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THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY
Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 95
The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel’s
National Security
Efraim Inbar
© The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900 Israel
http://www.besacenter.org
ISSN 0793-1042
February 2012
The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies
The BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University was founded by Dr. Thomas O.
Hecht, a Canadian Jewish community leader. The Center is dedicated to the memory of
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who
concluded the first Arab-Israel peace agreement. The Center, a non-partisan and independent
institute, seeks to contribute to the advancement of Middle East peace and security by
conducting policy-relevant research on strategic subjects, particularly as they relate to the
national security and foreign policy of Israel.
Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of
research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is
deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author's views
or conclusions. BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy summarizes the papers delivered
at conferences and seminars held by the Center, for the academic, military, official and
general publics. In sponsoring these discussions, the BESA Center aims to stimulate public
debate on, and consideration of, contending approaches to problems of peace and war in the
Middle East. The BESA Memorandum series consist of policy-oriented papers. The content
of the publications reflects the views of the authors only. A list of recent BESA Center
publications can be found at the end of this booklet.
International Advisory Board Founder of the Center and Chairman of the Advisory Board: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht
Vice Chairman: Mr. Saul Koschitzky
Members: Prof. Moshe Arens, Ms. Judy Ann Hecht, Ms. Marion Hecht, Mr. Robert Hecht,
Prof. Riva Heft-Hecht, Hon. Shlomo Hillel, Mr. Isi Leibler, Amb. Yitzhak Levanon, Sen.
Joseph I. Lieberman, Mr. Robert K. Lifton, Maj. Gen. (res.) Daniel Matt, Rt. Hon. Brian
Mulroney, Maj. Gen. (res.) Ori Orr, Mr. Seymour D. Reich, Amb. Meir Rosenne, Mr. Greg
Rosshandler, Amb. Zalman Shoval, Amb. Norman Spector, Mr. Muzi Wertheim
International Academic Advisory Board Desmond Ball Australian National University, Ian Beckett University of Kent, Eliot A.
Cohen Johns Hopkins University, Irwin Cotler McGill University, Steven R. David Johns
Hopkins University, Yehezkel Dror Hebrew University, Lawrence Freedman King's College,
Patrick James University of Southern California, Efraim Karsh King's College, Robert J.
Lieber Georgetown University, Barry Posen Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Jasjit
Singh Centre for Strategic and International Studies
Research Staff BESA Center Director: Prof. Efraim Inbar
Research Associates: Dr. Efrat Aviv, Dr. Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Prof. Stuart A. Cohen, Dr. Gil
Feiler, Prof. Jonathan Fox, Prof. Hillel Frisch, Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Col. (res.) Aby Har-Even,
Dr. Tsilla Hershco, Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Prof. Avi Kober, Dr. Yaakov Lifshitz, Prof. Ze'ev
Maghen, Mr. Amir Rapaport, Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, Maj. Gen. (res.) Emanuel Sakal, Prof.
Shmuel Sandler, Dr. Eitan Shamir, Dr. Dany Shoham, Dr. Shlomo Shpiro, Dr. Max Singer,
Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum
Director of Public Affairs: David M. Weinberg
Program Coordinator: Hava Waxman Koen
Publication Editor (English): Ilana Hart
Publication Editor (Hebrew): Alona Briner Rozenman
The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel’s National Security
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT ............................................................ 2
The Weakening of Arab States and Increased Uncertainty .............. 2
The Regional Balance of Power ....................................................... 4
THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN CLOUT ..................................................... 5
THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL .......................................... 7
Strategic Surprises ............................................................................ 7
Regional Isolation ............................................................................ 8
Erosion in Israel’s Deterrence ........................................................ 10
Growing Security Risks ................................................................. 11
Threats to the Sea Lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean ................. 14
The Iranian Nuclear Challenge ...................................................... 17
ISRAELI RESPONSES............................................................................. 18
A Larger Defense Budget ............................................................... 19
The Imperative for Defensible Borders .......................................... 22
Forging Strategic Alliances ............................................................ 22
Responding to Iran ......................................................................... 24
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 24
The 2011 Arab Uprisings and Israel’s National Security
Efraim Inbar*
INTRODUCTION
Dramatic events have unfolded in the Middle East since the beginning
of 2011. Large numbers of demonstrators have gathered in central
squares to voice outrage against their rulers while demanding
sweeping governmental reforms. Four long-time dictators have
already been removed from power. The Arab world is in turmoil and
authoritarian regimes are under great duress. The trajectory of these
events is not entirely clear, creating much political uncertainty. While
the nature of these domestic upheavals is novel internationally, the
ongoing Middle East turmoil only underscores current regional
trends. While the Arab states become weaker, non-Arab states – like
Turkey and Iran – are becoming relatively stronger; and the US is
slowly losing influence in the region.
This unstable environment indicates trouble for Israel. What follows
is an assessment of the implications of the changing regional
environment for Israel’s national security. The article first presents
the main elements of the changing strategic landscape around Israel:
the weakening of Arab states, changes in the regional balance of
power as radical anti-American forces appear to be gaining greater
influence, and America's apparent retreat from the Middle East. Part
two focuses on how these elements affect Israel’s national security.
Of foremost concern are the heightened risks of rapid change and
strategic surprises, greater uncertainty regarding the behavior of
leaders in neighboring states, increased terrorist activity, reduced
deterrence, growing regional isolation, emerging threats in the eastern
Mediterranean, and the continuing Iranian nuclear challenge. Part
three of the article discusses ways in which Israel must prepare itself
to meet the challenges of the deteriorating security environment.
*The author is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of
the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
2
Notably, Israel must increase defense outlays to expand its standing
army, particularly the ground and naval forces, and make additional
investments in missile defense and research and development. Israel
must also insist on defensible borders, seek out new regional allies,
and maintain its special relationship with the US.
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
The Weakening of Arab States and Increased Uncertainty
Despite over a century of Western cultural influence, the Arab world
has failed to modernize in many respects. As of yet, no Arab state has
evolved into a stable democracy.1 Several UN reports point out that
the Arab world lags behind the rest of the international community in
civil liberties, political rights, education, gender equality, and
economic productivity.2 This deplorable state of affairs is the root
cause of discontent and frustration, which fuels mass protest. Absent a
liberal-democratic political culture, however, mass mobilization in
pursuit of political change is unpredictable and is not necessarily
conducive to democracy.3 Heralding the “Jasmine Revolution” in
Tunisia or the “Lotus Revolution” in Egypt as model cases of popular
discontent in the promotion of democracy, freedom, dignity and
justice reflects a misunderstanding of complex political processes.
One should recall that the much welcomed 2005 “Cedar Revolution”
in Lebanon, which was steered by pro-Western political elements and
led to free elections, ended just four years later with Hizballah’s
takeover of the state. Similarly, free elections in the Palestinian
territories, pushed by a misguided American foreign policy, led to the
hardly-legitimate Palestinian presidency of Mahmoud Abbas and a
Hamas dictatorship in Gaza. It is therefore highly likely that the
newfound Arab hope for a more open and just political system will be
hijacked in free elections by Islamist parties whose commitment to
democracy is nil. Islam, “the heart and soul” of the identity of most
Middle Easterners, has always had great appeal in the region.4 This
reality makes Islamic political forces the strongest alternative to the
current dictators of the Arab states. The Islamists are likely to gain
power, whether by elections or by revolutionary means, as they are
usually the best organized political force outside the ruling
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
3
government. Recent election results in Tunisia and Egypt amply
demonstrate this point.
The increasing Islamist influence in Arab states may generate regimes
with a variety of revolutionary zeal. Unfortunately for their neighbors,
revolutionary regimes generally tend to display warlike behavior in
the immediate years after taking power.5 Even if the weak democratic
elements in the Arab world, despite all odds, succeed in generating a
democratization process, this would still pose dangers for its
neighbors. While a democratization process is laudable, historical
records suggest that states in transition to a stable democracy are
more war-prone than autocratic regimes.6 Neither Islamic
revolutionary regimes nor fledgling democracies fare well for
regional stability.
So far, much of the old dictatorial order has survived, but its stability
has been undermined and the nature of any successor regimes is
uncertain. The audacious demonstrations of the Arab masses against
tyranny in a quest for more responsive governments challenge the
current political order. The potential for further deterioration in the
region and the risk of additional states being torn by turmoil and civil
war and sliding into “failed state” status has increased significantly.
Such political entities are characterized by the absence of a monopoly
over the use of force; delivery of very limited justice; inability to
sustain a legal and regulatory climate conducive to private enterprise,
open trade, and foreign investment; and difficulty in meeting the basic
needs of the population in terms of health, education, and other social
services.7 The harbingers of such a scenario are Libya and Yemen.
The possible disintegration of Iraq and Syria, two very different cases,
is also not a far-fetched scenario. Inevitably, the ruling governments
in the Arab world will be busy parrying increased domestic
challenges in the near future. The unrest in the Arab world, its
growing Islamization, and the greater potential for its fragmentation
testify to the socio-political crisis and decline in the region – a
growing trend. At the same time, the foreign policy of these states has
introduced much uncertainty, complicating the strategic calculus of
policy makers.
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
4
The Regional Balance of Power
The upheavals in the Arab world accentuate another regional trend –
the rise of non-Arab Middle East powers Iran, Israel and Turkey at
the expense of the Arab states.8 The further weakening of the Arab
states will have a meaningful impact on the regional balance of
power. The most important Arab states, Egypt, Iraq and Syria, face
serious domestic challenges. While Saudi Arabia and Jordan seem to
have weathered the crisis, they definitely have to pay greater attention
to their domestic arenas. With the exception of Bahrain, whose
destabilization required Saudi military intervention, the rest of the
Arab Gulf monarchic regimes appear to display greater political
resilience than their republican sisters.9 Nonetheless, the need to focus
on domestic problems will reduce the ability of all Arab states to
build national power, project power beyond their borders, and combat
the Iranian and/or Turkish regional influence.
The Islamic Republic of Iran regarded what occurred in Egypt,
Tunisia, Yemen and Libya as pure and virtuous revolutions inspired
by Imam Khomeini.10
Tehran and Ankara, both of whom are aligned
with radical Islamist forces, have welcomed the “Arab Spring,”
particularly the anti-Mubarak demonstrations designed to topple the
military-based regime.11
Historically, Egypt was perceived as a
regional rival to the Turks and Persians. An Egypt beleaguered with
domestic problems has little energy to focus on countering Iran’s and
Turkey’s aspirations and influence. Both vie for regional primacy and
are interested in gaining popularity in the Arab world, in which Egypt
occupies a prominent role. Moreover, growing influence by the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt suits the ideological inclinations of
Iran’s and Turkey’s rulers. Indeed, the new Egypt has taken steps
toward rapprochement with Iran. At the same time, the United States’
exit from Iraq opens the door for Iran, as well as for Turkey, to
meddle in the affairs of another important Arab state, albeit a
weakened one, in order to gain greater regional power.
Turkey also actively supports the Sunni Islamist opposition to the
Alawite regime in Syria,12
whose fall would be quite a blow to Iran.
The instability in Syria has focused attention on the historic Turkish-
Persian rivalry in the region, signaling once more the dilution of Arab
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
5
power and decreased Western influence. Even if Syria remains a
source of conflict between Iran and Turkey, these two countries still
cooperate on many levels, including energy transactions, opposing
Kurdish nationalism, dividing spheres of influence in Iraq, and aiding
Muslim Brotherhood elements in the Arab world. They also share a
preference for an inactive US.
The decline in the relative power of Egypt enhances the leadership
role of Saudi Arabia as the only Arab state with the ability to
somewhat contain Iranian and Turkish influence. Not surprisingly, the
balancing game is complex. A Saudi-Turkish alliance has formed to
try to end Assad’s rule in Syria, an Iranian ally. The successful Saudi
intervention to protect the Sunni regime in Bahrain is another
example of curtailing Iranian influence. In this role, Saudi Arabia has
become a tacit ally of Israel.
Indeed, democratic and politically stable Israel is also a rising non-
Arab power and a player in the regional balance of power. The power
differential between Israel's national might and its neighbors has
further increased as it manages to prosper economically and to
develop a high-tech military.13
Israel is a de facto American ally
whose fortunes are linked to perceived US status in global and
regional affairs. As Cairo and Ankara dilute their pro-American
orientation and cool their relations with Jerusalem, the once favorable
regional balance of power, from Israel’s perspective, is deteriorating.
Finally, the key factor in the regional balance of power is the prospect
of Iran becoming a nuclear power. This would be a “game changer,”
affecting the destiny of the region.
THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN CLOUT
In 2011, developments in the Middle East underscored the further
erosion of the US position in the region. This is partly due to the
Obama administration's deliberate, “multilateral retrenchment…
designed to curtail the United States’ overseas commitments, restore
its standing in the world, and shift burdens onto global partners.”14
It
is also partly due to its confused, contradictory, and inconsistent
responses to the unfolding events in the Middle East. First, there was
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
6
a quick demand to oust then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, an
action unequivocally viewed in the region as betrayal of a loyal friend
and ally.15
Then, the American criticism of Saudi Arabia’s military
intervention in support of the Sunni ruling Al-Khalifa family in
Bahrain (March 2011) raised eyebrows in Arab capitals.16
Similarly,
many in the Middle East were puzzled by Washington’s slow
response to Gaddafi’s domestic troubles, leaving the initiative for his
removal to its West European allies. The desertion of the eccentric
Gaddafi, who in final analysis had cooperated with the West by
giving up his arsenal of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in
2003, was a surprise. Washington failed to grasp that the lesson
learned by Middle East leaders from the American attitude toward
Libya is that it is better to stick with the WMD programs, as
exemplified by North Korea and Iran, in order to prevent a Western
military intervention. In contrast, the brutal suppression of the local
opposition by the anti-American regimes in Iran and Damascus
elicited only mild and very late expressions of criticism from the
Obama administration. The American decision in July 2011 to
facilitate a dialogue with the anti-Western Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt further eroded the credibility of the US as an astute political
player and credible ally.
While there are voices in the West denying any enmity between the
Muslim Brotherhood and the US, there is no doubt that the leadership
of such Islamist movements throughout the Middle East sees America
as a bitter enemy. In the Middle East, leaders have witnessed
America's retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan, its engagement (or
appeasement, in Middle Eastern eyes) of US enemies Iran and Syria,
and the desertion of friendly rulers. This strengthens the general
perception of a weak and confused American foreign policy.17
Moreover, American military power is extremely stretched and
increasingly constrained in terms of budget. Finally, the
empowerment of the mobs in the Middle East inevitably strengthens
anti-American elements. America and its ally, Israel, are the favored
scapegoats in the Middle East, reflecting deep-rooted anti-Western
attitudes by frustrated multitudes that yearn for the long-gone Muslim
Golden Age.18
Israelis wonder whether America is capable of
exercising sound strategic judgment and standing by its allies. The
animosity displayed by the Obama administration toward the
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
7
Netanyahu government only reinforces the bewilderment about
American Middle East policy. Thus, the growing consensus in the
region among America’s friends and foes is “Obama does not get it.”
The immediate impact of the US in the region has declined due to its
confused and hesitant responses to the turmoil in various countries
and to the apparent irrelevance of the US to the complex domestic
processes underway. But this may be transitory. The Arab countries
that are angry with America, such as Saudi Arabia, will continue to
depend on the US in more ways than one, while countries that are
trying to introduce change, such as Egypt, will require outside
assistance and support; and few powers apart from the US are well-
suited to offer it. Finally, potential change in the White House
following the November 2012 American elections leaves open the
possibility of reinstalled confidence in the US.
THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL
From an Israeli perspective, the current Middle East trends are hardly
positive.19
Indeed, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has
frequently expressed his apprehensions about the direction of the
“Arab Spring.”20
Despite its economic and military strength, Israel
remains a small state with limited resources and diplomatic leverage
to shape its environment. It cannot attain what Arnold Wolfers once
called “milieu objectives.”21
Moreover, as a status quo power, it has
displayed little desire to play any leading role in regional affairs.
While ending the conflict with the Arab world has been a permanent
feature of Israel’s foreign policy, integration within the Middle East
was never an appealing objective. Israel carries some weight in the
international politics of the region; however, mainly it must adjust to
– rather than try to shape – regional and global developments. Israel,
then, must focus on emerging threats and prepare adequate responses.
Strategic Surprises
Over the years Israel has built a large and sophisticated intelligence
apparatus. Nonetheless, the unrest in the Middle East came as a
surprise. Israeli officials had speculated in recent years that the
forthcoming succession of an aging Mubarak could turn Egypt into an
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
8
“Iran next door.” But this conjecture was quashed by the predictions
of Israeli intelligence analysts and academic experts for a smooth
transfer of power. Similarly, Israel failed to gauge the strength of the
opposition in Syria. This is a stark reminder of the potential for rapid
change and political uncertainty in the Middle East. Strategic
surprises, as improbable as they are, still can happen. Consequently, it
is always necessary to prepare for a variety of scenarios, particularly
the worst-case ones. Furthermore, Israel must take greater care when
considering improbable but gravely threatening situations.22
Regional Isolation
As the Arab world looks less receptive to peace overtures, Israel must
prepare for greater regional isolation. The growing power of Islamist
circles and the deteriorating status of the US in the Middle East
negatively affect the historic peace process between Israel and its
neighboring states.23
This process, characterized by a reluctant
acceptance of Israel as a fait accompli in the region, was primarily the
result of the gradual realization that Israel could not be eradicated by
force due to its strength and that of its American ally.24
Another factor
which helped bring Arab actors to the negotiating table was the vital
diplomatic role played by the US in narrowing party differences and
endeavoring to reduce Israeli anxieties over taking risks for peace.
The Obama administration is less able than its predecessors to induce
Arab states to sign peace treaties with Israel and is less credible in
attempts to compensate Jerusalem for concessions that entail security
risks. Its financial incentives for the Jewish state are also more
limited.
Nowadays, the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan are under great
strain as anti-Israel domestic forces, particularly the Islamists, become
more influential and vocal.25
The Egyptian military, still in control of
the country, has announced its support for keeping Egypt’s
international commitments. But even if the vector of Egyptian politics
does not change dramatically in the near future, the current regime is
weaker than the previous one and, in all likelihood, does not wish to
be burdened with the Israeli relationship. The “cold peace” might,
therefore, become even chillier. Similarly, Jordan might prefer to
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
9
keep Israel at arm’s length so as not to expose itself to criticism by
radical opponents.
The current impasse in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians
complicates the situation. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been in
disarray since Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007, deeply splitting
the Palestinian national movement. In response to increasing regional
Islamist influence, the PA leadership in the West Bank signed a
reconciliation pact with Hamas in May 2011 designed to mend ties
between the two factions. While its implementation has been delayed
due to fundamental differences, a stronger Hamas role in Palestinian
politics makes the slim chances for bridging the Israeli-Palestinian
divide even more remote.26
The PA has actually defied American
calls to return to the negotiating table, opting instead for unilateral
action. Similarly, the political volatility in Syria disqualifies it from
being a peace partner whose commitments can be taken seriously.
Non-radical states in the Arab world are likely to relegate the
pragmatic cooperation with Israel to back channels or to minimize
their interactions with the Jewish state. The weaker Arab states are
becoming more vulnerable to radical penetration from Iran and to
domestic Islamist forces that are opposed to rapprochement with
Israel. For example, the new Tunisian government, in which the
Islamists play a major role, is gearing up to ratify a new constitution
that includes a section condemning Zionism and ruling out any
friendly ties with Israel. The Islamists' recent success in the region,
coupled with US' perceived departure, further encourage the radical
forces and validate their anti-American policies. In pro-Western
states, as US support is seen to be unreliable, rulers will begin
distancing themselves from the US and its ally, Israel.
Since the new Middle East is not conducive to peacemaking, the
“peace process” has seemingly frozen. The international community,
nonetheless, expects progress in the peace negotiations and many
blame the current impasse on Israel's reluctance to pursue peace
vigorously. This is detrimental to Israel, undermining its position as a
strategic Western asset in a turbulent region.
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
01
Furthermore, the rising non-Arab powers in the Middle East, Iran and
Turkey, are unfriendly toward Israel. Domestic changes, beyond
Israel’s control, have led to the foreign policy reorientation of these
regional powers that were once Israel’s allies. The 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran heralded the rise of an anti-Israeli militant
theocracy. In Turkey, the entrenchment of the Islamist AKP, after
successive electoral victories (2002, 2007 and 2011), moved this
pivotal state into the anti-Israel camp. Both instances indicate further
regional isolation for Israel.
Erosion in Israel’s Deterrence
America's decline in world affairs, particularly in Middle East
politics, may be temporary; yet, it has an immediate impact on the
region.27
US weakness negatively affects Israel’s deterrence
capability, which is not simply limited to its military power and
capacity to win conventional wars and low-intensity conflicts. The
perceived closeness of Israel to America, and the expectation that the
US will come to Israel's aid if needed, is an equally important
component of deterrence. The Obama administration, however, has
disappointed some of its Middle East allies, and its friendship with
Israel is no longer self-evident. As a result, Israel cannot necessarily
rely on Washington’s diplomatic, economic, or military support in the
event that it is attacked. Furthermore, Israeli use of force as a
preventive or preemptive move could exacerbate the strained
Jerusalem-Washington relationship – a pillar of Israel’s national
security. Such considerations are not new, but they are nowadays
more relevant than in the past as Israel considers military action
against Hamas, Hizballah and Iran.
Israel could find some consolation in the fact that the Middle East
crisis proves once again that it is America's most reliable strategic ally
in the region. In the future, it is likely that US planes will be able to
land safely in the Middle East only in Israel. Similarly, only Israeli
ports will be dependable for American contingency planning in the
eastern Mediterranean.
This does not mean that US declarations of commitment to Israel’s
security are fully credible. However, Israel has no alternative to its
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
00
alliance with the US, as its hegemonic status in world affairs is
unlikely to change in the next 20 years, at least. Therefore, in the
coming few years – particularly if Obama is re-elected in November
2012 – Israel must exercise caution vis-à-vis Washington.
Growing Security Risks
The Arab world is comprised of many weak states that are too busy
handling domestic affairs to invest in assembling a military coalition
against Israel or in building a modern conventional military force
capable of rivaling the Jewish state. In fact, the military, economic,
and technological gap between Israel and its neighbors has widened
over the years, making a large-scale conventional attack increasingly
unlikely – even if Jordan and/or Egypt were to abandon their peace
treaties with Israel.
Nonetheless, there remains a threat of other forms of military
aggression against Israel at the unconventional level, particularly due
to Israel's weakening deterrence capability. Unstable or failed states,
characterized by their complex and decentralized decision making
processes, are less deterrable than states with strong, centralized
political control.28
Consequently, the regional crisis augments Israel's
potential military challenges. This can happen particularly if the new
leaders are strongly motivated by hatred toward Israel, are
inexperienced, or miscalculate their steps. Moreover, neighboring
Arab leaders may decide to divert the attention of their populace from
domestic problems by starting a war of attrition with Israel or by
initiating terror attacks. For example, in the past, Syria’s Assad has,
under duress, organized civilian marches on Israel’s borders.
In addition, the domestic problems plaguing weakened Arab states
make them more terror prone. As leaders lose their grip over state
territory and borders become more porous, armed groups and
terrorists gain greater freedom of action. Such problems plague post-
Mubarak Egypt, where law and order have become more lax. For
example, in the Sinai Peninsula on Israel’s border, a pipeline
supplying Israel (and Jordan) with Egyptian natural gas has been
repeatedly sabotaged. Sinai has also turned into an unimpeded route
for Iranian weapons supply to Hamas and a base for terrorist attacks
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
02
against Israel. Hamas has even set up rocket production lines in Sinai
in an effort to protect its assets, as the group believes that Israel won't
strike targets inside Egypt due to the affect it would have on bilateral
relations.29
Furthermore, as weakened states lose control over their security
apparatus, national arsenals of conventional (and non-conventional)
arms become more vulnerable, which may result in the emergence of
increasingly well-armed politically dissatisfied groups who seek to
harm Israel. For example, following the fall of Gaddafi, Libyan SA-7
anti-air missiles and anti-tank RPGs seem to have reached Hamas in
Gaza.30
Similarly, in the event that the Syrian regime collapses,
Syria’s advanced arsenal, including chemical weapons, shore-to-ship
missiles, air defense systems, and ballistic missiles of all types could
end up in the hands of Hizballah or other radical elements.31
The domestic dynamics of certain unstable countries are of course
more consequential due to their strategic significance or politico-
cultural resonance in the region. For example, Egypt, the strongest
and most populous Arab state, plays a pivotal role in Middle East
politics. The praetorian, pro-Western Egyptian regime sacrificed
Hosni Mubarak, promised elections and reform, and formed an
alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, the only well-organized
political force outside the ruling government. It remains to be seen
how well the Egyptian generals can control the Brotherhood's
ascendance.
The prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its
seemingly great international acceptance will bolster the cause of the
radical Islamists all over. An Islamist takeover of Egypt would create
a strategic earthquake, strengthening the radical axis in the Middle
East and possibly reviving an Arab military coalition against Israel.
Israel’s fears center around the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty – a
main pillar of Israel's national security. Egypt's defection from the
Arab military coalition removed the strongest military component
from Israel’s list of enemies, thereby dramatically improving Israel's
strategic situation. Moreover, the peace with Egypt has prevented the
Arabs from launching a two-front war against Israel, thus allowing
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
03
significant cuts in Israel’s defense expenditures. The demilitarization
of the Sinai Peninsula further stabilized the strategic Egyptian-Israeli
relation by denying the two sides the option of surprise attacks. The
demilitarization arrangements, often seen in Egypt as an infringement
on its sovereignty, might now be violated, signaling a significant
change in Egyptian foreign policy. Such violations would elicit a
heightened threat perception in Israel and might be considered a casus
belli.
The erosion of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai, which borders Israel
and the Gaza Strip, has enabled Hamas to enhance its military
capabilities and freedom of action. Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood
offshoot that regards Israel as a religious aberration and is committed
to its eradication, encouraged by the developments in Egypt, might
adopt a more aggressive posture toward the Jewish state. The
Islamists in Egypt are not averse to this. In fact, the growing influence
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo already led Egypt to lift
restrictions on traffic in and out of Gaza, easing the Israeli blockade.
This strengthens Hamas’ grip on Gaza and on radical Islamic
elements within the Palestinian national movement.
The political vacuum in Sinai creates several new security challenges
for Israel along the southwestern border. The area could become a
haven for terrorists, as has occurred in parts of Lebanon, or a base for
pirates, as in Somalia. It has already turned into a highway for
weapons smuggling to Hamas. Managing the situation requires a
larger military presence in the area facing Sinai. Under duress, Israel
might even be forced to recapture parts of Sinai.
As relations with Egypt have become somewhat uncertain, Jerusalem
is closely monitoring developments with Jordan, which signed a
peace treaty with Israel in 1994.32
While Israel regards Jordan as its
"strategic depth," or buffer zone between it and potential enemy lines
to the east, the Jordanian elite see Israel as an insurance policy against
invasions from its neighbors. So far, King Abdullah has successfully
ridden the Middle East storm with minimal damage to his rule or to
relations with Israel. However, even here the opposition is rising, and
if Iraq or Syria fell to Muslim radicals, the pressure on the Hashemite
dynasty would grow. Jordan’s fall would plant hostile forces along
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
04
Israel’s longest border and the one closest to its heartland – the Tel
Aviv-Jerusalem-Haifa triangle, which holds most of Israel’s
population and economic infrastructure.
Syria, on Israel’s northern border, is also in turmoil (at the time of
writing) and it remains unclear whether the Alawite regime will
survive or be replaced by a new Sunni leadership. In summer 2011,
Assad tried to ignite a diversionary war against Israel. This was a
warning signal for Israel to prepare for the future possibility of
hostilities along the now quiet Golan border, whether initiated by
Assad or his successor.
Regional events have detracted attention from the Palestinian issue,
particularly since the uprisings have largely ignored the Palestinians.
The PA's ability to harm Israel in order to reignite international
interest is very limited, and the renewal of a terror campaign against
the Jewish state could be very costly to the Palestinians. Yet, the weak
and illegitimate PA has come under increasing pressure from the
powerful and popular Hamas. A Palestinian strategic miscalculation,
leading to the eruption of another round of violence, is a possibility
that Israel cannot ignore.
Jerusalem must continue closely monitoring the threats posed by its
adjacent and more distant neighbors. The recent political turmoil has
generally weakened the Arab states, giving Iran greater opportunity to
extend its reach. Moreover, America's strategic fatigue and its
ideological inclination to shed overseas responsibilities have left an
opening for its Middle East rivals, China and Russia – not a welcome
scenario by Israel. Thus, the regional unrest is a warning bell for
Israel to better prepare its defenses in case the situation worsens.
Threats to the Sea Lanes in the Eastern Mediterranean
The turmoil in the Arab world is changing the strategic landscape
around Israel, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean basin, where
elements of radical Islam could gain control. In this region, Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey display Islamist tendencies,
threatening the current unrestricted access to this area by Israel and
the West. About 90 percent of Israel’s foreign trade is carried out via
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
05
the Mediterranean, making freedom of navigation critical for Israel’s
economic well-being. Moreover, its chances of becoming energy
independent and a significant exporter of gas are linked to Israel’s
ability to secure free passage for its maritime trade and to defend its
newly discovered hydrocarbon fields, Leviathan and Tamar.
In Tunisia, the Islamists won the November 2011 elections. In Libya,
evolving political events after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi indicate
that radical Islamic elements will play a greater role in the future of
the country. If the transition to a new regime descends into civil war,
the ensuing chaos may allow greater freedom of action for Muslim
extremists from the shores of this Mediterranean country.
Libya’s eastern neighbor, Egypt, is still ruled by the military, but the
November 2011 elections catapulted the Islamist parties into a
dominant position in the emerging Egyptian political system. Apart
from having important ports on the Mediterranean, Egypt also
controls the Suez Canal, a critical passageway linking Europe to the
Persian Gulf and the Far East that could fall into the hands of the
Islamists. Significantly, Egypt has already opened the Suez Canal to
Iranian military vessels (February 2011). Access to the waterway
enhances the ability of radical Iran to supply its Mediterranean allies,
Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza. Moreover, it
enhances Iran's access to Muslim Balkan states, namely Albania,
Bosnia and Kosovo, increasing its influence in that part of the
Mediterranean as well.
Even if the Egyptian military is able to curtail the Islamist forces at
home, its grip over the Sinai Peninsula is a different issue. As noted,
the tenuous control of Egypt over Sinai has further weakened since
the fall of the Mubarak regime. This could lead to the “Somalization”
of Sinai, negatively affecting the safety of naval trade along the
Mediterranean, the approaches to the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea. At
the same time, nearby Gaza is currently controlled by Hamas, a
radical Islamist organization allied with Iran. Israel's enforced naval
blockade on Gaza has increasingly been criticized by the international
community. Considering the recent political changes in Egypt and
their detrimental impact on Egyptian-Israeli relations, containment of
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
06
the Islamist threat from Gaza will become even more challenging in
the near future.
North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits Lebanon, a state
dominated by radical Shiite Hizballah, whose ports are inhospitable
from a Western perspective. Hizballah has already laid claim to some
of the huge Israeli-found gas fields in the sea, which could diminish
Europe’s energy dependence on Russia and Turkey. Moreover, Syria,
an enemy of Israel and current ally of Iran, exerts considerable
influence in Lebanon. Its Mediterranean shores, north of Lebanon, are
also hostile to the West and its ports even supply services to the
Russian navy. While the Assad regime in Syria faces great domestic
opposition and may fall, any Syrian successor regime could be
Islamist and anti-Western as well.
The next state on the eastern Mediterranean coastline is AKP-ruled
Turkey. The country has, over the past few years, shifted away from a
pro-Western foreign policy, adopting instead a radical foreign policy
stance. The Turkish government supports Hamas and Hizballah,
opposes sanctions on Iran, and holds a strident anti-Israel position,
which reflects the AKP's Islamic coloration. Moreover, Turkey has
displayed huge ambitions for leadership in the Middle East, Central
Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the eastern Mediterranean. A
combination of Turkish nationalism, neo-Ottoman nostalgia and
Islamic-jihadist impulses has pushed Turkey into an aggressive
posture on several regional issues. It has, for instance, flexed its naval
muscles by threatening Israel that it will escort flotillas trying to break
the blockade on Gaza.
Turkey has also threatened Cyprus regarding its desire to acquire a
share of the potential energy riches south of the island. Turkey is
interested in gaining control or partial ownership over the maritime
gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean as this would help fulfill its
ambitions to serve as an energy bridge to the West, thereby creating
dependence on it. This puts Ankara at loggerheads with Nicosia and
Jerusalem who share an interest in developing the hydrocarbon fields
in their exclusive economic zones and exporting gas to energy-thirsty
Europe. The conflict of interests might lead Turkish troops, stationed
in the northern part of divided Cyprus, to complete the conquest of
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
07
the island started in 1974. Such a Turkish takeover would not only
hurt Western geo-economic interests, but would constitute a
significant Western loss of the strategically situated island. The
Cypriot island served as a bone of contention in the past between
Persia and the ancient Greeks and between the Ottomans and
Venetians. In short, it represents the struggle between East and West.
West of Turkey is Greece, a democratic Western state with a stake in
the protection of the Cypriots from Muslim domination. Its current
economic crisis, however, might erode its limited military ability to
parry the Turkish challenge alone. With the exception of Israel, all
other eastern Mediterranean states would likely favor the return of
Cyprus to Muslim rule and the ascendancy of Islam in the eastern
Mediterranean.
Western influence in the eastern Mediterranean is being challenged by
the growing radical Islamic influence in the region. The access of Iran
to Mediterranean waters, the disruptive potential of failed states, and
the competition between countries for energy resources is
destabilizing the region. But it is not clear that Western powers,
particularly the US, are aware of the possibility of losing the eastern
part of the Mediterranean Sea to radical Islam or are preparing in any
way to forestall such a scenario. Foolishly, they seem to believe that
the so-called “Arab Spring” heralds an improved political
environment and that Turkey represents “moderate Islam.” Such
American naiveté and European gullibility could become extremely
costly in strategic terms.
The Iranian Nuclear Challenge
The upheaval in the Arab world has deflected attention from the
realization of Israel’s most feared scenario – a nuclear Iran.
Moreover, the Middle East turmoil has played into the Iranian
strategy to simply buy time in order to present the world a nuclear fait
accompli. In the meantime, Iran assiduously continues to work on its
nuclear project, hardly impressed by economic sanctions and
diplomatic displeasure. Even the International Atomic Energy Agency
published a report (November 2011) voicing its concern over Iranian
activities that do not easily fit with those of a civilian program.33
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
08
Israel is very concerned about the ineffective international response to
Iran's nuclear progress. This global passivity seems either to indicate
an inadequate understanding of the far-reaching implications34
or a
lack of political will to tackle a difficult strategic problem. A nuclear
Iran would generate further efforts of nuclear proliferation in the
region as states such as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would hardly
resist the rationale for adopting similar nuclear postures, thereby
turning a multi-polar nuclear Middle East into a strategic nightmare.
Iranian nuclear attainment would strengthen its hegemony in the
strategic energy sector by its mere location along the oil-rich Arabian
Gulf and the Caspian Basin – the "energy ellipse."35
A nuclear Iran
would also result in the West's loss of the Central Asian states, which
will either gravitate toward Iran or try to secure a nuclear umbrella
with Russia or China, countries much closer to the region. An
emboldened Tehran, after nuclearization, will also become more
active in supporting radical Shiite elements in Iraq and agitating those
communities in the Arabian Gulf states. Moreover, since Tehran is a
central backer of terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas and
Islamic Jihad, it may be reckless enough to transfer several nuclear
bombs to such proxy organizations, which will have no moral
constraints on detonating a nuclear device in a European or American
harbor. Iran's nuclear program – coupled with further improvements
in Iranian missiles – would initially put most European capitals, and
eventually North American, within range of a potential Iranian attack.
The Obama administration seems reluctant to orchestrate crippling
sanctions on Iran or to use force in order to stop it. Jerusalem realizes
that the time to decide whether to preempt against key Iranian nuclear
installations or live with a nuclear Iran is getting closer. Israel’s
inclination to remove the threat of a potential nuclear enemy is going
to be tested. Indeed, during the summer and fall of 2011, there was an
unprecedented flurry of statements by Israeli officials and former
officials on whether an attack on Iranian nuclear installations would
be necessary or wise.36
ISRAELI RESPONSES
Jerusalem realizes that the demonstrating crowds in the Arab streets
are not likely to be effective agents of democratization and that the
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
09
popular sentiment in the Arab world is largely anti-Western and of
course anti-Israel. While Israel would welcome peace-loving,
democratic neighbors, its strategic assessments must be based on a
worst-case scenario. After all, conflict and bloodshed have been a
historical constant in the region. Understanding that its survival is
largely dependent upon its national power, Israel has cultivated over
the years a remarkable military machine. As a result, the last large-
scale war fought by Israel was in 1973. Since then, the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) has been preoccupied with small wars and non-state
actors. Yet, the changing strategic environment dictates more caution
and the need to meet a variety of threats. Maj. Gen. Eyal Eisenberg,
head of the Home Front Command, has warned that developments in
the Arab world increase the probability of an all-out regional war.37
While a multi-front ground war is still of low probability, it cannot be
ignored. As Israel’s strategic environment becomes more hostile, the
expansion of the IDF and the updating of its war-fighting scenarios is
a necessity.
A Larger Defense Budget
Israel has little choice but to increase its defense outlays in order to
meet future challenges, as outlined above. Israel must invest in
building a stronger force that is able to deal with a variety of
contingencies, including large-scale war. Israel needs a larger
standing army, particularly ground and naval forces. Since force
building is a lengthy process, appropriate decisions on force size and
structure, as well as budget allocations, must be made as soon as
possible. Several additional areas requiring special attention include
missile defense and research and development (R&D).
The southern border, which was quiet for a very long period of time,
once required only limited Israeli military presence. However, the
potential changes in Egypt, as well as in Syria, require the stationing
of larger forces on these borders. Moreover, the uncertainty over the
future of Egypt, Syria and Jordan arouses a worst-case scenario
assessment, which involves simultaneous military challenges of
different kinds on all of Israel’s borders.
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
21
The IDF has already deployed better quality troops to the Egyptian
and Syrian border areas. The tensions along the Egypt-Israel
demarcation line have also necessitated organizational changes, such
as establishing a new regional brigade next to Eilat.38
Israel has to
beef up its military presence along this border. A new division must
be deployed in Israel’s south in order to deal with Egyptian
contingencies as well as face the growing challenges stemming from
Gaza. Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Ganz has stated the need
for large-scale intervention in Gaza.39
A larger Israeli navy, responsible for hosting strategic systems, has
become increasingly important as Israeli territory, with its air force
bases and deployment areas, becomes more vulnerable to missile
attacks. This need, however, has not become a budgetary priority. The
modernization and expansion of the surface fleet (excluding
submarines) was neglected for some time and navy procurement plans
were not accommodated – this must be quickly rectified.
The political dynamics in the states on the shores of the eastern
Mediterranean, reviewed in the previous section, demonstrate the
growing threats to the sea lanes traversing this region as well as to the
new gas discoveries. The need to protect these waterways further
necessitates the upgrade and expansion of Israel’s surface navy.
Furthermore, dealing with missiles of a variety of ranges has been on
the national security agenda for at least two decades. Budgetary
constraints, anti-defense prejudices and strategic shortsightedness
have slowed the development and adequate deployment of a multi-
layered missile defense system. This situation needs to be remedied as
the motivation of radical forces to attack Israel grows – the entire
Israeli Home Front might come under intense rocket and missile
assault in any future conflict with Iran's proxies, Hamas and
Hizballah. To this end, the IDF has requested roughly $4 billion from
the treasury over the next five years to complete its missile defense
program.40
Meeting the missile challenge also requires improving passive
protection and active defense. Passive protection includes the
construction of shelters and fortified rooms in homes, and the
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
20
building of fortified areas within educational institutions and centers
of commerce and entertainment. Active defense refers, among other
things, to the adequate deployment of Iron Dome batteries for
intercepting missile threats of up to 70 kilometers, as well as the use
of David’s Sling missile defense systems for threats of up to 300
kilometers (not yet operational).41
Israel is working to integrate these
lower-tier missile defense systems with its upper-tier missile defense
components – upgraded versions of Patriot Advanced Capability
interceptors and Arrow-2 and 3 interceptors, designed to work against
long-range missiles. These systems, and their integration into a single
national command-and-control center, require greater funding.42
An
adequate missile defense system would expand freedom of action on
the political level. It could also potentially forestall the need for
ground operations in Gaza and southern Lebanon or limit their cost.
Israel’s main advantage over its adversaries is its superior manpower,
training, organization, and military technologies. While the defense
budget has only a marginal effect on the army education system and
available manpower, it has a great impact on R&D. The largely
privatized Israeli military industries have gradually become more
market-oriented, which has prompted a shift in their R&D priorities.
Unfortunately, they invest primarily in technologies that will give
them an advantage in the global market rather than in products that
suit the specific future needs of the IDF.43
Therefore, Israel must find
the resources to ensure continued R&D for enhanced deterrence and
for winning future wars.
While Israel’s flourishing and expanding economy can afford larger
defense outlays to meet its national security challenges, it has become
politically challenging to put this into practice, especially considering
the mass social protests of summer 2011. Indeed, reflecting the
popular mood that more money should be directed to meet domestic
needs, the Israeli cabinet decided in October 2011 to cut the defense
budget.44
The economic troubles in the eurozone, a main export arena,
and fears of a world recession also indicate the need for fiscal
stringency and belt-tightening.
A courageous Israeli leadership could nevertheless explain to its
people that changing circumstances require some austerity measures
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
22
that might freeze the standard of living for a while. Israeli society has
shown remarkable resilience and spirit in protracted conflict and
might respond positively to a well-crafted call from its political
leaders. Such an address must be accompanied by visible measures to
reduce military waste and genuine efforts to reduce the growing gap
between rich and poor in Israeli society in order to maintain social
cohesion.
The Imperative for Defensible Borders
As a result of the political volatility along its borders, Israel must
insist on defensible borders in any future peace negotiations with the
PA and Syria. Simplistic slogans about the decreasing value of
territory and topographical assets ignore the fact that historically
military technology has continuously fluctuated, occasionally
favoring defensive postures or offensive initiatives. The history of
armaments shows that each weapons system eventually has a counter
weapon. For example, the fire power of machine guns was neutralized
by tanks, which in turn were threatened by anti-tank missiles, which
then triggered the emergence of sophisticated tank defense systems.
The technology race is complex, and contemporary technological
advantages are always temporary as new technology is developed.45
Moreover, the technological offense-defense balance is not the
primary factor in determining military outcomes – topographical
constants can be a highly valuable asset. Strategists and militaries
around the world still confer great importance upon the topographical
characteristics of the battlefield.
Thus, the design of Israel’s future borders with Syria and the PA
should not be shaped by ephemeral current technologies that seem to
grant advantages to Israeli defensive capabilities. The history of
warfare demonstrates that technological superiority and better
weapons are not enough to win a war.46
Forging Strategic Alliances
Despite the decline of American influence in the Middle East, Israel
has no choice but to continue to nurture its strategic partnership with
the US. The US is likely to remain the dominant global power for a
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
23
long time, and its decline in the Middle East is probably temporary.
The shared values of the two countries and the large and stable
support for the Jewish state in American society makes this country
the best possible ally. Israel’s foreign policy should adapt to the
differences of opinion and even conflict of interests between a large
power and its small ally in such a way as to assure continued
American friendship and support. In the final analysis, the
developments in Washington are much more important for Jerusalem
than those in the region.
As long as Israel enjoys America's friendship, regional isolation will
be easier to overcome. Nevertheless, Israel has an obvious interest in
fostering good relations and maintaining peace treaties with Egypt
and Jordan. Its duty is to attempt to forge strategic partnerships with
regional powers so as to increase its freedom of action. Reducing its
isolation will also help in lessening the burden of the Israeli alliance
on Washington. Realpolitik can create partnerships between strange
bedfellows: for instance, a Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and a Jewish Israel
joined against Iran. This rationale may also appeal to the Sunnis in
Iraq or to the Kurds, who could reemerge as a useful ally for Israel,
limiting its isolation. The new state of South Sudan looks to Israel for
support and could become a regional ally. All anti-Islamist groups in
the region, primarily minorities such as the Druze, Christian
Lebanese, or Assyrians in Syria and Iraq are probably interested in
forging ties with a strong Israel, although they may fear that
cooperation with the Jewish state is too dangerous.
In truth, regional isolation is bearable. After all, a modern, affluent,
democratic and powerful Israel hardly wants to integrate into a region
characterized by despotism, corruption, ignorance and poverty. Apart
from modest economic benefits, the Middle East has limited attraction
for an Israel that basically wants to be left alone by its neighbors.
Furthermore, Israel can find partners in the eastern Mediterranean to
compensate somewhat for the loss of Turkey's friendship. Greece and
Cyprus are courting Israel, strengthening Western presence in the
eastern Mediterranean. Italy, in close proximity, also has excellent
relations with Israel, which can be further developed. Hopefully, the
US will recognize its reciprocal interests in this region and project
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
24
power through its 6th
Fleet to prevent this area from becoming an
Islamic lake.
Responding to Iran
The main challenge to Israel’s security, the Iranian pursuit of nuclear
weapons, has been unaffected by the Arab turmoil. However, the
dilemma vis-à-vis Iran becomes more acute as the Iranians get closer
to achieving a nuclear arsenal and the chances for a counterrevolution
seem to dim. Most Israelis, of all walks of life, do not believe that
economic sanctions can change the politico-strategic calculus in
Tehran and precipitate a decision to stop the nuclear program.
Therefore, the widespread conclusion is that only covert operations
and/or military force can delay or stop nuclear progress. The issue of
whether to preemptively strike Iran's military installations is being
hotly debated at the highest levels in Israel, as this is not an easy
decision to make. An unexpected muscular Western move may spare
Israel’s government the deliberations, but there is little hope that such
a scenario will materialize, thus once again leaving the Israelis to go it
alone.
CONCLUSION
The Arab Middle East remains a stagnant region in deep socio-
political crisis with small chances for positive change in the near
future. The current regimes may stay in power or be replaced by new
dictatorships, moderate or radical. In either case, the immediate future
will feature weak states grappling with domestic problems and facing
uncertainty over the direction of their foreign policy – this is mixed
news for Israel. The changing regional balance of power in favor of
Turkey and Iran, who both encourage radical elements in the region,
does not favor Israel. As well, the seeming decline of American clout
in the Middle East has negatively affected the peace process with
Israel and reduced its deterrence power. Israel is facing greater
regional isolation, more terror, threats to its sea lanes and energy
resources in the eastern Mediterranean, and the prospects of a nuclear
Iran.
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
25
While the changing security environment has deteriorated, Israel
remains a strong state. The power differential between Israel and its
neighbors is larger than ever, which allows Israel to meet most
challenges on its own. It must spend more money on defense,
however, and has to cultivate new relationships in the region. The US
remains its only important ally, and the preservation of good relations
with Washington is a central pillar in Israel’s national security. Israeli
society has displayed great resilience in the past when faced with
national security challenges. Most Israelis understand the reality of
living in the Middle East, but they must recognize that this rough
neighborhood may become even more brutish in the near future.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Gabi Ben-Dor, Hillel Frisch, Avi Kober, Shmuel
Sandler and Max Singer for their very useful comments and Timothy
McKinley for providing important research assistance. This paper,
which was generously supported by the Tikvah Fund, is a revised and
expanded version of a previously published article, “Implications of
Middle East Upheavals Upon Israel,” Middle East Quarterly, 19,
Winter 2012, pp. 39-46.
Notes
1 For an incisive analysis, see E. Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture,
London: Frank Cass, 1994. 2 For the reports, see http://middleeast.about.com/od/middleeast101/f/arab-human-
development.htm. For the Arab predicament, see also R.S. Humphreys, Between
Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1999. 3 For the road to modernity and democracy, see M. Singer, The History of the
Future: The Shape of the World to Come Is Visible Today, Lexington: Lexington
Books, 2011. For the necessary sequence in peoples’ attitudes conducive to
democracy, see R. Inglehart and C. Wetzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and
Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 4 Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire, p. 188.
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
26
5 S.M. Walt, “Revolution and War,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, April 1992, pp.
321-68. 6 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,”
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 5-38. 7 For an analysis of this phenomenon, see R.I. Rothberg, ed., When States Fail:
Causes and Consequences, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 8 For an index of weak states, see
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx. 9 H. Frisch, “Why monarchies persist: balancing between internal and external
vulnerability,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, September 2010, pp.
167-84. 10
M. al-Zaydi, “Not ignorance, but feigned ignorance,” Ashark Alawsat, December
11, 2011, available at: http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=27651. 11
For various official remarks in Ankara and Tehran, see "Egypt uprising is an
Islamic ‘awakening’: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei," The Toronto Star, February 4,
2011, available at: www.thestar.com/news/world/article/933539--egypt-uprising-is-
an-islamic-awakening-ayatollah-ali-khamenei; N. Barsoumian, "‘I Don’t Bear a
Hidden Agenda’: Erdogan Lays Out Vision for New Middle East," The Armenian
Weekly, September 27, 2011, available at:
www.armenianweekly.com/2011/09/27/erdogan-lays-out-vision-for-new-middle-
east/; J. Fleishman and N. Parker, "Mubarak says he won't seek reelection but will
stay in office 'for the next few months,'" Los Angeles Times, February 1, 2011,
available at: articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/01/world/la-fg-egypt-crowd-20110202.
For the Islamist turn in Turkish foreign policy, see E. Inbar, “Israeli-Turkish
Tensions and Their International Ramifications,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, Winter
2011, pp. 132-46. 12
New York Times, May 4, 2011; The Jerusalem Post, May 8, 2011. 13
See J. Adelman, The Rise of Israel: A History of a Revolutionary State, London:
Routledge, 2008; D. Senora and S.Singer, Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's
Economic Miracle, New York: Twelve, 2009. 14
D.W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines
in Uncertain Times,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, July/August 2011, p. 58. 15
D. Hamilton, "Israel shocked by Obama’s 'betrayal' of Mubarak," Reuters,
January 31, 2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/31/us-egypt-
israel-usa-idUSTRE70U53720110131; A. Shavit, “Obama’s betrayal: As goes
Mubarak, so goes US might,” Haaretz, August 10, 2011. 16
For such criticism, see D. E. Sanger and E. Schmitt, "US-Saudi Tensions
Intensify with Mideast Turmoil," New York Times, March 14, 2011, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15saudi.html?pagewanted=a
ll. 17
Smith, “Weakened U.S. Influence,” pp. 6-8; N. Gardiner, “Barack Obama’s
‘leading from behind’ foreign policy: No wonder the US president looks weak and
confused,” The Telegraph, April 26, 2011, available at:
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100085078/barack-
obama%E2%80%99s-leading-from-behind-foreign-policy-no-wonder-the-us-
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
27
president-looks-weak-and-confused/; R. Kagan, “Obama’s Year One: Contra,”
World Affairs, January/February 2010, available at:
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2010-JanFeb/full-Kagan-JF-2010.html;
H. Keinon, “Assad: US has lost influence in ME,” The Jerusalem Post, May 25,
2010. B. Gwertzman, “Weakened U.S. in Stormy Mideast,” Council on Foreign
Relations, available at: http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/weakened-us-stormy-
mideast/p24826. 18
See B. Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, September
1990, available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-
of-muslim-rage/4643/; B. Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, November/December 2002. 19
For Israeli perceptions of the changing environment, see D. Byman, “Israel’s
Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3,
Summer 2011, pp. 123-36. 20
See inter alia his statement before the Knesset on November 23, 2011, available
at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/8913577/Arab-
Spring-anti-democratic-says-Benjamin-Netanyahu.html 21
For the distinction between goals related to adding resources, “possession goals,”
and “milieu goals” that shape the environment in which the nation operates, see A.
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962. 22
See Y. Dror’s discussion of mega-trends in the 21st century in Israeli Statecraft:
National Security Challenges and Responses, New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 37-
53. 23
For the decline of the interstate dispute and the ethno-national conflict between
Jews and Palestinians, see H. Ben-Yehuda and S. Sandler, The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Transformed: Fifty Years of Interstate and Ethnic Crises, Albany: SUNY, 2002; see
also E. Inbar, “Arab-Israeli Coexistence: Causes, Achievements and Limitations,"
Israel Affairs, Vol. 6, Summer 2000, pp. 256-70. 24
For the importance of systemic factors in peacemaking, see B. Miller, States,
Nations and the Great Powers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 25
See H. Keinon, “Anti-Normalization Forces Gaining Strength in Jordan,” The
Jerusalem Post, August 10, 2011, pp. 1,10; E. Lake, “Muslim Brotherhood seeks
end to Israel Treaty,” The Washington Times, February 3, 2011, available at:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/3/muslim-brotherhood-seeks-end-
to-israel-treaty/. 26
E. Inbar, "The Rise and Demise of the Two-State Paradigm," Orbis, Vol. 53, No.
2, Spring 2009, pp. 265-83. 27
For a refutation of the “American decline” arguments, see R.J. Lieber, The
American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, London and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005; C. Norrlof, American Global Advantage: US
Hegemony and International Cooperation, New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010.
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES
28
28
For an analysis of the impact of politics on deterrence and deviation from
rationality, see P.M. Morgan, Deterrence. A Conceptual Analysis, Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1977, pp. 125-202. 29
Y. Katz, “Hamas sets up rocket production line in Sinai,” The Jerusalem Post,
December, 11, 2011, available at:
http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=248948. 30
"Israel says Gaza gets Anti-Plane Arms from Libya," Reuters, August 29, 2011,
available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-palestinians-israel-libya-
idUSTRE77S3UO20110829. 31
B. Opall-Rome, “Senior Israeli Commander Sees Danger in Syrian Collapse,”
Defense News, December 12, 2011, p.1. 32
The best account of Israel-Jordan relations is given by M. Zak, Hussein Makes
Peace (Hebrew), Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1994. 33
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of
Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran", IAEA Director
General's Report, November 8, 2011, available at:
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf. 34
J.M. Lindsay and R. Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.
89, No. 2, March/April 2010; and E. Inbar, "The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran,"
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2006, available
at: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html. 35
The term “energy ellipse” was coined by G. Kemp and R.E. Harkavy, Strategic
Geography and the Changing Middle East, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1997, p. 113. 36
See inter alia, G. Weitz, "Barak to Haaretz: Iran won't drop nuclear bomb on
Israel," Haaretz, May 5, 2011, available at:
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/barak-to-haaretz-iran-won-t-drop-nuclear-
bomb-onisrael-1.359870; Y. Melman, "Report: Mysterious blast in Iran's Isfahan
damaged key nuclear site," Haaretz, November 30, 2011, available at:
www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/report-mysterious-blast-in-iran-s-
isfahan-damagedkey-nuclear-site-1.398671; T. Buck, "Ex-Spymaster Opposes Iran
Attack," Financial Times, November 11, 2011, available at:
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fbbe0342-0c57-11e1-88c6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1fIqhg81d; Y. Lapin, "Strike fallout can never be as bad as
nuclear Iran," The Jerusalem Post, November 23, 2011, available at:
www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=246745.
For a confirmation of Israel’s alarmist view of the Osirak reactor, see H. Brands and
D. Palkki, “Saddam, Israel and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?”
International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, pp. 133-66. 37
S. Diaz, “The Probability for an All-out War Has Increased in the Middle East,”
Israel Hayom, September 9, 2011, p. 7. 38
“Creation of new regional brigade was necessitated by recent tensions along the
Israel-Egypt border,” IDF Spokesperson's Office, November 27, 2011, available at:
http://www.idf.il/1283-13961-en/Dover.aspx.
ARAB UPRISINGS AND ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY
29
39
G. Allon and G. Golan, "Large military operation may be needed in Gaza, says
IDF chief," Israel Hayom, November 16, 2011, p. 9. 40
Yuval Azoulai , “IDF wants NIS 15b for Arrow missiles,” January 3, 2012,
available at: http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-
Industry/2012/01/13/Israel-needs-39B-to-fund-Arrow-plan/UPI-
45861326477304/?spt=hs&or=si. 41
U. Rubin, The Missile Threat from Gaza: From Nuisance to Strategic Threat,
BESA Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 91, Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University,
December 2011. 42
B. Opall-Rome, “Israel Integrating Upper-, Lower-Tier Missile Defenses,”
Defense News, June 20, 2011, p. 4. 43
Y. Lifschitz, Israel’s Military Industries, BESA Mideast Security and Policy
Studies No. 92 (Hebrew), Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, December 2011. 44
B. Opall-Rome, “Israel MoD Battles Budget Cuts,” Defense News, October 17,
2011, p. 6. 45
For the relationship between technology and war, see M. Van Creveld,
Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, New York: The Free Press,
1989. 46
For the overstated importance of technology in shaping military outcomes, see
K.A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.