Such is the law of the carpenter. If he learns topractice the techniquesofwoodworkingandalso learnshowtodrawupplans,hecanlaterbecomeamaster.A carpentermust keep his toolswell sharpened and alwaysmaintain them.

Only a specialist in woodworking knows how to make a precious box for astatueoftheBuddha,abookshelf,atable,astandforalamp,allthewaydowntoachoppingblockoralid.Eitheravassalorasoldierissimilartoacarpenter.Theyshouldponderthiswell.Acarpentermustalwayskeephismindattentivetothefollowingthings:The

woodmustnotloseitsshape,thejointsmusthold,hemustplanewellbutavoidoversmoothing,thewoodmustnotwarplateron.Ifyoustudythewayofstrategy,itisnecessarytoexamineattentivelywhatI

writehere,downtotheleastdetail.

IWriteonStrategyinFiveScrollsI write my work in five scrolls, the scrolls of Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, andHeaven,inordertoshowclearlythequalitiesofeachofthefiveways.33IntheScrollofEarth,Ipresentanoverallvisionofthewayofstrategyandthe

pointofviewofmyschool.Itisdifficulttoarriveatthetruewayrelyingonthewayoftheswordalone.Itisappropriatetounderstanddetailsonthebasisofabroadvisionandtoattaindepthbybeginningonthesurface.It isnecessarytoplot a straight path through terrain that has been leveled. That is why I havegiventhenameEarthtothefirstscroll.ThesecondistheScrollofWater.Youshouldlearnwhatisessentialregarding

thestateofthemindfromthenatureofwater.Waterfollowstheformofasquareor roundvessel. It isadropandalsoanocean.Thecolorof itsdepths ispure

green,andtakingthispurityasmyinspiration,IpresentmyschoolintheScrollofWater.If you succeed in clearly discerning thegeneral principle34 of the art of the

swordandinthismannereasilydefeatoneperson,youcandefeatanyopponent.The mind is the same whether it is a matter of defeating one person or athousandortenthousandenemies.The strategy of a general consists in applying on a large scalewhat he has

studiedonasmallscale.ThisisthesamethingasdesigningalargestatueoftheBuddhaonthebasisofamodel35ofthirtycentimeters.Itisdifficulttoexplainitin detail, but the principle of strategy is to know ten thousand things from asinglething.It isinthiswaythatIwriteaboutthecontentofmyschoolintheScrollofWater.The third scroll is that of fire. In this scroll I write about war, for fire

symbolizesablazingmind,whethersmallorlarge.Thewayofwaristhesameifthesituationisoneagainstoneortenthousandagainsttenthousand.Thisshouldbeexaminedwell,makingthemindnowlarge,nowsmall.Seeingwhatislargeiseasy,seeingwhatissmallisdifficult.Itisdifficultto

change strategy quicklywhen you aremany,whereas a single person quicklychangeshistacticsinaccordancewithhisstateofmind;thatiswhyforsuchacaseitisdifficulttoforeseetheminutedetails.Thisshouldbeexaminedwell.That which I write about in the Scroll of Fire happens in a short time.36

Thereforeitisnecessarytotraininitandhabituateoneselftoiteverydaysothatanimmutablemindcanbecometheordinarything.Thisisanessentialpointofstrategy; it is in relation to this mind that I write about war and individualcombatintheScrollofFire.Thefourth is theScrollofWind.WhatIwrite in thisscroll isnotaboutmy

ownschoolbutdealswiththestrategiesofotherpresent-dayschools.Weusetheexpressions the ancientwindand themodernwind, andalso thewindof suchand such a family.37 I explain the strategies of the other schools and theirtechniquesintheScrollofWind.Withoutknowingothers,onecannotreallyknowoneself.Inthepracticeofall

the ways and in all manners of working with things, the danger exists ofdeviatingfromthetrueway.38Evenifyoupracticethewaydailyandthinkyouareontherighttrack,itispossibletodeviatefromthetruewayifyourmindhasturnedawayfromit.Youcanrecognizethisifyouknowhowtoobserveonthebasisofthetrueway.Ifyouarenotprogressingalongthetrueway,aslighttwistinthemindcanbecomeamajortwist.Thismustbeponderedwell.In other schools it is thought that just the way of the sword constitutes

strategy,andnotwithoutreason.ButwhatIunderstandbytheprincipleandthetechniques of strategy is quite different. Iwrite about the other schools in theScrollofWindsoastoacquaintyouwiththeirstrategy.ThefifthistheScrollofHeaven[orEmptiness].39WithregardtothatwhichI

mean by heaven, how could one distinguish between the depth of it and itsentrance,40sincewhatwearetalkingaboutisemptiness?Afterhavingrealizedtheprincipleoftheway,41itbecomespossibletomoveawayfromit—youwillfindyourselfnaturallyfreeinthewayofstrategyandyouwillnaturallyreachahighlevelofability.42Youwillnaturallyfindthecadencethatisappropriatetothemoment,andthestrokewillappearallbyitselfandstrikehomebyitself.Allofthatisinthewayofemptiness.IwriteintheScrollofHeavenofthemannerofenteringnaturallyintothetrueway.

IGiveMySchooltheNameSchoolofTwoSwordsIdescribemyschoolintermsoftwoswords,sinceallwarriors,fromthevassaltotheordinarysoldier,mustweartwoswordsfirmlyattheirsides.43Formerly,these two swords used to be called tachi and katana; today they are calledkatana andwakizashi. It goeswithout saying that allwarriorswear these twoswords44 in their belts. Whether they know how to use them or not, in ourcountry,carryingthetwoswordsisthewayofthewarrior.ItisinordertomaketheadvantageofcarryingthetwoswordsunderstoodthatIdescribemyschoolintermsofthetwoswords.Thelanceandthenaginata45areweaponstobeusedoutside,onthefieldofbattle.46Inmy school a beginner learns the way by taking the large sword and the

smallswordinhishandsatthesametime.47Thisisessential.Ifyouaregoingtodie in battle, it is desirable to utilize all the weapons you are carrying. It isdeplorable to die with weapons left in their scabbards without having beencapableofusingthem.48Butifyouhaveaswordineachhand,itisdifficulttohandleeachofthetwo

swordsasyouwish.Thatiswhyyouhavetolearntowieldthelargeswordwithjustonehand.Itisnormaltowieldalargeweaponlikethelanceorthenaginatawithtwohands,butthelargeswordandthesmalloneareweaponstobeutilizedwithjustonehand.Holding a large sword with two hands is a disadvantage when fighting on

horseback,whenfightingontherun,whenfightinginmarshyterrain,inadeepricepaddy,onstonyground,onasteeproad,orwhenyouareinthemidstofa

melee.Whenyouareholdingabow,49alance,oranyotherweaponinyourlefthand, youmust hold the sword with the right hand.50 That is why holding aswordwithtwohandsisnotappropriateinthetrueway.Ifyoudonotsucceedinkilling your enemywith just one hand, it is enough to use two hands at thatpoint.Itisnotaverycomplicatedmatter.Itisinordertolearntohandlethelargeswordeasilywithonehandthatwe

learn to wield the two swords.51 At the beginning everyone has difficultyhandlingthelargeswordwithjustonehandbecauseofitsweight.Itisthesamethinginanyformofnewbeginning.Forabeginneritishardtodrawabow,andhandlinganaginataisalsohard.Whatevertheweapon,theimportantthingistoget used to it. In thisway youmay succeed in drawing a strong bow, and byexercisingeveryday,youwillachieve theability towield theswordeasilybyacquiringthestrengththatisfittingfortheway.Thewayoftheswordisnotamerematteroftheswiftnessofthestrike.Iwill

explainthispreciselyinthesecondscroll,theScrollofWater.Thelargeswordisused in an open space and the small sword in a confined space—that is thestartingpoint52oftheway.Inmyschoolonemustwinwithalongweaponaswellasashortone.Thatis

whyIdonotfixthelengthofthesword.Tobereadytowinwithalltheweapons—thatistheessenceofmyschool.Theadvantageofusingtwoswordsinsteadofonebecomesmanifestwhenone is fighting alone againstmany adversariesandwhenoneisfightinginaclosed-inplace.It isnotnecessarytowritemoreaboutthisnow.Itisnecessarytoknowtenthousandthingsbyknowingonewell.If you are to practice the way of strategy, nothing must escape your eyes.53Reflectwellonthis.

KnowingtheMeaningoftheTwoIdeogramsHyoHo54

Customarilyinthisway,someonewhoknowshowtohandleaswordiscalledamanof strategy. In thewayof themartial arts,55 someonewhoknowshow toshoot a bow is called an archer, someone who knows how to shoot a gun iscalledagunner,someonewhoisskillfulwiththelanceiscalledanexpertwiththelance,andsomeonewhohandlesthenaginatawelliscalledanexpertwiththenaginata.Thussomeonewhoexcelsinthetechniquesoftheswordshouldbecalledanexpertwiththelongswordoranexpertwiththeshortsword.Thebow,thegun,thelance,andthenaginataareallweaponsofthewarrior;eachoneofthem is part of the way of strategy. Nevertheless, strategy is usually used todesignatetheartofthesword.Thereisareasonforthis.

It is through thevirtueof the sword56 thatone rules a country and thatonebehaves ina fittingmanneroneself.The sword is at theoriginof strategy.Bymastering thevirtueof thesword,onepersoncandefeat ten. Ifonecandefeatten,ahundredcandefeatathousand,andathousandwilldefeattenthousand.Itis inthissensethat inmyschooltheprinciplesarethesameforoneasfortenthousand,andwhatImeanbystrategyincludesthepracticesofallwarriors.WemayspeakofthewayoftheConfucians,oftheBuddhists,ofteamasters,

ofmastersofetiquette,orofdancers,butthesewaysaredistinctfromthewayofthewarrior.Nonetheless, anyonewhounderstands theway in great depthwillfind the same principle in all things. It is important for each person topersevere57inhisownway.

KnowingtheAdvantageofEachWeaponinStrategyIf you know well the advantages of the different weapons, you can use anyweaponappropriately58inaccordancewiththesituationofthemoment.Thesmallswordisadvantageousinaconfinedplaceandwhenyougetclose

toyouropponent.Thelargeswordissuitedtonearlyallsituationsandpresentsadvantages in all of them.On the battlefield the usefulness of thenaginata isslightlylessthanthatofthelance,forifyoucomparethetwo,thelanceallowsonetotaketheinitiativebetter.59Iftherearetwopractitionersofthesamelevelandonehasalanceandtheotheranaginata,theonewiththelancewillhaveaslightadvantage.Theeffectivenessofthelanceandthenaginatadependsonthesituationofcombat;theywillnotbeveryeffectiveinaconfinedspacenorwhenyouaresurroundedbyenemiesinahouse.60Theyareweaponsespeciallyforthebattlefield,indispensableinsituationsofwar.Youcanlearnanddevelopthesubtletiesoftechniqueindoors,61buttheywill

notbeappropriateifyouforgetthetrueway.Thebowisappropriate62whenyouaremoving troopsforwardorback in thestrategyofbattles. Itmakespossiblerapid fire in parallel with the use of lances and other arms. It is thereforeparticularly useful on battlefields in open terrain. But its effectiveness isinsufficient for attacking fortresses or for combating enemies who are fartherthanthirty-sixmetersaway.63At the present time, there aremany flowers and little fruit in archery—this

goeswithoutsaying,andgoesfortheotherartsaswell.Ifanartisnothingbutthat,itcannotbeusefulinareallyimportantsituation.Theinterestisgreat.64Fromwithinafortress,thereisnoweaponmoreeffectivethanagun.Onthe

field of battle also, the interest of the gun is great before an encounter.Once,

however, the encounter has begun, its effectiveness diminishes. One of theadvantages of the bow is that the trajectory of the arrow is visible, and thedeficiencyofthegunisthattheballcannotbeseen.Itisappropriatetoexaminewellthisaspectofthings.Asfarasthehorseisconcerned,itmustbestrong,resilient,andwithoutbad

habits.Generally,asforall theweaponsofwar,youshouldchoosehorses thatarelargeandgoodformarching.Theswords,boththeshortandthelong,shouldbe large and sharp,65 the lance and naginata large andwell honed.Youmusthavebowsandgunsthatarepowerfulandarenoteasilyruined.Youshouldnothave a predilection for certain weapons. Putting too much emphasis on oneweaponresultsinnothavingenoughoftheothers.Weaponsshouldbeadaptedto your personal qualities and be ones you can handle. It is useless to imitateothers.Forageneralasforasoldier,itisnegativetohavemarkedpreferences.Youshouldexaminethispointwell.

CadencesinStrategyCadenceisinherentinallthings,especiallyasfarasstrategyisconcerned.66Itisnotpossibletomastercadencewithoutthoroughtraining.Inthisworldwecanseethatdifferentcadencesexist.Thecadencesoftheway

of the dance and ofmusicianswith their stringed orwind instruments are allconcordant and without distortion.67 Going through the various ways of themartialarts,therearedifferentcadencesdependingonwhetheryouareshootingabow,firingagun,orridingahorse.You must not go against cadence in any of the arts, nor in any handcraft.

Cadencealsoexistsforthatwhichdoesnothaveavisibleform.68Regardingthesituation of a warrior in the service of a lord, according to the cadences hefollows, he will rise or fall in the hierarchy, for there are cadences that areconcordantandothersthatarediscordant.Inthewayofbusiness,therearecadencesformakingafortuneandcadences

forlosingit.Ineachway,thereexistdifferentcadences.Youmustdiscernwellthecadences inconformitywithwhich thingsprosperand those inconformitywithwhichthingsdecline.In strategy, different cadences exist. First it is necessary to know the

concordantcadencesandthentolearnthediscordantones.69Amongthelargeorsmall and slow or fast cadences, it is indispensable for strategy to discernstriking cadences, interval cadences, and opposing cadences.70 Your strategycannotbesureifyoudonotsucceedinmasteringtheopposingcadence.

Atthetimeofstrategiccombat,youmustknowthecadencesofeachenemyandutilizecadencesthattheywillnotthinkof.Youwillwinbyunleashingthecadencesofemptinessthatarebornfromthoseofwisdom.Ineachscroll,Iwillwriteaboutcadence.Examinethesewritingsandtrainwell.

If youpracticediligently, frommorning till night, thewayof strategy I teach,your mind will spontaneously broaden. I am transmitting to the world mystrategy in itscollectiveand individualdimensions. Iamexpounding it for thefirsttimeinwritinginthesefivescrollsofEarth,Water,Fire,Wind,andHeaven.Thosewhowouldliketolearnmystrategyshouldapplythefollowingrulesin

ordertopracticetheway:

1. Thinkofthatwhichisnotevil.712. Trainintheway.3. Takeaninterestinallthearts.4. Knowthewayofallprofessions.5. Knowhowtoappreciatetheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofeachthing.6. Learntojudgethequalityofeachthing.7. Perceiveandunderstandthatwhichisnotvisiblefromtheoutside.8. Beattentiveeventominimalthings.9. Donotperformuselessacts.

Youmusttraininthewayofstrategykeepingthesegeneralprinciplesinmind.Particularlyinthisway,ifyoudonotknowhowtoseetherightthingsinbroadperspective, you will not be able to become an accomplished practitioner ofstrategy. If you master this method,72 you will not lose, even alone againsttwentyorthirtyopponents.Firstofall,becauseyoumaintainyourvitalenergyconstantly in your strategy73 and you practice the direct way, you will winthroughyour techniquesandalso throughyourwayof seeing.Sinceyouhavefreemasteryofyourbody74 as a result ofyour training,youwillwin throughyourbody;sinceyourmindisaccustomedtothisway,youwillalsowinthroughyourmind.Onceyoureachthisstage,howcanyoubedefeated?Regardinggrand strategy, youmust be victorious through the quality of the

people you employ, victorious through the way in which you utilize a greatnumberofpeople,victoriousbybehavingcorrectlyyourselfinaccordancewiththeway,victoriousbyrulingyourcountry,victoriousinordertofeedthepeople,victoriousbyapplyingthelawoftheworldinthebestway.Thusitisnecessary

toknowhownottolosetoanyone—inanyoftheways—andtofirmlyestablishyourpositionandyourhonor.Thatisthewayofstrategy.

ThetwelfthofthefifthmonthofYear2ofShoho[1645]SHINMENMUSASHIFortheHonorableLordTeraoMagonojo

ThefifthofthesecondmonthofYear7ofKanbun[1667]75TERAOYUMEYOKATSUNOBU

FortheHonorableLordYamamotoGensuke76

Notes

Note:ReferencestonumberedsourcesintheBibliographyofthisbookarecitedinparentheses.

1.Nitenichiryu:ni,“two”;ten,“heaven,universe”; ichi,“one”;ryu,“school.”Nitenhasseveralsenses:

1.Twoheavens.2.Thetwoheavenlybodies,orthemoongodandthesungod.3.Anotherheavenoranotheruniversethatiscontrastedwiththenaturalheavenoruniverseinthefollowingsense:Whensomeonereceivesaverygreatfavorfromaperson,thatpersonisconsideredasaheavenorauniverse.(99,100)

We could translate the name literally as “School of Two Heavenly BodiesUnited” or “School of Two Heavens United.” In theGorin no sho, Musashidesignates his school by this name only twice.He usually usesNito ichi ryu.Instead of ten, “heaven,” he uses to, which means “sword,” which I havetranslated as “School of Two Swords.” A more literal translation would be“SchooloftheUnityofTwoSwords,”butthisoverlylongformulationlosestheconcisenessoftheJapaneseexpression.Thetermnitenevokestwoimages.Wecanunderstandnitenasacontraction

inwhichtheideaofto,“sword,”isimplicit,andthisexpressionthenyieldstheideaoftwoswordsraisedtowardthesky—orelsethetwoswords,thelongandthe short, raised toward the sky—symbolizing the twoheavenlybodies,or thesungodandthemoongod.Lateron,theexpressionNiten-sama(samameans“lord”)wasusedasaname

forMusashibyhisadmirers.

2.“Wayofstrategy”:hyohonomichi.

3. The province ofHigo corresponds roughly to the present-day prefecture ofKumamoto.

4.ThenameofMusashi’sfatherwasverylikelyHirataMunisai.Hewasoneofthe principal vassals of a minor feudal lord of the mountainous region ofSakushu,westofKyoto.Hewasapractitioneroftheswordandthejitte,asmall

metalweaponwithsixhooksonitwithwhichitwaspossibletoparryaswordandpotentiallyimmobilizeitforamoment.

5.TheprovinceofHarimacorrespondstoapartofthepresent-dayprefectureofHyogo.

6.AsfarasMusashi’syearofbirthisconcerned,opinionsaredividedbetween1582 and 1584. I have adopted the second date, which seems the moretrustworthy.

7.TheprovinceofTajimacorrespondstothecurrentprefectureofHyogo.

8.CertainduelsMusashifoughthaveremainedfamous.Oneofthebestknownisthatinwhich,allalone,heopposedtheadeptsoftheYoshiokadojo,oneofthemostfamousof theeightschoolsofKyoto.Aftersuccessivelyvanquishingthetwoprincipalmastersoftheschoolinindividualcombat,Musashiconfrontedtheentire group of the school’s practitioners by himself. His victory over theYoshiokadojobegantosolidlyestablishMusashi’sreputation.Thiscombattookplacein1604;Musashiwasthentwentyyearsold.Attheageoftwenty-one,oneyear after this combat, Musashi wrote “The Mirror of the Way of Strategy”(Hyodokyo), which is composed of twenty-eight instructions on strategy. Thisshowsthatfromthetimeofhisyouthhewastryingtoarriveatakindofwrittensynthesisofhisart.Wefind in thatworkasectionwhose title (“WhenOneIsFighting against Several Adversaries”) recalls this fight against the Yoshiokadojo.

9.Musashirecognizedwhenhewasaboutthirtythatdespiteallthevictorieshehadwonuptothatpoint,hehadnotattainedtheultimatelevelofhisart.Thesevictories were only relative ones, since accidental elements—chance, theinadequacy of his opponents, and so forth—were factors in them. For twentymoreyearshesoughtaftertheimmutableessenceofhisart,anditwasnotuntilhe was around fifty that he believed he had reached a satisfactory state ofinsight.Heexpressedthisinapoem,asfollows:

Ipenetratedsodeeplyintothemountainsinmyquest,NowhereIam,comeouttheotherside,soclosetohumanbeings.

10.Four-thirtyinthemorning.

11.“Warriorfamilies,”buke:Thisword literallymeans“family”or“clan,” the

keofawarrior,bu.Herethetermisusedtorefertotheclassofwarriorsinthecontextoftheeducationthatisappropriateforthissocialgroup.Thetermkeisalsopronounced ie andmeans“house,”“family,”andalso“clan.”Here,byanextensionof the senseof“clan,” itdesignates theclassofwarriors.The termsbushi,“warriors”or“samurai,”andbukeshouldbedistinguished.

12.Sukimonoorsukisha:fromsuki,“artoflivingthatincludestheartoftea,”andmonoorsha,“man.”Thistermisnolongerinusetoday.

13.Thissentence,likeonethatcomesabitfurtheron(“Withoutlearninghowtohandleweapons,withoutknowingtheadvantagesofeachofthem,awarriorislackingsomewhatineducation”)hasatonethatiscriticaltowardthewarriorsofthetime.InMusashi’seyes,veryfewwarriorsseemtohavebeenworthyofthename.Musashideclaredinapreviousparagraph,“Butveryfewlikethewayofstrategy.”Thusthepracticeofstrategydoesnotseemtohavebeeneasy,evenforwarriorsofthisperiod.Musashi’sattitudewillbecomeclearerandclearerasweadvanceintheGorin

no sho. He is trying to find, by means of what he calls hyoho, “strategy,” apragmatic approach that is generally applicable. But his pragmatism is not atechniqueintheWesternsenseoftheterm.Thereisnomind/techniqueduality.ForMusashi,techniqueisnotdistinctfrommind.Thusmindmustbesoughtforintechnique,andtheprincipleofeffectivenessisalwaysincludedintheessentiallogic of technique. Musashi considers the hyoho he practices to be a greatprinciple applicable to all phenomena. He is himself his techniques; the manbecomesonewiththetechniquesheapplies.Eachoftheartscanbecomeapathinlifeifitisunderstoodasaway.This manner of thinking was reinforced and refined during the Edo period

(1603–1867), when Japanese society cut itself off almost entirely from theoutsideworld.Japanfellbackonitselfanddevelopedasocietyinwhichvariouscultural models came together in their movement toward refinement andformalization.Itisonlyinsocietiesofthistypethatitispossibletoconceiveofaprinciplethatisvalidforallphenomena,suchastheonesoughtbyMusashi.

14. Kantori is presently calledKatori and is located in Chiba prefecture. TheshrineofKatoriisdedicatedtoFutsunushinokami,agodofwar.(100)“Kashima” refers to the shrine of Kashima, located in Ibaraki prefecture.

AccordingtotheKojiki(122,pp.65–70),TakemikazuchinoMikotoconqueredthe country of Ashihara no nakatsu kuni at the command of the goddessAmaterasu.TheKashimashrineisdedicatedmainlytoTakemikazuchi,agodof

war. Hitachi was an ancient province that corresponded to parts of the twopresent-dayprefecturesofChibaandIbaraki.When the sakimori, soldiers of eastern Japan,moved down intoKyushu to

defenditfromtheinvasionoftheKoreansandtheChinese,theywenttopraytothe god of the Kashima shrine. This ritual at the shrine, which was calledkashimadachi, becameestablishedas a custom in the seventhcentury.Useoftheritual inconnectionwith therecruitmentofsakimoriwasabandonedat thebeginningofthetenthcentury,butthecultofthewargodoftheKashimashrinecontinued. It took on greater importance beginning in the Kamakura era,especiallyforwarriorsofeasternJapan.ThetownofKashimadevelopedalongwiththeshrine.ThetwoshrinesofKatoriandKashimaarelocatedonoppositebanksofthe

Toneriver.Thewatergod,thegodoftheriver,andthegodofthetidesarealsovenerated there. As far as the practice and culture of the martial arts areconcerned, the traditions of the two shrines go back to mythological times.Beginning in the fourteenth century, several schools of swordsmanship werefoundedbypriestsoftheseshrines.The oldest known of these schoolswas founded by IizasaChoisai Ienao, a

warriorattachedtotheKatorishrine.(1-b,1-c,32,42)ChoisaiwasexperiencedinbattleandthestudyoftheswordandlivedattheKatorishrinewhilestrivingto perfect his swordsmanship. He prayed to the war god of the shrine frommorning till night and trainedwith his sword against the trees. At the end ofthreeyearsofsolitaryexploration,hereceivedarevelationfromthewargodandfoundedtheschooloftheswordknownasTenshishodenKatorishintoryu.ThisschoolispresentlycalledShintoryu.IizasaChoisaidiedattheageofahundredonthefifteenthofthefourthmonthofthesecondyearofChokyo(1488).TheschoolofswordsmanshipcalledKashimashinryuorKashimashinkage

ryu was founded by Matsumoto Bizen no kami Masabobu (1468–1524), astudentofIizasaChoisai.TheMatsumotofamilyhadbeenpriestsoftheShintoshrineofKashimaforgenerations.HereinbriefisthestoryofMatsumotoBizen(15,pp.9–18;32,pp.23–29;42,pp.276–292)andhisstudentBokuden(32)asrecountedinvariouschroniclesandlegends:Starting from the teachings of Iizasa Choisai, Matsumoto Bizen developed

techniquesforvariousweapons,suchasthelance,thenaginata,andthestaff.Hetransmittedtheultimatetechniqueofhisschoolunderthenamehitotsunotachi,“the single sword.” He fought with the lance on the battlefield twenty-threetimesandkilledandbeheadedtwenty-fivefamousfeudallordsandseventy-sixordinarywarriors.Hediedonthebattlefieldattheageoffifty-seven.Matsumoto Bizen transmitted the hitotsu no tachi to Tsukahara Bokuden

Takamoto(1489–1571),alsothesonofafamilyofpriestsoftheKashimashrine.Having received the teachingofMatsumotoBizen,Bokudenstudied theartoftheKatorishintoryuwithhisfather.In1505,attheageofseventeen,hefoughthis first duel with a real sword and killed his opponent. After this he foughtnineteenduelsandparticipatedinthirty-sevenbattles.Hewaswoundedonlybyarrows,sixtimes.Thenumberofenemieshekilledreached212.HesecludedhimselfintheKashimashrineforathousanddaysandreceiveda

revelationrelatedtotheartofthesword.Then,withtheteachingsofMatsumotoBizen as a basis, he founded the Shinto ryu,whose technique is a revitalizedformof thehitotsuno tachi. Bokuden traveled through various regions in thecourse of three journeys, during which he met adepts of various schools andtransmitted and spread the art of his own school. Here is a passage from theKoyogunkan recountinghis first journey:“On the journeyhe took to improvehis understanding of strategy, Tsukahara Bokuden traveled on horsebackwiththree spare horses, taking along with him three hunting falcons. Eighty menmadeuphisretinue.Thus,withregardtohisstudyofstrategy,lordsaswellasaccomplishedadeptstreatedhimwithrespect.Bokudenwasarealadeptoftheartofthesword.”(15,p.10;32,p.24)InKyotoBokudentaughthisartofswordsmanshiptothreeAshikagashoguns

in succession: Yoshiharu (1511–1550), Yoshiteru (1536?–1565), and Yoshiaki(1537–1597).Within the Katori and Kashima traditions, the lineage of Iizasa Choisai,

MatsumotoBizen,andTsukaharaBokudenTakamotoisthebestknown.(1-b,1-c,15,32,42)Thetechniquesoftheschoolsofswordsmanshipthatissuedfromthistradition

are forceful and simple, since they were intended to be used on the field ofbattle,wherewarriorsfoughtinarmor.Inhis textMusashi seems tobemakinganallusion to themanner inwhich

TsukaharaBokudenpropagatedhisschool.Musashi also wrote that Arima Kihei, his first opponent in a duel, was a

practitioneroftheShintoryu,foundedbyTsukaharaBokuden.

15. “The ten talents and the seven arts,” ju no shichi gei: According to thedictionary(100),noandgeihavethefollowingmeanings:No:(1)Theabilitytoaccomplishthings;(2)apersonwhohasatalentorwho

has accomplished things; (3) the techniqueof an art, ability for technique; (4)effectiveness;(5)Nohtheater.Gei:(1)Thetechniqueortheknowledgeacquiredinamartialscienceorart;

arts,crafts;(2)gametechnique;(3)technique,work.

16.“Pragmaticdomain,”rikata:Literally,rimeans(1)trenchant,verysharp;(2)convenient; (3) effective, useful; (4) the terrain is excellent; (5) victory; (6)interest, advantage, gain. Kata means “direction,” “position,” “domain,”“means.”Thusrikatareferstoadomainthatcreatesaninterestoranadvantageandthereforehasaconcreteusefulness.

17. “The principles,” ri:Musashi frequently uses the word ri in the sense ofprincipleorreason(see“Ri”intheappendix).“Thesword”:kenjutsu literallymeans“techniquesof thesword,”hence“the

sword,”“theartofthesword,”or“swordsmanship.”

18.DuringMusashi’s time, encountersbetween schoolsof the swordwere forthemostpartbattlesfoughtwithoutmercy,andtakingmatterslightlyorhavingthe illusion of knowledge could result in death. Thus he recommends notpausing over what is not essential. Musashi’s own difficulties show throughbehindthisremark—heneverobtainedapositionofresponsibilityfromagreatlordcommensuratewiththeabilitiesheconsideredhimselftopossess.

19. “Fourways”:Thedescriptionof the fourways—warrior, shi; peasant,no;artisan, ko; and merchant, sho—does not follow the hierarchical order. Thismightseemabitincoherent,butitisdoubtlessconnectedwiththemovementofthoughtpreparingthecomparisonbetweenthebushiandthecarpenter.During the Tensho era (1573–1592), in institutionalizing the existing social

hierarchy, Toyotomi Hideyoshi established four feudal classes or orders. Thissystem was reinforced by the Tokugawa regime. Its principal aim was toguarantee the power of the governing class of warriors, which henceforthpossessedamonopolyonweaponsandbenefitedfromvariousprivileges.Abovethem,butwithouteffectivepower,werethenobleswhosurroundedtheemperor.Belowthesefourclasses, twootherclassesexisted:etaandhimin,whichwereconsiderednonhuman.Theetaperformedvariousimpuremanualtasks,notablyworkwithanimalskins.Thehiminwerebeggarsandatthesametimedidworkconnectedwiththetransportandcleaningofcorpses.ThefeudalclasseswereabolishedintheMeijiera,buttheywerereplacedby

newsocialclasses:kazoku(newnobles),shizoku (formerwarriors),andheimin(ordinary people). This social classification was abolished by the constitutionafter theSecondWorldWar.But theproblemoftheetaand thehiminwasnotresolvedinasatisfactorymanner.Todaytenacioussocialdiscriminationagainsttheformeretaandhimin still exists, even though theseclassesno longerexistfromalegislativepointofview.

“Fortraversinghumanlife,”hitonoyoowatarukoto:Toevokethesituationof human life,Musashi uses the imageof a ship crossing.Heuses this imageagainintheScrollofFire.

20.Tokuismostoftentranslatedas“virtue”(see“Toku”intheappendix),butitalso has the sense of “richness.” In this passage, toku seems to draw on thissecondsetofmeaningsandindicatetheparticularqualities,therichness,hiddenineachweapon.

21.“Blackcords,”sumigane:sumi,“ink”;ganeorkane,“ruler.”

22.“Noblehouse,”kuge:ku,“theemperor’scourt”;ge,“house.”Thisreferstothesocialsystemofvassalage.“Warriorhouse,”buke:bu,“militaryperson,”ke,thesamemeaningasge.Inorder tounderstandMusashi’s comparison, it shouldbe explained that in

Japanese,thesametermrefersbothtothehouseasabuildingandtothefamilythatoccupiesit.Thecorrespondingideogramispronouncediewhenitisaloneandkeorgewhenitiscombinedwithanotherword.ForJapanesethoughtthisisnotmerelyaverbalmatterbutalsoexpressestheprofoundsenseofidentitythatexists among members of a family and also solidarity among members of afamilydownthroughsuccessivegenerations,bothofthesebeinggivenmaterialexpressionintheshelteringformofthehouse.Thisnotioncanbeexpandedtotheleveloftheclan,whichisconceivedofasalargefamily,andcanthenextendbeyondthattothesolidarityamongclanscomposingthesocialclassofwarriors.Anotherextensionofthetermallowsit todesignateaschoolofatraditional

art; forhere, too, themodeof transmissionof theschoolwasbasedmainlyonthe system of house and family. The relations between the master and hisdisciples were patterned on the model of the family relationship of father tochildren. The system of adoption was often utilized to perpetuate the familynamethatwaslinkedwiththeknowledgetransmittedbyaschoolinahereditaryfashion.Thepointwasfortheheadofthefamilytobeabletoperpetuatehisartandperhapsalsodirecttheschool.Thistendencybecamemorepronouncedwithtime.Musashi, for his part, maintained the continuity of his family through

adoption,buthisschoolwasperpetuatedindependentlyofhisname.Itwasoftenthecaseduring theEdoperiod,and is stilloften thecase today, thatwhen theleadership of a school is determined by family inheritance, the quality of theschooldeclines.Whathappensinthesecasesisthatthedisciplewhotakesoverthesuccessionisnotnecessarilythebestonebuttheonebestplacedwithinthe

family.

23.“TheFourHouses,”shike:shi,“four”;ke,“house”or“family.”Several interpretationsofMusashi’suseof thewordshike arepossible.The

wordcouldrefereithertothefourFujiwarafamiliesortothefourschoolsofthetea ceremony;or else it alludes tobothof them. In the first sense, shike is anabbreviationofFujiwarashike (thefourFujiwarafamilies),whichrefers to thefourmainFujiwarafamiliesoftheeighthcentury.TheFujiwarafamilyexercisedaverygreatinfluenceonimperialpolicyatthattime.Thisfamilybeganitsriseto importance at the end of the seventh century. After that it divided intonumerousbranches,someofwhichweretoplayanimportantroleinthehistoryofJapan.The termshike canalso refer to the fourschoolsofchanoyuorsado (tea

ceremony). The four schools are the Omote senke, Ura senke, Mushanokojisenke,andYabunouchikesenke.I have opted for the first interpretation, based on the first paragraph of the

introduction to theGorin no sho, whereMusashi gives his name as ShinmenMusashinokami,FujiwaranoGenshin.Thefamilynametakenbyabushiwas,asMusashi’sname indicates, a composite form,andoftenoneof thenames itincludedwasareferencetoamoredistantclanthantheonewithwhichhewasimmediately connected. Inclusion of this more-distant clan served to link theindividualwiththeperiodoftheemergenceofthebushiinJapanesehistory.Inusing thisname,Musashiwas indicatingaremotederivationofhisfamily linefromtheFujiwaraclan.Theothernameheused,Shinmen,was thatof the feudal lordofwhomhis

familyhadbeenvassalsforseveralgenerations;thisisanameMusashi’sfamilywould have received authorization to use. Musashi used this name when hewantedtoclarifyhislineofdescent.ThenameMiyamotodoesnotappearhere.This was the name of the village where he spent his youth, and it was notnecessarytoincludeitinhisofficialname.GenshinistheBuddhistnamethathechoseasaparticipantinthatspiritualpath.TheideogramscomposingitcanalsobepronouncedMasanobu.Masanawouldhavebeenachildhoodname.Forabushi,genealogywasofmajorimportance.Asenseofhonorwasalways

attached to the family name. Although the choice of name was sometimes amatterofcircumstanceandwasflexible,once itwasdetermined,abushi livedanddiedbyhisname.

24.“School,”ryu:“Style,”fu,canalsobereadkaze,“wind.”“House”isie.

25. “In this way the chief carpenter”: In Japanese, there are two differentideogramsthatarepronouncedtoryo.Toryo: (1) post, beam; (2) he who is in charge of a country; (3) chief; (4)

mastercarpenter.Toryo:(1)rulingallthings;(2)hewhorulesanddirects,presides.(100)Musashiusesthesecondideogramtorefertothechiefcarpenteraswellasthe

chief warrior, thus stressing the comparison. That is why, in this passage, Itranslatedas“chiefcarpenter”andnot“mastercarpenter,”as in the restof thetext.I translated as “resemble each other” the expression onaji, which literally

means“thesame,identical.”

26.Shoji:slidingscreensmadeofstretched,translucentpaper.

27.Tokonoma,tokumawari:architecturalfeatureattherearofthemainroom.

28. “Being vigilant with regard to the surroundings,”monogoto o yurusazarukato: yurusazaru is used in the sense of ki o yurusanai, “not relaxing one’sattentionandgoingintodetail.”

29.“Knowingsubstanceanditsfunction”:taiyuoshiru.Musashiwritesittaiyu,inhiragana.AuthorsofferingcommentariesontheGorinnoshoareofdifferentopinions

on the interpretationof this term, forwhich four transcriptions into ideogramsarepossiblewiththefollowingmeanings:

1. “Greatcourage”or“couragemanifestedintheaccomplishmentofanimportantthing.”(10)

2. “Function,effect,use.”(13)3. “Essentialpoint”(11);Kamata(4)retainsthehiraganaandgivesan

interpretationinhiscommentarythatfitswiththat.4. “Substanceanditsapplication”(Buddhistterm).

Musashi’s contemporary, Yagyu Munenori, writes: “Tai yu exists in eachthing;whenthereis tai, thereisyu.Forexample, thebowis taiand theactofaiming,drawing,andhittingthetargetistheyuofthebow.Thelampistaiandthelightisyu....Theswordistai;slashingandstabbingisyu.Thustheessencederivesfromtai,andthatwhicharisesfromtheessenceandmovestowardtheoutsideinordertoaccomplishdifferentfunctionsisyu.”(56,p.102)

Yagyu Munenori developed a theory of the art of the sword based on thepractice of Zen. Musashi also practiced Zen; that is why, in view of YagyuMunenori’sinterpretation,Ibasedmytranslationonthefourthsenseoftheterm.

30.“Ambientenergy”:Itranslatedthetermki,whichmeans“air,”“ambience,”“vitalenergy,”thiswayinordertotrytopreservetheplayonthetwoaspectsoftheterm’smeaning.

31. Musashi could in fact have been a carpenter and even a master of thisdiscipline. In the course of his life, he handcrafted works of art as well asweaponsandobjectsofdailyusage forawarrior.Hiswoodsculpturesandhispaintingsarewellknown,buthemadeagreatnumberofordinaryobjectswhosequalities are also highly esteemed: wooden swords (bokken), saddles, tsuba(swordhilts),metalhunchin(paperweightsforChineseinkcalligraphies),andsoon.Themodern separation of art from handcraft did not exist forMusashi.He

wasanartist andartisanat the same time.At the timeofhisduelwithSasakiKojiro,itissaidthathemadeawoodenswordfromanoarjustbeforethebout.Lateron,whenoneofhispatronsaskedhim,“Whatwasthebokkenlikethatyouused to fightagainstKojiro?”bywayofanswer,Musashi readilymadeon thespotabokkenof127centimetersinlength.Thisbokkenisstillpreservedtoday.(11,p.37)

32. Musashi writes this mendo. Mendo or medo refers to “long externalcorridors.” In the construction of this period, long, raised external corridorslinkedbuildings.Tomakeitpossibletoenterinnercourtyardsonhorseback,itwas sometimes necessary to provide passageways by having a corridor thatcould be raised in themanner of a drawbridge.This iswhatwas called akirimedoormedo.Lateronthistermcametorefertothelongcorridors.(99)Mendo,written inanotherway,means“problemofdetail.”The ideogramis

derivedfromtheoneforthetermabove.Thebusinessofgettingthehorsesbythemedowasasourceofproblems,hencetheemergenceofthissecondsense,whichismorecommontoday.(100)Ikeptthefirst interpretationbecauseitfitwiththelogicofthecomparisonofstrategicqualitiestotheworkofacarpenter.

33.This arrangementmight seempuzzling from the point of viewofWesternlogic. It does not have anything to do with an analysis of the techniques. Itreflectssomething that ismuchmore important forMusashi: thestateofmindthatmustdominateeachphaseofprogressalongtheway.Intruth,forMusashi,

swordsmanship is not merely a matter of technique but rather—as we havealready seen—a way of life. Nevertheless, in the course of this work, thetechniques are described with the greatest precision. For Musashi, man andnatureareofthesameorder,bothpartofthesamecosmicentity;thisiswhatisexpressedbytheorientationoftheScrollofWater.The explanation of the meaning of the Scroll of Heaven might cause the

reader someconfusion.This scroll represents the fruitionof theprocessof theway, that is, emptiness, which is not nothingness but rather the origin ofexistence.

34.“Principle”:ri.

35.“Model,”kata,means“form,prototype”or“modelfortheplasticarts.”Itisalso the word that designates standardized sequences of movements in thephysicalarts.Akatainthissenseservesatonceasanidealreferencepointandasameansoftransmissionoftechnicalknowledge.

36.“Happensinashorttime”:thisideaalsoreferstourgentsituations.

37.Thewordwindhasseveralmetaphoricalsenses.Inthecommonexpressionsreferredtohere,differentimagesareevoked.Inthereferencetotheancientwindandthemodernwind,theimageisthatoffashion.Intheexpression“thewindofsuchandsuchafamily,”themeaningis“familytradition.”

38.“Deviatingfromthetrueway”:Itranslatedthewordgedointhisway,whichrefers to “religions other than Buddhism (for which the word naido is used),heresies,dogmasthatareinconflictwiththetruth,aninsult.”

39.Thewordkuhasseveralsenses:“heaven,”“sky,”“emptiness,”and“space”(see“Ku”intheappendix).IntheScrollofHeaven,Musashiusesitinthefullrangeofitsmeanings,stressingthesenseofemptiness.Inthetext,afterhavingtranslateditthefirsttwotimesas“heaven(oremptiness),”Iusedonetranslationor anotherdependingon thenuance that seemed tome tobedominant at thatpoint.

40.“Depth,”oku,and“surface,”kuchi.Kuchiliterallymeans“mouth,”hencetheimage of amouth throughwhich entry ismade and thence of an entrance orsurfaceinrelationtoadepthorcore.Usuallyforthedichotomyof“surface”and“depth,”thepairoftermsomoteandokuisused.

41.“Theprincipleoftheway”:dori.

42.“Highlevelofability”:Kidoku,whichtodayispronouncedkitoku, literallymeans (1) “extraordinary, marvelous, something rare and strange, the fact ofparticularlyexcelling,astrangesign,excellenteffectiveness,beingdeservingofpraise”;(2)“thestrangepowerofGodandofBuddha.”

43.Musashi called his schoolNito ichi ryu. It is possible to interpret ichiryusimplyinthesenseof“myschool,”butinthevocabularyofthemartialarts,ichiis frequently used with the connotation of unity, the integration of multipleelements. For example, ichi ban, “a single occasion”; ichi nen, “a singleintention”; and ippon, whose meaning I describe more precisely below. Nitomeans“two swords.” Ichimeans “one,” and ryumeans “school.” To say only“theSchoolofTwoSwords,”itwouldbeenoughtosaynitoryu.Bycombiningthe twowordsnito and ichi,Musashi seems to be expressing the state of thebushi who knows how to use the two swords as one. Thus the meaning is“SchooloftheUnityoftheTwoSwords,”butsoastostickwitharenderingthatreflects theconcise rhythmof thenameofMusashi’sschool inJapanese, Iamreservingmentionofthisnuanceforanoteonly.Toexplainfurtherthesenseofichi,Iwilltaketheexampleofthetermippon

usedinallthecontemporaryJapanesemartialartstoindicateavictory.Ipponisa contraction of ichi hon, hon meaning “fundamental” or “essential.” In atraining sessionor a tournament, it is customary tocount thenumberofboutswon by each participant. Ippon refers to a win obtained through the use of asingletechniquewithinasystemofconventionswhereitisrecognizedthatiftheparticular movement in question had been fully completed outside theconventionalsystem,theopponentwouldhavesufferedablowthatwouldhaveputhimoutofcombat.Inthedayswhenpeoplefoughtwithrealswordsorwithwoodenswords,theresultofaduelwasmostoftendeterminedbytheuseofasingledecisivetechnique.DuringtheperiodofMusashi’syouth,theresultwasdeath.However, inperformingcombatexerciseswithinaschool, thanks to theconventions that were adopted, the practitioners could engage in combatrepeatedly in a series of many bouts. They then counted up the number ofvictoriesanddefeatsintermsofunitsofhon(ippon).Whatissoughtafterinthemartialartsistheidealippon,thatis,avictoryobtainedthroughatechniquethathasanintegralconnectionwiththatwhichisfundamentaltothecombat.

44.Ryokoshimeans“twoswords.”Ryomeans“two,”andkoshiistheunitusedtocountswords.

45.Thenaginataisaweaponwithalonghandleandathick,curvedbladelikethatofascythe.

46.Tonomomo:To is currently pronounced soto andmeans “outside”;monomeans “weapon.” Thus the expression means “weapon meant to be usedoutside,”amongotherplaces,onthefieldofbattle.Theideogramtoorsotoisalsopronouncedhoka.Inthatcasethemeaningis

different: “the realmorworld that existsoutside theordinaryone;a thing thatexistsoutsidenormalstandards;elsewhere,otherthan.”Ifweinterpretitinthissense,thentheswordbeingthenormalweaponofthewarrior,thelanceandthenaginata are added on to that. We could then translate: “The lance and thenaginataareweaponsofwaradditionaltothesword.”

47.ItshouldbenotedherethatinMusashi’stext,thedesignationforeachofthetwo swords is not consistent. Sometimes he uses tachi and katana andsometimes katana and wakizashi. As he himself explained in the previousparagraph,thetwoexpressionsmean“thelargeswordandthesmallsword,”butkatanareferstothesmallswordinthefirstexpressionandthelargeoneinthesecond. In Musashi’s time, the names of the swords had not yet becomealtogetherfixed.

48.“Itisdeplorableto...,”hoieniarubekarazu:Hoiispronouncedhoniatthepresent time and means (1) “true mind,” “spirit,” or “intention,” “initialintention,”“truedesire”;(2)truesense, truemeaning;(3)thatwhichoriginallyshouldbe,characterormannerinherentinathing.Aliteraltranslationwouldhavebeen:“Itisnotinthetruespiritto...,”butto

avoidconfusionwiththetranslationofkokoro,Idecidedtoavoidthetermsspiritandmind.

49.Clearlytherewasnoideahereofdrawingthebowusingthelefthandalone.What is being talked about is carrying a bow so as to use it at some othermoment.Itshouldbenotedthatinbattle,warriorscarriedseveralweaponsatthesametime.Inadditiontothetwoswordsstuckintothebeltontheleftside,somewarriorscarriedtwoorthreemoreontheirbackssotheycouldchangeweapons;andothers,asMusashisays,carriedabow,alance,anaginata,andsoforth.

50.InspiteofwhatMusashisays,itisextremelydifficulttowieldaswordeasilywithjustonehand.Evenholdingashinai (abamboopracticesword),whichisthreetofourtimeslighterthanasword,withjustonehand,itisdifficulttofight

withease.Nowadays,thereareveryfewpractitionersofkendowhousetwoshinai.The

difficulty experienced now must have been much greater when practitionersfoughtwith swords in real combat.The fact is that in sword combat, it is notenough merely to swing the weapon, but one must also be able to parry theattacksofanopponentwhoisusingaheavyswordthatheismostoftenholdingwithtwohandsandthenbeabletoslashhim.It isnotpossibletoevaluatethedifficultyinvolvedinthisbyfightingwithshinaialone.“Itisimpossibletousetwo swords without having the innate strength of Niten-sama” (Sir Niten, orMasterNiten,wasthetitleofrespectgiventoMusashi).Thisisanadagethatisoftenheard in sword circles.Togiveyou an exampleofMusashi’s strength, IcitehereapassagefromtheNitenki:

OnedayLordNagaokaaskedMusashi:“Howshouldbamboopolesforflagsbechosen?”“Showmethepiecesofbambooyouhave,”repliedMusashi.The Lord had a hundred pieces of bamboo he had ordered for this

purpose brought into the garden.Musashi pickedup one of the pieces ofbamboo,andholdingitbytheend,madearapidstrokeintheair.Hewenton to do the same thingwith each piece of bamboo. Every one of thembrokeinhalfexceptone,whichMusashigavetothelord,saying,“Thisoneisgood.”“Thatisanabsolutelysurewaytotestthem,butitcanonlybedoneby

you,”repliedLordNagaoka,smiling.(2,p.181)

51. Itmight be useful tomake clear just howdifficult it is to handle a heavysword. At the present time in kendo, an adult man uses a shinai thatweighsabout 500grams, awomanone thatweighs420grams.Whenpractitioners ofanother discipline, such as karate or judo, use a shinai for the first time, theygenerallyhavetheimpressionthatitisverylight.Butastheybegintopracticekendo, their impression changes very quickly, and they pass through a phasewhere the shinai seems very heavy to them. Practitioners of kendo are verysensitivetothebalanceanddifferencesinweightoftheirshinai,adifferenceof10or 20gramsbeing strongly felt.Whenkendo is practicedusing two shinai(nito),thelargeshinaiweighsabout375gramsandthesmallone265.Butwhendoingcombatexercises,ashinaiof375grams,heldwithjustonehand,seemsveryheavy, andvery fewmodernkendopractitioners succeed inhandlingoneone-handedwithease.The largesword thatMusashi talksaboutweighedbetween1,200and1,500

grams.Thusitwasthreetofourtimesheavierthantheshinaicurrentlyusedinthenito(twoshinai)combatform.

52.HereIdecidedtotranslatehoithiswaybecauseitseemedtometohavethesenseof“initialintention.”

53.ThissentenceexplainswhatthewayofstrategymeansforMusashi.Itgoesfarbeyondhandlingasword.Hemakesthingsthatothersmightseekinreligionapartofstrategyitself.Oneanecdote—perhapsromanticized—tellsusthatonhiswaytomeetagreat

number of opponents whom he was supposed to face in a fight in which hischanceswereverypoor,MusashipassedbyaShintoshrine.Suddenlybecomingawarethathehadstartedtopraywiththeintentionofaskingfortheprotectionof the gods, he straightened up and came to his senses, accusing himself oflackingconfidenceinhisstrategy,forheshouldbetrustinghisfateonlytothat.(61)ThisisthesenseinwhichthephraseofMusashi’sfoundintheDokkodoisusuallyinterpreted:“Respect theBuddhaandthegodswithoutrelyingontheirhelp.” In this way he expresses incisively and explicitly a tendency thatordinarilyunderliesthephilosophyofbudobutisleftunspoken.Warriorscouldbepractitionersofdifferentreligions,butthereligionsweremoreacolorationofthewayofthewarriorthantheotherwayaround.

54.Hyohofutatsunojinori:Literally,rimeans“interest,advantage.”Musashioftenusesriwithoutdistinguishingitfromitsothermeaning,“reason,principle,the logicof things,meaning.”Here, inconnectionwith“knowing theri of thetwoideogramshyoandho,”itseemsmoreplausiblethatrihasmorethesenseof“meaning”or“principle”than“interest”or“advantage.”

55.Musashi uses the termbugei to designate themartial arts in general. It isimportant to note that Musashi makes a point of the demarcation separatinghyoho fromtheother terms.That iswhyIpreferhere to indicate theJapaneseterm he uses each time rather than to translate them all as “martial arts.”Wehave:

hyohosha:manofhyoho,someonewhoknowshowtohandletheswordite:archerteppouchi:someonewhoshootsagunyaritsukai:expertwithalancenaginatatsukai:expertwiththenaginata

tachitsukai:expertwiththelongswordwakizashitsukai:expertwiththeshortsword

56.“Thevirtueofthesword,”tachinotoku:Onthemeaningofthewordtoku,see“Toku”intheappendix.Ihavetranslatedtokuas“virtue,”butthiswordcanalsomean“interest”or“advantage.”Thenuanceof“virtue”seemedtometobepresent in thesense inwhichMusashiemploys the termhere inrelation to thesword.

57. “Persevere”: in this sentenceMusashi uses the termmigaku,whichmeans“topolish”andwhichIhavetranslated“topersevere.”Musashifrequentlyusesthetermmigakuinthesenseof“persevere,developoneself,studyindepth,”andthelike.Thisexpressionisfrequentlyusedintherealmofthearts.

58.“Appropriately”: ideau ordeau,meaning “tomeet, to face, to coincide, toadjustto,tosuitthesituation.”

59. “If you compare the two . . . ,”yariwa sente nari, naginatawa ushirodenari:IrenderedMusashi’scomparisonasIdidinviewofthefollowing:

•Sentemeans“precedesomebodyinanact,dosomethingbeforesomeoneelse,attackbeforesomeoneelse,fightatthehead(ofagroup),taketheinitiativebyattackingfirst.”•Ushirodeorgotemeans“thebackofapersonorathing.”Whenitisopposedtosente,itdesignates“someonewholagsbehind,wholetstheothertaketheinitiative.”

60.Theexpression torikomorimono could also refer to the opposite situation:“whenyouareattackingoneormoreenemieswhoare shutup inahouse”or“whomyouhaveencircledandwhoareonthedefensive.”

61. “Indoors”: This is the translation of zashiki. This refers to training takingplace inacoveredhall.Thisphraseconfirms that inMusashi’s time, thequestfortechnicalsubtletybegantobeatrend.AccordingtoMusashi,thistakesyouawayfromthepracticeofeffectivecombat.Thistrendwasfurtheraccentuatedlateron.

62.“Theywillnotbeappropriate...Thebowisappropriate.”Inbothcases,theverbisdeau.

63. One ken equals 1.8 meters; twenty ken, the measure given here, is thusequivalentto36meters.

64.“Theinterest isgreat”:Thissentence,whichis incomplete in thecopythathascomedowntous,iswrittenasfollows:Sonoriooshi.Ithinkthisphraseisacopyingerror,takingtheplaceofsukunashi.Inthatcase,thetranslationwouldbe “This does not have much interest.” Indeed, in many transcriptions intomodernJapanese,thissentence,whichdoesnotfitintothecontext,isdropped;alsosometextsadoptthesenseofsukunashi.Forexample,KamikoTadashi, inhis transcription,omits this sentence from

hisreferenceeditionof the textof theGorinnosho. (5,p.60)KamataShigeointerpretsit inthesenseofsukunashi.Hetranslates it intomodernJapaneseas“Sonoritenwasukunai.”(4,p.81)TerayamaDanchukeepstheexpressionsonori ooshi, but he attaches it to the next sentence. He has “Sono riten no ooinodewajokakunonakakaranotepponimasarumonowanai,”whichtranslatesas“Thereisnothingmoreadvantageousthanshootinggunsfromtheinsideofafortress.”(11,p.113)

65.AsMusashihasalreadysaid,generallywarriorscarriedtwoswords,thelongandtheshort.Thesizeofapairofswordsvariedaccordingtopersonalchoice.Thesizeofaswordwasnormallymeasuredbythelengthoftheblade,buttogetareal ideaof thedimensionsofasword, itwasnecessary to take intoaccountthethickness,breadth,curve,andformoftheedge,whichcomposedtheoverallform of the blade, as well as the quality of the steel. Among the differentpossiblesizesofpairsofswords,Musashiadviseschoosinglargesizes.

66.“Cadence,”hyoshi:ThenotionofhyoshihasmajorimportanceintheGorinno sho. The term does not have an exact equivalent in English and posessignificanttranslationproblems(see“Hyoshi”intheappendix).

67. “Musicians with their stringed or wind instruments,” reijin kange: Reijinmeans“apersonwhoplaysmusic.”Thiswordrefers inparticular toanofficerwhoisamusicianplayingthetraditionalofficialmusicknownasgagakuatthecourt for the nobles and also in shrines and temples. Kan refers to stringedinstrumentsandgentowindinstruments.

68. “Thatwhich does not have a visible form,” ku naru koto: Kumeans sky,heaven,emptiness,orspace(see“Ku”intheappendix).

69.“Theconcordantcadencesand...thediscordantones,”hazunoauhyoshi,hazunochigauhyoshi:Hazureferstothetwoendsofabowwherethestringisattached. It also refers to the notched end of an arrow that fits onto thebowstring.Thisiscalledmorepreciselytheyahazu.Onthebasisofthisimage,hazu also means “that which is thought will normally happen, that which isreasonable,reason.”Itisalsousedinthesenseof“plan”or“promise.”

70. I will try to convey a more concrete notion of these different forms ofcadencesorhyoshi.

•“Thestrikingcadence(orhyoshi)”:ataruhyoshi.•“Theintervalcadence,”ormoreprecisely,“thehyoshithatplacesyouintheintervalbetweenactions”:manohyoshi.Thistermreferstoalltherhythmicelementsthatcandevelopinanintervalorthemomentofvoid,howevershortitmaybe,thatoccursbetweentwomovementsorbetweentwophasesofthebreathingprocess.Suchmomentsofvoidoccurwhenapersonisinmovementaswellaswhenheisnotmoving,forexample,whenheisinaguardposition.Ifyourlevelishighenough,youcandetectthesemomentsofvoidinyouradversaryandatthisinstantattuneyourselfintentionallytohisrhythms;andyoucanalsobecomeawareofthemomentsofvoidinyourownactionsandfillthemwithanewrhythm.WhatMusashimeansbymanohyoshiwillbedealtwithlateras

partofthemoregeneralnotionofsuki,whichreferstoafaultorlapse.InthedevelopmentoftechniqueintheJapanesemartialarts,waysofprovokingafault(suki)inone’sopponentplayanimportantrole.Itisnotamatteroffindingsuchafaultinyouropponentbutofcreatingitinhimbyexertingvariouspressuresthroughyourowntechniqueandthroughyourwilltoattack.•“Theopposingcadence,”somukuhyoshi:Somukumeans“toturnone’sbackononedirection,togointheoppositedirection,tomoveaway”or“towrong-footsomeone.”Thisexpressionreferstodeliberatelynotmatchingtheother’shyoshiinordertoforestallanaction(eitheryourownortheopponent’s).Onthesimplestlevel,thismeansknowinghowtobreakthehyoshiofanattackbybackingoff.Ifyouarecapableofapplyingthisawarenesstoyourownactions,youcanrealize,atthemomentofunleashingthem,thatcertainattacksarefutile,andyouthenbecomecapableofdroppingtheminordertostayfocusedonsomethingmoreimportant.

I find a connection between this notion from martial arts practice andMusashi’sfightingstyle.ItissaidthatMusashiwasabletoeludethebladeofhisopponent with great precision, dodging it by a margin of one and a halfcentimeters.ThisqualityofMusashi’sperception is calledmikiri.However, inthe documents that are relatively reliable, we find only a single account thatwouldconfirmthiscapabilityofMusashi’s.IntheNitenkiwefindthefollowingpassage from the account of his duelwith SasakiKojiro: “Kojiro’s sword cutthrough theknot ofMusashi’s headband, and theheadband fell to theground.Musashialsolaunchedhisattackatthesamemomentandhisstrokestrucktheheadofhisadversary,whofellimmediately.”(2,p.174)Theliteraltranslationofmikiriis:mi,“tolook”or“tosee,”andkiri,“tocut.”

Hencewemaytranslatetheterm“toseewithcuttingminuteness”or“toseeallthe way with a look”; more precisely, we could say “discerning the state ofsituationsorthingswithincisiverigor.”Thisincisiverigorisnotbasedjustonastatic perception of distance, because in the martial arts, distance includesmovement—that is why the space of distance becomes fused with cadences.Thusmikiri rests on the accuracy of hyoshi, especially of the somuku hyoshi,whichcausestheopponent’sattacktofailandleadstoasurevictory.Thatisafirstdimensionofmikiri.AccordingtoMusashi’slogic,whichisnowfamiliartous,mikiricouldalso

beunderstoodonalargerscale.Inthecourseofthenumerouscombatsinwhichheengaged,Musashiwasneveroncemistakeninhisassessmentofthestrengthofhis adversaries,which iswhatmade itpossible forhim toavoiddefeat.Henever losta fightanddoubtlessachieved thehighest levelofhis time.Wecanalso draw the conclusion that if he judged certain opponents to possibly besuperior to himself, he avoided fighting with them for as long as he had notsucceeded in turning the situation in his favor. For Musashi, discernment ofincisive rigor must be the basis of strategy, individual or collective. In thesituationofaduel,themikiriofthreecentimetersdeterminesthemaanddecidestheissueofthebout.Mikiriextendedtolarge-scalestrategydistillsinonewordone of the teachings of Sun Tsu: “If you know yourself and you know yourenemy, you will not lose one fight in a hundred.” This rigorous discernmentcharacterizestheswordofMusashiaswellashisartisticexpression.

71. “Think of that which is not evil,” yokoshima ni naki koto o omou: TheJapaneseexpressionherecontainsanuanceofdoublenegation:“Thinkof thatwhichisnotgood.”Anothertranslation,correspondingtoasecondsenseoftheterm yokoshima, is possible: “Think of that which does not deviate from theway.”

72.“Method,”ho:Homeans“law,rule,manner”or“method,model.”ItisalsoaBuddhisttermmeaning“teachingoftheBuddha.”InthissentenceMusashiuseshotoreferbacktohyoho,thustohisteachingasawhole;thatiswhyItranslatedthistermas“method.”Abitearlierheusesthistermtorefertothepreceptshehadformulated.Thesenseofthetermbeingclearlylimitedthere,Itranslatedit“rules.”

73.“Youmaintainyourvitalenergyconstantly. . . ,”kinihyohootaesazu:Amore literal translation would be: “In your ki, you do not interrupt strategy.”Inversioncanservetoreinforcethemeaningofanexpression.

74. “You have freemastery of your body,” sotai yawarakanareba: Themoreusualreadingoftheideogramsisjiyu,whichmeans“free.”ButinthetextoftheGorinnoshohandeddownintheHosokawafamily,whichistodayconsideredto be the one closest to the original and which I use as my basic text, theseideograms,inthispassage,aretranscribedwithoutannotation,whileinanotherpassage of the Scroll of Water they are accompanied by an annotation inkatakana:yawaraka.In the Ihon gorin no sho by Yamada Jirokichi, this sentence is written

differently:Sotaiyawarakanijiyuninari.(14,p.365)Thusitcontainsboththewordsyawarakaandjiyu.Themeaningsofthesewordsareasfollows:

Jiyumeans“pursuingfreedomofthemindorthought.”InitsBuddhistsense,itmeans“withoutanyconstraint.”Yawarakameans“beingflexible,gentle,docile.”Yawaraisalsopronouncedju.Itis“theartofflexibility,”whichwastheancientformofjudo.(100)

Although in the dictionaries I consulted I did not find any indication ofaffinitybetween these twowords, theirmeaningsareoftenused inassociationwithpracticalexplanationsofjujutsu.Forexample,whenIwaslearningjujutsuunderthetutelageofMasterKubotaShozanbetween1975and1980inJapan,heexplainedthemeaningofthewordjubycompletingitwiththemeaningofthewordjiyu.Followinghisexplanationsoftechnique,heoftenadded,“Juwajiyu.Jiyu deareba yawarakai.” (“Flexibility means freedom. If one is free, one isflexible.”) I interpret this as follows: The flexibility of jujutsu aims at thefreedomofthebodythatisderivedfromperfectmasteryofthebody.Ifoneisfreeinthebody,themindisalsofree.Itisatthispointthatonecanacquiretrue

flexibility.Master Kubota did not invent this association of the words ju, jiyu, and

yawaraka. He himself learned it from his teacher. I have also heard thisexpressiononotheroccasions,inconnectionwiththepracticeofthemartialartsofkenjutsuandkarate.Eventhoughtheseconnectionsarenotreported in thedictionaries, I think it

shouldbepointedoutthattheseideasaretransmittedtogetherinthepracticeofthemartialarts.ThishelpstoclarifyMusashi’stext.

75. On the sole copy of theGorin no sho that has come down to us today,mentionisaddedofatransmissionlaterin1667.

76.Theworkiscomposedinfivescrolls,andeachscrollissignedanddatedinthesameway.

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