Thayer Vietnam's Relations With China and the United States

8/7/2019 Thayer Vietnam's Relations With China and the United States

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Vietnam's relationswith China and The United StatesCarlyle A. ThayerElneritus Professor,School of H u n 1 ~ l n i t i e s and Social Sciences,'('he l1nivcrsity of Ne\\' South Wales~ l the Australian J)cfcncc Force Acadcnly, ( ~ a n b c r r a

IntroductionThis paper presents an analysis of Vietnam's two

most important sets of bilateral relations, Vietnam-Chinaand Vietnam-United States. In recent h istory Vietnam hasfought successful wars with both major powers and thenproceeded to normalize relations with its formeradversaries. The focus of this paper is on the postnormalization period in general and defence relations inparticular.

The paper is divided into five parts. Part 1 provides ageneral overview of Vietnam's changing worldview andconceptualization of foreign relations. Part 2 reviewsVietnam-China relations. This is followed in part 3 by ananalysis of Vietnam-United States relations. Part 4presents a comparative analysis of defence relations. Part5 offers some preliminary conclusions.

Vietnam's Changing WorldviewVietnam has witnessed a remarkable transformation

in its worldview and conceptualisation offoreign relations


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when the Cold War era is cOll1pared with the post-ColdWar period. During the Cold War VietnalTI was a Inenlberof the socialist can1p led by the Soviet Union and adoptedan orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological framework. Itaccepted the view that the world was divided into twocamps, social ist and capitalist, on the basis of antagonisticcontradictions. In other words the world was dividedbetween 'friends and enemies' and the key question was'who will triumph over whom?'. Global integration wasviewed negatively as a process of assimilation (hoa nhap)through which socialist states would loose their autonomyifnot identity.

Vietnam generally refrained from taking sides in theSino-Soviet dispute but adhered to the view that the SovietUnion was the leader of the socialist world. In the late1960s, for example, Vietnamese foreign policytheoreticians propounded the Soviet 'theory of threerevolutionary currents' (ba dong thac cach mang) as aframework for analysing global political developments.]Vietnan1 finnly rejected 'Mao's theory of three worlds' inthe 1970s.

The later years of the Cold War witnessed thebeginnings of a change in Vietnam's worldview. Vietnamwas very much influenced by 'new political thinking'advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary ofthe Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev1 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnamese Perspectives on InternatIonal Security: ThreeRevolutionary Currents', in Donald H. McMillen. ed., Asian Perspectives on

International Security. London: Macmillan Press, 19H4, 57 -76.VAI TRO eVA V ~ NAM TRONG KHU vue

8 cHAu A- TI-rAI BiNH DUONG .

provided a new rationale and framework for viewingglobal change.: The stress was now on the role ofeconomics and science and technology as drivers ofchange. Vietnam's own domestic socio-economic crisis inthe mid-1980s also contributed to the process of reevaluati11g Vietnam's worldview.At the el1d of 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev put paid tothe concept of the 'two worlds' in a major address to theUnited Nations General Assembly. Gorbachev stressedthat the development of anyone country would be based'on the interests of all mankind'. He spoke of the'emergence of a mutually connected and integral world'and that future progress would only be possible 'throughthe search for a consensus of all mankind, in movementtoward a new world order'. Once again, influences fromthe Soviet Union impacted on Vietnam.

The process of adapting and then modifyingVietnam's traditional worldview was a gradual one. Itinvolved intense internal debate and in some respects theelements of the old ideological framework have not beenjettisoned completely. Vietnam's new outlook nowperceived the world as increasingly interdependent andeconomic integration (hoi nhap) was now viewed apositive process.

Ran1csh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer. eds., The Soviet Union as an Asian Pac(ficPOVv'er: hnplications ( ~ Gorhachev'.\' 1986 Vladivostok Initiative. Boulder:Westview Press, 1987 and Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Indochina', in Desmond Ball andCathy Downes, eds., Security and Defence: Pac(jlc and Glohal Perspectives.Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990.403.

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Changes in Vietnanl's worldview can bedocumented with reference to eight i111portant conceptualturning points: Politburo Resolution No. 32 (1986),Politburo Resolution No.2 (1987), Politburo ResolutionNo. 13 (1988), Seventh Party Congress (1991 ), mid-tennparty conference (1994), the Ninth Party Congress (2001)and eighth plenum of the party Central Comlnittee(2003).3

Polit buro Resolution No. 32In July 1986, after a period of intense internal

debate, the Politburo of the Vietnam Communist Party(VCP) adopted Resolution No. 32 (32/BCT21) on newopportunities and possibilities to consolidate and developthe economy. Significantly, this resolution identified'peace and development' as the highest priority and laidthe basis for 'new thinking' (tu duy moi) in theconceptualization of VietnalTI'S national security policy.According to Phan Doan Nam, Resolution 32:

; On the eve of the Eighth Congress the VCP was rent by internal diviSIons between'reformers' and 'conservatives' over ideology, the pace and scope ofreform efforts,the extent to which Vietnam should open itself to foreign int1uences, andleadership change. The foreign policy section of the Political Report to the EighthCongress was amended several times before it was tabled. During this periodthere was intense internal party debate over developing diplolnatic relations withthe United States. The Political Report was a status quo document and did notdevelop or elaborate any lnajor new policy then1es such as 'renovation' adopted bythe Sixth Congress, or 'industrialization and modernization' endorsed by theSeventh Congress. See Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Upholding State Sovereignty ThroughGlobal Integration: The Remaking of Vietnamese National Security Policy',Paper to conference Viet Nanl, East Asia and Beyond, City University of 1longKong, Hong Kong, December 11-12,2008,25.

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clearly set out guidelines and revised diplomaticpolicies, and moved toward a solution in Cambodia. TheResolution clearly stated:

- the external mission of Vietnam is to have goodcoordination between the strength of the people and thestrength of the era, to take advantage of favourableinternational conditions to build socialism and defend theFatherland, proactivel y create a condition for stability andeconolnic construction.

- It is necessary to move proactively to a new stage ofdevelopment, and peacefll1 coexistence with China,ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], andthe United States, and build SoutheastAsia into a region ofpeace, stability and cooperation.

4

Nonetheless, many in the VCP continued to view theworld divided into friends an d enelnies. According toInterior Minister PhalTI Hung, in the first stage of theperiod of transition to socialism, the strugg le to defeat themulti-faceted wa r of sabotage waged by hegemonists incollusion with imperialism is closely linked to the strugglebetween socialism and capitalism to determine 'who willtriun1ph overwholn'.

Sixth Party CongressIn Decelnber 1986, Vietnaln held its Sixth National

Congress, a meeting that has become synonymous with

4 Phan Doan NmTI, 'Ngoai Giao Viet Nam Sau 20 Nam Doi Moi', Tap Chi CongSan,no. 14(760), July 2006,26.

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the expression doi moi or renovation.) r-rhe sixth congresswas mainly concerned with overcoming the crisis in thedomestic econolny. Imlnediate priority was given toincreasing food and grain production, consumer goodsand exports. Secretary General Truong Chinh delivered asummary of the Central Committee's Political Report. I-Ieidentified several means to achieve these prioritiesinclllding 'to expand and heighten the effectiveness ofexternal econolnic relations'.

Two important points should be noted. First, thepolicy ofdoi lnoi led to the abandonment ofone the centralplanks ofcommunist ideology central planning. Second,in order to overcome its economic crisis, Vietnam wouldhave to open itself to foreign investment from nonsocialist countries. In order to achieve this objectiveVietnam first had to liquidate the Cambodian problem. b

Politburo Resolution No.2Politburo Resolution No.2, 'On Strengthening

National Defence in the New Revolutionary Stage', wasCarlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnaln's Sixth Party Congress: An Overview',Contemporary SoutheastA,)'ia, June 1987, 9: 1, 12-22.

t> 'The period of struggle ainled at a total victory of the Canlbodian revolution,under the illusion that the Hsituation is irreversible," had COlne to an end, and wehad to acknowledge the reality of a step by step struggle to achIeve a politicalsolution for the Cambodian question'; see: Tran Quang Co, floi Ky Tran QuangC ~ o , http://www.ykien.net/tqc01.html. See also: Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Kampuchea:Soviet Initiatives and Regional Responses', in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A.Thayer, eds., The Soviet Union as an Asian P a e ~ f i e PO}1,)er: Implications ( ~ Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok Initiative. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, 171200 and Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Prospects for Peace in Kampuchea: Soviet Initi ativesand Indochinese Responses', The Indonesian Q u a r t e r ~ v , 2nd Quarter, 1989, 17:2,157-172.

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adopted sometime between April and June 1987 and waskept secret.7 Politburo Resolution No. 2 mandated thereturn home of all Vietnamese military forces inCambodia and Laos to be followed by a major program ofd e l n o b i l i z a t i o n . ~

In SepteInber 1989 Viet11am unilaterally withdrewits anned forces froIn CaInbodia. This set the scene for anegotiated end to a decade-long conflict that had beencostly in blood and treasure and which had left Vietnamdiplomatically isolated and dependent on the SovietUnion. Over the next five years Vietnam demobilized700,000 troops, reducing main force strength from 1.2million in 1987 to 500,000, thus reducing recurrent costs.Vietnam's strategic readjustment resulted in the adoption

In September 1987 Nguyen Van Linh addressed a conference of high-levelInilitary cadres. In the course of his presentation, Linh Inentioned an ilnportant'Politburo resolution on national defence tasks in the present period' (Nghi quyetcua Bo chinh tri ve nhieln vu quoe phong trong giai doan hien nay). The speechwas published three years later: Nguyen Van Linh. Ma}' Van De Quan Su Va QuaePlzong nong Su Nghiep Doi !'v1oi (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan.1990), 721. See also: Editorial, 'Urgently Consolidate and Improve the Quality ofthe Reservc Force for Mobilization and Militia and Self-Defense Forces to MeetDCInands of New Tasks.' Quan Doi Nhan Dan, July 6. 1989 broadcast by HanoiDomestic Service, July 6, 1989; and Senior Lt. Gen. Dang Vu Hiep. 'Some IssuesRelating to the Policy Aimed at Achieving the Task of Building the Anny andConsolidating National Defense in the New Situation,' Tap Chi Quoc Phong ToanDan, July 1989 broadcast by Hanoi Domestic Service, July 9. 1989.

>< Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnam's Strategic Rcadjustment', in Stuart Harris and GaryKlintworth, eds., China as a Great POH'er: M},ths. Realities and Challenges in theAsia-Pac{/ic Region. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1995, 185-201 and Carlyle A.Thayer, 'Demobilization but not DisannamentPersonnel Reduction and ForceModernization in Vietnam', in Natalie Pauwels, ed., War Force to Work Force:Glohal Perspectives on Denlohilization and Reintegration. BICC Schriften zuAbriistung und Konversion. Baden-Baden: NOlnos Verlagsgesellshaft, 2000.199-219.

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of cOIl1prehensive security outlook by depreciating therelative salience of l11ilitary power and raising theil11portance of econo1l1ic strength as contributors tonational security.

Politburo Resolution No. 13On May 20, 1988, Vietnamese party leaders adoptedprobably the most important modification of foreign

policy in the contemporary period: Politburo ResolutionNo. 13 'On the External Mission and Policy in the NewSituation,.9 Politburo Resolution No. 13 used the tennnational interest (loi ieh dan toe) for the first time,unequivocally identified economic development asVietnam's main priority, and called for a 'Illulti-directionalforeign policy' orientation. The new emphasis was 'tomaintain peace, take advantage of favorable worldconditions' in order to stabilize the domestic situation andset the base for economic development over the next ten tof I1teenyears. 10

In other words, this resolution marked the beginningof a shift away from the 'two worlds' view towards theconcept of an interdependent world. Vietnam was now

Gareth Porter, 'The Transfonnatlon ofVie tnanl's Worldview: Froln Two CaInps toInterdependence', C'onlenzporary Southeast As ia, 12: 1, June 1990, 1-19: Chu VanChue, 'Qua trinh doi Inoi tu duy doi ngoai va hinh thanh duong 10i doi ngoai doimoi', Nghien Cuu Quoe Te, 3:58,2004, 9; Nguyen Dy Nien, 'Chinh Such Van HoatDong Doi Ngoai TrongThoi Ky Doi Moi', Tap Chi COllgSan, 17(740), September2005, 30; and Phan Doan Nam, 'Ngoai Giao Viet Nam Sau 20Nanl Doi Moi', TapChi CungSall, no. 14(760), July 2006,26-30.\1I Luu Doan Huynh, 'VietnaIn-ASEAN Relations In Retrospect A Few Thoughts',jJialoglle + Cooperation, 2004,1,23-31.

VAI IR a eVA vItT NAM 'IRONG KHU Vlfc14 cHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG .

poised to shift froln confrontat ion to accol11illodation in itsforeign policy. According to one party officiat PolitburoResolution No. 13 directed that a 'comprehensive andlong-tenn regional policy towards Asia and SoutheastA s i a ~ be drawn up 'as soon as possible'. 1

Seventh Party Congress (1991)The next important evolution il1 Vietnam'sworldview was the formal adoption of a 'multi-directionalforeign policy' by the Seventh National Congress in June1991. 12 As key foreign policy documents tnade clear,Vietnam would 'diversify (da dang) and multilateralise(da phuong) economic relations with all countries andeconomic organizations...' In short, 'Vietnam wants tobecome the friend ofall countries in the world community,and struggle for peace, independence and development'.According to the Political Report, 'We stand for equal andmutually beneficial co-operation with all countriesregardless of different socio-political systems and on thebasis ofthe principle ofpeace ful co-existence,.13

The Political Report, reflecting the anxieties ofpartyconservatives and ideologues following the collapse of

11 Nguyen Huu C a t ~ 'Viet Nam Hoi Nhap vao Khu Vue vi Hoa Sinh va Phat Trien',Nghien Cuu Dong NanIA, February 1996.28-29.

I.' VU Khoan, 'Mot so van de quoc te eua dai hoi VII quan', in 80 Ngoai Giao, Hoinhap quoe Ie va giu vung han sac. Hanoi: Nha xuat ban chinh tri quoe te, 1995.75and CarlyleA. Thayer, 'Indochina', in Ramesh Thakur and Car1y1eA. Thayer, eds.,Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia-Pactfic and the Fonner Soviet Union.Boulder: Westview Press, 1993,221.

I, Communist Party of Vietnam, 7th National C--'ongress DOCllment8. Hanoi:VietnaITI Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1991. 134.

VAI 'IRa rn A ~ NAM TRONG KHU VlJe 15CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .


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socialislll in Eastern Europe., gave priority to relationswith the Soviet Union, Laos, Calnbodia., China, Cuba,other 'COlTIlTIUnist and workers' parties', the 'forcesstruggling for peace, national independence, delTIOCracyand social progress', India, and the Non-AlignedMovelnent. It was only at the end of this list that Vietnam's'new friends' were lTIentioned:

To develop relations of friendship with othercountries in South-East Asia and the Asia-Pacificregion, and to strive for a South-East Asia ofpeace, friendship and co-operation. To expandequal and mutually beneficial co-operation withnorthern and Western European countries, Japanand other developed countries. To promote theprocess of normalization of relations with theUnited States. 14

Other residues of old political thinking remained.The final version of the P l a ~ f o r m .for NationalConstructiofl ifl the Period 0.1' Transition to Soci(zlism.,chapter two, for example, asserted that 'the contradictionsbetween socialism and capitalism are unfolding fiercely'but that 'nlankind will certainly advance to socialism., forthis is the law of evolution of history' .15 For its part,Vietnam would by-pass the capitalist stage and embark ona prolonged transition to socialism 'involving manystages' of which the present was just the 'initial stage'.

I ~ Ibid., 135.I ~ Ibid.,49-50.

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evolution' was of Inajor concern. 17 Secretary General DoMuoi's Political Report reaffirmed Vietnam'scommitlnent to the broad outlines of economic andpolitical renovation that had emerged following theseventh congress. X His report warned about the threat ofpeaceful evolution aimed at 'abolishing the party andsocialist reginle'. In the face of this assessment, thePolitical Report reaffirmed Vietnam's commitment to'building a socialist orientated market nlechanism understate management' and opposition to political pluralism orany other challenges to socialism.

The major policy theme to emerge from the mid-termconference, however, was the priority to be givenindustrialization and modernization. In order toindustrialize and modernize the Political Reportunderscored the crucial importance of mobilizing dOlnesticand foreign capital. The shift of the economic structure tosupport industrialization had been mentioned first in theStrateg}' o f Socio-Economic Stabilisation andDevelopment Up Until the Year 2000 adopted by theSeventh Congress. The stress on industrialization andmodernization had been endorsed by the CentralCommittee's third plenum in June 1993. Now it was givenhigherstatus by its endorsement by the mid-tenn conference.

17 Prior to the conference delegates were given a required reading list that containedfour works dealing with the threat of peaceful evolution. One afthe books was atranslation of a Chinese account justifying the suppression C)f pro-democracydemonstrators in Beijing in 1989.

IX Nhan Dan, January 21, 1994.VAI lR O eVA v ~ NAM lRONG I


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i111portantly, witl1 the world's t}lree 111ajor eCOn01111Ccentres: Europe, North Alnerica and EastAsia.

Ninth Party Congress (2001)The Ninth Party Congress Inet in April 2001 and

reaffinned that 'Vietnaln wants to be a friend and a reliablepartner to all countries in the world' by diversifying andmultilateralilzing its international relations. 2u Priority wasplaced on developillg relations with 'socialist,neighboring and traditional friendly states,.21

The Ninth Congress set the goals of overcomingunderdevelopment by the year 2010 and acceleratingindustrialization and modernization in order to become amodem industrialized state by 2020. In order toaccomplish these goals Vietnam vigorously stepped upefforts to integrate itself with the global economy bypursuing membership in World Trade Organisation(WTO). This process of integrating Vietnam's economywith the global economy was popularized by theexpression 'vuon ra bien lon' or 'to plunge into the bigocean'.2(1 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnam in 200 I: The Ninth Party Congress and After', Asian

SUITey, 42: I, January/February 2002,81-89.:1 A Politburo resolution adopted in Novenlber200 1sketched Vietnatn's diplolnatlcstrategy as follows: continue to strengthen relations with Vietnam's neighboursand countries that have been traditional friends; gIve importance to relations withbig countries, devel oping countries, and the political and econoJnic centers of the

w o r 1 d ~ raise the level of solidarity with developing countries and the non-alignednl0vement; increase activities in international organizations; and developrelations with communist and workers' parties, with progressive forces, while atthe same time expanding relations with ruling parties and other parties. Payattention to people's d i p l o m a c y ' ~ see: Vu Duong Ninh, editor in c h i e t ~ Ngoai 6'iaoViet Natl1 Hien D a l ~ 1975-2002. Hanoi: Hoc Vien Quan He Quoe Te, 2002, 110.

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According to Vu Khoan, the Ninth Congressresolution identified two main measures to attain thisgoal: 'first, perfect the regime of a market economy withsocialist characteristics, and second, integrate deeper andmore fully into the various global economic regimes.""Integration into the global economy will tie our economyinto the regional and global economies on the basis ofcomInOll rules of the game'.2 1 In the following yearsVietnam succeeded in getting the United States Congressto gra11t it permanent normal trade relations status (PNTR)as a prerequisite for United States approval of Vietnam'smelnbership in the WTO.

8th Plenum (2003)The party Central Committee's eighth plenum (ninth

congress) met from July 2-12, 2003. It approved animportant reinterpretation of two key ideological conceptsthe 'objects of struggle' (doi tuong) and 'partners' (doi tac)in foreign relations. According to the eighth plenum'sresolution, 'any force that plans and acts against theobjectives we hold in the course of national constructionand defense is the object of struggle'. And, 'anyone whorespects our independence and sovereignty, establishesand expands friendly, equal, and mutually beneficial

~ - ) Vu Khoan, 'Tich Cue va Chu Dong Hoi Nhap Kinh Te Quoc Te', Tap Chi CongSail. 119,2006, internet edition.

-'- This was the first time the concept of 'market economy with socialistcharacteristics' was e n d o r s e d ~ Le Xuan Tung, 'Nhung Dot Pha Tu Duy Ly Luan veKinh Te Thi Truong 0 NuocTa', Tap Chi CongSan. 16(715),August 2004,17.VAI TRO rn A V ~ NAM lRONG KHUVVc 21CHAu A-THAI BWH DTJONG .


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relations with Vietnam is o u r p a r t n e r , . ~ 4 The eighth plenum resolution argued for a more

sophisticated dialectical application of these concepts:'with the objects of struggle, we can find areas forcooperation; with the partners, there exist interests that arecontradictory and different from those of ours. We sholl1dbe aware of these, thus overcoming the two tendencies,namely lacking vigilance and showing rigidity in ourperception, design, and implementation of specificpolicies'.

The eighth plenum resolution provided the policyrationale for Vietnam to step up defence relations with theUnited S t a t e s . ~ 5 After the plenum Vietnam advised theUnited States that it would accept a long-standinginvitation for its Defence Minister to visit Washington.Vietnam also approved the first port call by a U:S. Navywarship since the Vietnam War.

This section has traced the gradual evolution of 'newthinking' in the conceptualization and implementation ofVietnam's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Thesections that follow will analyse Vietnaln's two most

:4 Vietnam ComITIunist Party, Commission on ideology and Cultural Affairs,DOCUI11ents of'the Eighth C"entral ('onlnzittee 0.1' the Vietnanz C0l11nlllllist Par(v(Hanoi: The National Politics Publishing House, 2003), quoted in Nguyen VuTung, 'Vietnamese Foreign Policy: At a New Crossroad?,' Paper to Strategic andForeign Relations, Vietnam Update 2004, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,Singapore, Novell1ber 25-26,2004.

: ' ~ Carlyle A. Thayer, 'The Prospects for Strategic Dialogue', in Catharin E. Dalpinoeditor. Dialogue on U.S.- Vietnanz Relations: Ten Years After Nonnalization. SanFrancisco: The Asia Foundation, 2005, 26-30.VAI TRO ellA VIf:T NAM TRONG KHU Vl1e22 CHAu A-THAI BiNH DVONG .

important sets of bilateral relations, those with China andthe United States.

-vietnam-China RelatiollSBackgroundIn January 1950, the People's Republic of China

extended diplomatic recognition to Vietnam's fledglingC01TI1TIUnist regime, the Denlocratic Republic of Vietnam(later renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam). Chinasupported the Vietnamese communists in their successfulresistance to French colonialism. Relations weredescribed 'as close as lips and teeth'. China providedsubstantial material and personnel support to communistVietnam during the Viet nam War (1965-73).

Relations began to fray in 1972-73 when Chinabegan to urge a diplomatic settlement of the Vietnam Warshort of reunification. Hanoi's relations with Beijingbegan a downward spiral in 1977-78 over growingconflict between the Khmer Rouge regime and Vietnaln.Hostilities erupted in February-March 1979 when Chinainvaded northern Vietnam to teach Vietnam a lesson for itsinvasion of Cambodia. Relations remained strainedthroughout the Cambodian conflict as China continued tosupport the Khmer Regime and shell Vietnam's northernprovinces.

It was only in September 1990, a year afterVietnam's unilateral withdrawal of military forces frolnCalnbodia that China and Vietnam agreed to nonnalizerelations at a secret summit in Chengdu. Vietnam and

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China fomlally nonnalized relations in Novelllber 1991pointedly only after an international conference in Parisreached a cornprehensive political settlen1ent inCambodia the previous O c t o b e r . ~ ( )

The Structure of Bilateral RelationsThis section provides an overview of the structure ofbilateral relations involving party-to-party, state-to-state

and Inil itary-to-mili tary relations.:?7In March 1999, a surnn1it meeting of the leaders of

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the VietnamCommunist Party adopted a sixteen-character guidelinecalling for 'long-term, stable, future-orientated, goodneighborly and all-round cooperative relations'. In June2008, following another summit of party leaders inBeijing, bilateral relations were raised to that of 'strategicpartners', and a year later this was upgraded to a 'strategiccooperative partnership'.

Vietnam and China hold regular sumlnit meetings oftheir party leaders. These meetings provide the

2/-> ChIna also tunled down a Vietnanlese proposal to fonn an alliance. replying'coInrades but not allies'; see: CarlyleA. Thayer, 'Comrade Plus Brother: The NewSino-Vietnalnese Relations', The PacUic Revie11', 5(4), September 1992,402-406and Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Sino-Vietnalnese Relations: The Interplay of Ideologyand National Interest', Asian Surve.v, 34(6), June 1994, 513-52X.See: Carlyle A. Thayer, 'The Structure ofYietnam-China Relations. 1991-2008',Journal ( ~ International Culture [Chosun University, Gwangju]. December2008. 1(2), 45-98 and Carlyle A. Thayer. 'Vietnam and Rising China: TheStructural Dynalnics of Mature Asynlll1etry', In Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast AsianA./Tair5; 2010. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 20] 0,392-409.

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Strategic Defence Security Dialogue in H a n o i . ~ x Militaryto-military relations are discussed in detail in thefollowing section.

Vietnam pursues three strategies in its relations withChina. First, it utilizes high-level par ty and state visits as adiplomatic tool to shape its relations with China. Vietnan1has negotiated a web of joint statements, agreemellts, andtreaties in an effort to quarantine contentious issues fromintruding on and negatively affecting other areas ofcooperation and to make Chinese behavior morepredictable and less likely to hann Vietnall1's nationalinterests.

High-leve l meetings have resulted in the adoption ofguidelines to regulate bilateral relations and set deadlinesfor lower officials to settle particu lar disputes such as theland border. A prime example may be found in Vietnam'sapproach to managing border disputes with China. 24Vietnam stresses the legacy of past close relations andmutual benefit over contemporary differences. Vietnamobtained Chinese agreement to detach these issues fromhigh-level consideration and to relegate them to technicalworking groups, and to solve the easier probleills beforethe more difficult. Vietnam's diplomatic strategyemphasized common interests, such as making the land2:< 'China- Vietnam boost defence cooperation.' Voice of Vietnam News, Novelnber

28. 2010; 'Vietnamese party, army senior officIals ITIcet with Chinese 111ilitarydelegation,' Xinhua, November 28,2010; and 'Defence officials Ineet in dialoguewith China,' Viet Nan1 News, November 292010..") Brantly Womack, China and ~ / 7 e t n a m ' The Politics qj'A,\)'Inlnctry, New Yotk:Cmnbridge lJniversity Press, 2006, 5 and 89-90.

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l11ention of the 1979 border war with China so as not tooffend Beijing. The Chinese Embassy regularlyintervenes to protest any publication or action that is seenas infringing Chinese sovereignty, especially in the SouthChina Sea. The slow pace of Vietnam-United Stateslnilitary-to-lnilitary relations up until recently may beattributed in part to concerns about China' s reaction.

China exerts direct pressure through high-levelmeetings by national leaders. Party-to-party relationsrepresent a special conduit for Chinese influence.Vietnam's model of econolnic development borrowsheavily but not exclusively from Chinese experience.Vietnamese foreign policy also mimics Chineseformulations such as appropriating the expression 'peace,cooperation and development' to describe generalstrategic trends in Asia Pacific. Hanoi also adapts Chineseideology to its own needs, such as 'the threat of peacefulevolution'. In sum, no other foreign state is as assertive orinfluential in Hanoi than China.

Economic RelationsWhen Vietnam nonnalized relations with China two

way trade grew astronomically. China is now Vietnam'slargest trading partner. China supplies Vietnam withmachinery, refined oil and steel. In return, Vietnam suppliesChina with unrefined oil, coal and rubber. The single mostimportant issue in the trade relationship is the imbalance inChina's favor. In 2008, China exported $15.7 billion worthofgoods to Vietnam, while Vietnam managed to export only$4.6 billion to China, leaving a deficit of$11.1 billion.

VAI TRO eVA V ~ NAM TRaNG KHU Vl1e28CHAu A-THAI BtNH DUONG .

China's trade surplus has figured at every high-levelsummit in recent years. Party and state leaders agree thatefforts should be made to make it more balanced. Buthow? The stnlcture of Vietnamese exports had changedlittle over the years and no major c}1ange is expected in theC01l11ng years. Vietnamese domestic Inanufacturerscannot produce quality goods that are competitive in theChinese ll1arket place. Restricting Chinese imports is noton the cards.

Vietnam's massive trade deficit with China must beplaced in the context of Vietnam's current trade deficit of$19 billion with the rest of the world (2009). Vietnamneeds continued access to markets in the United Stateswhere it has a $9 billion surplus (2009).

Vietnamese leaders have called for increasedChinese investment to mitigate the trade imbalance.Although China has responded, the total amount ofinvestment ($3 billion) is modest when compared to otherforeign investors. Also, China's investment in bauxitemining in the Central Highlands has proven to be highlycontentious in Vietnam.

In addition to the economic benefits of trade, thereare also geo-strategic considerations at play. The growthof trade has been accompanied by a massive upgradingand construction of infrastructure roads, bridges, railwaysmuch of it funded by the Asian Development Bank andWorld Bank as part of the Greater Mekong Sub-region.Increasingly mainland Southeast Asia is being linked tosouthwestern China. In addition, Vietnam and China are

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pronloting the develc)plnent of the 'two corridors and oneeconomic beltway' linking southern Cllina, Hainan islandand northern Vietnain. Froin Hanoi's point of view, thisnot only serves Vietnam's development needs, but alsoenmeshes China and provides Beijing incentives forcooperat ive behavior.

The relationship between VietnarI1 and China is ahighly aSytnmetric one in all dimens ions of power. Vietnam,with a population of 89 million, rankS as the world'sthirteenth most populous country, yet it is only a middlesized Chinese province by comparison. The major strategicpreoccupation of the Vietnamese leadership is how to usethe levers ofdiplomacy, economic relatioI1S and military tiesto maintain their autonomy and independence and preventfrom being pulled into China's orbit.

Outstanding IssuesConflicting claims to sovereignty iI1 the South China

Sea have generated a number of issues that have30caused friction in bilateral relations. Six

clusters of issues lnay be identified:'0 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Recent Developnlents in the South China Sea: Implications forPeace, Stability and Coopenltion in the Region'. in Tran Truong Thuy, ed., The South

China Sea: Cooperation jar Ri!gional Securitv and Di!veloprnent. Hanoi: Nha XuatB ~ The Gioi, 2010, 125-138; Ian Storey and C'arlyle A. Thayer.. 'The S.outh China SeaDIspute:. A Review of Developments and Their I m p l i c a t l o ~ s ~ l n c e the 2002Declaratlonon the Conductof Parties," in K. V. Kesavan and DaDlt SIngh, eds., Southand Southeast Asia: Re.spollding to Changing Ceo-Political and Security Challenges.Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, 57 - 7 2 ~ and Carlyle A. Thayer,'Recent Developlnents in the South China Sea: Implications for Regional Peace andProsperity', Paper presented to the 2nd International WorkshOP on the South China Sea:Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, co_sponsored by the DiplomaticAcadeITIy of VietnmTI and the VietnmTI Lawyers' Association, New World SaigonHotel, Ho Chi Minh City, VietnmTI, November 12-13,2010.

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1. China's establishinent of th e Sanshaadlninistrative unit on Hqinan Island withresponsibility over the P a r a ~ e l Islands, Spratlyarchipelago and Macclesfielq Bank.

2. The publication of anti-Vietl)amese material onthc Intcrnct such as the Purported Chinsseinvasion plan of Vietnam, Chinese criticislTI ofVietnamese sovereignty cl(till1S in the SouthChina Sea published on a jOint Vietnaln-ChinaTrade Ministry website, and the publication ofanti-China commentary 01) the Internet byVietnaiTIeSe bloggers.

3. Chinese pressures on Exx()nMobile, BP andothers to cease assisting V i ~ t n a m in exploringand developing hydrocarbon resources in theSouth China Sea.

,-1. China's imposition of u n i l a t ~ r a l fishing bans intIle South China Sea north () f 12 degrees northlatitude annually during t h months of MayAugust, and Chinese aggressiveness againstVietnamese fishing craft in il1)posing these bans.

5. China's protest at s u b m i s ~ i o n s by Vietnam(including ajoint submissiol) with Malaysia) tothe United Nations C o m m i ~ s i o n on Limits toContinental Shelves in May 2009 and China'slodging of a V-shaped map containing ninedash lines to indicate the ~ x t e n t of Chinesesovereignty claims.

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6. Continued Chinese diploll1atic pressure onVietnaln to cease any action, includingblogging and publication that China findsobjectionable., especially in relation to theSouth China Sea.

The souring of relations over the South China Seahas also magnified other issues such as China's Inassivetrade surplus in relation to Vietnam and the paucity ofChinese investments in Vietnaln; illegal Chineseworkers/migrants in Vietnam; and environmental andpossibly national security concerns over China's bauxitemining venture in Vietnam's Central Highlands.

Vietnam-United States RelationsBackgroundThe United States withheld diplomatic recognition

from Vietnam for over two decades following the end ofthe Vietnam War. The main impediment was the issue of afull accounting of all U.S. servicemen who went missingin action or were held as prisoners of war (MIA/POW). In1994, the U.S. lifted its trade embargo as a result ofprogress in address ing this issue by Vietnam. In July 1995the United States extended diplomatic recognition to theSocialist Republic ofVietnam.

War Legacy IssuesFor the next fifteen year bilateral relations continued

to be weighed down by unsettled legacy issues arisingfrom the Vietnam War: full accounting for U.S. Prisone rsof War/Missing in Action, Vietnamese refugees and

VAI lR Q eVA V ~ NAM lRONG KHU vue32 CHAu A- THAI BiNH DUONG .

Vietnaln's demand tl1at the U.S. address 'the wounds ofwar' and stop its support for anti-communist exilesseeking to overthrow the Hanoi government. It tookVietnalTI and the United Sta tes six years befo re could theynegotiated their first substantive agreement - the Bilateral~ r r a d e Agreell1ent of200 1.

Legacy issues left by the war still persist today butare no longer tIle centerpiece of the bilateral relationship.The U.S. accepts that Vietnam is doing its best inproviding a full accounting [or MIAs. Nevertheless, thePOW/MIA issue still remains one of the U. S.government's highest priorities with Vietnam. Inreciprocation for Vietnamese humanitarian assistance inaddressing the MIA issue, the U.S. has made cooperationin health the cornerstone of its assistance program anddirects three-quarters of its funding to addressingHIV/AIDS and pandemic influenza.

VietnalTI has pressed for reciprocity in addressinglegacy issues and in recent years has asked the UnitedStates for assistance in dealing with Agent Orange hotspots. Congress has appropriated funds to assist withdioxin removal and to provide health care facilities in DaNang where Agent Orange was once stored. Secretary ofState Hillary Clinton promised in Hanoi 'to increase ourcooperation and make even greater progress together' todeal with the legacy ofAgent Orange. 31~ I Retnarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vietnanl DeputyPrime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khienl. Government GuestHouse, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22, 2010, U.S. Department of State, Office of theSpokesman, July 22, 2010.

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Economic RelationsEconoll1ics took center stage in 2000, a pivotal year,

with the signing of a Bilateral Trade Agreement. In 2007.,Vietnam and the United States signed a Trade andInvestment Agreement. Two-way trade jumped from $450Inillion in 1995 to $12.9 b illion in 2009 . As noted above.,Vietnam enjoys a hefty $9 billion surplus. ObamaAdministration officials support Vietnam's fullparticipation in the Trans Pacific Partnership to expandfree trade. American companies have invested $9.8 billionin Vietnam, placing the U.S. sixth on the investnlentladder. Economic relations also include a Bilateral AirTransport Agreement (2003, amended in 2008) and aBilateral Maritime Agreement (2007). Over 200memoranda of understanding have been signed betweenuniversities in both countries.

Political RelationsPolitical relations have steadily improved since

2000 when Bill Clinton became the first Alnericanpresident to visit Hanoi. In 2006 and 2007, the U.S. andVietnamese presidents exchanged reciprocal visits. Amajor turning point occurred in June 2008 when PrimeMinister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Washington. In ajointstatement, the United States declared its respect for theterritorial integrity ofVietnam and its opposition to the useof force to overthrow the Hanoi government, thusaddressing Vietnamese concerns about the activities ofoverseas Vietnamese. Prime Minister Dung revisited

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1the USS JVhll IJ. S"tenllis, an aircraft ca n ier operating inthe South China Sea. In Decell1ber, Vietnanl's DefenceMinister General Phung Quang Thanh, stopped of f inHawaii to nleet with U.S. Pacific Comllland officials aspart of his visit to Washington. In Hawaii he wasphotographed peering through the periscope of the USSFlorida, a nuclear-powered guided missile sublnarine(SSGN). In 2009 and 2010, VietnalTI cOlnpleted repairs ontwo U.S. Military Sealift Command vessels.

On the 15 th anniversary of normalization, Vietnam'sdeputy ambassa dor visited the USS George W H. Bush inNorfolk, Virginia, while half a world away Vietnalneselocal government and military officials flew out to theUSS George Washington in waters of f the central coast ofVietnam. Just prior to the fly out, the U.S. and Vietnamconducted their first naval engagement activities. InAugust 2010, in a significant upgrade of their defencerelationship, Vietnam and the US held their first DefenseDialogue between senior defence officials. 3-l This meetingfocused on bilateral issues such as MIA accounting,unexploded wartime ordnance, Agent Orange, and areasfor future cooperation.

Also on the occasion of the 15 th anniversary of thenormalization of diplomatic relations (July 1995-July2010), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared inHanoi that America considers Vietnam 'not only important

;-1 Carlyle A. Thayer, 'Vietnaln's Defensive Diploluacy', Op Ed, The Wall StreetJournal, August 20-22,20 10, II.VAITRoeUA VItTNAM1RONGKHUVVe36 CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG .

on its own 111erits . but as part of a strategy ainled atenhancing American engagenlent in the Asia Pacific, andin particular Southeast Asia'. According to SecretaryClinton . all the fUlldamentals were in place for the U.S. totake its relations with Vietnanl 'to the next level ofengagement, cooperati on, friendship, and partnership'.15

Constraints and DifficultiesWhile there is definitely new momentum in the

bilateral relationship, there are constraints and potentialdifficulties in the path ahead. Jh The first concern is whatSecretary Clinton described as 'profound differences' overhuman rights and political freedom. 37 Human rights remainthe main point of contentiol1 in bilateral relations. u.S.Ambassador to Vietnam, Michael Michalak, made clear thatanns sales to VietnalTI are not possible until the human rightssituation improves. In an interview with VietNamNetPublisher NguyenAnh Tuan, Ambassador Michalak stated,'We would very much like to expand our military to militaryrelationship to include the sale ofanns, but until we are morecOlnfortable with the human rights situation in Vietnam,that's just not going to be possible'. ~ I, Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vietnam DeputyPrime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia KhielTI. Government GuestIlouse, Hanoi, Vietnan1, July 22, 20 10, U.S. Department of State, Office of theSpokesman, July 22, 2010.I> Carlyle A. Thayer, 'US-Vietnam Relations: A Scorecard', Asia P a c ~ f i c Bulletin(East-West Center, Washington, D.C.), No. 67, September 14,2010,1-2.17 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at Event Celebrating the

15 th Anniversary of United States-Vietnam Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22,20 I0, U.S. Department of State,()ffice of the Spokesman,July 22, 2010.II{ Tllan Viet Narll, July 6, 2010 reprinted in 'Vietnam's relations with America are infact a strategic connection,' VietNamNet, July 11,20 IO.

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The second constraint arises fronl conservativeelements in vietnaln who still view the United States withsuspicion. They not only characterize religious freedom,hUll1an rights and delTIOCracy as tools to undennineVietnaln's socialist regilne but argue that educationalexchanges are part of the 'plot of peaceful evolution'. Th econservative influence within the vCP is evident in draftpolicy docUlnents circulated prior to the EleventhCongress in 2011. The draft Political Report is repletewith references to 'hostile forces' and 'peacefulevolution. ,3lJ VCP conservatives oppose the currenttrajectory in defense relations with the U.S. because of thepotential friction they may cause with China.

A third constraint lies in different expectationsregarding economic reforms. Vietnam is frustrated bywhat it considers politically lllotivated trade barriers suchas anti-dumping and anti-subsidy taxes on Vietnamesegoods as well as U.S. pressures to equitize state-ownedenterprises. The U.S. has offered technical assistance intrade and investment matters and would like to encouragegood governance. But many obstacles stand in the way.Corruption is rampant and affects all sectors. Vietnam'srestrictions on access to the Internet has become acontentious issue. 4o Vietnamese government decision,\) 'Du thao [Mat] Bao Cao Chinh Tri tai Dai Hoi XI cua Dang (April 2, 2010),' in

Dang Cong San Viet Nam, Du thao Cae Van Kien Trinh Dai i foi XI ella Dang (TaiLieu Su DungTai Dai Hoi Dang Cap Co So), Luu Hanh Noi BO,Apri1201 O.40 Ren1arks by Secretary of State Hillary RodhalTI Clinton and Vietnam DeputyPrime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, Goven1ment GuestHouse, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 22, 2010, U.S. Department of State, Office of theSpokesman, July 22, 2010.

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other defense cooperation, arlllS and equipnlent sales andstrategic cooperation.

1. High-Level VisitsThe United States and Vietnam have exchanged two

reciprocal visits by defense Ininisters/secretary ofdefense. These have been spaced at three-year intervals(see Table 1 below). In contrast, the patterns of ministeriallevel visits betweel1 Vietnam and China has been 1110reerratic and heavily weighted in China's favor. Vietnam'sdefense minister has journeyed to China on sevenoccasions since 1991. A six-year gap occurred betweenthe second and third visits and a five-year gap took placebetween the fourth and fifth visits. Th e exchanges are notreciprocal. China's defense minister has visited Vietnamonly twice with a thirteen year gap between visits.

Vietnam hosted its most recent ministerial-level visitsfrom China inApri12006 and the United States in July ofthesame year. In October 2010, both the Chinese and u.s.defence ministers attended the ASEAN Defence MinistersMeeting Plus Eight (ADMM + 8) inaugural meeting inHanoi. Vietnam's Defense Minister last visited the UnitedStates in November 2009 and China inApril2010.

A review of high-level defense exchanges belowsecretary/minister level for the period 2002-mid-2009reveals that Vietnam has received roughly equaldelegations from China (ten) and the United States(eleven).-+) But there is a marked imbalance in delegations-1' Data on exchanges was taken fronl Vietnam's 2004 and 2009 Defense WhitePapers. Data for the year 2004 was omitted from these publications.

VAI TRO eVA V ~ NAM TRONG KHU VUe40 CHAu A- THAI BiNH DUONG .

from Vietnam. Eleven high-level Vietnamese delegationsvisited China, while only four visited the United States.

High-level exchanges between Vietnam and Chinamay be classified into three broad categories: generalstaff, general political department and regional militarycommands. There is a rough balance in exchanges at

44general staff and general political department level.China has dispatched three delegations of regiOI1almilitary commanders to Vietnam and received only onereturn visit. Most recently, in a new development, thePolitical Commissar of the Vietnam People's Army Navy,Tran Thanh Huyen, visited Beijing.45

Table 1Exchanges of Defense Ministers:Vietnam, China and the United States, 1991-2009

1991 July1992 December 1993 May1998 January2000 July 2000 March2005 October 2006 April 2003 November 2006 July2007 August2008-09 no visits 2008-09 no visits 2009 November 2008-09 no visitsApril 2010

11 Senior Lt. Gen. Ma Xiaotian, Dcputy Chicf of the People's LiberatIon ArmyGeneral Staff, VIsited Vietnam on November 27,2010. H is visit is not included inthese figures.4 ~ 'ChIna. Victn31TI Necd to Enhance Cooperation: Senior Chinese Military Officer,'

Xinhua. NovcInbcr 23.2010.VAI TRO eVAVIt:T NAM TRONG KHU vue 41CHAu A-THAI BINH DUONG .


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Because Victnal11 and China arc both comlTIuniststates and maintain a system ofpolitical control over theiranned forces, they have an avenue of defense cooperationnot available to the United States. Also, Vietnalll andChina share a comlllon border and both have put in a major .effort to demine and demarcate their common frontier.

The structure of high-level exchanges betweenVietnam and the United States differ from those betweenVietnam and China because the U.S. Defense Departmentand anned forces are not structured the same way as theVietnamese and Chinese militaries. For example, Vietnamhas no counterpart to the U.S. system of CombatantCommanders, such as the Commander of the U.S. Paci ficCommand (formerly Commander-in-Chief PacificCommand or CINCPAC). The United States has nocounterpart to the head of the General PoliticalDepartment . U.S. delegations to Vietnam may be groupedinto three categories: (1) visits by the Commander U.S.Pacific Command; (2) visits at Deputy Assistant Secretaryof Defense level; and (3) visits by componentcommanders, U.S. Pacific Command.

Between 2002 and mid-2009. the United States sentan equivalent number of high-level delegations toVietnam as China (eleven as compared to China's ten).u.S. delegations reflect a greater diversity of interest andpotential for cooperation. By far the most frequent U.S.visitor to Vietnam is the Commander of the U.S. PacificCommand who logged four visits between 2002 and mid2009 (and a total of seven visits since 1994). In addition,

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included the first Search and Rescue l ~ x c r c i s e ( S f \ . J ~ f ~ X ) between China and Vietnanl. In June 2009, in an historicfirst, tw o Vietnanlese naval ships nlade a visit toZhanjiang port in Guangdong province in SouthwesternChina.

Vietnamese-Chinese naval exchanges pale incOlnparison to the regular annual visits by U.S. Navywarships, supplelnented by a slowly growing number ofnon-combatant and humanitari an ships (see Table 2).

In addition to the 'show the flag' and protocol natureof these visits, the U.S. adds value to port calls byproviding humanitarian and medical assistance to thesurrounding community. The visits by the USNSSC{feguard in 2009 and USNS Byrd in 20 10 for ship repairsmay be harbingers ofmore permanent arrangements. No wthat the Vietnamese navy has made port visits to Thailand,Malaysia and China it is possible Vietnam may agree tovisita U.S. port such as Guam.

Table 2u.s. Naval Ship Visits to Vietnamese Ports,2003-2010:" ' MlofVislt" :'2003 November2004 July2005 March-April2006 July2007 July2007 October2007 November

USS VandergriftUSS Curtis WilburUSS GaryUSS Patriot and USS SalvorUSS Pe/eJiuUSNS Bruce HeezenUSS Patriot and USS Guardian

Ho Chi Minh CityDa NangHo Chi Minh CityHo Chi Minh CityDa NangDa NangHaiPhong

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.. 1USNS Mercy Nha Trang2008 June USNS Bruce Heezen Oa Nang2009 June USNS Safeguard Ho Chi Minh City2009 August-Sept. USS Blue Ridge* and USS Lassen Oa Nang2009 November USNS Richard E. Byrd Hon Khoi Port2010 Feb.-March USNS Mercy Qui Nhon2010 May USS John S. McCain Oa Nang2010 August

*U.S. 7,h Fleet Flag Ship and escort.Finally, the United States has added a new

dimension to naval relations by flying Vietnamesemilitary officers out to the USS John D. Stennis and USSGeorge Washington to observe flight operations in theSouth China Sea in April 2009 and August 2010,respectively, and by the holding of their first navalengagement activities.

3. ProfessionalMilitary Education and TrainingVietnamese-Chinese cooperation in the area of

p r o f e s ~ i o n a l military education and training is at thenascent stage. The visits by senior officials from theirrespective General Political Departments invariablyinclude discussions on exchanging experiences in armybuilding on their agenda. In 2008, Vietnam's DeputyDefense Minister held discussions in Beijing oncooperation in personnel training. Both sides also havediscussed Vietnamese participation in courses offered byChina's National Defense University.47

17 A Jl1aJor delegation from China's National Defense University first visited Hanoi inlate 2004.VAI TRO ru A V ~ NAM TRONG KHU VlJe 4)CHAu A-THAI BlNH DUONG .


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CHAu A- THAI BiNH DUONG . CHAu A-lHAI BlNH DUONG .

Vietnanlese participation in professional Inilitaryeducation and training with the United States is of longerstanding but involves only limited nunlber of VietnaIllesepersonnel. Perhaps the first opportunity for lnilitaryeducation was offered by the Asia-Pacific Center forSecurity Studies in Hawaii in the late 1990s. Incolnpletedata suggests that numbers have slowly risen from two in1998 to a high of thirteen in 2004. Since 2005, Vietnamhas been eligible for E'xtended International MilitaryEducation and Training (IMET) and later IMET (Englishlanguage and medical training). Eight Vietnamesemilitary personnel participated in FY2005. In 2007 theUnited States asked Vietnam to accept U.S. officers andcadets for training in Vietnamese universities. The statllsofthis proposal is uncertain.4x

4. OtherD efense CooperationAs noted above, defense cooperation between VietnalTI

and China has been mainly of a confidence building natureinvolving demining and demarcating the ir COlllmon landborder and joint naval patrols in the GulfofTokin.

By contrast, Vietnanl's other defense cooperationrelations with the United States have been and continue tobe more extensive. Obviously MIA-PO W full accountinghas been the main focal point for decades. But Vietnamand the United States also cooperate in other programs4X For comparison. Australia has hosted more than 80 senior Vietnamese Defensevisitors and over ISO Vietnamese Defense students since February 1999. Duringthe saIne period over 900 Australian Defence offi ciab have visited VictnaITI.

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to VietnalTI. NORINCO was also reported to be discussingco-productiOrl arrangements for heavy machine guns andalTItl1unition with a Vietnan1ese counterpart. In 2008,Vietnanl's Deputy Defense Minister held discussions withChina's COlrlmission for Science, Technology andIndustry in Beijing. No doubt the prospect s for Chinesedefense induGtry cooperation with VietnalTI have beenlimited by recent anns and servicing agreements betweenVietnam and tpe Russian Federation.

Military equipment sales between the United States Iand Vietnam llave been raised over a number of years. In1994, for eXilmple, the Commander in Chief PacificCommand proposed equipment exchanges and saleswhile on a visit to Vietnam. In 2005, the U.S. Ambassadorto Vietnam raised the possibility of joint cooperation inrepair and maintenance and the purchase of supplies bythe U.S. Navy, The following year, Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld, while on a visit to Hanoi, suggestedthat Vietnam wight buy military spare parts.

All of these proposals were subject to legalrestrictions. In 2006, the Secretary of State approved thesale, lease, export and/or transfer of non-lethal defensearticles and oefense services to Vietnam. This wasfollowed by (l Presidential Memorandum establishingVietnam's eligibility under the Foreign Assistance Act of1961 to make certain purchases. Vietnam was excluded,however, fron1 lethal end items or their componentsincluding non--Iethal crowd control and night visiondevices. In 2007, the International Trafficking in Arms

vAl lRa ellA V$ T NAM lRONG KHU VlJe48 CHAu A- THAI BiNH DUONG

Regulations were amended to allow sales to Vietnam oncase-by-case basis.

--rhe U.S. would like to see VietnalTI take part in theForeign Military Sales process. U.S. officials have alreadyexplained the process involved and how to submit a Letterof Request for Price and Availability. Vietnam could seekapproval to acquire spare parts for its stock of capturedU.S. Annored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and UH-I(Huey) helicopters which are presently inoperable. In2009, the head of the Pentagon's Defense CooperationAgency singled out maritime patrol craft and coastal radaras possible items for sale. But U.S. officials have madeclear that non-lethal anns sales are contingent uponVietnam engaging more fully with tIle United Sates.

As early 2003, U.S. private sector defense industrysources began to identify Vietnam as a potentiallyattractive anns market. In 2007, the U.S.-ASEANBusiness Council opened an office in Hanoi and hosted avisit by a U.S. Defense and Security Corporate ExecutiveDelegation representing ITT Corporation, Aerospace,Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Oracle.

6. Strategic CooperationThe United States has engaged with Vietnam more

fully to promote strategic cooperation than China. 49Vietnam conducts strategic cooperation with its northern

l() Carlyle A. Thayer. Sou.theast Asia: Patterns of'Security Cooperation. ASPIStrategy Report. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010,41-55.

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neighbor mainly through 111ultilateral channels such asASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forull1. Vietnaln is keen topromote what is known as the ADMM + 8 processinvolving ASEAN Defense Ministers and their dialoguepartners (Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, NewZealand, South Korea, and the United States). Vietnamheld the first ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi in Octoberand hosted the first Ineeting of the ASEAN DefenceSenior Officials Meeting Plus Eight in December 2010.

Vietnam's strategic cooperation with the UnitedStates includes more channels for cooperation than theASEAN process. In 2004, Vietnam attended the AsiaPacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) meeting held in Tokyofor the first time. A Vietnamese observer reportedlyattended a meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiativeheld in New Zealand. Vietnam has also discussed - btltremained noncommittal on - its participation in the U.S.Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In June 2008, PrimeMinister Nguyen Tan Dung, announced plans forVietnam's participation in the Global Peace OperationsInitiative. Vietnam continues to send defense officials tothe Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. In 2008, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffmet with Vietnameserepresentative s for the first time.

China is relatively new to the defense cooperationgame. The scope of what China can offer is limited incomparison to long-established programs in the U.S.China and Vietnam share a special political-ideologicalconduit for relations between their armed forces that is

VAl TRO eVA vIf:T N AM TRONG KHU Vl.1e)0 CHAu A-TIw: BiNH DUONG .

closed to the United States. This conduit provides China ameans to influence Vietnam but the extent of China'sability to do so in practice appears quite limited. Vietnamand China have 111ade concrete progress in addressing landand 111aritill1e (Gulf of Tonkin) border issues. In October2010, at the inaugurallneeting of the ADMM + 8, Chinaagreed to join VietnalTI as co-chair of the Expert WorkingGroup on l-1ul11anitarian Assi stance and Disaster Relief.

The United States engages in defense cooperation ona global scale. It can offer an extraordinar ily wide scope ofprograms that are of long-standing. The unique role ofCombatant COlnlnanders in the U.S. system gives the U.S.Pacific Command a special edge in offering opportunitiesfor cooperation with Vietnam. Although Vietnam has sentnearly three times as many high-level defense delegationsto China (eleven) as the United States (four) from 2002 tomid-2009 that has not resulted in greater Chineseinfluence or defense cooperation.

ln summary, bilateral defense cooperation betweenVietnam and China and Vietnam and the United States areheavily tinged by political considerations. No doubtdefense officials in both Beijing and Washington wouldlike to see an increase in bilateral military-to-militarycooperation with Vietnam. Vietnam moves slowly anddeliberately and generally sets the pace. When Vietnamdecides to move forward, its policies towards China andthe United States appear to move in tandem. The initiationofdefense dialogues with the U.S. and China is 2004-05 isan example. Vietnam also maintains a rough equivalency

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in the nUlnber of high-level exchanges it receives fromboth countries.

ConclusionThis paper has reviewed four major topics:

Vietnam's changing worldview in the post-Cold War era,Vietnam-China relations, Vietnam-United States relationsand Vietnam's defence relations with China and theUnited States in comparative perspective.

Vietnam has completely altered its worldview fromthe orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological view of theworld riven by antagonistic contradictions between thesocialist and capitalist states to a world that iseconomically and technologically interdependent.Vietnam's new world view embraces the concept ofnational interest in which sustainable economicdevelopment leading to industrialization an dmodernization has top priority. Therefore, Vietnam hassought both international and regional integration throughan open door policy that welcomes foreign directinvestment and promotes trade.

Vietnam has adopted a comprehensive view ofsecurity that depreciates (but does not jettison) the role ofmilitary power and emphasizes the importance ofeconomics. In the post-Cold War era Vietnam has soughtpeaceful coexistence with its former adversaries Chinaand the United States. Vietnam has also adopted policiesto tum Southeast Asia into a 'region ofpeace, stability andcooperation'.

') 2 VAI TRO eVA VIt:T NAM TRONG KHU vueCHAu A-THAI BiNH DVONG .

And VietnalTI has adopted a multi-directionalforeign policy that stresses diversification andnlultilateralization of its external relations. This newapproach is encapsulated in the expression that Vietnamseeks 'to be a friend and reliable partner with all countries'.In short, Vietnanl eschews classical balance of powerpolitics in its relations with China and the United States.

By way of conclllsion, this section will attenlpt toanswer three Inajor questions:

I. HOM) is Vietnam responding to the ri se o.fChina?Vietnaln suffers frotTI the 'tyranny of geography' in

that it is located next to China and has one of the mostasymmetric bilateral relationships in the world. BrantlyWomack characterizes the current relationship as one ofmature asymmetry through which China seeksacknowledgetnent of its primacy and Vietnam seekrecognitivn of its autonomy. 50

Vietnanl has sought to enmesh China in a web ofbilateral ties in order to make China's behaviour morepredictable. Vietnam has structured its bilateral relationswith China through a series of agreements that stresscomprehensive cooperation through party-to-party, stateto-state and tnilitary-to-military ties. Vietnam has alsosought to enmesh China in a web of multilateral tiesthrough ASEAN-centric regional institutions.

~ ( Brantly Wonlack, 2006. China and Vietn(un: The Politics 0.( A.\)'Jnnletry. NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 235-237.

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Vietnall1 faces two Il1ajor obstacles in Il1aintaining anlature aSyll1111etric relationship with CIlina: a huge andnl0unting trade deficit and conflicting sovereignty claimsin the South China Sea. Vietnam's policy of enmeshnlentIlas not been entirely successful. In light of Chinese,assertiveness in the South China Sea, dating froln 2007 tothe present, Vietnam has sought to enhance its positionvis-a-vis Cllina through defence self-help Ineasures andby cultivating defence ties with the United States.

2. Why'is Vietnam recalibrating its relations with theUnited States?

Vietnam's pursuit of global economic integration hasmeant that it has had to develop good political and economicrelations with the United States despite the legacy of issuesleft over from the Vietnam War. Vietnam is dependent ontrade with the U.S. (and the European Union, Japan andSouth Korea) to counterbalance its huge trade deficit withChina. Even further, it is in Vietnam's interest to encourageU.S. investment in Vietnam to give Washington a stake inVietnam's stability and development.

Vietnam's bilateral relations with the United Statesare bedevilled by Washington's promotion of humanrights and religious freedom. This gives rise to concernsby party conservatives that the United States seeks tooverturn Vietnam's socialist regime through peacefulevolution.

Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has ledHanoi to recalibrate its relations with the United States by

VAI me ) eVA V ~ NAM mONG KHU vue54 CHAu A-THAI BiNH DUONG .

ur ing Washington to oppose China's ambi t claims to theS;uth China Sea.'l Therefore, Vietnam has responded toU.S. overtures by taking gradual mainly symbolic - stepsto develop more robust defence relations to insulate itselffrom Chinese pressures.

3. What is Vietnanl ~ ) " f u t u r e strategic sign(jicance inthe Asia-Pac?'fic?Vietnam today is widely viewed as an important

strategic player in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific.This is based on the size of its population and economicperformance. Vietnam is an emerging middle-incomecountry.

Vietnam is also a key player in ASEAN and inASEAN-centric regional architecture. Vietnam has aproven diplomatic track record of contributing positivelyto regional security through ASEAN-centred institutionsand as a recent non-permanent member of the UnitedNations Security Council where it had to address globalIssues.

Finally, and of strategic significance, Vietnam is alittoral state on tIle South China Sea through which passvital sea lines of communication. For a number of yearsVietnam has been gradually modernizing its annedforces. 52 When Vietnam fully absorbs new guided missile'I Carlyle 1\. Thayer. 'The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the SouthChina Sea'. Securif)"Challenges [Kokoda Foundation], 6(2). Winter 201 0.69-84.


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frigates and Kilo-class sublnarines into its anned forces,Vietnanl will be a position to contribute Inore positively toregional l11aritime security in partnership with AsiaPacific's major power.

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