1. Laying PlansTs`ao Kung, in defning the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in his tent. ee ss. !".1un T#u said$ The art of war is of %ital importance to the tate. &!'t is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. (ence it is a sub)ect of in*uiry whichcan on no account be neglected. &+The art of war, then, is go%erned by f%e constant factors, to be ta,en into account in one-s deliberations, when see,ing todetermine the conditions obtaining in the feld. &.These are$ /10 The 1oral Law2 /!0 (ea%en2 /+0 3arth2 /.0 The Commander2 /40 1ethod and discipline. &'t appears from what follows that un T#u means by 51oral Law5 a principle of harmony, not unli,e the Tao of Lao T#u in its moral aspect. 6ne might be tempted to render it by 5morale,5 were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss. 1+.4,"The 1678L L89 causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their li%es, undismayed by any danger. &Tu :u *uotes 9ang T#u as saying$ 59ithout constant practice, the o;cers will be ner%ous and undecided when mustering for battle2 without constant practice, the general will be wa%ering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand.5 signifes night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. &The commentators, ' thin,, ma,e an unnecessary mystery of two words here. 1eng hih refers to 5the hard and the soft, wa?ing and waning5 of (ea%en. 9ang(si, howe%er, may be right in saying that what is meant is 5the general economyof (ea%en,5 including the f%e elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.@387T( comprises distances, great and small2 danger and security2 open ground and narrow passes2 the chances of life and death. &AThe C6118>B37 stands for the %irtues of wisdom, sincerity, bene%olence, courage and strictness. &The f%e cardinal %irtues of the Chinese are /10 humanity or bene%olence2 /!0 uprightness of mind2 /+0 selfCrespect, selfCcontrol, or 5proper feeling25 /.0 wisdom2 /40 sincerity or good faith. (ere 5wisdom5 and 5sincerity5 are put before 5humanity or bene%olence,5 and the two military %irtues of 5courage5 and 5strictness5 substituted for 5uprightness of mind5 and 5selfCrespect, selfCcontrol, or -proper feeling.-51DEy 13T(6B 8>B B'C'PL'>3 are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdi%isions, the graduations of ran, among the o;cers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military e?penditure. &11These f%e heads should be familiar to e%ery general$ he who ,nows them will be %ictorious2 he who ,nows them not will fail. &1!Therefore, in your deliberations, when see,ing to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis ofa comparison, in this wise$ &1+/10 9hich of the two so%ereigns is imbued with the 1oral lawF &'.e., 5is in harmony with his sub)ects.5 Cf. ss. 4./!0 9hich of the two generals has most abilityF &/+0 9ith whom lie the ad%antages deri%ed from (ea%en and 3arthF &ee ss. 69 how to con*uer without being able to B6 it. &4ecurity against defeat implies defensi%e tactics2 ability to defeat the enemy means ta,ing the oHensi%e. &' retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1C+, in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they gi%e, 5(e who cannot con*uer ta,es the defensi%e,5 is plausible enough."tanding on the defensi%e indicates insu;cient strength2 attac,ing, a superabundance of strength. &either is it the acme of e?cellence if you fght and con*uer and the whole 3mpire says, 59ell doneG5 &True e?cellence being, as Tu 1u says$ 5To plan secretly, to mo%e surreptitiously, to foil the enemy-s intentions and bal, his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood.5 un T#u reser%es his approbation for things that 5the world-s coarse thumb and fnger fail to plumb.51DTo lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength2 &58utumn5 hair5 is e?plained as the fur of a hare, which is fnest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a %ery common one in Chinese writers.to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight2 to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a *uic, ear. &(o hih gi%es as real instances of strength, sharp sight and *uic, hearing$ 9u (uo, who could lift a tripod weighing !4D stone2 Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see ob)ects no bigger than a mustard seed2 and hih K`uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mos*uito.119hat the ancients called a cle%er fghter is one who not only wins, but e?cels in winning with ease. &The last half is literally 5one who, con*uering, e?cels in easy con*uering.5 1ei :aoCch`en says$ 5(e who only sees the ob%ious, wins his battles with di;culty2 he who loo,s below the surface of things, wins with ease.51!(ence his %ictories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. &Tu 1u e?plains this %ery well$ 5'nasmuch as his %ictories are gained o%er circumstances that ha%e not come to light, the world aslarge ,nows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom2 inasmuch asthe hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he recei%es no credit for courage.51+(e wins his battles by ma,ing no mista,es. &Ch`en (ao says$ 5(e plans no superSuous marches, he de%ises no futile attac,s.5 The connection of ideas is thus e?plained by Chang :u$ 56ne who see,s to con*uer by sheer strength, cle%er though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be %an*uished2 whereas he who can loo, into the future anddiscern conditions that are not yet manifest, will ne%er ma,e a blunder and therefore in%ariably win.51a,ing no mista,es is what establishes the certainty of %ictory, for it means con*uering an enemy that is already defeated. &1.(ence the s,illful fghter puts himself into a position which ma,es defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. &8 5counsel of perfection5 as Tu 1u truly obser%es. 5Position5 need not be confned to the actualground occupied by the troops. 't includes all the arrangements and preparationswhich a wise general will ma,e to increase the safety of his army.14Thus it is thatin war the %ictorious strategist only see,s battle after the %ictory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat frst fghts and afterwards loo,s for %ictory. &(o hih thus e?pounds the parado?$ 5'n warfare, frst lay plans which will ensure %ictory, and then lead your army to battle2 if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, %ictory will no longer be assured.51"The consummate leader culti%ates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline2 thus it is in his power to control success. &1I1E37, thereby ma,ing it nearly synonymous with the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a consideration of the enemy-s general position or condition, while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. 6n the other hand, Tu 1u says$ 5The *uestion of relati%e strength ha%ing been settled, we can bring the %aried resources of cunning into play.5 (o hih seconds this interpretation, but wea,ens it. (owe%er, it points to the third term as being a calculation of numbers.1A8 %ictorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound-s weight placed in the scale against a single grain. &Literally, 5a %ictorious army is li,e an ' /!D o#.0 weighed against a (I /1O!. o#.02 a routed army is a (I weighed against an '.5 The point is simply the enormous ad%antage which a disciplined force, Sushed with %ictory, has o%er one demorali#ed by defeat.5 Legge, in his note on 1encius, '. !. i?. !, ma,es the ' to be !. Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu (si-s statement that it e*ualed !D o#. only. Eut Li Ch`uan of the T`ang dynasty here gi%es the same fgure as Chu (si.!DThe onrush of a con*uering force is li,e the bursting of pentCup waters intoa chasm a thousand fathoms deep. C ee more at$ http$OOsunt#usaid.comOboo,O.&sthash.Dw%@nh:.dpuf4. 3nergy1un T#u said$ The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men$ it is merely a *uestion of di%iding up their numbers. &That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate o;cers in command of each. Tu 1u reminds us of (an (sin-s famous reply to the frst (an 3mperor, who once said to him$ 5(ow large an army do you thin, ' could leadF5 5>ot more than 1DD,DDD men, your 1a)esty.5 58nd youF5 as,ed the 3mperor. 56hG5 he answered, 5the more the better.5!Mighting with a large army under your command is nowise diHerent from fghting with a small one$ it is merely a *uestion of instituting signs and signals. &+To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy-s attac, and remain unsha,enJthis is eHected by maneu%ers direct and indirect. &9e now come to one of the most interesting parts of un T#u-s treatise, the discussion of the C(3>P and the C(`'.5 8s it is by no means easy to grasp the full signifcance of these two terms, or to render them consistently by good 3nglish e*ui%alents2 it may be as well to tabulate some of the commentators- remar,s on the sub)ect before proceeding further. Li Ch`uan$ 5Macing the enemy is C(3>P, ma,ing lateral di%ersion is C(`'. Chia Lin$ 5'n presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure %ictory abnormal maneu%ers must be employed.5 1ei :aoCch`en$ 5C(`' is acti%e, C(3>P is passi%e2 passi%ity means waiting for an opportunity, acti%ity beings the %ictory itself.5 (o hih$ 59e must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attac, as one that is secretly designed, and %ice %ersa2 thus C(3>P may also be C(`', and C(`' may also be C(3>P.5 (e instances the famous e?ploit of (an (sin, who when marching ostensibly against LinCchin /now ChaoCi in hensi0, suddenly threw a large force across the :ellow 7i%er in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. KCh`ien (an hu, ch. +.N (ere, we are told, the march on LinCchin was C(3>P, and the surprise maneu%er was C(`'.5 Chang :u gi%es the following summary of opinions on the words$ 51ilitary writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of C(`' and C(3>P. 9ei Liao T#u K.th cent. E.C.N says$ -Birect warfare fa%ors frontal attac,s, indirect warfare attac,s from the rear.- Ts`ao Kung says$ -Poing straight out to )oin battle is a direct operation2 appearing on the enemy-s rear is an indirect maneu%er.- Li 9eiC,ung K"th and P as C(3>P, and C(`' as C(`'2 they do not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other li,e the two sides of a circle Ksee infra, ss. 11N. 8 comment on the T`ang 3mperor T`ai Tsung goes to theroot of the matter$ -8 C(`' maneu%er may be C(3>P, if we ma,e the enemy loo, upon it as C(3>P2 then our real attac, will be C(`', and %ice %ersa. The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.-5 To put it perhaps a little more clearly$ any attac, or other operation is C(3>P, on which the enemy has had his attention f?ed2 whereas that is C(`',5 which ta,es him by surprise or comes from an une?pected *uarter. 'f the enemy percei%es a mo%ement which is meant to be C(`',5 it immediately becomes C(3>P.5.That the impact of your army may be li,e a grindstone dashed against an eggJthis is eHected by the science of wea, points and strong. &4'n all fghting, the direct method may be used for )oining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure %ictory. &Chang :u says$ 5teadily de%elop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy-s San,s or falling on his rear.5 8 brilliant e?ample of 5indirect tactics5 which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord 7oberts- night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second 8fghan war.K1L5MortyCone :earsin 'ndia,5 chapter .".N"'ndirect tactics, e;ciently applied, are ine?haustible as (ea%en and 3arth, unending as the Sow of ri%ers and streams2 li,e the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew2 li,e the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. &Tu :u and Chang :u understand this of the permutations of C(`' and C(3>P.5 Eut at present un T#u is not spea,ing of C(3>P at all, unless,indeed, we suppose with Cheng :uChsien that a clause relating to it has fallen outof the te?t. 6f course, as has already been pointed out, the two are so ine?tricably interwo%en in all military operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. (ere we simply ha%e an e?pression, in fgurati%e language, of the almost infnite resource of a great leader.one of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of energy and the force stored up in the bent crossbow until released by the fnger on the trigger.1"8mid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all2 amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. &1ei :aoCch`en says$ 5The subdi%isions of the army ha%ing been pre%iously f?ed, and the %arious signals agreed upon, the separating and )oining, the dispersing and collecting which will ta,e place in the course of a battle, may gi%e the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. :our formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsyCtur%y, and yet a rout of your forces *uite out of the *uestion.51ote the following anecdote of un Pin, a descendent of un 9u$ 'n +.1 E.C., the Ch`i tate being at war with 9ei, sent T`ien Chi and un Pin against the general P`ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later. un Pin said$ 5The Ch`i tate has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our ad%ersary despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account.5 8ccordingly, when the army had crossed the border into 9ei territory, he ga%e orders to show 1DD,DDD fres on the frst night, 4D,DDD on the ne?t, and the night after only !D,DDD. P`ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself$ 5' ,new these men of Ch`i were cowards$ their numbers ha%e already fallen away by more than half.5 'n his retreat, un Pin came to a narrow defle, with he calculated that his pursuers would reach after dar,. (ere he had a tree stripped of its bar,, and inscribed upon it the words$ 5Inder this tree shall P`ang Chuan die.5 Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong bodyof archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a light. Lateron, P`ang Chuan arri%ed at the spot, and noticing the tree, struc, a light in order to read what was written on it. (is body was immediately riddled by a %olley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. KThe abo%e is Tu 1u-s %ersion of the story2 the ('( C(', less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, ma,es P`ang Chuan cut his own throat with an e?clamation of despair, after the rout of his army.N(e sacrifces something, that the enemy may snatch atit. &!DEy holding out baits, he ,eeps him on the march2 then with a body of pic,ed men he lies in wait for him. &9ith an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, 5(e lies in wait with the main body of his troops.5!1The cle%er combatant loo,s to the eHect of combined energy, and does not re*uire too much from indi%iduals. &Tu 1u says$ 5(e frst of all considers the power of his army in the bul,2 afterwards he ta,es indi%idual talent into account, and uses each men according to his capabilities. (e does not demand perfection from the untalented.5(ence his ability to pic, out the right men and utili#e combined energy. &!!9hen he utili#es combined energy, his fghting men become as it were li,e unto rolling logs or stones. Mor it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on le%el ground, and to mo%e when on a slope2 if fourCcornered, to come to a standstill, but if roundCshaped, to go rolling down. &Ts`au Kung calls this 5the use of natural or inherent power.5!+Thus the energy de%eloped by good fghting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. o much on the sub)ect of energy. &The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu 1u-s opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid e%olutions and sudden rushes. 5Preat results,5 he adds, 5can thus be achie%ed with small forces.5 C ee more at$ http$OOsunt#usaid.comOboo,O4&sthash.VVB"9ocr.dpuf". 9ea, Points and trongChang :u attempts to e?plain the se*uence of chaptersas follows$ 5Chapter '=, on Tactical Bispositions, treated of the oHensi%e and the defensi%e2 chapter =, on 3nergy, dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general ac*uaints himself frst with the theory of attac, and defense, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect methods. (e studies the art of %arying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the sub)ect of wea, and strong points. Mor the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attac, and defense, and the perception of wea, and strong points depends againon the abo%e methods. (ence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on 3nergy.51un T#u said$ 9hoe%er is frst in the feld and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fght2 whoe%er is second in the feld and has to hasten to battle will arri%e e?hausted. &!Therefore the cle%er combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy-s will to be imposed on him. &6ne mar, of a great soldier is that he fght on his own terms or fghts not at all.K1Lee Col. (enderson-s biography of tonewall Qac,son, 1AD! ed., %ol. '', p. .AD.N+Ey holding out ad%antages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord2 or, by inSicting damage, he can ma,e it impossible for the enemy to draw near. &'n the frst case, he will entice him with a bait2 in the second, he will stri,e at some important point which the enemy will ha%e to defend..'f the enemy is ta,ing his ease, he can harass him2 &This passage may be cited as e%idence against 1ei :aoCCh`en-s interpretation of '. ss. !+.if well supplied with food, he can star%e him out2 if *uietly encamped, he can force him to mo%e. &48ppear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend2 march swiftly to places where you are not e?pected. &"8n army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not. &Ts`ao Kung sums up %ery well$ 53merge from the %oid K*.d. li,e 5abolt from the blue5N, stri,e at %ulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attac, in une?pected *uarters.5 those places that are not li,ely to be attac,ed25 and Tu 1u adds$ 5(ow much more, then, those that will be attac,ed.5 Ta,en thus, howe%er, the clause balances less well with the precedingJalways a consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang :u, therefore, seems to come nearer the mar, in saying$ 5(e who is s,illedin attac, Sashes forth from the topmost heights of hea%en Ksee '=. ss. T7ICT'6> T6 (' P3>378Lwe read$ 58 defensi%e war is apt to betray us into too fre*uent detachment. Those generals who ha%e had but little e?perience attempt to protect e%ery point, while those who are better ac*uainted with their profession, ha%ing only the capital ob)ect in %iew, guard against a decisi%e blow, and ac*uiesce in small misfortunes to a%oid greater.51@>umerical wea,ness comes from ha%ing to prepare against possible attac,s2 numerical strength, from compelling our ad%ersary to ma,e these preparations against us. &The highest generalship, in Col. (enderson-s words, is 5to compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against each fraction in turn.51AKnowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fght. &9hat un T#u e%idently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a general to di%ide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to eHect a )unction at precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in o%erwhelming strength. 8mong many such successful )unctions which military history records, one of the most dramatic anddecisi%e was the appearance of Elucher )ust at the critical moment on the feld of9aterloo.!DEut if neither time nor place be ,nown, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right e*ually impotent to succor the left, the %an unable to relie%e the rear, or the rear to support the %an. (ow much more soif the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred L' apart, and e%en the nearest are separated by se%eral L'G &The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lac,ing in precision, but the mental picture we are re*uired to draw is probably that of an army ad%ancing towards a gi%en rende#%ous in separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a f?ed date. 'f the general allows the %arious detachments to proceed at hapha#ard, without precise instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang :u-s note may be worth *uoting here$ 5'f we do not ,now the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the day on which they will )oin battle, our unity will be forfeited through our preparations for defense, and the positions we hold will be insecure. uddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle in a Surried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between wings, %anguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost di%isions of the army.5!1Though according to my estimate the soldiers of :ueh e?ceed our own innumber, that shall ad%antage them nothing in the matter of %ictory. ' say then that %ictory can be achie%ed. &8las for these bra%e wordsG The long feud between the two states ended in .69 how to con*uer without being able to B6 it,- whereas here we ha%e the statement that -%ictory- can be achie%ed.- The e?planation is, that in the former chapter, where the oHensi%e and defensi%e are under discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot ma,e certain of beating him. Eut the present passage refers particularly to the soldiers of :ueh who, according to un T#u-s calculations, will be ,ept in ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that %ictory can be achie%ed.5!!Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may pre%ent him from fghting. cheme so asto disco%er his plans and the li,elihood of their success. &8n alternati%e reading oHered by Chia Lin is$ 5Know beforehand all plans conduci%e to our success and to the enemy-s failure.5!+7ouse him, and learn the principle of his acti%ity or inacti%ity. &Chang :u tells us that by noting the )oy or anger shown by the enemyon being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low or the re%erse. (e instances the action of ChoC,u Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman-s headCdress to suCma ', in order to goad him out of his Mabian tactics.Morce him to re%eal himself, so as to fnd out his %ulnerable spots. &!.Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may ,now where strength is superabundant and where it is defcient. &Cf. '=. ss. ".!4'n ma,ing tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them2 &The pi*uancy of the parado? e%aporates in translation. Concealment is perhaps not so much actual in%isibility /see supra ss. A0 as 5showing no sign5 of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. &Tu 1u e?plains$ 5Though the enemy may ha%e cle%er and capable o;cers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us.5!"(ow %ictory may be produced for them out of the enemy-s own tacticsJthat is what the multitude cannot comprehend. &!apoleon than a ,nowledge of grammar will teach him to write li,e Pibbon.5!A1ilitary tactics are li,e unto water2 for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. &+Do in war, the way is to a%oid what is strong and to stri,e at what is wea,. &Li,e water, ta,ing the line of least resistance.+19ater shapes its course according to the nature of the ground o%er which it Sows2 the soldier wor,s out his %ictory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. &+!Therefore, )ust as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are noconstant conditions. &++(e who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a hea%enCborn captain. &+.The f%e elements /water, fre, wood, metal, earth0 are not always e*ually predominant2 &That is, as 9ang (si says$ 5they predominate alternately.5the fourseasons ma,e way for each other in turn. &Literally, 5ha%e no in%ariable seat.5There are short days and long2 the moon has its periods of waning and wa?ing. &Cf. =. ss. ". The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the want of f?ity in war by the changes constantly ta,ing place in >ature. The comparisonis not %ery happy, howe%er, because the regularity of the phenomena which un T#u mentions is by no means paralleled in war. C ee more at$ http$OOsunt#usaid.comOboo,O"&sthash.?Pa)"sMn.dpuforth hill5 before the enemy had got wind of his mo%ements. 8 crushing defeat followed for the Ch`in forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of 6Cyu in all haste and retreat across the border.41aneu%ering with an army is ad%antageous2 with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. &' adopt the reading of the T`I>P T'3>, Cheng :uChsien and the T`I (I, since they appear to apply the e?act nuance re*uired in order to ma,e sense. The commentators using the standard te?t ta,e this line to mean that maneu%ers may be proftable, or they may be dangerous$ it all depends on the ability of the general."'f you set a fully e*uipped army in march in order to snatch an ad%antage, the chances are that you will be too late. 6n theother hand, to detach a Sying column for the purpose in%ol%es the sacrifce of its baggage and stores. &ome of the Chinese te?t is unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. ' submit my own rendering without much enthusiasm, being con%inced that there is some deepCseated corruption in the te?t. 6n the whole, it is clear that un T#u does not appro%e of a lengthy march being underta,en without supplies. Cf. infra, ss. 11.P T'3> is added$ 5Mrom this we may ,now the di;culty of maneu%ering.5119e may ta,e it then that an army without its baggage train is lost2 without pro%isions it is lost2 without bases of supply it is lost. &' thin, un T#u meant 5stores accumulated in depots.5 Eut Tu :u says 5fodder and the li,e,5 Chang :u says 5Poods in general,5 and 9ang (si says 5fuel, salt, foodstuHs, etc.51!9e cannot enter into alliances until we are ac*uainted with the designs of our neighbors. &1+9e are not ft to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the countryJits mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. &1.9e shall be unable to turn natural ad%antage to account unless we ma,e use of local guides. &ss. 1!C1. are repeated in chap. V'. ss. 4!.14'n war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. &'n the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the numerical strength of his troops, too, a %ery prominent position.K!LMor a number of ma?ims on this head, see 51arshal Turenne5 /Longmans, 1ADor can ordinary ob)ects be seen clearly enough$ hence the institution of banners and Sags. &!.Pongs and drums, banners and Sags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host maybe focused on one particular point. &Chang :u says$ 5'f sight and hearing con%erge simultaneously on the same ob)ect, the e%olutions of as many as a million soldiers will be li,e those of a single man.5G!4The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the bra%e to ad%ance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. &Chuang :u *uotes a saying$ 53*ually guilty are those who ad%ance against orders and those who retreat against orders.5 Tu 1u tells a story in this connection of 9u Ch`i, when he was fghting against the Ch`in tate. Eefore the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned to camp. 9u Ch`i had the man instantly e?ecuted, whereupon an o;cer%entured to remonstrate, saying$ 5This man was a good soldier, and ought not to ha%e been beheaded.5 9u Ch`i replied$ 5' fully belie%e he was a good soldier, but' had him beheaded because he acted without orders.5This is the art of handling large masses of men. &!"'n nightCfghting, then, ma,e much use of signalCfres and drums, and in fghting by day, of Sags and banners, as a means of inSuencing the ears and eyes of your army. &Ch`en (ao alludes to Li KuangCpi-s night ride to (oCyang at the head of 4DD mounted men2 they made such an imposing display with torches, that though the rebel leader hih suCming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.!, year 1D, ss. 10 of Ts`ao Kuei, a protege of Bu,e Chuang of Lu. The latter tate was attac,ed by Ch`i, and the du,e was about to )oin battle at Ch`angCcho, after the frst roll of the enemy-s drums, whenTs`ao said$ 5>ot )ust yet.5 6nly after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he gi%e the word for attac,. Then they fought, and the men of Ch`i were utterly defeated. Tuestioned afterwards by the Bu,e as to the meaning of his delay, Ts`ao Kuei replied$ 5'n battle, a courageous spirit is e%erything. >ow the frst roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. ' attac,ed when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. (ence our %ictory.5 9u T#u /chap. .0 puts 5spirit5 frst among the 5four important inSuences5 in war, and continues$ 5The %alue of a whole armyJa mighty host of a million menJis dependent on one man alone$ such is the inSuence of spiritG5a commanderCinCchief may be robbed of his presence of mind. &Chang :u says$ 5Presence of mind is the general-s mostimportant asset. 't is the *uality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic stric,en.5 The great general Li Ching /8.B. 4ine =ariations out to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with the >ine ituations5 of chapt. V'. This is the %iew adopted by Chang :u. The only other alternati%e is to suppose that something has been lostJa supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some weight.1un T#u said$ 'n war, the general recei%es his commands from the so%ereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces. &7epeated from =''. ss. 1, where it is certainly more in place. 't may ha%e been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.!9hen in di;cult country, do not encamp. 'n country where high roads intersect, )oin hands with your allies. Bo not linger in dangerously isolated positions. &The last situation is not one of the >ine ituations as gi%en in the beginning of chap. V', but occurs later on /ibid. ss..+. *.%.0. Chang :u defnes this situation as being situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch`uan says it is 5country in which there are no springs or wells, Soc,s or herds, %egetables or frewood25 Chia Lin, 5one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to ad%ance.5'n hemmedCin situations, you must resort to stratagem. 'n desperate position, you must fght. &+There areroads which must not be followed, &53specially those leading through narrow defles,5 says Li Ch`uan, 5where an ambush is to be feared.5armies which must be not attac,ed, &1ore correctly, perhaps, 5there are times when an army must not be attac,ed.5 Ch`en (ao says$ 59hen you see your way to obtain a ri%al ad%antage, but are powerless to inSict a real defeat, refrain from attac,ing, for fear of o%erta?ing your men-s strength.5towns which must not be besieged, &Cf. '''. ss. . Ts`ao Kung gi%es an interesting illustration from his own e?perience. 9hen in%ading the territory of (suCchou, he ignored the city of (uaCpi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the country. This e?cellent strategy was rewarded by the subse*uent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang :u says$ 5>o town should be attac,ed which, if ta,en, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble.5 (sun :ing, when urged to attac, PiCyang, replied$ 5The city is small and wellCfortifed2 e%en if' succeed inta,ing it, it will be no great feat of arms2 whereas if ' fail, ' shall ma,emyself a laughingCstoc,.5 'n the se%enteenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. 't was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and maneu%ers. (e said$ 5't is a great mista,e to waste men in ta,ing a town when the same e?penditure of soldiers will gain a pro%ince.5K1L51arshal Turenne,5 p. 4D.Npositions which must not be contested, commands of the so%ereign which must not be obeyed. &This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their re%erence for authority, and 9ei Liao T#u /*uoted by Tu 1u0 is mo%ed to e?claim$ 59eapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to %irtue, a military commander is the negation of ci%il orderG5 The unpalatable fact remains, howe%er, that e%en 'mperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity..The general who thoroughly understands the ad%antages that accompany %ariation of tactics ,nows how to handle his troops. &4The general who does not understand these, may be well ac*uainted with the confguration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his ,nowledge to practical account. &Literally, 5get the ad%antage of the ground,5 which means not only securing good positions, but a%ailing oneself of natural ad%antages in e%ery possible way. Chang :u says$ 53%ery ,ind of ground is characteri#ed by certain natural features, and also gi%es scope for a certain %ariability of plan. (ow it is possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical ,nowledge is supplemented by %ersatility of mindF5"o, the student of war who is un%ersed in the art of war of %arying his plans, e%en though he be ac*uainted with the Mi%e 8d%antages, will fail to ma,e the best use of his men. &Chia Lin tells us that these imply f%e ob%ious and generally ad%antageous lines of action, namely$ 5if a certain road is short, it must be followed2 if an army is isolated, it must be attac,ed2 if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged2 if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted2 and if consistent with military operations, the ruler-s commands must be obeyed.5 Eut there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these ad%antages. Mor instance, 5a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if he ,nows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. 8 hostile force may be open to attac,, but if he ,nows that it is hardCpressed and li,ely to fght with desperation, he will refrain from stri,ing,5 and so on.ot on high hills, but on ,nolls or hilloc,s ele%ated abo%e the surrounding country.facing the sun. &Tu 1u ta,es this to mean 5facing south,5 and Ch`en (ao 5facing east.5 Cf. infra, . 11, 1+.Bo not climb heights in order to fght. o much for mountain warfare. &+8fter crossing a ri%er, you should get far away from it. &5'n order to tempt the enemy to cross after you,5 according to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang :u, 5in order not to be impeded in your e%olutions.5 The T`I>P T'3> reads, 5'f T(3 3>31: crosses a ri%er,5 etc. Eut in %iew of the ne?t sentence, this is almost certainly an interpolation..9hen an in%ading force crosses a ri%er in its onward march, do notad%ance to meet it in midCstream. 't will be best to let half the army get across, and then deli%er your attac,. &Li Ch`uan alludes to the great %ictory won by (an(sin o%er Lung Chu at the 9ei 7i%er. Turning to the C(`'3> (8> (I, ch. +., fol. " %erso, we fnd the battle described as follows$ 5The two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the ri%er. 'n the night, (an (sin ordered his men to ta,e some ten thousand sac,s flled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he attac,ed Lung Chu2 but after a time, pretending to ha%e failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other ban,. Lung Chu was much elated by this unloo,edCfor success, and e?claiming$ 5' felt sure that (an (sin was really a cowardG5 he pursued him and began crossing the ri%er in his turn. (an (sin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great %olume of water, which swept down and pre%ented the greater portion of Lung Chu-s army from getting across. (e then turned upon the force which had been cut oH, and annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further ban,, also scattered and Sed in all directions.4'f you are an?ious to fght, you should not go to meet the in%ader near a ri%er which he has to cross. &Mor fear of pre%enting his crossing."1oor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. &ee supra, ss. !. The repetition of these words in connection with water is %ery aw,ward. Chang :u has the note$5aid either of troops marshaled on the ri%erCban,, or of boats anchored in the stream itself2 in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facingthe sun.5 The other commentators are not at all e?plicit.Bo not mo%e upCstream to meet the enemy. &Tu 1u says$ 58s water Sows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the lower reaches of a ri%er, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us away in a Sood. ChuC,o 9uChou has remar,ed that -in ri%er warfare we must not ad%ance against the stream,- which is as much as to say that our Seet must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they wouldbe able to ta,e ad%antage of the current and ma,e short wor, of us.5 There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to us.o much for ri%er warfare. &etCli,ecountry, %enturing into which you become entangled.5/+0 tempori#ing ground2 &Pround which allows you to 5sta%e oH5 or 5delay.5/.0 narrow passes2 /40 precipitous heights2 /"0 positions at a great distance from the enemy. &'t is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classifcation. 8 strange lac, of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman-s un*uestioning acceptance of glaring cross di%isions such as the abo%e.!Pround which can be freely tra%ersed by both sides is called 8CC3'EL3. &+9ith regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. &The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu :u says, 5not to allow the enemy to cut your communications.5 'n %iew of >apoleon-s dictum, 5the secret of war lies in the communications,5K1Lee 5Pensees de >apoleon 1er,5 no. .P. &4Mrom a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. Eut if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. &"9hen the position is such that neither side willgain by ma,ing the frst mo%e, it is called T31P67'U'>P ground. &Tu 1u says$ 53ach side fnds it incon%enient to mo%e, and the situation remains at a deadloc,.5IE67B'>8T'6>. &Tu 1u cites the unhappy case of T`ien Pu K('> T`8>P (I, ch. 1.@N, who was sent to 9ei in @!1 8.B. with orders to lead an army against 9ang T`ingCts`ou. Eut the whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly Souted his authority by riding about the camp on don,eys,se%eral thousands at a time. T`ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in e%ery direction. 8fter that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.9hen the o;cers are too strong and the common soldiers too wea,, the result is C6LL8P3. &Ts`ao Kung says$ 5The o;cers are energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse.51either o;cers nor men ha%e any regular routine.5and the ran,s are formed in a slo%enly hapha#ard manner, the result is utter B'67P8>'U8T'6>. &1A9hen a general, unable to estimate the enemy-s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a wea, detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place pic,ed soldiers in the front ran,, the result must be 76IT. &Chang :u paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues$ 59hene%er there is fghting to be done, the ,eenest spirits should be appointed to ser%e in the front ran,s, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demorali#e the enemy.5 Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar /5Be Eello Pallico,5 =. !@, .., et al.0.!DThese are si? waysof courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. &ee supra, ss. 1+.!1The natural formation of the country is the soldier-s best ally2 &Ch`en (ao says$ 5The ad%antages of weather and season are not e*ual to those connected with ground.5but a power of estimating the ad%ersary, of controlling the forces of %ictory, and of shrewdly calculating di;culties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general. &!!(e who ,nows these things, and in fghting puts his ,nowledge into practice, will win his battles. (e who ,nows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. &!+'f fghting is sure to result in %ictory, then you must fght,e%en though the ruler forbid it2 if fghting will not result in %ictory, then you must not fght e%en at the ruler-s bidding. &Cf. ='''. ss. + fn. (uang hihC,ung of the Ch`in dynasty, who is said to ha%e been the patron of Chang Liang and to ha%e written the 8> LI3(, has these words attributed to him$ 5The responsibility of setting an army in motion must de%ol%e on the general alone2 if ad%ance and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achie%ed. (ence the godCli,e ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country-s cause Klit., ,neel down to push the chariot wheelN.5 This means that 5in matters lying outside the #enana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute.5 Chang :u also *uote the saying$ 5Becrees from the on of (ea%en do not penetrate the walls of a camp.5!.The general who ad%ances without co%eting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, &'t was 9ellington, ' thin,, who said that the hardest thing of all for a soldier is to retreat.whose only thought is to protect his country and do good ser%ice for his so%ereign, is the )ewel of the ,ingdom. &8 noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese 5happy warrior.5 uch a man, says (ohih, 5e%en if he had to suHer punishment, would not regret his conduct.5!47egard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest %alleys2 loo, upon them as your own belo%ed sons, and they will stand by you e%en unto death. &Cf. '. ss. ". 'n this connection, Tu 1u draws for usan engaging picture of the famous general 9u Ch`i, from whose treatise on war 'ha%e fre*uently had occasion to *uote$ 5(e wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to ha%e either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared e%ery hardship with his men. 6ne of his soldiers was suHering from an abscess, and 9u Ch`i himself suc,ed out the %irus. The soldier-s mother, hearing this, began wailing and lamenting. omebody as,ed her, saying$ -9hy do you cryF :our son is only a common soldier, and yet the commanderCinCchief himself has suc,ed the poison from his sore.- The woman replied, -1any years ago, Lord 9u performed a similar ser%ice for my husband, who ne%er left him afterwards, and fnally met his death at the hands of the enemy. 8nd now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fghting ' ,now not where.-5 Li Ch`uan mentions the =iscount of Ch`u, who in%aded the small state of (siao during the winter. The Bu,e of hen said to him$ 51any of the soldiers are suHering se%erelyfrom the cold.5 o he made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men2 and straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with Soss sil,.!"'f, howe%er, you are indulgent, but unable to ma,e your authority felt2 ,indChearted, but unable to enforce your commands2 and incapable, moreo%er, of *uelling disorder$ then your soldiers must be li,enedto spoilt children2 they are useless for any practical purpose. &Li Ching once said that if you could ma,e your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of theenemy. Tu 1u recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in !1A 8.B., when Lu 1eng was occupying the town of ChiangCling. (e had gi%en stringent orders to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor ta,e anything fromthem by force. >e%ertheless, a certain o;cer ser%ing under his banner, who happened to be a fellowCtownsman, %entured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it o%er his regulation helmet as aprotection against the rain. Lu 1eng considered that the fact of his being also a nati%e of QuCnan should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, andaccordingly he ordered his summary e?ecution, the tears rolling down his face, howe%er, as he did so. This act of se%erity flled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth e%en articles dropped in the highway were not pic,ed up.! (I, ch. 1, f. +.N 'n "!1 8.B., Li Ching was sent from K`ueiCchou in suCch`uan to reduce the successful rebel (siao (sien, who had set up as 3mperor at the modern ChingCchou Mu in (upeh. 't was autumn, and the :angts#e being then in Sood, (siao (sien ne%er dreamt that his ad%ersary would %enture to come down through the gorges, and conse*uently made no preparations. Eut Li Ching embar,ed his army without loss of time, and was )ust about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until the ri%er was in a less dangerous state for na%igation. Li Ching replied$ 5To the soldier, o%erwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must ne%ermiss opportunities. >ow is the time to stri,e, before (siao (sien e%en ,nows thatwe ha%e got an army together. 'f we sei#e the present moment when the ri%er is in Sood, we shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, li,e the thunder which is heard before you ha%e time to stop your ears against it. Kee =''. ss. 1A, note.N This is the great principle in war. 3%en if he gets to ,now of our approach, he will ha%e to le%y his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be ft to oppose us. Thus the full fruits of %ictory will be ours.5 8ll came about as he predicted, and (siao (sien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suHer the penalty of death.ta,e ad%antageof the enemy-s unreadiness, ma,e your way by une?pected routes, and attac, unguarded spots. &!DThe following are the principles to be obser%ed by an in%ading force$ The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not pre%ail against you. &!11a,e forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. &Cf. supra, ss. 1+. Li Ch`uan does not %enture on a note here.!!Carefully study the wellCbeing of your men, &Mor 5wellCbeing5, 9ang (si means, 5Pet them, humor them, gi%e them plenty of food and drin,, and loo, after them generally.5and do not o%erta? them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. &Ch`en recalls the line of action adopted in !!. E.C. by the famous general 9ang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of the Mirst 3mperor. (e had in%aded the Ch`u tate, where a uni%ersal le%y was made to oppose him. Eut, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all in%itations to fghtand remained strictly on the defensi%e. 'n %ain did the Ch`u general try to force abattle$ day after day 9ang Chien ,ept inside his walls and would not come out, but de%oted his whole time and energy to winning the aHection and confdence of his men. (e too, care that they should be well fed, sharing his own meals withthem, pro%ided facilities for bathing, and employed e%ery method of )udicious indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogenous body. 8fter some time hadelapsed, he told oH certain persons to fnd out how the men were amusing themsel%es. The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and longC)umping. 9hen 9ang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he ,new that their spirits had been strung up to the re*uired pitch and that they were now ready for fghting. Ey this time the Ch`u army, after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch`in general immediately bro,e up his camp and followed them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. hortly afterwards, the whole of Ch`u was con*uered by Ch`in, and the ,ing MuCch`u led into capti%ity.Keep your army continually on the mo%e, &'n order that the enemy may ne%er ,now e?actly where you are. 't has struc, me, howe%er, that the true reading might be 5lin, your army together.5and de%ise unfathomable plans. &!+Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to Sight. 'f they will face death, there is nothing they may not achie%e. &Chang :u *uotes his fa%orite 9ei Liao T#u /ch. +0$ 5'f one man were to run amo, with a sword in the mar,etCplace, and e%erybody else tried to get our of his way, ' should not allow that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who sets some %alue on his life do not meet on e%en terms.56;cers and men ali,e will put forth their uttermost strength. &Chang :u says$ 5'f they are in an aw,ward place together, they will surely e?ert their unitedstrength to get out of it.5!.oldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. 'f there is no place of refuge, they will stand frm. 'f they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. 'f there is no help for it, they will fght hard. &!4Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the *ui %i%e2 without waiting to be as,ed, they will do your will2 &Literally, 5without as,ing, you will get.5without restrictions, they will be faithful2 without gi%ing orders, they can be trusted. &!"Prohibit the ta,ing of omens, and do awaywith superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. &The superstitious, 5bound in to saucy doubts and fears,5 degenerate into cowards and 5die many times before their deaths.5 Tu 1u *uotes (uang hihC,ung$ 5-pells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no o;cer allowed to in*uire by di%ination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers-minds should be seriously perturbed.- The meaning is,5 he continues, 5that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your men will ne%er falter in their resolution until they die.5!. >ow the (I8'CQ8> is a sna,e that is found in the Ch`ang mountains. &5huaiC)an5 means 5suddenly5 or 5rapidly,5 and the sna,e in *uestion was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its mo%ements. Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of 5military maneu%ers.5tri,e at its head, and you will be attac,ed by its tail2 stri,e at its tail, and you will be attac,ed by its head2 stri,e at its middle, andyou will be attac,ed by head and tail both. &+D8s,ed if an army can be made to imitate the (I8'CQ8>, &That is, as 1ei :aoCch`en says, 5's it possible to ma,e the front and rear of an army each swiftly responsi%e to attac, on the other, )ust as though they were part of a single li%ing bodyF5' should answer, :es. Mor the men of 9u and the men of :ueh are enemies2 &Cf. ='. ss. !1.yet if they are crossing a ri%er in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other-s assistance )ust as the left hand helps the right. &The meaning is$ 'f two enemies will help each other in a time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together as they are by e%ery tie of interest and fellowCfeeling. :et it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lac, of cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies.+1(ence it is not enough to put one-s trust in the tethering of horses, andthe burying of chariot wheels in the ground &These *uaint de%ices to pre%ent one-s army from running away recall the 8thenian hero ophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself frmly to one spot. Kee (erodotus, 'V. .+!The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach. &Literally, 5le%el the courage Kof allN as though Kit were that ofN one.5 'f the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same *uality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. 9ellington-s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at 9aterloo as 5the worst he had e%er commanded5 meant no more than that it was defcient in this important particularJunity of spirit and courage. (ad he not foreseen the Eelgian defections and carefully ,ept those troops in the bac,ground, he would almost certainly ha%e lost the day.++(ow to ma,e the best of both strong and wea,Jthat is a *uestion in%ol%ing the proper use of ground. &1ei :aoCch`en-s paraphrase is$ 5The way to eliminate the diHerences of strong and wea, and to ma,e both ser%iceable is to utili#e accidental features of the ground.5 Less reliable troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more e?posed terrain. The ad%antage of position neutrali#es the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. (enderson says$ 59ith all respect to the te?t boo,s, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, ' am inclined to thin, that the study of ground is often o%erloo,ed, and that by no means su;cient importance is attached to the selection of positions... and to the immense ad%antages that are to be deri%ed, whether you are defending or attac,ing, from the proper utili#ationof natural features.5K!L5The cience of 9ar,5 p. +++.N+.Thus the s,illful general conducts his army )ust as though he were leading a single man, willyCnilly, by thehand. &Tu 1u says$ 5The simile has reference to the ease with which he does it.5+4't is the business of a general to be *uiet and thus ensure secrecy2 upright and )ust, and thus maintain order. &+"(e must be able to mystify his o;cers andmen by false reports and appearances, &Literally, 5to decei%e their eyes and ears.5and thus ,eep them in total ignorance. &Ts`ao Kung gi%es us one of his e?cellent apophthegms$ 5The troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning2 they may only re)oice with you o%er their happy outcome.5 5To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,5 is one of the frst principles in war, ashad been fre*uently pointed out. Eut how about the other processJthe mystifcation of one-s own menF Those who may thin, that un T#u is o%erCemphatic on this point would do well to read Col. (enderson-s remar,s on tonewall Qac,son-s =alley campaign$ 5The infnite pains,5 he says, 5with which Qac,son sought to conceal, e%en from his most trusted staH o;cers, his mo%ements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would ha%e pronounced useless5Jetc. etc.K+L5tonewall Qac,son,5 %ol. ', p. .!1.N 'n theyear @@ 8.B., as we read in ch. .< of the (6I (8> (I, 5Pan Ch`ao too, the feldwith !4,DDD men from Khotan and other Central 8sian states with the ob)ect of crushing :ar,and. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commanderto succor the place with an army drawn from the ,ingdoms of 9enCsu, KuCmo, and 9eiCt`ou, totaling 4D,DDD men. Pan Ch`ao summoned his o;cers and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and said$ -6ur forces are now outnumbered and unable to ma,e head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a diHerent direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and ' will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the e%ening drum has sounded and then start.- Pan Ch`ao now secretly released the prisoners whom he had ta,en ali%e, and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. 1uch elated by the news, the latter set oH at once at the head of 1D,DDD horsemen to bar Pan Ch`ao-s retreat in the west, while the King of 9enCsu rode eastward with @DDD horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. 8s soon as Pan Ch`ao ,new that the two chieftains had gone, he called his di%isions together, got them well in hand, and at coc,Ccrow hurled them against the army of :ar,and, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panicCstric,en, Sed in confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Ch`ao. 6%er 4DDD heads were brought bac, as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle and %aluables of e%ery description. :ar,and then capitulating, Kutcha and the other ,ingdoms drew oH their respecti%e forces. Mrom that time forward, Pan Ch`ao-s prestige completely o%erawed the countries of the west.5 'n this case, we see that the Chinese general not only ,ept his own o;cers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually too, the bold step of di%iding his army in order to decei%e the enemy.+ote how he returns again and again to this point. 8mong the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear and serious e%il than it is in the armies of today..1The diHerent measures suited to the nine %arieties of ground2 &Chang :u says$ 56ne must not be hideCbound in interpreting the rules for the nine %arieties of ground.the e?pediency of aggressi%e or defensi%e tactics2 and the fundamental laws of human nature$ these are things that must most certainly be studied. &.!9hen in%ading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion2 penetrating but a short way means dispersion. &Cf. supra, ss. !D..+9hen you lea%e your own country behind, and ta,e your army across neighborhood territory, you fnd yourself on critical ground. &This 5ground5 is curiously mentioned in ='''. ss. !, but it does not fgure among the >ine ituations or the i? Calamities in chap. V. 6ne-s frst impulse would be to translate it distant ground,5 but this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. 1ei :aoCch`en says it is 5a position not far enough ad%anced to be called -facile,- and not near enough to home to be -dispersi%e,- but something between the two.5 9ang (si says$ 5't is ground separated from home by an inter)acent state, whose territory we ha%e had to cross in order to reach it. (ence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there *uic,ly.5 (e adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which is the reason why it is not included among the >ine ituations.9hen there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. &..9hen you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. 9hen you penetrate but a little way, itis facile ground. &.49hen you ha%e the enemy-s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmedCin ground. 9hen there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. &."Therefore, on dispersi%e ground, ' would inspiremy men with unity of purpose. &This end, according to Tu 1u, is best attained byremaining on the defensi%e, and a%oiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.6n facile ground, ' would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army. &8s Tu 1u says, the ob)ect is to guard against two possible contingencies$ 5/10 the desertion of our own troops2 /!0 a sudden attac, on the part of the enemy.5 Cf. =''. ss. 1ine Prounds. e%eral of these are defned twice o%er, besides which there are two distinct lists of the corresponding %ariations. /.0 The length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other e?cept 'V. ' do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that un T#u-s wor, cannot ha%e come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands$ chap. =''' is ob%iously defecti%e and probably out of place, while V' seems to contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.41Mor it is the soldier-s disposition to oHer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fght hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. &Chang :u alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch`ao-s de%oted followers in (I, ch. .orthern barbarians, and that conse*uently he is in a state of indecision, not ,nowing withwhich side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can percei%e things before they ha%e come to pass2 how much more, then, those that are already manifestG- Thereupon he called one of the nati%es who had been assigned to his ser%ice, and set a trap for him, saying$ -9here are those en%oys from the (siungCnu who arri%ed some day agoF- The man was so ta,en abac, that between surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch`ao, ,eeping his informant carefully under loc, and ,ey, then summoned a general gathering of his o;cers, thirtyCsi? in all, and began drin,ingwith them. 9hen the wine had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rousetheir spirit still further by addressing them thus$ -Pentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region, an?ious to achie%e riches and honor by some great e?ploit. >ow it happens that an ambassador from the (siungCno arri%ed in this ,ingdom only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy e?tended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. hould this en%oy pre%ail upon him to sei#e our party and hand us o%er to the (siungCno, our boneswill become food for the wol%es of the desert. 9hat are we to doF- 9ith one accord, the o;cers replied$ -tanding as we do in peril of our li%es, we will follow our commander through life and death.- Mor the se*uel of this ad%enture, see chap. V''. ss. 1, note.4!9e cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are ac*uainted with their designs. 9e are not ft to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the countryJits mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. 9e shall be unable toturn natural ad%antages to account unless we ma,e use of local guides. &These three sentences are repeated from =''. . 1!C1.Jin order to emphasi#e their importance, the commentators seem to thin,. ' prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the following words. 9ith regard to local guides, un T#u might ha%e added that there is always the ris, of going wrong, either through their treachery or some misunderstanding such as Li%y records /VV''. 1+0$ (annibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied2 but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he too, the army in that direction, the mista,e not being disco%ered until they had almost arri%ed.4+To be ignored of any one of the following four or f%e principles does not beft a warli,e prince. &4.9hen a warli,e prince attac,s a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in pre%entingthe concentration of the enemy-s forces. (e o%erawes his opponents, and their allies are pre%ented from )oining against him. &1ei TaoCch`en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so much aHected by the Chinese$ 5'n attac,ing apowerful state, if you can di%ide her forces, you will ha%e a superiority in strength2 if you ha%e a superiority in strength, you will o%erawe the enemy2 if youo%erawe the enemy, the neighboring states will be frightened2 and if the neighboring states are frightened, the enemy-s allies will be pre%ented from )oining her.5 The following gi%es a stronger meaning$ 5'f the great state has once been defeated /before she has had time to summon her allies0, then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces.5 Ch`en (ao and Chang :u ta,e the sentence in *uite another way. The former says$ 5Powerful though a prince may be, if he attac,s a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some e?tent on e?ternal aid2 if he dispenses with this, and with o%erweening confdence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated.5 Chang :u puts his %iew thus$ 5'f we rec,lessly attac, a large state, our own people will be discontented and hang bac,. Eut if /as will then be the case0 our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will ta,e fright and refuse to )oin us.544(ence he does not stri%e to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. (e carries out his own secret designs, ,eeping his antagonists in awe. &The train of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan, appears to be this$ ecure against a combination of his enemies, 5he can aHord to re)ect entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enable him to dispense with e?ternal friendships.5Thus he is able to capture their cities and o%erthrow their ,ingdoms. &This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch`in tate became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the famous i? Chancellors gradually pa%ed the way for her fnal triumph under hih (uang Ti. Chang :u, following up his pre%ious note, thin,s that un T#u is condemning this attitude of coldCblooded selfshness and haughty isolation.4"Eestow rewards without regard to rule, &9u T#u /ch. +0 less wisely says$ 5Let ad%ance be richly rewarded and retreat be hea%ily punished.5issue orders &Literally, 5hang5 or post up.5without regard to pre%ious arrangements2 &5'n order to pre%ent treachery,5 says 9ang (si. The general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao Kung-s *uotation from the IC18 M8$ 5Pi%e instructions only on sighting the enemy2 gi%e rewards when you see deser%ing deeds.5 Ts`ao Kung-s paraphrase$ 5The fnal instructions you gi%e to your army should not correspond with those that ha%e been pre%iously posted up.5 Chang :u simplifes this into 5your arrangements should not be di%ulged beforehand.5 8nd Chia Lin says$ 5there should be no f?ity in your rules and arrangements.5 >ot only is there danger in letting your plans be ,nown, but war often necessitates the entire re%ersal of them at the last moment.and you will beable to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man. &Cf.supra, ss. +..4i, lea%ing drums and banner on the feld, Sed to the di%ision on the ri%er ban,, where another ferce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men2but the two generals succeeded in )oining the other army, which was fghting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the !DDD horsemen to play their part. 8s soon as they saw the men of Chao following up their ad%antage, they galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy-s Sags and replaced them by those of (an. 9hen the Chao army loo,ed bac, from the pursuit, the sight of these red Sags struc, them with terror. Con%inced that the (ans had got in and o%erpowered their ,ing, they bro,e up in wild disorder, e%ery eHort of their leader to stay the panic being in %ain. Then the (an army fellon them from both sides and completed the rout, ,illing a number and capturing the rest, amongst whom was King :a himself.... 8fter the battle, some of (an (sin-s o;cers came to him and said$ 5'n the 87T 6M 987 we are told to ha%e a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a ri%er or marsh on the left front. KThis appears to be a blend of un T#u and T`ai Kung. ee 'V ss. A, and note.N :ou, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the ri%er at our bac,. Inder these conditions, how did you manage to gain the %ictoryF5 The general replied$ 5' fear you gentlemen ha%e not studied the 8rt of 9ar with su;cient care. 's it not written there$ -Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come oH in safety2 place it in deadly peril and it will sur%i%e-F (ad ' ta,en the usual course, ' should ne%er ha%e been able to bring my colleague round. 9hat says the 1ilitaryClassicJ-woop down on the mar,etCplace and dri%e the men oH to fght.- KThis passage does not occur in the present te?t of un T#u.N 'f ' had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fght for their li%es, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would ha%e been a general debandade, and it would ha%e been impossible to do anything with them.5 The o;cers admitted the force of his argument, and said$ 5These are higher tactics than we should ha%e been capable of.5 Kee C(`'3> (8> (I, ch. +., H. ., 4.N4AMor it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm-s way that is capable of stri,ing a blow for %ictory. &Banger has a bracing eHect."Duccess in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating oursel%es to the enemy-s purpose. &Ts`ao Kung says$ 5Meign stupidity5Jby an appearance of yielding and falling in with theenemy-s wishes. Chang :u-s note ma,es the meaning clear$ 5'f the enemy shows an inclination to ad%ance, lure him on to do so2 if he is an?ious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out his intention.5 The ob)ect is to ma,e him remiss and contemptuous before we deli%er our attac,."1Ey persistently hangingon the enemy-s San,, &' understand the frst four words to mean 5accompanyingthe enemy in one direction.5 Ts`ao Kung says$ 5unite the soldiers and ma,e for the enemy.5 Eut such a %iolent displacement of characters is *uite indefensible.we shall succeed in the long run &Literally, 5after a thousand L'.5in ,illing the commanderCinCchief. &8lways a great point with the Chinese."!This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. &"+6n the day that you ta,e up your command, bloc, the frontier passes, destroy the o;cial tallies, &These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as a permit or passport by the o;cial in charge of a gate. Cf. the 5borderCwarden5 of LI> :I '''. !., who may ha%e had similar duties. 9hen this half was returned to him, within a f?ed period, he was authori#ed to open the gate and let the tra%eler through.and stop the passage of all emissaries. &3ither to or from the enemy-s country.".Ee stern in the councilCchamber, &how no wea,ness, and insist on your plans being ratifed by the so%ereign.so that you may control the situation. &1ei :aoCch`en understands the whole sentence to mean$ Ta,e the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations."4'f the enemy lea%es a door open, you must rush in. &""Morestall your opponent by sei#ing what he holds dear, &Cf. supra, ss. 1@.and subtly contri%e to time his arri%al on the ground. &Ch`en (ao`s e?planation$ 5'f ' manage to sei#e a fa%orable position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the ad%antage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. (e who intends therefore, tooccupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by ma,ing an artful appointment, so to spea,, with his antagonist, and ca)ole him into going there as well.5 1ei :aoCch`en e?plains that this 5artful appointment5 is to be made through the medium of the enemy-s own spies, who will carry bac, )ust the amount of information that we choose to gi%e them. Then, ha%ing cunningly disclosed our intentions, 5we must manage, though starting after the enemy, to arri%e before him /=''. ss. .0. 9e must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither2 we must arri%e before him in order to capture the place withouttrouble. Ta,en thus, the present passage lends some support to 1ei :aoCch`en-s interpretation of ss. .e%er %enture, ne%er winGK1L5Inless you enter the tiger-s lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger-s cubs.5N The only course open to us now is to ma,e an assault by fre on the barbarians under co%er of night, when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profting by their panic, we shall e?terminate them completely2 this will cool the King-s courage and co%er us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.- the o;cers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter frst with the 'ntendant. Pan Ch`ao then fell into a passion$ -'t is today,- he cried, -that our fortunes must be decidedG The 'ntendant is only a humdrum ci%ilian, who on hearing of our pro)ect will certainly be afraid, and e%erything will be brought to light. 8n inglorious death is no worthy fate for %aliant warriors.- 8ll then agreed to do as he wished. 8ccordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band *uic,ly made their way to the barbarian camp. 8 strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan Ch`ao ordered ten ofthe party to ta,e drums and hide behind the enemy-s barrac,s, it being arrangedthat when they saw Sames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of the camp. (e then set fre to the place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose onthe front and rear of the (siungCnu, who rushed out pellCmell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch`ao slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut oH the heads of the en%oy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the Sames. 6n the following day, Pan Ch`ao, di%ining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand$ -8lthough you did not go with us last night, ' should not thin,, ir, of ta,ing sole credit for our e?ploit.- This satisfed Kuo (sun, and Pan Ch`ao, ha%ing sent for Kuang, King of hanCshan, showed him the head of the barbarian en%oy. The whole ,ingdom was sei#ed with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch`ao too, steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, ta,ing the ,ing-s sons as hostage, he returned to ma,e his report to Tou Ku.5 (6I (8> (I, ch. .$ 5To drop fre into the enemy-s camp. The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a bra#ier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy-s lines.5!'n order to carry out an attac,, we must ha%e means a%ailable. &T`sao Kung thin,s that 5traitors in the enemy-s camp5 are referred to. Eut Ch`en (ao is more li,ely to be right in saying$ 59e must ha%e fa%orable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us.5 Chia Lin says$ 59e must a%ail oursel%es of wind and dry weather.5the material forraising fre should always be ,ept in readiness. &Tu 1u suggests as material for ma,ing fre$ 5dry %egetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc.5 (ere we ha%e the material cause. Chang :u says$ 5%essels for hoarding fre, stuH for lighting fres.5+There is a proper season for ma,ing attac,s with fre, and special days for starting a conSagration. &.The proper season is when the weather is %ery dry2 the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the ie%e, the 9all, the 9ing or the CrossCbar2 &These are, respecti%ely, the LI3(, ch. !$ 5The warli,e prince controls his soldiers by his authority, ,its them together by good faith, and by rewards ma,esthem ser%iceable. 'f faith decays, there will be disruption2 if rewards are defcient, commands will not be respected.51one should be more liberally rewarded. 'n no other business should greater secrecy be preser%ed. &Tu 1u gi%es a graphic touch$ all communication with spies should be carried 5mouthCtoCear.5 The following remar,s on spies may be *uoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any pre%ious commander$ 5pies are attached to those who gi%e themmost, he who pays them ill is ne%er ser%ed. They should ne%er be ,nown to anybody2 nor should they ,now one another. 9hen they propose anything %ery material, secure their persons, or ha%e in your possession their wi%es and children as hostages for their fdelity. >e%er communicate anything to them but what is absolutely necessary that they should ,now.K!L51arshal Turenne,5 p. +11.N14pies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuiti%e sagacity. &1ei :aoCch`en says$ 5'n order to use them, one must ,now fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and doubleCdealing.5 9ang (si in a diHerent interpretation thin,s more along the lines of 5intuiti%e perception5 and 5practical intelligence.5 Tu 1u strangely refers these attributes to the spies themsel%es$ 5Eefore using spies we must assure oursel%es as to their integrity of character and the e?tent of their e?perience and s,ill.5 Eut he continues$ 58 bra#en face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than mountains or ri%ers2 it ta,es a man of genius to penetrate such.5 o that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the passage.51"They cannot be properly managedwithout bene%olence and straightforwardness. &Chang :u says$ 59hen you ha%e attracted them by substantial oHers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity2 then they will wor, for you with all their might.51