The 1957 Defence White Paper The Cancelled Projects · This paper, which is based on a presentation to a seminar on the 1957 Defence White Paper, describes the aircraft and engine

Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2018/03

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The 1957 Defence White Paper

The Cancelled Projects

Tony Buttler

SUMMARY

This paper, which is based on a presentation to a seminar on the 1957 Defence White Paper,

describes the aircraft and engine projects that were cancelled as a direct result of the policies

announced in the White Paper. It also describes a number of aircraft projects that were

cancelled or on which development ceased in the mid-1950s. These are often identified as

casualties of the White Paper, although that was not the case.

One consequence of the 1957 White Paper was the decision by Hawkers to develop the

P.1127 after it became clear that there would not be a British market for the P.1121

supersonic air superiority strike fighter. The Harrier was developed from the P.1127, which

changed the face of high performance combat aircraft operations and is one of the most

important of all developments in UK aviation history.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is based on a presentation to a seminar on the 1957 Defence White Paper (1)

(DWP) on 24 October 2017 by the Historical Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society. It

considers the airframe and engine projects which were terminated by the White Paper, but

first I would like to mention three projects which were NOT cancelled by this document, but

which many publications say were, often I think to try to make out that the DWP had even

more of an effect on UK military projects than it perhaps did. When assessing these

programmes, it should be borne in mind that Harold McMillan became Prime Minister in

January 1957 and he then made Duncan Sandys his Minister of Defence – so all three

projects had already gone by the time Sandys began work on this document.

2. PROJECTS NOT CANCELLED BY THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

2.1 Hawker P.1083

The first design to consider is a gorgeous-

looking project from Hawker Aircraft, the

P.1083. This was intended purely to be a

supersonic development of the standard

Hawker Hunter, fitted with a new 50°

swept wing and armed just with guns. A

full go-ahead for the P.1083 was given by

the Ministry on 12th December 1951

(Figure 1). Then in April 1953, well into

manufacture, the Air Staff requested that

Figure 1 Original manufacturers model of the

Hawker P.1083.


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the P.1083 (and the Supermarine 545

which comes next) should be rearmed

with the de Havilland Blue Jay (later

Firestreak) air-to-air missile as its

primary weapon. This created problems

in both types due to a lack of space for

radars, fuel and other equipment. The

problems were never solved and in June

1953 the P.1083 was officially cancelled.

The prototype airframe, due to fly later

that year, was subsequently modified as

the prototype Hunter F.Mk.6 with the

Rolls-Royce Avon 200-series engine

(Figure 2).

2.2 Supermarine Type 545

The Type 545 was originally proposed as another 50°

sweep wing development of an existing type, this time

the Supermarine Swift, but as built it featured a

crescent wing and was known as the Crescent Wing

Swift (Figure 3). Go-ahead for this transonic project

was given in 1952, but by 1954 the need for the

aircraft was being questioned. Initially the programme

was cut back to just the part-complete first prototype,

and then the Type 545 was finally terminated in

December 1955. This decision was made largely to

conserve funds for other projects since the research

information the first aircraft would provide was now

considered be of too little value and too late. At this

point the prototype was not too far away from completion (Figure 4).

2.3 Gloster Thin Wing Javelin

The first Gloster Thin Wing Javelin project

was drawn in July 1953. When Specification

F.153 was written around the aircraft the

main structural difference between the

standard Javelin and the new thin wing

variant lay in the wing itself. Subsequently,

larger engines were fitted, the strength factors

were raised and the equipment requirements

were altered so much that this project was no

longer a Javelin with a new wing, but rather a

Figure 2 P.1083 and Hunter Hawker models show

their different wings.

Figure 3 Original manufacturer’s model

of the Supermarine Type 545

Figure 4 Supermarine 545 at Cranfield 1960

Wikipedia commons


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new aircraft having the same general

appearance. It was almost a full redesign

and as such was expected to be just

supersonic in level flight at altitude (Figure

5).

Then during a visit to Washington in

December 1955 the UK Minister of Supply

Reginald Maudling saw secret papers

relating to the Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow

interceptor fighter then under evaluation by

the US Air Force. As a consequence a UK

evaluation team was sent to Canada in the

New Year to assess the Arrow for its

potential use by the RAF. Both Arrow and

Javelin were produced by firms within the

Hawker Siddeley Group, but the Arrow clearly had a far superior performance and capability.

The Thin Wing Javelin was out of date and as a result was cancelled in May 1956. Further

and much more advanced versions of the Thin Wing Javelin were produced by Gloster and

published works which refer to these designs indicate that the Thin Wing Javelin would have

been capable of around Mach 1.8. But they were all produced after the real Thin Wing

Javelin project had been cancelled.

3. AIRCRAFT PROJECTS CANCELLED BY THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

Five aircraft projects were destroyed by the 1957 DWP, while the development programme

for another (the English Electric Lightning) was badly affected. And it was not just fighter

types that were lost – there were bombers as well and two jet engine programmes will also be

discussed.

Without wishing to criticise any decisions taken long ago in a different situation, in this paper

I would like to make some observations as to what I think might have happened had each of

these projects not been cancelled – what stage might they have reached? These are purely

my own thoughts and are presented to encourage discussion, and to perhaps suggest that in

some cases their demise might not have been such a loss as we might imagine.

3.1 Avro 730

The Avro 730 project started with the issue in

1955 of Specification R.156T and Operational

Requirement OR.330 for a supersonic high-

altitude reconnaissance aircraft capable of Mach

2.5. Designs were submitted by Avro, English

Electric, Handley Page, Short Brothers and

Figure 5 Model of the Gloster Thin Wing Javelin

Figure 6 The Avro 730 as proposed


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Vickers. The Avro 730 was declared the

winner and was ordered in prototype form in

late 1955. In its earliest form the 730 still fell

short of the requirements but it was considered

to be the best choice (Figure 6). In particular it

was to have an airframe made throughout in

high tensile steel because, thanks to the

problems of kinetic heat, this was the only way

of securing the specified Mach 2.5 speed. In

due course a nuclear weapon/bomb-carrying

capability was added under OR.336 and the

design was revised quite extensively (Figure 7).

In February 1957 service entry for Avro 730

was scheduled to be 1965 and the manufacture

of the first test fuselage was well under way at

Avro. But in March the Air Staff completed an

examination of the contribution which manned

fighter aircraft could make to the defence of the

United Kingdom, which of course formed the

basis of the famous April 1957 Defence White

Paper. At the same time the Air Staff examined the problem of maintaining the deterrent and,

in view of the increasing capacity of the Soviet defensive system (which included surface-to-

air guided weapons), it was now considered most unlikely that the Avro 730 could survive

during the period it would be operational. OR.336 was, therefore, cancelled in April 1957

along with the Avro 730.

The 730 was to have been powered by the

Armstrong Siddeley P.176 engine and extra

prototypes of the Bristol 188 research aircraft

were to have been built as P.176 test beds. The

188 was another steel aircraft and its first flight

did not take place until 1962 – nearly a decade

after it was first proposed – primarily because

of the time required to develop new fabrication

techniques for its steel structure (several changes

of engine also contributed to the delays).

The Avro 730 was full of advanced systems and equipment and there was plenty of scope for

problems. There were also concerns about how well the aircraft could fly if it was damaged

(would it be able to return to base?) and whether there would be sufficient stiffness in such a

long slim fuselage. Finally, as noted the all-steel Bristol 188 proved very difficult to build,

and so would manufacturing the larger 730’s structure have been an even more difficult and

longer task?

Figure 7 The Avro 730 as built

Figure 8 Bristol 188 research aircraft


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It is also worth bearing in mind that for the proposed SST (which became the Concorde), the

Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC) rejected steel in 1959 as too difficult and

too expensive. In America the North American XB-70 Valkyrie bomber was built in steel

and that too failed (few people realise that this was the heaviest aircraft it the world when it

first flew at Mach 3). I appreciate that the XB-70 was a rather different animal to the 730,

but it still illustrates that if you choose to use a heavy material like steel or titanium for a new

airframe, instead of a light alloy such as aluminium, the complexity and cost automatically

rise. And once a programme becomes very expensive, then justifying its existence becomes

even more difficult. The 1957 DWP was not just about the replacement of manned aircraft by

missiles – the extreme cost of modern aircraft and weapons was another key aspect.

My feeling is that had the Avro 730 been continued then it would have been very expensive,

the difficulty of a steel airframe would have brought delays, and by the time it entered service

it might have been out of date because guided weapons worldwide had forced the world’s

bombers to fly at low level. Even without the 1957 DWP I would not have been surprised if

the project had failed to survive beyond prototype flight.

3.2 Rocket Fighters and the Saunders-Roe SR.177

Britain’s rocket fighter programme was opened in 1952 by the issuing of Specification

F.124T to which 11 designs were proposed. The two selected for prototype construction were

the Saunders-Roe (Saro) SR.53 and the Avro 720 (Figures 9 and 10). All of the original

proposals were to be powered solely by rocket motors, but after further assessment both of

these aircraft were to have a mixed jet/rocket powerplant, the additional small turbojet

providing a ‘get you home’ capability.

In due course neither the 720 nor SR.53 were looked upon as full production machines for

operational service, but rather for limited production only to provide experience in rocket

motors and operations at great heights. Developed versions of both aircraft were subsequently

produced but the Saro P.177 (or SR.177) only was accepted since it was considered to be

superior over the updated 720. Consequently, the Avro 720 was cancelled in April 1955

before it had flown. This by the way was another design NOT terminated by the 1957 DWP.

Figure 9 SR.53 at Farnborough in 1957. Figure 10 Avro 720 mock-up made in metal!

This is the second example which was lost It had only one wing

in a crash Source: Avro Heritage


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The P.177 was a larger design than the SR.53 and powered by a de Havilland Gyron Junior

jet and de Havilland Spectre rocket (Figure 11). It was to be capable of Mach 2.35 and the

armament consisted of two de Havilland Red Top air-to-air missiles. An Instruction to

Proceed was given in September 1955 and a 27 aircraft programme was planned with 5 flying

shell airframes for basic aerodynamic and engine development, 3 more for weapon system

development and the remainder for more advanced testing and for trials with both the RAF

and Royal Navy – both services were to get the type as the P.177R and P.177N. This was a

big programme and there was also German Air Force and Navy interest as well. Indeed a

German technical mission visited the UK and made a detailed examination of the P.177.

However, the April Defence White Paper cancelled the RAF prototypes and cut the

development batch back to 18 aeroplanes – though at this stage the Navy’s allocation was to

be retained. However, these too were cancelled in June 1957.

The SR.53 prototypes were continued as research aircraft and the first of two built and flown

made its maiden flight in May 1957, but after the P.177’s demise the Air Staff did not know

what to do with them. However, after a re-appraisal in August 1958 it was fully intended to

keep the SR.53 flying because, in its present form, it was capable of Mach numbers as high as

any aircraft then flying in the UK, and greater altitudes. One of them was lost in a crash but

the second SR.53 was used for research until 1960.

It is understood that after Germany in World War 2 no rocket interceptor ever entered

service, though several programmes were started worldwide. Had the P.177 been flown and

developed then it would probably have entered service. But I wonder if it would have been

produced in numbers? Having a dual powerplant added to the complexity – it also meant

different fuels – and rocket fuels are usually quite nasty chemicals (the Spectre used hydrogen

peroxide and kerosene). Had the 1957 DWP not occurred then it might be safe to assume that

the Lightning would have been developed into a more capable aircraft far earlier than it was.

That alone might have pushed out the P.177, or at least restricted its service to just a few RAF

squadrons. And would the Navy have been keen to operate a rocket fighter aboard a carrier

using unpleasant chemicals in a war zone? I think it is quite possible that the P.177 might

have had a limited service career.

Figure 11a SR.177 model Figure 11b SR.177 artwork showing the aircraft

on approach for a carrier landing


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3.3 English Electric Lightning

I would like to mention the English Electric Lightning briefly (Figure 12) because this aircraft

did survive the slaughter. However, its development was curtailed or delayed quite considerably

by the White Paper. The intention was to retain the Lightning to fill the gap in the short term

until the service arrival of guided missiles, but after the ideas behind the DWP died down there

was clearly still a future for manned fighters. So then the Lightning was developed further –

specifically as the F.Mk.3/6 with the Avon 300-series engine.

The F.Mk.3 was the first ‘stretched’ or second generation Lightning and was first flown in

June 1962 (Figure 13). This variant also introduced the more advanced Red Top missile. If

it was not for the DWP, might the F.3/6 have appeared a few years earlier? Lightning’s big

weaknesses were its shortage of fuel/range and that it only carried two missiles – but

developing the aircraft earlier might have addressed these flaws. And there would quite likely

have been bigger export possibilities which would have helped the situation. BAC (as English

Electric became in 1960) did offer more advanced and more heavily armed versions, but by

the mid-1960s it did not seem worth going ahead with them. Had it been known that the

Lightning would remain in RAF service until 1988, it might have been different.

3.4 Short Seamew

It would seem that this is the forgotten project from the losses incurred by the 1957 DWP. In

1950 a small lightweight anti-submarine aircraft was considered ideal to complement the

larger forth-coming Fairey Gannet and Specification M.123 was raised to cover it. The

winning design was the Short S.B.6 which became the Seamew and the first example flew on

23 August 1953 (Figure 14). It would carry over 1,800lb of weaponry, including a torpedo.

Figure 12 Early Lightning in a photo produced for the 1959 Figure 13 The Lightning F.Mk.6

Farnborough Show had a bigger fin


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The Seamew prototype revealed some vicious

handling characteristics and so there were

development problems, but an initial batch of

41 aircraft was ordered in 1955 for the Navy

and for RAF Coastal Command. A year later

the RAF machines were cancelled and then

the 1957 Defence White Paper disbanded the

RNVR’s Air Branch altogether, and that

brought the cancellation of the Seamew order

with it. By that stage twenty-four production

machines had flown and several had been

accepted by the Royal Navy.

Unlike some of the projects considered here,

relatively little sadness seems to have been

expressed about the Seamew’s demise. But a

point to also consider is that by 1957 the anti-

submarine helicopter was beginning to appear

and was clearly the way forward. The Navy

would eventually receive the Westland Wasp,

which as the Saro P.531 first flew in

prototype form in July 1958. The Wasp itself

first flew in 1962 (Figure 15). The helicopter

was an altogether more versatile machine

than the Seamew ever could be. It could

operate from destroyers and frigates as well

as carriers, so one can assume that had the

Seamew been continued then its service career might have been relatively short because of the

adoption of the anti-submarine helicopter.

3.5 Fairey Delta 3 Long Range Interceptor

In early 1955 Specification F.155T was raised for a long range highly advanced all-weather

interception system capable of destroying very high altitude enemy raiders operating at

60,000ft and Mach 1.3. Proposals from

industry included the Armstrong Whitworth

AW.169, Vickers-Supermarine Type 559 and

Hawker P.1103 (see below).

The winner was a design from Fairey which,

unofficially, was known as the ‘Delta 3’

(Figure 16). This was a substantial

enlargement and development of the famous

record-breaking Delta 2 research aircraft and

its wing, centre fuselage and fin were to be

Figure 14 Short Seamew XA209 at Farnborough

in 1954 Source: Terry Panopalis

Figure 15 The Westland Wasp at the 1962 SBAC

show, a month before the first flight

Source: Wikipedia Commons

Figure 16 The Fairey ‘Delta 3’ was a spectacular

aircraft design


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made in high tensile stainless steel. A two seater, the Delta 3 would carry two huge radar-

guided Vickers Red Dean air-to-air missiles weighing 1,300lb each, it would feature a droop

nose (like Concorde) for landing, and the maximum speed at height was Mach 2.27. The

powerplant was to be two Rolls-Royce RB.122 jets plus two de Havilland Spectre Junior

rocket motors, giving an all-up-weight of over 50,000lb.

Duncan Sandys cancelled Specification F.155 on 29th March 1957, a few days prior to the

release of the White Paper, though the prototype Delta 3s had not yet been ordered. As an

aside this meant that Fairey’s desire to see a fighter created from its successful Delta 2 died

as well (Figures 19 and 20). But many within the Air Staff had campaigned strongly for

orders to be placed.

F.155T did represent the cutting edge of technology in the 1950s and in fact the designs

drawn against the specification were some of the most monstrous and exciting combat

Figure 19 Fairey Delta 2 Figure 20 Drawing comparing the Delta 2

Source: Phil Butler and Delta 3

Figure 17 The AW.169 came first equal to Figure 18 Supermarine’s Type 559 came third in

the Fairy Delta 3 and after the latter’s the F.155T competition

selection was continued as a back-up

‘wind tunnel’ project for about a year,

in case the other project failed


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aircraft ever proposed. They were very powerful and in most cases the maximum speed was

set by a kinetic heat structural limit, not a power limit. But, had it been built, I wonder if the

Delta 3 would have reached no further than the prototype stage, in part because of its size and

complexity. It would have been a very expensive aircraft to develop, while the policy of

defence using guided weapons was being adopted worldwide. The need for an aircraft quite

as large as this might have died altogether.

The long range interceptor was by the way considered not just in the UK. America, Canada

and the Soviet Union also produced designs and prototypes, and one service type (the

Tupolev Tu-28). I would like to review the other Western types briefly because this also

gives an opportunity to show that the ideas behind the 1957 DWP did not settle just on

Britain alone.

After the rise of the Soviet Union, America spent a huge sum of money developing

interceptor aircraft to defend its homeland – the Northrop F-89 Scorpion, McDonnell F-101

Voodoo and the Convair F-102 Delta Dagger and F-106 Delta Dart. In 1954 a requirement

called Weapon System WS-202A was issued for a Long Range Interceptor. The competition

was won by North American Aviation with a design which became the F-108 Rapier (Figure

21). This was due to fly in 1961 but in September 1959 the project was cancelled on grounds

of cost, though the development of the ground-based Boeing Bomarc missile was another

factor.

In 1954 Canada ordered the Avro CF-105 Arrow interceptor (Figure 22) and the first

prototype flew in 1958. But this was cancelled, very controversially, the following year after

five examples had flown. The project was replaced by American McDonnell CF-101 Voodoo

fighters and, again, the Boeing Bomarc surface-to-air missile. Perhaps it is unfair to compare

these programmes against those closed by the 1957 DWP, but again part of the problem with

these overseas designs was their cost. Once again it is important to consider that one of the

reasons behind the new UK policy was the expense incurred in the development of new

advanced combat aircraft programmes, and defence spending in general.

Figure 21 North American F-108 Rapier. As built Figure 22 Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow

this would have had modified wingtips


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4. The Hawker P.1121

This project evolved from one of the losing F.155T long range interceptor contenders, the

Hawker P.1103 (Figure 23). The P.1103 was dropped early in the F.155T competition

because it was too small, but the Hawker team decided to continue its design and

construction. It was revived in early 1956 as the P.1116 Mach 2 interceptor and long range

strike fighter, and then refined in June 1956 as the P.1121 Mach 2 air superiority strike

fighter (Figure 24). Hawker eventually financed the project as a private venture but some

within the Air Staff were amazed by this decision (and irritated at having to reassess it)

because the basic configuration had been rejected in the P.1103. In particular it was not

looked upon by the Air Staff as a complete weapon system, and indeed it was considered that

Hawker Aircraft had yet to grasp the weapon system concept as a whole.

The P.1121 was to be powered by a single de Havilland Gyron jet engine, it was to be armed

with Red Top missiles, rocket projectiles and Aden cannon and was expected to reach Mach

1.35 at sea level and 2.35 at height. In January 1957 Hawker was told that the Ministry was

not interested in ordering the P.1121, but a full scale mock-up was completed soon afterwards

(Figure 25). Then the release of the 1957 DWP killed any hopes of a home order. In

September 1957 the Hawker board agreed to continue with the P.1121 but at a much reduced

rate of expenditure, and the project finally fizzled out in 1958.

Figure 23 Hawker P.1103 artwork Figure 24 Hawker P.1121 manufacturer’s model

Figure 25 Hawker P.1121 mock up Figure 26 Hawker P.1121 prototype under

construction. This did not progress too far beyond

what can be seen here but does still survive in

museum hands Source: Chris Farara


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It is entirely wrong to say that the P.1121 was cancelled by the 1957 DWP because it was

never ordered by the RAF. But the new policy certainly blocked any hopes that this design

might have been bought to fill a role in UK service. For me this is the most difficult of the

projects to assess as to what might have happened had it continued. Many reports suggest that

the P.1121 would have flown and performed well. It would also have followed the highly

successful Hawker Hunter and it seems logical to suggest that at least some of the countries

who bought the Hunter would have taken the P.1121 as well. This aircraft could have been

quite a success.

However, as is well known, the P.1121 was replaced at Hawker by the P.1127 V/STOL

aircraft (Figure 27), which of course was developed into the Harrier – and we all know how

successful that aircraft was and how it

changed the face of high performance

combat aircraft operations. In some

ways it was a fluke that P.1121 was

replaced by P.1127, but to my mind this

was one of the most important of all

developments in UK aviation history.

The V/STOL design was surely a much

more important project for the UK than

P.1121 could ever be! One might even

say that the P.1127 was the most positive

outcome of the events brought about by

the 1957 DWP in terms of combat

aircraft design and procurement!

5. ENGINE PROJECTS CANCELLED BY THE 1957 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

A number of missiles became victims of the White Paper, as did two engine development

programmes which were also abandoned – the de Havilland Gyron and Rolls-Royce RB.106.

Work started on de Havilland’s single shaft Gyron axial jet engine in 1950 and it first ran on

the bench on 5 January 1953 (Figure 28). And it soon achieved the planned 20,000lb thrust

with reheat, which at the time made it

the most powerful engine in the world.

Uprated to 25,000lb, the Gyron was

tested in the Short Sperrin bomber

prototype from July 1955 but it never

flew in a production aeroplane. It was

intended to go in the Hawker P.1121

interceptor. Ministry support for the

Gyron stopped in February 1956 but,

after having seen prospects for overseas

sales, de Havilland Engines decided to

complete further tests at its own

Figure 27 Hawker P.1127 in June 1962

Source: Terry Panopalis

Figure 28 De Havilland Gyron engine


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expense. However, in October 1957 the firm acknowledged that, with no backing for the

P.1121, the development work should stop and the engine was abandoned despite

demonstrating 29,300lb of thrust. Meantime, however, considerably scaled down versions,

called the Gyron Junior, were developed and used in the Bristol 188 experimental supersonic

research aircraft and, on a production basis, in the Mark 1 Blackburn Buccaneer naval strike

aircraft.

A Rolls-Royce engine project also aimed at supersonic fighter designs was the RB.106. This

originated in 1953 and, in contrast to the Gyron, featured a more complex layout with two

separate axial compressors, driven independently by single-stage turbines, to provide a higher

overall a pressure ration of 8:1 and thus a lower fuel consumption during subsonic phases of

flight. With external dimensions set to make the unit interchangeable with the RR Avon

RA14, basic static thrust was rated at 15,000lb, and 21,750lb with reheat. A scaled down

option, designated RB.112, was also offered as an alternative. Some compressor rig testing

was carried out but no engines were built before the emergence of the 1957 DWP resulted in

the disappearance of the envisaged advanced supersonic fighter projects.

6. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

The theories behind the 1957 Defence White Paper gradually died away and by 1960

attention was turning towards fighter aircraft again. Indeed, the UK did acquire new fighters –

updated versions of the Lightning as noted, and then the McDonnell F-4 Phantom from

America. As regards new ‘fighter’ design in the UK, for much of the 1960s the emphasis fell

primarily on multi-role types, the best known of which was the Hawker P.1154 supersonic

V/STOL strike fighter. Much later, in 1971, Air Staff Target 396 was raised to find a

Buccaneer, Harrier and Jaguar replacement. In 1975 the air ‘component’ of this requirement

was split away as a separate requirement AST.403, the lead in to what would become the

Eurofighter Typhoon. AST.403 was the first new pure fighter requirement to be raised after

the 1957 DWP – no less than 18 years afterwards!

I would like to end on a lighter note. The politics behind the 1957 Defence White Paper, the

claims for and against, and whether it was right or wrong, have been a very serious matter of

discussion now for 60 years. Indeed, red faces and high blood pressures have often resulted.

But there is one element about which historians cannot argue over at all – if it hadn’t

happened then we would have had a lot less to write about and a lot less to talk about!

REFERENCE

Secretary of State for Defence Defence: Outline of Future Policy Command Paper 124, HMSO,

London, April 1957


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The Author

Tony Buttler worked for twenty years in the aircraft industry as a metallurgist. In 1994 he

took a Masters Degree in archives at Loughborough University and since 1995 has worked

full time as an aviation historian. So far he has written 29 major books, numerous titles in the

Warpaint series of modeller’s publications and a large number of articles for historical

aviation magazines. He also lectures to RAeS Branches and other enthusiast groups and is a

member of the Committee of the RAeS Historical Group.

Documents

The 1957 Defence White Paper The Cancelled Projects · This paper, which is based on a presentation to a seminar on the 1957 Defence White Paper, describes the aircraft and engine