The adaptive point of view in psychoanalytic metapsychology

international Journal of Law and Psychratry. Vol. 3. pp. 257-265.1980 Printed m the U.S.A. All rights reserved.

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The Adaptive Point of View in Psychoanalytic Metapsychology

Frank Summers*

Adaptation has played a role in psychoanalytic theory from its inception. Freud held the view that organism and environment are bound in a mutual intercourse that seeks equilibrium. In an unequilibrated state, one-half of the equation must adapt to the other. According to Freud, both autoplastic and alloplastic adaptation play a crucial role in the survival of a particular organism. Despite Freud’s reference to this aspect of organismic functioning, he did not include adaptation in his enumeration of the psychoanalytic points of view (Freud, 1915). Hart- mann (1939) elaborated the meaning of adaptation for psychoanalytic theory, and Rapaport and Gill (1959) included the adaptive point of view in their discus- sion of metapsychological frames of reference.

The purpose of the present article is to define the crucial importance of adaptation in psychoanalytic theory in order to demonstrate an inherent tension between psychoanalytic theory as a theory of organismic adaptation and psychoanalytic concepts of pscyhopathology. This analysis will be used to assess the use and misuse of adaptation within psychoanalytic theory.

Metapsychology

Adaptation means “making suitable.” One can perceive alloplastic adaptation at the psychological level in maternal caretaking. The mother’s comforting of the crying infant is an environmental adaptation to the infant’s psychological state. As the child develops, it becomes capable of actively changing itself to meet environmental stress, thereby becoming capable of autoplastic adaptation (Mur- phy, 1962). This growing ability to cope with the environment is one way of understanding ego development. “Ego” may be viewed as the name psychoanalysis gives to the group of abilities that allows the organism to adapt to its environment.

According to Freud’s structural theory, the ego has the role of balancing the demands of id-drives, superego strictures, and environmental needs (Freud, 1923/1960). Insofar as these three sources of pressure are balanced, psychic equilibrium is achieved. An equilibrated state is a state of adaptation. According to Freud’s notion, adaptation implies harmony between the needs of the organism and its environment. However, one can see that such a state also implies an inner state of harmony. If the organism-environment relation is in disequilibrium, psychic strain is experienced. Conversely, if internal demands cannot be met, as for example in the frustration of a drive, effort will be made to change the environment to provide gratification and restore psychic equilibrium.

*Assistant Professor, Northwestern Institute of Psychiatry, Northwestern University Medical School, 259

E. Erie St., Chicago, Illinois 60611, U.S.A.

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Id, superego, and environment are interdependent because their needs must all be balanced within the organism. Stress in the organism-environment relationship will produce strain in the other aspects of psychic functioning. Adaptation between person and environment cannot be separated from psychic equilibrium within the organism.

Hartmann (1939) emphasized the reciprocal relationship between drive and environment by pointing out that defenses against drives help in the mastery of environmental situations. Hence, the same mechanisms are used to cope with internal and external stresses. Disturbances in the internal environment, the drives, imply disruptions in the relationship to the world, and vice versa. The repression of a drive implies a limitation in the type and variety of relationship to the world, that is to say, it limits the adaptive capacity of the psyche. An inhibi- tion in the mode of relatedness to the world implies the use of defenses against affect. For this reason, Hartmann felt that the internal organization of the ego, which he referred to as “fitting together,” and adaptation were mutually depen- dent. It follows from Hartmann’s formulation that adaptation always means a state of adaptedness to the world and psychic equilibrium within.

From these considerations, it can be seen that the adaptive point of view is not simply one way of looking at psychological states, but the central feature of the structural theory, according to which the ego must balance the demands of psychic needs and pressures. The structural theory necessarily led to a focus on ego capacities for mastery, competence, and coping (Murphy, 1962; White, 1963). All of these terms refer to the ability of the organism to handle an environmental situation in a manner that is suitable for it. A successful result implies a lessening of anxiety and an internal state of equilibrium. Ego capacity and adaptive capacity are not distinguishable concepts. The degree of success achieved by the ego in balancing various pressures to achieve psychic harmony is its adaptive capacity.

Clinical Theory

In the clinical setting, the psychoanalytic clinician takes an observational stance within which it is assumed that there are reasons for all clinical phenomena. The essential difference between the psychoanalytic, as opposed to other frames of reference, is that the psychoanalytic therapist maintains the consistent posture that all symptoms and psychological problems are, by nature, understandable and their reasons discoverable. Freud developed the psychoanalytic method when, borrowing from Breuer, he reconceptualized hysteria as an understandable reaction to psychological processes, rather than an entirely organic or constitutional disorder as had been previously assumed (Breuer & Freud 1893/1960). That is, he adopted the view that hysterical symptoms were meaningful.

Freud (1893) went into some detail to demonstrate that hysterical symptoms resulted from repression of early memories of childhood traumata. The symptoms were linked by a series of associated mental concatenations, including memories and fantasies, to the early trauma. As the symptoms were shown to possess an association with the early trauma via the mental series, the reasons for

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their appearance were elucidated. Freud held that symptoms have reasons and, therefore, are the rational products of a particular psyche. The conclusion that may be drawn from Freud’s interpretation of symptoms as meaningful is that symptoms are rational; they follow from the state of the psyche.

The purpose of psychoanalytic procedure from its inception has been to discover the reasons for symptoms. Despite Freud’s emphasis on the supposedly irrational forces of the id, his clinical technique was based upon the discovery of unperceived rationality. Hysterical symptoms appeared irrational prior to Freud; his contribution was to point out that the symptoms fit the state of the psyche and, therefore, were understandable.

To say that symptoms fit the state of the psyche at a particular time is to say that they achieve psychic balance. Indeed, this was Freud’s view. in his analysis of Little Hans’s horse phobia, Freud pointed out that by displacing his fear of his father onto horses, Little Hans was able to maintain a harmonious relationship with the paternal environment (Freud, 1905). No longer fearing his father, Little Hans was able to achieve a type of psychic equilibrium. The horse phobia can then justifiably be viewed as an adaptation to the conflictual triangle of Hans’s loving his mother and fearing retaliation from his father. The solution, although resulting in a symptom, managed the conflict in a manner that made the boy’s relationship to his environment more suitable than it had been and, thus, resulted in a greater degree of psychic equilibrium.

The implication of this analysis is that other possible solutions would leave the psyche in a less harmonious situation within itself and with respect to its environment. Had Little Hans not been able to displace his fear onto horses, he would have been left with the anxiety of fearing his own father. Such anxiety may well have proven overwhelming and paralyzing. The displacement, which resulted in a phobic symptom, prevented greater loss of psychic functioning. This principle is also crucial to the psychoanalytic view of psychopathology: each symptom or behavior pattern, however distressing it may be, protects against a state of greater psychic disruption and achieves the highest level of organization of which the psyche is capable.

The rationality of symptoms is consistent with Hughlings Jackson’s theory of brain functioning. Jackson (1958) pointed out that the brain always functions at the highest level of its capabilities. Studying brain-damaged patients, Jackson noted that when one area of the brain was damaged, other areas take over, insofar as possible, the functions of the damaged area. If the highest centers are damaged, the next highest centers take over and the brain operates at that level. The brain operates at its lowest, or reflex level, only after the higher centers have all been destroyed. One can say that the brain is adaptive because it responds to changed circumstances by making its relationship to the environment as suitable as possible.

The psychoanalytic model of psychic functioning is the psychological analogue to the Jacksonian view of the brain. If symptoms are rational, they must represent the best available solution to a given situation. If other “better” solutions are available, the symptom is not rational, and therefore, not truly understandable, for its occurrence remains a mystery. As a rationale for a symptom is explicated, it shows itself to be the rational, and therefore the best, out-

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come for a given situation. The psychoanalytic assumption of understandability reveals itself to be the psychological equivalent of Jackson’s brain theory: the psyche adapts at the highest level of which it is capable.

Freud’s view of neurotic symptoms was that, although they appear irrational from the “realistic” point of view, they result from an “inner logic” of the psyche. The reasons for symptoms are discoverable precisely because there is a rationality to their appearance based on the mental connections within the psyche. This viewpoint has critical implications for therapeutic technique. The analyst must assume a posture that will provide for the greatest likelihood that the rationality of the symptom will appear. Since the logic of a given psyche is likely to be different from the logic of the social world, the analyst must suspend judgment on the patient’s psychological material. Freud’s principle of technique was clearly a reflection of this fact.

The technique . . . consists in making no effort to concentrate on anything in particular, and in regard to all that one hears the same measure of calm, quiet attentiveness - of evenly-hovering attention . . . . the principle of evenly-distributed attention is the necessary cor- ollary to the demand on the patient to communicate everything that occurs to him without criticism or selection. . . . (Freud, 1912, p. 324)

Freud’s theory of technique was that a non-judgmental, observational stance by suspending customary judgment provided the best opportunity for the inner logic of the psyche to manifest itself. The analyst, by adopting the stance that symptoms are understandable, eschews the judgment of irrationality and views symptoms from the adaptive point of view.

Uses and Misuses of the Adaptive Point of View

It has beensuggested that the adaptative point of view is inherent in both the structural model of psychoanalytic metapsychology and the theory of psychoanalytic technique. Indeed, it is not stretching the thesis too far to assert that what links metapsychology and the theory of technique is precisely their mutual adherence to the adaptive point of view. The structural model is a way of viewing the effort of the psyche to balance pressure within and without to achieve its highest level of psychic equilibrium; the technique is based upon a search for the reasons for a particular type of psychic equilibrium. The structural model appears not to be an adventitious theoretical development within the psychoanalytic movement, but rather a view of the psyche linked to principles of technique out of which it was likely to evolve at some point. It is not surprising that the discovery of psychic understandability would lead to a concept of a psychological structure that is responsible for producing one particular psychological constellation rather than another. The search for the reasons why a given level of psychological organization has been achieved within an individual led at the theoretical level to a concept of the forces that are responsible for the achievement of a given state of psychological equilibrium.

If it is true that psychoanalytic theory implies the adaptive point of view toward psychological phenomena, a question presents itself: How can


psychoanalytic theory distinguish between normality and psychopathology? Does not the assumption that all behavior is adaptive eliminate the concept of psychopathology? Here one is led to a little-noticed tension within the psychoanalytic model. On the one hand, the analytic paradigm implies that a given psychological constellation is understandable, but the psychoanalytic clinician may judge the same behavior to be psychopathological. What can the judgment of pathology mean for behavior that is adaptive? The dilemma may be stated this way: How can the clinician search for the reasons for psychological phenomena and yet judge them to be pathological?

Psychoanalytic theoreticians have generally tended to propose one of two answers to this question. The most common solution is to suggest that behavior is not entirely adaptive, but all behavior has an adaptive “component.” This putative soiution simply avoids the relevant question: What is non-adaptive behavior? If “non-adaptive” means “without reason,” how can the psychoanalytic paradigm encompass it? If behavior is conceived as having reasons, then it is adaptive in the sense meant here and the judgment of psychopathology is called into question. Nor can a distinction between “good reasons” and “bad reasons” open the way toward a solution. It is precisely the basis of judgments as “good” or “bad” that is in question.

The other common manner of handling the problem is to adopt the genetic point of view. Meninger and Holzman (1958) contend that symptoms are behavior which were adaptive at one point in the individual’s life, but no longer serve an adaptive purpose. Again, the proposed solution is more apparent than real. If the behavior is not adaptive now, why is it occurring? Whatever explanation is arrived at for the presence of a particular behavior must necessarily be the reason(s) for its existence and, therefore, represents its adaptive value; if there is no explanation, the behavior is outside the psychoanalytic model. Symptoms oc- cur in the present; either there are reasons for this occurrence, or they are not understandable. The fact that they may have been meaningful in the past is of little moment. If the past is connected to the present, the past psychological situation is simply a link in the chain leading to present adaptation. If the past bears no relationship to the present, the former situation is neither relevant nor psychoanalytically accessible.

Efforts to differentiate “adaptation” from “maladaptation” from a psychoanalytic perspective appear doomed to failure because the assumption of understandability and the judgment of “psychopathology” pertain to separate frames of reference. This fact has not generally been recognized by psychoanalytic writers, who have often assumed that psychoanalytic understanding could ex- plicate why a given behavior is “pathological,” as well as understandable.

Kernberg’s work on the borderline syndrome illustrates this confusion of points of view. According to Kernberg (1975), the borderline syndrome is characterized by “non-specific manifestations of ego weakness.” Among these are the inability to control impulses, lack of anxiety tolerance, and inadequate sublimatory channels. An example would be a patient who has periodic temper outbursts, during which he/she becomes verbally abusive and even physically assaultive. To refer to such a trait as “weakness” implies failure to meet a standard. Although Kernberg articulates neither the standard nor its rationale, one can divine that Kernberg’s implicit standard is that stress should be managed in a

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verbal, non-abusive manner. Behavior that does not meet this standard is not acceptable, and, therefore, presumed to result from “weakness.” It is in- conceivable that behavior that finds acceptance would be thought to arise from deficit. The failure of certain behavior to meet an implicit standard is the criterion for “ego weakness.”

The psychoanalytic understanding of why a rage outburst occurs must be separated from the inference that the ego is “weak.” Kernberg confuses the two. He appears to accept for at least a partial explanation of why rage outbursts oc- cur that the ego is “weak.” This point of view is widespread among contem- porary psychoanalytic theorists (for example, Blanck & Blanck, 1974; Govac- chini, 1979; Horner, 1979). As is true for many analytic theorists, Kernberg’s thesis is that certain deficits in ego structure render the personality vulnerable to unacceptable behavior. The inability to control impulses, for example, would be an explanation for an outburst of rage. However, were verbal abuse an acceptable manifestation of rage, it would not be presumed to result from “weakness” of any type. Since “weakness” of the personality, however understood, is a judgment based upon the disapproval of certain behavior, it cannot be explanatory. “Weakness” is a judgment, not a “fact.” However, judgment is precisely what the psychoanalytic paradigm must avoid. The “evenly-hovering attitiude” of which Freud wrote cannot judge psychological material as “good” or “bad”, “weak” or “strong.” The therapist searching for reasons is not aided by judgments of personality deficit. “Ego weakness” is neither an explanatory concept nor can it fit into the psychoanalytic model.

The unfortunate mixture of frames of reference in psychoanalytic ego psychology may be seen as an instance of a general corruption of the adaptive point of view in metapsychology. The term “adaptation” has come to mean adjustment to an “average expectable environment” (Erikson, 1963; Hartmann, 1939). According to Hartmann, there is a range of possible environments within which the individual must be able to adjust to be mentally healthy. Neither Hart- mann nor any other major psychoanalytic theoretician would be so crude as to suggest that mental health is tantamount to social conformity. Perhaps this is why the criterion is a range of environments, rather than a particular environment. Nonetheless, adjustment to an unspecified set of “environments” is proposed as a criterion for “normality,” and such a criterion locates the source of strain between organism and environment in the personality, while assuming environmental standards. Despite the fact that some theorists, such as Rapaport and Gill (1959), have attempted to distinguish between social conformity and adaptation, the use of “average expectable environment” fallaciously links the two concepts. The fact that mutual adaptation between organism and environment is advocated does not affect this conclusion because a range of “expectable environments” is a standard to which a personality must adjust or be judged “pathological.” To use “adaptation” in this sense applies an external standard to the personality and ignores the efforts of the ego to achieve an internal harmony of its own making.

The equation of social conformity and adaptation is often seen in the use of “maladaptation.” Psychoanalytic theory often assumes a distinction between “adaptive” and “maladaptive” behavior. However, once the reasons for a given behavior are brought to light, by definition its adaptive value is recognized and a


judgment of “maladaptation” has no foundation. Since reasons make the phenomenon in question understandable, the basis for a judgment of “maladaptation” cannot be found within the psychological situation of the individual in- volved. The only vantage point from which any negatively-toned judgment such as “maladaptation” can be made is external. Social disapproval of a given behavior may take the form of applying such a label. The social judgment “maladaptation” means that the mode of adaptation of a given individual is not acceptable according to an assumed standard. Behavior that fails to meet this standard is labelled “maladaptative” and the adaptive point of view is used as an instrument of social conformity, rather than as a vehicle for understanding.

Psychoanalytic technique searches for the unperceived rationality of symptoms. The question to be asked of the temper outburst is: How does it achieve psychic equilibrium? The answer to this question reveals the reasons for the outburst. Reasons explain why behavior is “good” for the organism, not why it is “bad.” When it is understood why the outburst of rage is the best possible way of responding to a situation, the behavior is understood. Judgments of deficit have little relevance to this inquiry.

This model has implications for the countertransference. This sometimes baf- fling term has been usefully defined as the strain the therapist experiences in the maintenance of observational stance (Winnicott, 1947/1975). Insofar as the therapist feels the impulse to transcend “evenly-hovering” attentiveness, a countertransference issue is in evidence. Therapists will inevitably feel the urge to judge patients, but the carrying out of this wish is clearly poor technique. It may be said that when therapists feel the beginning of a shift in attitude from the adaptive point of view to a judgmental perspective they begin to question their feelings toward their patient. Not only is the judgmental perspective outside the psychoanalytic frame of reference, but also the adoption of such an attitude in the therapist is a warning signal that there is trouble in the treatment. At the theoretical level, however, analytic commentators have tended to adopt the judgmental perspective by use of the language of ego deficit. Evidence that this perspective is contradictory to the analytic paradigm is the fact that were such a stance adopted in the treatment situation, a countertransference issue would be readily acknowledged. It may be fair to conclude that the language of ego deficit is anti-therapeutic at the clinical level.

If it is psychopathological to have recurrent rage outbursts, or for that matter, to get periodically depressed, or to suffer from psychogenic stomach pain, this judgment is necessarily made outside the psychoanalytic paradigm. To depict behavior as “neurotic” is to classify it as fitting into a given realm of discourse. In the terminology of Wittgenstein (1968), one is at the level of metalanguage. The psychoanalytic paradigm has no tools for rendering a decision as to which level of discourse a given phenomenon belongs.

The contribution of Freud (1893) was not to discover hysteria, but to under- stand it differently. Freud adopted a new attitude toward the symptoms; i.e., that they are meaningful and can be understood. The deficits of the hysteric had been known long before Freud. That hysterical symptoms were meaningful was the unique contribution of psychoanalysis to the study of that condition.

Ironically, the distinction between the psychoanalytic paradigm and the psychopathological frame of reference is illustrated by Kernberg’s treatment

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principles. He makes no use of “ego weakness” except when he advocates extra- therapeutic measures. When Kernberg suggests interpretation of grandiose defenses to uncover underlying rage, he assumes that both the grandiose defenses and the rage are understandable experiences. However, when he advocates “blocking” certain behavior because it is “acting out,” he assumes comprehension is not possible. Behavior that requires active blocking manifests “ego weakness,” such as lack of impulse control. The extra-analytic measure is needed because the behavior is thought of as manifesting a deficit, rather than as an understandable effort to achieve an end, that is, as adaptive. However, when the latter point of view is adopted, interpretation is advocated, and the concept of “ego weakness” is not relevant. Insofar as Kernberg judges certain behavior, whether as “defective, ” “weak,” or “pathological,” he is not acting as a psycho- analyst, for he is proposing no understanding of behavior, and his extra-analytic treatment approach reveals this fact. Insofar as he sets forth a psychoanalytic understanding of the borderline syndrome, he is not elucidating why it is pathological, but why it is understandable, and he suggests interpretation. That he uses two separate frames of reference is made evident in his “dual” treatment approach of interpretation and “action.”

Kernberg clearly views himself as setting forth a clinical theory and treatment approach. However, by the use of “ego weakness” as an explanatory concept, he confuses societal judgment with psychoanalytic understanding. In this regard, he is no different from many analytic writers. The concept of psychopathology is used as though it were description, rather than judgment against external standards, and the understanding of behavior is confused with justification for this judgment. Psychoanalytic comprehension can only offer explanation for the occurrence of behavior or traits, whether they be ordinary, extraordinary, or unique; it can never justify a judgment of their approval or disapproval, whether such a judgment takes the form of “normal,” “pathological,” “ego weakness,” or any other. A psychoanalytic explanation cannot determine why an ego is “weak” but it may be able to uncover the reasons why a patient is angry enough to throw a book at the analyst.

Nonetheless, the ego psychological approach to psychopathology is based upon the concept of “ego weakness.” All assessment of psychopathology from the ego point of view is a judgment of the strengths and weakness of a given personality structure. From this point of view, a personality may be assessed as lack- ing ego boundaries, failing to control impulses, unable to integrate percepts of others, or failing in other respects. The language of such an assessment is necessarily a language of deficit. The fact that such an assessment may conclude that deficits are minimal or non-existent is of little moment. The judgment is societal in origin and implies that the source of disequilibrium between the ego and society is within the personality. Assessment of ego structure, under the cloak of psychoanalytic theory, is ultimately a societal judgment.

Concluding Remarks

Anti-psychoanalytic clinicians have criticized the use of adaptation as a criterion for mental health on the grounds that it is tantamount to socially- conforming behavior (Laing, 1967). This error has, indeed, been made in the


assessment of psychopathology. However, the adaptive point of view in another and more meaningful sense is the polar opposite of social conformity. The adaptive point of view taken by the psychoanalytic therapist is precisely to suspend judgment for the purpose of seeking veiled meaning. The adaptive value of symptoms thus revealed indicates their “internal logic” and value to the individual irrespective of external norms. The psychoanalytic model, if carried to the logical conclusion of its method and structural theory, is a paradigm in which the concept of adaptation plays a crucial role, not as a means of social conformity, but as its opposite: a sanctuary for individual meaning free from customary social judgment.

A strict adherence to the adaptive point of view in psychoanalytic therapy and theory is both sound clinical practice and the means by which the psychoanalytic model frees itself of theoretical prejudice. The concept of “adaptation,” which has been so misused as a tool of social conformity, has within it the potential for the psychoanalytic model to develop theory and clinical technique grounded on the efforts of individuals to achieve their own unique form of psychological harmony in an atmosphere free from social judgment.

References

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The adaptive point of view in psychoanalytic metapsychology