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8/14/2019 Thayer Radical Islam & Terrorism in Southeast Asia
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Radical Islam and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia
Carlyle A. Thayer*
‘We must not confuse a few al-Qaeda escapades with Southeast Asian Islam asa whole’ Robert W. Hefner, March 25, 2003.
Introduction
Prior to the Bali bombings of October 12, 2002, the conventional view of Islam in
Southeast Asia, and Islam in Indonesia in particular, was that it was different
from Islam in the Middle East, Pakistan and Central Asia. Islam in Southeast
Asia was viewed not only as moderate but inward looking and tolerant. The
conventional view also held that radical Islam represented a tiny minority and
was not influential politically either domestically or in regional affairs.
*I would like to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Greg Barton who provided me with copiesof three of his unpublished manuscripts. This paper draws heavily on the various reports issuedby the International Crisis Group and Political Islam in Southeast Asia, Conference Report,Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.. March 25, 2003. All references may be found in thebibliography.
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The vast majority of Southeast Asia’s Muslims are Sunni.1 In many areas Islam
has become intertwined with pre-existing values and belief systems associated
with folk religion, Buddhism and Hinduism. This intermixing resulted from the
history of Islam’s arrival from the twelfth century. The bearers of Islam spread
their views peacefully and not by force of arms. They adapted to local customs
and conditions. A broad historical overview would also reveal that a tiny
minority of Muslims have been drawn to more puritanical or extremist variants
of the faith.
The Bali bombings challenged the conventional view of Islam. The causes of
terrorism were now widely perceived as closely linked to Islamic politics. The
bombings exposed an extensive terrorist network in Indonesia that had well-
established links with militant groups not only throughout Southeast Asia but
internationally to al Qaeda. The reluctance of the Indonesian government to
1The Sunni tradition is known in Arabic as the Ahl-i Sunnah (the People of Sunnah). The word
‘Sunnah’ means custom, method, or path and refers particularly to the example of the prophetMuhammed as found in the Hadith. The Sunnis are those who follow the tradition of the prophetand his companions in understanding the Islamic faith. Shia Muslims hold the same fundamentalbeliefs of other Muslims, with the principle addition being that they also believe in an imamate,which is the distinctive institution of Shia Islam. Islam experienced a schism about a century after
death of the prophet Mohammed. The dispute centred around the appointment of a caliph. TheShias argued that only a direct descendant of the Prophet could be appointed, while the Sunniargued any person approved by the religious community was eligible. The caliph had substantialpolitical and military power but no inherent religious authority. Sunni Muslims view the caliphas a temporal leader only and consider an imam to be a prayer leader, but for the Shia the historiccaliphs were merely de facto rulers, while the rightful and true leadership continued to be passedalong through a sort of apostolic succession of Muhammed's descendants, the Imams (whencapitalized, Imam refers to the Shia descendant of the House of Ali). This dispute becameentrenched in doctrine.
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declare Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) a terrorist group perhaps was an indication that
radical Islam had more political influence than previously accepted.
The prior discovery of a regional terrorist network centred on peninsula
Malaysia and Singapore also challenged conventional wisdom that political
violence associated with radical Islamic groups was an internal domestic issue in
states with Muslim minorities. Traditionally such groups were viewed as
insurgents who advocated either autonomy or separatism. Now the picture was
more alarming: radical Islamic groups were seen as advocates of a pan-regional
movement to create an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia and beyond.
Some international terrorism experts have painted a more alarmist picture. They
argue that Muslims in Southeast Asia had been radicalized by the spread of
Wahhabi puritanical doctrine and Jihadi extremism. They view Southeast Asia as
the second front if not the global epicenter of international terrorism. Some
observers argue that Indonesia might go the way of Pakistan. Country and area
specialists take a more measured view, but they are in disagreement about
whether radical Islam in on the rise or decline in Indonesia and throughout
Southeast Asia.
This paper will present an assessment of the role of radical Islam and political
terrorism in contemporary Southeast Asia. The next sections discusses several
important semantic issues before proceeding to a discussion of radical Islam in
Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore, the Philippines, and southern Thailand. The
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well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation all have separate definitions. Some
countries have attempted to side step this semantic problem by drafting laws
defining terrorist acts. Other countries view these so-called ‘terrorist acts’ as
criminal offenses. The inability of the international community to define
terrorism has resulted in giving carte blanche to international terrorism experts to
pick and choose which groups to include.
One possible way out of this conundrum is to define a terrorist group as any
group proscribed by the United Nations. A caveat needs to be entered that the
UN lists only those groups associated with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.
The present UN lists three groups in Southeast Asia as terrorist organizations: al
Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah2 and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
There are equally vexing semantic difficulties in discussing politically active
Islamic groups. There is a tendency among security analysts to lump all Islamic
groups, associations and political parties together in a discussion of radical
Islamic groups. As yet there is no agreed definition of key terms. A quick survey
of the literature produces the following: Islamic fundamentalism, Islamisation,
Islamism, Islamist, political Islam, radical Islam, militant Islam and Islamic
extremism.
2Indonesia has not yet declared JI a terrorist organization. JI’s leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir wasfound guilty of involvement with JI. But the Indonesian court said it lacked the evidence todemonstrate that Ba’asyir was JI’s amir or spiritual leader.
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There is near unanimous agreement among the Muslim elite in Southeast Asia
that Islamic fundamentalism is a totally inappropriate and inaccurate term to use
in the context of political terrorism. Islamic fundamentalism is a conservative
belief that sharia law should be introduced to govern daily life.3
Islamisation is the process of religious self-awareness and spiritual renewal that
has been underway among Muslims in Southeast Asia for a decade or more. It
refers to the adoption of pious religious habits such as fasting during the holy
months, saying daily prayers, and adopting Muslim dress (tunics for men,
headscarves for women).
Islamism is ‘the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as
personal life’.4 Islamists are who want legislated recognition and a direct role for
Islam as the religion of the state.
Political Islam may be defined as ‘those individuals and organizations that gain
their legitimacy from Islam and that seek to gain power through electoral
processes and to participate in representational institutions such as parliament
3International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections . Asia Report no.71, Jakarta and Brussels, December 18, 2003, 13, note 40.
4Sheri Berman, ‘Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society’, Perspectives on Politics (AmericanPolitical Science Association), June 2003, 1(2), 257.
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and local assemblies’.5 Barton argues that it is necessary to distinguish between
two types of political Islamism (conservative and radical) and militant Islamism.6
The term radical Islam is often used by international terrorism experts as a short
hand equivalent for extremists and terrorists. Country specialists argue that
radical Islam is more a religious than a political movement and should not be
equated with terrorism. Indeed some radical Islamic groups oppose terrorism
and violence. Radical Islam contains both democratic and anti-democratic
elements and a diversity of beliefs including: radical, revolutionary, utopian and
extreme.
The sources of radical Islam in Indonesia are both internal and external. Most
contemporary radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia are composed of
modernist Muslims who were oppressed during the New Order.7 Modernist
Muslims argue that the true basis of Islam is the Koran and the example of the
Prophet Mohammed and they believe Islam should play a greater role in
government. The largest modernist organization in Indonesia is the
Muhammidiyah. In the years after independence the Masyumi party represented
5Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.,March 25, 2003, 2.
6Greg Barton, ‘Islam, Islamism and politics in post-Soeharto Indonesia’, unpublished manuscript,December 25, 2003, 6-8.
7Generally, orthodox Muslims in Indonesia can be divided into two very broad religious streams,the modernist and traditional. Traditionalists base their views on Islamic tradition handed downby history including even Javanese traditions. The leading traditionalist organization is NahdatulUlama (NU). Traditionalists accept the secular state.
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the views of modernist Islam. Masyumi was banned by President Sukarno for its
involvement in a revolt on Sumatra in the late 1950s. Members of Masyumi
continued to face repression under President Suharto. They abandoned political
affairs and shifted their energy to the Indonesian Islamic Faith-Strengthening
Board (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII). The internal sources of
radical Islam are based on perceptions of persecution through injustice, human
rights abuses and military brutality.
The external sources of radical Islam in Southeast Asia lie in the intrusion of
Western culture and globalisation, the impact of the Iranian Islamic revolution in
1979, the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism by Saudia Arabia, and the jihad
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As a counter-reaction to the Iranian
Revolution, Saudia Arabia promoted the spread of Wahhabism globally through
the construction of mosques, religious schools (madrasah), social welfare activities
and aggressive proselytizing. Wahhabism represents a narrow reformist teaching
of Islam that is variously described as austere, strict and/or puritanical. It
provides the ideological underpinning of the Saudi state. What was exported to
Southeast Asia and elsewhere is more properly termed neo-Wahhabism, a
religious ideology that far exceeds the conservatism of official Saudi Wahhabism.
Finally, Islam in Indonesia has been influenced by Salafism or the pure Islam of
the first century as practiced by the Prophet and his Companions. International
terrorism experts fail to take note, however, that many groups that adhere to the
Salafi tradition are not violent. The spread of radical Islamic beliefs and the
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development of a plethora of radical Islamic groups was encouraged by the
impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 which resulted in the collapse of
the New Order and the weakening of the Indonesian state.
Militant Islam has two meanings. Militant Islam may be defined as the support
of violence in the defence of Islam. At one level it may take the form of public
displays of strength (brandishing swords) designed to intimidate rivals. The
second meaning of militant Islam is the support of violence when Islam is
perceived to be under attack. In its most extreme form, militant Islam supports
preemptive jihad against its enemies.
Islamic extremism has been defined ‘as those groups which have a
fundamentalist disposition. They hold to a strict doctrinal or scripturalist view of
the faith and have a conviction that Islam must be implemented in its full and
literal form, free of compromise. They are trenchantly reactive, whether through
language, ideas, or physical violence, to what are seen as corrosively secular,
materialist or deviationist forces’.8 Islamic extremism often views radical Islam
as not going far enough. It is in this tiny fringe that modern day political
terrorism ( jihadi extremism) may be located.
Finally, arising from the discussion above, it should be noted that there is no
clear distinction between moderate and radical Islam. These groups do not
8Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H.Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.,March 25, 2003, 13.
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represent a dichotomy so much as a continuous spectrum. Nevertheless, the use
of the terms moderates and radicals is a useful shorthand way of drawing
attention to differences in political outlook. Secondly, any analysis that places
political Islam or Islamic politics in the context of terrorism risks distorting our
analysis. There is much more going on in the Islamic community than just
political terrorism and it is this activity that represents mainstream Islam in
Southeast Asia. Political terrorism represents an extremist fringe within larger
society.
Indonesia
Indonesian Islam has been heavily influenced by domestic folk religion and
Sufism.9 Political violence is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. Violent
extremist groups have existed since independence in 1949. They made their
appearance in three distinct historical periods: (1) late 1940s to early 1960s in
form of Darul Islam; (2) mid-1960s to late 1990s, a period of state repression of
political Islam; and (3) mid-1990s during which there was a revival of Islamic
radicalism initially instigated by the Suharto regime itself. One rallying call
among various Islamic groups, including radicals, is for the adoption of the
9Islamic mysticism shaped by Persian and Indian thought; see Greg Barton, ‘Making sense of Jemaah Islamiyah terrorism and radical Islamism in Indonesia’, unpublished paper, January 14,2004, 12.
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‘Jakarta Charter’ or the restoration of seven words deleted from the declaration
of independence that would have required Muslims to observe their religion.10
Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist, has popularized the terms abangan and santri
to describe Islam in Java. The former is a term used to describe nominal Muslims
whose belief systems are heavily infused with indigenous beliefs and folk
religion. Santri refers to observant or orthodox Muslims. The vast majority of
Indonesia’s santri are associated with either the Muhammadiyah (30 million
members) or Nahdlatul Ulama (35 million members). As noted above, the former
is a modernist Islamic association, and the latter in a traditionalist organisation.
These two great streams (aliran) in Indonesian politics were represented in the
country’s first free national elections held in 1995. Muhammadiyah supporters
were represented by their stalking horse, the Masyumi party. Table 1 displays
the results. Four parties garnered 78 percent of the total vote. The two major
Muslim parties received 39.3 percent of the total vote, while the two secular
parties, the nationalist and communist, received 38.7 percent.
Table 1. 1955 General Elections
Political Party Percent of Total Vote Description
PNI 22.3% secular nationalist
10These words were dropped from the first of the five sila (Pancasila), ‘with the obligation foradherents of Islam to carry our Islamic law’.
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Masyumi 20.9% modernist Muslim
NU 18.4% traditionalist Muslim
PKI 16.4 communist
Total 78.0%
After independence in 1949, Indonesia was wracked by the Darul Islam
insurgency in West Java, which attracted support in Aceh and South Sulawesi in
the 1950s. In 1958, Indonesia was also subject to rebellion in West Sumatra and
other outer islands supported by elements of the Masyumi party. President
Sukarno suppressed these revolts and militant Islamism was effectively
neutralized through violent state repression.
President Sukarno also repressed moderate Islamism. As noted, Masyumi was
banned. Its successor, Parmusi, was politically constrained.11 In 1960s and 1970s,
NU avoided confrontation with the state. NU developed a network of 8,000
pesantren in Java, South Sumatra, and in Kalimantan to propagate moderate
Islam. In 1973 Indonesia’s eleven legal political parties were grouped by fiat into
three oganisations. All the Muslim parties were grouped into the United
Development Party (PPP). Secular nationalists were grouped into the Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI), while supporters of the New Order formed GOLKAR as
11In 1967 Suharto engineered an internal coup in Parmusi to block former Masyumi leaders from
gaining office.
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their political organisation. In the 1970s the NU’s pesantren system was
modernized and this led to the birth of small group of Islamic liberals. In the
1980s a youth reform movement also emerged. NU reorientated itself to religious
and social welfare activities. NU declared its acceptance of Pancasila as sole
ideological basis of the Indonesian state (accepting belief in one God rather than
Islam) and withdrew from the PPP.
The New Order regime continued to view Islamism with suspicion. When the
threat of communism receded, the New Order identified the danger of militant
Islamism and extremist Islam as the major domestic threats to national security.
The message of Islamic moderates lost ground in this environment. Embittered
Islamists turned to politics to vent their grievances. They were assisted by
officially funded conservative foundations who were backed by overseas
Wahhabist institutions. Repression resulted in Islamism being driven
underground where it became a powerful social movement among the youth on
university campuses and within certain mosques and madrasah (religious day
school) communities.
With political space closed, the leaders of modernist Islam transferred their
energies to religion. In 1967, they founded the Indonesian Islamic Faith-
Strengthening Board (DDII) to advance conservative Islamic beliefs. DDI leaders
quickly became involved in verbally attacking their more liberal brethren who
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chose to work with the New Order regime. The DDII became increasingly
militant.
In 1987, two leading conservative DDII figures founded the Indonesian
Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (Komite Indonesia untuk
Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam or KISDI). KISDI operated under patronage of
Prabowo Subianto, a military leader. KISDI was sympathetic to the plight of
Palestinians and used this issue to recruit members. In 1990s KISDI launched
campaigns to support Muslims in Bosnia, Indian Kashmir, France and Algeria.
The above developments took place amidst an international resurgence of
interest in Islam. For more than a decade a revival of interest in Islam had been
underway in the Muslim world in general and Indonesia and Malaysia in
particular. By the 1990s it was increasingly commonplace to see businessmen,
bureaucrats, and public servants take time out from work to pray and to fast
during Ramadan. As noted, the fall of the Shah, Saudi funding for religious
proselytizing, and Muslim reaction to the perceived decadence of western
culture let to the revival of Islamism, particularly among disaffected youth. In
Indonesia, this process was described as the ‘santri-fication’ of society.
President Suharto and elements of the New Order regime, including members of
the political civilian and military elite, courted the support of Islam by providing
finance, protection and patronage during their final decade in power. Most
prominently, this took the form of the establishment of the Indonesian
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Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). In 1990s, ICMI restored a sense of
legitimacy to the Suharto regime.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 led to the collapse of the New Order and a
period of great domestic political instability including the resort to violence by
radical Islamic militants and extremists. After Suharto’s resignation, forty-two
Islamic parties were formed, a sure sign of weakness, lack of cohesion and
ideological fragmentation.
One major indication that radical and militant Muslims only represented a tiny
fraction of Indonesian society was the result of the 1999 national elections. These
were the first free and fair national democratic elections since 1955. Table 2 below
sets out these results. These results reflect a similar breakdown of communal
affiliations in 1955. The two secular nationalist parties, PDI-P and GOLKAR
received 56.3 percent of the total vote. The three mainstream Muslim parties
received 30.4 percent of the total vote, while the two avowedly radical Islamist
parties Crescent Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, BPP) and Justice
Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) received a miniscule 3.3 percent. Even if this total
were combined with the PPP’s tally, the total vote received by identifiable
Islamist parties was only 14 percent. The 1999 election results clearly indicate
that few Indonesian voters are attracted to any variety of political Islamism or
radical Islamism.
Table 2 National Elections of June 1999
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Political Party Percent ofTotal Vote
Description
Indonesian Democratic Party ofStruggle (PDI-P)
33.8% Megawati Sukarnoputri
secular nationalist
GOLKAR 22.5% New Order remnants,
secular nationalists
National Awakening Party (PKB) 12.6% Abdurrahman Wahid (NU)
United Development Party (PPP) 10.72% Islamist party
National Mandate Party (PAN) 7.1% Amien Rais
(Muhammadiyah)
Crescent and Star Party (PBB) 1.94% Radical Islamist agenda
Justice Party (PK) 1.36% Radical Islamist agenda
Sub-total all Islamist parties 14.02%
Total 90.02%
In the aftermath of the fall of the New Order, three prominent radical groups
emerged in Indonesia: Islamic Defenders Front, Laskar Jihad and Jemaah
Islamiyah.12 It is important to note that all three had their roots in militant
movements established well before al Qaeda established a presence in the region.
For all that has been written by international and regional terrorism experts, the
fact remains that al Qaeda has achieved only a superficial degree of coordination
with local Islamic radicals in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Both
Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front, for example, have distanced
12International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. Asia Report no.71, Jakarta and Brussels, December 18, 2003, 10.
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themselves from al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda established links
with only two major groups in Southeast Asia, JI and the ASG, and both have
been proscribed by the UN as terrorist organisations.
The Islamic Defenders Front13 (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) was founded on
August 17, 1998. It soon developed the largest paramilitary organization in
Indonesia. Total FPI membership has been placed at 40,000 of whom 5,000 were
residents of Jakarta. The FPI is not a product of al Qaeda machinations but rather
the product of patronage by factions within Indonesia’s deeply divided political
and military elite. As Robert Hefner remarked, the FPI is heir to Indonesia’s
tradition of elite-sponsored Islamist para-militarism dating back to the 1970s.14 In
the 1990s the FPI was used as the elite’s cats paw to mount violent attacks on
pro-democracy activists. The FPT is more properly viewed as a vigilante
movement because its main activity has been to harass and physically attack
nightclubs, gambling dens, red-light districts, and other sites of vice and iniquity.
Within days of the Bali bombings the Islamic Defenders Front suspended its
activities.
Laskar Jihad (Holy War Fighters) represents the second largest but best funded,
coordinated and armed Islamic paramilitary group to emerge after the fall of the
13Sometimes translated as the Defenders of Islam Front.
14Robert W. Hefner, ‘Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Assessing the Trends’, in Political Islam inSoutheast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School ofAdvanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.., March 25, 2003, 8.
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New Order. It was formed in early 2000. Laskar Jihad is the paramilitary wing of
the Communications Forum of the People of the Way of the Prophet and the
Muslim Community (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah,). Like the
FPI, it is not an al Qaeda franchise but the creation of high-level Indonesian
military and elite patronage.
Laskar Jihad, like the FPI, acted as a vigilante group in attacking bars, brothels
and discotheques. Although its total membership was quite small, Laskar Jihad
was responsible for inflicting horrendous physical violence on Christians and
their armed militias in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Laskar Jihad may be seen
as a radical Islamic militant group motivated to defend Muslim groups and
people that it perceived to be under attack or threat by Christian forces.
There can be no doubt that Laskar Jihad received high-level patronage from
opportunistic elements of the Indonesian elite including the military who were
motivated to destabilize the Wahid presidency and to maintain pressure on
Megawati.15 Laskar Jihad depended on elite patronage at every turn, such as
displaying swords in front of the Presidential Palace (April 2000) or receiving
military escorts as it traveled from West Java to Surabaya. Laskar Jihad was
publicly given arms in Ambon City by uniformed Indonesian soldiers. Laskar
Jihad’s violent activities, seemingly carried out with impunity, incurred the
15International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. Asia Report no.71, Jakarta and Brussels, December 18, 2003, 19.
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wrath of rival political factions. Laskar Jihad clashed repeatedly with the police
and military. Its leader, Jafar Umar Thalib, was arrested in May 2001.
Laskar Jihad was dissolved in October 2002 three days after Bali bombings.
Subsequently, however, Laskar Jihad veterans have been employed to oppose
regional separatists in Papua and Aceh. In other words, far from serving the ends
of ‘global Islamic extremism’ Laskar Jihad has served to support the unity of the
Indonesian secular state. According to Michael Davis, the emergence of Laskar
Jihad ‘reveals the low level of support for their brand of political Islam among
Indonesian Muslims’.16
Jemaah Islamiyah draws its inspiration from the Darul Islam rebellion led by
Kartosuwirjo in West Java in the 1950s. Kartosuwirjo was a principle organizer of
Hizbullah, a militia set up by Masjumi during the Japanese occupation in the
Second World War. In January 1948 Kartosuwirjo formed the Islamic Army of
Indonesia (Tentara Islam Indonesia, TII) in West Java and rebelled against the
Indonesian republican government due to its negotiations with the Dutch.
In mid-1949 Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the foundation of Islamic State of
Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), covering districts in West Java
controlled by his troops. Kartosuwirjo called this area Darul Islam (abode of
peace). DI strength may have reached 20,000 fighters. Rebellion spread to the
16Michael Davis, ‘Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, April 2002, 24(1), 28.
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provinces of Aceh, South Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Central Java in the early
1950s. In 1952, for example, a Hizbullah leader in South Sulawesi refused to
demobilize his forces. He made contact with Kartosuwirjo and in 1953 Sulawesi
declared itself a part of the rebel Islamic state of Indonesia. Kartosuwirjo’s forces
continued to clash with Indonesian republican forces even after independence
was declared in 1949. In 1962, Kartosuwirjo was arrested and three years later the
resistance leader in South Sulawesi was killed. The Darul Islam movement
collapsed at this time. An estimated 20,000 persons, both combatants and
civilians, lost their lives, another half a million persons were displaced from their
homes.
Little was heard about Darul Islam over the next decade. In mid-1977 Indonesia
arrested 198 persons who were reportedly members of Komando Jihad. All had
backgrounds in the Darul Islam movement. These events still remain murky. It is
unclear if the appearance of Komando Jihad marked a true resurgence of Islamic
radicalism. Some Indonesian specialists portray Komando Jihad as an elaborate
military intelligence ‘sting’ operation. According to this account, the chief of
military intelligence, Ali Moertopo, in an effort to flush out Islamic radicals,
urged former DI members to contact their colleagues and reactivate their
movement to counter communism. When they did so, they were rounded up and
arrested. Whatever the case, the Komando Jihad affair had the consequence,
intended or otherwise, of reforging bonds among Muslim radicals in South
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Sulawesi, Sumatra and Java, and reviving the idea of promoting an Islamic state.
The revival of DI set the scene for the emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah.
The rise of JI is closely associated with two figures, Abdullah Sungkar17 and Abu
Bakar Ba’asyir. Both Sungkar and Ba’asyir joined the Masyumi party and
participated in the activities of the Masyumi-affiliated Indonesian Muslim Youth
Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, GPII). Both became involved in
dakwah or missionary activity. In 1967, Sungkar and Ba’asyir set up Radio
Dakwah Islamiyah Surakata in Solo. They both founded the Pesantren al-Mu’min
(renamed Pondok Ngruki) in Ngruki in 1973.
In November 1978, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were both arrested during the round
up of DI members. They were put on trial in 1982 and sentenced to nine years
imprisonment. This sentence was overturned on appeal and the pair were
released. Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Pondok Ngruki and resumed
teaching. They soon built up a network of supporters. Sungkar urged graduates
to return to their home villages and form cells of around a dozen members and
live communally. Soon Islamist cells and discussion groups sprung up in Solo
and Yogyakarta.
The Tandjung Priok riots in September 1984 proved a catalytic event.
Government security forces shot dead dozens of Muslims. In February 1985 the
17Sungkar was born in Brebes, Central Java in the late 1930s of Yemeni descent. He was a former
officer in Kartosuwirjo’s TII.
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government prosecution lodged an appeal against the overturning of sentences
to Sungkar and Ba’asyir. In this climate, Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled to Malaysia
and their network of supporters went underground. Enroute to Malaysia
Sungkar stopped in Lampung, South Sumatra to establish a religious community
among the tens of thousands of migrants from Central and East Java who had
relocated there.
While in Malaysia, Ba’asyir and Sungkar resumed teaching and maintained their
links with associates in Jakarta, Central and West Java, North Sumatra and South
Sulawesi. Sungkar recruited volunteers for the mujahidin in Afghanistan. The first
small contingent of Indonesian recruits was sent to Pakistan in 1985. A larger
group followed a year later. These recruits were first sent to Peshawar where
they were processed at a paramilitary base commanded by Abdullah Azzam.
Later, recruits were sent to Camp Saddah run by the Afghan mujihadin
commander Sayyaf. In 1991 Camp Saddah began the first of several three-year
courses of paramilitary instruction. The Indonesians recruits were now joined by
volunteers from Malaysia and Singapore. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Imam
Samudra were among the prominent graduates of Camp Saddah. In 1992 Camp
Saddah was moved to Torkham, Afghanistan. This was at a time when a Taliban
coalition government was formed. Al-Ghozi played a leadership role at Torkham
where he forged ties with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
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In 1993 a split occurred in the ranks of DI activists that led directly to the
formation of JI under the leadership of Sungkar. In 1996 JI asked al-Ghozi to
establish a training facility within the MILF-run Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao.
Later in the year JI shifted to Mindanao where they set up their own training
facility, named Camp Hudaibiyah, within the Camp Abu Bakar complex. Camp
Hudaibiyah was sub-divided into Camp Solo, Camp Banten, and Camp
Sulawesi. An estimated several hundred Indonesians trained there before Camp
Abu Bakar was overrun by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 2000. JI then
set up a new training camp in Poso, Central Sulawesi and also continued to train
in Mindanao.
The importance of the Afghanistan experience cannot be underestimated. All
members of JI’s senior leadership and key operatives involved in terrorist
bombings trained and fought in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the period
1985-1995. This was a formative experience. JI activists who fought in Maluku
and Sulawesi and trained in Mindanao were similarly radicalized.
In 1990s Sungkar and Ba’asyir came into contact with radical elements who
broke away from the Egyptian Brotherhood and founded the al-Gama’at al-
Islamiyah. As a consequence, Sungkar and Ba’asyir shifted their goal from
establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia to a pan-Iislamic vision of
reestablishing an international Islamic caliphate. Sungkar and senior Afghan
alumni formalized the structure of JI which they set out in a manual entitled,
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‘General Guidelines for the Jemaah Islamiyah Struggle’ (Pedoman Ummum
Perjuangan al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah). Sungkar was appointed amir or
commander/leader.
After Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to
Indonesia. Sungkar died shortly thereafter. Ba’asyir reestablished himself in
Pondok Ngruki. Pondok Ngruki is one of five so-called ‘ivy league’ pesantren
identified as being closely linked to JI and teaching a jihadist interpretation of
Islam. A sixth pesantren, Lukmanul Hakiem, in Johore (Malaysia) was closed in
2001. Other jihadist pesantren are located in Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.
Graduates from these pesantren form JI’s foot soldiers. JI’s pesantren network is
but a very tiny portion of Indonesia’s 14,000 pesantren (religious boarding
schools).18 But these JI-run boarding schools nevertheless have had a major
impact on developments in Indonesia. For example, all known JI links to al
Qaeda were Ngruki graduates: Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, Hambali, Abu Jibril
and Agus Dwikarna.
The period after the fall of Suharto, as noted above, witnessed a sharp rise in the
number of radical Islamic groups. These groups were diverse in origins, beliefs
and the manner in which they operated. After his return to Indonesia, Ba’asyir
moved to unite all groups committed to implementation of shariah in Indonesia.
18Pesantren are known elsewhere as madrashas. In Indonesia the term madrashah denotes a dayschool with a largely secular curriculum.
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In August 2000, Ba’asyir took the initiative to organize a three-day congress in
Yogjakarta of delegates representing virtually every Islamist group from across
the archipelago. This congress formed the Indonesian Muslim Council (Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) dedicated to the establishment of a new international
caliphate. Ba’asyir was elected Amir ul-Mujahidin or commander of MMI’s
governing council. Many Ngruki alumni and ex-Afghan veterans took up key
leadership roles.
Ba’asyir’s assumption of the leadership of the JI and MMI provoked dissent by
more radical elements. A younger group of militants gathered around Hambali.
Hambali orchestrated the December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings during which
attacks were made on thirty-eight churches and priests in eleven cities resulting
in nineteen deaths and 120 wounded. Hambali also ordered planning for major
terrorist operations in Singapore. When security authorities rounded up the JI
network in Malaysia and Singapore in late 2001, Hambali ordered operations
against so-called soft targets. This led directly to the Bali bombings in October
2002. Additional terrorist outrages in Medan (Sumatra), Pekanbaru (Riau), and
Bandung, Sukabumi and Ciamis in West Java were conducted by other JI cells.
For example, Omar al-Faruq was active in Riau. JI cells were also reportedly
active in Lombok and Sumbawa. In December 2002, JI operatives assisted
Wahdah Islamiyah and Laskar Jundulla in South Sulawesi.
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International and regional terrorism experts have adopted an al Qaeda-centric
paradigm in their analysis of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia and elsewhere
in Southeast Asia. This paradigm depreciates the agency of local groups in
setting their own agendas. In the view of terrorism experts, JI is merely an
affiliate or franchise of al Qaeda. The above account demonstrates that JI has
deep roots in Indonesian society extending back to the Darul Islam movement of
the late 1940s. The terrorist core of JI consists of a loose network of radical
Islamists associated with the Pondok Ngruki pesantren in Solo, Central Java.
Many of the key leaders in JI have had military experience in Afghanistan. Some
are related by marriage. The core of this group is difficult to estimate, but it may
consist of a minimum of three to four hundred highly radicalized extremist
militants who form part of a regional and international network with ties to al
Qaeda.
In addition to the three main radical groups just discussed, there are numerous
other radical Islamic organizations such as Laskar Jundullah (Fighters of God),
and Laskar Mujahidin (Holy War Fighters). These organizations have created
armed groups who have battled Christian militia in the outer islands. These
groups are purely parochial. But not all of Indonesia’s radical Muslim groups are
violent. For example, Hizbut Tyahrir, which favours an Islamic caliphate and
comprehensive implementation of Islamic law, KISDI (Indonesian Committee for
World Islamic Solidarity), and Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian
Muslim Brotherhood) all advocate an uncompromising doctrinal position and
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stage protests and mass rallies. Yet these organizations have been careful to
avoid physical violence.
Malaysia and Singapore
Political Islam is a fact of life in Malaysia and reflects the communal nature of
Malay society. The federal government has always been in the hands of a
coalition representing Malays, Chinese and Indians. This tripartite coalition was
initially known as the Alliance. After 1971 the coalition expanded and became
known as the National Front. Throughout the 1980s, as in Indonesia, Malaysia
was swept by the forces of Islamization emanating from the Middle East.
The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) as been in opposition throughout most of
the post-independence period. PAS engages in what has been termed ‘ethnic
outbidding’, in effect challenging the Islamic credentials of the main Malaya
party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Political Islam has
therefore tended to deepen inter-communal tensions as well as tensions among
the Malay community. In recent years there has been a growing generational
dissonance among Malay youths.
The 1999 federal elections serve as a case in point. Due to the fall out from the
Anwar Ibrahim affair, the Malay elite was split. In the 1999 elections less than
half of Malay Muslims supported UMNO. Disaffected Malay Muslims supported
PAS. But a detailed examination of the motivations of these voters reveals that
they voted against UMNO and not in support of PAS’s brand of Islamism.
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During the 1999 elections both PAS and UMNO vied with each other in
promoting the Islamization of Malaysian society.
UMNO has sought to control both public Islamic discourse and the political
opposition, including PAS. In June 2001 acting under provisions of the Internal
Security Act authorities arrested over 70 individuals who were charged with
being members of a militant Islamic organization, KMM,19 and Jemaah
Islamiyah. In December 2001/January 2002 fifteen alleged JI members were
arrested in Singapore. A second wave of arrests followed in August.
Chart 1 JI's Organisational Structure
Mantiqi 1 and 2
1. Malaysia-Singapore
2. Western Indonesia
Mantiqi 3 and 4
3. Mindanao, Sabah, Sulawesi
4. Papua and Australia
Disciplinary Council Religious Council
Governing Council
Central Command
Amir
Police interrogations revealed a regional organizational structure that divided
Southeast Asia up into four regions or mantiqi (see Chart 1) with a special focus
on operations in Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. In other words, the
radical Islamic network had a regional and not a national focus. While a number
of PAS members were detained in Malaysia, the majority of detainees were
19Malaysia initially identified its alleged domestic terrorists as members of KumpulanMujihaddin Malaysia (KMM). Then, without explanation, redesignated the group as KumpulanMilitan Malaysia to conform to the government’s view that the detainees were domestic militantsand not international jihadis. There is disagreement by analysts over whether KMM actuallyexists or is a term invented by the government. KMM’s membership is miniscule.
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Indonesian veterans of the Afghan conflict or were Indonesians who sought
sanctuary in Malaysia and were recruited from religious discussion groups.
Nearly all detainees or suspects linked to the Bali bombings had permanent
resident status and had spent years in Malaysia.
Religious extremism is not a notable feature of Islam in post-independence
Malaysia. There have been three notable exceptions, but these incidents are the
exceptions that prove the rule: the attack on a police station in Johore (October
1980); conflict in Memali, Kedah (November 1985), and Al-Ma’unah’s seizure of
arms from military depots in Grik, Perak (July 2000). After the wave of arrests of
KMM/JI members, Malaysia stopped funding privately owned religious schools
claiming they were breeding grounds for religious extremists.
Historically, political Islam has not made any headway in Singapore where the
public space for politics is tightly circumscribed by the government. One
significant feature of the detainees arrested in the island state was that they were
relatively well off members of society in comparative terms.
Philippines
Muslims make up 17% of the population in the southern Philippines. But the
Philippine Muslim community is not a single ethnic group. Philippine Muslims
may be divided into three major and a number of minor ethnic groups. Each is
separated by significant linguistic differences as well as geographical location.
The vast majority of Philippine Muslims are traditionalists, not fundamentalists,
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whose religion has become intertwined with local animist beliefs. The southern
Philippines provides few historical examples of successful political parties based
on Islam. When Islamic parties have arisen they have championed regional
interests rather than Islamist causes.
The Moro separatist movement is quite distinct in that is has attracted significant
popular support based on local issues such as inequality in land ownership and
poverty. The Moro National Liberation Front has negotiated a peace agreement
with the Philippines government and is participating in regional autonomy
arrangements. A break away group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
should be viewed as a bona fide rebel force and not a terrorist organization. The
mainstream MILF forces usually focus their armed attacks on sabotaging
government infrastructure and conducting guerilla operations against the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The MILF has permitted Israeli irrigation
engineers to work unmolested on plantations in areas under their control. The
MILF is currently observing a ceasefire with the Manila government and
negotiating a possible political settlement. In 2003 the MILF condemned terrorist
bombings at Davao airport (later claimed by the Abu Sayyaf Group). The MILF
has offered to help apprehend international terrorists and has refrained from
criticizing U.S. military support to the AFP directed against the ASG. The
Philippines’ government has refrained from designating the MILF as a terrorist
organization. To many observers, the MILF is a rebel group representing
legitimate grievances of Muslims in the southern Philippines.
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Some elements of the MILF, however, have been implicated in international
terrorism. The MILF provided training facilities at Camp Abu Bakar to the JI
during 1996-2000. Recent reports indicate that JI members continue to train MILF
militants and that JI members are still undergoing paramilitary training on
Mindanao.20
The Abu Sayyaf Group represents an exception to this picture. It was formed in
1993 by Filipino veterans of the Afghan conflict. But the ASG has failed to grain
traction among the majority of the Muslim community in Sulu, Tawi Tawi and
Basilan. The ASG quickly degenerated into criminal behaviour to such an extent
that al Qaeda may have distanced itself and sought out ties with the MILF
instead. The ASG’s links with al Qaeda were tenuous at best and atrophied if not
were extinguished in 1995 with the death of its founder.
The ASG is an atypical Muslim separatist group in that includes new converts to
Islam and non-Muslims among its members. The ASG today may total around
200 fighters, divided between eighty percent common criminals and twenty
percent Islamic militants. Prior to 1995, the ASG was probably the only Islamic
group in the Philippines to have espoused global Islamic demands (eg. freeing
those convicted in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center). The ASG is the
20Oliver Teves, Associated Press, ‘Terror group members from Indonesia training rfecruits in
Philippines’, November 26, 2003; Kimina Lyall, ‘Manila admits JI training continues’, The Australian, December 12, 2003; Kimina Lyall, ‘JI grows terror in Philippines’, The Weekend Australian, December 13-14, 2003; and Karen L. Lema and Friena P. Guerrero, ‘Gov’t says no large JI presence in Mindanao’, Business World, December 17, 2003.
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only Islamic extremist group to employ kidnapping, murder and general terror
as its main tactics. The ASG claimed responsibility for the March 2003 Davao
airport bombing.
In summary, Muslim political activity in the southern Philippines, both peaceful
and violent, has been and remains overwhelmingly concerned with Muslim
ethnic nationalism rather than fundamentalist Islamic goals. The roots of Muslim
grievances extend back hundreds of years; the factors that led to the emergence
of the MNLF and MILF predate al Qaeda’s arrival in the region by several
decades.
Southern Thailand
Thailand has a Muslim minority representing about five percent of the total
population. One half of all Thai Muslims live in the south where they constitute
the majority in four provinces: Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun. Thai
Muslims form a heterogenous ethnic community. Southern Thailand has a long
history of violence, extremism and irredentism. Islamic separatism was
especially rife from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s. The Patani United
Liberation Organisation (PULO) and its armed wing, the Patani United
Liberation Army (PULA), were the most visible Muslim separatist organizations
with a peak strength of 20,000 fighters. As a result of a government amnesty in
1987 most gave up arms.
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In 1995 a dissident faction known as New PULO broke away from the main
body. In 1997, PULO and New PULO formed a tactical alliance and operated
under the name Bersatu (Solidarity). This alliance suffered a set back the
following year as a result of joint Thai-Malaysian police operations. An estimated
900 militants voluntarily joined a government rehabilitation programme. Over
the last decade, due to Thai government policy, the influence of separatist groups
and security problems in the south greatly declined. As a result of Thailand’s
transition to democracy Muslims were given greater political opportunities. For
example, southern Muslims currently hold eight seats in the Senate and the
present Interior Minister, Wan Muhamad Nor Matha, is a Muslim.
There are unconfirmed reports that KMM/JI remnants from Malaysia fled to
southern Thailand after the Malaysian government initiated a security
crackdown. However, no established connections linking southern Thai Muslim
separatists to al Qaeda have been discovered. At most, JI has used Thailand as a
meeting place. For example, there are unconfirmed reports that JI terrorists may
have planned the Bali bombings at a gathering held in Thailand. 21 The arrest of
Hambali, a leading JI figure, indicates that Thailand may also have served as a
temporary safe haven.
21These claims have been discredited by Indonesian police that targeting of Bali was decided inIndonesia around July-August 2002.
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There has been a marked upsurge in violence since late 2001. An estimated fifty-
six security personnel have been killed since then. In January 2004 there was
unexplained spate of violent attacks in southern Thailand. In the most serious
incident, a military camp was attacked and over one hundred assault rifles were
stolen from its armory; at the same time eighteen schools were set on fire. Thai
government authorities have been unable to identify the attackers. Speculation is
rife that this violence may be linked to criminal activity, police-military rivalry or
the revival of separatism. Police and security officials have identified Gerakan
Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) as the most likely perpetrator, but Barisan
Revolusi Nasional (BRN), PULO, and New PULO have been implicated as well.22
A key GMIP leader fought in Afghanistan and GMIP may have had links with
KMM in Malaysia.23 GMIP has been described by ‘observers’ as a ‘loose
gathering of gangs’ with ‘no real political ideology’ and should not be equated
with the BRN and PULO.24
22‘Barrack raided, 20 schools torched in South’, The Nation [Bangkok], January 5, 2004; ‘Wanted
rebel leader a key suspect’, The Straits Times Interactive, January 6, 2004; ‘Bt1m reward for topsuspect’, The Nation, January 7, 2004; ‘New command post to be set up Defence minister wantsfull-scale force’, The Bangkok Post, January 6, 2004. Rohan Gunaratna has also identified JemaahSalafiah as a Thai extremist group; see: Patrick Goodenough, ‘Thailand Gov’t Urged to GetSerious with Terrorists’, CNSNews.Com, January 9, 2004.
23Alisa Tang, Associated Press, ‘Terrorist group helping insurgents, Thailand says’, January 9,2004.
24‘Attackers had “outside help”’, The Nation, January 9, 2004.
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Cambodia and Myanmar
The exact size of the Muslim community in Cambodia, mainly ethnic Chams, is
unknown but may number several hundred thousand. There is little historical
evidence of Islamic militancy or extremism among this group. But in 2003, the
police made a number of arrests of both Cambodian citizens and foreigners on
charges of links to international terrorism and JI.25 At least twenty-eight foreign
teachers have been expelled. Three of those arrested were associated with the al-
Mukara school which taught Wahhabi religious beliefs and received funding
from Saudi Arabia. Another detainees was associated with an Islamic school
outside Phnom Penh funded by a Kuwaiti charity.
Myanmar is host to a Muslim minority totaling 3.8 percent of the population. The
Rohingyas are an Islamic minority group located in the western state of Arakan.
An estimated 200,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh as refugees/displaced
persons. Militant Rohingyas were reportedly present at a regional planning
meeting held under JI auspices. Extremist Rohingyas reportedly have also made
contact with terrorist groups based in Afghanistan (under Taliban rule),
Bangladesh and Kashmir.26
25Ker Munthit, Associated Press, ‘3 Muslim Foreigners Arrested in Cambodia’, The Guardian, May28, 2003; Michael Kitchen, Voice of America, ‘Cambodian Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah TerroristGroup’, June 12, 2003; Ek Madra, Reuters, ‘Cambodia, Thailand Take Aim at Militant Islam’, June12, 3003; ‘JI cell members may be set free in Cambodia’, Radio Australia, December 19, 2003; andEk Madra, Reuters, ‘Cambodia to Try Egyptian, Thai Militant Suspects’, January 5, 2004.
26Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror . Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003,173-175.
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Conclusion
This paper began by raising two main issues: (1) whether the conventional view
of Islam in Southeast Asia needed to be modified in light of the events of the Bali
bombings in October 2002 and (2) whether Southeast Asia has become the second
front or global epicenter of international terrorism. This paper argued that
radical Islam has deep historical roots in the region, especially in Indonesia. But
political Islam has not generally been politically influential. Radical Islamist
groups have had a significant impact on politics and security out of proportion to
their numbers largely through their use of violence and intimidation.
This paper also argued that developments in Middle East remain crucial to our
understanding what is occurring not only across the Muslim world but in
Southeast Asia as well. In this respect, political Islam in Southeast Asia has not
been as insulated from external influence as is commonly believed. Influences
from the Middle East when combined with the forces of globalization serve to
reinforce radical Islam because they undermine state sovereignty and encourage
the formation of overarching rather than national (or parochial) identities.
Al Qaeda training and funding have enabled radical Islamic organizations to
execute acts of violence and terrorism on a scale out of proportion to their
numbers in society. But al Qaeda’s assistance has not succeeded in convincing
any major radical Islamic group in Southeast Asia to hitch its domestic struggle
to al Qaeda’s internationalism. The appeal of al Qaeda has largely fallen on deaf
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ears. Al Qaeda has not succeeded in creating a seamless Islamist International,
nor has it establilshed a ‘network of networks’ under al Qaeda’s effective control.
Islamic extremism represents only a miniscule proportion of the entire Muslim
community and it lies on the fringes of radical Islam. The dominant influences on
radical Islam do not emanate from overseas or al Qaeda but from domestic and
regional influences such as diminished state capacity, ethno-religious tensions,
elite instigation of sectarian conflict, the role of paramilitary jihadis and economic
crisis. Theologically conservative Islam is here to stay but it will be one of many
competing strands in Southeast Asian society. With these modifications, the
conventional view that Islam in Southeast Asia is moderate, inward looking and
generally lacking in political influence still holds.
The theses that Southeast Asia is international terrorism’s second front or the
epicenter of global terrorism are untenable on empirical grounds. Southeast
Asia’s Muslim community is not homogenous, it is extremely diverse. Different
patterns are evident in each country. In Singapore, Islamic politics are confined
to the ruling party. In Malaysia some sections of Islam have developed a more
radicalized and conservative disposition than their Indonesian counterparts due
to their experiences under colonialism and rivalry with ethnic Chinese. More
recently there has been a closing of the democratic space in Malaysia and a shift
towards Islamic conservatism. But Islamic extremism and terrorism has failed to
gain traction. Thailand has followed a more inclusive path in its southern
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provinces, but the upsurge of violence recently casts a question mark over the
success of this process. Muslim extremists in Malaysia and Singapore are
motivated by regional and global rather than local factors. Throughout the
region, radical Islam still remains deeply divided.
What about the situation in Indonesia? First, this paper has noted that militant
Islam has been an attractive ideology to a small minority of Indonesian Muslims
for several centuries. Radical Islamic groups have used violence to further their
aims since the early years of independence. Over the past decade there has been
a change in the dynamics of Islamic radicalism towards a greater degree of
internationalization and a marked tendency by militant groups to employ
violence and physical destruction. This is partly the result of the Afghan
experience and regional networking. But domestic factors appear to weigh more
heavily. This paper has identified three key drivers of radical/militant Islam in
Indonesia: intra-elite conflict, military orchestration, and weakened state capacity
to control extremist groups. In sum, the most important influence on Islamic
violence in Indonesia has been the collapse of local governance, loss of elite
cohesion, and incitement to sectarian violence.
Is Islam a rising or declining force in Southeast Asia? Greg Barton argues that the
initial stages of regime change has allowed small groups of Muslim radicals to
influence Indonesian society and politics out of all proportion to their true size
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and that this process will continue.27 Barton notes that Indonesia’s lower classes
are becoming increasingly disenchanted with President Megawati’s brand of
secular-nationalism and could be receptive a program that fuses Islam and
economic populism (eg. morality, social justice and economic nationalism).
Barton also argues that there is a real possibility Islamist political parties will
enjoy considerable leverage after the 2004 elections when they can expect to
enjoy strong party-political and military connections and support. In these
circumstances, radical Islamists would have a catalytic effect on influencing
Muslim society especially if they employed violence.
The long term trends indicate that the secular political traditions dating back to
the colonial era in countries with Muslim populations are eroding. There is a
growing belief in the region that Islam should not be confined to the private
sphere. In sum, there is clear evidence that Islamisation has spread in Southeast
Asia. But this process has not resulted in the rise of political Islam as a major
force. The Indonesian case is instructive. In the post-Suharto era, the major
Islamic parties have been riven by factionalism and personality disputes. As
noted, there was a decline in electoral support for Islamist parties between 1955
and 1999. There is also evidence that public support for the constitutional
recognition of Islamic law has dropped markedly.
27Greg Barton,. ‘Indonesia at the Crossroads: Islam, Islamism and the Fraught Transition toDemocracy’, Paper presented to the Conference on Islam and the West: the Impact of September11’, organized by Monash University and The University of Western Australia, Melbourne,August 15-16, 2003, 27.
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In the future, the influence of radical Islam in Southeast Asia will have little to do
with al Qaeda and more to do with state-society relations, the development of a
civil society (non-violent political competition) and expansion of participation in
politics and economic life. Success on these fronts will undercut the appeal of
radical Islam and its links with political terrorism in Southeast Asia.
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Appendix A - Muslim Populations in Southeast Asia
Country Total Population Percent ofMuslims
MuslimPopulation
% of Total SoutheastAsia’s Muslim
Community
Indonesia 212,195,000 87.0 184,609,605 89.50
Malaysia 22,229,040 55.0 12,225,972 5.93
Philippines 82,841,518 4.6 4,142,076 2.00
Thailand 61,797,751 3.8 2,348,315 1.14
Myanmar 41,994,678 3.8 1,679,787 0.81
Singapore 4,300,419 14.0 602,059 0.29
Vietnam 79,939,014 0.7 531,000 0.25
Cambodia 12,491,501 2.4 299,796 0.14
Brunei 343,653 67.0 230,248 0.10
Laos 5,635,967 1.0 57,000 0.10
Southeast
Asia
468,011,411 206,725,858
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Source: Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Conference Report, Southeast Asia Studies Program, The
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University, Washington,D.C.., March 25, 2003, 3.
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