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The 2015 SDSR: Considerations for Multinational Defence Acquisition

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This article argues that, in an era of austerity and constrained defence budgets, the next SDSR needs to seriously examine the role of multinational defence acquisition in maximising the value UK taxpayers receive from the defence budget.

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Page 1: The 2015 SDSR: Considerations for Multinational Defence Acquisition

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Anglo-French cooperAtion: An rAF typhoon And A French Air Force MirAge 2000n

prActice their ForMAtion Flying skills (rAlph Merry rAF crown copyright)

The 2015 SDSR: Considerations for Multinational Defence Acquisition

The 2015 STraTegic Defence & SecuriTy review will Shape Defence SpenDing acroSS The uK’S armeD forceS for The nexT five yearS. peTe iTo anD peTer anTill Say The review will neeD To grapple wiTh The ongoing iSSue of mulTinaTional Defence cooperaTion.

As the UK works on its 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), this is the appropriate point to assess the extent to which it should rely on

multinational defence acquisition programmes to address future security needs. At one level, the answer is clear—it depends on the programme. However, while the final answer may be “it depends”, the SDSR deliberations should address the question: “Depends on what”?

The 2010 SDSR set forth specific considerations and indicated the United Kingdom “will generally favour bilateral equipment cooperation or off-the-shelf purchase, because such arrangements are potentially more straightforward and more fruitful than complex multilateral arrangements which have delivered mixed results for us in the past. The criteria for equipment cooperation will include the existence of common requirements, complementary technological capabilities,

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affordability for both participant nations, and enhanced export potential or industrial advantage”.1

However, the 2010 SDSR also highlighted the inherent contradictions among the different goals. On the one hand, the United Kingdom will pursue an approach which “… strengthens mutual dependence with key allies and partners who are willing and able to act, not least to make our collective resources go further and allow nations to focus on their comparative advantages”.2 The SDSR indicated support for “greater sharing of military capabilities technologies and programmes, and potentially more specialisation, working with key allies, including France, and based on appropriate formal guarantees where necessary”.3

On the other hand, immediately following that text, the SDSR noted that the United Kingdom needs “a Defence Industrial and Technology policy that seeks to secure the independence of action we need for our Armed Forces, while allowing for increased numbers of off-the-shelf purchases and greater promotion of defence exports”.4 In short, the 2010 SDSR outlined the conflicts inherent in pursuing more international cooperation, and the issues which should be addressed in deliberations for the 2015 SDSR.

Enhancing intEropErabilityIn analysing the issue of where the United Kingdom should

focus its attention regarding multinational programmes, certain documents warrant attention. The first is a report by

the UK National Audit Office (NAO)5. While published in 2001, the report remains a cogent piece of analysis on the subject. It highlighted the fact that “cooperation in defence research offers economic and technology benefits, generating a 5:1 return on the Department’s £40 million annual investment on joint research programmes and providing knowledge with an annual value of approximately £280 million at minimal cost through information exchange programmes”.6 The NAO judged that “cooperating in the procurement of defence equipment brings economic benefits by sharing development costs and through economies of scale in the production, and further, through the lifecycle by sharing in-service support and upgrade costs”.7

Continuing on the general benefits that can arise from multinational cooperation, the NAO noted that: “In military terms, cooperative procurement can enhance interoperability with allies. Post-Cold War changes in the global security environment have seen an increasing emphasis on the need to harmonise mission capabilities with allies for joint and coalition operations. From an industrial perspective, defence equipment cooperation holds the prospect of preserving existing and developing new market influences and technological competence, as well as influencing industrial restructuring. International political benefits such as the strengthening of security relationships and the enhancement of European security and defence identity can also flow from defence equipment cooperation.”8

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FrAnce hAs deMonstrAted interest in the British ArMy’s wAtchkeeper tActicAl unMAnned AeriAl systeM (Andrew linnett, crown copyright)

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A second document is the Gray review of defence acquisition9, which also addressed multinational cooperative initiatives, and judged that: “A number of UK acquisition projects that are currently underway involve collaboration with other nations to jointly procure equipment for use by the military forces of all of the participants. The potential economic benefits of acquiring equipment in this way are significant:• fixed development costs can be defrayed amongst a

number of partners, generating economies of scale and associated reductions in unit costs that would not be otherwise be realised, and

• projects that are very large and which could not realistically be undertaken independently by the United Kingdom; in such circumstances, collaboration affords access to technologies and capabilities that would otherwise be out of reach.”10

Gray added that: “The inherent difficulties in ensuring that all participants in any collaboration have their interests aligned is widely held to be at the root cause of many problems and, more generally, the view across the MoD and the wider defence industry is that such problems are a characteristic of all collaborative projects to a greater or lesser extent. It is certainly the case that the divergence between the objectives of the various partners has led to problems on some projects. However, the question of whether the poor reputation of collaborative projects is warranted across the board remains open.”11 good and bad coopEration

The relevance of such considerations is apparent in specific bilateral cooperation efforts. With regard to France, the 2010 SDSR indicated that the United Kingdom would “intensify our

security and defence relationship with France,” adding that the United Kingdom “will strengthen the relationship at all levels, and, where possible, develop future military capabilities in complementary, cost-effective ways.”12 This sentiment was apparent in the 2012 Anglo-French summit declaration in which there was attention to defence equipment and the desire for cooperation on unmanned air systems in particular.13

Although it has not been clear as to when those sentiments would become manifest in actual programmes, due in part to the French conducting their own policy reviews and a cooling off of the relationship14, a summit was held at the end of January this

year where both the British prime minister David Cameron and French president Francois Hollande signed a communiqué to move forward and build on what had been set up in 2012.15

With regard to the United States, the United Kingdom commitment is even more apparent, as are the contradictions in desired goals. The 2010 SDSR noted that the United Kingdom “will reinforce our pre-eminent security and defence relationship with the United States. It remains deeply-rooted, broadly-based, strategically important and mutually supportive.”16 While there is no reason to reiterate the numerous reasons why the United Kingdom can benefit from

“there is a need for the United Kingdom to more closely consider

the Key factors in its decision-maKing with regard to mUltinational

defence cooperation.”

entente cordiAle: uk secretAry oF stAte For deFence philip hAMMond tAlks to the French Minister oF deFence JeAn-yves le driAn during A visit to hMs BulwArk (Joel rouse crown copyright)

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more cooperative efforts with the United States (the size of the US defence budget, the amount spent on research and development, interoperability, etc.) it is important to consider the negative repercussions of such cooperation.

One issue involves the importance of UK national sovereignty, and was highlighted in the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy which emphasised that: “To meet our own sovereign needs, it is important that we continue to have the autonomous capability to operate, support and where necessary adapt the equipment that we procure. Appropriate technology transfer is therefore of crucial importance. This is so for any cooperative project, but in practice difficulties have arisen particularly with the United States, whose technology disclosure policy we have found less adapted to the needs of cooperative procurement than those of our partners in Europe.”17

To conclude, there is a need for the United Kingdom, as part of its deliberations on the 2015 SDSR, to more closely consider the key factors in its decision-making with regard to multinational defence cooperation. The details of specific proposals will certainly be significant. However, the SDSR provides the opportunity to assess the relative significance which the United Kingdom wishes to place on national sovereignty, risks with regard to the duration and cost of programmes, the prospect of UK defence sales and numerous other considerations. While the significance of each of these factors may change with regard to specific initiatives, what is important is that the United Kingdom assess, as part of the SDSR 2015 exercise, just how much emphasis it places on each of these security policy considerations. n

aboUt thE aUthorS: Peter Antill rejoined Cranfield University in June 2009 to

undertake research in order to create a defence acquisition body of knowledge as well as several projects aimed at producing a continuous stream of publications over the longer term. This has included various books, journal articles, case studies, conference papers, monographs and chapters in edited publications as well as updating teaching material used by the Centre for Defence Acquisition. Peter graduated from Staffordshire University in 1993 with a BA (Hons) International Relations and followed that with an MSc Strategic Studies from Aberystwyth in 1995 and a PGCE (Post-Compulsory Education) from Oxford Brookes in 2005.

Since September 2008, Pete Ito has served as a lecturer and researcher in defence acquisition. He serves as the academic leader on the Acquisition Employment Training course, runs the Financial Military Capability (Advanced) course, and delivers the International Dimensions of Defence Acquisition and Research Methodology courses in the Defence Acquisition Management MSc. Ito has undertaken various research projects in the area of defence acquisition. After earning a BA in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Juris Doctor (law) degree and a MA in International Affairs from George Washington University in Washington, D.C. Ito worked for 25 years as a Foreign Service Officer for the US State Department. He joined Cranfield University in September 2007.

FootnotES: 1 HM Government. (2010) Securing Britain in and Age of Uncertainty: The

Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, London: The Stationary

Office, October 2010, pp. 59-60, also available at http://www.direct.gov.

uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/

digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf, as of 3 February 2014.

2 Ibid, p. 10.

3 Ibid, p. 12.

4 Ibid.

5 National Audit Office (NAO). (2001) Maximising the Benefits of Defence

Equipment Co-operation, HC 300, Session 2000-2001, London: The

Stationary Office, 16 March 2001, available at http://www.nao.org.uk/

report/ministry-of-defence-maximising-the-benefits-of-defence-equipment-

co-operation/, as of 3 February 2014.

6 Ibid, p. 1.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Gray, B. (2009) A Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of

State for Defence: An Independent Report by Bernard Gray,

October 2009, available at http://www.bipsolutions.com/docstore/

ReviewAcquisitionGrayreport.pdf, as of 3 February 2014.

10 Ibid, p. 83.

11 Ibid.

12 Op Cit, HM Government, 2010, p. 60.

13 Prime Minister’s Office. (2012) UK-France Declaration on Security and

Defence, dated 17 February 2012, from http://www.number10.gov.uk/

news/uk-france-declaration-security/, paragraph 16.

14 Chuter, A and Tran, P. (2014) “Both Sides Optimistic Ahead of French-

UK Summit” at DefenseNews, at http://www.defensenews.com/

article/20140128/DEFREG01/301280022/Both-Sides-Optimistic-Ahead-

French-UK-Summit, as of 3 February 2014.

15 Prime Minister’s Office. (2014) “UK and France agree closer defence

cooperation”, dated 31 January 2014, located at https://www.gov.uk/

government/news/uk-and-france-agree-closer-defence-co-operation, as of

3 February 2014.

16 Op Cit, HM Government, 2010, p. 60.

17 Ministry of Defence. (2005) Defence Industrial Strategy, London: The

Stationary Office, Cm 6697, December 2005, p. 45, located at http://www.

official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm66/6697/6697.pdf, as of 3

February 2014.