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Imagine a military force entrenched on a river-bank, dug into a mountaintop, or isolated bya brutal winter storm. Members of the mili-tary force must have supplies—food, water,ammunition, fuel—to maintain their posi-tion and survive. How do they communicatetheir requirements to the rear area? What isthe most efficient route and method to trans-

port the materiel?1 Many years ago, these were the basicproblems of military logistics. Today this field hasgrown infinitely more complex. Drastic changes insupply chain management practices of military forces

have been dictated by ever-changingglobal politics—and sometimes

even changing political bound-aries. United States militaryplanners have begun trans-forming their logistical opera-

tions to accommodate a newnational security environment,

changing how logistic functions areaccomplished while revising traditions and organiza-tion structures. But military organizations—with theirrich historical traditions and special budgets—haveproven an especially difficult domain to promote orga-nization change and unification. For instance, oneNATO government proposed a single unified enter-prise resource planning (ERP) system to streamline itsinternal logistics system. Each element of its armedforces immediately presented a different ERP solutionfavoring its own supply system design. Since no servicewas willing to compromise or change its existing sup-ply system, the project was terminated. Informationtechnology has proved to be a unifying force in thebusiness environment, in military organizations it willcertainly prove a greater challenge.

The U.S. military spends almost 30% of its operat-ing budget on supply, maintenance, and transporta-tion, with an increasing share devoted to technology[1]. Logisticians understand information is a funda-mental element for effective logistic management. Thishas been true in the military context since armies werefirst organized and is even more critical today. Everyaspect of the military supply chain—from consump-tion rates on the battlefield, to supply levels in forwardand rear area depots, plus the ability to obtain air- orsea-lift capacity including the facilities and manpowerto unload and store supplies—is contingent on solidinformation, and more critically on the capacity tocommunicate that information expeditiously.

Logistics and supply chain management is rarelymentioned when countries expound upon their mili-tary achievements. The public rarely sees demonstra-tions of cargo aircraft, transport ships, and trucks itdoes fighter aircraft, warships, and tanks. Despite thislack of publicity, logistics has been a topic of interestfor military philosophers and historians. Sun Tzu, theChinese philosopher, and Carl Von Clausewitz discussthe art of logistics in their works. Von Clausewitz, inhis renowned text On War, refers to logistics and sup-ply lines as centers of gravity, or targets that ifdestroyed can defeat an enemy force without directengagement. Military historians cite campaigns lost asa result of inadequate supply chain management.Logistic targets and objectives have been the focus ofoffensive actions including Sherman’s march throughGeorgia during the American Civil War (the Unionarmy’s drive was directed at splitting the Southernstates and breaking the Confederate Army logisticssupply chain), the Allied strategic bombing campaignof the Axis forces (targeting German industrial pro-duction), and the German U-boat campaign duringWorld War II (focused on merchant shipping, there-fore limiting supplies from the U.S. as opposed tosinking warships).

THE ART OFMILITARY LOG

1The definition of materiel as used here is “equipment, apparatus, and supplies usedby an organization or institution.”

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Military logistics has changed as warfare hasbecome more sophisticated. The French army (of150,000) under Bonaparte subsisted “off the land” ifthe population density was approximately 3,000 per25 square miles. If the population density fell belowthis threshold, troops were forced to carry their ownprovisions, which reduced their fighting capabilities.As armies became larger, more mobile, and the inten-sity of warfare increased, formal lines of supply devel-oped, requiring movement of regular provisions tosoldiers in the field. To shorten the distances requiredto resupply field units, armies developed a depot sys-tem to assemble and disperse soldiers near the frontlines (the supply chain). The larger and faster mov-ing the army, the longer the supplychain and the more difficult theresupply effort. Advances (forwardmovement) have been limited bythe length of the supply chain andin some cases armies have madetactical blunders by advancingbeyond the capability to resupply.

Cold War ScenarioDuring the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies werestructured to fight two major conflicts, EasternEurope and the Korean peninsula. The size of oppos-ing armies and the intensity of warfare at the end ofthe 20th century required massive logistics undertak-ings, and for every combatant an estimated six to tennon-combatants were required to maintain the sup-ply effort. Additionally, military equipment becameincreasingly complex (and heavy) with greater dis-tances from suppliers and rear area supply depots tothe battlefield.2 Logistics planners compensated forthese factors by using a variation of the classic depot

scheme. In both Europe and Korea, forward-deployed units and supply depots were positioned instrategic locations, holding several days of supplies.In Korea, forward-deployed forces are/were posi-tioned north of the Han River, with supply depotslocated south of their positions from Seoul to thesouthern coast. These supply depots were suppliedfrom bases in Japan and the Phillippines, which inturn were supplied from rear area bases in the U.S. orallied countries. The main supply bases received andstockpiled their materiel from suppliers under con-tact to the military and moved it through the supplychain as required.

The scheme described here is similar to the supplychain for a traditional manufacturing opera-tion, in which the manufacturer contractswith a supplier to make and deliver materialto the facility, where it is stockpiled for lateruse. The manufacturer determines hisdemand requirements and establishes a sup-ply chain system allowing him to obtain andmove the required material from supplier to

the plant, and from the plant to the customer. Thisis a “static supply chain,” which has fixed ends, aknown supplier at one end, the manufacturer in themiddle, and a customer destination at the other end.To a certain extent, the volume of material movingthrough the supply chain at any given time can bepredetermined based on the projected demandrequirements. Much the same scenario would occurto keep deployed forces in Korea supplied. Goodswould be moved forward as the conflict progressed,with each link of the supply chain utilized.

Post Cold WarWith the end of the Cold War, the diametricallyopposed force structure of the world changed. Therewas no longer the threat of a major ground war inEastern Europe as the Soviet bloc dissolved. Cur-

Steven JohnSimon

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GISTICSMoving to a dynamic

supply chain.

2Wars are becoming shorter in duration due to the accuracy and rapid expendituresof munitions and other consumables, for example, fuel. A prime example of this isOperation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf.

rently, there is optimism for a reduction in tensions onthe Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, there has notbeen a corresponding reduction in military missionsand in some ways, today’s climate is more explosive andcertainly more difficult, especially from a logistics per-spective. If Cold War logistics was characterized by astatic supply chain with forward deployed supplydepots, then post Cold War logistics must be charac-terized by a “dynamic supply chain.”

Current military missions are radically different thanthe conflicts envisioned during the Cold War. Nolonger do forces enjoy prepositioned materiel locatedclose to potential battlefields. Today, the area of conflictis not known until days or weeks before an incidentoccurs and many missions involve non-traditional mil-itary roles such as humanitarian efforts or peacekeep-ing. This has forced military logistics planners to createinnovative means to move personnel and materiel toany location rapidly. Force restructuring has accountedfor some of this ability but some situations require tra-ditionally heavily armored forces, as used in DesertStorm. As a result, planners have created mobile for-ward supply depots. Materiel has been placed onsquadrons of large ships, which are rotated near poten-tial “hotspots.” The ships are designed to rapidlyunload equipment and supplies and then exit the com-bat area. Troops are usually flown into the area, matedwith the equipment, and moved to the battlefield. Tomaintain the resupply effort, the U.S. Navy has devel-oped the concept of “logistics over the horizon,” whichallows ships to offload miles from shore on floatingcauseways. These scenarios are similar to the idea ofjust-in-time supply in manufacturing. As soon as sup-plies reach the beach they are moved to the forwardlocation and into the hands of the combatants. Thisreduces the number of supply depots, the threat ofattack by hostile forces, and proves useful in areas with-out developed seaports. In regions without seaports, theresupply effort must be conducted via air, which ismore difficult, time consuming, and expensive.

Current Logistics System DeficienciesThe current operating environment uses isolated,independent, and sometimes incompatible systems,processes, and data. Planning lacks realistic detaileddata necessary to provide effective and timely logisticssupport at the unit level; higher levels of commandlack visibility into ongoing logistics operations at lowerlevels; and there is no common interoperable end-to-end system to support decision-makers, at any level.Consequently, the very rapid replanning and redirec-tion necessary to support crisis action responsivenessfor multiple simultaneous missions cannot be accom-plished today.

A significant deficiency is the current process of cre-ating and maintaining Time Phased Force Deploy-ment Data (TPFDD), which specifies and scheduleslogistics support activity in response to anticipatedoperational needs, but does not lend itself to crisisaction planning and dynamic execution environ-ments. TPFDDs are difficult to generate, lack accu-racy due to degraded source data, and are notresponsive to changing operational requirements orlogistics support failures during execution. Data struc-tures currently used in TPFDDs and other supportingdocuments do not allow for a tight binding betweendynamic operational realities and the ongoing logisticsactivities.

The transportation planning and executionprocesses and supporting systems are fragmented.Transportation-related automated systems are“stovepiped” and not integrated among services, uni-fied commands, subordinate commands, or amongmodes of transportation. As a result, meaningful andaccurate information relative to either deployment orsustainment planning and execution is not available ina timely manner or, in some cases, at all. The result isan inefficient use of critical transportation assets, portcongestion, improper sequencing of units and theirsupport, excess costs, a disrupted flow of units andmateriel into the theater of operations, and a generallack of in-transit visibility.

Finally, defense logistics materiel managementmethods, procedures, and supporting automated sys-tems have not kept pace with advances in informationtechnology. Existing systems are not integrated eitherwithin or among the services. The accuracy of demandforecasting is marginal. This compartmentalizationhinders the generation of a fused, accurate, and timelyasset visibility picture across the entire operationalspectrum, which greatly complicates the decision-making process. It also results in excess costs to sup-port both day-to-day and contingency responseoperations.

Given the current environment of stovepiped logis-tics systems, sub-optimal use of transportation, thelack of integrated business processes, and inaccuratetotal asset visibility information, commanders at allechelons lack confidence in the logistics pipeline.Additionally, they are unable to maintain an accurate,real-time knowledge of the operational environmentand the location and availability of assets required tofunction effectively. This results in redundant requisi-tion of materiel and supplies, which clogs the trans-portation pipeline and complicates the logisticsplanning and execution processes.

Existing logistics planning and decision support sys-tems must be changed from a long lead-time deliberate

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planning process to an extremely rapid automated cri-sis action planning process with links to all operationaland logistics planners. This highly automated rapidreaction system must also provide the capability tomaintain a common understanding of the operationalsituation, permit real-time monitoring of operations,and automate rapid replanning when significant devia-tions in the operational situation dic-tate. As Department of Defense(DOD) resources continue to decline,large DOD-held inventories, replenish-ment supplies, and safety stocks arebeing reduced. Responsibility for main-taining adequate inventories must beshared with commercial facilities, ven-dors, and manufacturers. This willnecessitate faster, more automatedcapabilities to:

• Monitor the operational readiness ofmateriel and equipment;

• Predict equipment failure using fore-casting and simulation technologies;

• Rapidly identify, order, acquire,source, pack, and transport requiredsustainment supplies and equipment; and

• Monitor and enhance retrograde movement andrepair of failed components and return of items toinventory for reissue.

The overriding common goal of these programs is toenable the warfighter to project and sustain over-whelming combat power sooner through better controlof the logistics pipeline.

Advanced Logistics SolutionThe Advanced Logistics Program (ALP) will developautomated, multi-echelon, collaborative informationsystems/transportation technologies that will providewarfighters with an unprecedented capability to moni-tor, rapidly replan and re-execute logistical support.

ALP will develop a computer network infrastructurethat allows distributed real-time visualization and inter-action with all phases, elements, and components ofthe military and commercial transportation infrastruc-ture. Applications are being developed to provide atechnology environment allowing warfighters torapidly understand and assess the logistics and sustain-

ment implications of a crisis situation. ALP also helpsgenerate effective plans and courses of action, monitorsa plan’s execution, and uses that information to replan.Additionally, automated systems are under develop-ment that will enable significant efficiency improve-ments in transportation and sustainment, such asmonitoring the condition of assets and the infrastruc-ture, the creation of plan sentinels to serve as an earlywarning system for plan deviations, and improvementsin theater distribution.

The dynamic supply chain must be proactive as wellas reactive, with the ability to reconcile multiple andvaried contingencies. A humanitarian operation inAfrica requires a radically different composition offorces and supplies than peacekeeping operations in

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Example from Joint Vision 2010.

UltraLog Objectives

Real-time visibility of actual usage at point ofconsumption (battlefield)

Real-time information about locally availableparts on a global basis

Real-time status of materiel requests and supply actions with immediate feedback to the battlefield unit

Optimize real-time, field-level, data gathering

and analysis with a resulting increase in forecastaccuracy

Real-time link between commercial supplysources, transportation providers, and systems utilized.

Provide an automated capability to prioritize andoptimize materiel shipments

Reducing order shipment times from days to hours

former Yugoslavia during the winter months. Addi-tionally, operations are multinational (under UnitedNations sponsorship and others), which changes theforce structure and increases resupply complexity.The time frame associated for operations has alsobecome shorter. Humanitarian operations do nothave the luxury of spending weeks or months inpreparation. Most operations must be deployedwithin hours to provide effective aid to those in need.As a result, technology is being employed to supportlogistics planning. The Defense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency (DARPA) will spend $90 millionover the next four years to develop UltraLog, a vast,Web-based intelligent network that determines logis-tics requirements in real time. The system revolvesaround a revolutionary agent-based architectureusing individual computers to solve discrete pieces oflogistics problems and working together to deter-mine a final solution. This wedding of informationtechnology and logistics is key to the effective man-agement of a dynamic supply chain for military andother organizations (such as disaster relief ). As illus-trated in the Joint Vision 2010 figure, technology-infused logistics has become one of the pillars of theU.S. military’s force projection concept and a fullpartner with operational forces. Raising logistics tothis strategic level allows logistics-based informationtechnology systems to directly interface with opera-tional systems, providing the real-time informationflow necessary to meet dynamic requirements. Oncein place, the ALP will reduce the development timefor a logistics plan from 60 days to under one hour.Communications links with forward-deployed unitswill give supply consumption rates to Ultralog,which will relay this information to rear-area supplydepots, as well as schedule transportation. This sys-tem has the ability to revolutionize the managementof the dynamic supply chain while cutting planning

time, improving efficiencies and reducing costs, andinsuring prompt delivery of supplies to the forwardarea.

One example of the change introduced by Ultra-Log is adaptive workflow brought by the introductionof logistics technology to deployed units. The NavalConstruction Forces (Seabees) have adapted technol-ogy originally developed by the Marine Corps andcreated a fully deployable and rapidly implementablelocal-area network (LAN in a box) with satellite com-munications capabilities. This system allows theSeabees and their component forces to communicatewith rear-area elements, expediting the process ofordering supplies, checking the status of orders andshipments, and streamlining reporting. This systemhas reduced the lengthy approval process through theintroduction of adaptive workflow—allowing person-nel throughout the chain of command to change theirprocedures based on evolving requirements—whileincreasing the discretionary authority of commandersin the field.

Military decision-makers and senior-level com-manders have recognized the importance of logisticsand supply chain management as an integral elementof strategic plans. Rear-area technology such as Ultra-Log and the increasing use of deployable technologyand global communications systems will continue toallow commanders to make more effective use of theirsupply chain as a force multiplier.

Reference1. National Research Council. Technology for the United States Navy and

Marine Corps, 2000–2035. National Academy Press, Washington, DC,1997.

Steven John Simon (suppo@iwon.com) is a professor at the Stetson School of Business and Economics at Mercer University inAtlanta, GA, and a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve.

© 2001 ACM 0002-0782/01/0600 $5.00

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Sample of UltraLog Technologies

The interconnection of models, simulations, and applications that lead to real-time logisticscontrol

Shared operations and logistics command andcontrol schema

Adaptive work flowObject-based information representation with

“drill down” capabilityPlan sentinels, based on known or forecasted

logistics capabilities that identify plan deficien-cies during the planning process; and execution

sentinels that, based on planning assumptionsand expectations, detect when an action is notbeing executed according to plan

Automatic replanning optionsSemiautonomous search and retrieval of dataIntegration of commercial data sourcesMediator processing Ad-hoc query capabilityExtensions for electronic data interchangeUser-friendly human-computer interfacesData mining