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THE ANARCHICAL CYBER SOCIETY AND FREEDOM 2.0: NEW C HALLENGES TO POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1

Gills Lopes Macêdo Souza (Brazil)2 Francisco Alves de Azevedo Neto (Brazil)3

Abstract : After the e-Revolution which was the basis for the Arab Spring and triggered the so-called Operation #AntiSec, inevitable questions have arisen and permeated the news, tweets and fora throughout the globe: Did some new democratic mechanisms or arrangements emerge in cyberspace or simply new manifestations of something old? To what extent do fundamental rights apply to the cyber environment? What is the relationship between the cyber-attacks led by Anonymous and LuzSec and the quest for freedom in a non-tangible space? How are states responding to these attacks in both institutional and political levels? Lastly, what is the political role of the Internet in the new power settings of the 21st century? Based on political science and international relations classics (such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Mill, Locke, Constant, Wight e Bull) and more recent concepts of Nye’s cyber power and Clarke and Knake’s cyber war, this paper aims to answer these questions by using the freedom issue as a starting point, as well as the new role played by the state in what we call here the “anarchical cyber society”. In doing so, we hope to bring cyberspace issues into the realm of both Political Science and International Relations.

Keywords : Anarchical Cyber Society. Political Science. International Relations. INTRODUCTION

The struggle between freedom and authority is presented as a feature more evident in parts of the history that we have been familiar with early [...]. (Mill 1963: 3, free translation).

The twenty-first century, contributed by the revolutionary contributions of new

information and communication technologies (ICT), from the Information Revolution - or Third Industrial Revolution - makes the concept of network society increasingly possible (Castells, 2007). One of the factors responsible for this statal adaptation to the Information Age is the Internet popularization.

The term “cyberspace” was coined in 1984 by the writer William Gibson in his famous science fiction book Neuromancer and means today, “the total interconnectedness of human beings through computers and telecommunication

1 We would like to thank the Center for the Study of Comparative Politics and International Relations (NEPI/UFPE/CNPq), especially to prof. Dr. Marcelo A. Medeiros (UFPE), for comments. Also to Dr. Marcus Melo, and Dr. Andrea Steiner (UFPE) for their translation help and advice. 2 Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) Fellow by the Federal University of Pernambuco – UFPE’s Mater in Political Science, and Undergraduate student in Computer Networks by the Federal Institute of Science and Technology of Paraíba – IFPB. Email: gills@gills.com.br. 3 Chief of Police, Graduated in Law, and a special student of the UFPE’s Master in Political Science. Email: franciscozvd@hotmail.com.

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without regard to physical geography” (Thing 2003: 200). Thus, one can envision cyberspace in various man-machine relationships, such as those used to interconnect data, services and people: telephone, wifi, amateur radio networks.

Although the Internet is contained in the cyberspace, this article uses both concepts as equivalent since, although ontologically there is some differences, both they have the same significances practice a synergistic to designate environment within which need not be physical presence so that the human beings exists a communication link between them. It is used here also the term "Internet" to describe its other literary equivalents, such as the World Wide Web, the large network, WWW, or even "the network of networks" (Vidotti & Oliveira 2004).

Several movements that start in the virtual world and / or int the actual one claim the maintenance of a free, anarchical Internet, ie, without arbitrary interference from anyone is, including the state itself. But more than that, it uses the very Internet's anarchical structure to mirror the itself society where they live. This applies, for example, the emergence of hackers-crackers4 aliances, the hacktivism5, and the use of web resources to propagate and combat governments that do not respect fundamental freedoms of its own population. The so-called Arab Spring - or wave of democracy in the Arab world - carried out in the first half of 2011, is the chief example of the use of the libertarian and anarchical structure of Internet to promote their ideas.

With the outbreak of hacktivists demonstrations – of which greatest exponents are the so called #AntiSec Operation6, and ThePlan – also in 2011, there are inevitable questions that since then permeate the news, virtual social networks and forums. Some of these questions are as follows: one can argue that something new comes within the cyberspace? Without the help of both the Internet's users and structure, the revolutionary movements in the Middle East would have the same effects? To what extent fundamental rights apply to the cyber environment? And as the state has responded to these actions?

The main hypothesis here is that the modern state - guided by the twin triad territory- sovereignty- the people, and land-air-sea - adapts to the new ICT, aiming to maintain its sovereignty. However, such maintenance often clashes with the interests of citizens, especially with respect to freedom restrictions. In order to corroborate this premise, this work seeks to assistance in some Politics' classics so that we can respond to the inquiries mentioned above having as nuclear issue the problem of freedom. The choice of this issue here is reflected by the fact that it is a central theme in the current international debate involving the Internet. Because it is both a topic with a vast literature, and the classics the fact that have lived in very different times and customs, this work takes care not to recklessly charge claims

4 The computer sciences literature is very solid as to difference between hacker and cracker: while the former is a computer expert - usually a “clever programmer” (THING 2003:376, free translation) - the latter “is someone who invades computer systems of another person [...], breaking computer security” (Thing 2003:186, free translation). 5 Merger between activism and hack jargon created within the studies cyberpolitics to designate the area of operation of the politically aware hackers. Thus tools and concepts previously used by computer specialists (such as software development) may be serving some ideological movement that put , on its agenda, issues of Internet freedom. 6 Abbreviation for "AntiSecurity." The symbol representing the hash mark (#), when placed next to a word in a tweet (message to 140 characters posted on Twitter) forms a hashtag. Thus the composite utilization "# AntiSec" in the name of the operation conducted by the Anonymous and LulzSec groups goes back to the idea that one of the major weapons used by them is just a more in vogue presently media: the virtual social networks.

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classics' on aspects that involve the problem of freedom in cyberspace. It is important to remember that the use classics' here serves only to theoretical support ways where we want to reach namely: to understand whether the current freedom - that primarily involves cyberspace - is so different from that of earlier times. To this first one we call freedom 2.0; to the second one, freedom 1.0. If we get an affirmative answer we will understand that new configurations of power are also required to accompany it, both by organized civil society and the state. Moreover, a positive response yet demonstrates a current Political Science and International Relations' inability in seeking to understand / explain these phenomena, because such attempts are being further studied in areas such as Linguistics and Sociology of the Communication.

A part of this work's title, "the cyber anarchical society", is an adaptation a traditional International Affairs' book , and concept created by Hedley Bull in his book The Anarchical Society dated 1977. The central idea behind this reinterpretation implies a double acceptance. The first one concerns the fact that, just as in interstate relations, there is not a Leviathan to control the whole cybernetic system. The second one rests on the idea that the environment encompasses cyber official relations between states: virtual embassies7, public services to its citizens (e-gov), joint policies to combat cyber crime8 etc. Besides the freedom issue, the question of power also comes under discussion in an age where both power and information gain inseparable linkage in the main international fora. According to Nye (2011:123), states experience nowadays – and therefore differently at the classicals’ time such as the Bull one – a new nature of power: “[the] ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use of the electronically interconnected information resources of the cyberdomain.”

This work aims to contribute to both the Political Science and the International Affairs/Relations, to launch bothe new visions and debates towards too traditional and vital concepts as freedom and power. ON FREEDOM 1.0

[...]freedom is like [...] these fortified wines, fit to nourish and fortify robust temperaments used to them, but that burden, ruin and intoxicate the weak and delicate people who are not accustomed to it. (Rousseau [200-?]:12, free translation).

To Berlin (1969:2), freedom “[...]is a term whose meaning is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist.” So, this work is guided by this author’s warnings.

Throughout the human history, the issue of freedom is indeed debated in various discussion spaces. Since Ancient Greece days and the Roman civilian’s freedom right, the essential fact is that the “freedom” theme was costly to many who sought to understand it, defend it or fight for it: since the life – told in years of study – that remarkable writers and scholars, and going for the death of so many others revolutionaries, sympathizers and even innocents who died to let their libertarian ideals alive. The Brazilian case “Minas Gerais’s Conspiracy” in the eighteenth century is a pertinent illustration to this last passage, when the Brazilian martyr

7 An example is the Virtual Embassy of the United States Tehran: http://iran.usembassy.gov. 8 As the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, signed in 2001.

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Joaquim “Tiradentes” José da Silva Xavier had his life cut short and his legend shrouded under the under the veil of the flag that brought the liberty imprinted with hard way: libertas quæ sera tamen – from Latin: freedom, albeit late. Since Fidel Castro (apud Souza & Lima 2010), at the Cuban Revolution beginning, when asked which side they were, he said that “his men were not ‘capitalists or communists, but humanists’, and that they were opposed both the ‘capitalist freedom without bread’ as well ‘the communist bread without freedom’”.

We call freedom 1.0 to every concept of freedom engendered before the creation of the Free Software Movement in 1983, whose starting point is the release of the GNU Project9. We believe that by that date, the concept of free spins in terms of acts whose effects are physical - write, speak, do, kill, eat, move around. Perhaps, the only concept in which freedom 1.0 can be taken in abstract terms is the right of free thought - because this, is true, the effects of thought, per se, does not produce results in the physical environment.

Are used here also the Isaiah Berlin’s writings on freedo, which categorize the freedom on two concepts: positive and negative ones.

The notion of negative freedom answers the question “What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?” (Berlin 1969:2). For him, freedom is negative because the individual can have their freedom to achieve a goal denied by human beings. In his own words: “By being free in this sense I mean not being interfered with by others. The wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom.” (Berlin 1969:3), that is, “[...] the liberty of some must depend on the restraint of others.” (Berlin 1969:4).

The positive liberty, in turn, rests on the following question: “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?” (Berlin 1969:2). Thus many answers to the concepts of negative and positive freedom can be drawn from the Political Science classics.

Going into this area, although Rousseau ([200 -?], P. 74) asserts that freedom is “the men' noblest faculty”, Mill (1981:37), p in turn, adds that it “only reaches its peak when the individual is [...] in possession of the full citizenship privileges.” These full rights in Mill’s can be seen also in Berlin (1969:4): “[...] there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated”. Notwithstanding at the time of Pericles the individual freedom be absolute (Glotz 1988:107), often groups of individuals question the direction the State while guarantor of their freedom takes when the engendering of laws, even aimed at other purposes, is limited, though very slightly, some individual freedom.

For instance, civil law, for Hobbes (2005, p. 126), is more than an artificial bond created between the sovereign taker and his subjects, it

is, for every subject, constituted by those rules that the state imposes, orally or in writing, or by other sufficient sign of its will, in order to use it as a criterion for distinguishing between good and evil, ie, which is contrary to the rule. (Hobbes 2005:156, free translation).

Yet for Hobbes (2005, p. 126), it is impossible for any state to regulate, by law, all actions and words of men, although, according to Constant (1985, p. 11), in ancient times, “laws regulated customs, and as everything depended on customs, there was nothing that laws do not regulate.” Constant, in turn, criticizes the Abbe

9 For further information about the Free Software Movement and the GNU project, access http://www.gnu.org/gnu/initial-announcement.en.html.

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de Mably – a Rousseau's successors – because he wanted not only the actions, but also the individuals’ thoughts could be achieved by force of law. To this Abbe, the law must pursue “the man without respite and without leaving him to no refuge where he could escape from his power” (Constant 1985:17). Thus, on this subject and pondering the limitations of legal norms, Constant (1985:18-19) concludes that “the laws must also have limits.”

The issue of freedom in Hobbes’s is put as limitations to the individual towards him/her sovereign. For him, “nothing that the sovereign [...] do for his/her subject may, under any circumstances, properly be called injustice or injury, because each subject is the author of all acts of the sovereign” (Hobbes 2005:126, free translation). By bringing Glotz to this discussion, he informs that the philosopher Democritus “stated that it is better to live like a poor in a democracy rather than to enjoy happiness an apparent in a king's court” (Glotz 1988:107, free translation). Contrary to this tenet, Hobbes argues that “no matter whether the state is monarchical or whether popular, freedom is always the same” (Hobbes 2005:128, free translation), ie, the state10 makes no mistakes or injustices against its citizens precisely because it itself is the citizens’ will. So like na Aristotelian syllogism, there is no injustice when an individual does something against himself, because he was not guided by anything other than his own will. However, for that matter, Hobbes makes a crucial caveat:

If the sovereign commands a man, even if rightly condemned, kills or injure himself, or not to resist an attack, or to abstain from using food, air, medicines, or any other thing without which he can not live, yet this man has the freedom to disobey. (Hobbes 2005:129, emphasis added, free translation).

As noted above, the right to life is the only right that does not waive, in Hobbes’s11. For him “the right by nature men have to defend themselves can not be abandoned by agreement at all” (Hobbes 2005:131). In Bobbio’s view, Hobbes seeks to “demonstrate that the basic element of political society is obedience to the sovereign," (Bobbio, 1991:80, free translation) even though the Italian philosopher realizes that the Hobbesian liberal idea of freedom is to do whatever is not prohibited12.

But for Benjamin Constant – “the most eloquent of all defenders of freedom and privacy[...]”, according to Belin (1969:5) –, there are two types of freedom: one, an exercise which had cost dearly to the ancient peoples, and another one “whose use is particularly useful for modern nations,” which engenders the representative system. For him, the desire for one or other freedom is connected directly to the type of social organization of each era. Thus Constant proposes an ontological exercise of asking someone who hypothetically living in an old and modern age about what is freedom for him/her. Here is the Constant’s question, and answer, in verbis:

Ask yourselves first [...], which in our day an Englishman, a Frenchman, an United States of America’s inhabitant understand about the word freedom. It is for each one of them the right only to submit themselves to the laws [...]. It [...] is the right to say their opinion [...], to come and go without needing permission and without having to account for their motives or their

10 Which is represented – in the most famous Hobbesian work – the metaphor of the Leviathan, which governs everything and everyone at all. 11 Cf. also Bobbio (1991). In a more general sense about freedom and caveats in Hobbes, Berlin (1969:5) says that Hobbes “agreed that some portion of human existence must remain independent of the sphere of social control”. 12 In the same sense, see Berlin (1969:3).

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footsteps. It [...] is the right to meet with other individuals [...]. Finally, it is the right for each one to influence the administration of government, whether by appointmenting all or certain employees, either through representations, petitions, claims, to which the authority is more or less obliged to take into consideration. Compared to this, the liberty of the ancients consisted in exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of the whole sovereignty [...], they admitted as compatible with freedom the individual’s complete submission to the authority of. [...] All private actions are subjected to strict oversight. (Constant 1985:10-11, free translation).

Constant (1985:15, free translation) further states that freedom for the ancients “was the sharing of social power among all citizens of one country.” This freedom differentiation is posed by Constant in that way so that it does not reachs the following mistaken conclusion: that the ancients preferred to be bound by the mands of others instead of being in possession of their own freedom. Rather, freedom is brought to understand that the ancients “had no notion of individual rights” (Constant 1985:12, free translation). However one can not “enjoy more liberty of the ancients,” since “our freedom must consist of peaceful enjoyment of private Independence” (Constant 1985:15). Thus it may be “concluded that we should be much more attached to our individual Independence than the ancients” (Constant 1985:15, free translation).

As can be seen, the freedom 1.0 gives rise to an evolution of the concept of individual freedom that, for its theoreticians, is mainly related to the right to come and go. But as pointed out by Berlin:

“We cannot remain absolutely free, and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest. But total self-surrender is self-defeating. What then must the minimum be? That which a man cannot give up without offending against the essence of his human nature. What is this essence? What are the standards which it entails? This has been, and perhaps always will be, a matter of infinite debate.” (BERLIN, 1969, p. 5).

This debate is fueled further when cyberspace is claimed as a platform totally free of statal interference. To the core of this debate we call freedom 2.0. ON FREEDOM 2.0

The current networks dynamics characterize the cyberspace as a interactive, and self-organizing complex virtual organism. (OLIVEIRA & VIDOTTI, 2004, free translation).

For being the amalgamation of several networks, the WWW itself is heterogenous through absorption. The Internet is more to a society than for a system in itself. So to keep it, it is need some conduct standards so that the large network remains in constantly expanding and that the Internet’s user can make full advantage of this space (W3C 2012). Thus, each country has an agency responsible for managing some characteristics of the Internet in its territory. In the Brazilian case, the charge for such a task is the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br), which is

Composed of government members, business sector, third sector, and academic community that represents a pioneer model of Internet governance with regard to the effectiveness of civil society participation in decisions involving the Internet deployment management, and use. (CGI.BR [2011], free translation).

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Actions taken by CGI.Br might always be guided by democratic principles. Not surprisingly the word “freedom” – followed by “privacy” and “human rights” – appears as the first principle to guide the Brazilian Internet (CGI.Br 2009).

Nevertheless it holds here that the Internet is anarchical13, there are bodies whose function is to suggest improvements in certain Internet areas. For example, in order to allow a greater people with physical or visual disabilities’ inclusion, the World Wide Web Consortium – W3C – gives some guidelines and suggestions for improving architectures protocols and markup languages so that always largest possible number of people can be part of the Internet.

When Rousseau ([200 -?]:14, free translation) refers to laws, he argues that “under the pretext of doing better laws, it is often brought great evils to correct minor ones.” Having this Rousseaunian maximum to the Brazilian case, the civil society has rejected the Senator Eduardo Azeredo’s Bill Substitute (PLS)14. This bill proposal seeks to exercise in Brazilian law the same as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime – of which Brazil is not a signatory – already has already done since 2011 in international law: to criminalize and punish cybercrimes (Souza & Pereira 2009). The problem is not on the merits, but how these typifications and punishments are described: with freedom restriction to traffic freely in Internet as well as injuring the fundamental right to privacy, once “traces” of the Internet’s user should be kept by Internet access providers.

Civil society organizations – mainly human rights activists, representatives of consumers rights’ defenders, and persons linked to ICT areas such as the Free Software Movement – immediately repudiated this PLS. Meantime, many protests in both the streets and cyberspace has been made. Moreover and the fact that an online petition about that has been widespread and already has almost 166,000 signatures15.

Although Hobbes refers to the merely geographical / physical movement, he conceives freedom as the "absence of opposition" because “whatever is tied or wrapped so that it can not move only within a certain space [...], we say that is not at liberty to go further” (Hobbes 2005:124, free translation). This to go further freedom can be by analogy used in cyberspace? Logically, Hobbes does not answer this question, but he goes on to say that “a free man is one who [...] is not prevented from doing what they want to do” (Hobbes 2005:125, free translation). Thus, in a Hobbesian vision, it can be said that the fact that a limiting freedom law in cyberspace is not unfair because the state only acts unjustly when he takes the means to survival of the citizen. However, transposing it to the freedom 2.0 – the Information Age’s freedom –, to limite Internet access is the same as limiting the air from the atmosphere or water from the seas? Since its inception, the Internet was conceived immaculately free and decentralized (Kleinrock 2008).

However, Hobbes warns that “when the words free and liberty are applied to anything that is not an object, there is a misnomer, because what is not subject to motion is not subject to impediments” (Hobbes 2005:125, free translation). Air and water, for example, move naturally; therefore, their movements are not performed

13 Not in the sense of being an amalgam of chaos and disorder, but because it is not controlled by any sovereign entity that dictates laws of conduct for people in cyberspace. 14 In fact, there are three SLPs, namely: Substitute Bill to PL House Nº. 89/2003, and Senate Bills 70/2000 and 137/2000. 15 Pelo veto ao projeto de cibercrimes: em defesa da liberdade e do progresso do conhecimento na Internet Brasileira. Available at: <http://petitiononline.com/mod_perl/signed.cgi?veto2008>. Access in: 11 mar. 2011.

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by the human will. The Internet, true, was done by men and designed to suffer no arbitrary interference to limit its usage.

If the freedom1.0, the human being was tied to the constrained domains, the freedom 2.0 comes to develope your own domain. So, it is argued here that cyberspace is free and therefore conducive to extended liberty, the freedom 2.0. When we speak here of freedom in cyberspace, it is talk of cyberspace natural freedom.

However, according to Rousseau ([200 -?]:78, free trnaslation), “a country where nobody frustrates the laws and did not abuse the judiciary would not need neither magistrates nor laws.” Meanwhile, it is clear that the PLS above mentioned demonstrated a need for laws to fight cybercrimes committed by crackers, since it is unacceptable that in a society, even if a virtual one, individuals act to steal or damage something does not belong to them. Mot to mention the spread of child pornography and trafficking of all kinds. This is “the sole in-favor aim,” that Mill (1963:12,64, free translation) talks about and “which can legitimately exercise pressure on any member of a civilized community, against his will. Is to prevent harm to others.” But who is to judge in advance when and how an individual or groups of them become a menace to society? The question still remains rather complex even for the freedom 2.0. ON CYBERSPACE

Only one dominates or share what is “mine”, “yours” or “ours”. At this point,

as an example, is introduced into roughly the idea of property in cyberspace. The judgment of what is “mine”, “your” and “our” in cyberspace is often different from the discussion there is in the real world. Because there are things that can not be touched or weighed within the legal systems of measures of weight and capacity, it is difficult to measure values, even when they have sometimes diferent limited permitions of use.

Some people, like Richard Stallman16, argue that all software should be free both in price and in the possibility of being modified in order to be adapted to each various person or entity’ situations. He states the software, so to speak, must have a social function. On the other side of the discussion, there are those who do not think so, and therefore advocate – and charge as well – for their software. However, there is no way to demarcate territories on the Web, what it is experiencing is wother an analogy between the virtual domains (.br, .es., .us and so on) or even misunderstand the rule played by institutions such as W3C, ICANN and CGI-Br on Internet governance.

There is no way to do in cyberspace what the famous phrase of Rousseau ([200 -?]:57, free translation) enables thinking: that “the first one, surrounding terrain, remembered to say, ‘This is mine’ and found people simple enough to believe that, was the true founder of civil society.” First, because, as emphasized by Mounier (2006: 205-206, free translation), cyberspace was conceived by its founders as “a shared space [...], non-physical.” And second, because there is not, and never was along the Information Age, people simple enough to devise an appropriation of the Internet. The same thing happens with another Rousseaunian maxim to explain the origin of society and laws, which states that the rich “finally 16 Former Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) programmer and Free Software Movement founder.

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conceived the most reflected project than ever penetrated the human spirit – namely to employ in his favor the very forces of those who attacked him – to make his supporters, old opponents” (Rousseau [200 -?]:69, free translation). That is, once inside in the large network, there is no stratification among Internet users – between rich and poor, eg –, they are just IP addresses17. What can happen, as already said, is the association of the classical concept of virtual property with the sites, as well as the sites of fact, they have to be hosted in one place – in the case of virtual a space provided by a hosting company or a standalone web server. However, since there is no concept of territoriality in the Internet, one can say it does not have a fixed size, and therefore, nobody, however rich (s)he is in real life, can not buy the Internet.

Has Cyberspace territory? Facing a challenge to mod ern state

Although being a Cold War’s daughter and invented by the Department of Defense (Clarke & Knake 2010:34) in the late 1950s, the Internet has been led by academic community, and, during the past 20 years, by international civil community. As pointed out by one of the Founding Fathers of the Internet, Kleinrock (2008), what guided his work and his fellow explorers of cyberspace – when the Internet was still a draft of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) – was the information and ideas sharing. And that continues today.

The problem is that cyberspace, as being an environment essential to today's society and the capitalist system itself, is also a barn suitable for the proliferation of everyday evils, such as viruses, worms, trojans, spams and other malware. Ot is also targeted by major economic players18. Moreover, it is true the fact that war powers envision issues concerning cyber defense, considering cases involving Russia and Estonia19, in 2007, and Georgia and Russia, in 200820. These cyber attacks followed by war attacks in Georgia was the perfect demonstration of how international conflicts will be made in this century (Nye, 2008).

There is no question here that should not occur economic and military inferences in this environment in order to, for example, make it free of malware, to facilitate the consumer's life or even in order to get rid of pro-Tibet activists of government spying. What is not allowed, by Internet users, is the interference in their private affairs. In other words, advertising, investment and marketing allocated to the Internet are necessary, since the function of a given web site, for example, is not distorted21. Regarding the cyber defense22, it is essential States, like Brazil, have their bodies turned to military defense of national cyberspace23, after all, our riches are not only in the Brazilian Amazon or the pre-salt, but stored in databases

17 De acordo com Thing (2003, p. 448), endereço IP (IP address) “é um número de 32 bits que identifica cada remetente ou recipiente de informações que são enviadas em pacotes (packets) via internet”. 18 No sentido de ser aparentemente mais um espaço para a livre dominação do capital – conforme visto com a chamada Bolha da Internet, entre os anos 1999 e 2000. 19 Quando russos contrários a uma ação política da Estônia resolveram desestabilizar e danificar infraestruturas de informação estonianas, através de ataques virtuais. Cf. Clarke & Knake (2010, p. 30); Nye Jr (2008; 2011). 20 Cf. explicação mais adiante. 21 E.g.: ao invés de haver mais notícias num sítio virtual de notícias, haver mais banners. 22 Não confundir com segurança cibernética, que envolve as polícias, e não as Forças Armadas. Para mais detalhes, vide: SOUZA & MEDEIROS, 2011. 23 Em 2010, foi criado o Centro de Defesa Cibernética (CDCiber) do Exército Brasileiro.

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24. In an interconnected world like this, information has become a great power in the hands not only of individuals but of states as well. This also does not mean that relevant information to the population should be safeguarded in favor a third party, for mere financial speculation or disposition of the population. Mastering the Internet, for some who did not realize that the structure under which it is built, refers to taking it – or part(s) of it – as if it were his own, private. This, though tempting for some, it is impossible for all.

Rousseau ([200 -?]:25,38) distinguishes man from animals through two main aspects: the perfectibility – a neologism coined by him to describe the man ability in adapting to the elements of nature – and freedom. In the case of the Internet, it seems that since its inception, the human being was able to keep both mentioned characteristics: refined, expanding access to large network, and maintained the freedom that so characterizes the WWW. Thus, it is understood that “individual freedom is the true modern liberty” (Constant 1985:21, free translation).

Attempts to deploy a global governance on Internet have already taken out in the UN since 2005, through its International Governance Forum (IGF). This Forum,

should not overlap or replace the governance mechanisms that currently exist or will be created, but to coordinate with them in order to promote broad participation in its activities, suggest them questions, make recommendations for non-binding (CGI.BR 2012, free translation).

Thus, issues such as self-government and self-management of the Internet become pronounced in outside the UN. But this brings up another Mill’s passage:

phrases as “self-government” and “people's power over themselves” do not express the true state of affairs. The “people” who wield power is not always the same people over whom power is exercised. (Mill 1963:6, free translation).

What we see is an increasingly active participation of the "people" on the issues involving the Internet and consequently their freedom. The IGF has representatives from many different public and private sectors, but many of those who are demanding more freedom in the vast network does not actively participate in the negotiating table.

According to Mill (1963:6, free translation), "the will of people practically means the will of the more numerous or more active people." The cyber attacks led by the group Anonymous – which had great international impact in 2011 – show that, when more active parts of a movement decide to join forces, the most numerous starts to become a viable object. Anonymous, Arab Spring and the cyber-freedom fight

[...]without the pressure of social forces, political ideas are stillborn[...]. (BERLIN, 1969, p. 2). Brilliant and articulate, the Anonymous activists seem to be able to cause problems for any service that challenge them. So far, nobody knows how to stop them. (CAMPI, 2010, free translation).

The virtual actions promoted by the group Anonymous, which involved sometimes the LulzSec one, take up some historical debates that involve since the res publica, through the freedom of expression and information.

24 In Brazil, its National Defense Strategy, launched in 2008, puts assertively cyberspace as one of the three strategic sectors for both defense and national development.

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Anonymous is a group of hackers and sympathizers without names, positions or hierarchies. In their own, “If you slice off one head of Hydra, ten more heads will grow in its place. If you cut down one Anon, ten more will join us purely out of anger at your trampling of dissent.” (YOUR ANON NEWS, 2011). Its name comes from the fact that the first members used the web site 4chan.org, which mainly teenagers exchanged ideas and information about pop and cult culture. When a comment was not signed by a registered user, the same was signed automatically by “Anonymous”.

Just as the Internet, these young people grew up and the ideas engendered from that virtual collaboration space have also evolved and overflowed into other areas. Here, it is clear that a Hobbesian maximum does not apply to many of the groups that inhabit the cyberspace: that there is no incentive to create something lasting, since a third party can take it. What we see by using services such as 4chan.org is that the environment is more akin to the Locke’s (1983) state of nature, where everybody is equal because they are free.

The main symbol used by the Anonymous movement, both in cyberspace and in street demonstrations, is the Guy Fawkes’s Victorian-type mask used by the anarchist character “V”25, in both the comic book and the movie “V for Vendanta”, written by Englishman Alan Moore.

Figure 1 – Character "V", wearing a Guy Fawkes mask

Figure 2 – Protesters wearing a Guy Fawkes mask

Source:

http://wwws.br.warnerbros.com/vforvendetta/img/pto_OS_victoria_101.jpg (15 Mar. 2012).

Source: http://blogs.estadao.com.br/link/files/2012/02/a

nonymous.jpg (15 Mar. 2012).

Other brands that allude to the story created by Moore are seen both in the Anonymous’s aesthetic and literary productions, as the group's motto: “We are Anonymous. We are legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us…” (YOUR ANON NEWS, 2011).

The Guy Fawkes mention here is essential to understand many of the group actions and its relevance to the Arab Spring. Historically, Fawkes was part of a conspiracy of Catholics who wanted to kill the king of England, the Scottish James I, and hus that the unequal treatment between Catholics and Protestants ceased and England returned to be a Catholic country. The conspirators’ idea was to wait for the king and the Protestant leaders to gather in the English Parliament, and when that occurred, 36 powder barrels were detonated (Marshall 2010:316; Moore 2012). Because of the Gunpowder Conspiracy has taken more than a year to top it off, its

25 The reader notices that the symbol "V” is the one that characterizes the anarchist movement (a stylized "A") upside down.

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members have sworn not to reveal what was happening under the Parliament. Thus, on November 5, when Parliament would open, Guy Fawkes was chosen to detonate the barrels, even if it would cost his life. Meanwhile, the secret was leaked. Near November 4th midnight, Fawkes was caught red-handed, tortured, and sentenced to the flames.

In the 1980s, amid the neo-liberal policies that prevailed in both England and the United States of America, the writer Alan Moore's work "V for Vedanta" is launched. In it, the anarchist character "V" seeks to complete the Fawkes’s unfinished acts, giving to a new England – futuristic and ruled by a fascist party, which is a caricature of the Thatcher’s government – the possibility of dawn on Nov. 5th under the aegis of a new government of the people, by the people, and for the people. As noted in that work, everything revolves around the power that ideas and symbols have to change the political status quo, through the people’s direct action.

So, the hackeractivist Anonymous movement has used various elements that refer to the Guy Fawkes story, include the speeches of the character "V" – as "beneath this mask there are ideas, and ideas are bulletproof" (V FOR VERDANTA 2006) or even the folk phrase "Remember, Remember, the 5th of November", which is still held by English culture.

Wikileaks – web site founded by Julian Assange, and that leaked classified documents from government agencies around the world – is another topic that is usually associated with Anonymous. Although there is no direct link between them, the fact is that, after Wikileaks put the "Internet in the center of world diplomacy" (JOURNAL OF BRAZIL 2010, free translation), companies like Visa and MasterCard blocked donations that kept the Assange’s web site on air, generating the hackerativistas’ wrath. In solidarity with the Wikileaks, Anonymous organized cyber attacks to these companies (Campim 2011) and has taken since then up the cause of leading the voice for information freedom to government agencies throughout the globe.

The connection between Anonymous and the Arab Spring is very close (Postill 2012). It arises when the Arab revolts by higher transparency and freedom come to Tunisia in 2011. Repressed in the streets, protesters post videos and messages on the Internet, showing the abuses committed by the Tunisian government. Some members linked to Anonymous join the cause and intensify of the actions, in what is known as "Tunisia Operation ". The culmination of this action was the publication (defacement) of videos on the own Government of Tunisia web site.

In Egypt, the Anonymous participation was beyond than Tunisia: the hacker group " to bring down the sites of the Ministry of Information and President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party" (Somaiya, 2011). These web sites were taken off air until the Mubarak’s fall, although 600 people have been arrested in this operation (Somaiya 2011). Among other actions, may also be included to Anonymous the Internet connection restore through mobile phones that had been blocked by the government.

Then, the broadcast Al Jazeera (2011) released a note stating that the Anonymous had released “names and passwords for email accounts belonging to Middle East government officials”.

After the apparent Arab spring ending, the group leads a strong virtual war on two fronts: one, against the governments that "try to take control of the Internet" (BRAZIL ANON 2011, free translation), and, another one, against the corrupt governments that break the Social Contract by allowing irregularities may occur.

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Other groups and sympathizers joined to this battle, in what is known as #AntiSec Operation. This operation opened in June 2011, with attacks on various public and private web sites/services worldwide. The largest cyber attacks in the Brasilhistory of Brazil occurred throughout in that time (IG 2011). After 50 days, by sailing with his pirate raft in the waves of the Internet, and causing massive damage to multiple web sites and databases – including the CIA and FBI’ – the group LulzSec ceases its activities/, after "changing the hacktivism forever" (PC MAGAZINE 2011, free translation). Despite its sophisticated computer engineering attacks, the group used to many puns and humor to it victims, as well as the Twitter to draw attention to its cause, which attracted not only supporters of the ICT areas, but also of other one that were identified with the group cause, namelly: showing for those who "patrol" cyberspace that it has no owner and the Internet users are not criminals.

Not fully supporting the LulzSec’s harmful actions, Anonymous creates the web site "What is the plan?" (http://whatis-theplan.org) to attract supporters to the cause and explain what the modus operandi of #AntiSec Operation, and how it is divided. According to the web site, there are three phases over a period of one year:

1. Phase 1 is to: educate yourself on what the government wrongly does, share information, spread the idea, building a network of synchronous ideas, and get rid of the shackles of the system (ANONYMOUS, [2011], p. 2). This phase begins with the own June 2011cyberattacks;

2. Phase 2 , there will be a division between "the real members of frauds. The weak, the strong. The ignorant, the wise "(ANONYMOUS [2011]:3 free translation), in allusion to the idea that agents of governments will be infiltrated the movement – what has proved be true, with the arrest of some members during 2011; and

3. Phase 3 , which is "full circle. The revolution. The turn. The end of all our work, the achievement of our objectives. The apex of freedom.” (ANÔNIMOS [2011]:3, free translation).

After the Arab Spring, it is can observate, through the subsequent Anonymous actions, that its agenda is not restricted only to technology issues, but political ones as well, in which worth its salt the issue of freedom. Challenged by a wave of hackers and sympathizers without names, without the organizational structure and no nation, governments around the world begin to react. Not only arrests are made by police, but the debate comes to larger instances, like NATO and UN. It is precisely this state of things that this paper belongs: to make both Political Science and International Affairs/Relations realize that a lot of issues – politics, power, freedom, war ones – are traveling over the Internet and they require theoretical and empirical. ON CYBERWAR: WHEN THE ART OF WAR MEETS THE CYBERSPA CE

The question isn't what are the chances of a cyberwar. […]is what are the chances of a war. (Richard A. Clarke apud Ramirez 2010:1).

For Wight (2002:24), security is a term quite ambiguous. Therefore, he does a normative analysis by trying to understand to whom and at whose expense it belongs and is obtained. The case studies with international conflicts below show that this normativity, which resembles the Robert Cox’s famous aphorism, can be understood in many ways: from the thinking of policy maker to former national

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interests – eg, cultural or historically constructed – or immediacy – political and / or economic.

Considering that “different generations think of cyberspace differently” (Clarke & Knake 2010:xii), understand the role the Internet plays in current international politics (Oppermann, 2009) is extremely importance to this work. In this sense, there are authors who believe that cyberspace is a new environment / topology – such as land, sea and air – (Clarke & Knake 2010:36; Proença Jr 2009:4), and therefore has to be dominated by the state, and those who are opposed to this statement (Carr 2009).

The new global order, engendered by the Cold War (Sato 2000; Villa & Reis 2006:36) and the consolidation of the Information Revolution, or Scientific-Technological Revolution (Vizentini 2006:273), provides interconnectivity between individuals and corporations to a degree never before imagined26. As emphasize Villa & Reis (2006:36, free translation):

For decades, nuclear weapons and power have become virtually synonymous. The new scenario broke that identity, making emerging new dimensions of power and new actors in the calculation of international power.

Meanwhile, the cyber environment becomes an amalgam of complex interdependence and technological dependence of information systems interconnected by computer networks 27. For comparative purposes, in 1995, there were only five million Internet users worldwide (Velloso 2004:267); in 2011 this number rises to more than two billion (DEBATES GACINT, 2011a, p. 1; INTERNET WORLD STATS, 2011).

Thus, in a world increasingly globalized, in transition (Villa & Reis 2006:31), multipolar (Amorim 2001:12), complex and interdependent (Flores 2004:23), doubts emerge about what the future centers of power (DEBATES GACINT 2011b:1; Villa & Reis 2006:32-33,37) and the main threats to the State.

In this sense, the relationship between Science and technology – S&T – and militarism ,U.S., for example, is consistent with the statement of Wight, to whom the power of a sovereign state can be measured by several factors, among them "educational and technological improvement" (Wight 2002:5, free translation).

It is not new the fact that, throughout human history, technological advances have aided to change military perceptions, strategies, and even the organization28. However, just like the real world, the virtual one also designs new possibilities for social interaction, state inference (DEBATES GACINT: 2011:3), and opportunity for profound changes. At the dawn of the 21st century, one of these new possibilities surges: the cyber war.

The cyber war concept has many meanings, and not a few exceptions, differences between authors. In a more holistic and pragmatic one, Bezerra ([2009], free translation) reports that cyber war is the "use of the Internet as a tool for political or military action." Arquilla & Ronfeldt (1993:30) consider that there is another form of war among states. As for Clarke & Knake (2010: xi) and Demeterco (2011), it is understood as an alternative to conventional warfare, which may in fact increase the occurrence of traditional fighting, whose main targets are not military

26 Cf. Arquilla & Ronfeldt 1993:25-27; Velloso 2004:267; Villa & Reis 2006:37. 27 Cf. Carvalho 2011:5; DEBATES GACINT 2011ª:2,4; 2011b:1; Ferrer 2003:12-13; Friedman 2011:SR11; Held & Mcgrew 2001:8,12,27,34. 28 Cf. Arquilla & Ronfeldt 1997:24; Fritsch 2010; Keegan 2006:306-307.

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but civilians, precisely because they depend on ITC-based critical infrastructures29. The real possibility of disruption, sabotage or damage to these infrastructures can enhance the course of a war30 or even an attack undeclared 31, especially in a context where information is shared through computer networks. In this sense, Souza & Teixeira Jr (2011, free translation) conceptualize such cyber wars as:

modalities which are characterized by strategic goals such as privileged information and/or destabilize certain information manager system based on computer networks of one or more statal entity, using for this, the cyber environment.

That said, providing tactical-operational defense of this area lies on the shoulders of the armed forces, comprising the so-called cyber defense (Carvalho 2011:8; Souza & Medeiros 2011:6).

It should differentiate between cyber defense and cybersecurity, though remembered by Villa & Reis (2006:20, free translation), "In general, one can say that the concept of security has a defensive reference." Cybersecurity refers to the relief and prevention of so-called cybercrimes in the public sphere – the political level. Cyber defense, in turn, is the "set of defensive, exploration and offensive actions in the context of military strategic planning conducted in cyberspace" (Carvalho 2011:8, free translation), should be coordinated by a military defense body. With respect to operational and tactical aspects of the defense of cyberspace, the Armed Forces are implementing specific strategies in order to prevent or counteract a cyber war.

Table 2 – Difference between cyber defense and cybersecurity in Brazil

LEVEL DENOMINATION COORDINATION AGENCY Political Information and

Communication Security (SIC) Cybersecurity

Institutional Security Cabinet of the Republic Presidency (GSI-

PR) Strategic cyber defense Department of Defense

Operational cyber war Armed Forces

Tatic Source: Carvalho (2011:8, free translation).

Episodes involving the use of new ICTs linked to ancient forms of art of war32

stand out in almost debutante 21st century international politics. Some of these episodes pervade literature involving issues such as international security, diplomacy, the Revolution in Military Affairs - RMA - and computer networks. At this point, two cases can be cited. The first one concerns the international conflict involving Russia and Georgia33, in 2008, where a cyber war preceded and potentiated the Russian military attacks into Georgia. The second case refers to the discovery and the impacts of the computer worm StuxNet34, in 2010, when this virtual tool sabotaged Iran's nuclear program, which was attributed to the worm,

29 Critical infrastructures are not only physical structures but also services and systems, which, if disrupted or destroyed in part or in whole, may have political, international or even national security implications (Carvalho 2011:7; Demeterco 2011:6-7; Mandarino Jr 2009:19-22). 30Vide, for instance, the Russia vs. Georgia case, infra. 31 Ass saw int the Russia vs. Estonia case (Bezerra [2009]; Clarke & Knake 2010:30; Nye Jr 2008; 2011; Oppermann 2009:12-15; Souza & Teixeira Jr 2011). 32 Cf. Carr 2009; Clarke & Knake 2010; Nye 2008; Oppermann 2009:15-18; Souza 2011:8. 33 Cf. Clarke & Knake 2010:17-21; Georgia 2008; Gorman & Barnes 2011; Saalbach 2012:16-17; Souza 2011:8; Souza & Teixeira Jr 2011. 34 Cf. Broad et al. 2011; Falliere et al. 2011; Hopkins 2011; Ira 2010; 2011; Souza 2011:8.

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since then, the fact that it is the first weapon of war designed specifically to cyberspace (Hopkins, 2011).

In the shadow of these events, countries set their cyber defense policies, and organisms military, influenced by three biases: (i) impacts caused by warlike episodes in international politics, or (ii) its own military experiences in cyberspace, or (iii) both. This argument rests on the prediction made in 1993 by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997:27) that “the information revolution will cause shifts both in how societies may come into conflict, and how their armed forces may wage war."

However those are wrong who think that the existence of military technologies of mass destruction limits the military power of the current world system between states that hold such technology and those that do not hold. At the core of this argument, there is a backdrop that never fails to exist even when the war was, in fact, seems unlikely: the power politics. In other words, "the war has not lost its traditional political functions merely by the existence of nuclear weapons and other instruments of advanced military technology" (Bull 2002:221, free translation)35. However, Keegan (2006:92-93, free translation) notes that the computation from the last decades of the twentieth century, changes the war logic as an extension of politics, from the moment that sharpens the perception that the costs of war "clearly outweigh its benefits”36. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The progress of civilization, and the transformations through the centuries ask to the authority more respect by the individuals’ habits, affections, and independence. It must address these issues with hand wiser and lighter. (Constant 1985:22, free translation).

One of the most practical result of the cyber attacks on government web sites in the virtual world was the discussion of issues surrounding the Internet. In Brazil, for example, discussions on the Senator Azeredo’s PSL, which was shelved in the House, returned to the agenda of parliamentary deliberations.

The movements demanding anti-corruption and more public tranparency have won out of cyberspace and target the streets of cities around the world, through the Occupy movements.

With more political sense, the voice for the freedom maintenance in cyberspace seems to have embodied the Constant’s (1985:23, free translation) maxim: "the danger of modern liberty is too easily renounce our right to participate in power political.” Thus, for the SecurEnvoy co-founder, Andy Kemshall: “What people choose to ignore is many of today’s experts are ex-hackers themselves so Anonymous and LulzSec are actually tomorrow’s authority.” (HELP NET SECURITY 2011).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization -NATO-, in turn, framed the Anonymous as a government threat (NATO 2011). In response, the group issued a statement stating that they would like to remind NATO that:

[...]the government and the people are, contrary to the supposed foundations of “democracy”, distinct entities with often conflicting goals and desires. It is Anonymous’ position that when there is a conflict of interest

35 This statement meets the ideas of Clausewitz (2003:27-29). 36 Something that has already been weighted by the Norman Angell, in The Grand Illusion, on the threshold of the twentieth century.

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between the government and the people, it is the people’s will which must take priority. (YOUR ANON NEWS 2011).

In 2011 the UN General Assembly, following in the footsteps of Estonia and Finland, suggests that Internet access should be considered a fundamental right (UN 2011).

Access to ICT-based services is becoming increasingly easier and faster for the entire international society, transforming it into an international cyber society therefore. As shows the USA eJournal (2010) when it affirms that in 2008 and 2009, the International Telecommunication Union estimated that the costs of these types of services fell 15% in 161 countries surveyed; during the year 2009 nearly two billion people worldwide had access to a computer, whereas 64% of the population of developed countries used the Internet, only 18% of the population of developing countries have access to WWW. Brazil, by the year 200937, finish May 2010 with more than two million registered domain names and 65 million Internet users. It's a leap of individual participation and ownership ever seen. They are social processes that, although not new in its essence, we propose a new guise (collaboration and participation), which had once been called cybersocialization, ie "the individual’s entrance” in cyberspace (Souza & Pereira 2009:2). As taught by the English School, the various facets of international society can be manifested by the effective elements of international order. And among them, in turn, the war appears. Therefore, it is believed, in this paper that the existence of a cyber-society is, among others, the manifestation of the unchanging nature of war bonded to the new tactics and new employment strategies enabled by ICT and by a cyberspace free and anarchical. Then, it lies here the essence of the anarchical cyber society.

Although it played a key role in the Arab Spring, the the Anonymous’s Plan is broader than just turn off web sites, it aims to "organize the peoples in search of freedom" (ANONYMOUS [2011]:2, free translation). More than that, it carries with it a question that, despite enormous efforts, no olitical Science and International Relations classic was able to answer: "Are we really free?" (ANONYMOUS, [2011]:2, free translation). REFERENCES AL JAZEERA. Yemen, Libya - Jun 5, 2011. Available at: <http://blogs.aljazeera.net/topic/libya-yemen/yemen-libya-jun-5-2011-2247>. Access in: 4 Jan. 2012. Amorim, Celso (2001). Reflexões sobre o mundo “pós -11 de setembro”. PANORAMA da Conjuntura Internacional, São Paulo, n. 12, p. 11-14, dez. 2001-abr. 2002. Available at: <http://www.iri.usp.br/documentos/af43e8af44116918d717a77b936bd731.pdf>. Access in: 1 Apr. 2012.

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