The 2007-9 Financial Crisis and the Future of International Relations

Leslie Elliott ArmijoLeslie.armijo@cal.berkeley.edu

March 2011

FIVE THESES

1. Not much contagion for emerging markets (EMCs)

2. Due to a combination of virtue—and luck

3. Significance for international relations is that the wealthy democracies (finally) notice convergence

4. Emerging powers (EPs) is a more useful concept for IR than is emerging markets

5. Political regime type will influence the IR profile of EPs

ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES’ FLUandEmerging Market Countries’ hiccups

Cumulative Annual Growth Ratespercent, weighted average

Country Group 

Pre-Crisis 2000-6

Crisis2007-9

Drop  

All advanced economies

2.6 -0.1 -2.7

G7 2.3 -0.5 -2.8EU 2.5 -0.1 -2.7       All developing economies

6.2 +5.7 -0.5

Asia 8.0 +8.6 +0.6Latin America 3.4 +2.7 -0.7CE Europe 4.9 +1.6 -3.3MENA 5.0 +4.3 -0.7

Sub-saharan Africa 5.8 +5.0 -0.8

Cumulative Annual Growth Rates

* All AIC aggregates shrank, 2007-9

• All developing country aggregates had positive growth, 2007-9

* The only developing country aggregates that dropped as much or more as the AICs were those closely tied: CCE and Mesoamerica and Caribbean

EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES’ VIRTUEAnd their luck

Sources of EMCs’ Virtue--and Luck• High commodity prices (esp LAC & SSA)

* EMC financial crises in 1990s banking reforms (esp Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia?)

* Capital controls (China, India, Brazil, Chile)

* Less sophisticated home financial markets no involvement in CDSs, securitized mortgages, etc (esp Andean countries, SE Asia, SSA)

THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE CRISISAdvanced countries wake up to convergence

The advanced countries take notice• In 1980s developing Asia grew faster than the G7• In 1990s developing Asia, LAC, and MENA grew faster

than the G7• In 2000s every developing region grew faster than the G7• BUT THESE TRENDS ESCAPED NOTICE in the G7

foreign policy community• In Fall 2008, G.W. Bush administration realized a

coordinated global stimulus required a G20 summit, not the G7

Cumulative Annual Growth Rates(%, weighted averages)

1980-89 1990-99 2000-06 2007-09 2010-12 est.

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

Asia (dvlping)

All developing

S/S Africa

MENA

LAC

C/E Europe

All advanced

EMERGING POWERSNot just emerging markets

“Emerging Markets” v. “Emerging Powers”

• For analysis of development trajectories, “one country, one case” research works

• For analysis of IPE and IR, it may help to focus on larger, more capable countries

• There is growing self-consciousness within the set of “emerging powers”

“Correlates of War” Power Index• Composite index of global capabilities by J. David Singer,

Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey• Most used in International Relations scholarship• Calculated continuously 1820-2001• National shares in world totals in six hard power

capabilities: • Population• Urban population• Iron & steel production• Energy consumption• Military personnel• Military expenditure

“Correlates of War” Power Index

1955

China India

Brazil U.S.

G4 Other

2001

China India

Brazil U.S.

G4 Other

Armijo Power Index

• COW index has these problems: • No GDP• Positive valence for energy consumption, not production• No indicators of high technology

• Armijo index is global shares in 6 components:• GDP• Population• No. of telephone subscriptions (fixed & mobile)• Industrial value-added• Foreign exchange reserves• Total military spending

Armijo Power Index

1990

China India

Brazil U.S.

G6 Other

2007-9

China India

Brazil U.S.

G6 Other

POLITICAL REGIME TYPESAnd emerging powers’ behavior in the international system

Political Regime Types• Variations along two somewhat independent dimensions

allows categorization of most political regime types.

• Similar to dimensions Robt Dahl labeled “polyarchy” (~ democracy)

• Democratic contestation implies open competition for political offices, secret ballots, and executive constraints (variation from authoritarian to democratic)

• Democratic participation or inclusion refers to the scope of suffrage and political demand-making (variation from elite to mass-based regimes)

Variations in Political Contestation

• Authoritarian regimes bifurcate into growth miracles and disasters

• Increases in democratic contestation: • Have a U-shaped relationship with inward foreign

investment (Bayulgen)• Predict lower growth volatility (Mobarak; Chandra and

Rudra; Armijo and Gervasoni) • Predict fewer growth crises (Armijo and Gervasoni)• Predict steady, positive growth, though not miracles

Variations in Political Inclusion

• Transition from low to moderate inclusion regime leads incumbents to prioritize economic growth

• Transition from moderate to high inclusion leads incumbents to prioritize both growth and stability (avoid crises)

• See Dreze and Sen; Armijo & Gervasoni

Democratic Peace Theory Revisited?

• Democratic partners in global negotiations may find it easier to resolve problems of collective action than will partnerships containing one or more authoritarian states (Armijo and Gustafson; Armijo forthcoming)• Transparency of deliberations• Trust• Need to convince domestic populations difficult to

reverse or cheat• Multiple veto players