Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
1
The 2019-20 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief The 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index is the seventh in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world, based on the findings from face-to-face interviews conducted with 28,288 individual respondents in 13 Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. The Arab Opinion Index remains the largest public opinion survey carried out in the Arab world. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples. The overall samples guarantee probability-proportional-to-size (PPS), ensuring fairness in the representation of various population segments.
A total of 69,000 hours of actual work was needed to carry out these surveys by an overall team of 900 individuals, equally balanced on gender. The team covered a total of 820,000 kilometers across the population clusters sampled.
• The results of the index are presented according to the countries surveyed and according to the general average of each Arab region. For the purposes of comparison, the data of the countries surveyed are classified according to the geographical regions of the Arab world, namely:
Arab Maghreb - Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia
Nile Valley - Egypt and Sudan
The Arab Mashreq - Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq
The Gulf - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar
Section 1: Living Conditions of Arab Citizens
How did the Arab citizens assess their economic conditions?
Figure 1: Self-reported Household Income Level
● Only 27% of respondents, mostly in the Gulf region, reported that their household income was sufficient for them to make savings after their necessary expenditures were covered. A further 43% reported that while their household incomes were sufficient to cover necessary subsistence expenditures, they could not sustain savings. Fully 26 % of respondents reported that they lived “in a state of need,” with household incomes not covering their necessary expenditures. As is expected, the affluent families are concentrated in the gulf Region, while families in need are centered in the Mashreq. ● Of those respondents whose households live “in need,” 51% resort to borrowing from a
variety of sources, including family and friends as well as banks and financial institutions to cover
their essential expenditures.
2
● Another 17% of needy families rely on handouts and charitable assistance from friends and family, while 14% on assistance from charitable organizations and government aid, indicating traditional support networks remain stronger than institutional frameworks.
Figure 1: Self-reported Household Income Level over Multiple Waves
Figure 2:Self-reported household income level by region
27
22
20
20
21
18
15
43
46
49
48
42
40
42
26
30
29
29
32
37
41
4
2
2
3
5
5
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
My household’s income covers expenditures sufficiently and allows us to save
My household’s income covers our expenditures but does not allow us to saveMy household’s income is not sufficient for necessary expenditures and we face difficulties
Dk /declined to answer
51
25
23
14
27
40
36
51
49
43
6
31
25
36
26
3
8
1
1
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
My household’s income covers expenditures sufficiently and allows us to save
My household’s income covers our expenditures but does not allow us to save
My household’s income is not sufficient for necessary expenditures and we face difficulties
DK /declined to answer
3
How do Arab citizens assess the political and security situations in their countries?
• 69% of the respondents believe that the level of security in their country is good, compared to 30% who said rated it negatively.
• The assessment of the level of safety in the respondents ’countries, according to the results of the 2019/2020 poll, is less than what was recorded in the 2018/2017 poll by five points, and higher than what was recorded in the 2015, 2014 and 2012/2013 polls.
• 46% described the economic situation of their countries as good, compared to 52% who evaluated the economic situation of their countries overall negative. The majority of respondents in Arab countries, with the exception of the Gulf countries, evaluated the economic situation in their countries negatively, especially in the countries of the Arab Mashreq.
Figure 3: Respondents assess the economic situation of their countries
69
66
32
11
10
9
2
2
1
1
1
16
25
27
58
49
56
39
27
21
14
11
20
46
4
30
2
6
9
28
21
32
42
41
48
32
40
40
28
28
1
1
1
11
8
15
29
35
36
53
38
13
68
24
3
0
1
6
6
1
3
1
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Kuwait
Mauritania
Egypt
Morocco
Palestine
Sudan
Iraq
Tunisia
Jordan
Algeria
Lebanon
Aggregate
very good good bad very bad Dk /declined to answer
4
Figure 4: Respondents assess the economic situation of their countries
Figure 5: Respondents assess the economic situation of their countries according to
the regions of the Arab world
• 48% evaluate the political situation in their countries as positive, compared to 47% who evaluate it as
negative. Most respondents in the Gulf states evaluated the political situation as positive.
• Respondent evaluation of the political situation in their countries was the most positive in the
2019/2020, compared to all the previous waves/years of the survey.
56
6
5
1
16
37
38
36
16
30
6
31
33
40
28
1
22
23
43
24
3
3
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
very good good bad very bad DK /declined to answer
56
6
5
1
16
37
38
36
16
30
6
31
33
40
28
1
22
23
43
24
3
3
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
very good good bad very bad DK /declined to answer
5
Figure 6: Respondents ’assessment of the political situation in their countries
according to the results of index surveys
Figure 7: Respondents ’assessment of the political situation in their countries,
according to Arab world regions
74
66
20
11
11
10
7
3
3
2
1
1
1
16
16
28
61
47
54
54
27
26
22
15
53
8
8
32
1
3
14
23
18
22
32
41
27
45
32
32
29
25
2
11
5
8
25
26
36
37
9
59
62
22
9
3
2
9
13
6
9
4
12
1
5
5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Kuwait
Mauritania
Egypt
Jordan
Morocco
Sudan
Tunisia
Palestine
Algeria
Iraq
Lebanon
Aggregate
very good good bad very bad Dk /declined to answer
53
7
5
3
16
35
40
37
21
32
6
29
28
32
25
1
16
20
41
22
5
8
9
2
5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
very good good bad very bad DK /declined to answer
6
What are the priorities of the Arab citizen?
• The priorities of the citizens of the Arab region are varied, but the largest bloc (57%) said that their
priorities are economic in nature. More than half of the citizens mentioned that unemployment, high
prices, poor economic conditions, and poverty are the most important challenges facing their country.
• 16% of the respondents mentioned priorities related to government performance and policies, such as
weak public services, financial and administrative corruption, governance and its policies, and
democratic transition, which are problems that fall within the framework of governance policies and
institutions in Arab countries.
• 10% of the respondents said that their priorities are related to issues related to security, safety and
political stability.
• 22% of the citizens of the Arab region want to emigrate, and the majority of them want to do so in
order to improve their economic situation. However, about 15% of the respondents who wanted to
emigrate said that their motive is education or continuing education, and 12% said that they want to
emigrate for political or security reasons.
• More than a quarter of respondents in the Mashreq, Maghreb and Nile Valley countries want to
emigrate, compared to 5% in the Gulf countries.
Figure 8: Public opinion trends toward the desire to emigrate, according to AOI
results over the years
22
26
24
23
22
22
24
77
73
75
74
76
76
74
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 /2013
2011
yes no Dk /declined to answer
7
Figure 9: Public opinion trends towards the desire to migrate according to the
regions of Arab world
• Respondents' attitudes varied regarding the countries posing the greatest threat to their countries;
22% of the public believe that Israel is the most threatening to the security of their countries, while 14%
point to the United States of America as the source of the threat, and 13% Iran. About half of Iraqis
believe that Iran is the main threat to the security of their country.
• The largest bloc in Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt and Mauritania believes that Israel is the most
threatening to their respective countries.
• 47% of the respondents in the Mashreq countries said that Israel is the main threat to their countries.
While 27% of the Arab Gulf region respondents stated that Iran is the first threat. For threats facing the
Arab region, Israel occupied the first place as a threat to the Arab region in the eyes of the respondents
from all countries, and from each country separately.
Figure 10 :Public opinion trends towards countries most threatening to respondents'
countries
28
27
26
5
22
71
71
71
94
77
1
2
3
1
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
Yes No DK/declined to answer
Country of threat
Country Israel America Iran
Neighboring Arab
countries
Arab states
France Turkey Other states
European states
Non-Arab neighboring or regional
states
Armed semi-state
groups
Don’t know/refuse
to answer
There is no
source of
threat
Total
Jordan 51 12 7 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 18 100
Tunisia 11 11 0 14 19 0 1 0 1 0 0 43 0 100
Algeria 11 2 0 1 1 61 0 0 0 0 0 14 10 100
KSA 4 3 39 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 38 10 100
Sudan 24 37 6 15 2 0 0 1 0 4 0 7 4 100
Iraq 6 31 50 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 100
Palestine 81 13 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 100
Kuwait 23 25 34 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 6 8 100
Lebanon 48 17 19 5 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 4 2 100
Egypt 25 10 4 14 17 0 18 2 0 0 0 4 6 100
Morocco 3 3 1 20 2 2 0 1 2 0 5 24 37 100
Mauritania 13 12 2 5 3 3 0 2 0 2 0 58 0 100
Qatar 3 7 9 55 0 0 0.3 0.3 0 0 0 10 15 100
Average 23 14 13 11 4 5 2 1 0 0 0 18 9 100
8
Figure 11 : Public opinion trends towards the most threatening countries according
to regions of the Arab world
Figure 12 : There are many sources of threat to an individual. In your opinion, what
are the three most important sources of threat?
Arab Mashreq Nile Valley Arab Maghreb Gulf Overall Average
Israel 46.5 24.5 9.5 9.3 23
America 18.3 23.5 7.0 11.3 14
Iran 19.3 5.0 0.8 27.0 13
Neighboring Arab countries 3.8 14.5 10.0 19.7 11
Arab states 1.0 9.5 6.3 0.0 4
France 0.0 0.0 16.5 0.0 5
Turkey 1.5 9.0 0.3 1.0 2
Other states 0.5 1.5 0.8 0.7 1
European states 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0
Non-Arab neighboring or regional states
0.0 2.0 0.5 0.0 0
Armed semi-state groups 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0
don't know / declined to answer 4.3 5.5 34.8 24.0 18
there is no source of threat 5.0 5.0 11.8 7.0 9
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Top source of
threat 2nd most
important threat 3rd most
important threat Average
Drugs 18 18 11 16 Terrorism 14 10 8 11 External risks / external interventions 10 9 8 9 The gap between the rich and the poor 9 8 11 9 Water scarcity 8 5 4 5 Climate change 7 4 4 5 Cyber security / cyber attacks 7 6 5 6 Crime 6 12 11 10 Political instability (political polarization and political conflicts)
5 5 7 6 Environmental pollution 3 5 5 4 Tensions in the Region 3 4 4 4 Societal tensions 2 3 4 3 Forced migration 2 3 4 3 Expatriates 1 1 1 1 Regional divisions 1 1 2 2 Sectarian divisions 0 1 1 1 Sectarian tensions 0 1 1 1 Others 0 0 0 0 don't know / declined to answer 4 -- -- 4 No second / third option -- 4 9 6
Total 100 100 100 100
9
Figure 13: There are many sources of threat that can affect an individual. In your
opinion, what are the most important sources of threat?
Section 2: Perceptions of State Institutions and Governmental Effectiveness
Citizens ’confidence in state institutions
• The confidence of Arab citizens in state institutions in their countries varied; while their confidence is
high, especially in the military and public security institutions, the confidence in judicial, executive, and
legislative branches are low. Representative legislative councils received the least amount of confidence.
Arab
Mashreq
Arab Maghreb
Nile Valley
Gulf Overall Average
Drugs 24 20 15 11 18
Terrorism 8 16 15 17 14
External risks / external interventions 13 3 9 14 9
The gap between the rich and the poor 8 14 7 4 9
Water scarcity 3 12 13 5 8
Climate change 3 8 11 7 7
Crime 6 10 7 2 7
Cyber security / cyber attacks 4 2 5 15 6
Political instability (political polarization and political conflicts)
12 4 6 1 6
Tensions in the Region 3 1 3 3 3
Environmental pollution 4 3 4 2 3
Forced migration 3 1 1 1 2
Societal tensions 2 2 1 2 2
Regional divisions 1 1 1 1 1
Expatriates -- -- -- 4 1
Sectarian divisions 2 -- -- 0 1
Sectarian tensions 2 -- -- 0 1
Others 1 0 0 1 0
don't know / declined to answer 1 2 0 11 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100
10
Figure 14: The extent of citizen confidence in the institutions of their countries (the
general average in societies surveyed)
• Public opinion is divided over the evaluation of the performance of legislative councils in Arab
countries with regard to their oversight of governments, or their representation of social groups and
sects. Half of the respondents believe that these councils fulfil their role at these levels, while about half
believe that they do not. Input from Tunisia and Kuwait boosted positive ratings for such councils.
Figure 15: Respondent evaluation of the performance of their representative
legislative councils in their duty to oversee governments
63
39
33
32
28
21
17
17
16
25
37
38
37
31
26
42
37
43
6
12
14
15
16
17
21
19
19
5
10
11
13
23
32
18
23
17
1
2
4
3
2
4
2
4
5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Army
Police /General Security/ Gendarmerie
Sharia Courts
The Judiciary
Government/ government Ministries
Councils/ Parliaments
Local Media
Municipal / local councils
Private companies
High degree of confidence Confident to some extent Lack Confidence to some extent
Completely lack Confidence DK /Declined to answer
30
27
27
21
19
14
11
12
9
4
2
16
29
59
35
19
43
55
54
43
29
25
20
38
16
11
16
21
14
18
15
15
24
25
25
18
17
2
13
37
12
8
2
12
25
44
50
20
8
1
9
2
12
5
18
18
13
2
3
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Tunisia
Kuwait
Egypt
Iraq
Mauritania
Algeria
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Morocco
Jordan
Lebanon
Aggregate
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree DK /Declined to answer
11
Figure 16: Respondent evaluation of the performance of their representative
legislative councils in their duty to monitor governments according to Arab world
regions
How does public opinion evaluate government performance?
• The evaluation of the performance of governments at the level of foreign policies, economic policies,
and in a range of public policies and services, is generally not positive; 43% to 50% (depending on the
country) of respondents evaluated government performance as positive, and this evaluation roughly
coincides with the public's evaluation of government performance in previous AOI polls.
• There is a clear consensus among the Arab public that financial and administrative corruption is varied
across their countries: 91% of the Arab public believes that corruption is widespread in their home
countries, compared to only 7% who believe that corruption is not widespread at all. Data also indicate,
over the course of seven years (since 2011), that citizen perceptions and opinions regarding the extent
of corruption in their countries have not changed substantially. Respondents in the Mashreq countries
are most certain of the spread of corruption in their countries, while the highest rates were recorded in
the Gulf countries that corruption was not widespread.
There is a prevailing belief at the level of public opinion that corruption is widespread in both the public
and private sectors, albeit in greater proportions in the public sector.
• 43% of the respondents believe that the category of politicians contributes most to the spread of
financial and administrative corruption, followed by businessmen at 23%, then senior state employees,
16%.
27
18
16
9
16
35
39
52
21
38
15
18
13
23
18
13
15
5
44
20
9
10
13
2
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
Strongly agree Agree Disagree
Strongly Disagree DK/declined to answer
12
Figure 17: Public opinion trends towards the extent of financial and administrative
corruption in the countries of respondents in AOI polls over the years
Figure 18: Public opinion trends towards the extent of financial and administrative
corruption, according to Arab world regions
48
45
46
47
53
56
56
30
31
33
33
30
29
28
13
15
14
12
8
7
7
7
6
4
6
5
4
3
2
3
3
3
4
4
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Very widespread Widespread to some extentLimited Prevalence Completely not PrevalentDK /Declined to answer
69
56
52
9
48
22
28
30
41
30
5
9
10
28
13
2
4
5
18
7
1
3
3
5
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
Very widespread Widespread to some extentLimited Prevalence Completely not PrevalentDK/declined to answer
13
Figure 19: The trends of Arab public opinion towards the extent of the spread of
financial and administrative corruption in the public and private sectors
Figure 20: The trends of Arab public opinion towards the extent of the spread of
financial and administrative corruption in the public sector and the private sector,
according to Arab world regions
50
29
33
40
12
22
3
5
2
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Public sector
Private sector
Very widespread Widespread to some extent
Limited Prevalence Completely not Prevalent
DK /Declined to answer
64
58
53
11
50
31
36
27
14
29
27
30
34
47
33
41
36
38
45
40
6
9
10
31
12
18
17
24
32
22
2
2
2
9
3
6
4
6
5
5
1
2
1
1
2
3
6
5
3
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
Pu
blic
se
cto
rP
riva
te s
ect
or
Very widespread Widespread to some extentLimited Prevalence Completely not PrevalentDK/declined to answer
14
Figure 21: Which of the following groups contributes the most to the spread of
corruption in your country?
Most contributing
most nd2contributing
Average
Politicians 43 15 29
Businessmen 23 25 24
Senior State Employees 16 30 23
Municipality heads, mayors 4 10 7
Junior employees 6 6 6
Media and Press figures 3 6 5
Others 1 0 1
I don’t know/won’t reply 4 -- 2
No other choice -- 8 4
Total 100 100 100
32% of the respondents said that their countries apply the law equally among citizens, while 46% think
that they apply the law but favor some groups, that is, discriminate in their interest, and 20% think that
they do not apply the law equally at all.
Figure 22: Public opinion trends towards the extent to which the state applies the
law equally among people in AOI over the years
33
28
24
25
21
22
19
45
52
54
54
53
50
48
20
18
20
21
22
22
26
2
2
2
1
4
5
7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
The state applies the rule of law fairly and equitablyThe state applies the rule of law but favors some groups of citizens over othersThe state dose not apply the rule of law at allDK /Declined to answer
15
Figure 23: Public opinion trends towards the extent to which the state applies the
law equally among people according to Arab world regions
Public opinion was divided regarding the extent to which the principle of a fair trial is applied in
the respondents' countries. 62% said it was applied, while 35% said it was not.
71
33
28
9
33
25
49
49
55
45
3
16
19
35
20
2
2
4
1
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
The state applies the rule of law fairly and equitably
The state applies the rule of law but favors some groups of citizens over others
The state dose not apply the rule of law at all
DK/declined to answer
16
Figure 24: Public opinion trends towards the extent to which the principle of a fair
trial has been applied in the Index survey over the years
Figure 25: Public opinion trends towards the extent of applying the principle of a
fair trial according to Arab world regions
22
18
16
16
14
13
40
41
42
42
39
42
19
22
23
23
22
21
16
16
17
18
21
19
3
3
2
1
4
5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
Upheld to a large extent Upheld, to some extentNot Upheld, to some extent Completely not UpheldDK /Declined to answer
50
27
15
6
22
44
40
46
28
40
3
22
20
28
19
1
10
14
36
16
2
2
5
1
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
Upheld to a large extent Upheld, to some extent
Not Upheld, to some extent Completely not Upheld
DK/declined to answer
17
Section 3: Arab Public Attitudes towards Democracy
How does Arab public opinion understand democracy?
• Citizens of the Arab region can provide a definition of democracy; 89% of respondents provided a
definition with content.
• 39% of the citizens of the Arab region define democracy as a guarantee of political and civil freedoms.
20% of them said that democracy is a guarantee of equality and justice among citizens, 14% focused on
participation and the institutional aspect of a democratic system (circulation of power, separation and
control between the authorities), 9% defined democracy as a guarantee of security and stability, and 7%
defined it as improving economic conditions.
• The results show an increase in the percentage of those who defined democracy as participation and
the institution of democratic governance (circulation, separation, and oversight between authorities),
especially in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Mauritania.
• The majority of the citizens of the Arab region reject statements with negative content about
democracy, but they are divided on the statement that our society is not prepared to practice the
democratic system.
Figure 26: Supporters and opponents of some statements about the democratic
political system
• A majority of public opinion supports the democratic system, with a rate of 76%, compared to an
opposition of 17%.
• Despite the close support for democracy throughout the Arab region, support rates were highest in
the Levant and Maghreb regions.
11
8
6
6
5
29
28
22
20
15
33
36
41
42
39
17
18
22
23
29
10
10
9
9
12
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
My society is unprepared for democracy
Democracies are characterized by indecisivenessand discord
Democracies are not effective in the maintenanceof security and public order
Economic performance suffers in a democracy
Democracy is incompatible with Islam
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree DK /Declined to answer
18
Figure 27: Supporters and opponents of the saying, “The democratic system, even if
it has its problems, is better than other systems,” in AOI over the years
Figure 28: Supporters and opponents of the statement “The democratic system,
even if it has its problems, is better than other systems” according to Arab world
regions
The majority of respondents (74% consensus) believes that democracy is the most appropriate system
of governance for their home countries, when asked to compare democracy to other systems (such as
authoritarian regimes, representative democracies where electoral competition is limited to either
Islamist or non-Islamist/secular political parties, or to theocracies).
28
26
29
30
31
23
31
48
48
43
42
41
45
36
12
13
16
15
12
14
10
4
4
6
7
5
4
5
8
9
6
6
11
14
18
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Strongly agree Agree DisagreeStrongly Disagree DK /Declined to answer
36
31
25
23
28
42
46
54
46
48
11
10
12
15
12
4
4
5
5
4
7
9
4
12
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Gulf
Aggregate
Strongly agree Agree DisagreeStrongly Disagree DK/declined to answer
19
Figure 29: Public opinion trends toward the suitability of a set of political systems as
systems of government for their countries
51% of the respondents in the Arab region accept the arrival of a political party with whom they do not
agree to power through the ballot box, compared to 43% who said that they do not accept that. The
percentages of approval for this are the lowest compared to previous polls. The highest of these
percentages were recorded in the Nile Valley region and the lowest in the Gulf region.
Figure 30: Public opinion trends toward a political party taking power in a free and
fair election, by year
44
16
14
9
6
5
30
19
19
22
14
14
9
22
25
26
26
29
9
35
34
34
46
43
8
8
8
9
8
9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Democratic system
A political system in which the military / armyofficials rule
A government based on Islamic Sharia
Electoral system with competition limited toIslamist parties
Electoral system with competition limited to non-religious/secular parties
An undemocratic/authoritarian system ofgovernment
Very appropriate Appropriate to some extent Inappropriate to some extent
Completely inappropriate DK /Declined to answer
51
57
54
55
57
54
53
43
35
40
40
35
32
36
6
8
6
5
8
14
11
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Accept Oppose DK /Declined to answer
20
Figure 31: Public opinion trends toward a political party taking power in a free and
fair election, by region
How do Arabs establish democracy in their countries?
• This consensus on support for democracy is accompanied by a negative evaluation of existing
democracy in the Arab World. Respondents placed the level of democracy in the region at 5.8/10 – that
is, democracy remains, as far as they are concerned, only halfway there.
Figure 32: Assessing the level of democracy in countries surveyed by AOI over the
years
59
49
47
43
48
24
25
28
40
30
9
6
7
9
8
8
20
18
8
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
The Arab Spring is presently facing obstacles but will eventually achieve its aims
The Arab Spring has come to an end and the old regimes are returning to power
Neither of the two statements
DK/declined to answer
5.8 5.55.3
5.5 5.25.0
4.5
2019 /2020 2017 /2018 2016 2015 2014 2012 / 2013 2011
21
• The evaluation of the level of democracy, through the criterion of the ability of citizens to criticize the
government without fear, indicates that 30% of the respondents say it is not possible to criticize the
government without fear, compared with 27% in the 2012 poll. In fact, the majority of respondents in
some societies (such as Palestine and Saudi Arabia) reported that they cannot criticize the government
without fear.
• Arab citizen evaluations of their ability to criticize the governments of their countries on a scale of 1 to
10 also showed limited ability to criticize their own governments; this criterion received a score of 6.0
out of 10. Tunisia, Sudan, and Mauritania got the best scores, while Palestine and Saudi Arabia scored
the lowest in this regard.
• Respondent ability to criticize the governments of their countries was the highest in the Arab Maghreb
region, and the lowest in the Gulf region.
Figure 33: Assuming there is a numerical scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means the
inability to criticize the government and the number 10 means full ability to criticize
the government, how much are you able to criticize your country's government?
6.96.86.86.56.46.46.36.35.85.75.6
4.63.9
6.0
0.0
10.0
22
Figure 34: Evaluating the level of democracy in the countries surveyed and the
ability of citizens to criticize the government
Figure 35: Evaluating the level of democracy in the countries surveyed and the
ability of citizens to criticize the government according to Arab world regions
7.77.56.86.56.16.05.75.45.3
4.84.64.44.2
5.8
3.9
5.8
6.86.46.3
5.6
6.96.46.5
5.7
6.8
4.6
6.36.0
0.0
10.0Assess the level of democracy
7.2
5.75.3
5.0
5.85.4
6.46.2
5.96.0
0.0
10.0
The GulfThe MaghrebNile ValleyThe Levant/Mashreq
Aggregate
Level of democracy The ability of citizens to criticize the government
23
Arab Revolutions
How does public opinion gauge the 2011 Arab uprisings? In the context of identifying public attitudes toward democracy, we also gauge public opinion on
the Arab uprisings of 2011, for which the main demand was to end autocratic regimes. Thus, to assess the views of citizens on the revolutions at the moment of their happening, without asking about subsequent developments, we asked: “Back in 2011, several Arab countries witnessed revolutions and popular protests, in which people took to the streets in demonstrations. What is your assessment of that?”
Results show that 58% still consider the uprisings to have been positive, and 28% consider them to have been negative.
This percentage that was recorded in the 2019-2020 AOI is the highest percentage recorded since 2013.
Views of the Arab Spring over time.
Figure 36: Back in 2011, several Arab countries witnessed popular revolutions and
protests in which people took to the streets in peaceful demonstrations and protests;
what is your assessment of that? Based on AOI surveys over the years:
25
20
18
10
17
25
33
29
33
24
28
36
13
16
19
25
17
11
15
23
22
34
25
11
14
12
8
7
12
17
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
Very positive Positive, to some extent Negative, to some extent
Very negative DK /Declined to answer
24
Figure 37: Back in 2011, several Arab countries witnessed popular revolutions and
protests in which people took to the streets in peaceful demonstrations and protests;
what is your assessment of that? By Arab region:
Aside from their evaluation of the revolutions and their outcomes, respondents were asked about the
reasons that prompted people in 2011 to participate in the Arab revolutions and protest movements,
and they stated that their motives were to stand against tyranny and injustice, for democracy and
equality (29%), and against corruption (30%).
Figure 38: Back in 2011, several Arab countries witnessed popular revolutions and
protests in which people took to the streets in peaceful demonstrations. In your
opinion, what are the first and second most important reasons for that? As seen in
the AOI over the waves of the survey
45
28
21
17
25
30
32
34
34
33
9
10
13
18
13
7
14
12
21
15
10
16
21
10
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
Very positive Positive, to some extent
Negative, to some extent Very negative
Order of responses
First most important reason Second most important reason
2019 /2020 2017 /2018 2016 2019 /2020 2017 /2018 2016
Against corruption 31 21 25 14 11 6 Due to poor economic conditions
16 20 18 17 17 14
Against dictatorship 16 14 20 11 9 9
For political freedoms 6 8 10 7 8 7
To end oppression 6 8 5 12 14 15
For justice and equality 4 5 3 10 12 11
For democracy 3 4 4 8 8 9
For dignity 4 4 4 8 9 9
Other 1 3 3 1 1 1
don’t know, decline to respond 13 13 7 0 0 0
No other choice 0 0 0 12 13 19 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
25
• Arab public opinion was divided between optimistic and pessimistic about the reality and future of the
Arab Spring revolutions, with 48% said that they are in a faltering phase, but that they will eventually
achieve their goals, and 30% who believe that the Arab Spring has ended and that previous regimes
have returned to power.
Figure 39: Which of the following two phrases are closest to your point of view?
Which of the following two phrases are closest to your point of view?
• Public opinion in the Arab region trends in support of the Sudanese and Algerian revolutions, although nonresponse represents a third of the sample.
59
49
47
43
48
24
25
28
40
30
9
6
7
9
8
8
20
18
8
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
The Arab Spring is presently facing obstacles but will eventually achieve its aims
The Arab Spring has come to an end and the old regimes are returning to power
Neither of the two statements
DK/declined to answer
26
Figure 40: For several months, Algeria has been witnessing popular protests that led
to changes in the political system. Did you support or oppose these popular protests
in Algeria?
Figure 41: For several months, Algeria has been witnessing popular protests that led
to changes in the political system. Did you support or oppose these popular protests
in Algeria? By Arab world region:
71
66
64
62
58
51
50
45
45
43
43
25
18
49
6
12
15
18
15
13
25
9
8
25
21
26
20
17
23
22
21
20
27
36
25
46
47
32
36
49
62
34
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Algeria
Morocco
Palestine
Tunisia
Sudan
Mauritania
Kuwait
Lebanon
Egypt
Jordan
Iraq
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Aggregate
Support Oppose DK/Declined to answer
59
51
48
31
49
15
11
17
24
17
26
38
35
45
34
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
Support Oppose DK/declined to answer
27
Figure 42: Over the course of several months, Sudan witnessed popular protests
that led to changes in the political system. Did you support or oppose the popular
protests in Sudan?
Figure 43: For several months, Sudan has been witnessing popular protests that led
to changes in the political system. Did you support or oppose these popular protests
in Sudan? By Arab world region:
8163
6160
5149
4846
4540
241820
47
1420
127
1310
1724
199
1520
614
517
2733
3641
3530
3651
6162
7439
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SudanKuwait
PalestineEgypt
MauritaniaMorocco
TunisiaJordan
IraqLebanon
Saudi ArabiaQatar
AlgeriaAggregate
Support Oppose DK/Declined to answer
70
47
41
35
47
11
15
12
18
14
19
38
47
47
39
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
Support Oppose DK/declined to answer
28
The majority of the respondents whose countries witnessed popular protests supported these protests.
85% of the Sudanese supported the popular protests in Sudan.
82% of Iraqis support the popular protests in Iraq.
71% of Algerians support the popular protests in Algeria.
67% of the Lebanese people support the protests in Lebanon.
Figure 44: Supporters and opponents of the protests in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and
Sudan
• Participation rates in the popular demonstrations / protests ranged from 15% to 37% in Algeria,
Lebanon, Iraq, and Sudan.
85
82
71
67
5
16
6
31
10
2
23
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Sudan
Iraq
Algeria
Lebanon
Support Oppose DK/Declined to answer
29
Figure 45: Respondents reporting participation in protests in Lebanon, Iraq,
Algeria, Algeria and Sudan
Section 4: Civic and Political Participation
● Despite the fact that citizens in the Arab world support democracy, their political and civic participation is limited. To assess this issue, we tracked three indicators of political participation: political apathy, trust in existing political parties, and whether or not a respondent plans on participating in upcoming elections.
● Public opinion was split regarding participation in elections. The percentage of those who said they do not want to engage in elections has risen to 46%, although this figure hovered around 27% in the surveys from 2011 to 2013.
● Trust in political parties has also decreased over the years. ● Although Arab public opinion supports democracy and gauges the level of democracy in their
countries negatively, political apathy has become increasingly the norm. This is perhaps to be expected if we are to consider that the common citizen does not have space to criticize the government. Saudi Arabia is a prime example of this dynamic.
37
27
20
15
62
67
80
84
1
6
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Sudan
Algeria
Lebanon
Iraq
Yes No Declined to answer
30
Figure 46: Level of political apathy, by year
Figure 47: Level of political apathy, by region
12
12
10
12
12
17
15
30
27
30
32
27
30
25
30
32
34
33
36
30
31
28
28
25
23
23
19
26
1
1
1
2
4
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 /2013
2011
very concerned /engaged concerned /engaged
concerned, to a limited extent Completely not concerned
Declined to answer
14
13
10
9
12
38
26
27
30
30
26
31
31
31
30
22
29
32
29
28
1
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
Aggregate
very concerned /engaged concerned /engaged concerned, to a limited extent
Completely not concerned Declined to answer
31
Figure 48: Do you intend to vote in the coming parliamentary elections?
Figure 49: Levels of trust in political parties over time.
48
49
52
56
58
58
59
42
46
40
36
32
27
27
10
5
8
8
10
15
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 /2013
2011
Yes No Declined to answer
5
5
8
7
7
9
5
22
24
23
21
22
25
18
24
25
24
29
26
26
20
43
41
41
39
39
31
40
6
5
4
4
6
9
17
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
High degree of confidence Confident to some extent
Lack Confidence to some extent Completely lack Confidence
DK /Declined to answer
32
Figure 50 : Levels of trust in political parties by region.
● Membership of, and participation in, civil and voluntary organizations remains extremely limited across the Arab region, with no more than 16% of respondents reporting that they are members of such groups in any given country. When taking into account the level of active participation in the activities of such groups, the level of effective participation would likely fall further still.
10
9
5
2
5
42
27
27
16
22
28
31
24
21
24
14
27
40
55
43
5
6
5
7
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
High degree of confidence Confident to some extentLack Confidence to some extent Completely lack ConfidenceDK /Declined to answer
33
Figure 51: Types of political participation
● Additionally, a majority of respondents (61%) have no affiliation with a political party in any way,
nor do they feel that their views are represented by any existing political group or bloc.
Figure 52: Representativeness of Political Parties
18
15
14
12
10
9
82
84
86
87
90
91
1
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Family-based association
Voluntary/ charitable organization
Cultural Club/Association
Professional Association
Labor/Agrarian Union
Religious association
Yes No Declined to answer
Members 11
Non-members whose views
are represented by an existing
group 17
Non-members whose views
are not represented by
an existing group
61DK/ Declined to
answer11
34
● Opinion is split in terms of the interest of respondents in political affairs in their countries, though the proportion of interest is nearly constant over the past nine years.
● When it comes to following political news, we find that countries which have high rates of political apathy and no room for criticism are the ones that follow political news the least (i.e. Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Alternatively, in countries with more open political systems, people are more concerned with following political news.
● Fundamental changes have appeared over the past nine years in the sources for political news, with an increase in use of the internet over television.
● Most citizens (48%) still rely on television channels for political news coverage, followed by internet (35%) and radio (4%). Since many sources on the internet are news channel and newspaper sites, the change here is more in the means of accessing news than in the type of broadcasting or publishing institution.
● 35% of respondents stated they rely on the internet for political news, the highest proportion since 2011, doubling seven times over this period, with reliance on television channels decreasing.
● While 73% of respondents reported using the internet, to varying extents, only 27% indicated that they never use the internet. The results from the 2019-2020 poll show a continuing, statistically significant increase in internet penetration in the Arab region. The vast majority (85%) of Arabs who use the internet also have accounts on Facebook.
● 55% of Arabs who use the internet also have accounts on Instagram, 44% have accounts on Snapchat, while 45% have accounts on Twitter. The relative popularity of various social media can be seen in the chart below.
● Most of the respondents with social media accounts, in all regions of the Arab world, have accounts on Facebook; less than half of them have accounts on Twitter, apart from the Gulf region where 87% of respondents report having a Twitter account.
● The most used language while browsing the internet was predictably Arabic (87%) with French being the second most used.
● In light of the multiple uses of social media, its users were asked several questions to find out the extent of their use of it in: obtaining news and political information, expressing their opinions regarding political events, and interacting with political issues.
● In addition to other uses, the results showed that 80% of social media users also use it to obtain news and political information, and 20% use it more than once daily.
● 61% of social media account holders use it to express their views on political events, and 28% use it daily or multiple times a day.
● 61% of social media account holders use it to interact with political issues, 47% use it daily or multiple times a day.
● The society that least uses social media to interact with political issues was Saudi Arabia. This has been reflected in the Gulf region as a whole.
35
Figure 53: Comparison of news sources.
Figure 54 : Frequency of internet use: internet penetration has increased
considerably during the life of the Arab Opinion Index.
48
57
68
74
76
78
67
6
8
6
7
6
8
7
4
5
6
5
6
4
5
35
22
13
11
7
6
5
2
2
2
5
6
5
3
5
4
15
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 /2013
2011
Satellite T.V
Radio
Daily newspapers(print and online)
Online news sources
Friends and family/Word od mouth
Declined to answer
63
56
47
36
26
18
5
5
6
14
12
11
1
2
3
5
5
5
4
5
5
6
7
8
26
31
37
38
48
55
1
1
2
2
2
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
Daily or semi-daily Several times a weekSeveral times a month InfrequentlyI do not use the internet Declined to answer
36
Figure 55: Frequency of internet use: internet penetration has increased
considerably during the life of the Arab Opinion Index by region
78
77
45
44
63
5
3
4
7
5
1
1
2
2
1
3
2
7
5
4
11
17
42
40
26
3
1
2
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
Aggregate
Daily or semi-daily Several times a weekSeveral times a month InfrequentlyI do not use the internet Declined to answer
37
Figure 56: Social media users: frequency of various social media channels
Figure 57: Social media users: frequency of various social media channels by region
86
84
56
44
43
28
14
16
44
56
57
72
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Snapchat
Telegram
Yes, I have an account No, I do not have an account
9390
94
64
86
60
8993
96
84
4851
42
85
56
2925
44
87
44
2925
44
87
43
16
24
33
48
28
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
The
Mag
hre
b
The
Leva
nt/
Mas
hre
q
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gu
lf
Agg
rega
te
The
Mag
hre
b
The
Leva
nt/
Mas
hre
q
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gu
lf
Agg
rega
te
The
Mag
hre
b
The
Leva
nt/
Mas
hre
q
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gu
lf
Agg
rega
te
The
Mag
hre
b
The
Leva
nt/
Mas
hre
q
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gu
lf
Agg
rega
te
The
Mag
hre
b
The
Leva
nt/
Mas
hre
q
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gu
lf
Agg
rega
te
The
Mag
hre
b
The
Leva
nt/
Mas
hre
q
Nile
Val
ley
The
Gu
lf
Agg
rega
te
FacebookWhatsappInstagramSnapchatTwitterTelegram
38
Figure 58: How often respondents use social media to engage with social issues
Figure 59: How often respondents use social media to engage with political issues
37
37
36
35
25
13
22
16
15
15
15
13
12
22
25
28
29
23
17
26
25
20
33
35
29
8
11
24
8
13
15
12
6
15
14
11
22
21
19
6
11
13
28
21
20
30
51
46
37
52
29
28
34
72
64
40
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
1
2
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Iraq
Sudan
Egypt
Mauritania
Tunisia
Qatar
Lebanon
Palestine
Algeria
Kuwait
Morocco
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Aggregate
Daily or semi-daily Several times a week Less than once a week
Never Declined to answer
21
22
36
13
22
26
20
28
24
24
15
10
14
16
13
36
47
21
46
40
2
1
1
2
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
Several times a day Several times a week/once a weekLess than once a week NeverDeclined to answer
39
Figure 60 : The languages most used in browsing the internet
The most used language The second most used
language Arabic 87 7
French 7 13
English 4 30
Kurdish 1 0
Other 0 1
Refused to answer 1 --
No second languages -- 49
Total 100 100
Section 5: Religion and Religiosity in Public Sphere and Political Life
● Based on self-reporting, most of the Arab public is “religious to some extent” (63%). This compares with 12% of the Arab public who define themselves as “not religious,” and 23% as “very religious.”
Figure 61: Self-identified religiosity, by year
23
21
20
24
24
21
19
63
65
65
63
64
67
66
12
12
12
9
8
8
11
2
2
3
4
4
4
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Very religious Religious to some extent
Not religious Dk/Declined to answer
40
Figure 62: Self-identified religiosity, by region
When asked to define the attributes which define religiosity, most respondents provided answers
that focused on an individual's morality and values rather than the observance of religious
practices (39%). This value has not changed significantly over the years of the index.
28
15
34
20
23
54
72
55
69
63
14
12
9
8
12
5
1
2
4
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
Very religious Religious to some extent
Not religious DK/declined to answer
41
Figure 63: Most cited factors defining an individual as religious, by year
Figure 64: Most cited factors defining an individual as religious, by region
39
38
38
39
41
38
27
27
28
29
30
29
17
19
19
19
17
19
7
5
6
6
4
5
7
7
6
6
4
5
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 /2013
Carrying out religious obligations/rituals Being honest and trustworthyTreating others kindly Staying close to relatives and treating them wellHelp the poor and needy All of theseDk/Declined to answer
61
42
41
24
39
17
23
25
37
27
10
16
15
24
17
5
7
9
7
7
6
9
7
6
7
1
1
2
1
1
3
3
1
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Gulf
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
Carrying out religious obligations/rituals Being honest and trustworthy
Treating others kindly Help the poor and needy
Staying close to relatives and treating them well Other
DK/declined to answer
42
● While most Arabs describe themselves as somehow religious, most respondents nonetheless oppose edicts which pass negative judgement against members of other faiths, or which declare followers of differing interpretations of Islam to be apostates.
● Most respondents, while religious, refuse to accept that non-religious people are inherently bad people.
● Finally, most respondents do not discriminate on the basis of religiosity, or between religious and non-religious individuals, when conducting their social, political and economic/business interactions.
● The majority of respondents expressed that they do not deal with people on the basis of their religiosity or lack thereof, 61%, while 31% said that they prefer dealing with religious people.
● Most Arabs oppose the involvement of clerics in voter choice or in governmental policy. Similarly, a majority of Arabs are opposed to the employment of religion either by governments in order to win support for their policies, or by electoral candidates to win votes.
● Arab public opinion is split almost in half in attitudes towards the general principle of “separation of religion from state,” with a slightly greater inclination towards supporting the principle of separation of religion from political life (49%), compared to 44% of respondents who opposes this.
Figure 65: Perception of statement: "No religious authority is entitled to declare
followers of other religions infidels,” by year
55
42
38
29
27
26
25
16
16
13
12
10
3
24
32
37
46
28
40
38
55
58
55
35
46
40
13
41
6
12
10
15
14
14
13
19
20
27
21
24
50
18
4
8
2
17
14
7
5
4
5
16
12
13
13
9
3
1
4
11
5
15
2
3
4
9
9
13
21
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Egypt
Jordan
Lebanon
Tunisia
Iraq
Morocco
Palestine
Kuwait
Sudan
Mauritania
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Algeria
Aggregate
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
43
Figure 66: Perception of statement: "No religious authority is entitled to declare
followers of other religions infidels,” by year
Figure 67: Perception of statement: "In your day-to-day life, do you prefer to deal
with religious individuals?"
36
33
18
13
24
43
45
29
48
41
13
12
27
22
18
5
7
13
10
9
4
3
14
8
8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
Strongly agree Agree DisagreeStrongly disagree DK/declined to answer
30
31
35
35
38
35
26
7
7
9
9
8
7
62
61
54
55
52
56
70
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
I prefer to deal with religious individuals I prefer to deal with non-religious individuals
I have no preference Dk/Declined to answer
44
Figure 68: Perception of statement: "In your day-to-day life, do you prefer to deal
with religious individuals?" by region
Figure 69 : Perception of statement: “The government has no right to use religion to
win support for its policies.”
37
35
26
24
30
8
5
5
8
7
54
58
68
68
62
1
2
1
1
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/Mashreq
Aggregate
I prefer to deal with religious individuals
I prefer to deal with non-religious individuals
I have no preference
DK/declined to answer
55
35
33
33
32
30
26
21
20
17
8
8
27
35
49
40
36
27
43
37
53
57
53
53
40
44
6
11
14
14
18
18
25
18
19
21
20
18
17
3
3
12
4
15
8
6
5
3
5
3
11
6
1
2
1
13
8
1
6
3
1
4
16
23
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Egypt
Lebanon
Iraq
Morocco
Tunisia
Jordan
Mauritania
Sudan
Kuwait
Palestine
Algeria
Saudi Arabia
Aggregate
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
45
Figure 70 : Perception of statement: “The government has no right to use religion to
win support for its policies.” by region
Figure 71 : Perception of statement: "It would be better for my home country if
religion was separated from politics."
38
29
25
14
27
44
46
38
49
44
12
16
19
19
17
4
7
7
7
6
2
2
11
12
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Nile Valley
The Levant/ Mashreq
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
Strongly agree Agree DisagreeStrongly disagree DK/declined to answer
20
21
23
22
24
19
26
29
31
30
30
27
27
17
27
25
25
27
25
27
16
17
16
16
16
15
14
26
7
7
6
5
9
13
16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Dk/Declined to answer
46
Figure 72 : Perception of statement: "It would be better for my home country if
religion was separated from politics." by region
Section 6: Arab Public Opinion and Intra-Arab Relations
● A total of 81% of the respondents to the 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index supported the sentiment that the various Arab peoples formed a single nation, in contrast to only 16% who agreed with the statement that “the Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous bonds.”
29
24
16
11
20
37
30
21
30
29
20
26
29
31
27
11
16
23
19
17
3
4
11
10
7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
The Maghreb
The Gulf
Aggregate
Strongly agree AgreeDisagree Strongly disagreeDK/declined to answer
47
Figure 73: Respondents generally agree that the various Arab peoples constitute a
single nation.
Figure 74: Assessments of Arab national unity by region
36
35
40
37
39
44
35
45
42
37
42
42
35
36
16
19
19
18
14
14
17
3
4
4
3
5
7
11
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, separated by artificial borders
The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, even if each people has its own specificities
The Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous links
Dk /Declined to answer
41
38
37
28
36
41
49
51
43
45
14
10
7
27
16
5
3
4
2
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Maghreb
Nile Valley
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Aggregate
The Arab peoples constitute a single nation, separated by artificial bordersThe Arab peoples constitute a single nation, even if each people has its own specificitiesThe Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous linksDk /Declined to answer
48
● Public attitudes towards the foreign policies of regional and global powers towards the Arab world are broadly negative.
● Public opinion regarding German, Chinese, and Turkish foreign policy is more positive than it is towards those of other international and regional powers.
● The Arab public’s most negative foreign policy evaluation in the 2019-2020 AOI poll is of the US, Russian, Iranian, and French foreign policies.
● Around 58% of respondents held negative views of US foreign policy towards Arab countries; 58% also had negative views of Iran’s Arab policies; and 41% expressed negative views of Russia’s policy towards the Arab states.
Figure 75: Foreign policy assessments.
● When asked to look at specific US foreign policy areas, vast majorities of Arabs had negative views
of US policy towards Palestine (81%); Syria (81%); Yemen and Libya (72% each).
29
23
21
17
14
11
8
29
32
31
29
26
21
17
10
13
13
16
17
16
18
18
16
15
23
24
42
40
14
16
20
15
19
10
17
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Turkish foreign policy
Chinese foreign policy
German foreign policy
French foreign policy
Russian foreign policy
American foreign policy
Iranian foreign policy
Positive Positive, to some extentNegative, to some extent NegativeDk /Declined to answer
49
Figure 76: Assessment of US foreign policy
● When asked to look at specific Russian foreign policy areas, the majority of Arab respondents have negative views of Russian policy towards Palestine (59%), Syria (60%), and Yemen (60%).
Figure 77: Assessment of Russian foreign policy
● Arabs assess Iranian foreign policy in the region negatively; over half of the respondents have
negative views of Iranian policy towards Palestine (58%), Syria (60%), and Yemen (61%).
1
2
2
1
6
8
10
6
27
28
30
22
54
49
44
48
12
13
14
23
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
American policy towards Palestine
American policy towards Syria
American policy towards Yemen
American policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
3
6
3
8
15
15
15
15
29
24
30
26
30
36
30
21
23
19
22
30
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Russian policy towards Palestine
Russian policy towards Syria
Russian policy towards Yemen
Russian policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
50
Figure 78: Assessment of Iranian foreign policy
● 54% of Arab respondents view French policy towards Libya negatively. They also have a negative
view of French policy towards Palestine (53%), Syria (53%), and Yemen (51%).
Figure 79: Assessment of French foreign policy
● In contrast, the Arab public is roughly equally split in its perceptions of Turkish foreign policy in
Libya: 31% views it positively, compared to 32% who view it negatively. It is worth noting that 27% declined to answer. Similarly, 41% of the respondents had positive views of Turkey’s policies towards Palestine, compared to 42% who had negative views of Ankara’s policies.
6
9
7
17
15
16
27
27
28
31
33
33
19
16
16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Iranian policy towards Palestine
Iranian policy towards Syria
Iranian policy towards Yemen
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
4
3
3
3
22
21
20
16
29
30
29
23
24
21
24
31
21
25
24
27
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
French policy towards Palestine
French policy towards Yemen
French policy towards Syria
French policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
51
Figure 80: Assessment of Turkish foreign policy
Which state poses the greatest threat to the Arab world’s security? ● 66% of Arab public opinion considers that Israel and the United States combine as the two
countries that most threaten the security of the Arab world, while Iran comes in third place with 12%. ● The respondents of the Arab Maghreb were highest in their assessment of Israel as the country
most threatening to the security of the Arab world, while respondents in the Arab Mashreq were the highest in assessing the United States as the greatest security threat.
● 89% of Arabs believe that Israel poses a threat to the security and stability of the region. 81% believes that the United States poses a threat to the security and stability of the region.
● 67% of the respondents expressed their belief that Iranian policies threaten the security and stability of the region, while this percentage was 55% with regard to Russian policies, and 43% with regard to French policies.
Figure 81: States poses the greatest threat to the Arab Countries
12
10
5
8
30
28
27
23
21
23
25
17
20
23
22
25
17
16
21
27
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Turkish policy towards Palestine
Turkish policy towards Syria
Turkish policy towards Yemen
Turkish policy towards Libya
Very Positive Positive Negative Very Negative Dk /Declined to answer
2019/2020 2017/2018 2016 2015 2014 2012/2013 2011
Israel 37 39 41 45 42 52 51
United States 29 28 27 22 24 21 22
Iran 12 10 10 10 9 6 4
Arab Countries 5 7 5 5 5 3 2
Russia 1 2 3 1 -- -- --
European Countries 1 1 1 1 2 1 -- Other countries 1 1 1 1 1 0.3 1
Others 1 0 1 1 0.1 -- 0.2
No threats 2 4 1 1 1 1 0.4
DK/ Declined to
answer 11 8 9 12 17 15 19
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
52
Figure 82: States poses the greatest threat to the Arab Countries by region
States poses the greatest threat to the
Arab Countries The Gulf Nile
Valley
The Levant/
Mashreq The Maghreb Aggregate
Israel 41.4 38.3 35.8 31.1 37.0
United States 24.2 28.0 38.3 22.6 29.0
Iran 3.9 14.2 13.3 19.8 12.0
Arab Countries 6.7 3.4 4.8 4.2 5.0
Russia 0.8 1.9 0.9 0.5 1.0
European Countries 0.9 1.3 0.2 0.1 1.0
Other countries 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.2 1.0
Others 0.3 6.4 0.6 0.3 1.0
No threats 18.7 4.9 5.4 16.0 11.0
DK/ Declined to answer 2.5 1.1 0.7 4.9 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Figure 83: Assessment of foreign threats
80
82
80
65
70
63
49
47
52
31
34
45
23
22
33
16
13
22
19
15
19
9
8
9
16
14
19
18
19
21
24
23
24
21
23
26
16
15
17
16
19
19
3
2
3
8
5
8
12
12
10
20
18
14
27
25
21
29
26
27
24
23
24
3
2
2
5
3
3
9
9
7
10
9
6
16
13
9
24
25
20
29
30
28
5
6
6
6
8
7
12
13
9
15
16
10
13
17
12
15
21
14
12
13
10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
Isra
el
USA
Iran
Ru
ssia
Fran
ceC
hin
aTu
rke
y
Certainly Yes, to an extent No, to an extent Certainly Not Dk /Declined to answer
53
How do Arab itizens view the Palestinian Issue?
● Over three quarters of the Arab public agree that the Palestinian cause concerns all Arabs, and
not the Palestinians alone. ● It should be noted that 89% of Saudis agreed that the Palestinian issue is the issue for all Arabs
and not simply an issue for Palestinians themselves. Gulf public opinion had the highest percentage of respondents considering the Palestinian cause to be an issue for all Arabs, followed by Arab Maghreb public opinion.
Figure 84: Attitudes towards the Palestinian cause by country
79
77
75
75
77
84
84
15
15
17
18
14
8
9
4
5
5
4
4
4
1
2
3
3
3
5
4
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
The Palestinian cause concerns all Arabs and not the Palestinian people alone
The Palestinian cause concerns the Palestinians solely
Neither of the above two statements
Dk /Declined to answer
54
Figure 85: Attitudes towards the Palestinian cause by country
Figure 86: Attitudes towards the Palestinian cause by country
94
93
88
89
89
82
74
72
71
70
69
69
66
79
3
6
8
9
8
7
21
17
20
19
24
21
29
15
2
1
2
1
6
5
5
6
8
5
8
4
4
1
2
2
2
5
6
3
3
2
2
1
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Algeria
Jordan
Qatar
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Mauritania
Egypt
Sudan
Iraq
Morocco
Kuwait
Lebanon
Palestine
Aggregate
The Palestinian cause concerns all Arabs and not the Palestinian people aloneThe Palestinian cause concerns the Palestinians solelyNeither of the above two statementsDk /Declined to answer
84
82
75
73
79
10
13
19
19
15
4
3
5
5
4
3
2
2
3
2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Maghreb
The Gulf
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
Aggregate
The Palestinian cause concerns all Arabs and not the Palestinian people aloneThe Palestinian cause concerns the Palestinians solelyNeither of the above two statementsDk /Declined to answer
55
An overwhelming majority (88%) of Arabs disapprove of recognition of Israel by their home countries, with only 6% accepting formal diplomatic recognition. In fact, one half of those who accepted formal diplomatic relations with Israel and their governments made such a move conditional on the formation of an independent Palestinian state. When asked to elaborate on the reasons for their positions, respondents who were opposed to diplomatic ties between their countries and Israel focused on several factors, such as Israeli racism towards the Palestinians and its colonialist, expansionist policies.
The highest rate of refusal to recognize Israel was among respondents in Algeria at 99%, followed by those in Lebanon at 94%, and Tunisia and Jordan at 93% each.
Refusal to recognize Israel is proportionally the highest in the Gulf region; nearly 90% of Qatar and Kuwait respondents reject their country’s recognition of Israel, and 65% of Saudis expressed their rejection, as contrasted with 6% who agreed to recognition, while 29% refused to express their opinion.
Only 13% of the Sudanese agreed that their country should recognize Israel, compared to 79% of them who rejected such a step.
Figure 87: Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by your
country?
0
5
6
3
3
7
7
3
10
4
13
13
6
6
99
94
93
93
93
91
90
88
88
88
85
79
65
88
1
1
1
4
4
2
3
9
2
8
2
8
29
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Algeria
Lebanon
Jordan
Tunisia
Mauritania
Palestine
Iraq
Qatar
Kuwait
Morocco
Egypt
Sudan
Saudi Arabia
Aggregate
Support Oppose Dk /Declined to answer
56
Figure 88: Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel over years
Figure 89: Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel over years
Respondents who opposed diplomatic ties of Israel justified their positions with several reasons,
relating mainly to Israel’s colonialist nature, racist and expansionist policies, and persistence in
appropriating Palestinian land.
6
8
9
9
6
6
9
88
87
86
85
87
87
84
6
5
5
6
7
6
7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
2012 / 2013
2011
Support Oppose Dk /Declined to answer
3
6
13
7
6
93
92
82
82
88
4
2
5
11
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
The Maghreb
The Levant/ Mashreq
Nile Valley
The Gulf
Aggregate
Support Oppose Dk /Declined to answer
57
Figure 90: Reasons for opposing diplomatic recognition of Israel over time
Reasons given for opposing diplomatic recognition of Israel since 2014 (as a
percentage of respondents)
Figure 91: Reasons given for opposing diplomatic recognition of Israel by region
2019
/2020 2017
/2018 2016 2015 2014
Colonialist occupying power in Palestine 33.7 31.7 27.0 24.5 23.4
Expansionist state set on controlling more Arab territory 9.4 10.1 13.0 13.0 2.4
A terrorist state/supports terrorism 7.6 7.4 7.6 10.4 1.2
Israeli dispossession of the Palestinians; continued oppression of the Palestinians
6.8 8.3 8.1 6.9 5.5
Religious reasons to oppose Israel 6.7 6.6 5.2 3.3 4.9
(Israel) is racist towards Arabs 5.9 6.3 8.2 10.3 12.2
Recognizing Israel negates the Palestinian people 4.8 5.3 5.8 5.6 7.5
Israel is an enemy of my people/the Arabs in general 4.1 3.4 3.3 4.7 11.5
Israel threatens regional security 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.4 2.5
Israel violates agreements and treaties 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.4 2.3
Israel does not exist 2.3 1.1 0.6 0.3 3.4
No reasons given 1.9 1.6 1.8 0.6 10.2
Total of those opposed to recognizing Israel 88.2 86.8 85.9 85.4 87.0
Approve of the recognition of Israel 6.2 7.9 9.5 8.9 6.0
Do not know/declined to answer (as a percentage of respondents)
5.6 5 5 6 7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mashreq Maghreb Gulf Nile Valley Average
Colonialist occupying power in Palestine 43.4 36.1 26.0 21.0 33.7
Expansionist state set on controlling more Arab
territory 10.4 9.4 8.0 9.5 9.4
A terrorist state/supports terrorism 9.6 4.3 6.5 11.5 7.6
Israeli dispossession of the Palestinians;
continued oppression of the Palestinians 5.1 8.4 6.5 7.4 6.8
Religious reasons to oppose Israel 3.6 10.5 6.0 6.3 6.7
(Israel) is racist towards Arabs 5.7 5.7 6.3 6.0 5.9
Recognizing Israel negates the Palestinian
people 3.7 5.8 4.5 5.8 4.8
Israel is an enemy of my people/the Arabs in
general 4.1 3.6 3.4 6.2 4.1
Israel threatens regional security 3.5 3.4 2.9 4.9 3.6
Israel violates agreements and treaties 1.5 1.5 1.3 2.6 1.6
Israel does not exist 1.1 1.4 6.4 0.1 2.3
No reasons given 0.7 3.1 2.7 0.8 1.9
Total of those opposed to recognizing Israel 92.1 93.2 80.4 82.3 88.2
Approve of the recognition of Israel 6.1 2.6 6.3 13.2 6.2
Do not know/declined to answer (as a
percentage of respondents) 1.8 4.1 13.4 4.7 5.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
58
Section 7: Arab Public Opinion towards Extremist
Groups (such as ISIS)
● An overwhelming majority of 88% of the Arab public has a negative view of ISIL (or ISIS), with 3%
expressing a “positive” view, and 2% “positive to some extent.”
Figure 92: : General view of ISIL
● When asked if the existence of ISIL was either the result of internal factors endemic to the region or the result of foreign activity, only 27% of respondents expressed the view that the group’s existence resulted from the internal conflicts extant in the Middle East, compared to 55% who attributed ISIL’s existence to the policies of foreign powers. When presented with another two statements regarding the origins of ISIL, 42% of respondents were prepared to attribute the rise of ISIL to the extremism inherent in Middle Eastern societies while 33% attributed the rise of ISIL to the policies of Arab regimes.
3
2
2
3
4
2
3
3
4
7
4
10
7
9
9
13
78
85
80
80
72
7
3
5
1
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019/ 2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
Very positive Positive, to some extent
Neither positive nor negative Negative, to some extent
Very negative DK /Declined to answer
59
Figure 93: Respondents asked to select which statement on the nature of ISIL best
represents their views.
Figure 94: Respondents asked to select which statement on the nature of ISIL best
represents their views
● The Arab public offers a diverse set of remedies when asked to suggest the best means by which to combat the extremist groups (ISIL and such), when given the chance to define their first and second preferences for the means to tackle such ISIL in particular, and also terrorist groups more
27
29
29
38
20
55
59
58
50
69
5
2
3
3
7
13
9
10
8
4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2019 /2020
2017 /2018
2016
2015
2014
ISIL is the product of conflicts and forces within the region
ISIL is the product of foreign intervention
Neither of the above two statement
DK/Declined to answer
53
53
52
43
41
40
38
34
32
31
42
24
34
30
20
45
27
41
47
21
44
33
6
9
12
11
9
21
15
9
14
5
11
17
4
6
26
5
12
6
10
33
20
14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Sudan
Egypt
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Lebanon
Morocco
Jordan
Palestine
Mauritania
Tunisia
Aggregate
ISIL is the religious extremism and fanaticism of the Middle EastISIL is the product of policies of Arab regimesNeither of the above two statement Dk/Declined to answer
60
broadly: resolving the Palestinian cause was the most widely selected first choice, among 17% of respondents; ending foreign intervention in Arab countries was selected as the first choice by 15% of respondents; and 13% of them proposed direct military action.
Figure 95: Proposed remedies to ISIL/terrorism more broadly, first choice made by
respondents.
17
15
13
12
11
7
5
5
4
1
10
0 10 20 30
Resolving the Palestinian issue
Stopping foreign interference in the region
Intensifying military efforts in the war against terrorist organizations
Supporting democratic transition in the Arab region
Solving economic problems (such as unemployment and poverty)
Purging extremist interpretations of Islam
Finding a solution to the Syrian crisis in line with the aspirations of the Syrianpeople
Spreading a culture of religious tolerance
Changing sectarian policies in some countries (Iraq and Syria) to becomecitizenship states
Ending the Libyan crisis in a manner which meets the aspirations of the Libyanpeople
DK/Declined to answer
